



**CONTENTS**

Agenda item 19:

The Korean question (*continued*):

- (a) Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea;
- (b) Reports of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea;
- (c) Problem of ex-prisoners of the Korean war .... 151

*Chairman:* Sir Leslie MUNRO (New Zealand).

**AGENDA ITEM 19**

**The Korean question (A/2641, A/2941 and Add.1, A/2947, A/C.1/769, A/C.1/L.144) (*continued*):**

- (a) Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea;**
- (b) Reports of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea;**
- (c) Problem of ex-prisoners of the Korean war**

1. Mr. BLAUSTEIN (United States) recalled that it had been the practice of the Committee to invite a representative of the Republic of Korea, the victim of the aggression which had called forth the collective action of the United Nations in Korea, to participate in the discussion on the item before the Committee. It was just and proper that the Republic of Korea, which represented the vast majority of the Korean people, should be given the opportunity to state its views on an item which so vitally affected its future. He therefore moved that a representative of the Republic of Korea be invited to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion of that item.

2. Turning to the Syrian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.144), he said that it would be unthinkable to extend an invitation to representatives of the North Korean régime, which had been found guilty of the aggression in Korea by the General Assembly and had no right to participate in the Committee's debates, particularly since it had never accepted the competence of the United Nations on the Korean problem and had done nothing to purge itself of the aggression. The Committee was not engaged in a political conference where both sides would be represented if there was to be an agreement. It was to consider certain United Nations aspects of the Korean problem. The United States delegation would therefore vote against the Syrian proposal.

3. He also moved, under rule 132 of the rules of procedure, that the United States proposal be put to the vote before the Syrian draft resolution.

4. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) emphasized the great importance which the USSR dele-

gation attached to participation in the debate by representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. A peaceful settlement of the Korean question would not only correspond to the interests of the people of Korea, but would also contribute to a further relaxation of tension and the establishment of peace in the Far East. It was therefore necessary to ensure that the Committee give unbiased consideration to the question. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had officially addressed itself to the United Nations, requesting that its representatives be given the opportunity of taking part in the debate. Mr. Malik quoted the telegram sent by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of that Government on 31 October 1955 (A/C.1/769) to the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General, and declared that the USSR supported that legitimate request. The peaceful solution of the Korean question was of vital importance for the Korean people and could not be discussed in the absence of their representatives. The time had come to abandon the unfair and unjust practice of excluding representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in violation of the Charter. He could not accept the United States representative's desire to turn that practice into a precedent.

5. Noting that that representative had spoken of the "victim of aggression", Mr. Malik said that it was the task of the Committee to find ways and means of solving the question peacefully without excursions into the distant past. If aggression was to be the subject for discussion, his delegation could show who had been the real aggressor and who had intervened, but it did not wish to embark on such a discussion. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had repeatedly declared that it would not recognize any decision adopted in the absence of its representatives. The United States had endeavoured to cast blame on that position, but it was that which any self-respecting State would adopt. It must be recognized that a peaceful settlement could be brought about only with the participation of representatives of the Korean people and in accordance with that people's desire. That fact was indeed recognized by all concerned, including the United States.

6. Thus the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had taken part in the Korean Political Conference held at Geneva in the spring of 1954. During and after that Conference, in which it had made constructive proposals, it had clearly demonstrated its interest in an early settlement of the question. Various attempts had been made by North Korea to establish links with South Korea and to reach an understanding on the basis for peaceful unification.

7. On the basis both of the Charter and of the practical advantages, the USSR delegation, noting that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had submitted a request to that effect, had been prepared to submit a

proposal to invite representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to participate in the consideration of the question. In view of the submission of the Syrian draft resolution, however, it would support that proposal instead. Mr. Malik hoped that other delegations would display a proper and serious understanding of that approach, which would facilitate a settlement of the question.

8. As for the United States motion to vote first on the United States proposal, there were no legal or procedural grounds for departing from the established practice of voting on proposals in the order of their submission. He would vote against the United States proposal, and also against that motion.

9. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) said that all but a small minority of the Committee's members agreed that the Korean war had involved aggression against the Republic of Korea by the North Korean authorities. North Korea was an aggressor which had defied United Nations resolutions and ignored all General Assembly decisions and which, indeed, continued to defy the United Nations. Its participation in the debate could have no justification unless North Korea were to agree to respect and abide by the resolutions of the General Assembly. He did not think that the Syrian representative could guarantee that those conditions would obtain. On the other hand, the Republic of Korea had always been a friend of the United Nations, to which it had appealed for help, which the United Nations had attempted to provide. The Committee should therefore invite representatives of the Republic of Korea and should withhold any invitation to the North Korean authorities.

10. In order to simplify the procedural situation, he suggested an amendment to the Syrian draft resolution: to delete the words "and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea". That amendment, he thought, would obviate the necessity of voting on the United States motion for priority.

11. Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom) supported the United States proposal to invite only representatives of the Republic of Korea to participate in the discussion. The representative of Iraq had explained why such participation would be correct and wholly appropriate. It would also be in accordance with precedent.

12. On the other hand, he could not support the proposal to invite the North Korean authorities. The USSR representative appeared to think that anyone taking that position was not interested in a settlement of the Korean question. All were interested in such a settlement, but the point was whether participation by those authorities would facilitate a settlement. In his opinion, such participation would be neither appropriate nor useful. After all, the North Korean régime had not shown due respect for the authority of the United Nations and so far had made no constructive contribution to the achievement of the objectives of the United Nations.

13. Mr. SARPÉR (Turkey) recalled that proposals to invite representatives of the North Korean authorities had repeatedly been voted down by an overwhelming majority. There was no change in the situation which warranted a change of attitude. He therefore opposed the Syrian draft resolution and would support the United States proposal.

14. Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia) said that the first consideration in the work of the Committee must be

the unification of the Korean nation. General Assembly resolution 811 (IX) had reaffirmed that the objectives of the United Nations remained the achievement by peaceful means of a unified, independent and democratic Korea. Realization of those objectives would be a significant contribution to the strengthening of peace and security in the Far East. Since the discussion directly affected the vital interests of the Korean people, it was normal to invite representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to participate. To exclude such representatives from the discussion would not only be contrary to justice and the fundamental principles of democracy, but would also eliminate any hope of positive results. Achievement of the objectives of the United Nations was impossible in the absence of the parties most directly concerned. He fully subscribed to the views expressed in that respect in the telegram sent by the Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 31 October (A/C.1/769), the text of which he quoted. The cessation of hostilities in Korea had been achieved, and could only have been achieved, by agreement of the parties concerned. A peaceful settlement must equally be sought by such means.

15. He pointed out that the item before the Committee covered not only the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, but also the reports of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the problem of ex-prisoners of the Korean war. Both of the latter sub-items related to the implementation of one of the fundamental parts of the Armistice Agreement<sup>1</sup> concluded directly between the belligerents, who in concert with the international neutral organs established under the Agreement, were responsible for carrying it into effect. That fact made participation of the parties directly concerned all the more imperative. Any consideration without their participation would infringe upon the legal rights of the parties and could not achieve any positive results.

16. For those reasons, he supported the Syrian draft resolution. To invite one and to exclude the other of the parties directly concerned would not only be contrary to justice and equity, it would be impractical. He therefore opposed the United States proposal. He also opposed the United States motion regarding the order of voting, because he saw no need and no reason to reverse the normal order in that respect. He would oppose the Iraqi amendment on the grounds which led him to oppose the United States proposal.

17. Mr. BELAÚNDE (Peru) was unable to support the Syrian draft resolution. Most of the representatives present had witnessed the aggression by North Korea, joined later by Communist China. The Security Council, invoking the principle used in inter-American law, had at that time addressed an appeal<sup>2</sup> to both parties to cease all military operations and return to the *status quo ante bellum*. North Korea, far from heeding that appeal, had continued on its course of aggression and maintained a permanent defiance of the resolutions of the Security Council and later of those of the General Assembly. That was why North Korea and later Communist China had been condemned as aggressors. If assurances were given that the future attitude of North Korea would be different, the Committee might have

<sup>1</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1953, document S/3079.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., Fifth Year, Supplement for June, July and August 1950, document S/1501.

overlooked the past and kept practical considerations in mind. However, given the attitude of the North Korean authorities, it was clear that it was neither expedient nor necessary for the Committee to invite representatives of those authorities. Their presence would make the debate completely sterile.

18. Debates in the United Nations were very useful if they were preceded by careful and mature consideration and if all participants intended to reach the best possible solution. Despite the value of public diplomacy, the Committee must avoid what one might call "stage diplomacy" in which debate was used merely for propaganda purposes.

19. The North Koreans and their supporters had shown no desire to respect the United Nations resolutions. A debate with their participation could not be expected to cast light on the Korean problem. The points of view would be diametrically opposed. A debate of that order would be inappropriate as far as world public opinion was concerned. He would therefore oppose the Syrian draft resolution and support the United States proposal.

20. Mr. NÚÑEZ PORTUONDO (Cuba) said that historical facts could not be changed by wishful words. The Security Council and the General Assembly had declared North Korea an aggressor. The United Nations had taken the field against North Korea. Thousands of citizens of fifteen Member States of the United Nations had fallen in the cause of peace and of the United Nations. North Korea, together with Communist China, had launched the most infamous accusation in history against the United Nations, the accusation of bacterial warfare, which had been proven false. Moreover, if the Committee were to invite North Korea, a most bizarre contradiction would be involved. Item 60 on the agenda of the Assembly was the establishment and maintenance of a memorial cemetery in Korea to honour those who had fallen in the service of the United Nations. World public opinion could not accept the inconceivable paradox of inviting at the same time, and on equal footing, those who had caused the United Nations soldiers to fall. If North Korea were invited, the establishment of such a cemetery would be a farce and a mockery. He would therefore vote against the Syrian draft resolution and support the United States proposal.

21. Mr. PANYARACHUN (Thailand) supported the United States motion to invite only representatives of the Republic of Korea.

22. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said that the problem of Korea was not new but had a long and difficult history. The Committee should discuss it as dispassionately as possible. He was sorry to note that some delegations had used a procedural debate to upset the atmosphere in the Committee and to unload feelings against certain States and tendencies which they had not been able to indulge in during the debate on previous items. A much more serious approach was required if any solution was to be achieved at the present session.

23. Despite the cessation of hostilities, the Korean problem had not been solved, and it continued to complicate international relations in East Asia and in the world at large. In order to improve the situation, a new effort should be undertaken to assist in finding an ultimate solution of the problem. Such an effort was the more advisable now because the international atmosphere, manifested in the course of discussion of previous

items, made such a task easier than in earlier years. One requirement was that of objective consideration, entailing hearing the views of both parties and learning their attitudes as to the ways and means of achieving a solution. That was the objective of the Syrian draft resolution, and it coincided with the request made by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 31 October 1955 (A/C.1/769). Poland fully supported that request, in which it saw a true desire to reach agreed solutions. It would therefore vote for the Syrian draft resolution.

24. Such an objective solution should normally be accepted by the Committee, which had followed a similar course in other instances. Experience showed that a solution of the problem required co-operation by both parties on the basis of mutually acceptable principles. In that connexion, he denied the United States representative's view that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea need not be invited and had no right to participate. It was that Republic's fate, its future, and its State that were involved, and on which the Assembly's decision would have a strong influence. The United States proposal would involve return to the unfortunate practice which had proved futile in the past. But for that practice, the question would probably be much nearer solution. The fact that the problem was unresolved two years after the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement and ten years after the end of the Second World War argued for departing from that practice. Moreover, it was in contradiction with the "spirit of Geneva" and the growing conviction that solutions were to be sought only by negotiation and by mutual understanding. Some delegations had launched accusations. He would not follow them in that course, since the facts regarding the Korean war and aggression were well known and had been dealt with at length by his delegation in the past.

25. Many precedents in international life in recent years warranted extending such an invitation. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had taken part in the armistice negotiations, and its peaceful attitude and patience in the negotiations had helped end the war. It had also taken part in the Korean Political Conference at Geneva, where it had made constructive proposals towards a solution of the problem. Efforts by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and many organizations among its people to achieve understanding and discussion of problems with South Korea had resulted in failure, but the fault was not that of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which had shown that it attached great importance to the peaceful unification of Korea and to the maintenance of peace and security in Asia.

26. His delegation based its position on the principle of participation by both parties, and for that reason would support the Syrian draft resolution, despite the statements made in previous years by the representatives of South Korea which had scarcely been encouraging, and despite the well-known attitude of the South Korean authorities.

27. He had been surprised that the representative of Peru should refuse support to such a tenet of Latin American law. The principle of *audiatur et altera pars* was much older than that of restoring the *status quo ante*. Invitation of both parties would establish a new atmosphere and provide a new starting point for the debate. No one who desired unity could refuse to support a proposal to that effect.

28. In conclusion, Mr. Katz-Suchy said that rule 132 envisaged departure from the regular procedure only when that could assist the Committee's work. The United States proposal under that rule, however, was designed to upset the work of the Committee and was based on the desire to avoid a vote on the Syrian draft resolution. The United States proposal did not relate to the same question as that draft resolution. The latter would have the Committee hear both parties, whereas the United States proposal related simply to hearing a favourite in order to achieve certain political effects. It was undesirable practice, when two such different draft resolutions were involved, to use the priority rule to prevent a vote on one of them. Because he opposed any discrimination and sought a solution of the problem, his delegation would support the Syrian draft resolution, which would give equal treatment to both sides.

29. Mr. HOOD (Australia) said that, for reasons which had often been stated, his delegation would oppose the portion of the Syrian draft resolution relating to the invitation to the North Korean authorities. While appreciating the motives for the amendment suggested by the representatives of Iraq, he feared, however, that it would complicate the situation, because it did not remove all the difficulties involved in the Syrian text. Since the United States had already proposed that priority be given to the United States proposal, he would invite the representative of Iraq to reconsider his amendment.

30. The CHAIRMAN suggested that it would assist the Committee's debate if the representative of Iraq would withdraw his amendment.

31. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq), noting that the objective of his amendment and of the United States proposal was the same, said that he would withdraw the former in view of the feeling that it would be more convenient to give priority to the United States proposal.

32. Mr. MATES (Yugoslavia) said that events in Korea had been subjected to a thorough scrutiny by the United Nations on many occasions, and he did not think that it would be of great assistance to reopen such issues, although he recognized that everyone was entitled to hold and maintain views formed in the course of events.

33. His delegation did not regard the question of an invitation as the giving of a prize or award to either side. It was inclined to view it from the standpoint of usefulness in contributing to the work of the General Assembly. An invitation to both sides would assist the solution of the problem of unifying Korea in accordance with the objectives stated in several resolutions of the General Assembly. That had been the consistent view of his delegation in the Korean question and in other matters, such as inclusion of items in the agenda and the admission of new Members. He believed it important for the success of the Committee's debate and for the aims of the General Assembly that both sides should be heard. That did not imply anticipating agreement or that all remarks would be constructive. Both sides had the right to make remarks, whether or not others approved of them. His country's support of that position, even in cases involving its own interests, justified it in holding that view. The positions of the parties would in all probability be in opposition to each other, as the representative of Peru had noted, but that opposition would not be avoided by not inviting them. He therefore supported the Syrian draft resolution.

34. Mr. TSIANG (China) observed that other speakers had recalled the aggression against the Republic of Korea. Under the Charter, aggression was the number one international crime and the United Nations could not condone it without destroying its own basis. From the outset of the Korean problem the United Nations had offered the only solution consistent with peace and democracy, namely, free elections under the supervision of a United Nations commission. The Republic of Korea had accepted that solution and had co-operated with the United Nations Commission on Korea. The North Korean régime, however, had ignored United Nations resolutions and commissions, and that defiance was the root of the Korean problem. The telegram from the North Korean Foreign Minister gave no hint that that régime was ready to accept free elections under United Nations supervision and, therefore, the obstacle to a solution still remained. His delegation would, therefore, vote against the Syrian draft resolution and in favour of the United States proposal.

35. Mr. MENON (India) remarked that the discussion had been called procedural. It was so only in so far as the Committee was concerned with enlarging the number of participants in the debate. He had hoped that it would remain at that level, but the discussion had come close to the substance of the matter. The representative of Syria had not been polemical and had merely advocated the principle that all should participate in the discussion. The speech of the United States representative, however, had been discouraging, particularly as the United States position was known and the result of the voting could be forecast. Mr. Menon had hoped, in the context of the year 1955, for an approach that would avoid unhelpful language.

36. The discussion was not concerned with the aggression of North Korea, on which the General Assembly had pronounced itself with the support of India. After North Korea had been declared an aggressor by the Security Council, there had been United Nations action in Korea for a limited purpose, then an armistice, and then, at Geneva, a conference which some at least considered a political conference. At the present stage another matter than a question of aggression was the issue, namely, the unification of Korea. To revive the past, as the United States had done, seemed to be to warn others that there was no use in having a constructive approach.

37. Mr. Menon had hoped that the only objective of the United States would be the seating of South Korea. It was uncomplimentary, however, to a number of representatives including the representative of Syria to be told that seating North Korea would be "unthinkable". In fact, it was to be hoped that that could be achieved in order to heal the wounds of the past. Shortly the General Assembly would be discussing the question of the admission of new Members, some of whom had been enemies in a bitter war, and it was to be hoped that memories of the past would not arise. In the present debate it was to be hoped that there would be no statements that would provoke counter-statements.

38. The wording of the United States proposal would mean that South Korea would be invited to participate in the discussion of parts (a), (b) and (c) of the item. However, in the view of India it would be improper for South Korea to participate in the consideration of sub-items (b) and (c). The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission had been established under the Armistice Agreement as a neutral body and it was not now the



time to change the nature or functions of that Commission, even by implication. As far as sub-item (c) was concerned, one could not consult only one of the belligerents. Mr. Menon, therefore, requested both the Syrian and the United States representatives to revise their proposals.

39. While the Committee did not constitute a political conference under article 60 of the Armistice Agreement, nevertheless, it would deal with political issues. At the present stage, it was, however, unlikely that it could receive much assistance from anyone. The Members could discuss the matter amongst themselves without either party, particularly in view of the past contributions made by South Korea. India would not object to leaving out North Korea if South Korea also was left out, but the Committee could not shut out only one. Having such views, India had taken no initiative in the matter, but in the circumstances would support any proposal that gave equal treatment to both parties. That position arose, not out of any views concerning aggression, but on the ground that the contributions of the two parties to the deliberations would be comparable.

40. With regard to the United States motion for priority, it was true that the rules of procedure contained the provision referred to, but it was intended to solve procedural difficulties. To invoke voting support under that rule would be to defeat the purpose of the rules of procedure. India, therefore, opposed the motion on principle because it would treat minority views with scant consideration and make a mockery of the rules, not because the result of the voting was in doubt.

41. Mr. MELAS (Greece) said that the question was not just procedural but a matter of basic principle. Greece would not support the Syrian draft resolution. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had opposed not only the original plans of the United Nations, but also its later actions when co-operation had been expected of that Republic. Greece was ready to lay aside the past, but the authority of the United Nations was at stake. The fact was that there had been no change since a decision in the same matter had been taken the previous year (737th meeting). Moreover, the Committee was dealing, not with a dispute between the two parties, but with a situation in which the authority of the United Nations had been and still was being defied and disregarded. North Korea had taken no action to improve the situation. It was not a matter of discrimination or of two kinds of international law but a question of respecting international law. Since there had been no progress on the North Korean side, the time had not yet come to extend it an invitation.

42. Mr. SUAREZ BORRERO (Colombia) said that his delegation would vote against the Syrian draft resolution and for the United States proposal for reasons similar to those stated by the representatives of Peru and Cuba. Since the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had defied the authority of the United Nations at the Korean Political Conference at Geneva it was impossible to think of permitting them to sit and speak in the Organization. The Colombian delegation sought a solution of the Korean question, but felt the matter keenly since many of its citizens had died in Korea defending the ideals of peace and justice under the United Nations flag.

43. Mr. KISELYOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the Syrian draft resolution was based on the principles of justice and on the necessity of having both parties participate. The success of the

consideration of the Korean question depended upon the Syrian draft resolution. The solution of the Korean question was vital to the people of Korea and the Committee should be mindful of the interests of that people as a whole. A business-like approach required the representation of both sides. The absence of North Korea in the past had not contributed to progress, nor would it in the future. Those representatives who said that only South Korea should be invited were still talking in terms of the "cold war". The present task was the peaceful reunification of Korea through sober debate. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea had shown by its proposals that it favoured peaceful reunification. It had participated in the Korean Political Conference in 1954 and to invite it now would be in harmony with the principles of the Charter and in line with reality. The Byelorussian delegation would, therefore, support the Syrian draft resolution and oppose the United States proposal.

44. Mr. SHUKAIRY (Syria) appealed to the Committee to accept the Syrian draft resolution. It was not intended to carry any acquittal or conviction of one side or the other. It merely would invite both parties to express their views on the destiny of their own country which it was for them to decide. The Committee could help towards unification and the establishment of a democratic State, but the people themselves should decide their own future. The item before the Committee was the Korean question, not the question of South Korea. In the latter case it would have been proper to omit North Korea, but as it was a question of the whole, one party could not be denied participation. It therefore seemed that the United States proposal was out of order and, indeed, it would be "unthinkable" to confine the invitation to South Korea.

45. Syria's interest was solely in the cause of peace. It had no other objective in introducing the proposal. It did not belong either to the "Soviet bloc" or to the "anti-Soviet bloc". It belonged among those who pursued an independent and objective policy, but they were not "neutral" when the question of peace was at stake.

46. While the draft resolution did not acquit North Korea, which had been condemned for aggression, it would be absurd to suppose that such condemnation would be eternal, for then there would be no possibility for a peaceful settlement. Having in mind the condemnation of the General Assembly, the North Koreans could appear as convicted aggressors, but nevertheless they should be heard. If the General Assembly was to help in the establishment of a unified State, it had to hear both parties.

47. The United States proposal to invite only South Korea justified pressing the Syrian draft resolution. The Committee could have discussed the matter without either party, but it was "unthinkable" to invite one and deny the other the right to be represented. The hostility of the Soviet Union to South Korea and of the United States to North Korea was no secret, but that should not influence the Committee's decision. The aim should be the maintenance of peace.

48. It had been asked whether there had been a change in the situation which justified a change in attitude. The facts were that there had been an end to the hostilities and that an Armistice Agreement had been concluded, which constituted changes. Logically the United States position would lead to erasing the North Korean signature on the agreement and throwing it out of the United Nations archives. Moreover, there was the change in

international atmosphere created by the "spirit of Geneva", which should also apply to the Korean situation.

49. As for offering guarantees that North Korea would respect the United Nations decisions, or, for that matter, that South Korea would respect them—that was not the problem. The present aim should be to ensure that the decision reached was not one-sided.

50. Mr. SHUKAIRY would join in the tributes to the fallen, but he did not believe it would be any tribute to deny a hearing to one side. That would only amount to a new form of discrimination.

51. The United States had asked for priority for its proposal and had invoked the rules of procedure. That was a regrettable motion, for the rule concerned had been intended only for exceptional circumstances. The Syrian proposal could be defeated by a majority, but it would be unfortunate if the priority motion were carried.

52. Mr. QUIROGA GALDO (Bolivia) said that great importance seemed to be attached to the presence of the parties. However, to grant or to reject the North Korean request, or to invite South Korea again, would not enlarge or reduce the possibility of solving the Korean question. The statement by the representative of the Republic of Korea at the previous session had not provided facts for the debate, but only poisoned the atmosphere. Bolivia would, therefore, abstain in the votes on all proposals concerning invitations.

53. Mr. MENON (India) said that he had asked the movers of the draft resolution both publicly and privately to appreciate the present situation. The representative of the United States had cited precedents, but those precedents did not cover parts (b) and (c) of the item. The Indian delegation was, therefore, forced to move that the last words of both proposals be amended so that they referred only to part (a) of the Korean question. Mr. Menon hoped that his amendments would not have to be put to the vote, but would be accepted by the movers. It was not a procedural argument. Ever since 1952 steps had been taken to ensure that the stages from the cease-fire onwards were under neutral auspices, and machinery had been set up for that purpose.

54. It was true that the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission had been terminated, but the Assembly had not yet received its reports. As long as that work had not been wound up, the Indian position was that the results of that work could not be the exclusive competence of one side or the other. There was no reason why a representative of either North or South Korea should participate in any discussion dealing with the reports of that Commission or the persons who remained under the temporary protection of India. If the sponsors of the proposals insisted on bringing in one of the parties in the consideration of those matters, they were paying scant regard to the Indian position. In such an event there would appear to be no prospect even of an approach to reconciliation. Mr. Menon requested the support of the Committee because he considered that otherwise the Committee would not only be going against the request of the Government of India, but also against its previous decisions and considerations of equity.

55. Mr. BARRINGTON (Burma) said that if the Korean armistice negotiations proved anything, it was that there could be no unification except by agreement between the two parties. Perhaps an agreement on Korea would have to encompass wider areas, but the two parts of Korea would have to be parties to it. The United

Nations should, therefore, endeavour to bring North and South Korea together. None of the speeches in support of the United States position seemed to reflect any realization of that fact, and indeed they would tend to keep the two parties apart. Burma, therefore, could support neither the United States proposal nor the motion to give it priority, and would vote in favour of the Syrian draft resolution.

56. Mr. SHUKIARY (Syria) stated that he accepted the amendment proposed by the representative of India.

57. Mr. PALAMARCHUK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that he had not expected such vigorous objections to the Syrian draft resolution, perhaps because he had thought that after the Conference of the Heads of Government of the four great Powers there had been a change in international relations in the direction of co-operation in the solution of questions. It was the duty of the Committee to eliminate a situation in which the Korean question was discussed in the absence of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. At the 1954 Korean Political Conference, there had been a *de facto* recognition of the Democratic People's Republic as a sovereign State. That proved the importance of its participation in the examination of the problem.

58. The Committee should now extend an invitation, to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for, if it sincerely wished to solve the problem, it could not deny a hearing to the representatives of both parts of Korea. Past events had shown that it was useless to try to deal with the question in the absence of representatives of the Democratic People's Republic, which rightly did not recognize decisions taken in its absence. The Ukrainian SSR, therefore, supported the Syrian draft resolution and regarded the United States proposal as no more than another attempt to evade a solution of the Korean problem arrived at in accordance with the will of the Korean people.

59. Mr. BLAUSTEIN (United States) said that his delegation was opposed to the limitation proposed by the representative of India. The Republic of Korea had a vital interest in each of the sub-items and there was no point in limiting its participation. Moreover, in the past all aspects of the Korean question had been considered under one main item and the present main item covered all aspects of the Korean question. The United States hoped the Committee would not seek to impose any limitation on the participation of any invited representative, and would vote against the Indian amendment.

60. Mr. MENON (India) said the fact was that the Committee had never before discussed an item entitled "Reports of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Committee". It might be that that matter had been mentioned in passing in the past, but there had never before been such an item on the agenda.

61. India had proposed such an item the previous year, but it had been postponed. It was not correct to say that the report or the position of the non-repatriated men under the protection of India had been discussed. It was not equitable, nor in conformity with the agreement entered into, nor appropriate to the neutrality and objectivity which were necessary, to allow the participation of either of the Korean parties in that discussion. India had no option but to press its amendment to a vote.

62. Mr. POLLERI CARRIO (Uruguay) emphasized that the Committee was not a judicial organ solving a legal problem, but was concerned with a humanitarian mission. Legal principles were not at stake in the pres-

ent case. The Committee should concentrate on the task entrusted to it and consider only practical measures. In view of the attitude of North Korea toward the United Nations, an invitation to it would bring no benefit. Uruguay would, therefore, be unable to vote for the Syrian draft resolution.

63. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that in voting for the inclusion of the Korean question in the agenda, many delegations, including that of the Soviet Union, had presumed that in the changed conditions of reduced tension it would be possible to find a peaceful solution. The Geneva Conference had opened the door to a more comprehensive examination of all aspects of the matter. The United States statement, however, had poured cold water on those hopes. Already in the present Assembly there had been unanimous decisions on three questions, but the delegations presenting proposals on those matters made no efforts to get agreements on the basis of the Soviet Union proposals. Co-operation had been a one-way street, and that apparently was the idea on Korea also. The present debate revealed again opposition to a joint solution.

64. The United Kingdom representative had referred to the Soviet Union statement that whoever objected to an invitation to North Korea desired to hamper a solution. Whether that was the intention of the United Kingdom or not, the fact remained that those who prevented an expression of the North Korean views would hamper a peaceful solution. It was no use closing one's eyes to reality and keeping to the old line. With the relaxation of tensions there was opportunity to approach the problem more objectively.

65. The representative of Peru had asked whether there was any need to invite North Korea. Mr. Malik's

reply was that consideration of the problem with only one side present had borne no fruit. In the past the General Assembly had not achieved any results. It had been charged that North Korea did not recognize the decisions of the Assembly, but that raised the question as to who would argue that its Government would fulfil decisions taken in the absence of its representatives, that is, under conditions where they had not been allowed to express their views. Invitations to South Korea only, and the speeches of its representatives, had only complicated the situation. Other representatives had already recalled the slanderous attacks made by the South Korean representative, on India. Indeed, the Chairman had had to interrupt the South Korean representative, who had hardly assisted the Committee in reaching a solution. It was fitting and proper to hear both sides.

66. The discussion had revealed a division of views as to whether the Committee should try soberly to reach a solution, or continue in accordance with the old United States line. The Soviet Union favoured the former course, taking into account the recent international developments, and the course of events during the present session of the General Assembly. If the United States line were followed, the Korean problem would not be advanced an inch. Only by an invitation to North Korea as well as South Korea could the search for an agreed solution be facilitated.

67. Mr. JARRING (Sweden) moved the adjournment of the meeting in order to give time for thought before the voting.

*The motion was adopted by 31 votes to 18, with 4 abstentions.*

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.