



CONTENTS

	Page
Agenda items 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33 and 34 (continued):	
World Disarmament Conference: report of the Secretary-General	
Implementation of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States: report of the International Atomic Energy Agency	
General and complete disarmament:	
(a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament;	
(b) Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency;	
(c) Report of the Secretary-General under General Assembly resolution 2852 (XXVI), paragraph 5	
Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament	
Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests:	
(a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament	
(b) Report of the Secretary-General	
Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2830 (XXVI) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General	
Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace: report of the Secretary-General	1

Chairman: Mr. Radha Krishna RAMPHUL
(Mauritius).

**AGENDA ITEMS 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33 AND 34
(continued)**

World Disarmament Conference: report of the Secretary-General (A/8654, A/8668, A/8681, A/8693, and Corr.1, A/8757, A/8817 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.618)	
Implementation of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States: report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (A/8774, A/C.1/L.617)	
General and complete disarmament (A/C.1/1025 and 1026):	
(a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/8818);	
(b) Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (A/8774);	
(c) Report of the Secretary-General under General Assembly resolution 2852 (XXVI), paragraph 5 (A/8803, and Corr.1, A/C.1/L.616)	
Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/8818)	

Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests (A/8740, A/8741, A/C.1/L.611, 615 and 620):

- (a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/8818);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/8807)

Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2830 (XXVI) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General (A/8653, A/8808, A/C.1/L.619)

Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace: report of the Secretary-General (A/8809)

1. The CHAIRMAN: Before we resume our consideration of these items I should like to thank members of the delegations which have been good enough to co-operate with the Chairman and to participate in this morning's debate; they are: Morocco, Brazil, Romania, Australia and Norway.

2. Mr. KHATTABI (Morocco) [*interpretation from French*]: During my speech at the 1875th meeting I expressed the opinion of my delegation concerning the convening of a world disarmament conference. I should like to be permitted to make a brief comment today on the problem of disarmament as a whole.

3. The criticisms, sometimes severe but justified, which have been directed at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by a number of delegations lead us to think that it is no longer a question of discussing the activities of that Committee here, but rather of evaluating its real efficacy or questioning its competence as an organ for multilateral negotiations on disarmament.

4. Born of the famous joint statement by the Soviet Union and the United States of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations, issued on 20 September 1961¹ and approved by the General Assembly on 20 December of that year [*resolution 1722 (XVI)*], the Conference is frequently influenced by the changes in the balance of forces between the two principal military Powers which provide its co-Chairmen, and, because of this it has never been able to achieve any real progress in its field of competence.

5. Parallel to this lack of progress, the process of qualitative and quantitative development of weapons of mass destruction continues unabated and the atomic escalation

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.*

mechanism is acquiring such proportions that the Moscow Treaty of 1963² and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are on the point of becoming obsolete.

6. Moreover, the term “disarmament”, deprived of its original meaning, has given way to expressions such as “arms control”, which mean nothing but the maintenance of the strategic balance between the “great” Powers for the benefit of their own security and their special conception of the security of the other regions of the world. Moreover, it is in this context, that we must place the Soviet-American Agreements signed in Moscow on 26 May last; especially since those bilateral instruments make no provision for the qualitative limitation of strategic weapons.

7. If we add to all these discouraging factors the absence of France and China which, for different reasons, have never taken part in the negotiations of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, we can understand why that body is unable to achieve the progress expected of it.

8. In fact, the Conference is merely a reflection of the complexity of international relations, characterized by ideological antagonisms, military rivalries and economic, social and technical imbalances between countries.

9. At the present stage of virtual standstill of the multilateral negotiations on disarmament the General Assembly should first and foremost make every effort to find a way to get them out of the impasse by trying to get agreement on the form which conversations on disarmament must take, if that is genuinely the wish of the Powers directly concerned.

10. The five-Power talks advocated by certain Powers are blocked, as is known, by the opposition of one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, mutilated by the mistrustful attitude to it of two nuclear Powers, becomes increasingly less capable of making any headway along the path towards concrete negotiations capable of leading to real and universally accepted results in the field of disarmament. Bilateral conversations offer only limited possibilities as regards their scope and importance, to the extent that they are designed only to achieve the maintenance of stable equilibrium between the parties concerned. Moreover the enthusiasm aroused by the proposal to convene a world conference on disarmament is far from being shared, at least for the time being, by all the nuclear Powers. What should be done, therefore, to bring about agreement on the mechanism for the conversations on disarmament? That is the real problem which faces the General Assembly.

11. Before concluding this statement I should like to recall that my country is still convinced that nuclear disarmament must remain the primary and priority goal of all the negotiations on disarmament. To achieve that objective it is necessary for the nuclear Powers to halt all nuclear weapon tests, in order to open the way to the prohibition of their use, their reduction and ultimately their total elimination.

12. In our opinion the solution of the problem of the cessation of tests is essentially political. The technical difficulties of adequate and viable verification are no longer insurmountable, in view of the technical progress that has been made in the field of detection, localization and identification of explosions by seismic means.

13. Moreover, my country, which was among the first to sign the non-proliferation Treaty and which recently concluded a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, considers that the real importance of that Treaty as well as of the 1963 partial test ban Treaty, resides primarily in the universality of adherence to these instruments and, secondly, in the need to supplement them with more substantial measures.

14. We also consider that the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and their total elimination from the military arsenals of all States is the only means of strengthening the Geneva Protocol of 1925³ and of preserving mankind from the dangers inherent in that category of weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, it is only logical that all countries with insufficient means of protection and defence against any possible use of the chemical means of warfare should be opposed to any attempt to limit the scope of their prohibition or to delay the solution of the problem.

15. My delegation, deeply indignant at the use of certain methods of waging war and at the horror engendered by a reading of the Secretary-General's report on *Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use*,⁴ has not hesitated to join the sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.616, submitted on the initiative of Mexico and Sweden.

16. As regards the limitation of conventional weapons, my delegation considers that the solution of this problem should be found within the context of over-all general and complete disarmament and in an international climate better adapted to the need for fully respecting the freedom, the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of all countries.

17. Lastly, we believe that the question of disarmament is organically linked to the cause of the economic and social development of all peoples as well as to the will to strengthen international security—in other words, the security of all the countries and all the regions of the world without restraints or limitations of any kind—and in such a manner that all countries would be described as “large” or “small” only in terms of their contribution to the triumph of the principles of the United Nations and the purposes of the Charter.

18. Mr. ENE (Romania) [*interpretation from French*]: In its previous statement, at the 1876th meeting, the Romanian delegation, while presenting its concept of the place of the world disarmament conference in the context of the efforts to remove from the shoulders of the people the

² Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water.

³ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

⁴ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.I.3.

burden of armaments and to protect them from the threat of war, has already set forth its position on all the problems of disarmament.

19. Briefly, Romania considers that it is as necessary as it is urgent that a radical change be made in the negotiations on disarmament, that an end be put to the arms race and that we proceed to the achievement, on the basis of specific programmes, of effective measures of disarmament, in particular the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. Today, in this statement, we should like once again to stress the need to get the negotiations on disarmament out of the stage of ineffective discussions and to set them resolutely on the path of practical achievements.

20. In the opinion of the Romanian Government the disarmament negotiations must centre on the cardinal problems involved: namely, the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction, by granting the highest priority to nuclear disarmament. This priority flows from the undeniable fact that nuclear weapons are today the most serious threat weighing on all peoples.

21. We also consider that the new stage of disarmament negotiations should focus on the elaboration and the implementation of a concrete programme providing for, as its principal measures, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the establishment of zones of peace and nuclear-free zones, accompanied by appropriate security guarantees, the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and other means of mass extermination, and the gradual destruction, under international control, of such weapons.

22. In the whole group of nuclear disarmament measures, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is, in our opinion, the most urgent. In placing such a measure in the foreground, we are thinking of the harmful consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and of the risk that they might be used, as well as of the urgent necessity of using political and juridical means to prevent recourse to such weapons until they are completely eliminated.

23. The prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is all the more necessary as their very existence and the possibility of their being used merely encourage the practice of the imperialist policy of recourse to force and the threat of force, of aggression and of *diktat*. It is a primary requirement, in these circumstances, that the nuclear-weapon States assume the solemn obligation that they will not resort to the use of nuclear weapons or to the threat of using them against anyone and in any circumstances. As we have already indicated on other occasions, we consider that special attention must be given, within the context of the efforts designed to outlaw and eliminate nuclear weapons, to the achievement for that purpose of a universal agreement as a common commitment of States or of separate declarations by them.

24. The adoption of such a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons as a matter of priority would contribute to increasing confidence among States that possess these weapons and would also contribute to international *détente*, as well as open new possibilities for the cessation of

the production of atomic armaments and the destruction of stockpiles thereof. At the same time this would meet the legitimate requirements of the non-nuclear-weapon States for firm security guarantees.

25. This claim could be met either within the context of a general prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons or by means of a specific international agreement. What is essential is that the non-nuclear-weapon States be given firm guarantees that they will never, in any circumstances, be the victims of the use of such nuclear weapons or the threat of their use.

26. Starting from that position of principle and in the light of the attention that the matter before us requires, the Romanian delegation—as can be gathered from the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament requested that: “the question of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States be examined and solved in an appropriate manner in disarmament negotiations” [A/8818, para. 62].

27. In present conditions, when nuclear weapons and military bases are scattered in different parts of the world, an important step in order to avoid the nuclear danger would be the implementation of regional measures to prevent the penetration of nuclear weapons into new areas and to rid as large areas of the planet as possible of them. That is why we actively support the proposals designed to establish zones of peace and nuclear-free zones in different parts of the world, with appropriate security guarantees.

28. The Romanian delegation has supported the two items on the Committees' agenda concerning the establishment of such zones. As a European country, Romania believes that a transitional measure of great use would be the creation of zones of peace and nuclear-free zones in Europe, strengthened by the commitment of the nuclear States never to use atomic weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

29. It was pursuant to that line of reasoning that the Romanian Government submitted and continues to advocate the well-known proposals regarding the Balkan Peninsula. Since in the Balkans there are countries which exist under different social systems, we would like to find a way of organizing economic, technical, scientific, cultural and political co-operation among all the States of the region and thus arrive at the establishment of appropriate organs that will promote this collaboration, work for the elimination of military bases in the Balkans, the withdrawal of foreign troops and gradually transform the Balkans into a zone of co-operation and peace, free from nuclear weapons. The achievement of that goal would be in the interest of all the peoples of the Balkans and would fit within the general framework of the search for security and co-operation in Europe and for the establishment of an atmosphere of security all over the world.

30. It is true, as can also be gathered from our debates, that the peace and security of peoples and their very existence will be in permanent jeopardy as long as nuclear weapons are manufactured and their stockpiles increased. Romania also urges the cessation of the production and improvement of nuclear weapons and the gradual destruction of all such weapons under effective international

control. It is high time that these basic problems of disarmament were the centre of effective concern in disarmament negotiations.

31. The cessation of production and the destruction of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes and the transfer of existing stocks to peaceful uses are all called for by the vital interests of peace and security of peoples and by their pressing need to benefit fully from the advantages of the peaceful utilization of atomic energy. If the immense material and human resources that are present are devoted to the production of nuclear weapons and to research for their improvement had been utilized, in the form of nuclear energy, for peaceful purposes, considerable progress would have been achieved on the road to the liquidation of under-development and great encouragement would have been given to the economic progress and social welfare of all mankind.

32. We are deeply convinced that to progress along the road to disarmament is tantamount to achieving progress, first and foremost, in the above-mentioned fields; but this must be by a wide approach and the concerted assistance and contribution of all States and the scrupulous concern for the interests of all peoples.

33. Romania is in favour of outlawing the weapons of mass destruction and of eliminating them from the arsenals of all States. With that idea in mind we took part in the negotiations for the Convention on bacteriological weapons,⁵ which we have already signed. Thus, too, we support the conclusion of a convention dealing with the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons and have spoken out in favour of the draft convention on the matter that was submitted at Geneva [*ibid.*, annex B., sect. 5].

34. Romania has also made its contribution to the preparation of the Secretary-General's report on *Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use*.⁶ We believe that the new scientific and technical discoveries should be utilized in the wider interests of all peoples and not in order to create or develop new means of mass destruction.

35. Naturally, the negotiations dealing with chemical weapons and other similar matters should be linked with the chain of systematic efforts to eliminate all forms of mass destruction, first and foremost among which must be considered nuclear weapons.

36. This year's activity in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, as a number of delegations have pointed out, does not give us too many reasons for satisfaction; the report of the Conference to the General Assembly attests to this fact.

37. Concerned over the critical situation in the disarmament negotiations, Romania, together with a number of other countries, has constantly spoken out in favour of

improving the activities of the Geneva Conference. Our main proposals and suggestions to this end are contained in document CCD/PV.550, which is also mentioned in paragraph 159 of the report of the Conference. The Romanian delegation considers that there is a pressing need for effective negotiations concentrated on real measures to prohibit and destroy nuclear weapons, put an end to the arms race and achieve concrete progress on the road to disarmament.

38. To this end it is imperative that the negotiating organ on disarmament make a serious effort to adapt itself to existing realities and emerge from the present stalemate in which discussions are limited to a single problem and priority questions of disarmament are set aside. It must also intensify its work and increase its effectiveness. It must enter a process of parallel negotiations of the most urgent and necessary measures for disarmament. By its structure, procedure and activity that organ should lay the groundwork for a wider contribution by all States and should become a genuine negotiating body, its work based on the equality of States.

39. It is thus that Romania views the improvement and broadening of the activities of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, its democratization, and its submission to the effective control of world public opinion. The Conference should proceed to implement specific programmes on disarmament, which would be made public all over the world and translated into fact.

40. These are the main comments that the Romanian delegation wishes to make at this stage of our debate and they bespeak a sincere desire to contribute, together with other delegations, to the search for guidelines for future efforts towards disarmament.

41. Mr. SARAIVA GUERREIRO (Brazil): My delegation has already made a general statement covering several points [*1878th meeting*]. Today we want to submit a few comments on some of the specific agenda items on disarmament, in particular on the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [*A/8818*].

42. The work of the Conference in 1972 yielded no concrete results—at least not in the form of a draft convention—and this is, of course, a source of great regret to us all. Not that it can be expected that a negotiating body should necessarily produce one legal instrument per year; it would be simplistic and unwise to evaluate its work solely on the basis of that criterion.

43. The serious consideration of an important measure of disarmament, the identification of areas of agreement and a clearer understanding of the points of divergence to be bridged may well be considered as a task of such significance that a session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament may be devoted to it—the more so when the object of its consideration is a very complex measure of actual disarmament, such as the ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

44. In this sense, the work of the Conference in 1972 merits careful attention. The working papers submitted, the presentation of the opinions of experts, and the suggestions

⁵ Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

⁶ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.1.3.

of several delegations, including a draft treaty introduced by the socialist countries [*ibid.*, annex B, sect. 5], are evidence of the efforts made to advance in this field. But, unfortunately, no clear conclusions could be drawn and even the negotiating positions of some States whose participation is essential seem not yet definitely established.

45. Most of the discussion on the item on chemical weapons, in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, centered on two basic issues: the definition of the agents of chemical warfare and the verification and claims procedures.

46. I need not take the time of this Committee to recapitulate the long—and to a large extent technical—discussions on the definition and classification of chemical agents used for warfare purposes. It may be recalled, however, that the possibility of establishing a distinction between high toxicity agents, which serve no peaceful purpose except in very small quantities for use in research, and other agents, less toxic, but widely employed in peaceful industries, seemed to be relevant both from the point of view of the scope of a ban and as regards methods of verification. Some delegations did not exclude the possibility of a ban limited to high toxicity agents, if it proved to be an attainable initial step. Many other delegations, although they would settle for nothing less than a complete ban on the production of chemical weapons, admitted nevertheless that the distinction between high toxicity and dual-purpose agents was quite pertinent to the modalities of execution and to measures of verification of an over-all agreement.

47. The Brazilian delegation, although it still favoured a complete ban, at the same time did not wish to preclude *a priori* any solution that might be demonstrably significant and politically possible. However, the very interesting discussions in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, particularly those with the participation of experts, had the effect of reinforcing our original preference for a fully comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. There were two main reasons.

48. First, all chemical agents of warfare, whether highly toxic or less so, could have devastating effects on the populations of the less armed countries, which lack the specialized means of defence called for in this kind of warfare. In other words, toxicity was not only intrinsic but relative to the degree of protection of the victim. This is a point that has been made by several delegations, and in particular, I think, the Yugoslav delegation. The development of binary agents, as yet apparently not fully perfected, would only complicate matters since it would make it possible to convert two basically innocent agents into a deadly weapon, by joining them in the vector itself at the last moment.

49. Secondly, although the highly toxic agents could probably be reasonably defined by the cumulative use of different criteria, and although their production could be unconditionally forbidden, except in very small quantities for laboratory research, the control of their prohibition would present as much, if not more, political difficulty as that of dual-purpose, less toxic agents. The distinction

between the two categories did not seem, therefore, to lead to a practicable road.

50. Another possible approach to the question of the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons consists in analysing that prohibition, not in relation to the different categories of agents, but in relation to the different phases of military preparedness, basically the cessation of current production on the one hand, and the destruction of stockpiles and cessation of training on the other.

51. The delegation of the United Kingdom made this analysis in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [*see CCD/PV.557*] without favouring either phase as the object of the initial stage of prohibition—that is, without favouring as a first step the elimination of stockpiles with a freeze on production, or the elimination of productive capacity not accompanied initially by the destruction of stockpiles. In either case, they saw the same dangers lurking if direct international controls were not provided.

52. By the end of this year's summer session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, my delegation arrived at some preliminary conclusions, from the point of view of the countries that do not include chemical weapons in their military panoply. We left aside, for the time being, the question as it might present itself in the strategic relationships among the great Powers. This is to a considerable extent justified, since this kind of armament may be possessed by, or may affect, the super-Powers and the great, medium and small Powers alike.

53. At this juncture may I recall that some general principles, in our opinion, are valid, especially from the point of view of small Powers, in any measure of disarmament. These include non-discrimination, international co-operation in peaceful uses and non-limitation of national technological development, and employment of the resources liberated by such measures in economic and social development, particularly of developing countries.

54. Now, even if a single instrument is concluded forbidding the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, the obligation to forgo those different activities cannot enter into force for all parties at the same time without creating a *de facto* discrimination in favour of chemical-weapon Powers. This discrimination derives from two circumstances.

55. First, the destruction of stockpiles demands a long period and will probably entail environmental and legal problems of considerable consequence. Therefore, during that rather long lapse of time, still undefined, the countries which had accumulated stockpiles would be in possession of them, while other countries would have undertaken the commitment of not accumulating them.

56. Secondly, it is not impossible to obtain the information to prove that a developing country, which does not have a chemical weapons industry, is fulfilling its international commitment not to develop such an industry. New activities in the field of chemical industry are generally known, the economic indicators are accessible and a

system of reporting and comparative analysis of data can provide this assurance.

57. With regard to stockpiles of chemical weapons already existing in the arsenals of the great Powers, however, verification based exclusively on unilateral declarations cannot provide assurance that those stockpiles have been destroyed. In order, therefore, to equalize the situation among the parties it would seem necessary to begin with the destruction of stockpiles, verified by means of a direct international system. The elimination of stockpiles in the first stage with this direct international system, accompanied by the cessation of production, would probably facilitate the solution of verification problems in the subsequent stages. This use of direct international verification methods, including what has been called “demonstrative verification”, would probably lead to a climate of confidence that might make easier a politically possible system of “self-control” and national and international indirect methods of verification in the ensuing stage of prohibition of development and production. Indeed, the processes of development and production are so inextricably linked with the peaceful uses of chemical agents that one can hardly imagine the possibility of strict and unflinching control of those processes without too intrusive and probably unacceptable methods.

58. If a single instrument for banning chemical weapons is envisaged and a discriminatory *de facto* situation is to be avoided, such a treaty should enter into force immediately for the countries that produce and/or stockpile chemical weapons, in terms of a commitment to the destruction and to the cessation of production of such weapons. For the remaining countries, those that neither produce nor stockpile chemical weapons, the treaty would enter into force only when the complete destruction of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons had been carried out.

59. Another requirement of non-discrimination is to free the complaints procedure, in cases of alleged violation of the treaty, from the use of the veto by the permanent members of the Security Council, at least in the investigative stage. Some suggestions were made in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on possible mechanisms that would ensure a factual investigation of complaints of violations, an investigation that would be impartial and that could not be paralysed by the arbitrary decision of one of the parties to the convention.

60. There seems to be no difficulty in recognizing that there is no need for any limitation on full and unrestricted scientific and technological development in the utilization of chemical agents for non-military purposes; and that any agreement should provide expressly for the promotion of international co-operation for peaceful purposes in the field of chemistry.

61. The elimination of chemical weapons should liberate a substantial quantity of resources. The channelling of such liberated resources into economic and social development, particularly that of the developing countries, would then become a practical, concrete question. If we truly wish to establish a link between the Disarmament Decade and the Second United Nations Development Decade we should, in a chemical weapons convention, go beyond the mere

reaffirmation of the principle and provide for its implementation.

62. These are some comments which, of course, do not purport to be exhaustive and in some cases do not reflect a definitive position but which show many of the matters of concern to non-chemical-weapon Powers. The questions of the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles and a ban on further development and production of such weapons have not advanced politically and we cannot ignore their complexities, but nevertheless we cannot give up hope that progress may be achieved, that some Powers which have not yet taken a clear position will come forward with concrete proposals, and that next year the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament may engage in real negotiations in this field.

63. In the matter of nuclear disarmament, which is of the highest priority, nothing worth mentioning happened in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, although some delegations made statements or presented papers of great interest on the question of a complete ban on nuclear weapon tests, in particular on advances in the technology of seismographic detection of explosions. No new political development, however, could be detected.

64. A complete test ban seems to be much less significant today than it would have been 10 years ago, when the Conference began discussing it. Since then enormous sophistication and experience have been gained by the leading nuclear Powers in this field. The astonishing progress already achieved in the art of human decimation should make it easier, because it is less important strategically, to discontinue weapon testing. Even so, my delegation considers that it is urgent to try to bring about the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests, which would complement the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, without prejudice to the right of all States to carry out their own unrestricted research and to develop their capabilities in all peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

65. Other preliminary or collateral measures in the field of nuclear disarmament, such as the cut-off in the production of special fissionable materials, were only mentioned in passing. Of course, even less can be said of the convention of existing weapon-grade materials to peaceful uses, a question to which the representative of Japan correctly attributed importance in his statement at the 1877th meeting. Indeed, four years have elapsed since the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and the resolutions then adopted, whether on nuclear disarmament or on international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, have had scant, and in certain cases no, effect. The International Atomic Energy Agency, for instance, is so overwhelmed by its task of applying safeguards to and controlling the security *status quo* that its other fundamental function of helping developing countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is in fact losing priority. Suffice it to recall that, because of inflation and the international monetary crisis, the level of the 1973 programme for technical assistance, in terms of real purchasing power, was not expected to surpass the level of the programme for 1959. The net result would be that only 40 per cent of the requests for experts and

equipment could be met in 1973. We appreciate the serious efforts that the Director-General of the Agency and his staff have undertaken to remedy that situation and we understand that at the last Conference of the Agency some increase was obtained in voluntary contributions. However, even so, we have \$3 million as the present target for such contributions, and this means relative stagnation at a level which does not meet the original expectations of the Agency. We do not think that this calls for expressions of unmitigated satisfaction.

66. Is it because nuclear armaments pose an almost absolute threat to the security of mankind that it has been impossible to negotiate their destruction? It is repugnant to us to believe in that paradox. Nothing would contribute more to re-establishing the credibility of our efforts and attracting all nuclear Powers to multilateral negotiations than a common commitment to tackle seriously the cessation and reversal of the nuclear-arms race.

67. The achievement of meaningful progress towards disarmament presupposes, besides the political pre-conditions, the existence of a negotiating body with a stable, well-balanced and reasonably limited composition, although of course representative of all geographic areas, with working procedures that are sufficiently flexible to facilitate the reaching of consensus through knowledgeable endeavours at both the formal and the informal levels of discussion and consultation. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament basically fulfils those requirements, and certain organizational peculiarities that it presents could be altered if it would help its qualitative enlargement. No future organ that might be set up for continuous negotiation could deviate substantially from that format, with some enlargement and the replacement of one or two organizational and procedural oddities. But, however suitable the mechanism, frustration will haunt us if security conditions and political will fail to materialize.

68. Mr. MOTT (Australia): As several speakers have noted during this general debate, a feature of the international scene over the past year has been the steadily developing climate of *détente*. Continuing shifts in the basic relationships between the major Powers—which a few years ago would have required an exercise of imagination to contemplate—have eroded older approaches to fundamental aspects of relations between nations. This of course is not to say that solutions lie ahead, even in the foreseeable future, to all our problems. There is no need to detail areas of the world where tensions remain unabated. However, at the same time I think we can take heart from the developments of the past year, since the First Committee last considered subjects of arms control and disarmament, and can look forward with some cautious optimism to the future.

69. My delegation makes a habit of pointing out each year that a close relationship exists between the work we are doing here and the security of all our nations and peoples. We believe that the problems of arms control and disarmament, linked as they are with the whole apparatus of national and international policy, clearly demand the careful attention of all of us gathered here.

70. It is necessary, therefore, that we take account, as a factor of fundamental influence on our work, of develop-

ments in relations between nations in the past year. I would remind the Committee that the work of the United Nations on measures of arms control and disarmament has helped in some measure to improve relations between States. Thus it is, for example, that we can welcome the entry into force this year of the sea-bed arms control Treaty⁷ and the opening to signature of the biological weapons Convention,⁸ which is an agreement of genuine disarmament. These instruments are perhaps modest enough in the scope of their endeavours but nevertheless constitute worth-while elements of the system of arms control and disarmament that we are trying to construct.

71. We welcome too, as something of more significance, the agreement between the two nuclear super-Powers on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems and the interim agreement on measures concerning the limitation of strategic offensive arms [see A/C.1/1026]. If implemented faithfully and if followed by a further consolidating agreement or agreements at the second phase of these talks, they will be measures from which all mankind will gain. We wish both the United States and the Soviet Union well as they prepare for the next phase of their talks.

72. The improvement in the political climate confronts us with the question: how can we convert this situation to the further benefit of the peoples that we represent here? Here I think that I can do little better than draw upon the statement of the representative of Belgium at the 1878th meeting: we can continue the work we have begun and we can complete the work that remains unfinished; and in so far as it is within our power to do so we can encourage in particular China and France to play the role to which their influence as nuclear-weapon Powers and permanent members of the Security Council undoubtedly entitles them in the process of seeking effective means of promoting real international security.

73. Taking up the question of how we can best benefit from the current situation of *détente*, we come to the proposal for a world disarmament conference. My delegation has always been of the view that when it comes to the working out of effective measures of disarmament, measures that take adequately into account the real interests of States in differing security situations, there is no substitute for negotiation in a body of restricted size, which ideally should number among its members the important military and political States and States from the various regions of the world, and should have access to the type of specialist knowledge needed for this sort of work. We have always supported the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, while appreciating, first, that as at present constituted this body may not be fully satisfactory for its task and, secondly, that it has not been able to do as much as a number of States would have like it to do.

74. The sponsors of the proposal for a world disarmament conference, however, appear to accept that it will be necessary to continue the painstaking work of negotiation

⁷ Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.

⁸ Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament or a body like it. Their plan, as we interpret it, has a different, but allied, objective. They see a role for an organ in which all members of the community of nations can express their views on disarmament. This world forum, through debate on the questions of disarmament, could then offer guidance, which the smaller body would take into account in its work of preparing treaties.

75. This is indeed an imaginative plan. It is also a plan that requires careful examination by the General Assembly, because a world disarmament conference is not a project to be embarked upon lightly. If such a conference were held and if it failed—for example, if all it showed was that disunity existed where unity had been presumed—this could be a disastrous setback to hopes for disarmament.

76. It is no doubt for this reason that Member States of the United Nations at this Assembly have embarked sensibly and soberly upon a serious examination of the proposal. Quite a few delegations appear to have reached the conclusion that before any firm agreement is reached to convene the conference a great deal of preliminary work will need to be done. Their concern, like ours, seems to centre on two important considerations: the need for careful preparation if a conference is to be held, and the question of participation.

77. To our mind there has been a surprising degree of unanimity that we should proceed with care and deliberation and, as far as possible, by agreement on this issue. If a conference is eventually to be held it is clearly essential that it be properly prepared. This would imply that widespread agreement should exist as to such matters as objectives and agenda. Questions of date, duration and site are less important, and indeed agreement on these presumably would flow naturally from any process of preparatory work.

78. Equally important is the matter of participation. No doubt, with the absence of China and France from current disarmament negotiations in mind, many States have insisted that the attendance of the five nuclear Powers—as well, of course, as that of other States of major military and political significance—would be an essential pre-condition of a successful conference. My delegation is in this category.

79. It is therefore a fact of significance which we all must note that a divergence exists in the views of the nuclear-weapon States in respect of the conference. This naturally disposes lesser Powers to approach the proposition with prudent caution.

80. It is against this background that we have noted with interest the proposal of the representative of Argentina, taken up in statements by a good many non-aligned States, for what I might call a pre-preparatory phase in the consideration of the proposal. In that stage the views expressed on a world disarmament conference would be examined, with a view to making suggestions as to what course of action might be followed in the future. This sifting of views presumably would take place before actual preparatory work began and before any firm decision was taken to convene a conference. These latter steps, indeed,

might be largely dependent upon the former. In this regard, we have also noted with interest the wording of the draft resolution on this subject which the delegation of Brazil has put forward [A/C.1/L.618].

81. In studying the report of the Committee on Disarmament [A/8818] my delegation has noted that the organization and procedures of the Committee were the subject of critical attention and comment during the year. This derived no doubt largely from a realisation that without China and France the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament would be unlikely to be fully effective as a negotiating body. Like many other delegations, my delegation would strongly favour the participation of both of those countries in disarmament negotiations and would hope that acceptable means could be found of bringing about such participation.

82. At the same time we consider that the Committee on Disarmament, which has been in existence for 10 years now, has done good work in that time, and we would not like to see that work disrupted in the future. We sympathize with the impatience of those who would like to see it do more and who would like to bring about structural changes so as to achieve that objective. For our part, we do not necessarily believe that it has failed if, for example, it finds it impossible to produce one agreement each year for us in the General Assembly to scrutinize, although this year we note with regret that no material progress has been made towards agreement on a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test ban.

83. As to the question of whatever organizational and procedural changes might be necessary or useful to make the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament work more effectively, we assume that this is largely a matter for the Members themselves to sort out. We would be prepared to support whatever decisions they might take among themselves, and of course would welcome any initiatives in this regard that would improve the Committee's methods of work.

84. For the rest, until it proves possible either for China and France to take seats in the Committee on Disarmament—and, of course, much as we may hope that they will join, no one can force them to do so—or to convert that body into some other form of machinery that is generally acceptable, we can see no alternative but that the Conference should continue to work more or less as it is doing now.

85. Perusal of the report and of the documents attached to it indicates that the Conference devoted considerable attention this year to a study of the nature of prohibition on chemical weapons. To the regret of many delegations, however, it did not prove possible to reach agreement on the text of a treaty.

86. My delegation recalls the negotiations in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament last year which led to the presentation of the draft convention on biological weapons to the General Assembly at its twenty-sixth session. It was agreed then, reluctantly on the part of quite a few delegations, to treat biological and chemical weapons separately, in separate conventions, because the problems

involved in drafting effective controls were of different magnitude and complexity in the two cases. In the case of chemical weapons, these problems, of course, have been known for some time. They concern the scope of the prohibition, the definition of the agents to be prohibited, and the nature of the system of verification.

87. In its approach to disarmament treaties, my delegation is guided by the view that such treaties should promote, and be seen to be promoting, the security of States in real terms, and that to do this they must provide the parties to them with the highest possible degree of assurance that other parties are respecting their terms. As regards chemical weapons, we have always considered that any treaty must be clear as to the agents that are to be covered and must contain effective provisions for verification. In current circumstances we consider that some provision for on-site inspection is necessary to provide an acceptable level of assurance of compliance.

88. The control of chemical weapons is made more difficult by two considerations that do not apply with such force to biological weapons. The first is that many chemical agents have both peaceful and warlike applications. The second, a corollary of the first, is that the lawful manufacture of chemical agents is widespread in the community at large, for purposes unconnected with warfare.

89. Considerations such as those would appear to indicate that a different approach is necessary in the case of chemical agents. For the foregoing reasons, as far as my delegation is concerned, the model of the biological weapons convention is not appropriate for a chemical weapons convention. Indeed we had thought that acceptance of this proposition was implicit in the agreement last year on a separate biological weapons convention.

90. We consider that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament made worth-while progress this year in its study of the main problems that will have to be solved before agreement is reached on a chemical weapons convention. The Committee was materially helped in this process by the submission of a number of valuable working documents, not least among which was the work programme submitted by the United States [*ibid.*, annex B, sect. 4] regarding negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We take note also of the draft convention tabled by nine delegations [*ibid.*, sect. 5]. However, this to our mind is somewhat incomplete because it proceeds along the same lines as the biological weapons convention.

91. As to action on chemical weapons at this session of the Assembly, my delegation joins the delegation of Canada in favouring a non-controversial draft resolution which would take accurate account of the current situation and send the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament back to work next year.

92. Those are the views of my delegation on some of the issues now before the Committee.

93. Mr. OFTEDAL (Norway): In previous statements in the United Nations on arms control and disarmament we have maintained that the motives for acquiring weapons must be counteracted before there can be any hope for

substantial progress in arms control and disarmament. The desire to avoid a nuclear catastrophe constitutes only a negative common interest, which, furthermore, concerns the arsenals of merely a handful of States. Common interests of a positive nature concerning a number of States—preferably all States—must be developed.

94. But even in the absence of positive common interests strong enough to reduce the incentives and reasons for possessing arms and engaging in arms races, progress in arms control can and should be made.

95. Any step forward in this direction presupposes, however, a minimum of common desire and mutual interests of the parties concerned to reduce the anxiety and tension created by the existence of arms.

96. In this connexion we have noted with interest that both the Soviet Union and the United States of America point out that the agreements on limitation of strategic weapons which they recently concluded were worked out concurrently with other arrangements and understandings which demonstrate the development of a positive community of interests between the two States.

97. The Norwegian Government welcomes and appreciates the initial agreements reached at the strategic arms limitation talks [*see A/C.1/1026*] and the foundation thus being provided for agreements on further limitations on strategic weapons.

98. The most important aspect is, however, not the SALT agreements as such but the actual state of the relationship between the super-Powers which they record. In fact, hardly any effective agreement can be concluded—and respected—unless it reflects the real situation and true intentions of the parties. Thus we believe that the SALT negotiating process itself has rendered an important contribution to the creation of such a situation, making it possible to reach the agreements which so far have been achieved. Furthermore, although the two SALT agreements must be considered together, and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms in itself reflects an important reality and parallel intentions, I should like to express our particular satisfaction with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems because it contributes to reducing a strong potential incentive in the strategic arms race.

99. Such a view of the anti-ballistic missile Treaty may be said, however, to be based on the belief that the maintenance and perfection of offensive weapons are unavoidable. Despite man's assumed capacity for reason, this seems, unfortunately, to be the case. Still, what is accepted as necessary in the circumstances should not be confused with what is desirable. Human nature refuses to consider a mutual assurance of total destruction as a desirable basis for international relations. Fortunately, the super-Powers seem increasingly to recognize that, although the mutual assured destruction capability remains, their relationship must be built also on a positive community of interests.

100. Our hopes and efforts should be directed towards ensuring that such positive joint interests will prevail over

the tendency to over-ensure the mutual assured destruction capability. There exist many incentives in the arms race, but we have for our part—although this may be expected to constitute one of the most difficult tasks—stressed the necessity that arms control catch up with and take the lead over the development of weapons technology. Otherwise, even the most ingenious arms control proposals will become broken illusions.

101. We are disturbed when we hear that the SALT negotiations themselves are being used as a pretext for developing new or qualitatively improved weapons systems. The arms race spiral will never be stopped or turned downwards unless the urge constantly to outdo the adversary is replaced by mutual trust—and trust in oneself—to take the lead with regard to arms restraints and reductions.

102. The permanent members of the Security Council—which also are the five nuclear Powers of the world—have, under the Charter of the United Nations, special rights and responsibilities, including responsibility for progress in arms control and disarmament. No major progress in this and many other fields can be expected unless the five Powers act in concert.

103. However, all Members of the United Nations, large and small, have rights and responsibilities, and a world disarmament conference could provide all States with further insight into the politically complex problem of arms control and disarmament and make them more aware of both the risks involved in arms races and military confrontations and the need to make headway in arms control and disarmament.

104. Held under the right circumstances, a world disarmament conference could help to focus the attention of world public opinion on the ever-increasing arms race in all parts of the world and, in particular, on the resulting frightful financial burdens imposed upon the peoples of the world. A conference could help to marshal much needed world-wide support for limitation and subsequent reductions of armaments. In short, a conference could provide a significant stimulus for intensified work in the area of disarmament.

105. But such a conference would hardly serve its purpose if it became an arena for confrontation. The convening of a world disarmament conference would, in our view, be justified only if it could be held in a spirit of co-operation. Accordingly we see little positive value in a conference in which the major military Powers, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, would not be interested in participating. Furthermore, the conference would have to be carefully prepared as to procedure as well as substance and we believe that the major military Powers have a special task also in this respect.

106. In our opinion, there should exist no world forum outside the framework of the United Nations and we therefore consider it desirable also that arms control and disarmament talks progressively become more closely linked to this body. Accordingly, we would prefer that the question of convening a conference and its possible preparation, convening and realization remain under the auspices of the United Nations.

107. Whatever progress it is possible to make at this session of the General Assembly towards the holding of a world disarmament conference, we believe that the process of convening such a conference will be a lengthy one. Therefore, and because the outcome of a possible conference is difficult to foresee, we are of the opinion that the preparation and convening of a conference should not delay or obstruct the various arms control and disarmament talks in progress in other negotiating forums.

108. Whatever can be said about its achievements, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is the most effective existing forum for negotiations concerning universal arms control and disarmament agreements. Apart from the need to create such negotiating machinery as is necessary to include all major military Powers, we see little reason for changing the structure of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Where there is sufficient political desire and will to make progress in international negotiations, the suitable machinery can easily be set up.

109. I do not believe, for instance, that it is the structure of the Conference which has prevented progress towards an agreement to halt underground nuclear tests, despite the request from the General Assembly during the twenty-sixth session to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as a matter of highest priority, its deliberations on this question [*resolution 2828 C (XXVI)*]. The problem is constituted by the present international relationship, particularly the relationship among the nuclear-weapon States, and the attitudes those States take in the matter.

110. Reaching a comprehensive test ban agreement requires not only that such a ban be considered a common interest of the States immediately concerned, but also the existence of a reasonable verification capability proportionate to the risk inherent in undetected violations of a ban. We have noticed with satisfaction that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has continued to give the verification problem its attention, and we are grateful to those States which have spent so much of their energy and resources on this problem.

111. We have ourselves tried to support these efforts and it is well known that one of the world's two largest seismic array stations, NORSAR, built and operated through Norwegian-American co-operation, is situated in Norway.

112. NORSAR is now in full operation, and the high quality data which the array station produces can be copied and distributed to countries wishing to use them in their seismological research. Seismologists from various countries who have visited NORSAR, and the NORSAR research team, have been able to contribute to a better understanding of problems connected with verification by seismological means of a complete test ban by using NORSAR data.

113. The experience gathered from one year of full operation of NORSAR is very promising and active research efforts continuously improve the results. In order to sustain this endeavour, the research effort must go on and be increased in the coming years. We hope that NORSAR will be used in joint international research projects in detection seismology, which may further enhance the potential role

at NORSAR as a monitoring or control station for a large part of the world under a comprehensive test ban treaty.

114. We continue to believe, however, that active co-operation between the States immediately concerned would help to translate the scientific advances made in detection and classification seismology into practical verification arrangements for a comprehensive test ban agreement. I hope that the emerging positive community of interest among the super-Powers, to which I referred earlier, and which contributed to the conclusion of the recent SALT agreements, will also stimulate the interest of those Powers in halting underground nuclear tests.

115. We share the desire expressed by many that all States adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water—and other international arms control agreements, for that matter. We are also of the opinion that the Powers conducting underground nuclear tests have a special responsibility in setting up a viable and effective comprehensive test ban arrangement. However, these questions are interdependent. For instance, it would seem that the question of halting all nuclear tests in the atmosphere is likely to find solution only inside a comprehensive test ban agreement. As in many other fields, where progress is made piecemeal and from various angles, at a certain stage all the pieces must be pulled together and the various partial solutions made universal in a harmonized way. I have no illusions about the possibility of this goal being attained in the near future, but we hope that a world disarmament conference could give this kind of perspective to the arms control and disarmament problems.

116. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has also shed much light on the complex problem of strengthening the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, by also prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons as does the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, now in the process of coming into force.

117. There seems to a general consensus that the goal should be a complete prohibition of all chemical weapons for war purposes. However, chemical weapons have been used and they possess a potential military significance. With the existing mutual mistrust among nations, technical difficulties relating to the verification of a chemical weapons ban therefore become real obstacles to progress in this field.

118. The splitting-up of the problem for analytical purposes, as has been done at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, may turn out to be of help, and although the cherished goal is a complete ban on chemical weapons, it might be necessary to proceed in a pragmatic way, step by step.

119. However, the purpose is to prevent the use of all chemical weapons in war, and if circumstances make only a partial solution attainable, it would be made more mean-

ingful if there were a growing assurance that no chemical weapons would be used in war. This assurance would have to be comprehensive, since only then would there be a clear dividing line between the use and non-use of chemical weapons in war. This would also reduce the risk of escalation from non-lethal to lethal chemical weapons.

120. As to the verification of a chemical weapons ban, which may be the real obstacle to a solution, we have noted with interest the growing consensus in the Committee on Disarmament that it must be based on a combination of national and international control, although there does not yet appear to be agreement on how to apply this principle.

121. An effective procedure for international handling of complaints about violations of a chemical weapons ban might also be considered as part of a verification arrangement. However, such a procedure can only be effective if it provides for immediate and purposeful international investigation of such complaints in advance of any political consideration.

122. When we are able to let the interest in peaceful co-operation prevail over armed conflicts and the threat of use of force, and when there exist acceptable and effective procedures for reasonable, peaceful solutions of international disputes and for the maintenance of international peace and security—only then will there be a solid basis for non-use of force.

123. However, despite the fact that there are several armed conflicts in the world, that arms races continue and that the threat of war, including nuclear war, is still a reality, or perhaps rather because of this, there is a ray of hope in the fact that the world community remains conscious of the horrors of war and the indiscriminate suffering caused by weapons of mass destruction, and even by many of the weapons labelled conventional.

124. Unfortunately, we face many difficulties in drawing up and agreeing upon precise and effective prohibitions against various kinds of weapons and their use. We find the discussion at the Conference of the International Committee on the Red Cross most useful on, among other things, the use of weapons causing indiscriminate and especially painful suffering. Also in this connexion we should like to express our thanks to the Secretary-General for having placed before us the report on *Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use*.⁹ This report will undoubtedly constitute a significant contribution to the future task of building barriers against the use of such weapons and other kinds of warfare, such as what has been called “geophysical warfare”, whereby lasting and perhaps irreparable damage is inflicted upon man and his environment. These questions do indeed also deserve serious attention.

125. The CHAIRMAN: I should like to inform the Committee that Madagascar, Mauritius and Sudan have become sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.616.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.

⁹ United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.73.I.3.