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CONTENTS

Chairman: Sir Leslie MUNRO (New Zealand).

AGENDA ITEMS 17 AND 66

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/2979, A/3047, A/C.1/L.149/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.150, A/C.1/L.152, A/C.1/L.153) (*continued*)

Measures for the further relaxation of international tension and development of international co-operation (A/2981 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.151) (*continued*)

1. Mr. NUTTING (United Kingdom) wished to reply to a point made by the representative of the Soviet Union in his speech at the 805th meeting. In his statement, the Soviet Union representative had referred to the significant contribution made by his country in bringing closer together the positions of the parties on disarmament, and had expressed the opinion that the Western Powers had failed to take appropriate steps in the same direction. Mr. Nutting wished to emphasize that, in the view of the United Kingdom, agreement on disarmament was not a matter of bargaining, but one of ensuring real, and not illusory, security and peace. It was true that at the 801st meeting he had stated, with reference to the Soviet proposals of 10 May 1955 (A/2979, annex I),[1] that they represented a significant advance, because they adopted many of the views and some of the proposals advocated by the Western Powers. However, he had also said that the Soviet proposals were inadequate in providing means of guaranteeing that disarmament was actually carried out. In that connexion, he had repeatedly appealed to the Soviet Union to agree to a disarmament control organ with adequate powers and functions to fulfil its task, but had met with no reply from the Soviet representative.

2. The USSR representative had, at different times, indicated that the idea of control posts on the ground, embodied in the proposals submitted by the Soviet Union on 10 May 1955 and by Mr. Bulganin, Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, at the Conference of the Heads of Government of the four great Powers, was adequate to detect concentration of troops and armaments designed for a surprise attack. Mr. Nutting could not agree. However, even if that were true, the fact was that the 10 May proposals did not contain a guarantee that disarmament was actually being carried out. It was impossible to guarantee that a nation was reducing its armed forces by having control inspectors at railway stations. Inspection of barracks, depots, and armaments factories was necessary. The Soviet proposals did not provide for such inspection. Did the Soviet Union now agree that the control organ should have access to arms factories and barracks to make sure that countries were carrying out the reduction of armed forces and armaments they had undertaken? When the Soviet Union replied to that question, progress towards agreement would be made. The charge that Western countries were holding up progress was not true.

3. Sir Percy SPENDER (Australia) observed that the problem of disarmament was being discussed when hope for a solution had fallen to a lower point than at any period during the previous two years. There had been reasons to believe that the great Powers were gradually reaching agreement. Recent events had demonstrated, however, that the question of disarmament, notably at the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers, seemed to have produced a stalemate. It had therefore been recommended that the problem once again be referred to the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission.

4. In view of the experience of the previous four months in connexion with the "Geneva spirit", it was perhaps not altogether surprising that a stalemate had been reached. The "Geneva spirit" meant scarcely more than fear of a hydrogen war; but its effects on Western policies and on those of the Soviet Union had been quite opposite. While the Western reaction to it was to expect a relaxation in the "cold war", the Soviet Union took it to mean that the objectives of the "cold war" could be pursued safely by more versatile methods. In that connexion, Sir Percy recalled the Soviet tests of nuclear weapons, including, presumably, a hydrogen bomb; the intensification of the arming of East Germany; the pressure on West Germany; the offers of arms to Middle Eastern nations; and the fomenting of bitterness and misunderstanding between Asia and the West by Soviet leaders.

5. With regard to the recent Conference of Foreign Ministers, Sir Percy maintained that the acceptance of the Soviet proposals would have entailed great risks for

[1] See also DC/71, annex 15.

Western freedom. For example, the Soviet Union proposal for the liquidation of foreign bases would destroy the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while Soviet strength, distributed widely over the satellite countries, would remain completely unimpaired. If the Western nations were to accept such a demand, they could be rightly accused of failing to understand their prime responsibilities of maintaining united strength. The inclusion of that proposal in the Soviet programme for disarmament made those measures unrealistic and destroyed any hope of their acceptance by the Western Powers.

6. Reviewing the disarmament discussions in the Sub-Committee and by the four great Powers in their Geneva meetings, Sir Percy observed that perhaps the most noteworthy feature of the activities of the Sub-Committee in 1954 had been the Soviet Union's refusal to consider the French-United Kingdom proposals of 11 June 1954[2] and its insistence on the one-third reduction of armed forces and the unconditional abandonment of nuclear weapons. That form of disarmament would have left the Soviet Union with a perpetual advantage over the armed forces of the West, while depriving the West of its main protection, nuclear weapons. Hopes were raised in September 1954 when the Soviet Union had accepted the French-United Kingdom proposals as a basis for discussion.

7. When the Sub-Committee had resumed its deliberations in February 1955, in pursuance of resolution 808 (IX), unanimously adopted by the General Assembly on 4 November 1954, the Soviet Union had adopted an inflexible attitude. But on 10 May 1955 without warning, the Soviet Union had introduced important new proposals, incorporating some which the Western Powers had already put forward. For example, the Soviet Union had accepted the Western proposals for the ceilings for armed forces and the timing of the prohibition of the manufacture and use of atomic weapons.

8. Turning to the unsatisfactory or obscure features of the Soviet Union proposals of 10 May 1955, Sir Percy observed that, in the first place, while a prior unconditional ban on the use of atomic weapons was no longer insisted on, nuclear weapons could be used even in self-defence only in pursuance of a Security Council decision. Secondly, the proposals were vague on the scope of the proposed control organ's functions and authority and the time for its establishment. Thirdly, the disarmament proposals were intertwined with political action to reduce tension which was beyond the Sub-Committee's competence. Since it might be still possible during the first stage for forces to be concentrated without the knowledge of the control organ, provision for verification during that stage would therefore be of the greatest importance. Furthermore, it was clear that during the first stage the right to use nuclear weapons for defence against aggression should be retained. It was also essential that a fully effective control organ should be in existence before the beginning of the second stage of disarmament. In that connexion, Sir Percy observed that, while any effective control organ must be able to maintain a rigorous accounting of stockpiles and production of fissile materials, there was no inspection method yet devised to discover the extent of past production of nuclear material.

9. Referring to general difficulties in propounding an effective plan for disarmament, Sir Percy noted that, with the development of nuclear power stations, industrial facilities would be created which could be used with little or no alteration to manufacture nuclear explosives for military purposes. It would therefore seem necessary, if any disarmament plan was to operate satisfactorily, that practically all atomic energy installations would have to be declared as potential military installations, even though they had not been built for that purpose. Furthermore, when production of atomic power became a major industry, inspection might present serious international difficulties as well as problems of internal administration.

10. With regard to the Conference of the Heads of Government of the four great Powers in July 1955, Sir Percy noted that the proposals advanced by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom reflected the feeling that attention should be concentrated in the first instance on the increasingly complex problem of inspection and control. Reviewing their proposals, as well as that of the Prime Minister of France, Sir Percy noted that all three had the same objective in view: immediate, though limited, practical steps towards disarmament. The Soviet reply was in the form of a draft four-Power declaration (A/2979, annex II)[3] embodying the disarmament proposals contained in the Soviet proposals of 10 May 1955. The more recent meetings of the Sub-Committee and the Conference of Foreign Ministers at Geneva had produced no narrowing of disagreements, but had indeed, ended in a stalemate.

11. Since it devolved upon all to make some constructive contribution, the Australian Government believed that the Western proposals comprised the gateway to concrete progress. At the very least, one must regard those proposals as desirable preliminary steps. In particular, Sir Percy believed that the United States plan for inspection would be required as a preliminary part of a larger disarmament agreement and could in itself, if adopted, improve prospects of further progress towards the goal.

12. With regard to Mr. Moch's analysis (804th meeting) of the three solutions remaining, Sir Percy suggested that there was no one who disagreed with Mr. Moch's rejection of the solution which maintained the *status quo* and entailed a continuation of the armaments race, aggravated by the increase in the number of atomic reactors in all countries and the risks resulting therefrom. With respect to the other two solutions—namely, persuading one side to agree to the proposals of the other, or the achievement of a synthesis through reciprocal concessions—Sir Percy's opinion was that any line must be pursued that offered some prospect of a solution.

13. Although the primary responsibility for producing a disarmament agreement rested with the great Powers, the consequences of failure affected all. But even an agreement among the four Powers, while reducing the dangers of world conflict to very minute proportions, would leave the small disputes of nations whose activities were not necessarily immediately affected by such an agreement.

14. Since Australia was situated in the South Pacific, its Government must satisfy itself that the approach to disarmament was not conceived in almost exclusively

[2] See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for April, May and June 1954,* document DC/53, annex 9.

[3] See also DC/71, annex 18.

European or even Atlantic terms. Nuclear weapons could be passed from one nation to another, as well as the means of their delivery. Risks of conventional warfare were probably greater outside the European complex. Therefore, every nation had a vital interest both in securing agreement among the great Powers and in advancing its views on disarmament in the light of its own circumstances.

15. In that connexion, Sir Percy turned to an aspect of the question which appeared more than ever important in the present circumstances. That aspect was the function of the Disarmament Commission. He noted that, over the previous two years, responsibility for finding agreement on disarmament measures had come to rest not only primarily, but virtually exclusively, with the Sub-Committee members. Noting that the Disarmament Commission also had a principal responsibility to discharge in those matters, Sir Percy declared that if the Sub-Committee failed to produce any progress after reasonable time, then reason demanded that the Disarmament Commission itself should take up the question actively.

16. Drawing an analogy between the Disarmament Commission and the Security Council, Sir Percy asked whether any one seriously suggested that the Council should appoint from its membership a sub-committee consisting of four or five great Powers and that the Council itself should meet once or twice a year to receive a report from that sub-committee. With regard to the argument that an atmosphere of secrecy was favourable to the progress of negotiations, Sir Percy replied that the Disarmament Commission was not in fact obliged to meet in public. It might also be argued that, on geographical grounds alone, the scope of membership of the Sub-Committee should be widened to take into account the views or proposals of nations other than those now concerned with the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Observing that Australia had recently been elected to the Security Council, and thus automatically to membership in the Disarmament Commission, Sir Percy declared that Australia's own interests in the preservation of peace actuated it in seeking to assist in the establishment of a workable system of disarmament. If that spirit could not be brought to bear in a revivified Disarmament Commission, the argument would be strong for the enlargement of the Sub-Committee to take into account other parts of the world than the European-Atlantic region. The new spirit and fresh approach which might thus result would build on the essential spade-work already accomplished by the Sub-Committee. For the present year, however, he preferred not to enlarge the membership of the Sub-Committee or of the Commission.

17. In conclusion, Sir Percy stated that the peoples of the world could derive scant satisfaction from the knowledge that all that prevented war for the time being was the very frightfulness of the weapons with which it might be fought. Men needed more; they needed to know that the weapons of war no longer existed. Although there was indeed comfort in the knowledge that the aim of disarmament compelled common approval, there remained the fear that the future could produce national leaders prepared to gamble the world's safety and future in one desperate throw for world domination and power.

18. Mr. SHALFAN (Saudi Arabia) said that, while small countries such as his own might not manufacture lethal weapons of mass destruction or could not be justly accused of producing a situation that might intensify the state of international tension, nonetheless, they would be the first to suffer from the continuation of the armaments race. Perhaps the most effective way to relax tension would be to bring about disarmament. In that connexion, he cited the parts dealing with disarmament of the final *communiqué* of the Asian-African Conference at Bandung. All the Asian-African countries considered disarmament an absolute necessity, since no peace could be maintained if the armaments race was to continue unchecked. The Saudi Arabian Government appealed to all the great Powers to take immediate steps towards the realization of effective international control which should aim at the regulation, limitation and control of armed forces and armaments.

19. Mr. Shalfan said that one should nonetheless distinguish between those destructive and deadly weapons produced for the purpose of aggression and those that a small country manufactured or purchased for its own national defence. The Bandung principles did not preclude the exercise of the inherent right of self-defence, which could take the form either of individual action or of collective measures taken in concert with other neighbouring States of the same region. It was in that spirit that the Arab States had established the Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation Treaty within the framework of the League of Arab States. Regional pacts, freely arrived at and reflecting the popular will, were in themselves a desirable objective. It was questionable whether the cause of peace had been enhanced by regional arrangements prompted by the selfish designs of a major power in areas external to its geographical boundaries, such as the British-sponsored Baghdad Pact.

20. Turning to recent transactions in the Middle East for the sale of arms, Mr. Shalfan sought to place the matter in its proper perspective. The Tripartite Declaration of 25 May 1950—which had been described as an impartial endeavour on the part of the big Western Powers to regulate and supervise a balanced amount of arms to the Arab countries on the one hand and to Israel on the other—meant that a small State with one and a half million immigrant inhabitants was to be treated on a basis of parity with forty million Arabs occupying strategic and geographical positions that required the utmost degree of vigilance and protection. In addition, Israel was permitted to purchase freely from the West, while the Arabs were systematically reduced in their means of self-defence. It was that imbalance in the defensive requirements of the Arab States and the relatively immense arms superiority of their antagonists that gave rise to the urgent need for the Soviet transaction. The question of the limitation and regulation of armaments might well apply to that country of the Middle East which was armed to the teeth and which utilized such weapons for its own expansionist designs.

21. With regard to relaxation of tension, he stated that the Palestine problem was, in the final analysis, the creation of the British. He drew the attention of the Committee to actions of the United Kingdom with respect to the area lying between the Kingdom of Yemen and the Crown Colony of Aden, as well as the grave and serious situation which had arisen as a result of the British armed aggression against Buraimi in the eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula.

22. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that the Buraimi question was not on the agenda, and requested the

representative of Saudi Arabia to exercise restraint about details of the matter.

23. Mr. SHALFAN (Saudi Arabia) gave a detailed account of the experience of his Government in attempting to settle peacefully the Buraimi dispute with the United Kingdom. A tribunal to arbitrate the dispute had been set up on 30 July 1954 and was composed of five members: three neutral and two appointed by the parties to the dispute. The international tribunal constituted under the agreement met in Geneva in September 1955. It had been about to give its verdict—which Saudi Arabia had every reason to believe would have been unfavourable to the United Kingdom—when its proceedings unexpectedly came to a halt as a result of the inspired resignation of the United Kingdom member. Subsequent to that event, the Government of the United Kingdom reaffirmed its intention to continue to arbitrate the dispute and so informed the Government of Saudi Arabia. The latter Government was indeed awaiting notification of the appointment of a new British member to the tribunal at the very time when the act of armed aggression on Buraimi by the British Authority took place on 26 October 1955.

24. Mr. Shalfan stated that it was quite apparent that his Government had had recourse to all the pacific methods at its disposal to resolve the dispute. It had invited the United Kingdom to suggest any method within the framework of internationally accepted arbitration procedure capable of effecting a peaceful settlement of that British-created problem in the Arabian Peninsula. He referred to the agreement of 30 July 1949. The Saudi Arabian Government had also proposed that the disputed area should be supervised by international investigation, and furthermore had advanced the concept of an internationally supervised plebiscite. It was quite clear, therefore, that his Government had sought the United Kingdom's agreement to all the principles and procedures set forth in Article 33, paragraph 1, of the Charter. In conclusion, he questioned the sincerity of the policies of the United Kingdom regarding measures for the relaxation of international tension. He hoped that those who preached peace would follow the example of Saudi Arabia in attempting to resolve disputes by peaceful means.

25. Mr. de FREITAS VALLE (Brazil) said that it had never been disputed that effective controls and an atmosphere of trust were essential for disarmament. At present the Soviet Union acknowledged that no effective system of control had been devised and that there was no atmosphere of international trust. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union wished to proceed with arrangements and plans for a disarmament treaty. On the other hand, the United States and the other Western Powers, before proceeding too far, would rather pause and seek to set up the climate of confidence which would lead to a total disarmament programme. The question was whether to begin a detailed study of an over-all programme setting the levels of armed forces, the various dates, the budgetary provisions etc., although aware that implementation was not possible without effective controls and an atmosphere of trust, neither of which existed. If that were the best course, the Soviet Union position might be justified. If it appeared more constructive to proceed slowly but surely, a more moderate procedure would be better. Once a climate of trust had been created and controls devised, detailed disarmament programmes could be prepared, and then the USSR proposals of 10 May 1955 would be invaluable.

26. That position regarding controls and confidence had often been defended by the Soviet Union. Mr. de Freitas Valle quoted from the USSR proposals of 10 May 1955 to show that the Soviet Union Government realized that the armaments race was the consequence of mistrust and not of aggressive design and to illustrate the Soviet Union's position that the lowering of international tension would create the requisite conditions for a broad disarmament programme. That statement implied that the conditions did not yet exist and had to be brought about if there was to be progress towards disarmament. He also quoted the passage of those proposals concerning the possibility that control might be evaded by an aggressor who might accumulate stocks of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a surprise attack. The Soviet Union conclusion was that, until there was an atmosphere of trust, an agreement on international control would create a false sense of security, while in reality the danger of a surprise atomic attack would continue.

27. Mr. de Freitas Valle commended the straightforward Soviet Union declaration that until an atmosphere of trust had been created the institution of international control would only lull the vigilance of the peoples. It was even more laudable that the Soviet Union had been endeavouring to create that condition of confidence. The decision to make possible the conclusion of the Austrian treaty had been learned with satisfaction. International tension would be greatly relaxed if the Soviet Union would accept the Western proposals for the unification of Germany on the basis of free democratic elections. It was doubtful whether an agreement involving problems of security could be reached in an atmosphere of mistrust between the parties. If East Germany and West Germany were to try to reach agreement on such delicate issues as questions of defence and security, the difficulties would probably be overwhelming. However, it might be presumed that East Germany, in dealing with the same matters with Poland, would find no great difficulty. In one case there was mistrust and in the other confidence. Because there was confidence, there were no garrisons along the borders of the neighbours of the United States. Because of mistrust, the NATO system faced another defensive organization. In fact, NATO, the South-East Asia Treaty Organization, the Baghdad Pact and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance all derived from the lack of confidence. The same was true of the foreign bases which the Soviet Union so disliked; and presumably it was also true of the huge military forces maintained by the Soviet Union.

28. No country would burden its people with military expenditures were it not for the prevailing mistrust. Six years earlier (330th meeting) Mr. de Freitas Valle had pointed out that Canada, which was certainly not preparing to attack any other country or expecting an attack from its neighbour, was spending seventeen times more for defence than it had before the war. The clear reason was a feeling of insecurity. The conclusion was that what was required was a plan which could be immediately implemented and lead to the lessening of international tension. The basis for such a plan was to be found in the plans by the President of the United States and by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom submitted at the Conference of the Heads of Government. Nothing could help more to establish the necessary confidence than the exchange of military information and the inspection of military installations.

29. It was gratifying to note that the constructive suggestions of the Soviet Union for ground inspection were included in President Eisenhower's plan. It was encouraging to hear from the Soviet Union representative that his Government would take a favourable attitude towards the Eisenhower proposals if certain conditions were met. Those conditions were of primary importance and touched the crux of the question, nevertheless the situation gave reason to be hopeful.

30. Much valuable progress on disarmament had been made during 1955. There was no reason to resume the "cold war" or to despair. The difficulties should not be overemphasized nor should useless accusations be made. In such matters as disarmament setbacks were almost inevitable.

31. Mr. ALI (Pakistan) recalled that he had pleaded earlier for the application of the "Geneva spirit" to all the discussions in the United Nations, and was happy to hear from the Soviet Union representative that that spirit was not dead and that the USSR was determined to reach agreement on all outstanding questions. However, the language that representative had used in denouncing the Baghdad Pact was hardly conciliatory. The defensive nature of that Pact and its conformity with Article 52 of the Charter had already been pointed out by the representatives of Iran (803rd meeting) and Turkey (804th meeting). Mr. Ali wished to add that Pakistan was pledged to the ten principles of international conduct in the declaration of the Bandung Conference. The Soviet Union representative had rightly evaluated those principles and other results of the Bandung Conference as having contributed to the relaxation of tension. It was inconsistent to condemn as a threat to peace the action of Asian nations which had found it necessary in accordance with the Bandung declaration to enter into regional defence arrangements. The Soviet Union representative had also attacked the Manila Treaty, but Mr. Ali had previously dealt with that matter (531st plenary meeting).

32. Although attention should be devoted to the various political questions which had already been discussed in connexion with the relaxation of tension, the United Nations should not be oblivious to other problems which were no less potentially dangerous. Attention should also be focused on that part of the world where Pakistan was situated.

33. While the primary responsibility for ending the armaments race necessarily rested with the great Powers, the smaller nations had an equal stake in disarmament. A global war would not recognize territorial boundaries, and the peoples of the under-developed areas were no less vitally concerned with disarmament than those of technically advanced nations. Accordingly, the twenty-nine nations at the Bandung Conference had proclaimed their support for disarmament and the outlawing of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. They had appealed to the nations principally concerned to bring about disarmament and save mankind from the danger of annihilation.

34. During the previous year, disagreement on certain measures of disarmament had been narrowed. There was agreement on ceilings for armed forces, on the implementation of the programme in progressive phases, on the timing of the prohibition of nuclear weapons and on the establishment of a single permanent control organ, Unresolved were the questions of the subjection to the Security Council veto of the use of nuclear weapons in defence against aggression, of the discontinuance of tests of nuclear weapons, of the liquidation of military bases, of the reporting of violations of the disarmament treaty, and in particular of the rights, powers and functions of the control organ. Since the Sub-Committee had recessed its London session, formidable technical difficulties had appeared. It had been agreed that there was no infallible device for detecting nuclear stockpiles. It had, therefore, been concluded that complete control over the elimination of nuclear weapons was impossible. Further, the failure of the Conference of Foreign Ministers to reach agreement on political questions had further undermined international confidence.

35. The present situation, according to the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Canada, was that, until science devised a means for finding hidden stockpiles, a plan of disarmament involving nuclear weapons had to be ruled out. On the other hand, the Soviet Union, while admitting the difficulties, maintained that the necessary elements for a disarmament agreement under effective safeguards still existed. The Pakistan view was that, if detection was not possible, the stage for prohibition of nuclear weapons had not been set. The dangers involved in the margin of error of detection were such as to make any responsible statesman hesitate to agree to a programme without watertight guarantees.

36. It had been emphasized that a disarmament agreement required unanimity, which did not exist; the impasse could only be resolved by science. Pakistan had wondered whether there had been sufficient reconciliation between the West and the Soviet Union to warrant the hope of an agreement on disarmament in the field of conventional weapons. There also was the question whether effective control was possible. It was reassuring to read a statement made by the representative of France at the 47th meeting of the Disarmament Commission in which he had asserted that the technical means to ensure complete control in the conventional field did exist. However, it was not clear whether the Soviet Union would agree to the control measures envisaged in the working paper submitted by France on 2 September 1955 (DC/71, annex 22) or the United Kingdom memorandum of 13 September 1955 (DC/71, annex 23). The Soviet Union emphasis in the past on sovereignty had discouraged the hope of a compromise. However, it should be possible to arrive at a synthesis, in which event it would be practicable to enforce any agreement on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. The statements of the representatives of Sweden (799th meeting) and of the States members of the Sub-Committee supported that view. Thus, while there was an impasse on nuclear armaments, a large measure of disarmament was still feasible which might transform the international situation. Such a partial solution would enhance the prospects of a solution in the nuclear field.

37. Any disarmament plan had to be drawn up so that each stage increased the security of all parties and not of only one. Secondly, it should avoid a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international security. In that connexion, the observations of the New Zealand representative (802nd meeting) to the effect that at a certain stage, when each side could obliterate the other, there was no longer a question of superiority in nuclear weapons, were relevant. The parties should reconcile themselves to negotiating as equals in the shadow of the balance of terror.

38. The four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.150) was consistent with the views of Pakistan, which would support it subject to one reservation. Although some provisions were vague, they had been sufficiently clarified

by the sponsors. Pakistan fully agreed with the provisions relating to President Eisenhower's plan, which provided the best preventive to a nuclear war. Pakistan also welcomed Prime Minister Bulganin's proposal for control posts. It was wise to include the proposals of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the plan of the Prime Minister of France for financial supervision. However, the four-Power draft excluded the complementary proposal made by the latter and by the French delegation in the Sub-Committee (DC/71, annex 16) for the allocation of funds resulting from disarmament for the improvement of under-developed areas. That exclusion was regretted. The reason could best be stated in the words of the Prime Minister of France, who had said that disarmament should be viewed in conjunction with the related problem of redistributing the resources which it would liberate and had pointed out the moral advantages of the system. The French memorandum, submitted on 21 July 1955 to the Conference of Heads of Government, had stated the belief that disarmament and assistance to under-developed territories should be carried out side by side. Those proposals had been further developed by the French delegation in the Sub-Committee on 29 August 1955. In the view of the Pakistan delegation there was justification for restoring the link between the French proposals on financial supervision of military expenditure and on the allocation of funds. Pakistan, therefore, reserved the right to move an amendment to that effect.

39. Mr. HANIFAH (Indonesia) said that peace in the atomic age was the desire of all peoples. Although Indonesia was not among the military Powers, it was equally committed to the quest for a disarmed world. Indonesia had no desire to apportion blame but rather wished to emphasize the promising trends and to encourage their development. Although the work of the Sub-Committee had not been as successful as might have been wished, the progress had not been altogether discouraging. Agreement or *rapprochement* on a number of important questions had been achieved and should be welcomed. Those advances gave reason to believe that compromise solutions were possible.

40. There remained questions on which the parties were still far apart, in particular that of control. However, the complexity and importance of control demanded renewed efforts and forbade an attitude of despair. Since the parties had defined the difficulties of control, they had taken the first step towards resolving them.

41. The zeal of the members of the Sub-Committee in approaching the problems of disarmament was attested by the bulk of its second report (DC/71). The very number of the proposals, memoranda and other documents which had been produced proved that the task was being approached energetically. Moreover, it was agreed that the work of the Sub-Committee should be resumed, and members of the Sub-Committee had expressed views to the effect that there was the prospect of a solution. Unfortunately, such views had not been repeated in the discussions of the First Committee. However, it was to be hoped that the spirit of optimism and determination would again be present when the Sub-Committee reconvened.

42. A second favourable trend was the universal recognition of the need for international confidence. Indonesia had always contended that such confidence was imperative for any disarmament programme, and indeed at the ninth session (696th meeting) Mr. Hanifah had expressed the view that disarmament could not even be discussed unless there was a minimum amount of confidence.

43. Moreover, there existed a new appreciation of the need for conciliation and compromise. That need had been well expressed by the representative of France at the 68th meeting of the Sub-Committee when he had said that no Government could reasonably expect to see its own concepts adopted to the exclusion of all others and that the great need was for synthesis and conciliation. At the same meeting the representative of Canada had expressed the view that the source of a plan or of any features of it was immaterial if there could be agreement.

44. All mankind was apprehensive about the slow progress on disarmament. The Indonesian delegation felt a responsibility to assure its people and the peoples of Asia in general that they would not again suffer the ravages of war or be the victims of atomic weapons. However, they realized that swift progress arrived at unilaterally was illusory. It was gratifying, therefore, that the members of the Sub-Committee had acknowledged the need for conciliation.

45. Conciliation involved the willingness of both sides to make compromises. Likewise, confidence had to be felt by all parties and could only be built up through mutually acceptable efforts. The Western Powers had put forward the Eisenhower and Eden plans for restoring international confidence. With regard to the Eisenhower plan, the Soviet Union had contended that its implementation before disarmament would actually increase distrust. Instead, the Soviet Union had proposed that States having atomic weapons should immediately agree not to be the first to use those weapons against any State. The Western Powers had rejected that proposal on the grounds that such a pledge without control would threaten their security. It was not important which side was right. The fact was that each side viewed the plan of the other with distrust. It was therefore clear that neither the Eisenhower plan nor the Soviet proposal could by itself at the present time increase international confidence.

46. That appraisal added weight to the French appeal for synthesis and conciliation. The Indonesian delegation found considerable merit in all the confidence-building measures proposed, as well as in the conclusion of an agreement not to use atomic weapons. In the proper circumstances, the Eisenhower plan could only help to promote the restoration of confidence. On the other hand, the Indonesian delegation had always held the position that for purely humanitarian reasons agreement should be reached not to use atomic weapons, for their use for any reason was inconceivable.

47. It had been suggested that States should assume a solemn obligation not to use nuclear weapons except in defence against aggression either with or without a decision to that effect by the Security Council. Such a conditional ban seemed to be fraught with dangers. Aside from the difficulty of defining aggression, it had to be expected that atomic weapons would be used in the heat of a nuclear war on an unlimited scale. Thus the fate of humanity would hang in the balance on a decision taken in the heat of war. Moreover, there was the possibility that the possession of nuclear weapons might in time be widespread. That possibility emphasized the dangers of a conditional ban.

48. The anxieties of the nations which did not possess nuclear weapons were just as real as those of the Powers which did. Indonesia, therefore, welcomed the Indian initiative in proposing (A/C.1/L.149/Rev.1) the suspension of experimental explosions and a possible armaments truce. A standstill in the armaments race would relieve apprehensions and should also make available additional resources for economic advancement. With

regard to halting experimental explosions, Indonesia had as early as the spring of 1954 joined with Burma, Ceylon, India and Pakistan in urging that there should be no further explosions.

49. On that problem also the representative of France had expressed himself at the 64th meeting of the Sub-Committee. He had pointed out that the prohibition of test explosions would preclude any improvement in existing weapons and prevent the manufacture of bombs by Powers which did not yet possess them. He had gone on to say that total prohibition would include nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, and had concluded that some formula should be found which would prohibit military tests but allow tests for peaceful purposes only, subject to international control and the consent of a committee of scientists capable of ensuring that the experiments would not cause widespread harm. The Indonesian delegation failed to see why the prohibition of military test explosions should await the finding of such a formula. Once test explosions had been brought to a halt, the formula could be worked out. Furthermore, both the quantity and quality of nuclear weapons already produced made any further test explosions unnecessary.

50. The United Nations had no alternative but to succeed in the task before it. The twenty-nine nations of Asia and Africa at the Bandung Conference had appealed to the Powers concerned to reach agreement to suspend experimental explosions and had declared that universal disarmament was an absolute necessity. They had further urged all States to co-operate in promoting peace and security so that nuclear energy might be used only for peaceful purposes. It was the hope of the Indonesian delegation that the spirit of conciliation would prevail in disarmament and bring success.

51. Mr. de KADT (Netherlands) said his Government had stressed during the ninth session (690th meeting) that the agreements and unanimity on disarmament did not go beyond a pledge to do the utmost to effect what was necessary. It had taken the view that the real work remained to be accomplished by the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. In the same spirit of realism it had held that a meeting of the leaders of the great Powers would only be a success if the Foreign Ministers could develop agreement on concrete proposals. In consequence it did not despair over the results of the Geneva Conference although too high expectations had been aroused.

52. The Netherlands Government also did not despair of the possibility of reaching agreement on all the great questions outstanding, but believed that a long process requiring great patience was involved. Nor did it fear that in the meanwhile there was a risk of a new world war, because it knew that the peoples of all nations detested war. That meant that elective Governments were pledged to avoid war and search for disarmament. Governments of another type would respect peace only when they knew for sure that aggression would end in their fall and destruction. Peace could only be achieved by maintaining that risk for the despotic Powers who would wage war. However, that unhappy situation would not last forever, for there was a constant growth towards the preponderance of law and justice. Because of that process, if peace could be maintained, the totalitarian systems would wither away. Even at present the Governments of those States had to make concessions to the growing forces of peace, although they tried to limit those concessions to mere words.

53. Controlled disarmament had become very difficult with the growth of the techniques of destruction, but it could be achieved to a very high degree if it were organized in detail. Only if there was a willingness to consent to all the measures guaranteeing disarmament and at the same time to organize for security against any sudden attack could there be peace.

54. Many speeches gave the impression that the situation had again arisen of a conflict between two parties, one of which would not give in because it feared loss of power, and the other could not give in because it feared loss of security. In fact, that situation had always existed, although the reality had been wrapped in illusions.

55. The Netherlands could see no practicable road to peace other than that indicated by the four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.150). If there really had been a change of heart and if the campaign against the West should come to an end and be replaced by a real will to agreement, it should be possible to realize disarmament quickly and completely. However, in the circumstances, all that could be done was to make war a near impossibility, increase security, and make a beginning with disarmament. As long as an overdue action, such as ending the occupation of Austria, was represented as a concession which should be matched, there was no real change. How could it be believed that the situation had improved when there was a possibility of a new Berlin blockade? What was required was a profound change such as a situation in which the peoples of Eastern Europe might be permitted to regain their liberty.

56. In the circumstances, it was to be hoped that continuing negotiations might result in agreement on the security and control needed to bring the first steps of disarmament. The implementation of the Eisenhower plan and the Bulganin plan would be a great achievement. If those negotiations were approached in a spirit of abstention from barren propaganda, the situation would become more hopeful for security, disarmament and peace.

57. Mr. QUIROGA GALDO (Bolivia) said that Bolivia considered that peace was indivisible and, therefore, that its preservation was the responsibility of the small nations as well as of the great Powers. Among the nations producing raw materials there no longer existed the classical concept that conflicts were good business assuring prosperity to those who were not direct participants. The Second World War had been very enlightening with regard to the raw material markets, and its aftermath even more so. After Bolivia's experience with the tin market it could not accept the possibility of a new war. Furthermore, a conflict between Powers having the hydrogen bomb would be a war of extinction. The representative of the United States had summed up the matter when he had said that the question of disarmament was a matter of life or death for humanity.

58. Some had said that it was not enough to prohibit atomic weapons and that it was necessary to outlaw war itself and renounce its use as a political instrument, because any war would end with atomic bombardment. The head of the Bolivian delegation had said in the general debate (523rd plenary meeting) that the use of the hydrogen bomb would mean collective suicide and that the dilemma to be solved was that human beings had either to understand one another or die. It was with that consciousness of the magnitude of the problem that disarmament and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction should be approached. There was no room for subtle dialectics. It was time to cease advocating the proposals of one side as being better than those of the other. As the representative of France had said (804th meeting), there was no human voice powerful enough

to force the adoption of either the Soviet Union or the United States proposals. Unanimity was the absolute condition for progress, and there could be no victor in the debate. However, the main prerequisite of unanimity was the relaxation of tension.

59. Nevertheless, there had recently been some encouraging events. In particular, there was the concrete proposal made by President Eisenhower for the exchange of military blueprints and mutual aerial reconnaissance. The explanation of that plan given by the United States representative at the 802nd meeting made its viability clear. It was the least theoretical and the most realistic of all plans so far presented with regard both to laying the groundwork for disarmament and to establishing international confidence.

60. If confidence was to be established, the local conflicts which constituted points of tension had to be solved equitably. The Bolivian delegation believed that a number of those conflicts had resulted from the continuation of the colonial system. At a time when the principle of self-determination enjoyed great prestige it was not conceivable that force should be used to help nations which wished to eliminate economic freedom and to keep others in a state of servitude. The new political map of Africa and Asia had been drawn not only by the sword but also by the progress of human thought. It was clear that if the principles of the Charter were not followed a number of dangerous conditions would be perpetuated. The colonial and under-developed countries made up the greatest portion of the earth, and their populations constituted a majority. To turn a deaf ear to their aspirations would be tantamount to delaying disarmament.

61. If it were true that peace was indivisible, all nations had to contribute to the achievement of peace. Many countries at present were unable to make that contribution, but there were other small nations which, though under-developed, could fulfil the most important obligation of reducing armed forces and armaments, which represented a burden on their people and delayed their economic development. On that question, the head of the Bolivian delegation in the general debate had pointed out that it would be unduly optimistic to suppose that understanding among the great Powers would solve all problems. He had pointed to the need not only for the great Powers but also for the small nations to reduce their armed forces. He had gone on to deplore the tendency of some small States to replace the instruments of work by the instruments of war. Bolivia had no intention of purchasing arms and instead sought machinery to increase its food production and to build roads. The people and Government of Bolivia knew from experience that wars led only to chaos and misery. In order to ensure peace, the under-developed countries had to make their contribution by reducing their war budgets and investing the savings to promote agriculture and industry. On the American continent the Organization of American States had evolved principles to regulate the peaceful coexistence of its members. Moreover, it was a body before which their disagreements could be ventilated. That organization together with the United Nations offered a double guarantee for the preservation of inter-American peace.

62. The Bolivian delegation appealed to world opinion and especially to opinion in the under-developed countries to contribute to a lessening of tensions by means of progressive reductions in military expenditures. It reserved the right to submit a draft resolution whose adoption might satisfy the general desires of the peoples exhausted by the useless and heavy burden of the arms race.

63. Mr. MACKENZIE (United Kingdom) said that, while it was not appropriate at present to reply to the Saudi Arabian representative's remarks on recent developments in the Middle East, it was essential to state for the record that there was no truth in that representative's references to armed aggression in the Buraimi area and that his analysis of recent events in that region could not be accepted.

64. Mr. SHALFAN (Saudi Arabia) said that the armed aggression had been announced by Prime Minister Eden in a statement in the House of Commons.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.

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