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PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO THOUSAND AND NINETY-FOURTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,  
on Thursday, 20 November 1975, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. GHORRA (Lebanon)  
Rapporteur: Mr. ARTEAGA ACOSTA (Venezuela)

- Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security /31/ (continued)
- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3254 (XXIX): report of the Secretary-General /34/ (continued)
- Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: reports of the Secretary-General /35/ (continued)
- Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /36/ (continued)
- Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /37/ (continued)

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AS THIS RECORD WAS DISTRIBUTED ON 21 NOVEMBER 1975, THE TIME-LIMIT FOR CORRECTIONS WILL BE 26 NOVEMBER 1975.

The co-operation of delegations in strictly observing this time-limit would be greatly appreciated.

- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3258 (XXIX) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) /38/ (continued)
- Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean /39/ (continued)
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- Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East: report of the Secretary-General /46/ (continued)
- Prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other hostile purposes, which are incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /47/ (continued)
- Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia: report of the Secretary-General /48/ (continued)
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The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 120, 122 and 126 (continued)

Mr. ANWAR SANI (Indonesia): It is only after long hesitation that I have decided to speak on behalf of my delegation. I have practically nothing new to contribute. The debates on disarmament have tended to become a yearly routine without much meaning. In fact, the attendance this afternoon seems to justify this view. I would not go so far as to say that it has become an exercise in futility, however much I am tempted to do so. The subject is too vital to the world for us to give up hope that one day we shall be able to arrive at meaningful decisions that can be implemented and that will lead us towards effective disarmament. It is with these considerations in mind, and if only to emphasize my country's deep concern, that I have decided to speak, though I know that what I am going to say will be mainly a repetition of what I said last year and of what others have said before me.

In spite of our yearly exercise and our pious statements in favour of disarmament, the sad reality is that year after year nearly every country in the world has increased its arms arsenals. Practically every country in a position to do so, either because they have the means to buy arms or because they can obtain them from others, undertakes to improve its armament. I am afraid that the arms merchants of the world -- the arms-producing countries -- have long ago ceased to take our statements seriously. If in the past year agreements have been reached, they are in the nature of regulating the increase of armaments rather than reducing the

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existing arms arsenals. If limitations have been agreed upon, they are limitations upon the increase of armaments and not in the nature of limitations which entail the reduction of existing weaponry. I dare say, without exaggeration, that the world's arsenals today contain far more weapons than one year ago, while we continue to talk about disarmament.

Our distinguished Secretary-General, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, in the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization, describes disarmament talks as one of the most continuing activities of the United Nations. A review of the situation during the past three decades shows a very dismal record of achievement as well as very little hope that truly effective arms-control and disarmament agreements can be reached in the near future. On the one hand, the arms race has continued unabated and increasingly sophisticated weapons, nuclear as well as conventional, continue to be developed. On the other hand, there is almost complete stagnation of disarmament negotiations in the framework of the United Nations, while results in bilateral efforts are not much more heartening either.



(Mr. Anwar Sani, Indonesia)

So far as bilateral efforts are concerned, Indonesia has on several occasions welcomed the negotiations undertaken by the United States and the Soviet Union with the objective of putting limitations on their respective strategic armaments.

However, the agreements so far achieved do not convince us that real disarmament measures -- or even a freeze on the present levels of strategic forces -- are being envisaged by the two Powers. Far from being measures to reduce the already enormous over-kill capacity of their respective strategic weaponry, the agreements tend to legalize the quantitative and qualitative increase of such weapons. The qualitative arms race between the two major Powers has resulted in the increase in sophistication and destructive effectiveness of their nuclear weapons.

The dismal state of disarmament negotiations is duly reflected in the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) to the General Assembly contained in document A/10027, which fails to record any progress with regard to its priority items -- of which we should mention the promised conclusion of a treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. In this connexion, my delegation would like to welcome the initiative taken by the Soviet Union in proposing a draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. My delegation is of the view that the Soviet draft merits our serious consideration.

Negotiations in the CCD regarding other priority concerns of the General Assembly, such as general and complete disarmament and prohibition of the development, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction, are also characterized by lack of any significant progress. It may, therefore, be necessary to consider forums other than that of the CCD in order to achieve some kind of breakthrough in current disarmament negotiations.

It is discouraging to note from the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, contained in document A/10028, that despite serious and persistent efforts by Ambassador Hoveyda of Iran and Minister Elias of Spain, a basic divergence of opinions continues to exist on several aspects of the convening of such a conference, although it continues to be supported by a large majority of nations.

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Such critical issues as those affecting nuclear weapons -- involving the security of all nations -- can be successfully tackled only in a universal conference, which could initiate the process of laying the groundwork for arms control measures and regulations by all nations. Such a conference could also reassign first priority to the question of halting the arms race -- more specifically the nuclear arms race -- as a step towards the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament.

My delegation feels that a world disarmament conference would, in a sense, bring this serious and fundamental concern within the decision-making ambit of the international community. The situation now is, that although this question is, by its very nature, of common concern, it has virtually been confined to the exclusive competence of the CCD. A conference on a world-wide scale could be an instrument to focus on developments in the field of armaments, and the relative ineffectiveness of the measures taken since the creation of the United Nations to achieve disarmament. Finally, a world disarmament conference, by seeking agreements covering both nuclear and conventional weapons, would clarify the links which should exist between nuclear and conventional disarmament as well as between worldwide and regional disarmament.

For all of these reasons, Indonesia believes that a world disarmament conference attended by all militarily significant Powers, including the nuclear-weapon States, would be the appropriate forum for negotiating agreements leading towards nuclear and conventional disarmament which would be binding on the international community.

The attention of the world is now focused on the prospects of an increasing proliferation of nuclear technology, as a consequence of the world-wide energy crisis, and the danger which it implies for nuclear-weapon proliferation. The 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), initiated by the nuclear Powers, was met with reservations by the non-nuclear States. Though there was general agreement that further proliferation of nuclear weapons would jeopardize world security, and that, therefore, non-proliferation constituted a distinct advantage to all States, it was argued by many States that a treaty which did not provide for actual nuclear disarmament was undesirable and would even be unproductive. The reluctance of a number of non-nuclear-weapon States to adhere to the Treaty stemmed

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mainly from their objection to unbalanced obligations and responsibilities, contained in the Treaty, as between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States.

At the NPT Review Conference held in Geneva in May of this year to examine the implementation of the Treaty, noteworthy efforts were made to correct the obvious shortcomings of the Treaty. It is not without regret that we observe that the Conference was not entirely successful in eliminating the objects of the reservations of those States which have not become parties to the Treaty.

Most of their doubts would be dispelled if the nuclear-weapon States showed their willingness to fulfil their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, to undertake

"... to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". (General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex)

By refusing to reduce their present or future nuclear-weapon capabilities, the major Powers are responsible for making three decades of disarmament efforts -- in the words of one of the most respected advocates of disarmament, Mrs. Myrdal -- "a history of wilfully squandered opportunities".

As regards the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones which has been revitalized recently through a series of proposals relating to certain areas, the Indonesian delegation has welcomed and supported the Finnish initiative, which, by a resolution of the General Assembly adopted last year, led to the establishment of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts. I should like to express my delegation's appreciation to the Chairman of that Group, Professor Korhonen of Finland, and commend him for his able leadership in successfully completing the task assigned to the Group.

As the report of the experts makes clear in document A/10027/Add.1, Part III, the creation of such zones would lead to greater progress towards arms control, and the participation of all States in a region would enhance the effectiveness of the zone. The report further makes clear in Part IV that the positive impact of a nuclear-free zone on strengthening regional and international security would depend upon a proper distribution of responsibilities among the zonal as well as extra-zonal States.

(Mr. Anwar Sani, Indonesia)

Indonesia has supported the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones provided suitable conditions exist in a particular region, and the zone is proposed to be established with the initiative of and agreement among the countries in that region in order that the implications, feasibility and acceptability can be fully explored. Indonesia has maintained, therefore, that a proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in a particular region should receive the solid support of all countries in that region.

It is Indonesia's view, furthermore, that although the primary purpose of a nuclear-free zone is to enhance national and regional security, it is also essential that these efforts should form a part of the complementary process of arresting the nuclear-arms race, and of lessening the danger of nuclear war. These considerations would lend greater viability to the establishment of nuclear-free zones in different parts of the world.

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The Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, adopted by the General Assembly in 1971, called upon the big maritime Powers to halt further escalation of their military presence in that region. The Declaration continues to be supported by all the littoral and hinterland States which have shown an increasing interest in finding ways and means of implementing the Declaration. Recent developments in the Indian Ocean have added a sense of urgency to the desire for progress on this issue. Among these factors is the growing concern that big Power rivalry is being heightened and that the consequences would be disquieting, to say the least, for the littoral and hinterland countries. Of particular importance is the immediate prospect of a conventional naval arms race and the potential conflicts likely to arise from such rivalry, as well as the increasing activities of fleets possessing nuclear capability which have become a part of the strategic system of the super-Powers. All these developments have focused attention on the need to ensure that the Indian Ocean remains a zone of peace and to realize the principles contained in the Declaration.

However, the unwillingness of the big Powers to co-operate has rendered the task of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean increasingly difficult. In Indonesia's view, the competitive expansion of the military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean is fraught with danger, and that presence has, in fact, become a matter of common concern for the States of the region.

What needs to be agreed upon are measures to avoid another military competition, for it would be far better to forestall a confrontation in a region where competition has not yet become acute. This will require that the major Powers observe restraint in their military activities within the proposed zone of peace. In order to attain these objectives it would be necessary for their Governments to negotiate agreements on limiting deployment of their respective forces in the Indian Ocean.

Just as there exists a universal human desire for a secure and disarmed world, there now also exists an almost universal feeling of dismay and disappointment because of the very marginal results of the arms control efforts during the past three decades. The task of achieving the ultimate objectives of real disarmament is, admittedly, far from easy. My delegation

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appreciates the urgency of a basic review of the role of the United Nations in regard to disarmament, as suggested by the Secretary-General. And we really have not much time to lose.

Mr. DUGERSUREN (Mongolia): Mr. Chairman, since this is my first, albeit belated, statement, I should like to begin by adding my personal congratulations and best wishes to those already tendered to you by the Mongolian delegation on your unanimous and well-deserved election as Chairman of this important Committee. I share the feeling, often expressed here, that your able and wise guidance over the proceedings of this Committee will surely contribute to the successful conclusion of our work.

My felicitations and the same good wishes go to the other officers of the Committee.

The Mongolian delegation devoted its previous statement in this Committee to the two new agenda items inscribed pursuant to the timely initiative of the Soviet Union -- namely, the question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

Today, I intend to make a few remarks on the problems of nuclear disarmament, the prohibition of chemical weapons, and some other issues related to disarmament negotiations.

I should like, however, to begin with the general observation that political détente and disarmament are destined to go hand in hand. In fact, the arms control agreements of the 1960s, notably the pioneer Moscow Treaty of 1963 and the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, had heralded, or rather promoted, the trend away from confrontation to negotiation.

At present the further strengthening of détente and the process of peaceful co-existence between States belonging to different social systems -- which is epitomized in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe -- have created increasingly favourable conditions for taking further effective arms control and disarmament measures.

(Mr. Dugersuren, Mongolia)

On the other hand, it is true that unless concrete measures are expeditiously taken, the still unchecked armament race might threaten to erode the foundation of détente and world stability. Peace and security need the reduction and eventual elimination of the material basis for wars and conflicts.

The adoption of measures on disarmament is an extremely complex affair, and it requires political decision, goodwill and great efforts on all sides, especially on the part of States possessing significant military potential and, above all, the nuclear Powers.

The Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community, conscious of their historical mission, are determined, as before, to spare no efforts in order to contribute effectively to the cause of disarmament.

The Mongolian People's Republic proceeds from the above-mentioned considerations in its approach to the fundamental questions of disarmament. My Government has always considered nuclear disarmament as the central and decisive issue of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Checking the nuclear arms race and taking effective measures towards nuclear disarmament have become the most urgent objectives of today. Seen in this light, the strengthening of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and the non-proliferation régime as a whole, acquire paramount importance. The Review Conference of the parties to the NPT which took place last May was an important event in this regard.

In the Final Declaration, adopted by consensus, the participants of the Review Conference reaffirmed their strong support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty and their continued dedication to its principles and objectives.

We, like many others, were heartened by the accession of 10 additional States on the eve of the Review Conference. But, while expressing our satisfaction at this welcome development, we cannot but voice a grave concern that one nuclear-weapon Power not only remains outside the NPT, but openly opposes it. In parentheses, I must say that my Government has taken due note of the statement repeatedly made by France that it will respect the Non-Proliferation Treaty objectives.



It is also a matter of concern that a number of the so-called "near-nuclear" States have not yet become parties to the Treaty.

My delegation would like to emphasize the widely-shared view that strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the non-proliferation régime must become a norm of international life. Indeed, every additional accession serves the vital interest of all States, parties and non-parties alike. Here, my delegation joins those who have issued an appeal to the States that have not yet done so to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the greater interest of checking the nuclear arms race and delivering mankind from the danger of nuclear war.



(Mr. Dugersuren, Mongolia)

One of the central elements in the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime is strict implementation of the IAEA safeguards under article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As has been emphasized by many representatives both here and at the Review Conference, it is essential that countries exporting nuclear materials and equipment strictly comply with the common export requirements relating to safeguards and apply them to the complete fuel cycle of the importing countries.

In light of the non-proliferation requirements, various aspects of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes were examined by the IAEA and the CCD as well as the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. The prevailing view was that procedures for carrying out peaceful nuclear explosions should be an integral part of the non-proliferation régime based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

My delegation endorses the view that potential benefits from peaceful nuclear explosions should be made available to any non-nuclear-weapon State only through the services of the IAEA. It is our hope that the Ad Hoc Advisory Group of governmental experts on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, established by the IAEA, will expeditiously work out recommendations on the organization of an international service for peaceful nuclear explosions and on the structure and contents of an agreement or agreements envisaged under article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The question of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones has lately assumed a special importance, primarily in view of the need to check the spread of nuclear weapons. On the wise initiative of the Government of Finland a comprehensive study has been carried out by the Ad Hoc Group of qualified governmental experts under the auspices of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. My delegation had the occasion to express in the CCD its preliminary views on nuclear-weapon-free arrangements. I shall therefore confine myself to a few remarks at this stage.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones have as their primary aim preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and thus strengthening the security of the States concerned and world peace at large. It is the considered view of my Government that nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements should be entirely consistent with

(Mr. Dugersuren, Mongolia)

the objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It further holds that nuclear-weapon-free zones should really be free of nuclear weapons and that the arrangements thereof should be in compliance with the usage of international law.

My delegation, like many others, thinks that the General Assembly would do well to recommend the Ad Hoc Group study to Governments for their examination and comments. The study will promote a clearer understanding of the positions of States on various aspects of the question of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. We also think that it could serve as a useful reference material for the Governments which take an active interest in the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Mongolia has always considered that the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests would contribute in a decisive manner to arresting the nuclear arms race. It is natural, therefore, that my delegation welcomed as a most topical initiative the draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests presented by the Soviet Union.

Early positive action on the realization of this new initiative would help erect a firm barrier to the further sophistication of nuclear weapons and the creation of new systems of such weapons. With this in mind, I appeal to all delegations to display a constructive and an objective approach in order to find a generally acceptable solution on the basis of the proposal initiated by the Soviet Union.

Before leaving the subject of nuclear disarmament, I should like to turn briefly to another closely related domain -- the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), in which the whole international community has a most vital stake. These negotiations have a decisive part to play not only in bringing down the level of the existing weapons of mass destruction but also in forestalling a new deadly break-through in the arms race. Any concrete step forward in these negotiations is sure to have favourable implications on multilateral endeavours in such important areas as, for example, the complete and general banning of nuclear-weapon tests, the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons and so on.

(Mr. Dugersuren, Mongolia)

Having in mind the singular importance of the SALT negotiations, we should like to stress the urgent need for making further progress. We express our earnest hope that the two Powers will work expeditiously in order to take concrete steps to implement the Vladivostok accord.

Turning now to the question of the prohibition of chemical means of warfare, my delegation regrets the absence of substantive progress. And this is despite the fact that much technical groundwork was done in the CCD during negotiations on the basis of several important documents, including the draft convention on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons presented as early as 1972 by the socialist countries members of the CCD.

Negotiations have shown, however, that certain Western Powers are not prepared to accept a comprehensive ban. A step-by-step approach was proposed in the CCD, and many here in the General Assembly have favoured that approach as a means for making progress toward the ultimate goal. The Soviet Union and the United States of America agreed in 1974 to consider the question of tabling at the CCD a joint initiative envisaging the prohibition, as a first step, of the most dangerous and lethal chemical means of waging war. This accord has unfortunately not so far materialized.

(Mr. Dugersuren, Mongolia)

While regretting the lack of substantive achievements, my delegation discerns, as many others do, certain steps in the right direction that have occurred in the related areas. We welcome the entry into force of the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. It is all the more encouraging that the Convention represents the first real disarmament measure and provides for the elimination of a horrible weapon of mass destruction from the arsenals of States. With this in mind, Mongolia adds its voice to the appeals addressed to the States which have not yet done so to become party to the Convention. We hope that this instrument will add new impetus for accelerating the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

My delegation which, together with others, has strongly pleaded for making universal the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, notes with satisfaction the ratification by the United States of that important international instrument.

As in previous years, the Mongolian delegation proposes that the General Assembly renew its invitation to all States which have not yet done so to accede to or ratify the Geneva Protocol, and its call for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of that Protocol.

We hope that with the aforementioned positive developments the prospects for early concrete progress in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons will become brighter. In this connexion I should like to say that I listened with interest to the statement by the representative of the United States, Mr. Martin, at our 2073rd meeting, to the effect that his Government would:

"continue its efforts in this field with the hope that they will point to promising approaches to a possible joint initiative at the CCD during 1976". (2073rd meeting, p. 11)

I specifically noted this because those indications of concrete thinking, especially as regards the year 1976, have come from the side on whose actions, I would assume, to a great extent depend the prospects of the negotiations.

(Mr. Dugersuren, Mongolia)

The joint Soviet-American initiative would usefully supplement the efforts of the CCD in breaking the virtual deadlock and making tangible progress on the basis of approaches acceptable to all.

My delegation is of the opinion that the General Assembly should recommend to the CCD that it redouble its efforts and, realistically taking into account the situation obtaining, produce as soon as possible an agreement on effective measures for banning chemical weapons.

The main impression my delegation has got from this year's debate is that disarmament is being brought into ever-sharper focus in United Nations activities and that the Member States, with one or two exceptions, are determined to intensify their efforts to give new impetus to the disarmament negotiations. The time has indeed come to search actively for rational ways and means of materializing that quest.

We submit that a world disarmament conference, as proposed by the Soviet Union would represent the proper starting point in these efforts. Such a world forum, with the participation of all States, big and small, on an equal footing, would provide a rare opportunity for thoroughly scrutinizing the status of disarmament negotiations, identifying the priorities and charting guidelines for future negotiations. In other words, an adequately prepared world disarmament conference is certain to give fresh impetus to disarmament negotiations by indicating practical ways and means for an effective handling of arms control and disarmament matters.

Having this in view, and taking into consideration the repeatedly expressed will of the international community to convene such a conference, the General Assembly should recommend to the Ad Hoc Committee that it apply earnest efforts to get down to practical arrangements for the preparation of the conference.

My delegation will speak on some other issues on the agenda at a later stage when they are taken up separately.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Mongolia for his very friendly remarks addressed to me, and for his congratulations to the other Officers of the Committee.

Mr. AHMED (Egypt): A little over 10 years ago there were only three nuclear-weapon States; they then spent among themselves no more than \$80-100 billion on armaments, and their thermonuclear arsenals were enough to blow up the world three times over. The items relating to the subject on the First Committee's agenda were only two or three, including, at the top, general and complete disarmament, and another item or two about the need for a cessation of all nuclear testing.

Today, a decade later, there are at least five nuclear-weapon States and a score or so with a nuclear capability, and two score or more others on the threshold of achieving a nuclear capability. Only last year, the different States spent no less than \$300 billion on armaments; their thermonuclear strategic and tactical bombs are enough to blow up the world 10 times over; and we have 19 items related to disarmament on the First Committee's agenda. The main topic, the original central theme -- namely, general and complete disarmament -- receives only perfunctory mention; very few speakers have even bothered to make a passing reference to this heretofore revered title. Others' attention is diverted to peripheral and collateral issues which have cropped up since the beginning of the disarmament negotiations and which have relegated the main, central objective to eighth place on our agenda and to a similar fate in our deliberations. Not only are there 19 so-called disarmament items on our agenda, but this proliferation of topics is equalled by a proliferation of forums: after the original Disarmament Committee and the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament we have added the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, etc. The CCD is boycotted by two nuclear Powers; the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference is also boycotted by two other nuclear Powers.

(Mr. Ahmed, Egypt)

It is true that in the last decade and a half we have witnessed the conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959, the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, the Outer Space Treaty in 1967, the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, the Sea-Bed Treaty in 1971 and the Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1972. There has also been the agreement between the two super-Powers in the first round of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and, lastly, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974. However, the vertical as well as the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons continues, as can be seen from the Secretary-General's annual report. The arms race has been neither stopped nor reversed. None of the measures and agreements I have just referred to touches the core of disarmament. The agreements by the super-Powers relating to the Antarctic, Outer space and the sea-bed, welcome as they are, do not represent any genuine disarmament measures. They are precautionary, preventive measures aimed at preventing the arms race in certain faraway potential areas of competition. Such will be the case with the ban on bacteriological (biological) weapons.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks aim at setting ceilings for the strategic weapons and means of delivery of the two super-Powers. Welcome, as is any agreement they may reach -- or may have reached -- in this field also, that will be armaments-regulatory in nature and will not fall into the genuine disarmament ambit. They are a far cry from general and complete disarmament. Not a single nuclear or thermonuclear bomb is to be dismantled or destroyed, or was dismantled or destroyed, under any of the measures or agreements I have referred to. In other words, the battle for disarmament, general and complete disarmament, has not yet even begun and looks like being a very remote possibility, the way things are going. What is happening, what is being discussed, is a hodge-podge of subsidiary or peripheral arms control or preventive measures.

Ambassador Joseph Martin of the United States, speaking before this Committee on 30 October, acknowledged that the twenty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly had identified the two issues of reducing



(Mr. Ahmed, Egypt)

nuclear arsenals and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to additional States as being of the utmost importance in reducing the threat of nuclear war. That should be the central issue and our greatest single concern in the exercise in which we are at present engaged. The Partial Test-Ban Treaty signed in 1963 and the Non-Proliferation Treaty signed in 1968, while not in themselves disarmament measures, were intended to prevent vertical and horizontal proliferation. The nuclear Powers intended, by stopping tests, to improve the sophistication of their nuclear weapons. The non-nuclear Powers, by signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty, were banned from testing and gave up their nuclear options altogether. However, the cessation of testing, did not come about, for the super-Powers and the other nuclear Powers found themselves a loophole, in the form of underground testing. The so-called Threshold Test Ban Treaty signed in 1974 gave them licence to carry on exploding beneath a certain 150 kiloton threshold, which was judged by experts to be more than adequate to permit the nuclear-Powers to continue to perfect their tactical bombs and test their weapons. The Threshold Treaty not only legalized underground testing but also provided a pretext for other Powers to conduct atmospheric tests so long as the super-Powers had given themselves the license to further the sophistication and improvement of their bombs by underground testing.

Those two loopholes must be closed. The "nuclear club" cannot remain limited to its present number so long as weapon tests can be conducted underground or in the atmosphere, on any pretext or argument. That is the only sure way.

That brings me to the subject of the controversy about the need for on-site inspections. Whatever differences may remain, this is to our mind largely a political issue, since Swedish, Japanese, Canadian and other scientists have established the possibility of distinguishing between seismic events and underground tests without recourse to on-site inspection. Different proposals for getting around that political-technical problem have been made, including a complete test ban for a five- or three-year trial period, to be followed by a review.



(Mr. Ahmed, Egypt)

General Assembly resolution 3257 (XXIX), taking stock of all the controversy I have mentioned, once again called for the immediate and complete cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests. We will support any measure which would help to achieve that worthy goal. However, we believe that peaceful nuclear explosions should be the subject of a new régime of adequate international guarantees, preferably always under United Nations supervision and guidance, if the proliferation of nuclear weapons is to be prevented and the developing States are not to be denied the fruits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The other reason for disappointment is the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Under that Treaty, the signatory non-nuclear States were to give up the nuclear option, as well as important elements of their sovereignty, by accepting international safeguards. Those specific and concrete obligations of the non-nuclear signatories took effect immediately. On the other hand the nuclear Powers -- France and China not being parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- undertook certain commitments as a quid pro quo, namely, to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to make the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions available under a specific international régime, to halt all weapons testing and to reverse the nuclear arms race and, under United Nations Security Council resolution 255 (1968), to provide security assurances to the non-nuclear parties to the Treaty. In order to provide some means of checking on how the nuclear Powers were living up to their pledges under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the non-nuclear signatory States insisted on the holding of the Review Conference in May 1975.

My country, as one of the signatory States, attended that Conference. Unfortunately, the Conference saw a confrontation between the non-nuclear and the nuclear signatories, the non-nuclear parties struggling to extract specific commitments from the nuclear Powers to implement their treaty obligations and the nuclear Powers refusing to give any specific commitment, even though ready to continue to pay lip service to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(Mr. Ahmed, Egypt)

It is therefore not surprising that the non-nuclear parties showed little interest in the attempts by the nuclear Powers to shroud the issues in technicalities. The non-nuclear parties felt cheated, because they had lived up to their commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, while the nuclear Powers had not done so, and did not intend to do so; so the non-nuclear parties made a number of specific and definite demands for action by the nuclear Powers, including the honouring of their old forgotten pledges, which were the following:

First, to put an end to underground nuclear tests.

Secondly, to make a substantial reduction in nuclear arsenals.

Thirdly, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear party to the Treaty.

Fourthly, to take concrete measures of substantial aid to the developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Fifthly, to create a special international régime for conducting peaceful nuclear explosions.

Sixthly, to undertake to respect all nuclear-free zones.

Unfortunately, the nuclear Powers rejected that new approach. They put forward no new ideas or counter-proposals, but contented themselves with extolling the advantages of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks agreements and the Threshold Test Ban.

(Mr. Ahmed, Egypt)

They even praised the Security Council resolution 255 (1968 ), vague and indecisive as it is, as a measure intended to provide positive security assurances for the non-nuclear Powers, although two nuclear States permanent Members of the United Nations did not even participate in its adoption, and do not recognize it -- namely, France and China.

The non-nuclear parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, feeling that as they had voluntarily given up the nuclear option they were entitled to guarantees from the nuclear Powers, proposed at the Review Conference that the nuclear Powers should undertake: firstly, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty whose territories are free from nuclear weapons; secondly, to refrain from the first use of nuclear weapons against any other non-nuclear parties; thirdly, to encourage negotiations to establish nuclear-free zones and to respect the zones already established; and fourthly, to provide immediate assistance, without prejudice to their obligations under the United Nations Charter, to any non-nuclear party threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons at the request of the victims of such an attack.

The nuclear Powers completely rejected these proposals as well as all other proposals of the non-nuclear Powers at the Conference. Commenting on the results of this Conference -- or, rather, this sad confrontation -- William Epstein, one of the top disarmament experts of our day, said recently in an article entitled "Retrospective on the NPT Review Conference", published by the Stanley Foundation this year -- and I quote:

"Many of the non-nuclear Powers, especially those that were not under the nuclear umbrella of either super-Power, felt particularly bitter about the unwillingness of the nuclear Powers to give even such a negative type of security assurance. They felt that only a combination of arrogance and immorality could lead the nuclear Powers to insist that the non-nuclear Powers forswear the acquisition of nuclear weapons while the former continue to add to their fearful nuclear over-kill capacity, and at the same time refuse to undertake not to use or threaten to use these weapons against non-nuclear parties to the Treaty."

(Mr. Ahmed, Egypt)

He goes on to say:

"What was astonishing was that the Soviet Union, which had always supported such pledges, no longer did so. In fact, it appears to have abandoned the Kosygin formula, proposed during the negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which called precisely for an undertaking not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries that had no nuclear weapons in their territory. Ironically, only China and France, which are not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or to the Security Council resolution 255 (1968) on security assurances, are prepared to give such negative security assurances to all non-nuclear States ..."

It is clear from the foregoing that non-nuclear States, whether or not they are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, have received no impetus or encouragement to foreswear forever the acquisition of nuclear capabilities, as has been recently and justly observed by the distinguished representative of France, Mr. Taittinger, in this Committee. He imputed this to the selfishness and shortsightedness of the great Powers. And if the great Powers would not commit themselves to live up to their own pledges in the Non-Proliferation Treaty to stop all nuclear-weapons tests, to reduce their atomic arsenals and to reverse the arms race, how can one continue to believe in the seriousness of our endeavours?

While it may be true, as stated by the above-mentioned representative of France, that nuclear-free zones may not prevent the nuclear Powers from extending the war to those zones, or that in the event of an all-out nuclear war there is no guarantee that nuclear dust or contaminated waters will not reach those zones; and while we share his belief that only general and complete disarmament, under effective international control, will safeguard the world against holocaust, yet one cannot help but believe that the idea of nuclear-free zones may provide a means whereby non-nuclear Powers can, by their own initiative and efforts, ensure a greater measure of security.

(Mr. Ahmed, Egypt)

Politically and psychologically the idea can help non-nuclear neighbours to decide together to forswear the nuclear option and to prevent the stationing or deployment of nuclear weapons in their countries by nuclear Powers. In addition, it can be a means of using the leverage and combined weight of a wide group of countries to obtain pledges from the nuclear Powers not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any of the countries in the area of that zone. The United States of America and the United Kingdom, which refused to include such a pledge in either the Non-Proliferation Treaty or Security Council resolution 255 (1968), have both agreed to a commitment of this kind by signing and ratifying Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. China and France, which are not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or to Security Council resolution 255 (1968), have likewise become parties to the same Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

On the initiative of both Iran and Egypt, almost a year ago the General Assembly commended the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East by an overwhelming majority. The resolution considered it indispensable that all parties in the area proclaim their intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, testing, obtaining, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons. The resolution called upon the parties concerned in the area to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Let us now reiterate the positions as they are in the official records of the United Nations. The Egyptian Government's reply, contained in document A/10221 dated 12 September 1975, is nothing but a definite confirmation of Egypt's sincere wish to implement the General Assembly's resolution in letter and in spirit. Egypt is prepared to proclaim solemnly its willingness to refrain from producing, testing, obtaining or acquiring nuclear weapons on a reciprocal basis. In regard to the accession of the parties in the area of the Middle East to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, an indispensable act for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, according to that resolution, the signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by Egypt in 1968 is proof of Egypt's intentions.

(Mr. Ahmed, Egypt)

On the other hand, Israel's refusal so far to accede to the NPT has left Egypt with no choice but to stop short of ratifying that Treaty. Egypt is ready to ratify the NPT the moment Israel accedes to it and becomes a party thereto. The full co-operation of all States, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, and the establishment of an effective international control system are but complementary factors to build the whole set-up of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

A perusal of Israel's reply, contained in document A/10221/Add.1 dated 8 October 1975, shows that the Israeli position unfortunately is neither new nor serious; quite the contrary, it clearly indicates Israel's true intentions and policy with regard to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Israel cannot change the facts either by diplomatic manoeuvre or by specious argumentation and the repetition of the statement oft reported by the Israeli mass media: that Israel would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the region. This is not sufficient.

(Mr. Ahmed, Egypt)

The situation will be changed only when Israel pursues a straightforward and clear-cut path. First, Israel should fully accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as Egypt did, through signature, ratification and observance of all the provisions thereof. It is really ridiculous that Israel, while boasting of its vote in favour of the General Assembly resolution on the Non-Proliferation Treaty so many years ago, should, after more than seven years have elapsed since the establishment of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, now answer that it is still studying the legal and other implications of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Secondly, Israel should agree to place the Dimona reactor under international inspection. Thirdly, instead of Israel's attempts to obtain sophisticated weapons with nuclear potential, as reported recently by the American press, Israel should give a serious, unequivocal commitment to refrain from producing or obtaining nuclear weapons.

As regards Israel's demand that negotiations between the States of the region should be the only means by which a nuclear-weapon-free zone would be established, allow me to quote here from the statement of the Deputy Prime Minister of Egypt:

"Israel thereby lays down conditions which it realizes are rejected a priori, with a view to evading accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. There is a host of methods which can be followed if the intentions are truly good, such as the accession of all the States of the region to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This method alone would ensure that the region would be free from nuclear weapons; that may be followed, for example, by a binding declaration to refrain from introducing or using nuclear weapons, to be issued by all the States of the region which are Members of the United Nations or members of the International Atomic Energy Agency".

(A/10221/Add.2, p. 3)

One need not be overly pessimistic to be able to see that the picture is not a bright one when it comes to the status of the disarmament negotiations or the chances of success in this field.

Yet disarmament, general and complete disarmament, nuclear disarmament, is our business, the business of the small and medium-sized States, because

(Mr. Ahmed, Egypt)

should there be, God forbid, a nuclear war between the super-Powers, the whole world will not escape the dire consequences, either in the form of contamination or worse. Therefore, it is our duty to go on needling the great Powers and pushing them towards the achievement of our common goals.

The problems obviously are complex and complicated. They need, apart from technical answers to many complicated questions, a political decision at the very highest level. Sometimes, we small Powers are entitled to believe, those political decisions have been withheld for too long despite the availability of the technical answers. That is where a world conference on disarmament attended by world leaders and Heads of State at the head of their delegations might act as a spur. In this light, we welcomed the idea of our Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference. But like many others, we have been disappointed by the results. The Committee's present mandate does not leave it much room for manoeuvrability or much freedom of action. The boycotting by two nuclear Powers of the Committee's meetings has not helped either, notwithstanding the great diplomatic and negotiating skills of Ambassador Hoveyda of Iran. If a world disarmament conference should therefore prove difficult to convene by next year, my delegation shares the view and the commitment of the delegations of other non-aligned States that according to the Lima Conference resolutions, a special session of the General Assembly dedicated to disarmament should be convened to give the necessary impetus to the stagnating disarmament talks before the remaining half of the Disarmament Decade flies away with no hope for results being achieved.

As permanent members of the Security Council, the nuclear-weapon States have a double responsibility to arrest and reverse the vertical and horizontal nuclear danger. Yet they did nothing at the Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to provide any incentive to the non-nuclear hold-outs to give up their option to go nuclear. On the contrary, by closing their ears to all the non-nuclear Powers' appeals and proposals and by refusing to commit themselves to respect their own pledges according to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is argued by many experts that the nuclear Powers have given the other Powers every incentive to go nuclear and to abandon the Non-Proliferation Treaty since, it must be remembered, they can withdraw from it on three-months' notice.



(Mr. Ahmed, Egypt)

Yet we feel that there may yet be time both to save the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to make certain progress towards disarmament if the nuclear Powers act quickly and sensibly to live up to all their Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations and to provide credible security assurances to the non-nuclear Powers. At the top of the list of priorities my delegation suggests that there should be an immediate moratorium on all underground testing for a five-year initial period; a freeze on the production of new generations of nuclear-weapon systems, also for an initial transitional period; a declaration by the nuclear-weapon Powers forswearing the use, or threat of use, of their nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear State which does not have any nuclear weapons in its territories, and a nuclear-Power undertaking to honour, in accordance with their United Nations Charter obligations, any request for help from any such State attacked or threatened with nuclear weapons.

These measures should act as incentives against nuclear proliferation. If coupled with a progressive reduction by the nuclear Powers of the number of existing nuclear weapons and other advanced conventional-weapon arsenals, the nuclear Powers will be in a position to set a good example to the non-nuclear Powers thus, on the one hand, stimulating and reviving belief in the credibility of general and complete disarmament, and, on the other hand, exercising the necessary moral and political pressures on the non-nuclear States for the sake of arresting, and even reversing, the conventional arms race. The credibility of the disarmament talks is at stake; but much more important, the safety of the world -- indeed, the existence of the world as we know it today -- is also at stake.

Mr. AL-DOY (Bahrain) (interpretation from Arabic):

Disarmament has, in fact, been one of the most important issues since the creation of the United Nations, and the Organization has given it considerable and full attention. The United Nations, during the past three decades, has been able to adopt resolutions on a curbing of the arms race and the limitation of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but it has not been able to implement these resolutions so as to stop the general nuclear arms race.

(Mr. Al-Doy, Bahrain)

The danger of war and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction still continue. In actual fact, the problem of disarmament existed in the international community before the United Nations was founded, but it was only with the development of modern technology that the problem began to grow to the extent that armaments absorbed the lion's share, and became able, in their destructiveness, to compete with natural disasters. The earliest earthquake recorded by man took place in China in 1556 and killed more than 8 million people, but the atomic bombs in the stockpiles of the great Powers today annihilate the whole of mankind.

Bahrain, which is a small and peace-loving State, is a member of the Group of Non-Aligned countries. It has committed itself fully to the efforts of the United Nations to establish and maintain peace throughout the world. Since it first became a Member of the United Nations it has consistently supported all resolutions on the question of disarmament, including those concerning the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, the convening of a world disarmament conference, and the regulation of peaceful nuclear explosions.

My delegation supports all efforts and initiatives in the United Nations, and all steps by the great Powers, to arrive at an agreement on general and complete disarmament, to slow down the arms race and prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. Consequently, we believe that the great sums of money expended in the development and production of weapons of mass destruction could produce important practical and positive results if they were directed into development and peaceful activities, particularly in the developing countries. In this connexion, my delegation cannot comprehend the position of some States which call for disarmament and stress the danger of nuclear and bacteriological weapons, but which at the same time go on producing and developing those very weapons. Our fears are all the more overwhelming when we know that expenditures on armaments have risen to \$300 billion annually.

(Mr. Al-Doy, Bahrain)

My delegation wishes to emphasize its deep anxiety with regard to the arms race, particularly that in nuclear armaments. The arms race constitutes a direct threat to international peace and security, particularly to the small, non-nuclear States. We therefore feel that it is the duty of the United Nations and all its Member States to intensify their interest in the question of disarmament and the prohibition of the production of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and toxin weapons.

My Delegation supports the co-ordinated efforts directed to the preparation and convening of a conference on general and complete disarmament, particularly with regard to nuclear weapons, and consequently we hope that Members of this Organization will comply with the recommendations made by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs at the Lima Conference on the need to hold a special session of the United Nations devoted to questions of disarmament. Our support for such a conference stems from our complete conviction that political détente will always be precarious unless there is a parallel military détente. So long as the arms race continues, there can be no atmosphere of peace and trust throughout the world. My delegation therefore wishes to emphasize the importance of consolidating and strengthening the peaceful uses of technology through the International Atomic Energy Agency. At the same time, we call for a nuclear test ban, believing that such tests do not serve mankind and represent a threat to present and future generations.

The State of Bahrain, which is one of the hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, has on more than one occasion confirmed its full support for the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, including the Gulf region. We also welcome the proposal that the coastal and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean should hold a conference; they will thus be able to make a positive contribution to implementation of the principles laid down in the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

The use of napalm and incendiary weapons causes great pain and suffering to human beings and is a violation of human dignity. My Government has expressed its position regarding the use of such weapons in its memorandum submitted to the Secretary-General and published in document A/10223/Add.1.

(Mr. Al-Doy, Bahrain)

The Government of Bahrain has given its support to the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world. With regard to the Middle East region, my country has set forth its position regarding General Assembly resolution 3263 (XXIX) in the reply which it sent and which is to be found in document A/10221/Add.1, which reads, in part, as follows:

"The Government of Bahrain supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3263 (XXIX) adopted on 9 December 1974. Such support arises primarily from its desire to protect the region from the devastation of a destructive war and protect its people from confrontation, which is not in the interest of humanity or of the people of the region. The stockpiling, production or development of nuclear weapons is, first and foremost, a threat to the peace and security of the people of the area and, second, a threat to world peace and a direct threat to human civilization and the aspiration of people for peace and for building their economy and civilization". (A/10221/Add.1, p.2)

My delegation has taken note with satisfaction of the Final Declaration of the Conference on Security and co-operation in Europe, held in Helsinki. This document has great importance for strengthening and deepening mutual understanding and détente and for genuine co-operation and peaceful coexistence among the various States that have signed the Declaration. The document has reconfirmed the principles of the United Nations Charter, particularly that condemning the use of force. We also support détente on condition that it does not operate to the detriment of the developing countries.

(Mr. Al-Doy, Bahrain)

The situation in the world today, with the threat of war declining in various areas, provides a propitious climate for dealing with the complex questions of disarmament, and my delegation hopes that the international community will increase its efforts to curb the armaments race, the nuclear weapons race and achieve general and complete disarmament. This would be in the interests of mankind in view of the threat to man and his civilization.

Mr. NACO (Albania) (interpretation from French): The debate at this session of the General Assembly and in our Committee has once again highlighted the continuing concern of the freedom-loving countries which have noted that over the last year no progress has been made towards disarmament; on the contrary, the arms race has been stepped up and sources of tension and the possibilities of the outbreak of new conflicts have increased.

The delegation of the People's Republic of Albania fully appreciates the concern of freedom-loving Member States at the growing pace of the nuclear arms race and the aggressive activities of the two imperialist super-Powers -- the United States and the Soviet Union -- something which constitutes a danger to world peace.

In the course of this debate, the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union in order to cover up the risks entailed by their activities, have done everything in their power here to create the euphoria of a false peace by having recourse to old demagogic slogans about "détente", "co-operation and security", "general nuclear disarmament", keep on calling for bilateral and multilateral agreements on this question and are striving to present these "new proposals" as being a particularly valuable contribution which would open up prospects for disarmament; and they have also been attempting to represent meetings and conferences organized by the super-Powers as important events which contribute to international peace and security.

It is now clear to all of us that the tremendous fuss being made by the United States of America and the Soviet Union about disarmament in order to have us believe that they are seriously involved in this undertaking, is intended

(Mr. Naco, Albania)

to lull the vigilance of the peoples of the world, to create among the peace-loving peoples of the world a spirit of relaxation and to weaken and do away with their opposition to American imperialists, to Soviet socio-imperialists and all reactionary forces.

In practice, we have all witnessed the fact that the more the two super-Powers talk about disarmament, the more they are intensifying their arms race; the more they talk about the reduction of military budgets, the more they actually increase them; the more they talk about the destruction of nuclear weapons, the more they perfect them; and the more they talk about "détente", the more sources of tension in the world they create. Their purpose is, first, to obtain complete freedom of action and secondly to deprive other sovereign peoples and countries of the right to take the necessary measures for their self-defence, to persuade them to disarm, thus leaving themselves open to their great military potential.

Armaments are the very condition of the existence of the imperialist system. The two super-Powers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, are arming themselves in order to divide the world between them, to crush revolutions and subjugate peoples. In this awful competition to divide and dominate the world, to crush revolutions and to enslave peoples, the two super-Powers are making tremendous efforts respectively to outdo each other in the field of armaments.

The best proof of this is the annual increase in the military budgets of the two super-Powers which have reached fantastic proportions. These funds are used to increase their military arsenals, to produce new weapons, to improve the means of mass destruction and to strengthen their aggressive power. The unbridled race to produce nuclear weapons and rockets on the part of the American imperialists and the Soviet socio-imperialists has assumed great proportions. The Soviet socio-imperialists and the American imperialists in their competition to take over the seas and the oceans have strengthened their fleets. No day goes by when we do not hear of some military manoeuvre or another, when we do not hear of some new type of aircraft or warship which has been launched, or that we do not hear announcements about new types of rockets built by the United States of

(Mr. Naco, Albania)

America and the Soviet Union, or about experiments with nuclear-warhead rockets.

The United States and the Soviet Union in their rivalry are intensifying their policy of aggression and oppression against sovereign peoples. Recently the countries of northern Europe, rich as they are in fish and oil deposits, have been subject to pressures, blackmail and interference in their internal affairs on the part of the two super-Powers. The American imperialists in September this year organized large-scale manoeuvres in the north of Europe while the Soviet socio-imperialists organized large-scale naval manoeuvres and rocket tests in the Barents Sea.

Military manoeuvres are all part of the unbridled war preparations undertaken by the two super-Powers; they constitute a demonstration of their military apparatus, a demonstration of their might and an exhibition of their new types of weapons for intimidating peoples and creating psychoses of fear. All these things have nothing whatsoever to do with the détente they, the two super-Powers, so zealously advocate. And in fact they serve to aggravate even further the atmosphere of tension which exists in the world where there still survive sources of tension created by the two super-Powers thus bringing us ever closer to the risk of war in the world.

Recent events have demonstrated a further intensification of the efforts of American imperialists and the Soviet socio-imperialists to strengthen their military presence in various parts of the world. The two super-Powers have created artificial tensions and hotbeds of war in various parts of the world to ensure their military presence there and in order to be able to intervene. There is no denying that their fleets, which sail the seas and oceans of the world, and the many military bases they have created today represent a great danger to the freedom and independence of the peoples of the world.

(Mr. Naco, Albania)

It is no accident that the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Gulf area and the Indian Ocean have been subject to pressures, military threats, blackmail and unscrupulous actions on the part of the American imperialists and the Soviet socio-imperialists. All this is connected with the global hegemonistic strategy of the two super-Powers which want to dominate the whole world and also with their concrete plans to seize and subjugate these strategically important areas which are so rich in oil. This situation is a source of concern, not only to the peoples of the area but also to all the freedom-loving peoples of the whole world.



(Mr. Naco, Albania)

The two super-Powers today have become the greatest arms manufacturers and merchants in history. In their continual competition to increase and perfect their weapons, the two super-Powers have accumulated large quantities of arms which they are selling to other countries at high prices.

The export of arms is used as a means of pressure and blackmail to serve their expansionist designs. This was clearly proved when the Soviet socio-imperialists sabotaged the struggle of the Arab countries against Israel in October 1973 by cutting off the delivery of weapons and spare parts.

The United States and the Soviet Union are continuing to arm themselves while recommending that others disarm, thus weakening their struggle for liberty, independence and national sovereignty, and trying to force them to give up their struggle against the criminal and hegemonistic policy of the two super-Powers.

Events have shown that the agreements which the two super-Powers have concluded, and which they introduced with much fanfare as being a valuable contribution to disarmament, have nothing whatsoever to do with disarmament. As a matter of fact, these agreements have served, and continue to serve, their hegemonistic interests and have helped them to step up their efforts to keep other countries a long way behind them in the armaments race, to ensure for themselves absolute superiority in this area.

Furthermore, the representatives of the Soviet Union have, as they normally do, presented us in the course of this session with new proposals: the conclusion of a treaty on complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing, and the adoption of a new resolution on what they call "the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons".

It is well known that whenever the two super-Powers make proposals about nuclear-weapon testing, they have no other end in view but that of ensuring for themselves superiority and monopoly in the field. We are all aware that the Moscow Treaty on the partial cessation of nuclear tests did not prevent the two super-Powers from constantly increasing their stockpiles of these weapons and from perfecting them. Now, with their new proposal on the complete

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and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, the Soviet revisionists are trying to legalize underground explosions by invoking so-called peaceful purposes. And this means that they will continue to do what they have been doing so far, but under a different name.

The other proposal on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new kinds of weapons submitted by the Soviet revisionists is nothing more than a new manoeuvre to sow fear and panic among the peoples of the world and to divert their attention from the problems which are at present of concern to them.

The United States and the Soviet Union, while they talk of disarmament and the cessation of nuclear tests, are continuing to intensify them. In the past month, in Nevada, the United States carried out its most powerful nuclear explosion ever. This was the third explosion carried out in October and the twelfth this year. From 18 to 22 October, the Soviet socio-imperialists also carried out two underground nuclear explosions in the region of Novoya Zemlya, thus bringing to eight the number of tests they have carried out this year. The growing competition in nuclear testing between the two super-Powers demonstrates once again the unbridled nature of the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union within the context of their hegemonistic policies and their intensive preparations for new, atrocious wars. At the same time, this proves the false nature of the declarations and all the imperialist-revisionist propaganda about the so-called efforts they are making to bring about an end to nuclear weapon testing.

Events have shown that by the Non-Proliferation Treaty the United States and the Soviet Union have striven to legalize their nuclear monopoly, and to leave the sovereign peoples and countries of the world unarmed so that they can more easily impose their will upon them. Thus, the Soviet-American agreements on so-called strategic arms limitation have, in fact, done nothing to slow down the arms race between the two super-Powers. Quite the contrary, a new phase has begun in this arms race in terms of the improvements they have made to their strategic nuclear arsenals. Quite frankly, many countries in their statements have expressed concern at the danger of these agreements.

(Mr. Naco, Albania)

The convening of a world disarmament conference also forms part of the propaganda campaign being conducted by the two imperialist super-Powers in the disarmament field. A world conference whereby the socio-imperialists claim that they want to bring about general and complete disarmament is not only impossible but also very dangerous. The course of events in the world, the presence of bases and the fleets of the two super-Powers in the four corners of the world, and the military manoeuvres of the NATO and Warsaw Pact blocs, are all evidence of the serious danger today threatening the freedom and independence of sovereign States and peoples. In these circumstances, the convening of such a conference would only serve to create illusions and mislead people.

The statements of the Soviet Union and the United States to the effect that the results of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe will stimulate political détente, which in turn will promote military détente, are false; because events in Europe clearly show that the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe organized by the two super-Powers was not convened for the purpose of ensuring peace and security in Europe, but to serve their hegemonistic aims, to legalize their spheres of influence and their privileges in various European countries, and to force the States participating to recognize their role of arbiter in all European matters. There is no security in Europe, mainly, because the two super-Powers, according to their strategy for world hegemony, maintain large military contingents in Europe within the framework of military blocs they control: NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The competition for hegemony on the part of the two super-Powers has also extended to the south and to the north of Europe. It is no accident that each of the parties is striving to strengthen its aggressive bloc. To this end, Moscow is beginning to call loudly for the general replacement of the military equipment of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact, with a view to an offensive war; and Washington is asking NATO to strengthen its conventional military forces.

(Mr. Naco, Albania)

"The peoples of Europe" -- Comrade Enver Hoxha has said -- "can achieve their security only by strengthening their independence and national sovereignty, by struggling resolutely against the hegemonistic policy of the Soviet Union and the United States, and by resisting the efforts of the two super-Powers to retain their military bases and their zones of influence in Europe".

The conference on the so-called mutual reduction of armed forces in Europe is another manoeuvre designed to create the false impression that, in Europe, concrete steps are being taken towards disarmament. The token reduction which they are attempting to make is aimed solely at serving the cause of their balance of power and subjugating the European peoples. The so-called reduction of forces not only fails to affect the military potential of the two super-Powers, but actually tends to maintain these forces with a minimum of expenditure.

(Mr. Naco, Albania)

In the face of the aggressive activities of the two super-Powers, the freedom-loving and peace-loving countries are obliged to guard against allowing themselves to fall into the trap of the imperialists and the socio-imperialists, to bolster their international solidarity and strengthen their unity, and to rely on their own resources for the defence of their freedom and national independence. Freedom, independence, national sovereignty and the political and economic development of every country cannot be brought about from the outside, but only through the efforts and the struggles of each people and each country.

Events have shown to the peoples not only the ever-growing danger represented by the American imperialists and the Soviet socio-imperialists but also the need to wage an ever-increasing struggle against the super-Powers and continually to strengthen their defensive capability in order to meet any possible danger. We welcome the great successes of the People's Republic of China in the field of nuclear arms; this has not only broken the nuclear monopoly of the two super-Powers but also represent a very important factor for the protection of the higher interests of the Chinese people and the other freedom-loving peoples of the whole world against the nuclear blackmail of the American imperialists and the Soviet socio-imperialists.

Genuine disarmament must begin with the two super-Powers, which possess the greatest military potential and represent the greatest danger of war and aggression, and not by the peace-loving States, which are forced to defend their independence in view of the continual threats of the two super-Powers, nor by the oppressed peoples, which are waging a just struggle for liberation from imperialist colonial domination.

Genuine disarmament can be brought about only by a continual struggle on the part of all peoples against the policy of the two super-Powers and by imposing disarmament upon them.

The People's Republic of Albania will continue to stand shoulder to shoulder with all freedom-loving countries and will not fail to make its contribution to this end in the future.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Israel, who has asked to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

Mr. ERELL (Israel): I am grateful to you, Mr. Chairman. I should like, with your permission, to make just one point with reference to the statement made by the representative of Egypt in this debate.

He dealt at some length with Israel's intentions, which he took upon himself to interpret. I strongly suggest that the party which declines to negotiate is the party whose intentions ought to be suspect. Still, I should like to commend the representative of Egypt for having dropped, in the delivery of his statement, one offensive term, which appeared in his prepared written statement. I should like also to assure him that my delegation will study his statement very, very carefully and give it all due consideration, disregarding any other offensive words which he may have said and which he might have dropped but did not.

#### ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN: At the end of our 2092nd meeting, I reiterated my suggestion that, after we finish the general debate on items relating to disarmament on Friday, 21 November, at noon, we should proceed to discuss the various draft resolutions on the disarmament items. So far eight draft resolutions have been submitted and circulated as documents of the First Committee. I am aware that disarmament items are both complex and complicated and that there is therefore need for careful negotiations before draft resolutions can be introduced. However, I would remind the Committee that the cut-off date for the work of the First Committee is 5 December. It is therefore imperative that we begin the discussion of draft resolutions on the afternoon of 21 November.

(The Chairman)

I have been told that a large number of resolutions -- more than 20 -- are to be submitted. I therefore suggest that the cut-off date for the submission of draft resolutions be fixed as of Wednesday, 26 November, at 1 p.m. Regarding this matter, I was very happy to consult with some delegations which requested a little more time to submit draft resolutions.

I have been very flexible concerning procedural matters and I want to continue to be flexible. As a rule the draft resolutions should be submitted on or before Wednesday, 26 November, at 1 p.m. As an exception, if a draft resolution or a small number of draft resolutions are not ready by that time, I am sure that the Committee will afford an opportunity for the introduction of such draft resolutions after the cut-off date.

My suggestions on the organization of work is based on our previous experience. Last year, this Committee had 12 items on disarmament and there were 21 draft resolutions before it. The Committee devoted 14 meetings to the introduction and discussion of those draft resolutions and to the voting on them. This year, the Committee has 19 items on disarmament and, if we are going to have approximately 30 draft resolutions, we shall certainly need more than 14 meetings. Taking all these factors into consideration, as well as the cut-off date for the First Committee's work, we have, from tomorrow afternoon, about 20 meetings to consider all of this year's draft resolutions and to vote on them.

This procedure will not only preserve the flexibility of our work but also give adequate time and opportunity to delegations which are not involved with the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) to study the various draft resolutions, obtain instructions from their respective capitals, if necessary, and thus be ready to vote on the draft resolutions. Disarmament is of universal concern and I feel that each and every member of this Committee should have adequate and equal opportunity to participate in the disarmament discussions and to formulate any draft resolution.

(The Chairman)

Furthermore, I should like to give you some ideas -- ideas only, not decisions -- regarding the conduct of our work as from tomorrow afternoon.

Tomorrow afternoon we shall begin consideration of the eight draft resolutions which have already been submitted. Two more draft resolutions will be introduced tomorrow, and I hope more will be. I shall invite delegations to begin consideration of these draft resolutions in the order in which they have been submitted. I shall call on delegations to make their preliminary remarks or comments, if any and if they so desire, on each draft resolution. As soon as we have finished, we shall hear statements from those delegations wishing to introduce new draft resolutions -- that is, tomorrow afternoon, Monday morning, Monday afternoon, Tuesday morning, until Wednesday.

By following this procedure we shall be able to begin the serious consideration of these items and also isolate those draft resolutions which are not of a controversial nature. We may be able, by the middle of next week, to take action on them.

Those draft resolutions necessitating further discussion and comment will be taken up again after we have finished with this process. I am sure that we can proceed on a certain pragmatic basis without fixing definite rules for the conduct of our work as from tomorrow afternoon.

Nevertheless, I would urge delegations kindly to be prepared to begin, as from tomorrow afternoon, serious consideration of the draft resolutions before us so that we can finish our work on time.

I hope that these suggestions and this plan of action will be helpful for the conduct of work of this Committee.



Mr. PASTINEN (Finland): Mr. Chairman, I should simply like to seek clarification from you. If I understood you correctly, you said that we shall start on Monday our discussion of the draft resolutions which have already been submitted. Now, of course, we have no objection to that. I understood you also to say that you would try to finish with a number of draft resolutions, which I understood to mean that a discussion on them would be concluded at a certain stage.

Now, on some items draft resolutions have already been submitted, while other draft resolutions on the same items may still be expected. This is true of an item of particular interest to my delegation which relates to a comprehensive study of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all their aspects. A draft resolution by the delegation of Mexico and a number of other delegations has already been submitted and officially circulated, and I take it that that is one which will be introduced on Monday. However, I take it also that it would be the intention of the Chair not to conclude the consideration or discussion of that particular draft resolution at least not before all draft resolutions on one item have emerged.

I wonder if you would confirm whether my understanding is correct.

The CHAIRMAN: As to the first point raised by the representative of Finland, we shall begin consideration of the draft resolutions that have been submitted not on Monday but on Friday afternoon, that is tomorrow. There are also two draft resolutions expected to be introduced tomorrow afternoon, in addition to the eight we have already; and I hope more will be introduced. Then we shall begin consideration of those draft resolutions in the order in which they have been submitted. I shall invite those delegations wishing to make preliminary comments on those draft resolutions to do so.

We will not act immediately or in the middle of next week on any draft resolution unless we have isolated it completely in our debate as a draft resolution on which there is widespread agreement or consensus in the Committee, or which is not connected with any other matter.

(The Chairman)

We could thus dispose of that group of draft resolutions by the middle of next week, after which we shall go back to each one of the draft resolutions on which we have had preliminary comments in order to give delegations a further opportunity to pronounce themselves on them.

I hope that these comments have clarified the situation for the representative of Finland.

Mr. PASTINEN (Finland): Sir, I am most grateful for your clarification. You have indeed made the situation quite clear.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.