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PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED AND  
SECOND MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,  
on Tuesday, 2 December 1975, at 11 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. GHORRA (Lebanon)  
Rapporteur: Mr. ARTEAGA ACOSTA (Venezuela)

- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3254 (XXIX): report of the Secretary-General /34/ (continued)
- Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: reports of the Secretary-General /35/ (continued)
- Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /37/ (continued)
- World Disarmament Conference: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference /40/ (continued)
- General and complete disarmament /41/ (continued)
  - (a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
  - (b) Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency

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AS THIS RECORD WAS DISTRIBUTED ON 3 DECEMBER 1975, THE TIME-LIMIT FOR CORRECTIONS WILL BE 8 DECEMBER 1975.

The co-operation of delegations in strictly observing this time-limit would be greatly appreciated.

- Mid-term review of the Disarmament Decade: report of the Secretary-General /42/ (continued)
- Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa /43/ (continued)
- Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /44/ (continued)
- Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East: report of the Secretary-General /46/ (continued)
- Prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other hostile purposes, which are incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /47/ (continued)
- Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia: report of the Secretary-General /48/ (continued)
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- Organization of work

The meeting was called to order at 11.00 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 34, 35, 37, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 122 and 126 (continued)

Mr. MIHAJLOVIC (Yugoslavia): I wish to address the issues of the Mid-Term Review of the Disarmament Decade and the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests.

The current debate on disarmament has confirmed the general feeling that peace and security in the world cannot be based on the might of weapons and, in particular, on the so-called balance of weapons of mass destruction. This forum has again expressed its concern over the intensification of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, which threatens the security and existence of all peoples and countries. However, despite a growing awareness of the fact that such an accumulation of weapons of mass destruction has never before been seen in history, the arms race is continuing, absorbing considerable human and material resources that are so much needed for general social and economic progress.

Although certain results have been achieved along the lines of an easing of international tensions during the last few years, the risk of nuclear war and annihilation is constantly present, inasmuch as the piling-up of nuclear weapons by the countries possessing them does not at all strengthen their security while, on the other hand, it has a negative effect on the general state of international security. The maintenance of peace is incompatible with the arms race. One cannot seriously think of eliminating the threat of war while, at the same time, increasing military budgets and endlessly building up armaments.

We are now half-way through the implementation of the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade. Unfortunately, the road covered so far does not give us much cause for satisfaction. The draft resolution on the Mid-term Review of the Disarmament Decade, document A/C.1/L.731, that my country has the honour to co-sponsor, expressed, in its preamble,

(Mr. Mihajlović, Yugoslavia)

" ... deep concern at the meagre achievements of the Disarmament Decade in terms of truly effective disarmament and arms limitation agreements, and the detrimental effects on world peace and economy of the continuing unproductive and wasteful arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race".

(A/C.1/L.731)

It also reiterates, inter alia, the central interest of the United Nations in all disarmament negotiations and reaffirms that disarmament and development foster a climate of international understanding and co-operation. It calls, primarily, upon all Member States to intensify their efforts in support of the link between disarmament and development, envisaged by resolution 2602 E/XXIV on the Disarmament Decade, so as to promote disarmament negotiations and to ensure that the human and material resources freed by disarmament are used to promote economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries. It also invites the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to review the work done in the implementation of the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade and in this light to reappraise its tasks and duties in order to accelerate the pace of its efforts to negotiate truly effective disarmament and arms limitation agreements.

We feel that this demand addressed to the CCD is very timely. But we think that other disarmament forums which exist or may be established on a bilateral, regional or multilateral basis may be helpful for additional negotiations. We also believe that unilateral disarmament initiatives, particularly those taken by major military Powers, are of great significance and should be undertaken by one or more States at every appropriate opportunity. In this connexion, we deem it, of course, indispensable that the United Nations, which has specific responsibility for disarmament under the Charter, should be kept informed of all disarmament efforts, whether unilateral, bilateral or multilateral, and that it should maintain under constant review the role of the United Nations system in the field of disarmament.

The Yugoslav delegation considers that the reaching of new agreements in the field of disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, is assuming added urgency because further progress in international relations, taken as a whole, will be limited and brought into question unless disarmament measures go hand in hand with the progress achieved in the political sphere.



(Mr. Mihajlović, Yugoslavia)

In our mind, some of the following measures ought to be implemented by the end of the Disarmament Decade, that is, by the year 1980:

First, an urgent discontinuation of all underground nuclear-weapon tests, followed immediately by negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty;

Second, an undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States not under any circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States;

Third, withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States;

Fourth, prohibition of the development, manufacture and use of new types of weapons of mass destruction; and

Fifth, resumption of negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

We think that this minimum of only some restrictive measures could provide a solid basis for undertaking genuine measures of nuclear disarmament and of disarmament in general.

I should like now to say a few words concerning nuclear-weapon tests.

The continuation of nuclear-weapon tests has a negative effect on the general development of international relations on many counts. Today, twelve years after the signing of the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, which raised hopes for the possibility of rapidly reaching agreement on the complete prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests, their frequency is not diminishing, while the nuclear arms race is assuming ever more dangerous forms. In fact, nuclear-weapon tests encourage the continuation of the nuclear arms race. The efforts exerted with a view to strengthening international confidence and security, as well as the results achieved so far toward that end, are consequently based on unsecure foundations.

(Mr. Mihajlovic, Yugoslavia)

The continuation of nuclear-weapon tests brings also into question the effectiveness of certain international agreements, the basic aim of which was to help prevent further nuclear proliferation and acceleration of the nuclear arms race, namely, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear-weapon tests are undermining the very foundations of this Treaty; they greatly diminish its significance, and bring into question its universality and durability.

They also constitute a serious obstacle to the reaching of new agreements, such as a comprehensive test ban. The continuation of nuclear-weapon tests further hampers and postpones the solution of the problem of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, as well as the creation of conditions for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace in the world.

The comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is, in our view, one of the most urgent and significant measures to be undertaken in the field of disarmament. The banning of these tests would contribute considerably to the limitation of the nuclear arms race and of sophistication of weapons, and would provide convincing proof of the determination to advance towards the elimination of the nuclear threat. The Yugoslav Government has always urged the permanent prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests in all environments, which is also one of the common positions taken by the non-aligned conferences. We continue to believe that the highest priority should be accorded to this question. We would, therefore, have preferred a demand for the "highest priority" to have found a place in the draft resolution of the group of sponsors submitted in document A/C.1/L.738, as in General Assembly resolution 3257 (XXIX) last year.

We also consider a useful and acceptable initiative the draft resolution submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests (A/C.1/L.707). However, having in mind the existing difficulties which appear in connexion with how best to achieve a comprehensive test ban, we consider it useful to include in this draft resolution a provision to the effect that the consideration of such an agreement would remain within the

(Mr. Miha,jlovic, Yugoslavia)

competence of the CCD. We think that this addition is necessary because, if the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in the negotiations could not be secured for one reason or another, provision should be made for the possibility of the preparation of such an important agreement within the framework of the CCD, which is the only multilateral negotiating organ in the field of disarmament under the auspices of the United Nations.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Russian): I call on the representative of the Soviet Union to introduce amendments to the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/L.707 and A/C.1/L.711.

Mr. ROSCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation wishes to make the following statement on the draft resolutions on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons (A/C.1/L.711) and on the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests (A/C.1/L.707).

In the course of the general debate during plenary meetings of the General Assembly and in the course of the work of the First Committee itself, a great deal of attention has been devoted to both these questions, which were introduced at this session on the initiative of the Soviet Union. This is understandable; after all, what we are dealing with are proposals of great significance and relevance, since they are designed to ensure that measures are taken in the field of limiting the arms race and disarmament.

In this statement there is no need for me to argue these Soviet Union proposals or to explain them. That has already been done by the Soviet delegation at the 2072nd and 2075th meetings of the First Committee. The Soviet delegation has also held numerous meetings and talks with individual delegations and regional groups.

In the course of these contacts the Soviet delegation attempted to answer the questions put by a number of delegations while they were studying the Soviet proposals, and we should like to stress once again that the implementation of the proposals on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons, and on the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon

(Mr. Roschin, USSR)

tests would promote the further development of the favourable processes occurring in the world today, would help to make these processes irreversible and would help to supplement political détente by military détente.

During the consideration of the Soviet proposals at this session many delegations not only supported them but became co-sponsors of the draft resolutions on these subjects (A/C.1/L.707 and A/C.1/L.711). We should like to take this opportunity to express our profound gratitude to the delegations of Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Guinea, Hungary, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mongolia, Poland, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian SSR, Yemen, and Yugoslavia for their co-operation and co-sponsorship.

At the same time, we should like to express our gratitude to all those delegations which supported the Soviet proposals and commented on them in such a constructive spirit, informing us of their wishes and their observations.

The sponsors of these draft resolutions have found it possible to take into account the wishes expressed by a number of delegations, and certain additions and clarifications have therefore been made to the texts. The revised draft resolutions are contained in documents A/C.1/L.707/Rev.1 and A/C.1/L.711/Rev.1.

In the discussion of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons, a number of delegations pointed out the difficulty of defining the object of the prohibition, since what we are talking about here is a novel and complex problem in the realm of international relations: prohibiting potential or possible types of weapons and weapons systems which do not actually exist at present but may in the future. Therefore, it was pointed out that it would be a good idea to obtain an expert study on this subject by means, inter alia, of setting up a special group of experts. The sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.711/Rev.1 share the view of those delegations which believe that, in order to reduce the question to tangible terms -- that is, the question of what is to be the object of the prohibition -- the participation of highly qualified scientific and technological experts was required.

(Mr. Roschin, USSR)

Therefore, an addition was made to the text of the draft resolution in order to accommodate the wishes of delegations which supported our proposal in principle but drew attention to the need for an expert study of the question.

Operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution has had added to it the words "with the assistance of qualified governmental experts". Accordingly, paragraph 3 in the new form would read as follows:

"Requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to proceed as soon as possible, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, to work out the text of such an Agreement and to submit a report on the results achieved for consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session;"

It is precisely the Committee on Disarmament which has such positive experience in holding expert talks on matters of disarmament and the production of important international agreements, that is the most appropriate body for holding talks on the question of concluding a treaty prohibiting the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons.

With regard to the proposal for the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, many delegations supported the new approach to a consideration of this problem, that is, direct practical talks among all five nuclear Powers. The Disarmament Committee, which for many years has had on its agenda the question of complete and general prohibition of nuclear tests, in spite of considerable efforts has not been able to make any progress towards a decision. As we are aware, not all nuclear Powers have been taking part in the work of the Committee on Disarmament. And this fact, of course, considerably limits the possibility of producing and agreeing upon an appropriate prohibition within the framework of this Committee.

The sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.707/Rev.1 are convinced that the new approach contained in the draft resolution, if it were accepted, would help to overcome the inertia in the question of solving the problem of a complete and general prohibition of tests.

(Mr. Roschin, USSR)

In the course of the discussion, some delegations pointed out that in deciding on the question of the complete and general prohibition of tests, it was necessary to ensure that the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions should be accessible to all States, nuclear and non-nuclear. At the same time, a number of delegations expressed misgivings with regard to the possibility of peaceful nuclear explosions being used for producing and creating nuclear weapons or improving existing arsenals of such weapons, that is, being used for purposes incompatible with the complete and general prohibition of the testing of nuclear weapons and the proliferation of such weapons.

Furthermore, a number of delegations expressed the view that the non-nuclear States should also take part in the talks of the five nuclear Powers on the question of a complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The co-sponsors of the draft resolution are sympathetic to these ideas and wishes.

We have, therefore, found it possible to put in certain additions in the text in order to accommodate the delegations concerned and to meet their points and wishes. Accordingly, we have included in the preambular part of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.707/Rev.1 a new paragraph 4, worded as follows:

"Reaffirming that the potential benefits of any peaceful application of nuclear explosions should be available to nuclear as well as non-nuclear States, in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in such a way as to exclude any possibility of peaceful nuclear explosions being used for purposes incompatible with the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons."

Furthermore, in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, after the words "complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests", we would add the words "... to invite 25 to 30 non-nuclear-weapon States, to be appointed by the President of the General Assembly after consultations with all regional groups, to participate in those negotiations ..."

(Mr. Roschin, USSR)

In its amended form, then, paragraph 2 would read as follows:

"Calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to enter into negotiations not later than 31 March 1976 with a view to reaching agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, to invite 25 to 30 non-nuclear-weapon States to be appointed by the President of the General Assembly after consultations with all regional groups, to participate in those negotiations, and to inform the General Assembly of the United Nations of the results of the negotiations at its thirty-first session;"

Of course, the question of inviting non-nuclear States to participate in talks, and their appointment by the President of the General Assembly, will be decided in the light of agreement among the five nuclear States as to the opening of talks among themselves.

(Mr. Roschin, USSR)

The co-sponsors express the hope that the additions and clarifications made in the draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/L.707/Rev.1 and A/C.1/L.711/Rev.1 will satisfy States which have expressed the points of view and wishes in question.

In conclusion, the Soviet delegation would like to express the hope that both draft resolutions will receive wide support in the vote, both in the First Committee and in the plenary meeting of the General Assembly. In this way new steps will be taken towards limiting the arms race and towards disarmament in keeping with the interests of the peoples of all countries and the whole of peace-loving mankind.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Finland to introduce the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.739.

Mr. PASTINEN (Finland): In its statement on 13 November the Finnish delegation made brief comments on the question of environmental warfare, welcoming the two identical draft conventions submitted on 21 August by the Soviet Union and the United States to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). Today, the Finnish delegation has the honour to introduce for the consideration of this Committee the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.739 which is sponsored by the delegations of Afghanistan, Argentina, Bulgaria, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Mauritius, Netherlands, Poland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and my own delegation.

From the statements made in this Committee on the subject of environmental warfare, some salient features clearly emerge. The dominant one is the almost unanimous recognition of the importance of early preventive measures in this field, that is, that measures should be taken before the potential threat of these new techniques of warfare gets out of control. If -- as has been stated -- such means of warfare are introduced into the arms race, their prohibition will become more complicated. The significance of a convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques



(Mr. Pastinen, Finland)

has thus been generally recognized. Such a convention would eliminate from the arsenals of States a whole category of potential means of warfare of a particularly dangerous and destructive kind. The convention would thus become an integral part of the continuous effort of the international community to restrict the dangers inherent in the very existence of weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, the introduction by the Soviet Union and the United States of the text of the draft convention, as a basis for negotiation in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, has been welcomed.

The sense of satisfaction expressed by most is but a reflection of resolution 3264 (XXIX) adopted by the General Assembly last year by an overwhelming majority. The general tenor of the comments made here on this subject gives us cause to believe that the present draft resolution will be approved by consensus.

The text of the draft resolution is couched in clear and straightforward language, and I can therefore dispense with any elaborate explanations.

The first preambular paragraph recalls resolution 3264 (XXIX), in which the General Assembly requested the CCD "to proceed" -- and I want to emphasize this -- "as soon as possible to achieving agreement on the text" of a convention on the prohibition of action to influence the environment for military and other hostile purposes.

The second preambular paragraph expresses the same conviction that was included in resolution 3264 (XXIX), namely, that the conclusion of such a convention would serve to spare mankind from the potential dangers of the use of environmental techniques for military and other hostile purposes, and that it would thereby also contribute to strengthening peace and averting the threat of war.

On the other hand, the possibility of using some environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes will not be prohibited. To the contrary, in its third preambular paragraph, the draft resolution expresses the conviction that the development and use of such techniques could contribute to the preservation and improvement of the environment. This, evidently, is for the benefit of both present and future generations as the draft itself indicates.

(Mr. Pastinen, Finland)

The fourth preambular paragraph again refers to the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. That report is contained in document A/10027 and the relevant parts of that document are its paragraphs 40 to 45 as well as a number of working papers and the two draft texts of the convention, all of which are included as annexes to the CCD report.

The fifth preambular paragraph reflects the sense of satisfaction expressed in the Committee over the submission of identical draft conventions by the Soviet Union and the United States. It further notes with satisfaction the suggestions and preliminary observations offered by other delegations regarding those drafts.

I now come to the operative paragraphs of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.739. Operative paragraph 1 requests the CCD to continue negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement on the text of a convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, and to submit a special report on the results achieved to the General Assembly for consideration at its thirty-first session.

In referring to "early agreement" the draft also suggests that this might be reached during the Committee's 1976 session. On my own behalf, I would venture to say that the efficient manner in which this item has been taken forward so far, gives us reason to hope that this will indeed be possible. The paragraph also requests the CCD to bear in mind both the existing proposals and suggestions and relevant discussion by the General Assembly while working out the convention. Many delegations during our general debate have put forward their views on the question of environmental warfare. Some have done so in broad and general terms, others in a more precise and detailed way. We believe that all these statements, constructive and positive as they are, can be of valuable help to the CCD in its negotiations. That is why operative paragraph 2 requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the CCD all documents related to the discussion of this question by the General Assembly.

Finally, operative paragraph 3 envisages the inclusion of this item on the provisional agenda of the thirty-first session. If the wishes expressed

(Mr. Pastinen, Finland)

in operative paragraph 1 on the early agreement were to be fulfilled, as we hope they will, the next General Assembly would have the agreed final text of the convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques for its consideration.

It is with these hopes and expectations that I have the honour, on behalf of the co-sponsors, to commend the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.739 to the attention of this Committee for approval and adoption.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Finland for introducing the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.739.

Mr. PALMA (Peru) (interpretation from Spanish): In connexion with the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.724, of which Peru is a sponsor, regarding the definition of the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones and of the principal obligations of the nuclear-weapon States towards nuclear-weapon-free zones and towards the States included therein, my delegation would like to make a brief comment.

We cannot say that we are surprised at the objections expressed by some nuclear-weapon States, objections about which the representative of Mexico has already given clarifications with which we completely agree, and which we consider completely dispel any possible doubt as to the purpose and scope of the concepts contained in the document.

We shall therefore at this time limit ourselves to one element that we regard as common to the statements made by the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, to the effect that their respective Governments cannot recognize obligations in whose negotiation they have not participated.

Operative paragraph 2 of section II relating to the principal obligations quite clearly states that in each case they shall be embodied in an international instrument to be signed and ratified by all the nuclear-weapon States, and this in itself eliminates the alleged imposition of such obligations through a General Assembly resolution. Nevertheless, a brief review of such obligations may be in order.

The sovereignty of States does not mean that they are subject only to those obligations in the negotiation of which they have participated. If we review the principal obligations contained in part II of the draft resolution, we might arrive at interesting conclusions. We wonder: Would non-recognition of the obligation to respect the statute of total absence of nuclear weapons allow nuclear-weapon States not to respect this? Would non-recognition of the obligation to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against the States included in the zone mean that nuclear-weapon States are authorized to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States included in the zone? It hardly seems necessary to insist on the significance of these questions. Nobody need be indignant because the non-nuclear-weapon States seek to find a way of increasing their security -- which ultimately, as was pointed out by one of the representatives

(Mr. Palma, Peru)

I have mentioned, would be of only theoretical value if a nuclear war really did break out; or are we to expect power politics to block even this very modest safeguard?

The draft resolution under consideration is so solidly based on moral, legal and political considerations that their acceptance or refusal could be considered as an index of the real will of countries, large and small, nuclear States or non-nuclear States, to increase international security by recognizing the conceptual standards of what nuclear-weapon-free zones should be and the minimum obligations towards them and the States within them on the part of the nuclear-weapon States.

The alternative seems clear-cut. If the already perilous insecurity of today cannot be ended by the reasoned political will of the nuclear Powers, the inexorable rise in the number of States possessing these devices will increase the insecurity, not only of the States which remain non-nuclear States, but also of those who are not doing what is required to prevent such a situation.

On the basis of what I have said it does not seem absurd to invoke the special responsibility and political perspicacity of the nuclear Powers in calling on them today to support measures such as this that may forestall much greater evils tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of India to introduce the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.730.

Mr. MISHRA (India): The twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly adopted resolution 3265 A (XXIX) at the initiative of India. In that resolution the General Assembly considered that the initiative for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in an appropriate region of Asia should come from the States of the region concerned, taking into account its special features and geographical extent.

While introducing the draft resolution at the meeting of the First Committee on 15 November 1974, the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India pointed to the inappropriateness of the concept of South Asia as being considered as a separate region for the purpose of creating it a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

He said:

"It would be essential to take into consideration certain special features of the zone proposed by Pakistan. Africa and Latin America are separate and distinct continental zones, geographically and politically. In that sense, South Asia cannot be considered a zone. The presence in Asia of countries belonging to military alliances and the existence of nuclear-weapon Powers would have a vital bearing on the viability of a nuclear-weapon-free zone." (2020th meeting, p. 2)

He went on:

"The draft resolution ... we propose is put forward in that constructive spirit. ...

"Our draft supports the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in appropriate regions of the world by a process of consultation and agreement among the States concerned. However, it avoids any prejudgement concerning the concept, features and delineation of the zones. These are matters best left for discussion and eventual agreement among the interested countries. We feel that in view of the special conditions prevailing in our part of the world the draft resolution proposed by us is more suitable.

"We have carefully examined the statements made by the various delegations regarding the prerequisite of prior consultations and agreement before a nuclear-weapon-free zone could be endorsed by the General Assembly. In particular, that feature has been emphasized by our neighbours. ... We therefore hope that this proposal will enjoy unanimous support."

(Ibid., p. 3)

(Mr. Mishra, India)

Therefore, the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India proposed, and the General Assembly adopted, the view that the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should embrace an appropriate region of Asia, and further, that the initiative for the creation of such a zone should come from the States of the region concerned, and finally, that the initiative should take into account the region's special features and geographical extent.

(Mr. Mishra, India)

At this session of the General Assembly my delegation again stated its position in the following words:

"With regard to the proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, India had pointed out that no consultations regarding its implications, feasibility and acceptability took place before the item was inscribed on the agenda of the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly. India is of the firm view that such an arrangement can only be developed and matured from within the region concerned. For this purpose South Asia cannot be treated in isolation. It is a subregion and an integral part of the region of Asia and the Pacific. It is necessary to take into account the security environment of that region as a whole. A genuine nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region can only follow the total absence of nuclear weapons.

"The existence of nuclear weapons in the region of Asia and the Pacific and the presence of foreign military bases in the Indian Ocean complicate the security environment of that region and make the situation inappropriate for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the subregion of South Asia". (A/C.1/FV.2088, p. 37)

Since the adoption of resolution 3265 A (XXIX) there has been one significant development relating to the general question of establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world. I refer to the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects prepared by an Ad Hoc Group of Qualified Governmental Experts under the auspices of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and which is available to us in document A/10027/Add.1. The experts, although unable to agree on several fundamental questions, were nevertheless unanimous on certain basic principles which should be taken into account wherever appropriate conditions for a nuclear-weapon-free zone exist. One of these basic principles is that the initiative for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should come from States within the region concerned, and participation must be voluntary. My Government attaches particular importance to this not for mere doctrinaire reasons. This is for a very practical reason. We believe that for a zone to be viable it should come into being



(Mr. Mishra, India)

as a result of the basic desire of States to ensure their security. It cannot be imposed from outside of the region. Nor can it be imposed from within the region by one or more States. The initiative must be the product of common security concern, common perception of the threats to security, and the common desire to help each other in meeting such threats. It is only in such a situation that States will come together voluntarily to group themselves in a nuclear-weapon-free zone. It is of the essence that participation is voluntary. As the study unequivocally points out:

"Conditions in which nuclear-weapon-free zones might be viable and might enhance security are bound to differ considerably from region to region. The security considerations and perceptions of States which are potential members may vary and it is not possible or realistic, a priori, to set out precise guidelines for the creation of zones, since it is for Governments themselves to decide on their own security requirements and to determine their immediate and long-term national interests. ..."

(A/10027/Add.1, p. 41)

This does not mean, of course, that the United Nations can or should be kept out of the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Certainly not. But in our view, and looking at it from the angle of our region, the General Assembly can play a useful role only after a proposal for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone has been developed and matured among the States within the region concerned. The particular problems with which we are faced and which were outlined in our statements last year, and again this year, make it difficult for the involvement of the United Nations ab initio.

The position of the Government is as outlined above, and we believe that many of our fundamental points are shared by almost all delegations here. This position is suitably reflected in the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.730, which I have the honour to commend for adoption by the First Committee and eventually by the plenary.

Before I conclude, I should like to recall that in one of its preambular paragraphs, resolution 3265 A (XXIX) recognized that conditions and procedures for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones differ from region to region. What we have outlined in the preceding paragraphs of this statement is

(Mr. Mishra, India)

particular to our region. It may or may not apply wholly or partly to other regions. Therefore, we continue to maintain an open but sympathetic mind in regard to other items concerning nuclear-weapon-free zones before the current session of the General Assembly.

Mr. DUGERSUREN (Mongolia) (interpretation from Russian): The delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic today wishes to make a few brief comments on some of the draft resolutions before our Committee.

Firstly, I should like to express my views on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.726 submitted by the delegations of Mexico and Sweden on item 34 of the agenda. The Government of the Mongolian People's Republic believes that a reduction of military expenditures, which swallow up vast material and intellectual resources, would promote the curbing of the arms race and thus the further improvement of the international situation.

It is understandable, therefore, that our Government whole-heartedly supported the proposal of the Soviet Union to reduce by 10 per cent the military budgets of permanent members of the Security Council and the utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide additional economic assistance to developing countries.

As we have previously pointed out, this initiative establishes specific and practical links between two major problems of the present day: disarmament and development. The approach proposed by the Soviet Union to a solution of the problem of reducing military expenditures is extremely sensible. Indeed, it would be realistic and correct to reduce military budgets if this were begun by the States with the major military potential. In the light of these circumstances, the proposal of the Soviet Union was broadly supported by Members of the United Nations and particularly by developing countries.

(Mr. Dugersuren, Mongolia)

Many representatives of those States, in the course of this discussion, have favoured the taking of measures to bring about a reduction of the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily significant States, and the use of the funds so released for the needs of the developing countries.

The Soviet Union remains ready, and repeats that it is ready, to undertake practical measures if the other permanent members of the Security Council agree to do so too. However, these latter members have not displayed the political will to undertake even a business-like discussion of the ways and means of implementing such measures.

Furthermore, one of the permanent members of the Security Council had recourse to its favourite method of slandering and distorting the policy of the Soviet Union; and others would not mind at all turning their backs on this topical, relevant and timely problem and shelving it indefinitely. Our delegation believes that the General Assembly should most categorically come out in favour of adopting concrete measures for the implementation of the Soviet proposal to reduce the military budgets of States, and primarily those of the permanent members of the Security Council.

On the basis of these considerations, our delegation would like to express its doubts about the practical usefulness of the measures contemplated in the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.726. We do not, of course, doubt the sincerity of the intentions of the co-sponsors of that draft resolution to facilitate a solution to the problem of reducing military expenditures; nor do we deny the usefulness of carrying out the necessary studies likely in practice to promote a solution to the problems we face. However, that draft resolution lays its major stress on the study of all kinds of technical aspects of the problem, and we fear that such an approach might divert attention from the heart of the matter, and that it is not likely to stimulate the political will of the parties in question, which is so indispensable for the practical solution of the problem of reducing military expenditures. Therefore, our delegation will be compelled to abstain from voting on that draft resolution.

(Mr. Dugersuren, Mongolia)

I should like now to express the attitude of my delegation towards the draft resolutions relating to a comprehensive study of nuclear-weapon-free zones, contained in documents A/C.1/L.724 and A/C.1/L.734/Rev.1.

Referring to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.734/Rev.1, the Mongolian delegation believes the approach proposed by the delegation of Finland in its draft resolution is both correct and rational with regard to further steps which the General Assembly might recommend on the question of a comprehensive study of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Operative paragraph 4 of that draft resolution commends the special report containing the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones to the attention of all Governments, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other relevant international organizations; while operative paragraph 5 invites all Governments and organizations to transmit to the Secretary-General of the United Nations before 30 June 1976 such views, observations and suggestions on the special report as they may deem appropriate.

We think that this approach is entirely in keeping with the competence of the General Assembly and its established practices as an organ with functions of a purely recommendatory character. We shall therefore vote in favour of that draft resolution.

However, we cannot say the same about the fundamental provisions of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.724 submitted by the delegations of Mexico and a number of other States. In essence, this draft resolution, we believe, proposes endowing the General Assembly with a new function: that is, with the right to take decisions of a binding character -- and on such important questions as defining the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the major obligations of States possessing nuclear weapons with regard to those zones and the States included therein. The present provisions, in our view, are formulated in such a categorical way that we cannot avoid the impression that, as it were, without the endorsement of the General Assembly it is impossible for nuclear-weapon-free zones to exist, or indeed for the obligations of States possessing nuclear weapons towards such zones to be defined.

(Mr. Dugersuren, Mongolia)

Our delegation is not convinced of the advisability, and particularly of the propriety, of the General Assembly's adopting such a far-reaching decision on such complex questions, which are the prerogative of sovereign States. Therefore, our delegation will not be able to vote in favour of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.724.

We have studied with interest the amendments to that draft resolution, submitted by the delegation of Bolivia in document A/C.1/L.740. I believe that they would considerably improve the version in document A/C.1/L.724. Nevertheless, they do not serve to dispel definitively the doubts which we have voiced, particularly the part relating to the attitude of nuclear-weapon States to the nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Coming to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.732, I should first like to state that our delegation is in favour of the adoption of rational and thoroughly pondered measures in order to enhance the role of the United Nations in the area of disarmament, and we would stress once again that the taking of possible new measures to ensure the more effective functioning of the United Nations in this area should not be detrimental to the activities of existing forums for talks on disarmament problems, both multilateral and bilateral.

Of course, I will not be saying anything original if I say that in disarmament matters the most important and decisive thing, in the final analysis, is the political will of States and an international climate which is propitious for the expression of such political will. It would not be gratuitous, however, to recall this very well-known axiomatic truth whenever we are trying to find ways and means of enhancing the effectiveness of the work of the United Nations or of any other organ.

We should not allow ourselves unduly to be diverted by secondary problems, or to inflate them to such a point that we sometimes endow them with an unnatural and exaggerated significance.

A good example of this, in our view, is the criticism of the institution of the co-chairmanship of the Disarmament Committee. With all respect to the critics, I must say that it would be rather naive to attempt to create the impression that the idea of co-chairmanship is the

(Mr. Dugersuren, Mongolia)

main reason, for example, for the absence of two nuclear Powers from the Disarmament Committee. The real reason lies much deeper. For example, we are all very much aware that one of those Powers, on various pretexts, categorically opposes the convening of a conference of nuclear-weapon States to discuss urgent problems of nuclear disarmament. At present its negative attitude constitutes the major obstacle to the convening of a world disarmament conference, something which an overwhelming majority of States and the international community have favoured.

(Mr. Dugersuren, Mongolia)

Fearing in mind all I have said, our delegation has some reservations concerning the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.732, particularly as regards the creation of an ad hoc committee which, along with others, would study and propose possible new approaches for achieving more effective procedures and organization of work in the field of disarmament. As I have already said, my delegation is of course in favour of enhancing the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. However, measures on such an important problem require thorough consideration and careful and thoughtful pondering before we attempt to put them into effect. In this connexion we believe that as a first step we might provide for a more thorough study of the views and proposals of Governments on this problem, in order to prepare the ground for a carefully-pondered next step, and the preparation of proposals in the course of two or three weeks or so -- even of four or five weeks -- after the receipt of opinions from Governments seems to us a rather hasty measure. Those considerations will determine the position of my Government in voting on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.732.

In conclusion I should like to state that the Mongolian delegation wishes to become a co-sponsor of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.739, on the question of concluding a convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of means of influencing the natural environment, submitted today by the representative of Finland. Our delegation has already expressed, here and elsewhere, the position of our Government on this question and also had occasion to express approval in principle of the identical draft conventions submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 21 August this year. Therefore I do not wish to take up the time of the Committee at this rather late stage of its work with a detailed repetition of what we have said on the subject.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Pakistan to introduce the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.733.

Mr. YUNUS (Pakistan): I take the floor today to introduce the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.733) which my delegation has submitted on agenda item 48, entitled "Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia".



(Mr. Yunus, Pakistan)

Pakistan's desire for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia was expressed in August 1972 by Prime Minister Bhutto. The events of last year which led us to present the idea formally in this Assembly are too well known to require reiteration. I need only emphasize that Pakistan took this initiative because of the conviction that in the present situation, when the global arms race continues to escalate and to erode the restraints against nuclear proliferation, the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia constitutes the most feasible measure to bar the nuclear menace from this sensitive region. Pakistan believes that the creation of such a zone in South Asia is a realistic proposition, since all the States of the region have, in one way or another, affirmed that they do not intend to, and will not, develop, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. The establishment of such a zone would, in our view, give formal and unequivocal expression to those individual affirmations of the South Asian States. In putting forward the idea we were also encouraged by the positive attitude of the nuclear Powers and by their readiness, in principle, to respect the denuclearized status of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world.

Pakistan's proposal was adopted in General Assembly resolution 3265 B (XXIX) last year. Besides endorsing the concept of the zone, that resolution invited the States of South Asia, and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as might be interested, to initiate consultations for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The resolution also requested the Secretary-General to convene an early meeting of the South Asian States in connexion with the implementation of its provisions and to render such assistance as they might require.

As my Government saw it, the first step required for the purpose of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia was undoubtedly to hold consultations among the States of the region. Accordingly, Pakistan initiated consultations with some of the South Asian States. The Secretary-General's note indicates that:

"... although some discussions have taken place, differences exist in the approach to the question of the declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free-zone in South Asia." (A/10325, para. 2)



(Mr. Yunus, Pakistan)

I should like to explain briefly the way we look at this project, since we think it necessary to outline it once again.

First, no one need dispute that the initiative for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should come from the States of the region concerned. Pakistan has advanced the proposal as a South Asian country -- the initiative thus coming from within the region and not from outside it -- and it has done so in order to give common and clear expression to the unanimous will of the States of South Asia not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons. It is obvious, we believe, that agreement among all those States will be necessary before the proposed nuclear-weapon-free zone is formally established and legally acknowledged. There can be no exception to that principle. However, that is no bar, in the meantime, to the Assembly's consideration of this question and encouragement of the proposal, which, we are all agreed, is worthy in itself.

(Mr. Yunus, Pakistan)

Secondly, of the "special features" mentioned in resolution 3265 A (XXIX) of last year, presented by the Indian delegation, particular importance has been attached to the proximity of nuclear Powers to the region of South Asia, and this is a factor which would impede the establishment of a denuclearized zone in the region. Now, this requires close analysis. If the existence of nuclear weapons in the vicinity of South Asia poses a nuclear threat to the States in that region, there can be but two responses to this danger, particularly if recourse is not to be had to nuclear alliances. There can be only two options in that case. One response would be to embark on the development of retaliatory nuclear capability. But as I have stated, all the States of South Asia have already expressly and repeatedly declared that they will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons. The second response then follows directly from the rejection of the first, namely, to make arrangements whereby the States of the region can obtain binding undertakings from the nuclear-weapon States not to introduce nuclear weapons into the region or to use or threaten to use these weapons against them. This is an option which is gathering strength all around the globe. It is an obvious option for South Asia also.

Thirdly, as we know, the reference in resolution 3265 A (XXIX) to a zone in an "appropriate region of Asia" implies that South Asia, by itself, is not an "appropriate" region and that the possibility of a zone covering a larger area should be considered. In response to this view, General Assembly resolution 3265 B (XXIX), paragraph 3, invited such other "neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as may be interested" to join the South Asian States in the consultations for the establishment of the zone. For its part, Pakistan would welcome an expansion of the nuclear-weapon-free zone beyond South Asia to include other non-nuclear-weapon States since, by its very definition, a nuclear-weapon-free zone can be developed only among non-nuclear-weapon States. In this regard, my delegation feels that, since consultations among the South Asian States -- which, as I have said, have already eschewed the nuclear-weapons option and form part of a distinct region -- have a concrete basis on which they can proceed, progress in these consultations, it can be hoped, may bring other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States also to associate themselves with the process.

(Mr. Yunus, Pakistan)

Since the Assembly's action on our proposal last year, the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones has gained widespread support as perhaps the most feasible measure by which non-nuclear States can themselves promote their security against the nuclear threat and contribute effectively to the aim of nuclear disarmament. But let us recognize that the responsibility for taking this initiative rests squarely on their own shoulders. It is no accident that this Committee's agenda includes eight items relating to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world. In the introduction to his annual report, the Secretary-General has expressed the view that

"... nuclear-weapon-free zones provide the best and the easiest means whereby non-nuclear-weapon States can, by their own initiative and effort, ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons from their territories and enhance their mutual security." (A/10001/Add.1, p. 9)

The Secretary-General goes on to

"... urge the interested countries of the different regions to consult together with a view to the establishment of additional nuclear-free zones in their respective regions." (Ibid.)

My delegation's aim in submitting the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.733 is to follow precisely the course of action urged by the Secretary-General, the importance of which has been recognized all around, during the last year particularly. Its importance will, as we can see, be recognized during the coming years as well.

If I may now come to the provisions of the draft resolution, the preambular paragraphs are self-explanatory. The first recalls resolution 3265 B (XXIX), which endorsed, in principle, the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, and under which the requisite consultations are to be held. The second preambular paragraph notes the report submitted by the Secretary-General as required under operative paragraph 5 of resolution 3265 B (XXIX). The third paragraph of the preamble notes the views of the Secretary-General to which I referred a moment ago, in which the need for initiating consultations on proposals for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones has been emphasized.

(Mr. Yunus, Pakistan)

Operative paragraph 1. is designed to provide an encouragement to the States of South Asia to continue their efforts to establish the proposed nuclear-weapon-free zone. That is all. They have to continue their efforts to see what can come out of them. This is the central recommendation of our draft resolution, that those efforts be continued, that they not be abandoned. As I said earlier, there is no basic disagreement among the South Asian countries on the need for such consultations. Consultations have been understood as a prerequisite by everybody around this table. The importance of these consultations has also been emphasized by a number of other States, including most of the nuclear Powers. The Assembly can do no less, then, than to encourage the talks which have been initiated on this question among the South Asian States and to urge that efforts be continued to obtain the objective.

Operative paragraph 2 urges the States of South Asia to refrain from any action contrary to the objective of the denuclearized zone. It would be labouring the obvious if I were to elaborate on this provision.

Operative paragraph 3 seeks simply to place this item on the agenda of the next Assembly session. It would be optimistic, under the circumstances, to entertain the hope that the question will have reached the stage of final decision by next year. Indeed, the experience in Latin America and Africa and the progress in the establishment of other prospective zones, have already shown that the formal establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone takes time. It will naturally be the same in our region; it will take time. Meanwhile, we believe that the Assembly has to review the progress made and to encourage the States of the region to continue to move towards the objectives which the United Nations has endorsed.

(Mr. Yunus, Pakistan)

The establishment of an increasing number of nuclear-weapon-free zones is, in our view, not only in the vital interests of the States of the regions concerned but also an important collateral measure which can contribute effectively to nuclear disarmament. The proposal to bar nuclear weapons and their use from South Asia is also of special significance for the prospects of regional and global disarmament and for international peace and security.

My delegation's efforts to act on this question in concert with all the States of South Asia are common knowledge. We shall continue to exert ourselves in the same direction in future also.

While I have the floor, I should like to say a few words about the Indian draft resolution in document A/C/L.730, which has already been introduced. We indeed regret that, despite determined efforts, it was not found possible this year for the Assembly to act on a single draft resolution concerning the proposed nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. As far as that draft resolution is concerned, my delegation believes that it repeats the considerations and largely also the language of last year's General Assembly resolution 3265 A (XXIX). As we stated last year, we did not see any basic conflict in the provisions of that resolution and what Pakistan itself had in mind when it submitted resolution 3265 B (XXIX) and what it has in mind today in introducing the draft resolution which I have just put before the Committee. We take it as self-evident that when a proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone has been "developed and matured", it would of course, of necessity and in the natural course of events be brought to the General Assembly for its consideration and endorsement. We have no quarrel with that.

But in so far as the Indian draft resolution repeats what General Assembly resolution 3265 A (XXIX) stated last year, it appears to us redundant in that part. That by itself may not be such a grave matter -- repetition of the previous resolution. However, the proposal submitted by India does not give any guidance or encouragement to the States of the region. It also leaves the future course of action vague. Therefore, the draft resolution, as far as we can see, falls short of what seems to us to be the minimum necessary action. This is apparent from the action this Assembly is taking on other proposals for nuclear-weapon-free zones. There are principles which have been utilized for those proposals also, and a comparison lays this point bare.

(Mr. Yunus, Pakistan)

In the circumstances, my delegation finds itself unable to vote in favour of the Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.730) and considers it all the more necessary that the Assembly should, as stated in the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.733 -- which I have just introduced -- encourage the States of the region to pursue the efforts which they have already begun towards the attainment of the objective which both resolutions -- General Assembly resolutions 3265 A (XXIX) and 3265 B (XXIX) -- of last year enunciated as necessary and desirable.

It is surely the hope of the international community that the danger which will be posed to the region of South Asia and to the world by the introduction of nuclear weapons there should be averted through effective and credible means. The unilateral declarations made by the South Asian States eschewing the nuclear option are, while welcome in themselves, insufficient to match this concern. The intentions of Governments can change, as Governments themselves can change; but the capability for development of nuclear weapons, which has been demonstrated, will, however, remain.

It is therefore imperative that something more durable and irrevocable than individual policy declarations be devised to underwrite peaceful intentions, which, as I said earlier, are welcome in themselves. The proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, I repeat, offers an arrangement whereby the security of all the countries of the region can be enhanced and suspicion and doubt, which now stand in the way of lasting peace, eliminated. The action, then, which this Assembly will take on this project of peace is crucial to its responsibilities. We are confident that this responsibility will be effectively discharged.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Pakistan for introducing the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.733.

Mr. PASTINEN (Finland): It was not the intention of my delegation to speak again today. If I have asked to speak again, it is on a point of clarification, which, I hope, will be helpful.

My delegation this morning was approached by a number of delegations with questions relating to the revised version of our draft resolution on the "Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects". This revised draft resolution is contained in document A/C.1/L.734/Rev.1.

(Mr. Pastinen, Finland)

The questions have been directed quite properly to the matter of what the revisions consist of, and it might perhaps save effort, work and time for all delegations, including my own, if I were to give here a short explanation on that.

All the revisions undertaken in comparison with the original draft resolution are purely technical in character. They have been undertaken in response to the very helpful suggestions that were made by the representative of Mexico, for which we are very grateful.

The changes, then, consist of the following and they relate exclusively to operative paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the revised text. In operative paragraph 6, the figure "4" has been replaced by the figure "5". This corresponds to the present enumeration of the operative paragraphs. In operative paragraph 7, the word "special" has been added before the word "report". In operative paragraph 8, the words "special report containing the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones" have been substituted for the word "study" and also the words "special report" have been substituted for the word "report" in the last line of that paragraph.

Mr. MISHRA (India): I should like briefly to comment on the statement made a few moments ago by the representative of Pakistan when he introduced the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.733.

(Mr. Mishra, India)

The representative of Pakistan said that the Indian draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.730 appears to him to be redundant. We would not have introduced that draft resolution if we thought it to be redundant. As I pointed out in my statement, a significant development has taken place since the adoption of resolution 3265 A (XXIX) by the General Assembly last year, and that development is the comprehensive study prepared by qualified governmental experts.

Secondly, if we look at various draft resolutions before us at this session, is it possible to say that redundancy has been avoided in many of these draft resolutions, including, if I may say so, the Pakistan draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.733?

Now, last year the resolution adopted by the Assembly, on the initiative of Pakistan, mentioned certain considerations. Then it went on to propose the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and it further went on to propose consultations with the help of the Secretary-General. The Indian delegation voted against that resolution, making it clear that it was opposed to the idea. Nevertheless, the resolution was adopted.

We have before us the report of the Secretary-General which the representative of Pakistan himself quoted. The Secretary-General said in that report:

"... although some discussions have taken place, differences exist in the approach to the question of the declaration and establishment of a nuclear free zone in South Asia." (A/10325, p. 2)

Despite these differences of approach, the Pakistan delegation has thought it fit to bring forward another draft resolution this year which follows the same line as last year. Would it not be correct to characterize it as redundant?

My delegation would not like there to be any misunderstanding about India's position on this question. As evidenced by our negative vote on Pakistan's resolution last year, India is of the firm view that it could not join the proposed nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and, consequently, regrets its inability to participate in any consultations that might take place in respect of Pakistan's proposal last year and which is being repeated this year.



(Mr. Mishra, India)

There is one other point which the representative of Pakistan made this morning and on which I should like to offer a comment. He said that unilateral declarations made by the South Asian States eschewing the nuclear option -- while welcome in themselves -- were insufficient to match this concern -- the concern, I presume, of Pakistan.

India has been in the nuclear field since 1948. We came into this field with a declaration that we would utilize nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes. Is almost 30 years not long enough to prove the sincerity of a country? If we are ready to accept at face value the declarations made by other States of South Asia, why is it so difficult for others to accept our declaration at face value?

It is a very important point with us -- and this has been emphasized again and again in the First Committee, in the Committee of the Conference on Disarmament and in other forums -- that the most important factor in the utilization of technology for peaceful purposes is the political will and intention of the Governments concerned. We have not deviated from this intention since 1948. There is no reason to think that we will deviate in the future.

Mr. YUNUS (Pakistan): I think we require some clarification in respect to the point on redundancy and one or two other points which were made.

I think I should draw attention to the fact that I had stated that in so far as the Indian draft resolution repeats that which is stated in the resolution adopted last year -- not the entire resolution. I did clarify that it is the portion which is repeated from last year. That was the point. It was a reference to the repeated part.

The second point I should like to clarify is that my delegation did not refer to the comprehensive study because of the recognized fact, which we have already seen here, that the study contains views of qualified governmental experts expressed in contrary senses. There are other portions of that comprehensive study which I could bring to bear with regard to my point of view but which I think would not be really conducive to a final view in the Committee, because the study itself has now to be proceeded with in order to see what can come out of the labours of the experts which went into it. That was the reason why we thought that a reference to the comprehensive study at this stage may not necessarily establish a principle or a point.

(Mr. Yunus, Pakistan)

The third point is in respect of the Secretary-General's report which has stated that differences have existed in the approach to the establishment of the proposed nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Secretary-General pointed out that discussions did take place.

As regards the discovery of differences, we do not find anything extraordinary about the fact that there should be some differences about this proposal. Indeed, it might have been extraordinary if the differences did not exist. We believe that the thing to do would be to try to sort out those differences and that is all that my delegation is trying to do, to recognize realistically that they exist and to find a basis on which it may be possible to proceed further -- the basis which I outlined in my introduction of the draft resolution as the eschewing of the nuclear option by the South Asian States.

In respect of the policy declaration by India, my delegation has repeatedly welcomed that declaration. We recognize that India came into this field in 1948. Thirty years have elapsed. But we have also noticed -- and I suppose this has to be taken into account -- that the weapon-development capability came only last year. Let us not labour the point because there are differences between the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the explosive capacity which leads to the weapon-production capability. We have welcomed the policy declaration by India in this forum as well as in other forums, including the CCD, and therefore all that we have been seeking is to find some way of formalizing this peaceful expression of policy, of peaceful intentions, and it is for this reason that we would like to state that the Pakistan draft resolution is not based on joining issue with the declaration of that policy but tries to find a basis on which that declaration of policy could assume the form of some kind of nuclear-weapon-free zone -- the urge to create which is now universal -- as a part of collateral measures of nuclear disarmament, as an effective measure for the protection and strengthening of the security of regional States, as an initiative which these States can take themselves, and, as something, the responsibility for which rests on them squarely. That is the aim which we have been pursuing in this regard.

Mr. MISHRA (India): I should like to reply briefly to three points just made by the representative of Pakistan.

First, he referred to the well-known fact that the governmental experts were not unanimous in their opinions while preparing this study. The representative of Pakistan forces me to repeat myself. As I said in my statement this morning:

"The experts, although unable to agree on several fundamental questions, were, nevertheless, unanimous on certain basic principles which should be taken into account wherever appropriate conditions for a nuclear-weapon-free zone exist." (Supra p. 26)

It is for that reason that a reference has been made to a basic principle in our draft resolution.

Secondly, in regard to differences in approach to the question of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in our part of the world, the representative of Pakistan said that he recognizes the existence of those differences. Our point is that if there is recognition of those differences then is it not best to solve them beforehand, before coming to the Assembly for endorsement of the idea or proposal for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in a particular area. In our view that is a basic difference between the attitude of the delegation of Pakistan and that of the delegation of India.

Thirdly, the representative of Pakistan said that India demonstrated a weapons-related capacity last year. It has been no secret for many years that India was interested in the technology of peaceful nuclear explosions. Indian representatives have stated this in the First Committee, in the CCD and in other forums. If it came as a surprise to any delegation we can only say that they should have paid greater attention to our statements in previous years.

But the explosion of an experimental nuclear device does not automatically mean that we have acquired weapons-related capacity or capability. Again, that is a point to which I referred in my general statement earlier this month in this Committee. We can argue about it from now until doomsday. Perhaps we will not agree. But the fact is that unless our intention is related to what we are doing one is bound to read something into what happened last year which is beyond our intention.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): I do not intend to intrude in the interesting dialogue we are now listening to between the representatives of India and Pakistan. I have not asked to speak in order to intrude. Already last year my delegation offered both representatives its good offices to see whether it was possible to arrive at a single draft resolution. We failed last year, but if this year conditions are more propitious my delegation would always be prepared to co-operate, in so far as we can to that end, namely, to arrive at a single text.

But, I repeat, that is not why I have asked to speak. I have asked to speak in order to state that my delegation listened with great interest and pleasure to the statement made this morning by the representative of the Soviet Union in introducing two revised draft resolutions. Regarding the draft resolution on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons contained in document A/C.1/L.711/Rev.1, my delegation will be very pleased to vote in favour of that draft resolution.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

As regards the other draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.707/Rev.1, we were also pleased to see that in operative paragraph 2 a change has been made which is in part, only, in accord with what we ventured to state here in a statement made on 30 October last, that is, that the necessity and desirability of having the participation of not only nuclear-weapon States but of non-nuclear-weapon States also in the negotiations so that, as I said then:

"... the non-nuclear-weapon States [may] contribute to those negotiations in the same way in which they have so often averted total paralysis of the CCD in Geneva". (2072nd meeting, p. 21)

However, for the change to be completely satisfactory to my delegation this amendment should be further amended. The present text is not very clear -- at least not the Spanish text -- as regards who would invite the 25 to 30 non-nuclear States. I read:

"Calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to enter into negotiations not later than 31 March 1976 with a view to reaching agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, to invite 25 to 30 non-nuclear-weapon States..."

This is rather ambiguous. Is the General Assembly to issue the invitation, or is the invitation to come from the five nuclear-weapon States?

The only interpretation which would be acceptable to my delegation would be for the General Assembly to issue the invitations. It is not useless to repeat once more that the United Nations is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of States, so that there is no reason to have two classes of States: those which are directly invited by the General Assembly, and those which may be invited by the nuclear Powers. No. So I repeat: my delegation would suggest that here it should be made perfectly clear that it is the General Assembly which invites, and I think this could be done very easily. It would read:

"Calls upon all nuclear-weapon States..."

and in place of "to invite" it would read "and invites...".

This is my first remark.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

I have another which is not of the same order of importance, and it is in connexion with what I said in my statement of 30 October, that is, the desirability of the Ad Hoc Group or Committee -- or however the five nuclear-weapon States and the 25 or 30 non-nuclear-weapon States may be designated -- having available to them all the relevant documents of this Assembly. On 30 October, I said they should receive all documents pertaining to consideration by the General Assembly at this thirtieth session of items 37 and 122 of the agenda. These are two relevant items which are directly connected with the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. So that in the opinion of my delegation, a paragraph should be added similar to operative paragraph 2 of the text submitted by the representative of the Soviet Union in document A/C.1/L.711/Rev.1. It could be more limited.

"Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Group mentioned in the above paragraph 3 all documents pertaining to the consideration by the General Assembly at its thirtieth session of items 37 and 122".

Mr. YUNUS (Pakistan): All I wish to say is that we welcome the hope expressed by the representative of Mexico that it will still be possible to arrive at a single draft resolution on this item. We do not believe that this is impossible. We would like to join in the expression of that hope.

#### ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN: Since there are no further speakers, this afternoon's meeting will be cancelled and the time will be used in preparations for tomorrow, the day after, and Friday.

With regard to our programme, I indicated yesterday that we might start voting on Thursday afternoon. However, some delegations considered that the fruits have ripened and that we can begin plucking them earlier, perhaps Thursday morning.

Therefore, tomorrow, Wednesday, will be given over to final discussions of draft resolutions. Thursday morning we will move to Conference Room 3, which is equipped with electronic devices to deal with the mass of draft resolutions that we have.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.