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Chairman: Mr. Radha Krishna RAMPHUL  
(Mauritius).

AGENDA ITEMS 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33 AND 34

World Disarmament Conference: report of the Secretary-General (A/8654, A/8668, A/8681, A/8693, A/8757, A/8817)

Implementation of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States: report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (A/8774)

General and complete disarmament:

- (a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/8818);
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- (c) Report of the Secretary-General under General Assembly resolution 2852 (XXVI), paragraph 5 (A/8803 and Corr.1)

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- (a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/8818);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/8807)

Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2830 (XXVI) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General (A/8653, A/8808)

Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace:  
report of the Secretary-General (A/8809)

1. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now begin its consideration of the agenda items relating to disarmament questions in accordance with the statement I made at the 1860th meeting of the Committee.

2. As members of the Committee will recall the time-table under which the Committee operates, which is contained in document A/C.1/1023, provides for 20 days to be devoted to those items, that is, from Monday, 23 October to Friday, 17 November.

3. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Mr. Chairman, although a member of my delegation has already done so, I trust that you will not rule me out of order if I begin by expressing to you, Sir, and the other officers of the Committee our sincere congratulations on your well-earned unanimous election.

4. Today we begin consideration of an item that I should not hesitate to call the most outstanding of all those dealing with disarmament and assigned to the First Committee, namely, the calling of a world disarmament conference open to all States.

5. If, as the General Assembly declared in 1959 [*resolution 1378 (XIV)*] and emphatically reaffirmed 10 years later [*resolution 2602 E (XXIV)*], the question of disarmament is the most important matter confronting the world today and if, as the Assembly stated last year [*resolution 2833 (XXVI)*], all peoples have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations and it is therefore imperative that all States redouble their efforts to adopt effective disarmament measures, relating particularly to nuclear disarmament, it becomes axiomatic that the system which for 10 years has been available to the United Nations to deal with disarmament has proved itself obviously inadequate. This applies primarily to the question of allowing all peoples of the world to make a positive contribution to this matter which is of such interest to

them, since, when all is said and done, it is the very survival of man that may well be at stake.

6. It is a fact that the General Assembly meets every year, but it is also known that its agenda is always laden with the most diverse subjects. Submerged among more than 100 items, the outstanding nature of the items on disarmament cannot be correctly assessed. Even in the First Committee itself where these items are usually discussed, it is almost impossible for them to get the attention they deserve since they have to compete with many others, among which some possess an importance that cannot be underestimated, such as those dealing with the law of the sea and the peaceful uses of outer space.

7. Therefore, after three or four weeks of a somewhat hasty debate—and if one of us might tend to forget what you have just told us, Mr. Chairman, when you mentioned it, the programme of work of the First Committee would immediately bring it back to mind—in order to gain time we generally examine these items jointly and not separately and the General Assembly is reduced every year to adopting a series of somewhat routine resolutions. Those texts are very similar to the ones that were adopted at previous sessions and, regardless of their tone of profound concern, of justified alarm or of imperative urgency, practically all of these resolutions, for reasons which we doubtless all deplore but have thus far been unable to modify, find their burial in inertia or covered by resignation or swept away with the dust of forgetfulness in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

8. With regard to the Committee on Disarmament, I do not think any words are necessary. In 1959 it was composed for the first time of the same number of members as the General Assembly and began its work in an atmosphere laden with hope, but the absolute paralysis that set in afterwards lead us very seriously to consider the desirability of putting an end to an existence that during the last decade has appeared only on paper.

9. If there were any doubts regarding what I have just said, to dissipate them it is only necessary to cast a glance both on the voluminous report submitted to us by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/8818] and also at the agenda of the First Committee. An examination of the first of these documents, the report of the Committee on Disarmament, will prove to us that there was a complete standstill in the work in Geneva on the only two questions with which the Committee dealt in 1972: namely, the elimination of chemical weapons and the prohibition of all nuclear weapons tests. A reading of the second of these documents, namely, the agenda of the First Committee, when dealing with disarmament matters, leads us to the conclusion that once again there appear on that agenda items of disarmament which, like the second I have just mentioned, can compete with the policy of *apartheid* as far as antiquity in the debates of the General Assembly are concerned.

10. It was for these reasons that my delegation took a very active part in the informal conversations that were held during the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly which led to the adoption by acclamation of resolution 2833 (XXVI). In accordance with that resolution there was included in the agenda of the present session of the General

Assembly an item which we shall be considering as from today. It was also for this reason that Mexico was the first to reply to the invitation contained in that resolution, by sending to the Secretary-General, on 12 June of the present year, a memorandum containing the opinions and suggestions which that resolution called for. That reply was circulated on 14 June of this year as document A/8693 and it appears in the compilation annexed to the report of the Secretary-General [A/8817] dated 25 September of this year, and we trust that that document has been duly studied by all delegations.

11. The primary aim of the world disarmament conference, we believe, would be to develop the possibilities of effective action by the United Nations in that highly important matter, completing existing international machinery through the addition of an organ of universal membership which should meet every three or four years and which—without in any way infringing on the supremacy of the General Assembly on which it would be dependent—would in matters of disarmament play a similar role to that of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in its own field, that is, in economic and social questions.

12. We are firmly convinced that with the institutionalization of a world disarmament conference, open to all States and meeting with the regularity that I have just mentioned, lasting for two or three months, we would be filling an obvious gap and making an invaluable contribution to the fulfilling of its own responsibilities by the General Assembly. Among other tasks, the Conference would be entrusted with a careful study of the practical implementation of General Assembly resolutions, with an objective assessment of the progress achieved in the field of disarmament, comparing the respective development of armaments and disarmament, and adopting resolutions which it deemed appropriate as a result of its work.

13. Thus the Conference would considerably strengthen what we might term the “deliberating machinery” which has been available thus far to the United Nations and which, as I said earlier, has in the last decade proved to be entirely inadequate. If we want the new decade that started in 1970 and which was proclaimed to be the Disarmament Decade to give all States a chance to contribute to the overwhelming task of disarmament, then it is imperative that a new organ be created. A matter of this importance can then be considered in that new organ with the thoroughness and care it deserves and that organ will at the same time offer an adequate forum to all peoples so that the voice of the human conscience can be heard.

14. Furthermore, the Conference could serve as an instrument to ensure the reorganization of the Committee on Disarmament, making whatever structural or procedural changes that are necessary so that it can become an effective body. These are matters on which my delegation has insisted both here and in Geneva since 1969. May I recall a statement we made on 17 November of that year, at the 1691st meeting of the First Committee. May I also recall the working paper we submitted to the Committee at Geneva on 5 March 1970;<sup>1</sup> our statement at the 1992nd

<sup>1</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1970, document DC/233, annex C, sect. 6.

plenary meeting of the General Assembly, on 22 November 1971, and also the statements we made in the course of the present year at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, of which specific reference will be found in paragraphs 170 and 171 of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Finally, I also recall working papers CCD/385 and CCD/390 that the Mexican delegation submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [*A/8818, annex B, sect. 28 and 33*].

15. Since those documents are easy to refer to, I shall limit myself to recalling that our suggestions and proposals, basically, are intended to ensure participation of the People's Republic of China and of France in the work of the Committee, to replace the unheard of institution of co-Chairmen on the part of the two nuclear super-Powers by a procedure more in keeping with the principle of the sovereign equality of States, such as the annual election of a chairman or rotation of the chairmanship among all the members of the Committee in turn, and to obtain the participation of international civil servants composing the secretariat of the Committee in the preparation of the report to be submitted yearly to the General Assembly.

16. The results of the informal meetings mentioned in paragraph 173 of the report of the Committee, and which were held on 16 and 17 August 1972 at the request of the representative of Mexico, have confirmed our feeling that the world disarmament conference, even the preparatory work for it, would be most useful in achieving those ends which, we believe, have the overwhelming support of all the States.

17. In the light of what I have been saying, it will be easy to understand why our conviction of the need and the appropriateness of calling a world disarmament conference is today more deeply rooted than ever, since we are convinced that its advantages would be numerous and obvious and that, if we act objectively, no disadvantages could possibly be attributed to it.

18. Obviously, our judgement, as we stated in a plenary meeting last year and as the Government of Mexico made obvious in paragraph 11 of the memorandum transmitted to the Secretary-General, is based upon the fact that "one of the basic prerequisites for its success . . . is that thorough preparations should be made before the conference". At the same time—and this is something that we have also repeatedly stated—we will have to bear in mind the fact that the world disarmament conference is not intended to replace but, on the contrary, to strengthen the negotiating organ of limited membership, whether or not it keeps its name of Conference of the Committee on Disarmament or is given a different name. Nor will the holding of the Conference in any way jeopardize the continuation of bilateral negotiations of the type known as SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), on the results of which, may I mention, incidentally, we believe the General Assembly has a right to be officially informed by the participating States and that this report should be made at the present session.

19. Our position openly in favour of the world disarmament conference finds additional support in the many communications received from Governments and compiled in the two annexes of the Secretary-General's report. Of the

34 communications contained in that report 33 come to clearly positive conclusions, although the positions that they reflect may be, as they would have to be, subject to the fulfilment of such requirements as the three to which I have just referred, and also that the conference be open to participation by all States; but these requirements, themselves, obviously cannot be challenged by anyone.

20. To these favourable views must be added those of the States that participated in the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Georgetown, Guyana, from 8 to 12 August 1972. It is a known fact that at that Conference a declaration was adopted which is known as the Georgetown Declaration, paragraph 34 of which states:

"The Non-Aligned Countries reasserted their unswerving devotion to peace. They reiterated their support of general and complete disarmament under strict international control, the destruction of all weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and the prohibition of the further development and manufacture of such weapons. The members welcomed the initiative calling for the holding of a world conference on disarmament to search for effective solutions to this question, and stated their intention to co-operate for a successful outcome of such a conference."

21. If we take into account the fact that of the 59 countries participating in that Conference only 6 appear among those that replied to the Secretary-General, it means that to the 33 favourable opinions contained in the Secretary-General's report must now be added the 53 participants of the Georgetown Conference, which raises our total to 86, that is to say, almost two thirds of the entire membership of our Organization.

22. To this already impressive number must now be added the statements of seven of the nine States that spoke on this question in the general debate of the General Assembly and that do not fall under either of the two categories I mentioned before. Again, therefore, our figure rises to 93 States that have spoken out in favour of the holding of a conference, which surely leads us to hope that our discussions on the subject will lead to the adoption of a resolution on the question that will be adopted unanimously or, at least, by acclamation, as was the case last year.

23. We believe that our optimism is well founded, since thus far we know of only three opinions in which there is a glimmer of doubt regarding the appropriateness of an immediate decision. And among those three there are two that seem of major significance, one from the United States contained in one of the communications reproduced in the annex to the Secretary-General's report, and one from the People's Republic of China outlined in the statement which the Chairman of that delegation made in the course of the general debate in the Assembly [*2051st plenary meeting*].

24. With regard to the first of these opinions which, for the moment at least, can hardly be termed enthusiastic, we believe that a dispassionate analysis of the facts and the arguments adduced at length by States in favour of holding the conference should inevitably lead that country to



conclude that no one is proposing a “premature convening” of it. This, incidentally, appears to be the main concern since those words are repeated no less than five times in the relevant communication. On the contrary, as I have already stated, all of us have stressed the need for very careful preparation. This, of course, would exclude any hasty or premature convocation.

25. We believe that it would be easy to come to an agreement on the fact that, as no one would suggest that the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment and the proposed United Nations conference on the law of the sea have in any way duplicated or might duplicate the functions of the General Assembly in their respective fields of action, so, too, no one would contend that the world disarmament conference might in any way imply an unnecessary duplication in this matter. In order to obtain tangible progress, additional efforts are constantly called for by the discouraging existing situation; and these efforts are urgent and must be redoubled.

26. With regard to the second opinion, we trust that the nuclear Power that I mentioned earlier—and which my country last year welcomed to the United Nations with great gratification—will reflect and give sympathetic attention to what was said by the other of the two nuclear Powers that had, unfortunately, been absent from the disarmament negotiations, and which in its communication of 25 August to the Secretary-General stated, *inter alia*, as follows:

“As it has stated on several occasions, the French Government believes that the problem of disarmament, and in particular of nuclear disarmament, is of vital importance. France is desirous of promoting the study of that problem and the implementations of any agreement that might be concluded, in so far as the purpose is to seek genuine disarmament measures accompanied by effective international control and dealing in particular with the destruction, and prohibition of the production of nuclear weapons.

“... ”

“It feels that such a meeting could give fresh impetus to the work on disarmament and, in particular, provide nuclear countries with a framework for joint discussion of their common problems in the interests of all.

“The French Government does not intend to make its participation dependent on any conditions or prerequisites and considers that all participants should accept such a rule.”

27. Another fact which we also consider to be extremely pertinent in this case is that mentioned by the Mexican Government in its communiqué of 12 June, and that is that we believe that the fate of item 26 of the General Assembly “should not be adversely affected by disagreements which exist or may arise among the permanent members of the Security Council”; and that it should be borne in mind that although we are the first to reiterate to the Soviet Union that highest degree of appreciation with which we welcome the initiative it took last year of including the item on the

agenda of the Assembly, so, too, with the same frankness must we repeat that the profound roots of the overwhelming collective movement which culminated in resolution 2833 (XXVI) must be found in that vast majority of countries that constitutes what is usually termed the third world. It was, in fact, their aspirations and their relentless efforts that first in Belgrade, in September of 1961, then in Cairo in October 1964, then again in New York where 42 of them sponsored the draft resolution which on 29 November 1965 became resolution 2030 (XX) following on an eloquent vote of 112 in favour and none against; and that later in Geneva, in August of 1970, when the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament received from the delegation of three non-aligned States a comprehensive draft programme for disarmament<sup>2</sup> whose final conclusion was that the possibility should be thoroughly studied of convening a world disarmament conference open to all States. And it was a month later in Lusaka, and finally at the very Headquarters of the United Nations during the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, that a number of delegations of non-aligned countries successfully carried out patient conciliatory work which allowed them to complete a draft which was to become resolution 2833 (XXVI). It is, as I said, all these aspirations and all these efforts that, little by little, laid the foundations on which we trust the world disarmament conference will rise.

28. We would venture to hope that a careful retrospective examination of the nature of the one I have just outlined will weigh heavily in a Power's deciding its position, particularly a Power that has a number of times emphatically proclaimed that it, too, is a member of the third world.

29. With regard to the content of a resolution that we might adopt, obviously my delegation would prefer it to be similar to resolution 2750 C (XXV). It will be recalled that, despite the complexity and scope of the problems relating to the law of the sea, which surely are not less important than those of disarmament, a specific date was set in that resolution and it was decided that a conference on the subject would be convened for 1973. We believe that something similar could be done at present, and we would tend to believe that spring of 1974 might be the best time to hold a world disarmament conference.

30. However, we do not believe that this is an essential element on which to judge whether the work done this year by the General Assembly on this subject is fruitful or not. In order to achieve general consensus it may be necessary for us to be satisfied with a resolution that limits itself to making an affirmative pronouncement regarding the need to convene a conference as soon as possible, to create an *ad hoc* body that will be sufficiently compact to ensure its effectiveness, and composed of approximately 30 members including all those States composing the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, entrusted with the indispensable preparatory work with the co-operation of the Secretary-General. If such a resolution were also to provide for the inclusion in the agenda of the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly of an item calling for consideration of the report that that *ad hoc* body may submit with

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, sect. 42.



a view to agreeing next year on the date for the holding of the conference, then my delegation would be ready to accept such a resolution as proof of our spirit of conciliation.

31. Therefore, the position of Mexico is extremely flexible, and I would further say that it is an extremely reasonable position. However, very frankly, I should like to say here and now that my delegation would find unacceptable any attempt to transfer the veto of the Security Council to the General Assembly, particularly when it is a predominantly procedural question, and there can be no doubt that the matter of taking up careful exploratory work on what the General Assembly termed, in resolution 2833 (XXVI), pertinent questions related to the world disarmament conference.

32. We are in fact convinced that the General Assembly would be remiss in its duty if it refrained from taking an immediate practical stand in order to improve the deplorable situation which prevails in matters of disarmament. To describe the position suffice it to mention that on the one hand it means that the overkill capacity stored up in nuclear arsenals is, according to the best assessments today, the equivalent of 15 tons of dynamite per inhabitant of the earth; and furthermore that the annual military expenditure rises to \$200,000 million, whereas, as no less a person than the President of the World Bank stated last week when addressing the Economic and Social Council at its 1841st meeting, there are hundreds of millions of people in the world who daily face privations that reduce human dignity to such levels that no statistics can properly describe them.

33. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): Today the First Committee is beginning consideration of the item on the World Disarmament Conference. As is known, this question is before the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly for discussion, pursuant to the recommendation contained in resolution 2833 (XXVI) adopted by the Assembly last year. That resolution, which reflected the views of almost all States Members of the United Nations and in the first instance of the non-aligned States, emphasized that it was imperative for all States to exert "further efforts for the adoption of effective measures of disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament". In that resolution the Assembly also recognized that "a world disarmament conference could promote and facilitate the realization of such aims".

34. That decision, unanimously adopted by the General Assembly, convincingly shows that States attach great importance to the problem of disarmament and are striving to find the most effective ways towards its solution. In our age, when tremendous stocks of very powerful weapons of destruction have been accumulated, one of the most urgent tasks is to unite the efforts of all States in order to curb the fateful arms race and thereby to prevent the world from sliding towards universal catastrophe. The head of the delegation of Mexico, Mr. García Robles, the previous speaker, spoke eloquently on this question.

35. The arms race swallows up enormous resources of manpower and material wealth. Every year over \$200,000 million are spent on armaments in the world, of which over

one third is spent by the United States. These tremendous military expenditures go far towards preventing a rise in standards of living, and curtail the possibility of giving due economic and technical assistance to the developing countries. If a considerable part of the resources that are now directed to the creation of destructive weapons were spent on productive purposes and for assistance to the developing countries, the world today would look very different. General human welfare, the state of science, education and health of all peoples, including the developing countries, would be on an immeasurably higher level.

36. At the twenty-sixth session the General Assembly concluded that it would be desirable and useful for this purpose to hold a world conference devoted to the problem of disarmament, with the participation of all States. At the same time, it stated that it would be necessary to take immediate steps in order carefully to consider the question of convening, after appropriate preparations, a world disarmament conference open to all States.

37. Now we may note with satisfaction that, in the period which elapsed between the two sessions of the General Assembly, the idea of holding a world conference of all States, specially devoted to a comprehensive consideration of disarmament questions, has won solid international support. There are many facts that convincingly indicate this. The proposal to convene the conference was supported in the decision of the Conference of Foreign Ministers from over 70 non-aligned countries held in August this year in Georgetown. In this document of States of what is called the third world, we read that the participants in the conference welcomed the initiative calling for the holding of a world conference on disarmament to search for effective solutions to this question, and stated their intention to co-operate for a successful outcome of such a conference.

38. In connexion with the request expressed in a resolution of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, a large group of States have sent replies to the Secretary-General setting forth their views and considerations on questions having to do with the conference. These replies are contained in the report of the Secretary-General [A/8817], now before us, which accompanies these communications from various States. This document shows that 33 of the 34 States that have replied to the Secretary-General expressed a positive attitude to the idea of holding a conference whose objective would be to give an impetus to steps to reduce the burden of the arms race which would otherwise have irreparable consequences. The disarmament conference is necessary and useful. This conclusion has been reached by the representatives of Bulgaria, France, Hungary, Mexico, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, Japan and many other countries. Full support for the Conference was expressed also by the German Democratic Republic, which has consistently pursued a constructive policy in regard to disarmament.

39. The latest testimony in favour of holding this conference is to be found in many of the statements of representatives in the general debate at this session of the General Assembly, emphasizing the necessity of holding a world forum on the important question of disarmament. This idea was clearly expressed in the statements of the

Foreign Ministers and representatives of Poland, Romania, Finland, Mexico, the United Republic of Tanzania, Ghana, Denmark and many other countries. Mr. García Robles, in his detailed statement, stressed that over 90 States have called for the holding of such a disarmament conference.

40. The examples I have given are sufficient to illustrate the viability and popularity of holding a world disarmament conference.

41. In my delegation's opinion it is essential that, in view of last year's discussion and also recent developments, at this session of the General Assembly we define quite clearly what the tasks of the Assembly are in discussing such a disarmament conference. In our view, now that the decision in principle to hold a disarmament conference was taken at the last session of the Assembly, we must take the next step and, having carefully weighed all views and considerations, outline practical and mutually acceptable ways of holding a conference. In this connexion it must be recognized that work to carry out this decision of the General Assembly at its twenty-sixth session has now entered upon a new and even more responsible stage. It is no longer a question of whether we should or should not convene a conference on disarmament. We have to solve another problem: how can we best prepare for the conference and when should this important international event be held?

42. In its statement today the Soviet delegation would like to set forth the approach of the Soviet Union to this important problem, which is a matter of interest to all peoples of the world.

43. May I begin by saying that, in calling for a disarmament conference in the United Nations, the Soviet Union has been guided by the desire to promote the unification and activation of the efforts of all States for a successful solution of the urgent problems of disarmament.

44. Disarmament has become a truly universal demand in our time. One need only look at the general debate at this session of the General Assembly in the course of which 125 States made statements showing that the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations attach great importance to this question.

45. For our part the Soviet Union, as the first socialist State in the world, from the very beginning of its existence has attached and continues to attach special importance to the problem of disarmament. The founder of the Soviet State, the great Lenin, was the first to put forward the slogan: "Disarmament is the ideal of socialism." And during the 1920s, while Lenin was still alive, the Soviet Union came out with a programme of general and complete disarmament.

46. After the Second World War, both in the United Nations and in other international forums, the Soviet Union unswervingly and persistently carried on the struggle for a comprehensive programme of general and complete disarmament and also pressed for individual measures to limit and halt the arms race in both nuclear and conventional weapons.

47. The Soviet Union has pressed for a ban on the use of nuclear weapons even at a time when we did not possess

such weapons, and we continue to do so now. Efforts to achieve international agreement on general and complete disarmament and to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons continue to represent one of the most important courses of action in the Soviet State's policy.

48. The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Comrade Brezhnev, in his report to the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1971 declared:

"The struggle for a halt to the arms race both in nuclear and conventional weapons and for disarmament up to and including general disarmament will continue to represent one of the important courses of action in the foreign policy activities of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet State."

49. Such has been and remains the unswerving position of principle of the Soviet Union on this question. It has been such from the first day of its existence. The consistent struggle of the Soviet Union in this direction is not only today's policy but also the policy of principle of the Soviet State which it has followed now for over half a century. We were following it at a time when the United Nations did not yet include any third world countries and we are continuing to follow it today.

50. In the light of these generally known historical facts there is no basis for attempts by opponents of disarmament and a ban of nuclear weapons both in the past and today to obfuscate or distort this consistent and resolute policy of the Soviet Union in the defence of disarmament.

51. Over the past decade considerable positive experience has been gained in international disarmament negotiations which shows that a halt to the arms race and disarmament, albeit difficult targets, are nevertheless attainable. The supporters of disarmament have to their credit a whole series of agreements already concluded on limiting the arms race which in the years of the cold war would have seemed completely impossible and unthinkable but which today are being successfully implemented. These include, among other useful agreements, the Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, Outer Space and Under Water, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

52. Among them, as has been widely recognized throughout the world and by many delegations in the course of the general debate at the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly, a special place is occupied by the agreement limiting anti-missile defence systems, resulting from the Soviet-American negotiations, and the temporary agreement on some measures in the field of limiting strategic offensive weapons.

53. At the present time a new and qualitatively higher stage has begun in the consideration and solution of this

problem. The task now is to ensure that all States without exception and irrespective of their size or population, the level of their military or economic potential, take an active and equal part in the discussion of disarmament questions and in the quest for the most rational ways of limiting and winding down the arms race and thereafter of fully eliminating it.

54. An important step towards this goal would, in the view of the Soviet Union, be a world disarmament conference. In setting forth the views of the Soviet Government on the place that the conference should hold in the system of international relations, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, in his statement at the present session of the General Assembly, said the following:

"We consider that this conference should be a forum at which all countries without exception could present and compare, on an equal basis, their views on the whole range of disarmament questions and come to agreement on practical steps designed to curb the arms race and achieve disarmament. This applies both to weapons of mass destruction and to conventional weapons." [2040th plenary meeting, para. 123.]

55. In this official statement we find a reflection of the Soviet understanding of what should be the objectives of the world disarmament conference. A comprehensive exchange of views at the conference would make it possible not only clearly and fully to ascertain the position of all States on the various aspects of disarmament but also to direct our joint efforts to the most effective ways and means of solving the problem. The actions of States aimed at carrying out disarmament measures resulting from the Conference would be more purposeful and better directed.

56. In a letter dated 14 August 1972 from the Foreign Minister of the USSR to the Secretary-General [see A/8817] we find a statement of the position of principle of the Soviet Union regarding practical ways of convening and holding a disarmament conference. This document has already been circulated to delegations; therefore we do not think it necessary in today's statement to expatiate on all the matters set out in it in connexion with the resolution adopted at the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly. My delegation would like to address itself to some key points and express its views on what might be the most constructive outcome of the discussion in the First Committee on the world disarmament conference.

57. First of all, as regards the agenda for the conference, the Soviet Union believes that the participants in this representative international body might consider a broad complex of disarmament questions. An important place in the work of the conference should be given to the consideration of ways and means of solving the problem which is of deep concern to all peoples—that of general and complete disarmament, which is the main ultimate objective of all United Nations efforts in the field of disarmament. Attainment of this objective, as has been emphasized in many General Assembly resolutions, would create a reliable basis for eliminating the threat of war and ensuring stable international peace and security. General and complete disarmament, by releasing enormous resources which

are now spent on maintaining the military machines of States, would make possible an unprecedented acceleration of the economic and social progress of all mankind. Recognizing this, the States gathering in a world disarmament conference could not but give due attention to the problem towards whose solution they have already taken the first steps.

58. It goes without saying that the conference could also concern itself with working out individual partial measures both in the field of limiting and halting the arms race and with regard to general and complete disarmament. In the course of the discussion topical questions would also emerge which could be settled in practical terms and agreed on in the course of the negotiations.

59. In setting forth these views about the agenda of the conference the Soviet Union considers that they are extremely constructive and would make it possible to take account of the views of all States. It is not our wish to impose any conditions on anyone as to the objectives or agenda of the conference. Any country has a right to raise any question at the conference and to make any proposal. The agenda can be agreed upon provisionally on a mutually acceptable basis before the conference. Beyond that it is the business of the conference itself to establish the order of its work: that is to say, to determine which and how many questions should be considered and in what order it would be most desirable to discuss them.

60. In the light of these considerations we find incomprehensible and unwarranted the assertions to the effect that the disarmament conference would become a discussion club if all States, small, medium-sized and great, took part in it. The Soviet Union has no small experience of participation in international negotiations, including disarmament negotiations, and from that experience we know very well that any negotiations or conferences can be turned into empty chatter if any of the participants are not seeking agreement or, worse still, if they are actually trying to prevent negotiations and wreck the possibility of agreement. Conversely, if States approach negotiations with a feeling of goodwill and a desire to reach mutually acceptable agreements, without of course jeopardizing their national interests in the process, then the negotiations can be positive and successful.

61. A world disarmament conference is conceived first and foremost as a world forum in which all States—and we emphasize "all States"—great, small and medium-sized, can make their contribution towards solving the problem of disarmament. Therefore those who would block the convening of a world conference are virtually trying to deprive many small and medium-sized States of an opportunity at a special international conference of expressing their views on so important a question as the problem of disarmament.

62. In international relations, as we know, wide use has already been made recently of major international conferences devoted to one or other particular problem which is of interest to all States. Such conferences have considered or will be considering the questions of the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the preservation of the human environment, the use of the resources of the sea-bed, the control of narcotic drugs, and so on. In the circumstances it is



perfectly legitimate and warranted to raise the question of holding a special international conference on disarmament. This is all the more necessary and timely because, quite rightly, many call disarmament the question of questions, by which they mean that progress in the field of disarmament is crucial to the favourable solution of many other international problems, chief among them being in what direction our international events are going to move. Are they going to move towards strengthening international peace and security or towards the growing threat of a world thermonuclear catastrophe?

63. In connexion with the question of a disarmament conference, at this session of the General Assembly, as last year, the view has been expressed that it is necessary to put forward as a prior condition which should be met before the conference is convened the requirement that certain States take unilateral steps in the field of limiting armaments. The Soviet delegation would like to express its attitude to this viewpoint.

64. First of all, we believe that putting forward such requirements or conditions before any international negotiations or before the opening of a disarmament conference is, in principle, inappropriate if we mean to have serious negotiations or a serious exchange of views among sovereign States on a footing of equality. At the same time, history has not a few examples showing that prior conditions of this kind are often put forward for the purpose of preventing or wrecking negotiations. This is particularly easy to see when such conditions include the deliberate selection of questions whose solution gives rise to serious difficulties. Take, for example, the question of the elimination of foreign military bases on the territories of other States: if the convening of a world disarmament conference were to be made contingent on the solution of that problem, one could safely say that such a conference would be long postponed.

65. Everyone knows full well that the problem of foreign military bases unfortunately remains unresolved because of serious differences in the positions of various States. The Soviet Union, for example, consistently favours the elimination of such bases and was the first to put forward an appropriate proposal in the United Nations at the fourteenth session of the Assembly [799th plenary meeting]. As the Committee knows, the Soviet Union was the pioneer in this matter. For more than a decade the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has been calling for an early and positive solution to this question of bases. Today, too, we continue to give great importance to the need to eliminate military bases from the territory of other countries. This was made quite clear in the decisions of the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which serve as guidelines for statements by Soviet diplomats in the international arena.

66. A different position in this field is taken by the Western Powers, which have so far displayed no readiness to dismantle their military strongholds beyond their national territory. Thus, unfortunately, this problem has not yet been solved. To put forward this problem as a prior condition for holding a conference on disarmament is tantamount to delaying the conference, if not preventing it altogether. There is no other possible interpretation of such

an approach. Of course, this does not preclude the possibility that at the world conference the question of the elimination of foreign military bases could, and indeed should, be considered. Indeed, that should be among the front rank of urgent measures directed at military détente and easing the arms race.

67. The Soviet Government, as has already been noted, proceeds from the assumption that any State is entitled to raise any question for discussion at the disarmament conference. No attempt should, be made, therefore, to put forward any proposals as prior conditions for convening the conference. It will be far more desirable to put forward these proposals for consideration by the actual participants in the conference. This is the only approach which can now be regarded as positive and constructive.

68. Another important question to which we should like to address ourselves today is the procedure for the preparatory work on the conference. In the view of the Soviet Government a preparatory body should be established for this purpose consisting of 30 to 35 members, including all the nuclear Powers, all the members of the Conference of the Committee of Disarmament and also a certain additional number of States, in order to ensure a balanced political and equitable geographical representation. Such a composition for the preparatory body seems to us fully justified. The participation of all the nuclear Powers in disarmament negotiations is insisted upon by almost all States. Members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which is a highly representative organ, could make a substantial constructive contribution to the work of the preparatory committee since they, having long been directly engaged in disarmament negotiations, have accumulated a great deal of useful experience in this area. The inclusion in the preparatory committee of an additional number of countries on the basis we have proposed, the basis of equity, would meet the wishes of those who want to participate actively in the convening of the conference and make the preparatory body still more representative.

69. The question arises as to when the world disarmament conference should be convened and when the work of the preparatory committee should begin. The Soviet Union considers that the conference could be held, let us say, within the next two years; the preparatory committee could start its work immediately following the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly, that is in January 1973. However, in expressing these views, the Soviet delegation believes that the time-periods mentioned should, of course, be determined by States after careful consultation and by mutual agreement. These questions, like any other question having to do with the conference, should be settled in such a way as to ensure the participation of all States in the work of the conference.

70. The Soviet delegation considers that at this session the General Assembly would make a substantial contribution towards implementing the proposal to convene a disarmament conference if it were to take a decision in principle to create a preparatory committee to prepare recommendations on the specific time and place for the conference, its agenda and other practical questions in connexion with the conference.

71. In calling for a world disarmament conference the Soviet Union at the same time considers that such a conference should in no way reduce the importance of those organs and channels for disarmament negotiations which are already being used. The task of the Conference is precisely to give a further impetus to more effective consideration of disarmament questions in the narrower working organs in which drafts of certain specific agreements are already being worked out. The conference should serve as a means of bringing a wider range of States into the work of preparing such agreements so that we may have an opportunity to compare and summarize the views of all countries on the various aspects of disarmament. The recommendations it prepares could be used by the participants in the narrower working organs dealing with disarmament questions. All this, in the final analysis, will help to ensure that the draft agreements prepared by those organs will win broader international support.

72. The preparatory committee cannot replace an existing working body for the continuation of the disarmament negotiations already under way, such as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, since its task is strictly defined as being to conduct the preparatory work for convening the disarmament conference. Similarly, the conference itself cannot take the place of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament since the practical and sometimes very detailed work on the preparation of texts of agreements requires negotiations in bodies with a limited number of participants and with the participation of acknowledged experts on disarmament questions.

73. Of course, in order to ensure the success of the world conference there will be need for the joint efforts and the goodwill of all the nuclear Powers. The Soviet Union hopes that in the final analysis all the nuclear Powers will take a constructive position and will help to bring about positive results at such a conference. We do not want to argue or to engage in polemic. What we want is to adopt at this session of the General Assembly a decision on the question of the world disarmament conference which would be in keeping with the interests of all States and peoples and of all mankind.

74. Such are the views of the Soviet delegation on the question of the preparations for and the holding of a world disarmament conference. We express the hope that they will be carefully studied by other delegations. For its part, the Soviet delegation is prepared, constructively and in a spirit of goodwill, to consider the views of all States on this important question now under discussion, the solution of which would help to slow down the arms race and thereby to strengthen the peace and security of all States.

75. In conclusion, I should like to say that the delegation of the Soviet Union reserves the right to express its views on all other aspects of the problem of disarmament which will be discussed in this Committee somewhat later.

76. Mr. BUSH (United States of America): Today the First Committee is beginning its consideration of disarmament problems, which constitute one of the most important items on the Committee's agenda. We take up these problems conscious of the fact that achievements in the area of arms control, particularly the two recently con-

cluded strategic arms limitation agreements, have had a beneficial effect both in beginning to curb the competition in nuclear armaments and in contributing to improvement of the international political atmosphere.

77. As President Nixon said in his foreign policy report to the Congress earlier this year:

"The limitation of armaments is an essential element in the larger political process of building a more stable international system. By contributing to international stability and restraint, arms control agreements can provide a greater measure of security than could be achieved by relying solely on military power. A mutual willingness to curb arms competition indicates constructive intentions in political as well as strategic areas. Progress in controlling arms can reinforce progress in a much wider area of international relations."

78. The United Nations, bearing the primary responsibility for the maintenance of world peace and security, appropriately devotes a substantial part of the annual session of the General Assembly to the general area of arms control and disarmament. This measure of concern clearly recognizes the interrelationship of arms control and international security.

79. The entry into force of the SALT agreements on 3 October marks a major achievement in arms control. For the first time agreement has been reached to limit strategic nuclear arms. This is an achievement that we have sought since the very beginning of the nuclear age. It follows a number of other important successes in arms control during the past decade, including the limited Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, the outer space Treaty, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the sea-bed arms control Treaty and the Convention on biological Weapons, as well as the earlier SALT agreements on measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and to modernize the US-USSR United States-Soviet Union direct communications link.

80. The Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Systems [*see A/C.1/1026*] represent a significant step in lessening the burden of nuclear weapons on mankind. They testify to the good faith of the two largest nuclear Powers in working to meet their pledge under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*], and they serve the cause of the first principle of the United Nations Charter—"To maintain international peace and security".

81. The SALT agreements are intended to promote stability, arrest the arms race and stimulate further measures to limit nuclear arms. They are designed to benefit all nations by establishing conditions for a more peaceful world in which resources can be redirected from means of destruction to ways of improving the life and the well-being of all peoples.

82. Under these agreements the United States and the Soviet Union have significantly limited themselves. Each

party undertakes not to deploy anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems for a defence of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defence. In the ABM Treaty the parties have pledged not to deploy more than 200 ABM launchers and missiles. In the Interim Agreement the parties have frozen the level of offensive strategic missile launchers at the number operational and under construction. A number of important qualitative restraints are also specified. For example, the parties have accepted limitations on development and on testing. They have agreed not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based; ABM launchers for launching more than one interceptor missile at a time; automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers; and multiple independently guided warheads for ABM missiles. They have also decided not to deploy new ABM systems based on other physical principles, such as those which employ laser beams, for example, without discussion and agreement on their limitation. The parties have also sought to limit the size and potential destructive power of offensive strategic missiles by agreeing not to substitute heavy missiles for light ones and not to increase significantly the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers.

83. The SALT agreements do not, of course, end the threat of nuclear war, but they have begun a great historical process which can ultimately lead to that goal. When the SALT talks resume in Geneva on 21 November we are resolved to make further progress by seeking more complete limitations on nuclear armaments. We believe that reason and purpose on both sides will continue to be the key to success, and we are confident that sober, persistent and realistic efforts will lead to positive results. We will return to the negotiations in that spirit, endeavouring to reach further agreements which will merit the confidence of all who seek a more stable and secure world.

84. The undoubted successes in the area of bilateral arms control have been accompanied by important work in the Geneva forum for negotiating multilateral arms control.

85. In accordance with resolution 2827 (XXVI), adopted by the General Assembly last year, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament continued and intensified its high priority deliberations on seeking effective prohibitions of chemical weapons. The work of the Committee during the past year dealt with a very wide spectrum of issues related to this important problem. A variety of approaches was thoroughly examined and analysed. Considerable progress has been made in identifying the various areas of concern. Consideration has been given to the troublesome problems of verification and compliance. All of this activity, I believe, has contributed to the significant degree of progress that has been made towards our goal, and has provided a basis for the Committee's work when it meets again next year.

86. Now, I would like to reaffirm at this point my Government's commitment to the undertaking contained in article IX of the biological weapons Convention [*resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex*] to negotiate in good faith for agreement on effective chemical weapons prohibitions. My Government's approach to achieving those prohibitions rests on the fundamental view that in this intensely

complex matter of chemical weapons restraint, reliance on one or more rough-and-ready abstract principles is simply not adequate. What is needed is thorough and objective study of the materials to be placed under control, as well as analysis of the problems and opportunities offered by various approaches. Existing problems need to be faced squarely and solved on the basis of mutual accommodation. We must recognize, for example, that any workable prohibitions would apply to some complex substances that are very closely related to large-scale production of materials for peaceful purposes. The chemical industry is, as we all know, one of the largest, most enterprising and most innovative industries. Recognition of these factors has resulted in the focusing of attention and discussion on defining what we are trying to prohibit or control and the related problems of verification.

87. Last spring, the United States presented to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament a comprehensive work programme to assist in the negotiation of practical and workable chemical weapons prohibitions. We are gratified that this programme helped to provide a framework for some of the discussions, working papers and technical meetings during the past year at the Conference.

88. The working papers which we submitted were all concerned in one way or another with the central problems of scope and verification of chemical weapons prohibitions and the relationship between these two factors, as well as with the associated problems of environmental safety. They discussed, for example, the crucial issue of which criteria might be considered relevant in establishing the scope of an agreement. They represented an earnest effort to lay the basis for establishing clear and broadly acceptable standards that could be applied uniformly by all parties to an agreement. It is precisely such basic, practical considerations that in our view must necessarily precede efforts to decide on treaty solutions.

89. I believe that the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament during the past year has significantly broadened and deepened the understanding of the important issues that are involved. The technical papers and the proposals submitted by a large number of delegations have clearly contributed to the common search for effective chemical weapons prohibitions. We expect to be responding on the issues and the proposals at the forthcoming meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

90. We are hopeful that the General Assembly will again, as last year, provide encouragement and stimulus to the Committee to continue on the general course it has set and, of particular importance, to consider all the various approaches to this problem.

91. Turning now to another vital element of the Committee's work, I would like to comment briefly on the issue of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament this year had before it a number of interesting proposals for solving the variety of problems that still confront us. My Government will continue to give those proposals serious consideration, recognizing that the General Assembly has attached great urgency to the achievement of a comprehensive test ban.



92. In a statement on 24 August [*see CCD/PV.580*], the United States representative at the Conference reaffirmed the support of the United States for an adequately verified comprehensive test ban and presented our position on several of the key aspects of the issue. At the same time, the United States presented a detailed working paper [*A/8818, annex B, sect. 31*] which reviewed some of the current progress and problems in seismic verification. As we have often stated before, an adequate degree of compliance with an agreement by all parties to it must necessarily be assured if an agreement is to contribute to the basic objectives of greater security for all.

93. The progress that has been made in seismology has indeed been heartening and we are proud of the contribution made by our own United States scientists in this regard. Very-long-period seismic stations as well as some new large arrays have made it possible to improve the capability for detecting and identifying seismic events. Nevertheless, as our working paper showed, important problems still remain. There are still, for example, a significant number of mixed events, including some fairly large-sized ones, in which the signals from smaller seismic events become hidden in those of larger earthquakes occurring at roughly the same time. These events create obvious difficulties in achieving an adequate degree of verification by national means alone. These difficulties are real and they are very significant.

94. More work must be done on solving these problems as well as the continuing problem of possible treaty evasion through clandestine testing. The United States continues to devote substantial resources to efforts to solve these problems, both by utilizing its own means and by co-operating with other countries.

95. As Mr. Martin made clear in speaking on this subject to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 7 September of this year:

“a comprehensive test ban is not an impossible goal, difficult though it is. However, the technical, military, and political questions involved must be faced. We, for our part, are making the utmost effort to understand these questions and to propose what we believe are the necessary solutions in order to achieve an adequately verified comprehensive test ban.” [*See CCD/PV.584.*]

96. The United States fully recognizes that in order to create a safer and a saner world it is not only important to write new arms control agreements but equally important to gain the broadest possible participation in those agreements that already exist. During the past year we have made some noteworthy progress in this respect.

97. After the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction had been commended by the General Assembly last year, it was opened for signature in Washington, Moscow and London on 10 April 1972. Almost 100 countries have already signified their intention to become parties to this landmark disarmament Convention. President Nixon has sent the Convention to the United States Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, and we hope it can be brought into force during the coming year.

98. The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof came into force on 18 May 1972 and has now been ratified by some 37 countries. The number of countries participating in the non-proliferation Treaty continued to grow during the past year and we are hopeful that this trend will continue. I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate that my Government continues to give full support to the objectives of the non-proliferation Treaty. We consider this Treaty to be one of the key disarmament agreements, which deserves the broadest possible international participation.

99. On the related matter of safeguards, many States have negotiated appropriate safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency pursuant to the non-proliferation Treaty. Of particular importance, the Agency has recently completed safeguards negotiations with the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). This will, it is hoped, lead to early ratification of the non-proliferation Treaty by the Governments concerned. For its part, the United States has initiated talks with the International Atomic Energy Agency on a safeguards agreement, pursuant to our unilateral offer to place United States nuclear activities, other than those of direct national security significance, under Agency safeguards at an appropriate time.

100. We all recognize that the complex area of arms control affects the national security of each country in the world. In no area is this more true than in that of the conventional weapons that each country needs to defend itself against possible external aggression and for the maintenance of internal security. Nevertheless, we must recognize that the expenditure of large sums of money on these arms can compete with the resources available for economic and social development in both developed and developing countries. Substantial increases in conventional arms can also disturb existing military balances.

101. Conventional arms must therefore be considered along with the weapons of mass destruction if we are to move towards a structure of peace and security. It is our belief that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should begin explorations in depth of this admittedly complex problem.

102. During the past year my Government has given considerable thought to the questions raised by General Assembly resolution 2833 (XXVI) with respect to a world disarmament conference. In our response to the Secretary-General's request for the views and suggestions of all States we have made known our position in very considerable detail [*see A/8817*]. Permit me to outline briefly the nature of my Government's views on this specific question of a world disarmament conference.

103. The United States already supports and participates in different forums which we believe are making concrete progress in the area of arms limitation. In the earlier part of my statement today I referred specifically to many areas of progress. We stand ready to provide assistance to and play our part in any discussions which appear likely to contribute to this end. For us the sole measure of the value of

disarmament mechanisms is their likelihood of contributing to the goal that we all share.

104. We do not believe, however, that a world disarmament conference would in fact contribute at this time to the achievement of concrete arms control agreements. The history of arms control efforts today shows that there is no substitute for careful, patient negotiations. A large, unwieldy conference would not provide the sort of atmosphere conducive to real progress; it could indeed be harmful to institutions that have already achieved a record of proved accomplishments and that are currently conducting on-going negotiations. So far as the establishing of broad objectives is concerned, we believe that this Committee, the First Committee of the General Assembly where all nuclear Powers are represented, is performing this task and that it need not be duplicated in another forum.

105. As we pointed out in our letter to the Secretary-General, the United States attaches importance to the maintenance of an "effective, expert and experienced body of limited size" to negotiate concerning arms control and disarmament. It is of course desirable that such a body be broadly representative and include the major military and economic Powers. The United States has repeatedly made clear in this connexion that it would welcome the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in arms control and disarmament efforts in a manner satisfactory to those States and in a manner reflecting the interests and concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States.

106. For the many reasons we have indicated in our letter, we believe that the General Assembly should not now attempt to convene a world disarmament conference, to set a specific date for a conference or to set up machinery for preparing for a conference. However, we believe it would not be inappropriate for the General Assembly, if a consensus of its members so indicates, to note in a resolution that a world disarmament conference could play a role in the disarmament process at an appropriate time.

107. The First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly has very important responsibilities in the field of disarmament. I noted earlier in the statement of Mr. Malik that the Soviet Union does not wish the world disarmament conference idea to downgrade in any way the substantial existing machinery. It is primarily in this Committee that nations have the opportunity to express their views on the entire range of disarmament issues. It is here in the First Committee that the world community can best work out priorities in the disarmament field, develop a consensus as to which measures are now ripe for negotiations in other forums and express its concern or its satisfaction with the progress made in an area of unsurpassed importance to all countries and to all mankind. There is nothing exclusive about this Committee.

108. The views expressed in the debates of the First Committee are important in stimulating disarmament work. The Committee plays an indispensable role in the continuing search for effective measures of arms control.

109. I have earlier noted a number of agreements which have been reached in recent years. In each case agreement was built upon the perseverance, hard work and, above all,

patience of all who were involved. None would have been reached without the help of many nations, including those which did not participate directly in the negotiating process.

110. Some 25 countries from different regions of the world now take part in the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Over the years they have acquired considerable expert knowledge about a wide range of disarmament issues. They do not have any monopoly, however, on either expert knowledge or ability to put forward fruitful ideas. I need only recall the outstanding role played by Mr. Pardo, at that time the Representative of Malta, in initiating the work which led to the sea-bed arms control Treaty. This year the Government of Finland presented a useful, detailed working paper on the subject of chemical weapons [A/8818, annex B, sect. 24] to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. I know I speak for all the members of that Conference in welcoming such contributions from all States Members of the United Nations, whether these contributions are made here or in Geneva.

111. In our view the years ahead are full of promise. We are all conscious of our responsibility to ensure that the improvement we are witnessing in the world political situation is translated into concrete achievements in the disarmament field. We believe that it will prove possible to identify areas where additional progress can be made, taking advantage of the gradual relaxing of tensions that all of us here in the United Nations can now observe. The First Committee, I am certain, will continue to act as a spur to progress, as a force in overcoming inertia. Progress—and I am sure you above all, Mr. Chairman, know this—will not be easy. The same perseverance, the same hard work and the same patience which were required continue to be needed in the future. But that progress must and, certainly in the view of the United States, can be achieved.

112. My Government welcomes this annual opportunity to review its objectives with the members of the Committee and certainly to review the progress that some of us forget has indeed been made. The United States delegation benefits greatly from this unexcelled opportunity to exchange views with other delegations, not only in the speeches and the debates but also in the corridors and in many conversations as well. Not only the goal of disarmament but also the process of accomplishing it belong to all nations, and this Committee—I need not remind members—is at the very centre of that process.

113. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now have the privilege and pleasure of hearing the Omar Khayyam of the United Nations. I call on the representative of Saudi Arabia.

114. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): I wish I were an Omar Khayyam because then I would be singing of the stars and writing poetry and making tents for a living; that is how Omar Khayyam earned his living. I think that it is a more gratifying and satisfying pursuit to write poetry and to be in the business of making tents than to go round in circles, as we often do in the United Nations.

115. This morning I heard Mr. García Robles of Mexico and he is to be congratulated on his exposé of the item we

are discussing, namely, the holding of a world disarmament conference at some future date. I have read some, although not all, of the documents with which the Secretariat has furnished us on the subject. If I were to read document A/8818, I do not think that I would have time to work in any Committee in the United Nations for the whole session. That is why I will not be presumptuous and talk as an expert, which I am not.

116. Before listening to the thesis of my good friend, Mr. Malik, I came to this Committee after having heard on the radio last night that the United States and China would not listen to any idea that would end in the holding of a disarmament conference. So the news media must have checked its news, or assumed it. Now that I have heard Mr. Bush, I think that news item has been confirmed. It is clear that while the Soviet Union has been in favour of holding a disarmament conference for a number of years, the United States, on the other hand, prefers bilateral and multilateral negotiations within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. In its letter of 30 August [see A/8817] on a world disarmament conference, the United States said that an open discussion of the conference might be conducive to what it called "heated exchanges" and the letter went on to say that no purpose would be served by the premature convening of a world conference. That is the situation as it obtains, with the two super-Powers having diametrically opposed viewpoints on the holding of a world disarmament conference.

117. The United States stresses the inherent difficulty of the subject matter which the conference would take up. On the other hand China was right when its representative, speaking in the General Assembly, referred to the monopoly that certain Powers have over nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. I still recall what I said a few years ago when the idea was still germinating and was brought to our attention in one of the sessions of the General Assembly that as long as France and China—China at that time was not a Member of the United Nations—were not willing to or did not co-operate and participate in a world conference very little could be achieved. I think that there has been a reduction at least in the title of the item before us although it still appears under the heading "General and complete disarmament". I do not know whether general and complete disarmament, and more specifically complete disarmament, can be achieved, for more than ever greed for material things and ambition to wield more and more power are still characteristic of men, regardless of the ideology of their Governments. Men and especially leaders of nations must become like the proverbial angels before we can expect them to support complete disarmament. And let us not forget that one of those proverbial angels rebelled and became the devil himself, so that even angels are tempted sometimes to wield power.

118. The statement I am making this morning is a preliminary one but I hope it is constructive in the sense that I will pose a couple of questions for the major Powers. First, will those Powers undertake to cease testing nuclear weapons, as has been requested by many of our colleagues? This morning I saw a draft resolution submitted by Australia and other States to that effect.

119. Secondly, will they stop forthwith developing new weapons, nuclear weapons mostly, and set the date for destroying those weapons? We want an answer, yes or no, with no demagogic replies or polemics.

120. Then a third question arises as follows: will the highly developed States possessing the technology of war deposit with the United Nations through the Secretary-General a comprehensive list of weapons of mass destruction in their respective arsenals? Some of us have been told that some arsenals contain ultrasonic mechanisms which if dropped on a city would kill human beings—and of course the animals, which have nothing to do with this mad world of ours—and leave the survivors deaf or half demented. Do they have such weapons or do they not? We, the smaller nations, would like to know: the smaller nations which are like innocent bystanders, not knowing what goes on in secret.

121. Fourthly, we have heard of lethal laser beams that lend themselves to mass destruction. What progress has been made in that direction and are there weapons of that nature in the arsenals of the super-Powers?

122. Fifthly, I have heard that there is a gas—and I am not talking off the back of my head; I have been informed of this by scientists, whom I will not name lest they be made the object of revenge—that has a somnolent effect on populations, which are thus rendered helpless and are easily overcome, either by being butchered by conventional weapons without resort to nuclear weapons, or by some other inhuman means.

123. The United States, in its letter of 30 August to the Secretary-General on the subject [*ibid.*], speaks of meaningful negotiations, "purposeful, quiet and businesslike exchanges of views". About what sort of weapons are these negotiations going to be conducted? Mr. García Robles told us something we had known for some time—that there are the equivalent of 15 tons of dynamite for every human being if nuclear weapons are deployed by any nation. It takes a bullet to kill one person. Fifteen tons: are not these big nations ashamed to keep on increasing their budgets in order to build an overkill of more than 151 tons? With what purpose? Let them blow up this earth and finish with it. We cannot remain spectators and listen to what they tell us here while they work secretly for more and more destructive weapons.

124. All I have said has a bearing on the projected conference. I think some of the small nations which know nothing about the technology of sophisticated arms would benefit from witnessing what goes on between the super-Powers, instead of the latter working bilaterally or multilaterally—not necessarily behind closed doors, but quite often behind closed doors. To us, the small nations, it would be educational to learn what goes on between them.

125. The United States mentioned in its letter of 30 August that "heated exchanges" would characterize the conference and perhaps would have liked to say that it would be helpful for propaganda. All right, perhaps we can meet that point. We could draft a resolution, or without drafting a resolution perhaps the representatives of the super-Powers could declare that they would not engage in



heated exchanges and propaganda and that the conference should be conducted in a businesslike manner. Then, when any one of the super-Powers engaged in propaganda, we could call it to order, having adopted such a resolution.

126. Before ending my preliminary remarks, because the hour is late and I hope I will have occasion to speak again, I must draw the attention of the major Powers and the lesser Powers to the fact that, while they negotiate in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva as well as on a bilateral or multilateral basis behind closed doors, we are cognizant of the fact that all of those major Powers have developed secret intelligence services on which they spend billions—I am not going to say in what currencies, whatever currency they have—not only to collect information and spy, but for subversion, for sabotage and sometimes to bring about coups d'état in small States when the Government is not to their liking.

127. This is a weapon. What about that weapon, because money is spent secretly in billions? Has anybody thought of that secret weapon, the intelligence services that no longer collect intelligence but subvert countries through *agents provocateurs*, by waging war, as General Romulo mentioned, by proxy? I have said the same thing in many Committees. How can we deal with that secret weapon? Should there not be a draft resolution whether here in the General Assembly, or, if the General Assembly during this session approves the holding at some future date of a conference on disarmament, at that conference? Is it not

high time that we ceased to be the targets of clandestine and surreptitious machinations? Suppose this secret weapon continued to be deployed? What would a world disarmament conference or for that matter the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva accomplish if that secret weapon were still deployed?

128. These are my preliminary thoughts before I prepare my statement on the question. We hope that the major Powers, even during this session while we are discussing the question, will make a last attempt to exchange views with regard to a possible conference, two, three or four years from now, on the lines suggested by Mr. García Robles, my good friend from Mexico, or in any other way that can be devised, so that in the meantime while these questions are being answered or left unanswered we may know how we, the small Powers, stand.

129. The CHAIRMAN: I should like Mr. Baroody to know that I have always thought of Omar Khayyam as having been a scientist, strategist and philosopher as well as a poet and singer.

130. There are no more speakers on my list for this morning. Before adjourning this morning's meeting I should like again to remind members of the Committee wishing to speak in the general debate to inscribe their names on the list of speakers as soon as possible.

*The meeting rose at 1 p.m.*