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PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO THOUSAND AND SEVENTY-FIFTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Monday, 3 November 1975, at 10.30 a.m.

<u>Chairman:</u>	Mr. GHORRA	(Lebanon)
<u>Rapporteur:</u>	Mr. ARTEAGA ACOSTA	(Venezuela)

- Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security /31/ (continued)
- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3254 (XXIX): report of the Secretary-General /34/ (continued)
- Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: reports of the Secretary-General /35/ (continued)
- Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /36/ (continued)
- Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /37/ (continued)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.55 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 31, 24, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 120, 122 and 126 (continued)

Mr. PASTINEN (Finland): Mr. Chairman, speaking from this seat last Thursday as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Qualified Governmental Experts for the Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, Professor Korhonen conveyed his congratulations to you. On behalf of the Finnish delegation, I should like now to join in the expressions of appreciation and respect which have been directed to you from all quarters. In the particular case of the Finnish delegation, I should like to add to these the sentiments of admiration and esteem based on the experience of a great many years during which the Finnish delegation has had the good fortune to work closely with you on a variety of United Nations matters.

It was the original intention of my delegation to speak only once in the general debate on disarmament. We were planning to say whatever we had to say at one go, as it were. The importance and the great number of disarmament items on our agenda, rather than any inflated opinion of the importance of our own views, led us, however, to revise our plans. Therefore, my statement this morning will deal only with three major areas and questions: first, the general political framework within which the disarmament negotiations have to evolve; secondly, the problems of nuclear proliferation, particularly in the light of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference; and, thirdly, the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the comprehensive study on them.

That being the case, the Finnish delegation will have to ask to be allowed to speak again at an appropriate later stage in order to state the views of my Government on a number of other important arms control and disarmament issues, such as nuclear disarmament, the SALT negotiations, banning of nuclear-weapon tests, chemical weapons, environmental warfare and so on.

We shall in due time, Mr. Chairman, have to seek your guidance about the timing of our second statement in a way that would be helpful to your efforts to conduct the business of this Committee as expeditiously and as efficiently as possible.

I now come to my statement this morning.

(Mr. Pastinen, Finland)

It is to state the obvious to say that disarmament cannot be viewed in isolation. It is part and parcel of the political process and, as such, subject to the same forces and influences as international politics in general. At a time when the world is moving from confrontation and conflict towards negotiation and détente, disarmament remains a crucial pursuit in the quest for a more stable and peaceful world order.

With this in mind, recent political developments should give us cause for hope. The third stage of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe signified not only a codification of the political détente in Europe at the highest political level. The political will which came to expression at that Conference -- the Helsinki spirit -- should open up new possibilities for arms control and disarmament in Europe. In the Final Act of the Conference the participating States themselves recognized their interests in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament which are designed to complement political détente in Europe and to strengthen their security -- as stated in the Final Act.

(Mr. Pastinen, Finland)

While the spirit thus has changed, the tools of confrontation and conflict remain. Europe today still is the scene of the most deadly concentration of large standing armies and sophisticated weapons, both conventional and nuclear, that the world has ever known. But more than ever, the guns of Europe are aimed at the shadows of the past.

It was against this background that the President of Finland in his speech at the Helsinki Conference expressed his conviction that:

"It is imperative that we devote, to an increasing extent, our faith in the future and our activities to the consideration of disarmament. We believe that the contribution made even by the present Conference" -- he went on to say -- "to the promotion of détente has brought us nearer the day when the idea of far-reaching international disarmament is not only a remote prospect but an integral part of our co-operation. This belief is not just a wishful dream of a small country not belonging to any bloc. It is based on the consciousness that, rather than any system relying on the use of force, the co-operation initiated by us is the best guarantee of security."

While all the States that participated in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe have not only an interest but also a duty to see to it that these aims are translated into reality, in the first instance the burden of proof falls on those who are engaged in the Vienna negotiations on reduction of forces and armaments in Europe. These negotiations are now entering their third year without any substantive results yet in view. We are fully aware of the complexity of the subjects discussed in Vienna, but we cannot hide our deepening concern about the standstill that seems to prevail there. In the aftermath of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe we are certainly entitled to expect that the standstill be broken and that at least initial results be achieved. My delegation is not in general in favour of deadlines of one kind or another. In this particular case, however, it would seem to us that the already agreed preparatory meeting to be held in Belgrade in June 1977 for continuing the multilateral process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe provides a natural time frame for efforts in Vienna.

(Mr. Pastinen, Finland)

The effects of détente in Europe are not restricted to that continent alone: in their declaration adopted in Lima, Peru, the Foreign Ministers of the non-aligned countries considered that the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe will have a positive impact on the solution of problems deriving from the cold war and other international problems. They particularly identified the danger of nuclear confrontation as one of these problems.

The prospects of détente in global dimensions have also been strengthened by the termination of the cruel conflict in Indo-China and the fact that for the first time after the Second World War no open warfare exists between States. Disarmament is an integral part of détente, and these developments should provide new opportunities and a new impetus toward progress in disarmament negotiations.

Yet, the reality is different. While the process of détente has scored impressive gains in Europe as well as on a global scale, disarmament negotiations have somehow fallen out of pace. For the last three years there has indeed been a distinct lack of dynamism in this field, at least as measured by the yardstick of agreements achieved. This is all the more strange, since in historical terms the trend away from confrontation and toward political co-operation -- that is, détente -- first emerged in the disarmament negotiations of the early 1960s. It is all the more deplorable when we keep in mind that the General Assembly has solemnly declared the 1970s the Disarmament Decade and that we are at present engaged in the mid-term review of the Decade on the initiative so opportunely taken by our Nigerian colleague at the last Assembly session.

Against this background, in our view, this Assembly would do well to consider whether ways and means could not at last be found to expedite the long drawn-out process for convening a world disarmament conference -- an idea which the Finnish delegation has consistently supported. We have considered, and continue to consider, that a world disarmament conference, under the necessary and generally accepted requirements, would provide the international community with an opportunity for a general review of the disarmament field in its entirety, for a reaffirmation of the goals for

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disarmament in political terms, and for charting the course and fixing the priorities for future negotiations. At this time, it would seem to us, further, that a world disarmament conference might well serve to instill a new sense of dynamism, and to provide new impetus and inspiration to our work in this field.

When I speak about lack of dynamism, I do not mean lack of activity. Disarmament negotiations have been continued as intensively as ever, be it in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, in Vienna or in other forums and other contexts. As before, these negotiations have been concentrated mainly on the efforts to strengthen existing restraints, or devising new ones, on nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, whether biological, chemical, environmental, or indeed entirely new types of such weapons, as suggested by the Soviet Union at this Assembly session. While we should not ignore the destructive potential of conventional weapons and the continued increase of their production in the world, we in Finland continue to believe that the focus on weapons of mass destruction is a correct one. Consequently, all efforts to guard against the risks inherent in the very existence of such weapons have our support.

In this respect, the Finnish Government considers the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a cornerstone in the international efforts to contain nuclear weapons. Last year, my delegation spoke at considerable length about the Treaty in the perspective of the then approaching review conference. Though the importance of the Treaty would, as such, warrant constant emphasis, I shall not repeat our arguments from last year. Suffice it to say that the Finnish Government continues to believe that, as a means to avert the danger of nuclear war, the Treaty serves the general interest of the international community as a whole, while it also responds to the particular security interests of each of its component Member States. We further believe that the Treaty is the best available instrument for promoting those interests.

The main purpose of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference was to strengthen the Treaty and to ensure its better implementation. In this respect, the Conference achieved what it realistically could be expected to achieve. The Treaty took an important step forward towards a more universal application through the adherence of eleven new States, including the five Euratom countries; and further ratifications and accessions, we believe, can be expected.

(Mr. Pastinen, Finland)

The Final Declaration of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference is essentially a political document. Its main thrust is the reaffirmation by the parties of their strong support for the NPT and their continued dedication to its principles and objectives; yet it is also a document of considerable substantive content and simultaneously an action programme for the future. It not only embodies an assessment of the parties on how the Treaty has so far fulfilled its role but also gives rather precise and detailed guidelines on how it could be better implemented in the future. Many of the participants - perhaps even most of them - would have liked the Conference to have gone further, to have taken more decisive action on a number of questions. That is particularly true of the implementation of article VI of the Treaty, and my delegation wishes to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the sincerity of effort of those delegations which tried to achieve this by way of additional protocols and other proposals which, however, failed to achieve a consensus.

Yet, on balance, the Final Declaration of the NPT Review Conference is a very worthwhile document. The consensus achieved on it is in a large measure due to the courage of initiative and the maturity of political judgment of the President of the Conference, Mrs. Inga Thorsson of Sweden. The Final Declaration is above all a demonstration of the unity of purpose among the parties to the Treaty to strengthen the non-proliferation régime. More than before, the NPT can be seen today as a part of the law of nations, a norm of international life, which benefits all nations, party and non-party alike.

But the business of strengthening the NPT cannot be laid to rest with the conclusion of the Review Conference and the adoption of its Final Declaration; nor can further efforts await the next Review Conference in 1980. The demand is for constant and co-ordinated action by all parties to the Treaty.

One of the major targets for such action is the strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in accordance with article III of the NPT. We note with special appreciation the determined

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stand taken on this issue by the Director-General of the IAEA, Dr. Sigvard Eklund, both during the Review Conference and at the recent General Conference of the IAEA. Whether that action will succeed depends in a decisive manner on the future application of article III, paragraph 2, of the NPT concerning the common export requirements relating to safeguards. As advocated by Dr. Eklund and by an overwhelming majority of the parties at the Review Conference, the exporting countries could and should require adherence to the NPT or other arrangements involving the application of safeguards to the complete fuel cycle of the importing countries as a condition for supply. Such a requirement would accord fully not only with the spirit but also indeed with the letter of the NPT. This, more than anything else, amounts to a test of the real intentions of the major supplier countries, parties to the NPT, to use the Treaty for the purposes it was originally intended to be used for. It will be a test of their willingness to recognize their own overriding interest in preventing proliferation of nuclear explosive capacity, be it at the expense of some other more transitory considerations.

Since, however, such considerations do exist and were expressed at the Review Conference, the Finnish delegation put forward at the Conference a suggestion that common export requirements should be complemented by common import requirements. The idea was, and still is, that parties to the NPT could also consider committing themselves not to import nuclear materials and other equipment from countries which are not parties to the NPT, or which have not accepted the NPT safeguards, or which have not otherwise shown that they act as if they were parties to the NPT in respect to their supply policies. It may well be that full implications of this suggestion were not sufficiently taken into account during the Conference. Be that as may, the Finnish Government intends to pursue this suggestion, in co-operation with others, during future negotiations on the strengthening of NPT safeguards, in which we shall actively participate.

In last year's debate my delegation referred to the possibility of supporting action for the NPT outside the immediate realm of the Treaty itself. One of such means is obviously the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones which,

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in addition to its other merits, is a valuable complementary instrument for seeking the same ends as the NPT within a different framework. The Treaty of Tlatelolco remains the most encouraging example of the possibilities of the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Recently, there has been a remarkable revival of interest in nuclear-weapon-free zones, and that interest continues. Altogether eight of the disarmament items on our agenda deal with such zones, the newest being the proposal by Fiji, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific.

The situation prompted the Finnish delegation at the last General Assembly session to take the initiative which led to the adoption by the Assembly of resolution 3261 F (XXIX), instituting a comprehensive study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects. In introducing that draft resolution last year the Finnish representative expressed the hope that the study would clarify the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones as such and provide such assistance and guidance as might be needed and asked for by any group of countries in the future. The same idea is reflected in the fifth preambular paragraph of resolution 3261 F (XXIX), by which the Assembly considered that further efforts concerning nuclear-weapon-free zones would be enhanced by a comprehensive study of the question in all its aspects. In other words, the aim was not an academic exercise but a practical study: that is to say, to be of assistance to those who are interested in nuclear-weapon-free zones by analysing both the opportunities and the problems connected with them. On the other hand, as we made clear at the time, it was not our intention to link the study, either in time or in substance, with any concrete consideration regarding the establishment of any such zone under consideration at present or contemplated earlier.

The study has now been completed. It was introduced in this Committee at its 2073rd meeting by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Qualified Governmental Experts which prepared it. It is submitted for the consideration of the Assembly, together with the comments of the CCD. The Finnish delegation has initiated consultations with other delegations with a view to the

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formulation of an appropriate resolution on the matter. We hope that a draft will in due time be adopted by consensus, as was the case with resolution 3261 F (XXIX), which initiated the study.

On behalf of the Finnish Government I should like at this time to offer some brief comments on the contents of the study, but before doing so let me pay a tribute to the experts who participated in the work of the Ad Hoc Group and to the representatives of the United Nations Secretariat, the IAEA and other international organizations who contributed to it. We in Finland are, of course, gratified that the chairmanship of the Group was entrusted to the Finnish expert.

It is our impression that the study is indeed comprehensive and that it covers all the aspects of nuclear-weapon-free zones as envisaged in the General Assembly resolution. The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones will henceforth be firmly anchored among the arms control and collateral disarmament measures designed to avert the threat of nuclear war and ultimately to promote the goals of general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Pastinen, Finland)

The experts were able to reach a consensus on several important principles relating to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, as appears from chapter III, paragraph 9 of their report. Though most of these principles are self-evident, and contain no novelties as such, this is the first instance that they have been authoritatively formulated on the international level and for the purpose of universal validity.

One of the most essential questions on which consensus was reached relates to the security of the States belonging to nuclear-weapon-free zones, which obviously must be a basic premise for the consideration of the establishment of any such zone. In the words of the report, (A/10027/Add.1) the purpose of a nuclear-weapon-free zone is

"... to spare the nations concerned from the threat of nuclear attack or involvement in nuclear war ..." (chap. III, para. 1, p. 38).

It goes on to say

"... that their vital security interests would be enhanced and not jeopardized by participation." (chap. III, para. 3, p. 39)

and yet again, that

"One of the principal objectives of the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone is to increase the security of its prospective member States." (chap. IV, para. 15, p. 50)

It is also significant that the experts were able to reach near unanimity on the term "nuclear weapon" and also on the conclusion that the principle of nuclear-weapon-free zones prohibits not only nuclear weapons but also any other nuclear explosion device in the area of the nuclear-weapon-free zone, and that access to the potential benefits of the peaceful nuclear explosions must be through international procedures consistent with article V of the NPT.

The vast majority of the experts consider that for the purposes of preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons, and thereby reducing the danger of nuclear war, the idea of the nuclear-weapon-free zone and the NPT complement and support each other. While we accept this, we also agree with those experts who consider that the concept of the nuclear-weapon-free zones has purposes beyond the scope of the NPT. This indeed becomes clear from the NPT itself which, in its article VII dealing with the nuclear-weapon-free zones speaks of "total absence of nuclear weapons". The restraints of a nuclear-weapon-free zone therefore go further than the NPT by also excluding from

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the territory comprising the zone nuclear weapons possessed or controlled by extrazonal States. The Finnish delegation feels that this basic distinction between the NPT and the concept of the nuclear-weapon-free zone should have received even greater emphasis in the report.

The experts now say that

"... the success of a nuclear-weapon-free zone would depend upon common agreement that the development and possession of nuclear weapons by any member would be perilous to the area as a whole." (chapter III, para. 4, p. 39)

This is true as such, but it should have been further clarified in our minds, by a statement that any presence of nuclear weapons is perilous to the area.

Since the basic purpose of any nuclear-weapon-free zone is to enhance the security of the States belonging to it, it is natural that the question of security guarantees by the nuclear weapon States beyond those envisaged in Security Council resolution 255 (1968) becomes central in any discussion of the nuclear-weapon-free zone. This is clearly reflected in the report of the Ad Hoc Group.

As far as the Finnish Government is concerned, we concur in principle in the conclusion of most experts that any arrangements for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone

"... must provide for appropriate guarantees by the nuclear weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against members of the zone." (chapter III, para. 9, p. 41)

This conclusion in fact is only a logical extension from a number of other statements in the report adopted by consensus, such as the one saying that the purpose of a nuclear-weapon-free zone is

"... to spare the nations concerned from the threat of nuclear attack..." (chapter III, para. 1, p. 38)

We regret therefore that no consensus could be reached in the Ad Hoc Group on the acceptance of the principle relating to the security guarantees. We regret this absence of consensus all the more, since we feel that it is not due to any irreconcilable controversy on the principle itself, but rather to a reluctance on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to commit themselves in advance to a generalized and abstract undertaking with possible claims for its instant and automatic application in all cases. The latter again,

(Mr. Pastinen, Finland)

we believe, was not really the intention of those who insisted that the principle of security guarantees is indeed essential to the concept of the nuclear-weapon-free zones.

In the final analysis, therefore, the differences on this crucial question may well be more apparent than real. It seems to be particularly so since the balance of rights and responsibilities between the zonal States and extrazonal States -- of which the security guarantees is an essential element -- has to be defined in each case separately in negotiations where all interested parties obviously would fully have to participate.

That concludes my statement for this morning, but as I indicated earlier, the Finnish delegation will speak again in this debate at an appropriate stage.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Finland for his most generous and kind remarks about me. In Mr. Pastinen's remarks regarding other opportunities for his delegation to speak, let me say that that will be naturally a welcome opportunity to hear the Finnish delegation speak again. And I will inform the Committee about something we are thinking of in order to speed up the debate in the Committee and to use all the time available to us. As a matter of fact, despite all the urging and the lobbying we do sometimes, we do not have any speakers for this afternoon's meeting, and we are compelled to cancel that meeting. And this is the situation which, if it has to occur, will be a very unhappy one. We may not conclude our work on time, though you know it is our hope to be able to complete our work ahead of time. This is our objective. Nevertheless, I will put some views to the Committee later on with regard to that. Perhaps we could do something more efficient in the following meetings. I now call on the representative of Iran, Ambassador Hoveyda, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference.

Mr. HOVEYDA (Iran), Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference: It is indeed an honour for me to address the First Committee again in my capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference in order to introduce its report.

I am pleased to be able to say that, against some odds, the Ad Hoc Committee was able to submit to the General Assembly a consensus report in conformity with its mandate. Before dwelling on the content of this report, allow me to touch briefly upon some procedural aspects of the work of the Committee. The Committee was guided by the mandate entrusted to it in resolution 3260 (XXIX) of the General Assembly. By this resolution, the General Assembly invited all States to communicate to the Secretary-General their comments on the main objectives of a world disarmament conference in the light of the views and suggestions compiled in section II of the summary annexed to the 1974 report of the Ad Hoc Committee. By the same resolution, the General Assembly decided that the Ad Hoc Committee should resume its work in accordance with the procedure established in General Assembly resolution 3183 (XXVIII) and that, in discharging its assigned task, the Ad Hoc Committee should give priority to the preparation, on the basis of consensus, of an analytical report, including any conclusions and recommendations that it might deem pertinent concerning the comments received from States.

As you know, the composition of the Ad Hoc Committee follows a somewhat unusual pattern. In addition to 40 States appointed to serve on the Ad Hoc Committee as members, the nuclear Powers have been invited to co-operate or maintain contact with the Ad Hoc Committee with the same rights as other members. Under this procedure, France, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union participated in the work of the Committee while China and the United States maintained contact with it through its Chairman.

The Ad Hoc Committee, in its deliberations, had before it the replies received from States (A/AC.167/1 and Add. 1-5 and A/10068, 10069, 10083, 10090, 10098) pursuant to paragraph 1 of resolution 3260 (XXIX), as well as the 1974 report of the Ad Hoc Committee to the General Assembly (A/9268) to which were annexed the detailed views of States on all aspects of convening a world disarmament conference.

At its meeting on 4 April, the Committee decided that the Working Group established in 1974 as an open-ended body should resume its work with the aim of preparing the draft report of the Committee. The Working Group held meetings between 4 June and 18 July under the able chairmanship of the Rapporteur of the Committee, Mr. Antonio Elias of Spain.

(Mr. Hoveyda, Iran)

A third feature of the report is the link between the objectives and other aspects of a world disarmament conference, notably the conditions under which such a conference could be convened. This stemmed from the position adopted by several Governments to the effect that the objective of the conference cannot be considered in isolation from the whole set of conditions under which a meaningful world disarmament conference could be convened. Part II of the report originates from this mode of thinking.

Given the analytical nature of the report, the Ad Hoc Committee has attempted to sum up in its conclusions the salient points and to draw some inferences from the emerging trends.

But before attempting to elaborate on these conclusions, I would like to make a cautionary remark. The conclusions of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee are the result of extensive and painstaking negotiations and represent a very delicate balance that cannot and should not be tampered with. Any elaboration on my part of these points should not, therefore, be construed either as an attempt to disturb this balance or as indicating any preference for one idea over another.

I feel duty-bound, nevertheless, to offer certain clarifications because I recognize that, because of the nature of the problems and the particular circumstances surrounding negotiations, delegations not involved in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee might find some areas of obscurity, which is not uncommon in documents of this nature.

With one exception, the conclusions deal mainly with what I have already described as the two different approaches to a world disarmament conference: one that would lead to a world disarmament conference with loftier goals, and the other to a conference the aim of which would be limited to expediting the process and streamlining the machinery of disarmament.

In its third conclusion, the report takes note of the opinion that the conditions required for the convening and the success of a conference of the first type, might not of necessity be applicable to a less ambitious type of conference.

(Mr. Hoveyda, Iran)

One of the arguments frequently made -- and with some justification in my opinion -- to discourage an early convening of a world disarmament conference is what has been described as the inadequacy of the political conditions for the successful conclusion of a world disarmament conference. It has been said that a world disarmament conference can raise expectations that it cannot fulfill. It can readily be seen that this argument loses much of its attractiveness when applied against a conference with limited objectives.

For obvious reasons the report has not gone as far as trying to make a case for this type of conference. But it seems to be the feeling of some delegations that if the idea of a world disarmament conference has any chance of getting off the ground, it must opt for limited and essentially auxiliary objectives.

The Committee has avoided any undue optimism. In the same paragraph where this opinion has been expressed -- or I should rather say where this hint has been dropped -- the opposing viewpoint has also been expressed to the effect that, barring the realization of certain pre-conditions, there could be no world disarmament conference or preparatory work for it. This approach assumes particular importance in the light of the subsequent paragraph, wherein the participation of all nuclear Powers and militarily significant States in any type of conference is portrayed as an essential condition.

Finally, the last conclusion of the report deals with the result of contacts made by the Ad Hoc Committee with the nuclear Powers in discharge of its mandate under paragraph 2 (b) of resolution 3260 (XXIX). As a result of such contacts, it was made clear to the Ad Hoc Committee that the respective positions of these States on all aspects of the convening of a world disarmament conference remain unchanged.

These were some clarifications that I felt I should offer in introducing the report of the Ad Hoc Committee. As I have indicated already -- and I do not want to overstress the point -- these clarifications can neither add to, nor detract from, the actual language of the report, which is the product of a difficult and delicate compromise.

(Mr. Hoveyda, Iran)

The Ad Hoc Committee also explored the possibilities of including in its report recommendations of a substantive nature. This, however, did not prove possible. The Ad Hoc Committee therefore confined itself to making a single recommendation of a procedural nature. In this recommendation the Ad Hoc Committee has suggested to the General Assembly that it examine the advisability of the continuation of its work under an appropriate mandate.

By having carefully chosen neutral language, the Ad Hoc Committee has refrained from influencing a decision which it regarded as essentially the prerogative of the General Assembly alone.

As a whole, the report of the Ad Hoc Committee reflects the current state of thinking within the international community on a world disarmament conference. While the Ad Hoc Committee has been careful not to overstep the narrow confines of its mandate, it has been thorough and probing in its search for solutions that could assist the Assembly in charting a course for the future. I commend this report to your attention.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Hoveyda, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, for his statement and for his introduction of the report of that Committee. May I express to him the admiration of the Chairman and of the entire Committee for the work he has performed in his capacity as Chairman and for the report submitted to this Committee. I know under what difficult circumstances Ambassador Hoveyda has conducted the work and the consultations of the Ad Hoc Committee. He has done all this with due diligence and the care and dedication that have always characterized his work.

Again, may I thank Ambassador Hoveyda on behalf of this Committee and, through him, extend our appreciation to the members of the Ad Hoc Committee as well.

Mrs. THORSSON (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, may I first of all take this opportunity to congratulate you on your chairmanship of this important body of the United Nations. May I also pay you my highest personal respects and express the fullest confidence of the Swedish delegation in your ability to conduct our disarmament debate in such a way that this session of the General

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

Assembly can, in retrospect, be said to have contributed effectively to promoting the cause of disarmament throughout the world. It might not be necessary to state the self-evident fact that this is indeed very badly needed.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

A few weeks ago the Foreign Minister of Sweden stated before the General Assembly that in his opinion disarmament represents the area where the United Nations has made least progress during its three decades of existence. This evaluation is an expression of frustration which I know is acutely felt by many of us present in this room, and it calls for serious reflection about our present situation.

Hopefully, this commonly shared concern about the gravity of the situation might provide an impetus for renewed efforts. Let me recall that in his statement celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the United Nations Charter, the Secretary-General said, inter alia, the following:

"I address a most urgent appeal to all nations, great and small, nuclear and non-nuclear, to exercise unilateral restraint, to slow down their arms races, and to limit the traffic in arms. At the same time they should urgently, and as a matter of priority, broaden the scope and intensify the pace of their efforts to negotiate truly effective arms control and disarmament agreements. Unless they do so, human survival as well as human welfare will be in grave jeopardy". (Press release SG/SM/2207)

What lessons have these past 30 years provided? First, although we have been spared another world war, every day of this period saw a war somewhere in the world. It has been estimated that the total duration of these conflicts in the years 1945-1969 exceeded 250 years, causing incalculable sufferings, devastation, human and material losses.

Further, disarmament negotiations during the post-war period have not been much more successful than they were in the 1930s one decisive difference being the vastly more complex and dangerous situation in the weapons field today. We have survived in the nuclear age so far not through any agreed concept of international order, but through crisis diplomacy and that uncanny substitute for a concept of order known as the balance of power.

In the age of nuclear weapons only one breakdown could result in a catastrophe leading to the destruction of civilized human life in much of the world. It is tragic that several opportunities were lost during the post-war period to lay a foundation for real disarmament measures and a new international

order. I am thinking, for instance, of the fate of the Baruch proposal in 1946 for an international régime for the management of fissile material. The negotiations preceding the non-proliferation Treaty in the middle of the 1960s also come to mind.

The situation today is well documented and it is hard to contribute any new facts in this forum, be it in terms of the incredible waste of resources in the armaments field or the capacity of destruction raised beyond imagination. But let us agree that multilateral disarmament negotiations are at a deadlock. Where could that lead us? Will it paralyse our capacity for action? Or will it provide opportunities for new initiatives?

There are some positive signs in the dark picture I have painted. One is the growing determination of the developing countries to have a decisive influence on their own future. My Government welcomes this new trend in world politics, which cannot avoid having its ramifications in the disarmament field. The statement on disarmament by the recent Lima meeting of Foreign Ministers representing the non-aligned countries confirms this development.

The international community as a whole has a common stake to find joint and reasonable solutions to the problems of disarmament. This is evident not least in the light of the enormous resources, particularly human resources, wasted on armaments, which could have been put to work for economic and social development. Thus, all States and the entire international community have the duty to press for energetic endeavours and to contribute to the success of disarmament efforts.

In this task a widening of the definition of national security to encompass also progress in the social, economic and cultural fields appears to be one of the few ways to break the deadlock of disarmament. This important aspect was emphasized by the representative of the United States to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in a statement before that forum in April this year. At the same time it must be clearly understood that the main responsibility for taking concrete steps towards real disarmament lies with the super-Powers.

My Government has expressed its satisfaction that the United States and the Soviet Union have started a process of negotiations to reach agreement on strategic arms limitation measures.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

I certainly do not underestimate the difficulties involved in such a process, without disturbing the delicate strategic balance. We cannot but express our regret, however, that the agreements reached so far do not represent a contribution to disarmament. On the contrary, they permit further increases in already formidable strategic missile forces and almost unlimited possibilities for qualitative developments aimed at greater destructive capability. No reductions are yet foreseen. This situation may seriously obstruct the chances of achieving effective disarmament measures with regard to nuclear weapons. Indeed, it constitutes a clear defiance by the super-Powers of article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty.

A particular problem lies in the fact that no attempt at all has been made to reduce the prestige of nuclear weapons in international relations. As I have stated before in the CCD, the political status value attached to the possession of these weapons is one main reason for the resentment felt by several non-nuclear-weapon States against nuclear-weapon States for refusing to give up something themselves which they try to keep others from acquiring.

The outcome of the recent non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference clearly demonstrates that the international community cannot afford further delays in nuclear disarmament. The international community stands at a crucial turning point in the non-proliferation issue. If the non-proliferation régime, which my Government has always strongly supported and will continue to support, is to survive, the two leading great Powers must urgently make definite nuclear disarmament commitments coupled with appropriate undertakings not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty.

Our ability to create an effective barrier against the further proliferation of nuclear weapons also depends on the condition that the peaceful use of nuclear energy -- everywhere, (I repeat "everywhere") and thus also in the nuclear-weapon States -- is subjected to as efficient measures of international safeguards as possible. Furthermore, States, which have not done so, must now adhere to the non-proliferation Treaty. I will discuss these latter aspects in the following paragraphs.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

The high priority attached by the Swedish Government to reaching effective measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons was again underlined in the Government statement presented by the Prime Minister of Sweden at the opening of the Swedish parliament on 15 October 1975.

As I said, it is obvious that we now stand before a turning point. The way we act or fail to act will have far-reaching consequences. If the present situation gives rise to pessimism or even alarm, this must not lead to apathy. I am convinced that the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation can still be dealt with successfully, provided that enough stringent measures are taken. We cannot passively just accept a process whereby nuclear explosive capabilities are spreading at an ever increasing rate without adequate safeguards being applied.

In my view, the single most effective measure, failing a universal adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty, would be to start implementing now the recommendation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference calling for a strengthening of common export requirements relating to safeguards. The recommendation proposes to extend the application of safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in an importing State not party to the non-proliferation Treaty. Sweden is prepared to participate actively in efforts aimed at this goal. The interests of preventing a further proliferation of nuclear weapons must prevail over commercial interests. And I cannot emphasize this point strongly enough: the interests of preventing a further proliferation of nuclear weapons must prevail over commercial interests. It is high time to take action.

An indication of the utter seriousness of the situation is the statement by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Dr. Sigvard Eklund, at the recent General Conference of that organization, which will be charged with much of the responsibility for the follow-up of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. In his statement the Director General asserted the following:

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

I might also add that the Swedish CCD delegation last August proposed the convening of an expert meeting within the CCD in early March 1976 to deal with the remaining problems still considered to be in the way of the discontinuance for all time of all nuclear weapons test explosions in all environments.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

In the area of peaceful nuclear explosions, valuable studies have been carried out by the IAEA and the CCD on the basis of last year's General Assembly resolution. The technical mandate of the IAEA to study this problem has been broadened and the IAEA Board of Governors has established an Ad Hoc Advisory Group which recently held its first meeting. The Group will consider a broad range of problems, among which the complex issues related to the special international agreement or agreements under article V of the non-proliferation Treaty merit particular attention. The CCD considered the arms limitation aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions during a meeting of experts this summer.

It seems clear that further studies are necessary in these fields. My delegation hopes that the General Assembly this year will adopt a resolution of a procedural character, which should contain provisions for a continuation of the work of the IAEA and the CCD along the lines indicated.

As is well known, the Ad Hoc Group of Qualified Governmental Experts under the auspices of the CCD has transmitted to the General Assembly its study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects, a study on which my colleague, Ambassador Pastinen of Finland, so ably commented earlier this morning. A Swedish governmental expert participated actively in the work of the Group. Detailed comments by my Government on the contents of the study were given in a Swedish statement in the CCD on 21 August.

In this forum I should like only to state that the study has, in our view, provided a useful summary of the many views represented in the international discussion on nuclear-weapon-free zones. The study is now completed and a continued role for the CCD in this matter seems not to be called for at present. In our opinion, further work should now best proceed in connexion with concrete zone proposals.

As regards the particular question of possible nuclear-weapon-free zones in Europe, my delegation finds that the report of the Ad Hoc Group does not constitute a fully adequate basis for a political exploration of the issues involved. The reason for this evaluation lies in the fact that several delicate and difficult problems in this context have either been disagreed upon or left out.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

I wish to wind up this statement by making a proposal. Although the United Nations during its 30 years has for various reasons made little or no progress in the field of disarmament, the fact remains that disarmament is one of the fundamental objectives of this Organization. I have tried to point to the vital need for action both within and outside the United Nations. The Secretary-General has devoted much attention to this problem in the introduction to his annual report to the General Assembly (A/10001/Add.1), something which has been greatly appreciated by the Swedish Government.

I need not repeat here the contents of the observations of the Secretary-General. I can only say that my delegation agrees with him that a basic review ought to be carried out of the role of the United Nations in the disarmament field. This session of the General Assembly, convening on the thirtieth anniversary of the United Nations, should, in our view, decide to undertake such a review with the aim of strengthening the resources and the effectiveness of the Organization in the field of disarmament.

The Swedish delegation has initiated informal consultations with other interested delegations on the best way to carry out the review which we intend to propose. It seems to me that an intergovernmental committee, established by the General Assembly at this session, could well perform this task and report its findings and proposals to the Assembly at its next session.

The precise composition of the committee could be left open for consultations. In our view, the committee should look into such matters as ways and means of improving the flow of information on disarmament and related matters from the United Nations to Member States and the public, possible new approaches for achieving a more comprehensive participation in the disarmament discussions of the United Nations and other multilateral bodies, a possible improvement of the structure and procedures of the United Nations negotiation machinery, ways and means of strengthening the follow-up by the United Nations of disarmament agreements and so on.

As my delegation sees it, such a committee should not be considered as prejudicing possible future decisions, for example, on a world disarmament conference -- on which the Ad Hoc Committee, under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Hoveyda of Iran, has performed such arduous and excellent work.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

Nor should it prejudice the convening of a special session of the General Assembly on disarmament matters. The committee would, rather, provide material as a basis for both immediate decisions to strengthen the resources of the United Nations in this area, and decisions of a more far-reaching nature, for instance, the convening of a conference or a special session.

My delegation intends to return to this matter, as well as to take up certain other important items of our agenda, at a later stage of our debate.

In conclusion, I want to say the following. It is my sincere belief that, besides carrying out detailed and, of necessity, highly technical step-by-step disarmament negotiations -- a process in which we shall always risk being overpowered by the military technological establishments -- we shall have to return to some basic and fundamental questions. I think that in doing so, the absurdity of the present situation will appear very clearly to us.

Let me put forward some such questions. How is it possible that so many still believe in the myth that possession of nuclear arms means added national security and prestige when all evidence and political wisdom points or should point to the opposite? What is the rationality behind a situation where the two main nuclear Powers are constantly increasing their nuclear arsenals, which are already many times more than sufficient to extinguish not only themselves but also the rest of human civilization? What does it mean to world economic and social development, that is, the welfare of individual human beings, that close to half of the world's scientific and technological talent, knowledge and resources are used to cause devastation, suffering and death instead of development, welfare and human happiness?

It is obvious to me that the situation calls for a redefinition of the concept of national security, a concept under the protection of which so much death, suffering and destruction has been caused to this frail planet and its poor human beings. In our interdependent time this concept will have to be redefined to encompass security for all in the broadest sense of that word, that is, human survival under fair and equitable conditions for everyone.

If we should fail in efforts to gain wide acceptance of such a basic and concerted goal, it is my conviction that the law of averages is going to catch up with us and, eventually, end the human experiment.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

That is the reason why I very seriously believe that we find ourselves at present in a position of new opportunities similar to those lost in the past to which I have referred. There is a chilling suspicion that if we do not make good use of them now they might prove to be the last ones.

Disarmament problems must therefore, at this crucial moment, be finally brought out of their isolation, examined and negotiated as an integral and important part of the global issue of survival in our time.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Mrs. Thorsson for her fervent appeal for disarmament; coming as it does from a woman during International Women's Year, I think that we men should heed it.

Mr. FLORIN (German Democratic Republic) (interpretation from Russian): We may note with satisfaction that there is a growing recognition of the need to take qualitative new steps towards disarmament. There can be no doubt that political détente has created the necessary conditions for this. On the other hand, we must supplement political détente with military détente in order to make the process of détente stable and lasting.

The scientific and technological revolution, the result of which has been a mass of new discoveries and advances for the good of mankind, has also made it possible to bring about accelerated development and expansion of the production of weapons and weapon systems. At the same time, political forces have increased in favour of using the results of the creative industry of mankind not for purposes of destruction but exclusively for purposes of the peaceful development and social progress of peoples.

We therefore believe that the optimistic view which has been gaining ground is justified: that, in spite of the continuing resistance of certain forces, there has been noticed a turning point in the limitation of armaments and in disarmament. To make this trend a reality, we need the appropriate political will and action on the part of States. The United Nations should be the Organization to make a decisive contribution to this.

On the agenda of this session of the General Assembly the items connected with disarmament and the limitation of armaments are occupying a more important place than ever before, and in this we see evidence of an enhanced readiness to use all possible ways and means for attaining effective international agreements. In the struggle for the limitation of armaments and for disarmament there have emerged two major trends and tasks: on the one hand, there is the reduction and elimination of existing types and systems of weapons; on the other hand, there is the matter of prohibiting the further perfecting of existing weapons and the development of new ones. These two tasks are closely interconnected. Hitherto, efforts designed to bring about international agreements to limit and call a halt to the arms race have related fundamentally to existing military potential, and there is no doubt that this is something which must be continued more energetically and more effectively.

(Mr. Florin, German Democratic Republic)

However, our experience shows how complicated it is to remove existing weapons from the arsenals of States. It would, therefore, be a tremendous step forward if we could prohibit the use of the advances of science and technology in the interests of developing and producing ever more dangerous types of weapons. The policy of disarmament must precede the possible results of scientific and technological development. We believe that the threat to mankind created by the arms race means that the path towards the attainment of general and complete disarmament must first of all be cleared of the dangers connected with weapons of mass destruction.

New ideas concerning problems of the day, and at the same time forward-looking ideas, quite often arouse doubts as to their feasibility. For example, we remember what happened with the proposal to prohibit military or any other hostile use of means of affecting the natural environment. We noticed in what a restrained way this proposal was received. The situation of the talks in the Geneva Disarmament Committee justifies our conclusion that in this area too practical results are possible in the near future.

The USSR has now made a proposal for the prohibition of the development and production of new forms of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. The adoption of that proposal would also create a new situation in the field of limiting armaments and of disarmament. The purposes of the proposal go much beyond the framework of the partial steps which have already been taken towards the reduction and elimination of weapons of mass destruction: they cover the development and production of new types of weapons and weapon systems as a whole, and are not simply limited to selected fields.

Furthermore, the proposal takes into account the urgent demand in the process of arms limitation and disarmament, to deal, first and foremost, with weapons of mass destruction. These weapons threaten not only the lives of individuals, but the very existence of whole peoples and the environment. The proposal is necessary, too, because the development and further perfecting of all forms of weapons is, in the final analysis, designed to expand their

(Mr. Florin, German Democratic Republic)

range and their destructive power. The conclusion of an international agreement prohibiting the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, of course, cannot replace measures to reduce and eliminate already existing military potentials. However, there is no doubt that such an international agreement would have a favourable effect in this area, too: it would meet the requirement which is being put forward ever more frequently by world public opinion, and also by the Conference to consider the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which took place in May of this year, to prevent not only a growth in the total volume of weapons of mass destruction, and particularly nuclear weapons, but to put an actual end to their further qualitative perfecting.

In the view of my delegation, the adoption of this draft resolution and the conclusion of an international agreement would be an important step towards the strengthening of international security and trust between peoples and States.

(Mr. Florin, German Democratic Republic)

There is another aspect which we consider extremely important. The implementation of the Soviet proposal would release tremendous material resources and divert the work of thousands of scientists towards the peaceful development of science and technology. Everyone understands how advantageous that would be for the peoples in question, for international co-operation in the economic and scientific fields and also for the increase of assistance to developing countries. That would eliminate the obstacles to peaceful co-operation among States which naturally arise when the advances of science and technology are used for military purposes. In this connexion we should like to draw attention to the fact that this draft international agreement would not only ban the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and weapons systems but, at the same time, make it incumbent upon the parties to promote scientific and technical co-operation in the interests of using the latest advances and discoveries of science and technology for peaceful purposes.

A few days ago at this session of the General Assembly the Third Committee approved a resolution calling for the use of the advances of science and technology exclusively for peaceful purposes in the interests of human rights, and nothing would satisfy that requirement more than the conclusion of the draft agreement under discussion here.

Sometimes, as we know, the question is asked what new kinds of systems of weapons should be banned? That question has already been cogently answered by the leader of the delegation of the USSR, Comrade Malik. Work on the definition and registration of possible new forms and systems of weapons of mass destruction, as far as we can envisage them today, should be carried out in talks among experts within the framework of the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. What we need today is a political decision of principle to prohibit entirely the production of new forms and systems of weapons of mass destruction. That would make it possible for the experts to begin productive work. We should ask the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to prepare an appropriate international agreement.

(Mr. Florin, German Democratic Republic)

The draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union demonstrates the consistent efforts of the USSR and other socialist States to implement the well-known peace programme.

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic supports the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.711 and will become a sponsor of it.

I should like to make a few further comments on the Soviet proposal for the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. That is a proposal which would satisfy a requirement which is on the agenda, and has been on the agenda since the very existence of nuclear weapons, and has been reflected in many General Assembly resolutions and other important intergovernmental documents. The peace programme of the socialist States and the political declaration of the Algiers Conference urgently call for such a prohibition. The Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water of 5 August 1963 lays down as a binding objective

"... the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time ..." (ENDC/100/Rev.1)

That requirement is contained also in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Review Conference on that Treaty, held in May in Geneva, also strongly confirmed that requirement. Therefore the draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests submitted by the Soviet Union (A/10241) has met with wide approval. Within the United Nations and also outside it, there has been repeated and detailed discussion on the question of the need for and urgency of such a step. I should therefore like to confine myself to just a few aspects.

The conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests is not aimed against any State, but is in keeping with the interests of all States and peoples. Such a treaty would remove the pernicious effect on the environment and on human health of tests in the atmosphere, and be a major contribution to the limitation of armaments and to disarmament in the field of weapons of mass destruction. The cessation of all tests would also logically facilitate the cessation of the development and production of such weapons, as well as their elimination from the arsenals

(Mr. Florin, German Democratic
Republic)

of States. The cessation of tests would, furthermore, counteract the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this connexion I should like to say that my delegation shares the concern of many States about certain commercial actions with regard to the delivery of equipment and material in the field of the application of nuclear energy that might be detrimental in relation to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This applies particularly to cases where States act as partner States to those which are not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In this connexion my delegation would like to draw attention to the relevant remarks made by the United States Secretary of State in the general debate at this session, at the 2355th meeting of the General Assembly.

In our view we should particularly avoid a situation where, contrary to United Nations decisions, such deliveries assist the aggressive racist régime in South Africa. Those deliveries have enabled it to produce atomic weapons. We should like with the utmost seriousness to issue a warning about that danger. It is the task of the United Nations to act in time to prevent that danger, and there is no convincing argument which can justify refusal to participate in such proposed action.

(Mr. Florin, German Democratic
Republic)

The possession of nuclear weapons cannot be viewed as the prerogative of State sovereignty. This has been acknowledged not only by almost 100 States, parties to the nuclear weapon Non-Proliferation Treaty, but also by those who are ready to join nuclear-weapon-free zones. The exercise of State sovereignty in the interests of international security, and the prevention of nuclear war, means on the contrary a readiness to put an end to the arms race, in particular in the field of nuclear weapons, by means of concluding international agreements and calling a halt to the testing of these weapons, which would be a step towards this goal.

We also strongly reject the view that before such an agreement is concluded, an equal level of armaments must be achieved. This would mean renouncing disarmament. We would like to remind you of some historical facts which support this. Fascist Germany refused to participate in any disarmament talks on the pretext that, as a first step, it was necessary to achieve an equal level of armaments. The result of this policy was the fascist aggression against the peoples of Europe and the 50 million victims in the Second World War. I must say that we are surprised at the fact that the United States representative, speaking in this Committee on 30 October, referred to the problem of control over the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing as being unresolved.

In recent years, there has been a rapid development in science and technology in this field too. The use of means of national control, provided for in other international agreements, has been fully justified. Our very experience confirms the fact that at the present time national means of detection of nuclear-weapon tests are quite adequate. The time has come to give up these outmoded and old-fashioned ideas. The path towards the early conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests must not be blocked by the adoption of these outmoded positions.

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic believes that the time has come when we must finally ensure the success of our efforts to bring about the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. We therefore support the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union in document A/C.1/L.707, and wish to announce that the German Democratic Republic has become a co-sponsor.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet Union has submitted for consideration by the General Assembly as an urgent matter the proposal on the "Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests". The purpose of this proposal, as was pointed out by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. A. A. Gromyko, in the general debate of the General Assembly is:

"... to end completely nuclear-weapon tests and thus radically to limit the practical possibilities for perfecting it further." (A/PV.2357, p. 58).

The question of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is not a new one. It is inseparably connected with the creation of these weapons. Of course the most radical solution of the problems arising from the emergence of nuclear weapons would be their complete prohibition and destruction. Proposals on this subject, as we know, have been repeatedly made by the Soviet Union in the United Nations. On the initiative of the Soviet Union, the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly decided to prohibit the use of force in international relations, at the same time permanently prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. However, this decision, too, has not yet acquired the force of international law, and the world still continues to witness the continuing nuclear-weapon race.

Since, in view of the position of other nuclear Powers, difficulties have appeared in the way of the complete prohibition and liquidation of nuclear weapons, the gradual -- that is, a stage-by-stage -- approach to the solution of the problems of nuclear disarmament and the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war has become the only one practically feasible. This, of course, in no way removes from the agenda the historical task of achieving general and complete disarmament, including both nuclear and conventional weapons.

In recent years, the first substantial steps have been taken towards the curbing of the nuclear-weapon race, and these have had a positive influence on the improvement of the international climate. Treaties were concluded on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests in three environments, on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in outer space and on the sea-bed and ocean floor, as well as the Soviet-American agreements on the prevention of nuclear war and on the limitation of strategic weapons.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Despite these initial positive steps, the arms race continues, the military arsenals of States are being replenished with both nuclear and conventional weapons, and nuclear-weapon tests still continue to be carried out. An important measure which would result in the suspension of this extremely dangerous process and contribute to a downward trend in the curve of the arms race, would be the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The position of the Soviet Union on this question is well known.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The Soviet Union for many years has been making considerable efforts to bring about the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests. The Peace Programme adopted by the Twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union paid particular attention to this question of considerable significance. The Programme stressed that the USSR was in favour of the cessation everywhere and by all of nuclear-weapon tests, including, of course, underground tests.

In 1963, with the most active participation of the USSR, the Moscow Treaty was concluded which banned nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. In 1974, at the high-level Soviet-American talks in Moscow, the Soviet-United States Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear-Weapon Tests was signed. Thus, one more step was taken towards the complete cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests. However, it has so far not proved possible to resolve this extremely important and urgent problem

Consequently, at the present time our task is to reach a concrete international agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests, without exception, by all States. The Soviet Union has repeatedly made official statements about its readiness to come to agreement on such a prohibition. So the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, stated in Warsaw on 21 July 1974, "The Soviet Union is ready, in particular, to conclude an agreement on the complete cessation of all underground nuclear-weapon tests".

This position of the USSR enjoys wide support and understanding. It is shared by a large majority of States. The countries of the socialist community are firm and consistent advocates of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

The non-aligned countries also favour the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, as is proved by the decisions of their Conferences held in Georgetown, Algiers and Lima. Thus, the Political Declaration of the Algiers Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries proclaimed:

"The Conference declares itself in favour of general and complete disarmament, and especially ... the total cessation of all nuclear tests in all environments in all regions of the world". (A/9330, para. 72)

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The Political Declaration adopted in Lima last August expressed the determination of the non-aligned States to continue their actions directed to the conclusion of an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests.

Expressing the will of the absolute majority of United Nations Member States, the General Assembly in recent years has adopted a number of resolutions calling for the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

The Soviet proposal on complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests has been supported, at the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, by representatives of the socialist States and many non-aligned and Western countries, and we would like to express our gratitude to them.

To put an end, immediately and everywhere, to all nuclear-weapon tests by all States is the will of the overwhelming majority of States, and of all peoples of the world. This is an undeniable fact. Nevertheless, there are some people who not only oppose the cessation of nuclear tests but are also attempting to prove the unprovable -- that the continuation of nuclear tests, as they see it, is in the interests of the peoples. They claim that they, if you please, must keep pace with or overtake somebody or other in the nuclear-weapons race.

Well, what are we to say about this kind of assertion? The gist of these statements is obvious: they are designed to whip up war hysteria, to heat up international tension and to accelerate the unbridled arms race.

We in the Soviet Union will continue untiringly to strive for disarmament and come forward with new initiatives aimed at achieving the main final and noble objective, general and complete disarmament.

In the period after the signing and coming into force of the Moscow Treaty, attempts were made, and are still being made, to solve the problem of the cessation of nuclear tests in all environments on the basis of what I would call a selective approach to the solution of this problem. Proposals were put forward to halt nuclear tests unilaterally. It was proposed that such partial measures should be carried out only by some nuclear Powers, while the conducting of tests by other States, including tests in the atmosphere, would be, in practice, legitimized. The question arises -- and I would like to ask those who make these proposals -- does the continuation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere not represent the greatest threat from the standpoint of the principal radioactive contamination of our planet?

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

This kind of proposal, of course, could not and cannot solve the problem of the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests by everyone. They would lead only to the creation of one-sided advantages for some States to the detriment of the interests of others. The carrying out of such measures would not only fail to promote the strengthening of international peace and security, but in our view -- and we are firmly convinced of this -- would create grounds for complications and friction among States. We would like to stress particularly that in the course of actually bringing about concrete disarmament measures no harm should be done to the security of anyone at all. I should like to stress that: "anyone at all". This principle is an indispensable condition for successful progress in the field of arms limitation and disarmament, as well as in the field of the cessation of nuclear tests. Our task is to find ways of solving the disarmament problem without jeopardizing the security of anyone at all, and for the benefit of all.

With a view to the goal of complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the Soviet Union has prepared an appropriate international draft treaty which has been submitted for consideration by the General Assembly at its thirtieth session.

This draft treaty provides for the prohibition of test explosions of nuclear weapons in all environments -- in the atmosphere, in outer space, under water and under ground. This obligation must be assumed by all States, and, of course, by all nuclear Powers without exception. It is only with the participation of all nuclear States that the task of complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests can be accomplished. That is precisely why our draft resolution provides that the treaty enter into force only after it has been ratified by a certain number of States, including all nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Of great significance are the questions of control over compliance with the treaty. The Soviet draft provides that control over compliance by all States parties to the treaty with the obligations assumed by them not to carry out test explosions of nuclear weapons in any environment will be based on the use of modern national technical means of control, together with certain international procedures. The development of international co-operation in the exchange of seismic data among the States parties to the Treaty should be an important means of control.

The Soviet delegation considers that the time has come to abandon the approaches and criteria of the past -- when tension, mistrust and suspicion prevailed in relations among States -- in matters of control over compliance with international agreements on disarmament questions. Of course, we cannot not fail to bear in mind the tremendous leap forward that has taken place in the field of science and technology and that has significantly extended possibilities for the use of technical means of control which guarantee full detection of nuclear tests in violation of the treaty. There is also another factor that must be borne in mind, namely, that a tremendous amount of positive experience has been accumulated in the use of national technical means of control over compliance with the important agreements in the field of the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons.

The Soviet draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests provides that if any party whatsoever to the Treaty violates the obligations that it assumed not to carry out such tests, the Security Council of the United Nations must undertake an inquiry upon receipt of a complaint from the State which has ascertained a violation of the treaty.

The general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests must not, of course, be allowed to create obstacles to the enjoyment of the benefits flowing from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. Of course, the carrying out of peaceful nuclear explosions must be in conformity with the goal of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Non-nuclear-weapon States will benefit from the peaceful use of nuclear explosions in accordance with the provisions of article V of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. However, in the case of nuclear-weapon

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

States, the procedure for carrying out peaceful nuclear explosions will be established under a special agreement which should be concluded as quickly as possible. In determining this procedure, due regard must be paid to the recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is the most competent and qualified international organ for producing recommendations of this kind. The IAEA, as is well known, is doing a great deal of work on the practical implementation of the provisions of article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

As is pointed out in the Secretary-General's note, document A/10316, various agencies and organs are undertaking a broad and serious review of the question of peaceful nuclear explosions. This was mentioned, incidentally, in the course of the debate in the First Committee.

The Soviet Union is carrying out a broad programme of scientific research and development on the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions, and is accumulating data on the economic effectiveness of this new technology and on safety measures in conducting such explosions. The Soviet Union is actively participating, through IAEA, in the taking of preparatory steps to provide services to non-nuclear countries in carrying out peaceful nuclear explosions pursuant to article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As is well known, the Soviet Union has expressed its readiness to provide services on peaceful nuclear explosions to non-parties to the non-proliferation Treaty as well, on condition that this will be done under appropriate control and on the basis of procedures worked out by IAEA.

A relevant draft resolution, co-sponsored by a group of States including the Soviet Union, has been submitted in document A/C.1/L.707, for consideration by the First Committee. It calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to enter into negotiations not later than 31 March 1976, with a view to reaching agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, and to inform the thirty-first session of the General Assembly of the results of those negotiations. Consequently, we are calling upon the nuclear-weapon States, without further delay, to enter into negotiations with a view to finding a solution to this exceptionally important problem.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

These are the considerations which the delegation of the Soviet Union deemed it necessary to put forward in submitting, for the consideration of the United Nations General Assembly and its First Committee, its proposal on the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. In submitting this proposal, the Soviet Union expresses the hope that it will be most carefully studied, in a spirit of goodwill, by all Member States of the United Nations.

The Soviet delegation is convinced that the decision taken by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirtieth anniversary session on the question of the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests will prove to be a significant contribution to the cause of progress in negotiations on disarmament problems.

A complete ban on tests will be of the utmost importance for curtailing the nuclear-weapon race even further. The conclusion of a treaty, the draft of which has been introduced by the Soviet Union, would make it possible drastically to limit practical possibilities for the further perfection of nuclear weapons and prevent the emergence of new generations of nuclear explosives even more powerful, more destructive and more sophisticated.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The cessation of all nuclear tests undoubtedly would be a major contribution to averting the threat of a nuclear war, to curbing the arms race and to disarmament. This measure would be in the interests of all States, nuclear and non-nuclear, and promote the further development and intensification of international détente and the strengthening of peace.

The CHAIRMAN: I apologize to the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Thorsson, for having failed to thank her for her kind and very friendly remarks about me. I should also like to announce that Democratic Yemen has become a co-sponsor of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.711.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN: As I mentioned earlier we have no speakers for this afternoon and we are compelled to cancel the meeting. As I look at the list of speakers for subsequent days I notice that for tomorrow afternoon we have no speakers; for Wednesday afternoon we have only one speaker; for Thursday afternoon we have no speakers; for Friday afternoon we have possibly enough for a short meeting; and for Monday, happily, we have also enough for perhaps a short meeting.

I am sure that members will not wish this situation to remain as it is and will want to use the time available to inscribe on the list of speakers the names of those representatives who wish to speak.

Nevertheless, I should like to think aloud and suggest some ideas that may be helpful in the organization of our work. First, I urge delegations wishing to introduce draft resolutions to do so at the earliest moment. That will help other delegations to take a position regarding those drafts. Another idea that comes to mind, if it meets with the approval of the Committee -- and I am not making a definite proposal at this stage but would like to consult with members and benefit from their advice -- is, for instance, to set aside perhaps two meetings every week for the consideration of specific proposals, ideas and draft resolutions. That perhaps would be very helpful. It will mean an interruption in the general debate but we would be using all the time available to us in order to accomplish our task before the deadline. It may help delegations to consult

(The Chairman)

with their Governments on the new proposals and draft resolutions. It will also help delegations to consult among themselves. It will be a useful thing perhaps if we can interrupt our general debate every now and then in order to address ourselves to something specific. We could do that after consulting those delegations which have definite statements or proposals to make at a particular meeting.

As an example at random, let us assume that we set Thursday afternoon for the consideration of one of the new proposals, the one made by the Soviet delegation. We could perhaps hear some specific views then about that particular proposal. We could then set another date for the discussion of another proposal or for the item on the world disarmament conference when we would hear some specific views on that particular subject. That will give interested delegations an opportunity to express their views and it will help us to organize our work.

I am just throwing out these ideas in order to elucidate the reactions of delegations, preferably in private, and if anyone wishes to give me their reactions to these ideas I shall be very happy to hear from them tomorrow.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.