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Chairman: Sir Leslie MUNRO (New Zealand).

AGENDA ITEM 19

The Korean question (A/2641, A/2941 and Add.1, A/2947, A/C.1/769, A/C.1/771, A/C.1/L.145, A/C.1/L.146/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.147) (*continued*):

- (a) Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea;**
- (b) Reports of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea;**
- (c) Problem of ex-prisoners of the Korean war**

1. Mr. MENON (India) pointed out that one member of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) had declined to sign its report (A/2947), a fact which might deserve an explanation.

2. Referring to the basic objective of the Commission to bring about the unification and rehabilitation of Korea, he noted that, while one part of that objective referred to the whole of Korea, the other, rehabilitation, applied only to one part of the country. In that connexion, he suggested that the United Nations would have to address itself to the fact that casualties and devastation had been caused in both parts of Korea, and that the causes of hunger and famine that existed on one side were, from the humanitarian point of view, of equal importance with those on the other.

3. With regard to certain details of UNCURK's report, it appeared that the greater part of the information contained therein—whether concerning the armistice or the alleged violations of the armistice, or the conditions in Korea—had come from the authorities in the Republic of Korea or from the United Nations Command.

4. Mr. Menon recalled that the various resolutions adopted in the past on the question by the Security Council and later by the General Assembly had always indicated that it was necessary to bring the two parts of Korea together. In order to achieve that aim, the co-operation of the two sides was required. To insist that the only way to establish unity was through ac-

ceptance of an election supervised by the United Nations amounted to imposing a settlement by one side on the other. The United Nations, however, was not incapable of acting impartially. It was possible, as Sir Anthony Eden had suggested in Geneva, to find a body of Member nations which had not taken part in the war to conduct the elections or to take other steps towards unification in an impartial way. The United Nations had followed the road of negotiation for a long time. The political questions in regard to Korea were specifically mentioned in the Armistice Agreement¹ as being capable of political settlement. Paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement provided for a political conference. On 28 August 1953, when the political conference had been decided upon, the General Assembly, after a long debate, had decided (resolution 711 (VII)) that there should be a conference which was representative not only of the United Nations, but of the other side as well, and of those who were not on either side. It had thus been established that the political issues must be a matter for negotiation.

5. Mr. Menon reiterated the view of the Indian Government that the Korean Political Conference had not been terminated. That view was based on the fact that there had been no report to the General Assembly by the Geneva Conference in the sense of resolution 711 (VII). There had been no communication of the proceedings of the Conference, although there had been a report² on the Conference. In the absence of an official document from the Conference itself, it was thus possible to draw various inferences. Thus, it seemed to the Indian delegation that in Geneva it had been agreed that there must be impartially and internationally supervised elections. There had been no agreement that there must be United Nations supervision.

6. The First Committee was not a forum where the work of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission could be examined. According to paragraphs 24, 25 (g), 28, 29, and 41 of the Armistice Agreement, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was responsible only to the Military Armistice Commission. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission had submitted no report to the United Nations. Without an official report of that Commission, and in view of the fact that the Armistice Agreement provided for the settling through negotiations of any violations of that Agreement, the Indian delegation was not prepared to discuss any alleged violations. There might have been certain violations of the Armistice Agreement; but the Committee should not permit a great deal of passion to be introduced by the suggestion that there had been serious violations. Had there been serious violations, there

¹ Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1953, document S/3079.

² Official Records of the General Assembly, Ninth Session, Annexes, agenda item 17, document A/2786.

would have been war in Korea. In that connexion, it should be recalled that the President of the Republic of Korea, speaking at the first anniversary ceremonies of the Korean Army Training Command at Kwangju, had called for readiness to fight for unification soon. That attitude of the Republic of Korea was certainly not in conformity with the Armistice Agreement or with the laborious efforts which had been made by the United Nations from 1950 to 1952 to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea. The report of UNCURK contained the statement that, while the United Nations Command had faithfully observed the terms of the Armistice Agreement, the North had flagrantly violated them by a considerable military build-up, particularly by the illegal introduction of combat aircraft (A/2947, para. 12). That statement had not been supported by evidence from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Furthermore, such an indictment was not part of the function of UNCURK. Its task was the task of healing, not that of making an inquest or finding fault.

7. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was the keystone on which the arch of the Armistice Agreement rested at present; if it were pulled out, the whole edifice would fall down. But in November 1954 the Provost-Marshal General of the Republic of Korea had sent a letter to the Czechoslovak and Polish members of the Commission warning them to leave the country peacefully within a week of the receipt of his message (A/2947, para. 15). Those members were part of the Commission, bearing, irrespective of the opinions of the countries or the persons, the *imprimatur* of the United Nations. The members of the Commission shared a great deal of the sanctity of the United Nations, and that state must be maintained. That official act on the part of the Republic of Korea, which was followed by demonstrations against the Commission, was a unilateral violation of the Armistice Agreement.

8. The UNCURK report quite clearly brought out the fact that the Republic of Korea had taken an antagonistic attitude to the principle and machinery of the Armistice Agreement and that the purpose of so doing was to tear the Armistice Agreement to pieces. Thus, one party, which was part of the United Nations Command, continued to pursue the policy of breaking up the armistice.

9. The immediate objective of the United Nations when it went into Korea had been to repel aggression. Its main objective, however, was the establishment of peace in Korea. In the opinion of the Government of India, the United Nations should actively encourage contacts between the two parts of Korea. It should permit them, and if necessary, use what influence it had, to achieve unity from the top rather than the other way around. As a preliminary step, even before talking about elections, it should remove the idea that the unification of Korea could come by one side adopting the Constitution of the other, or by one side leading an army into the other side. There could not be a unification which was the absorption of one side by the other. That applied to the North as well as to the South.

10. The delegation of India deeply regretted the approach that was made from an attitude of non-reconciliation, an approach that was contrary to the efforts made by the General Assembly in 1952 and thereafter, an approach that did not coincide with paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement and did not tally with the fundamental objectives of the United Nations

in Korea. The United Nations, therefore, must not simply reiterate every year its resolutions. It was very important that the United Nations and the powerful countries which had a great influence on its policies did not convey to the peoples of Asia that perhaps it was a good thing to leave that running sore. It was important that the message of the United Nations should greet the vast multitudes of Asia, who had been recently awakened to nationalism, in the context of assisting them in their actions, in their unity and in their rehabilitation. By simply passing a resolution referring back to the past and saying it could do no more, the United Nations would admit its failure. That was the reason why the Indian delegation would not vote for the draft resolution submitted by the United States (A/C.1/L.145).

11. The Geneva Conference, in the opinion of the Indian delegation, had elicited a great many ideas and had shown that the similarities in the approach of the several sides were greater than the dissimilarities. It was common ground that if there must be unity in Korea, there must be elections on a proportional basis, and a proportional basis did not mean equal proportions. It was common ground that those elections must be free. The point of difference was with regard to ensuring that the elections would be properly carried out. It would not detract from the prestige of the United Nations if the supervision of those elections would not be formally the task of the United Nations. Many important problems had been settled outside the organizational framework of the United Nations, although not outside the purposes of the Charter. Similarly, whatever machinery was set up for the supervision of elections in Korea should be agreeable to the United Nations and in consonance with the Charter. But the unification of Korea could not be less important than what was alleged to be the prestige of the United Nations.

12. So far as the Indian delegation was concerned, it hoped that the Korean question would be considered for the last time at the present session. The time had come to take action between sessions of the General Assembly in order to heal that wound in Asia. The great leaders of the peoples, particularly the great leaders of the United Nations Command, must take the initiative so that all the forces and all the channels available were utilized for that purpose. Discussions and the use of diplomatic channels were the necessary ingredients in the matter.

13. Secondly, the United Nations must introduce greater flexibility into its attitude. It must get away from the language of the ultimatum and must adopt the language of reconciliation. Where there was conflict, it was only sharpened by threats, by ultimatums, and by adopting positions which would not help in solving the problem. The delegation of India, therefore, pleaded for reconciliation. It requested the delegation of the United States to try to see its way to deleting from its draft resolution the reference to resolution 811 (IX).

14. The delegation of India had no objection to the greater part of the United States draft resolution. However, the draft resolution, in recalling the resolution of the previous year, meant that United Nations supervision was a condition precedent to the unification of Korea. India would have no objection to United Nations supervision if it were possible to persuade both parties to accept it. Korea could not be unified without the consent of the North and the South. The two Govern-

ments of Korea should therefore be encouraged to come together on such problems as they might discuss without any political or constitutional commitments. In that way, contacts might develop. One must perhaps reconcile oneself to the view that elections were still far off, that unification could not be accomplished in one stage. But unification would never be accomplished if negotiations were not allowed to develop. Peace could not be brought about by pursuing counsels of conflict.

15. Turning to part (c) of the agenda item, relating to the problem of ex-prisoners of the Korean war, Mr. Menon stated that consultations had been taking place between the Government of Brazil and the Government of India with regard to the Brazilian offer to receive those ex-prisoners who opted to live in Brazil. He also noted the offer made by the Government of Argentina to receive some of those ex-prisoners and expressed the thankfulness of the Government of India to both Governments and to the Secretary-General for his efforts in the matter. In that connexion, Mr. Menon remarked that, although the Government of India did not anticipate any difficulty, the ex-prisoners remained in India until they were resettled. The problem must therefore be regarded as a standing problem.

16. Referring to a request by the Government of the Republic of Korea that three South Korean representatives be allowed to interview Korean ex-prisoners in India, and ascertain from them their wishes regarding repatriation, Mr. Menon stated that the Government of India was responsible only to the two Commands, and not to any particular Government, for the final disposition of the ex-prisoners. The Government of India, therefore, suggested that the South Korean Government should make its approach through the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Furthermore, under paragraph 11 of the annex to the Armistice Agreement, the ex-prisoners of the Korean war could either elect to go to a neutral country or ask to be repatriated to their fatherlands. The word "fatherland" in that paragraph meant either China or North or South Korea, according to the Command to which those ex-prisoners belonged at the time they were taken prisoner. The Government of India had thus turned down the request of a South Korean who wanted to be sent to North Korea, and that of a North Korean who wanted to be sent to South Korea.

17. According to the latest statement of options of 15 October 1955, there were only 2 South Koreans, 74 North Koreans, and 12 Chinese ex-prisoners in India. Of those, 4 North Koreans and 2 Chinese had been repatriated in 1955, according to their options and the terms of the Armistice Agreement. The ex-prisoners had expressed their gratitude to the Government of India for the affection, generosity and kindness which they had received in India.

18. Mr. Menon concluded by stating that, while India recognized neither South nor North Korea, it desired to live in peace with both the people of the North and the people of the South. It was its desire that, before too long, those people would belong to one unified, independent and prosperous country.

19. The CHAIRMAN invited the representative of the Republic of Korea, in the absence of objections, to make a further statement.

20. Mr. LIMB (Republic of Korea) said he had thought that it would have been enough to present the fundamental policy of his Government, as he had felt that most delegations were committed to the denuncia-

tion of aggression and the support of the United Nations policy of unification for Korea. The remarks of the representative of India, however, called for comment since they criticized the Government and people of the Republic of Korea for their patriotic sentiments and loyalty to the idea of national independence. The Republic of Korea was dissatisfied with the Armistice Agreement. The truce had been signed at Panmunjom over its protests. It had not signed the Agreement, which indeed had been drawn up by the other fifteen members on the United Nations side and shown to the representative of the Republic of Korea only an hour before its presentation to the other side. The Republic of Korea, however, had agreed not to obstruct the Agreement, in order to allow for the convening of the political conference which should have been called within six months. The representative of India could not show that the Republic of Korea had not kept that undertaking. The Agreement was twenty-eight months old, and the political conference had adjourned seventeen months before without results, but the Republic of Korea continued to abide by the Agreement.

21. None could assert that a sovereign nation had to agree to occupation by aggressive foreign forces. The Swedish representative, on 2 December 1954, had pointed out (738th meeting) that there could be no effective inspection by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) in North Korea. Those facts were known, but the Republic of Korea was criticized for objecting to intolerable conditions of division, occupation and exploitation. It was a novel thing to assert, as the Indian and Communist representatives had done, that the victims should be condemned for their protests against tyranny. In fact the Korean Government and people were conducting themselves with restraint, but had no intention of being supine.

22. An objective summary of the situation concerning the truce was as follows: first, the Republic of Korea, while not a signatory, was abiding by the Agreement because of its solidarity with the United Nations; secondly, the truce had been repeatedly violated by the Communist side; thirdly, the truce had been scrupulously observed by the forces of the Republic of Korea and of the United Nations; and fourthly, the Republic of Korea had maintained a consistent attitude of protest. Those facts entitled the Government of the Republic to the approval indicated in the reports of UNCURK with regard to its co-operative attitude.

23. With regard to the reference made to demonstrations against the behaviour of the Communist members of the NNSC, Mr. Limb drew attention to paragraphs 18 and 19 of the latest UNCURK report (A/2947), which set out the influence exercised by the President of the Republic to restrain the violence.

24. The references by the representative of India to undemocratic aspects of the Government were inappropriate, since an experimental period was needed in any new State. The UNCURK report had indicated the problems facing the Government and stated that events had been influenced by circumstances peculiar to the situation. Those who had no facilities for examining the facts were unwise to present *ex cathedra* judgement on political affairs in the Republic of Korea. It would be possible to review the various accomplishments and the progress made in the Republic and to recall that four million people had escaped to freedom from North Korea, but most members of the Committee understood those matters. In any event, it was not appropriate to

try to justify the breach of the armistice terms by the Communists, by alleging inadequacies on the part of his Government.

25. Mr. Limb requested that the General Assembly at its tenth session should declare that the truce had, in effect, been ended by the Communist violations. No truce could bind one side and not the other. The present truce did not bind the Communists, so it should not in law or in reason bind the Republic of Korea alone.

26. Mr. JARRING (Sweden) said that he had not intended to participate in the debate despite Sweden's special interest as a member of the NNSC. His delegation shared the opinion that it would not be useful to discuss the matter in detail, but some statements concerning the NNSC caused him to draw attention to the statement made by the representative of Sweden at the 738th meeting. He wished to repeat that the Swedish position concerning the NNSC remained as then stated.

27. Mr. BLAUSTEIN (United States of America) said that he was intervening again reluctantly, because of some of the remarks which had been made in the debate. The difficulties in the way of achieving the United Nations objectives in Korea were great enough without being increased by statements which contained errors of fact and groundless accusations. While it was not necessary to deal with every propaganda charge, the Polish statement (790th meeting) could not be ignored or left unchallenged.

28. One example would demonstrate how the Polish representative had tried to leave mistaken impressions. After trying to ridicule the use of helicopters for inspections by the NNSC, the Polish representative had said that three Polish members of the Commission had lost their lives on such an inspection flight. The facts were that the flight in question was not an inspection trip, but had been carried out in connexion with the normal rotation of personnel, and that it was made in a liaison plane, not in a helicopter, and that the American pilot had also lost his life. The Polish representative was merely trying to exploit the loss of four lives to substantiate a baseless charge.

29. The Polish representative had said that the charges of Communist violations of the Armistice Agreement made by the representatives of the United States and Australia were not detailed or substantiated, and that the only detailed charge was that North Korea had organized a force of about 400 to 500 jet aircraft. Mr. Blaustein said the charge was not that North Korea had had no air force, but that up to the time of the Armistice Agreement its air force had not been based in North Korea. The United Nations Command's *communiqués* had referred to action over North Korea, but they had also noted that the Communist planes fled back across the Yalu river. All North Korean airfields were inoperative when the Armistice Agreement was signed, as was shown by photographs taken on 27 July 1953. However, within a few months, United Nations radar detected continuously increasing jet aircraft activity from North Korean bases in violation of paragraph 13 (d) of the Armistice Agreement. That provision limited the introduction of *matériel* to replacement on a piece-for-piece basis.

30. The Polish representative had asserted that the charge of illegal introduction of aircraft into North Korea had not been taken into consideration by the NNSC. The facts were that on 21 February 1955 the senior member of the United Nations Command on the

Military Armistice Commission had made a request to the NNSC for the dispatch of three inspection teams to the airfields in six specific areas in North Korea. He had requested an investigation of the illegal introduction of combat aircraft and also of the failure of the Communist side to report such introduction. The Czechoslovak and Polish members had successfully stalled the inspection for a week, during which, as United Nations radar had established, the Communist side had been able to fly most of the MIGs out of those areas. The Swiss and Swedish members had found it impossible to reach a convincing judgement as to the justification of the charges. However, the Swiss and Swedish members of team No. 7 had reported that the team was not in a position to conduct an investigation in a sufficiently thorough manner to allow it to reach a convincing judgement. That was so because, as they reported, they were not permitted to approach MIG aircraft, except for three, closer than fifteen metres. Secondly, their request to be shown the records of the aircraft movements, which would have indicated when they were introduced into North Korea, had been refused. Thirdly, their requests to inspect even the nearest surroundings of the alleged boundaries of the airfields had been denied. The Swiss and Swedish members of the other two teams had reported similar difficulties. That was an indication of how the Communist side had failed to co-operate with the NNSC.

31. With regard to the co-operation of the two sides with the NNSC, the Swiss and Swedish members had reported to the Military Armistice Commission on 7 May 1954. They had stated that the United Nations Command side took a broad view of its obligations and threw itself open to full control by the inspection teams, which it furnished with all documents relating to incoming and outgoing *matériel*. On the other hand, they had reported that the Korean People's Army and Chinese People's Volunteers never submitted any documents other than prior notification reports. The inspection teams had been unable to check efficiently because of the stand taken by their Czechoslovak and Polish members, who had kept the controls to a bare minimum in the northern territory. The report continued that in the North the inspection teams had never gained the insight into movements of *matériel* which they had in the South.

32. On another occasion the Swiss and Swedish members had rejected in its entirety a report submitted by the Polish member of the NNSC charging the United Nations Command with violations of the provisions concerning reinforcements. In a memorandum of 4 May 1954, to the Military Armistice Commission, the Swiss and Swedish members had said that there was no evidence to show that the United Nations Command had increased its combat strength since the armistice. Indeed, they concluded that the United Nations Command had considerably reduced its over-all combat strength and described the charge as a product of the imagination of the Czechoslovak and Polish members. They said that the methods followed in framing the charges consisted largely in isolating facts and figures from their context and in making generalizations on the basis of distorted premises. They found that the United Nations Command had loyally abided by the letter and spirit of the Armistice Agreement.

33. In the Military Armistice Commission on 5 and 14 July 1955 the United Nations Command representative had summarized how the Communist side had violated the Armistice Agreement and had rendered all

investigations ineffective with the collusion of the Czechoslovak and Polish members of the NNSC. He pointed out, in part, that after the date of the signing of the Armistice Agreement, 27 July 1953, the Communist side had made no personnel reports until 12 September 1953, and no *matériel* reports until 6 October 1953. Not until 9 February 1954 had a *matériel* report been made on an incoming shipment, which then referred to one anti-aircraft gun. During the first year of the armistice, the United Nations Command had submitted 370 personnel reports; the Communist side, 42. The United Nations Command reports had covered some 287,000 arrivals and 362,000 departures. The Communist side had reported only the ridiculous figures of some 12,000 arrivals and 31,000 departures. During the same period, there had been similar disparity in reports on *matériel* and, indeed, the Communist side had not reported the movement of even one combat aircraft.

34. The Polish representative had referred to recent difficulties confronting the personnel of the NNSC in the Republic of Korea. In the circumstances, however, it was hardly surprising that the people of the Republic of Korea had reacted strongly against the presence of the Communist members of the Commission. The United Nations Command had observed its obligation to afford the necessary protection, and that was why special arrangements, such as the use of helicopters, had been provided. Despite those precautions, however, there had been no interference with the carrying out of the responsibilities of the inspection teams stationed in the three ports of entry in the Republic of Korea.

35. The Polish representative had further asserted that fifteen divisions and equipment for seventeen divisions had been withdrawn from Korea by the United Nations Command, and had wondered how it was possible to equip the Korean army from the remaining stocks. Mr. Blaustein recalled that the United States had had only eight divisions in Korea at the time of the armistice and had withdrawn six of them to the continental United States, as well as reducing other forces in adjacent areas. As to combat *matériel*, any such equipment withdrawn could be replaced under the armistice terms on a piece-for-piece basis.

36. The Polish representative had also referred to the development of ten reserve divisions. Mr. Blaustein said that he had previously referred only to active forces on both sides. It was correct that those divisions were in process of organization and that that was fully consistent with the Armistice Agreement.

37. In his remarks concerning free elections, the Polish representative had included a sentence which could be fully accepted, even though the United States attached a different meaning to it. That was the passage about rejecting a mockery of free elections in which favourable results for one side would be assured in advance. If the Communist side was in fact willing to subscribe to such language, a Korean settlement could quickly be achieved. But it was because of the Communist interpretation of the words "free elections" that a form of supervision was necessary which would assure honesty. That was why it was necessary to reject the proposal for supervision by a body in which there would be an equal number of Communist and non-Communist members, for that was the composition of the NNSC, with its built-in veto.

38. In summary, the record showed that the United Nations Command had observed the Armistice Agree-

ment and that the Communist side had not. The United Nations Command had co-operated with the NNSC, and the Communist side had frustrated and obstructed its work and caused it to fail in North Korea. The nations of the United Nations Command had proposed at Geneva a programme which would ensure free elections, while the Communist side had proposed a plan which would give the North Korean régime a veto over the more than three-quarters of the Korean people who lived in the South. The United Nations had long sought a solution for the Korean problem consonant with its objectives, but the Communist side had refused to recognize the legitimate interest of the United Nations on the grounds that it was a belligerent.

39. Mr. Blaustein, in conclusion, expressed the hope that the Communist side before long would agree to arrangements which would allow for genuinely free elections and so make possible the unification of Korea under a free and independent Government.

40. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said that the United States representative had tried to impress the Committee by quotations out of context from reports of the NNSC and from the previous Polish statement. With reference to the death of the Polish members of the inspection teams, he had not stated that the accident had taken place on an inspection flight, but in the course of their inspection duties. He still believed that the aircraft was a helicopter and it had so been reported fully in the Polish Press; moreover, due credit and sympathy had been extended to the American pilot. However, it was beneath the dignity of the Committee to use such an accident for cheap propaganda purposes.

41. Mr. Katz-Suchy said that he had ridiculed the use of blacked-out helicopters for inspection flights over South Korean airfields. That was the only method of inspection allowed, and to peer out of a door from the height of several hundred feet was much worse than being kept fifteen metres away from planes on the ground. No proper inspection could be conducted in that way.

42. The United States representative had again made his charge about jet aircraft being brought into North Korea after the armistice. He had gone further than the United Nations Command representative, who had only charged that the number of jet aircraft in the North Korean airports had been increased. The United States representative had also asserted that there had been no inspection made. But inspection team No. 4 had checked the airfield concerned and had found that the charge was not confirmed by the facts. In February, teams Nos. 6, 7 and 8 had again checked the North Korean airports and had concluded that the ten aircraft on the airfield in question had not been brought in since the armistice. The inspection teams and the military representative of the Democratic People's Republic had had to reject the United States requests for inspection of further airports or of details which did not come within the terms of the Armistice Agreement. The United States had tried to include in the Armistice Agreement the duty to give all details as to military equipment, but that had been rejected, and no such reports were made by either side.

43. The United States representative had tried to deal with questions on which the Swiss and Swedish members of the NNSC had been in disagreement with the Polish and Czechoslovak members, but he had quoted them out of the context of the meetings in which the statements had been made. The work of the Com-

mission had admittedly met with certain difficulties, especially in the initial organizing period when forms of inspection had been discussed. However, in the last year, the harmony of the NNSC had been increasingly greater, and its reports and conclusions had been unanimous. No confirmation of any of the charges submitted by the representative of the United States had been found. At the previous session (741st meeting), the Polish delegation had dealt with violations of the truce by United Nations forces, which had been accepted by the NNSC, in particular the famous incident of the cases of spare parts.

44. The United States representative had produced no new material and had failed to prove his case or to reply to specific charges. As an example, there was the charge concerning the introduction of war materials through the port of Chinhae. The only reply from the United States was that the charge was propaganda. It was regrettable that debate of that kind was necessary, but the United States representative was apologizing for those who had not only made inspection difficult, but had also threatened to break up the Armistice Agreement. It was true that the United States forces had protected the inspection teams, but that had not made their lives easier or the work of inspection possible. It was quite wrong for the representative of the United States to try to justify actions directed against the NNSC and even against the wording of his own draft resolution.

45. After three statements from the United States representative, one might have expected that he would defend the Armistice Agreement, to which the United States was a party, and confirm that the United States would not permit further violations. However, he had tried to justify the "strong reactions" of the demonstrators organized by the South Korean police against the NNSC.

46. The United States representative had suggested that there was an agreed point in connexion with free elections. Mr. Katz-Suchy doubted that there was such

agreement, for the United States representative wanted the elections to be organized by a Korean commission on which the South would appoint a majority and so be able to pattern the elections on those which had already been conducted in the South. He even wanted to have the "neutral" group supervising the elections to be composed of countries which had fought in Korea and had a direct interest against one side. The fact that the problem was being discussed without the participation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea removed any doubt as to the sort of commission the United States would like to consider as "neutral".

47. The Polish view was that, in a war-torn and divided country, only the equal treatment of both sides could guarantee objectivity. When there was a spirit of understanding, the need for unanimity had never prevented action, as was shown not only in the United Nations itself, but also in the NNSC. However, decisions reached by mutual understanding were not the aim of the United States, which was interested in keeping Korea divided unless it could be united on United States terms. It was time to abandon that attitude and to seek to unite Korea on the basis of an understanding reached by free discussion between the two sides.

48. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) wished to draw the attention of the Committee to the fact that the charges made by the representative of the United States and of South Korea against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China had been made in the absence of representatives of the latter Governments. The fact that the United States had preferred to arrange that the charges would be made in the absence of the accused made those slanders neither more convincing nor more just. As long as the United States and South Korea repeated their charges in that manner, no good results would come from the discussion of the Korean question in the United Nations.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.