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**Chairman:** Sir Leslie MUNRO (New Zealand).

**AGENDA ITEMS 17 AND 66**

**Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/2979, A/3047, A/C.1/L.149/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.150, A/C.1/L.152, A/C.1/L.153) (*continued*)**

**Measures for the further relaxation of international tension and development of international co-operation (A/2981 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.151) (*continued*)**

1. Mr. MATES (Yugoslavia) said that the unanimous adoption of resolution 808 (IX) on disarmament at the ninth session of the General Assembly had been received enthusiastically throughout the world. The effect produced by that resolution had been much more the result of that unanimity than of the resolution itself. Although the resolution, being of a procedural character could not solve outstanding problems, it had helped the progress of the discussions in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission and among the participating Governments.

2. The report on the Sub-Committee's discussion (DC/71) had been disappointing because of its lack of any final and operative agreements. If the report were examined to see whether it had become easier or more difficult to continue on the rough road towards agreement on disarmament, it was obvious that some positive results had been achieved which could serve as a basis for further efforts. Among the positive results achieved was the general acceptance of maximum levels of armed forces and a considerable measure of agreement on the comprehensive plan for disarmament in stages.

3. That line of development had later been superseded by the discussion of other proposals which had intro-

duced a new approach to the problem. That new approach, based on the technical difficulties of controlling and supervising the elimination of nuclear weapons, had itself become the major source of controversy during the second part of the present year.

4. It was of considerable consequence, however, that during that time no proposal had been completely or absolutely rejected. That did not necessarily mean that any one of the older or of the more recent proposals alone could become generally acceptable after further discussion, but simply indicated the possibility that a combination of existing proposals could reconcile the views reflected in them.

5. Progress had been impeded not only by technical difficulties regarding the scientific limitations of supervision and detection of nuclear stockpiles, but also because of certain political considerations. The Yugoslav delegation believed that the crux of the problem and of the present controversies on disarmament lay in the attitude of accepting a forward step towards disarmament only in so far as that step satisfied the requirements of national security of those countries called upon to implement it. There was nothing fundamentally wrong in that basic yardstick, which had been applied and defended eloquently during the whole course of the discussions on disarmament in the United Nations. Security, which had gained enormously in importance at the present time, was no longer a question of being involved in a new war; rather, it was the vital question of being possibly involved in a nuclear war with all its consequences for all of mankind. A lasting state of international security could prevail only in a world in which there were no international conflicts and tensions that could develop into a war and in which there were no technical means readily available to carry it out. So far, neither of those requirements for a stable peace and for international security existed.

6. One important change which had occurred recently was that the weapons of war had become a powerful deterrent themselves. The folly of war had been generally recognized, not only because of the virtues of peace and the widespread disastrous effects of war, but primarily because of the illogic of using means which served no thinkable purpose. That important change, which had so decisively influenced the international climate, had deeply influenced the discussions on disarmament. The awareness of that new situation was not by itself a sufficiently strong and wide foundation on which naïvely to allow the peace and security of the world to rest without a continuation of relentless and even more urgent and determined efforts to arrive at harmonious international relations in a disarmed world, allowing, naturally, for unavoidable, and even desirable, historically conditioned divergences and differences in various countries and parts of the world. The Yugoslav delegation believed that there was no substitute for genuine security, and that such security could be achieved only

through simultaneous efforts, both in the field of disarmament and in tackling the controversial questions which still bedevilled international relations.

7. The political difficulties in the way of progress towards a comprehensive plan of disarmament had been correctly defined as essentially the lack of mutual confidence. However, since past failure could not be automatically projected into the future, that discovery should not lead to the abandonment of efforts. Even though the realization of the folly of wars might not be sufficient to prevent them, that new factor had already brought about such important reappraisals of values that results impossible in the past now seemed attainable with patience and determination.

8. Turning to the question of the technical difficulties in detecting nuclear stockpiles, Mr. Mates stated that he had not tried to penetrate the technical intricacies of the problem, which could be usefully done by an international panel of qualified experts. It was obvious, however, that such difficulties posed a formidable problem. He hoped that scientists would do their best to find proper technical solutions if they could. It was encouraging that the statements in the debate on that issue had not been accompanied by an affirmation that technical difficulties rendered disarmament impossible. The debate indicated that only a combination of technical difficulties and the lack of a minimum of trust posed insurmountable obstacles. That seemed to indicate that mutual trust and confidence was the really important element. He hoped that the combined ingenuity of statesmen and the resourcefulness of scientists would overcome those difficulties, provided that the attempt at their solution was conducted on an acceptable general platform. His delegation could not follow the advice offered by the opposite view, which could mean only letting disarmament wait for such an improvement in international relations that the technical difficulties would become insignificant in the face of complete trust and the disappearance of tensions and conflicts. It was not likely that a world bristling with arms, including thermonuclear bombs, could ever achieve such a state of perfection; in such circumstances it would hardly be necessary to concern oneself with armaments.

9. For those reasons, the Yugoslav delegation would not put the blame for the difficulties on the shoulders of the scientists. While profiting from the advice scientists could give them, statesmen could not avoid the responsibility of seeking and finding solutions of the problem now while it mattered. The stakes were too high to plead helplessness; nor would mankind accept such a plea. That did not mean, however, that confidence-building plans which had been devised and proposed in recognition of actual difficulties could not be valuable and applicable in the framework of the general efforts and as a partial answer to the problem. He had a great respect for the wisdom and sincerity of plans intended to increase security, such as the plan proposed by the President of the United States. It was not the substance of the plan that had created real difficulties in the discussion; the main difficulty was rather due to opposing views as to the context in which the plan should be carried out. Such views, although in conflict at present, offered a possibility of conciliation.

10. The Yugoslav delegation deemed it correct to put the emphasis on aerial surveys, inspections, controls and the exchange of information, *i.e.* on all necessary organizational measures connected with disarmament, in-

cluding prevention of the use of existing, or remaining, weapons for a surprise attack. Such an argument was, indeed, valid and legitimate interpretation of the requirements of security. It was likewise correct to consider that no measure which did not include the reduction of armaments or which was not an integral part of a comprehensive disarmament plan necessarily carried out in stages met the necessary requirement of vital security.

11. Unless it was possible to arrive at mutual recognition of those arguments, it would be difficult to visualize real progress or the development of a sufficient measure of the necessary trust on which to base further progress. However, it was to be expected that such a reconciliation, or rather a combination and broadening of views, might develop in further discussions of the Sub-Committee. With that conviction in mind, the Yugoslav delegation favoured prolongation of the mandate of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. Mr. Mates looked for recognition of the fact that, although security was a universal concern, the specific interpretation of irreducible minimum security requirements must necessarily vary from country to country. It was not only size and technical development, but geography, history, and all the other factors which defined a nation that were relevant in that context.

12. Any attempt to seek a solution to the problems of disarmament and international security by majority vote was doomed to failure. The only way to end the present stagnation was to be found in an effort to discover a common denominator in the still conflicting views on irreducible minimum security requirements expounded during the discussion. That meant that actual disarmament, which included sizeable reductions of conventional armaments and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, could not be separated from any initial steps. Such a change in approach could, indeed, pave the way to further progress. Real progress would then mostly depend on the ability to find workable solutions for those open questions of a comprehensive disarmament plan which so far had defied agreement. All the principal open questions were more or less connected with control and supervision, and the establishment and functioning of international organs for the purpose.

13. The new proposals put forward at the conference of the Heads of Government of the four great Powers at Geneva could be of great value in such efforts. In that context, the new elements introduced at that conference were considered by his delegation as a possible new impulse rather than a delaying factor.

14. The initiative of the Prime Minister of India in urging the discontinuation of experimental explosions of nuclear weapons was complementary to those proposals, as was India's further proposal (A/C.1/L.149/Rev.1) recommending a truce in armaments pending an applicable agreement on positive steps in disarmament.

15. The wisdom and usefulness of the proposals of 11 June 1954,<sup>1</sup> submitted to the Sub-Committee by France and the United Kingdom, were undiminished. It was most gratifying that the Soviet Union had accepted those proposals as a basis for discussion. The authors of the proposals had expressed dissatisfaction with some of the interpretations given to their ideas in the subsequent proposal of the Soviet Union.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission Supplement for April, May and June 1954*, document DC/53, annex 9.

16. His delegation hoped that, through efforts towards agreement along all possible avenues of approach, more flexibility on all sides and generally acceptable constructive results could be attained.

17. Finally, his delegation considered it to be inappropriate to discuss in detail the problem of disarmament in a forum where all nations were represented as long as there was no sufficiently prepared basis for discussion. With that in mind, Yugoslavia had supported the establishment of the Sub-Committee and now favoured the prolongation of its existence. While his delegation was not inclined to lose patience with the slow progress of the discussion among a limited number of representatives, it would welcome a greater understanding among the members of the Sub-Committee of the fact that they were a preparatory body entrusted with the task of preparing a text which would enable the United Nations to draft a universal convention on disarmament. He hoped that the members of the Sub-Committee, who had the heavy responsibility of being negotiators and drafters of a project of such vital importance to mankind, would never cease to have that as their ultimate goal.

18. Mr. AZKOUL (Lebanon), before addressing himself to the items under consideration, wished to endorse the sentiments expressed by the representatives of Iraq (802nd meeting) and Syria (805th meeting) concerning the gravity of the tensions in the Middle East and North Africa and concerning the urgent need of effective measures for the reduction and elimination of those tensions in the interests of the peoples of those areas and of world peace.

19. The two agenda items under consideration had not only a relationship of cause and effect, but also one of mutual interaction. The armaments race seemed to be one of the principal causes of the prevailing international tension, which, in turn, seemed to provoke, encourage, accelerate and justify the armaments race. At first sight, it appeared to be a vicious circle. However, closer examination showed that, although mistrust fed the armaments race in the form of cause and effect, the armaments race did not necessarily engender mistrust. The fact that a country armed itself to the teeth did not in itself prove that that country desired war and was girding itself for an attack upon another State. On the contrary, it could mean that that country did not want war, but that it was afraid of being attacked and was arming out of fear. Only when the intention of attack rather than defence was attributed to a State which was arming and when its peaceful desires were questioned did the fact of arming become the cause of mistrust. Then the fact of arming was regarded as a manifestation of possible aggressive design.

20. Consequently, it was not the armaments race itself, but the interpretations attached to it which could engender mistrust. If a country armed for fear of being attacked and could at the same time offer irrefutable proof of its peaceful intentions, then no one could reasonably accuse it of provoking or increasing mistrust in the world. It could be concluded that, if mistrust necessarily engendered the armaments race, the armaments race did not necessarily engender mistrust. It might at most intensify mistrust, provided that such mistrust was already in existence.

21. The first practical inference to be drawn from that conclusion was that the way to call a halt to the armaments race and to achieve disarmament was to seek to solve the problem of mistrust, and to reduce and eliminate the international tensions which weighed so heavily

upon the world. What had to be solved was the problem of conflicts between States, especially those between East and West. Those conflicts were social and ideological as well as political and economic. The United Nations must induce States not only to abandon their illegitimate political, economic and social designs, but also to repudiate any ideology based on internal or external domination, expansion, exploitation and aggression. The world was justified in fearing the effects of such ideologies and in mistrusting their supporters.

22. Indeed, efforts for the solution of outstanding problems and the consequent easing of international tension were continuing ceaselessly within the United Nations, most of the activities of which were either designed to bring that purpose about or were such as to be capable of contributing to it. Similar efforts were made outside the United Nations. One first-rate effort, the broad effects of which could not yet be appraised or foreseen, had been the recent historic Conference of the Heads of Government of the four great Powers at Geneva. That Conference had raised high hopes, which he would describe, not as exaggerated, but rather as rash and impatient. It was not the time now to judge to what extent those hopes were, or might be, capable of fulfilment. Another effort had been the recent conference of the Foreign Ministers of the four great Powers, which appeared to have ended in total failure and thus cast a shadow upon the preceding Conference of the Heads of Government. Nevertheless, the conferences had been praiseworthy efforts, which must be continued with perseverance. Inasmuch as their effects might appear only in the long run, they could not yet be called failures. Nor was it certain that their lack of success was necessarily due to a lack of goodwill, inasmuch as failure could well be caused by circumstances independent of human will. To illustrate the possibility that felicitous effects might have been produced by the Conference of the Heads of Government, one could ask the question: Why not believe that the reduction of armed forces announced by the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries was not, as many hastened to assert, a mere propaganda stratagem, but was the actual result of the impression of sincerity which President Eisenhower had evidently produced on Soviet leaders at Geneva? Regarding the Foreign Ministers Conference, who knew whether better results could not have been attained if it had been scheduled only after more careful preparation by experts or representatives at a lower level than the Foreign Ministers?

23. The effort to relax international tension as a method of discontinuing the arms race by eliminating its cause was necessarily slow and difficult, though one in which to persevere. Other methods must be found to end the armaments race more rapidly, without waiting for the results of the first. That task was all the more necessary since the armaments race held the risk of plunging the world into a new war of unparalleled devastation.

24. The armaments race could bring about a war if either or both of the opposing camps nurtured bellicose intentions. However, even if neither camp wanted war but participated in the armaments race only for defence, such a race could drag both into war notwithstanding the desire of each to avoid it, because the military superiority which was sought as a deterrent to attack itself constituted an almost irresistible temptation to war. On the other hand, the realization that the armaments race would sap the resources and vitality of a

nation indefinitely and to the point of exhaustion might in time give rise to the desire to end an intolerable situation by destroying the side regarded as the cause. An urgent solution of the disarmament problem was therefore necessary if only because of the dangers implicit in the armaments race.

25. The sense of urgency in the quest for a solution should not be confused with precipitate haste. The concrete possibility of a world war, especially since the advent of the atomic era, seemed not so great as some believed or wished to make it appear. With both sides possessed of atomic and hydrogen bombs in sufficient quantities to wreck the maximum mutual havoc and with each side certain that to try to bomb the other meant to be bombed itself, a situation existed not of a nature to lead to war. Another factor working against war was that overwhelming or even substantial superiority could not be assured in nuclear weapons and that numerical superiority in conventional armaments and armed forces could be compensated for by means of alliances, qualitative progress in scientific and technical fields, and other factors. Consequently, it was impossible at present, despite appearances to the contrary, to acquire such assurance of superiority as to give good reason for starting a war.

26. However, if some possible aggressor had convinced himself that neither he nor his adversary would resort to nuclear weapons and even if he had overwhelming superiority in armed forces and conventional armaments, he would be bound to realize that his very superiority would determine his adversary to pin his hopes on the atomic weapon. Therefore, he would hesitate, since even a victorious war would surely be accompanied by total destruction. If the possibilities of war were thus slender, that did not mean that they did not exist.

27. So many unknown elements determined the global power of the opposing camps, so many operative motives worked in the minds of those responsible for the safety of the world, that the slender chances of war could be increased by circumstances. Therefore, urgently but without precipitate haste, it was necessary to seek a solution to the problem of the armaments race.

28. The Disarmament Commission had sought to stop the armaments race, not by eliminating mistrust, but by eliminating military superiority. In order to halt the race, it was necessary to render it impossible for either side to achieve superiority over the other. That could be achieved by setting ceilings on the armed forces and armaments of each side and by adopting necessary and adequate safeguards to prevent each side from exceeding those limits, either overtly or covertly. Since it had been recognized that nuclear weapons presented a common danger for all mankind, those weapons should be destroyed and their production prohibited, even while the necessary and sufficient safeguards for the strict observance of those ends were being adopted. Thus, a harmonious and reliable balance between the military power of each side would be established. Without military superiority or the illusion of military superiority, war was virtually impossible. That, in essence, was the global disarmament plan of the Disarmament Commission. Once completed in detail, the plan was designed to be accepted by all States in the atmosphere of distrust which now prevailed in the world and which was the real framework that conditioned and determined the plan's value and scope. The plan had to be acceptable within the atmosphere of distrust which rendered such a plan necessary.

29. For the acceptance of the plan in the atmosphere of distrust, two objective conditions and one subjective condition had to be fulfilled at the same time. The first objective condition was that the disarmament measures contemplated in the plan should be of such a nature as to ensure a really harmonious balance between the parties. The second objective condition was that the safeguards written into the plan should be adequate to prevent that balance from being upset. The subjective condition was the good faith of the States which had thus far participated in the armaments race. They must be truly peace-loving and have participated in the armaments race from mistrust and fear, and not with aggressive designs. States of goodwill, despite their mistrust, would accept the plan, provided that the balance written into it was genuine and the controls built into it were adequate. However, the State acting in bad faith would reject such a plan precisely because it fulfilled those two conditions, and would accept only a plan which would enable it to break the equilibrium whenever its advantages so dictated, and thus to escape control.

30. The plan in preparation by the United Nations was designed to protect States acting in good faith and not possible aggressors; therefore, the elaboration of measures to ensure harmonious balance and to safeguard its observance had to be carried out with the greatest care and caution. While the Disarmament Commission had focused its attention on nuclear and conventional armaments, the Lebanese delegation believed that other factors might well play a role in increasing or diminishing the aggregate power of a State. Those other factors must likewise be taken into account when the harmonious balance of power was determined. On such factor was that of the system of alliances. Such systems were not stable and were often subject to sudden changes. What happened to the balance of power when such changes occurred? In the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, for instance, the maximum levels of the military effectives of the great Powers had been essentially agreed upon. The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China were to have aggregate power approximately equal to that of the United States, the United Kingdom and France. Although at present such a distribution appeared to be a harmonious one, he wondered whether the equilibrium would not be dangerously disrupted if one of the present allies switched sides. Did not that very contingency cast doubt on the possibility of harmonious balance and equilibrium? He wished some clarification on that point.

31. The Sub-Committee seemed to have given increasing attention to the subject of control and had recently reached the unanimous opinion that control over nuclear weapons was not possible in the present state of science. That revelation, however, had not much changed the factual situation in the Sub-Committee. The Soviet Union continued to call for the prohibition of nuclear weapons prior to the establishment of controls, and the Western Powers continued to reject that demand without pressing for the controls which they regarded as impossible at the moment. The position of the Lebanese delegation on that question was determined by the general framework of distrust within which any disarmament plan was bound to operate at the present juncture. It was absurd to ask States to do something which presupposed confidence when confidence did not exist. That was an elementary contradiction and a dangerous proposal. The mutual fear of nuclear destruction provided a much more reliable safeguard than would the uncon-

trolled prohibition of atomic weapons, which would allow a possible aggressor to build up its nuclear armaments to launch an atomic war.

32. The study of the problem of control of nuclear weapons must be continued. The Government of the United States was prosecuting that study vigorously. The Lebanese delegation, however, endorsed the views of the Norwegian delegation (804th meeting) in suggesting that such action should also be undertaken by the United Nations itself, if only to render the conclusions universally acceptable. Like the Norwegian delegation, his delegation urged the Disarmament Commission to study more closely the control of bacterial weapons.

33. With regard to the control of conventional armaments, in which a number of spheres of action still called for efforts, Mr. Azkoul agreed with the representative of France (804th meeting).

34. In summary, the Commission might continue to examine the general disarmament plan in an effort to reduce existing differences. Secondly, it might undertake a study of those aspects which were technically controllable and which were mutually agreed to lend themselves to control and verification independently of the disarmament plan. Thirdly, it might prepare one or more juridical instruments with regard to those aspects. Finally and above all, it might examine with a view to adoption proposals designed both to prevent surprise attacks and to create more confidence with a view to future steps in the problem of disarmament. Such proposals included the plans of the President of the United States and of the Prime Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France. Those plans could be studied and implemented independently of other plans for disarmament, but could also pave the way for either comprehensive or partial disarmament plans.

35. Turning to the spirit in which the disarmament work was undertaken, Mr. Azkoul noted with regret the hasty interpretation that the rejection of a proposal, or silence in the face of a proposal, was evidence of bad faith on the other side. It was necessary to display tolerance in that respect. Any plan which the United Nations might propose must necessarily rest on the premise that all States now participating in the armaments race were acting in good faith. If the contrary were supposed, any hope for the adoption or implementation of such a plan could be abandoned once and for all. The future would show who was acting in good or bad faith.

36. Regarding the working methods of the Disarmament Commission, Mr. Azkoul thought that the Commission did not have enough time to discuss the Sub-Committee's reports in detail. In the atmosphere of mistrust which prevailed in the Sub-Committee, progress was bound to be slow. If the Disarmament Commission, with its larger membership and less doctrinaire outlook, examined the reports of the Sub-Committee seriously and in detail, it could contribute to the clarification of differences.

37. The Lebanese delegation hoped that, with the new working plan to be assigned to the Disarmament Commission by the four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.150) and with the conciliatory contributions of the members of the Commission, more felicitous and encouraging results on the road to disarmament might emerge.

38. Mr. PALAMARCHUK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) emphasized that the peoples of the world desired peace and wanted to avoid the possibility of nuclear warfare. To them, the problem was to achieve prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. At the ninth session, the General Assembly had concluded (resolution 808 (IX)) that a further effort should be made to reach agreement on comprehensive and co-ordinated proposals providing for a major reduction in armed forces and armaments, total prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, and the establishment of effective international control. To a certain extent, that resolution could be regarded as a political directive to the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee. The purposes envisaged were vital for all nations. The unanimous adoption of the resolution, he noted, had been preceded by lengthy and patient negotiation which had culminated in the five-Power draft resolution.<sup>2</sup>

39. The proposals made by the USSR on 10 May and 21 July 1955 (A/2979, annexes I and II)<sup>3</sup> had helped considerably to improve the atmosphere and the circumstances governing the implementation of that resolution. Being concrete expressions of the peace-loving foreign policy of the USSR, those proposals had been the result, not of a temporary expression of expediency, but of a consistent regard for mutual confidence and peace. They had been aimed at the simple and clear objective of ending the armaments race and relaxing international tension, thereby relieving humanity of the burden of fear.

40. It was generally admitted that the USSR proposals had led to a considerable *rapprochement* among the various members of the Sub-Committee. Thus, there were no longer any differences regarding the ceilings on armed forces and the timing of the prohibition of the atomic weapon, and there was a considerable degree of agreement on control and inspection. The peoples of the world had correctly assessed the peaceful intentions of the USSR. The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom had admitted the comprehensive and progressive scope of the USSR proposals despite the fact that their delegations had attempted to slow down and halt progress in the Sub-Committee. Indeed, after 10 May 1955, the Western Powers, fearing that agreement would be reached, had retreated from positions adopted previously, and in particular from the French-United Kingdom proposals of June 1954. The representative of Canada had (805th meeting) made it clear that the Western Powers now questioned the very possibility of achieving a favourable or affirmative resolution at the present stage. Thus, the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/L.150) focused attention, not on disarmament and control, but on quick action on the plan for exchanging blueprints and for air reconnaissance, the argument being that that plan would end the fear of surprise attack.

41. Study of the proposals of President Eisenhower, however, led to the conclusion that they would not by themselves contribute to security. Once one side had collected information, it could use that information to increase its reserves of material, since there would not yet be in existence an agreement on the prohibition of atomic weapons. It was clear that such information could well be used for aggressive purposes. Moreover,

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Ninth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 20 and 68, document A/C.1/752/Rev.2.

<sup>3</sup> See also DC/71, annexes 15 and 18.



it was contemplated that the plan would be carried out while the armaments race continued and while military groupings, along with networks of bases threatening other States, remained in existence. In that connexion, he quoted from Prime Minister Bulganin's reply to President Eisenhower to the effect that if such plans were adopted in the absence of effective measures to reduce armaments and to prohibit nuclear weapons, the result might be to reduce vigilance against the continuing danger of a breach of the peace resulting from intensification of the armaments race. The inescapable conclusion must be that the Western Powers were not interested in disarmament and in ending the arms race and that their declarations in previous years had far exceeded their actual intentions.

42. Since the Conference of the Heads of Government of the four great Powers, the previous summer, the Western Powers had abandoned General Assembly resolution 808 (IX) establishing a close link between reduction of armaments, the prohibition of atomic weapons, and control. The discussion now centered on the great difficulty of establishing effective control over nuclear materials. But those undoubted difficulties had been noted in the past. The old Atomic Energy Commission had referred to them, and in 1952 the representative of France had emphasized at the 1st meeting of Committee 1 of the Disarmament Commission that the danger involved was increasing rapidly. That statement had escaped the attention of the Sub-Committee at that time. The Western Powers had then said that only the cessation of wars such as that in Korea could permit the reduction of tension. The wars in Korea and Indo-China had ended, but the arms race continued and the danger of war remained. Then, when agreement had become possible on the basis of the USSR proposals, the Western Powers had advanced the pretext of the impossibility of control over stockpiles to refuse to agree to any disarmament. The consequence of such a stand, however, could only be to encourage those who favoured resumption of the "cold war" and an unbridled arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war. It was not difficult to see who was really hypocritical.

43. The prohibition of atomic weapons was provided for in the USSR proposals; indeed, it was regarded as the major and most urgent task. The proposal made by the Western Powers at the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Geneva, on the other hand, involved merely abandoning the use of such weapons in any manner contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and thus involved equating such weapons with conventional weapons. Experience at the end of the Second World War, however, showed that atomic weapons were instruments of mass destruction. They had been so defined in 1947 by the Atomic Energy Commission.<sup>4</sup> The fact that the proposal of the Western Powers equated conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction was evidence of the desire of those Powers to avoid prohibition of atomic weapons and to legalize their use on the same level as other types of weapons. As for the attempt to fit nuclear weapons into the Charter, the latter had already been used in the past as a cover for aggression. Such an attempt contravened the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations, the General Assembly having adopted as early as 1946, resolution 1 (I) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

<sup>4</sup> See *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, Second Year, Special Supplement*, p. 71.

44. The fact that the joint draft resolution contained nothing concerning the prohibition of atomic weapons was not accidental. Paragraph 3 of that draft, under the pretext of continuing the search for means of control, really recommended shelving the problem of disarmament for an indefinite period.

45. Since the Canadian representative had referred (805th meeting) to the USSR position on the unification of Germany and on European security, it was necessary to compare the USSR position with the one adopted by the Western Powers. The latter sought not only to remilitarize Western Germany—a process which was already under way—but Eastern Germany as well, in order to include all of Germany within the North Atlantic bloc, which was directed against the USSR and other countries. The USSR, in contrast, was trying to bring about unification of a peaceful Germany which would not be a threat to anyone, a policy warmly supported by the peoples of Europe, who realized that the rearmament of Germany was incompatible with the cause of peace. It was obvious that the USSR position on the German question was certainly not responsible for the remoteness of the prospects for disarmament.

46. The United Nations should not cease its efforts because there were difficulties in the way of disarmament. It must do everything in its power to prevent an atomic war, including the adoption of such measures as the moral condemnation of the use of atomic weapons. If the great Powers agreed, prior to prohibition, that they would not be the first to use nuclear weapons and if they urged other countries to make similar declarations, that agreement would represent an even more momentous step than the Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare, signed at Geneva in 1925. The objections raised against such an agreement were usually based on doubts about the *bona fides* of all concerned. However, history provided instances in which similar declarations had been successful. Thus, that Protocol had prevented the use of chemical and bacterial weapons during the Second World War. International law and practice to date on the limitation of means of waging war was a fully sufficient foundation for a moral and political proclamation against the use of nuclear weapons, which were the most devastating known to mankind.

47. Much was being said about the "Geneva spirit", but while some sought to strengthen it and maintain it by concrete measures, others were disloyal to it and sought to minimize it so as to return to the notorious policy of "positions of strength". The General Assembly should approve continuation of the "Geneva spirit" of co-operation regardless of the obstacles encountered and should adopt the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.151) concerning measures for the further relaxation of international tension and the development of international co-operation.

48. Mr. RAMADAN (Egypt) said that the Conference of the Heads of Government at Geneva had given rise to many hopes that the world was on the road towards a relaxation of tension. At that Conference, various plans had been advanced for increasing contact and re-establishing confidence between East and West, conditions which were indispensable for future agreement. Unfortunately, the favourable omens had been succeeded by doubt and mistrust. The subsequent Conference of Foreign Ministers, which should have been the starting point for further increase in confidence, had

revealed instead a change of positions on European security and German unification. Similar difficulties had arisen on other problems. Unfortunately, the prophecies of gloom had been borne out. The result had greatly changed the atmosphere for negotiations, and world public opinion was rightly concerned. The seeds of mistrust tended to increase world tension. It had been hoped that the Foreign Ministers would be able to find common ground on disarmament and that the ideas put forward by the Heads of Government in July 1955 would enable them to overcome differences. That hope had been strengthened by the fact that the entire world had in the meanwhile read statements emphasizing the importance of bridging the gap and of strengthening conciliation. The Conference of Foreign Ministers, however, had revealed that mutual mistrust underlay the different points of view, and positions had moved even further apart. The fact that there was no way of guaranteeing effective control had become evident to all and mistrust had coloured all points of view thereafter.

49. Yet all knew that atomic warfare would entail inconceivable calamity. Destruction would extend all over the world and civilization would be annihilated. While scientific knowledge did not permit any accurate estimate of the destruction, radio-activity from nuclear explosions could lead to the slow annihilation of all life. The smaller nations realized that they could not play a major role in that situation and that the decision lay in the hands of the great Powers. The latter were able either to precipitate catastrophe or to convert instruments of terror into instruments of human welfare by using atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. The strength of the nations of lesser size was that theirs was the voice of reason. They had the responsibility of making heard the message of the Asian-African Conference at Bandung with its proclamation of the attempt of humanity to remain alive. There was an element of urgency in the fact that the stockpiles of nuclear weapons were such that peace could be destroyed anywhere in the world. Those stockpiles also represented a very heavy financial drain on the nations concerned. One way of lessening international tension was to consider disarmament from that point of view. No nation could afford an arms race which consumed an ever-increasing proportion of its budget appropriations. Great advantages would accrue to all Powers if those budgets were reduced. Indeed, despite the differences between the great Powers, some progress had been achieved on the question of budgetary reduction as also on the question of the stage at which the prohibition of atomic weapons should become effective.

50. Mr. Ramadan expressed his conviction that the importance of the stakes was such that the great Powers would make serious efforts to achieve constructive results. It was not necessary that agreement should be total and cover all points immediately; it was sufficient to aim at agreement on as much as possible as soon as possible in order that confidence should take root. Should the world be able to channel to peaceful purposes the savings that disarmament would produce, the repercussions would be felt in all areas of life and there could be true progress in international relations as living standards rose throughout the world.

51. The relaxation of tension was the objective of all peace-loving peoples. Egypt was among those whose peace-loving intentions could not be doubted. In that connexion, he wished to dissipate any doubts that might have been raised by allusions to the position in the

Middle East. Egypt, like all sovereign States, had the right of self-defence and had taken certain steps to guarantee its security. It was convinced that those steps would achieve that end and would consequently be a factor for peace and stability in that part of the world.

52. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) found a note of drama in the debate. On the one hand, it was apparent that there had been a drawing together of many points of view. Thus, the Committee was no longer confronted with opposition between an intransigent position favouring unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and a one-third reduction in armaments, and a position based on the Baruch plan for control of atomic energy through an international organ and for balanced reduction of armaments. As had been apparent, for example during the sixth session of the General Assembly in Paris, the great majority had been convinced that there could be no true and real prohibition nor reduction of armaments without control, which in turn was impossible without inspection. That was why the General Assembly had recommended (resolution 502 (VI)) that the Disarmament Commission prepare a draft treaty based on the concept of an inseparable relation between the reduction and regulation of armed forces, the establishment of control, and the prohibition of atomic weapons in a series of stages. In that connexion, he recalled that, in response to Mr. Vyshinsky's emphasis (348th plenary meeting) upon the difficulties raised by the system of stages, he had emphasized (458th meeting) that the whole programme, like any international undertaking, must be carried out as a whole.

53. On the other hand, while a propaganda prohibition had been discarded, it unfortunately remained true that such proposals could have a political rebirth. He was disturbed by such a recurrence in the present debate. Prohibition presupposed precisely that element which was lacking, namely, mutual trust and confidence, which could not be created by decree. Control presented the same difficulty. The establishment of confidence must depend in large measure on the possibility of adequate control by organs with wide powers. In that connexion, he recalled another difficulty, namely, that the attribution of such powers to the control organ had in the past been interpreted by the USSR as a threat to its sovereignty. The USSR had maintained at the sixth session that it could not admit infringements upon its sovereignty. In response, Mr. Belaúnde had stressed the need to define sovereignty, which he viewed as the jurisdiction of the State within the international order. Absolute sovereignty could not be accepted. The sovereignty of the State was sacrosanct precisely because it operated within the framework of law and order. The question arose as to what were to be the limits of sovereignty and what the interests of international order.

54. Another aspect of the discussion at the sixth session had concerned the matter of stages. To meet a situation in which a position of superiority in conventional weapons was coupled with a lack of nuclear superiority, the idea of simultaneity of the institution of control over those two classes of weapon had arisen. That idea has subsequently been expressed in an admirable manner in the French-United Kingdom memorandum in 1954. The memorandum had been accepted by Mr. Vyshinsky as a basis for discussion. That step had been encouraging, but on the question of control, USSR acceptance had been attenuated by its insistence on provisional control, to be exercised by a provisional body, to be followed by a permanent body once the first

stage had been completed. Since the process of reduction, prohibition, control and inspection could not, chronologically speaking, be simultaneous, the Western Powers had rightly pointed out that logic required that the control organ be established first.

55. When the Disarmament Commission had been requested to resume work on the basis of the French-United Kingdom proposal, the ghost of the propaganda prohibition had returned in the shape of a proposal (DC/71, annex 1) by Mr. Gromyko for the unconditional destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear material. That proposal had been made as a separate element, despite the indivisibility of the problem of disarmament. In addition to the situation created by that proposal, there was the fact, admitted by the USSR, of the extreme difficulty of detecting concealed stockpiles. It must be hoped that instruments to detect the existence and location of such stockpiles could be developed. In their absence, the world faced the tragic situation in which control, up to then prevented by legal difficulties, now confronted scientific difficulties as well. There could be no way of ensuring punishment of offenders when there was no way of detecting an offence.

56. Control was the essential element in the problem of disarmament. The difficulties that had arisen with regard to it concerned in the first place the timing of its establishment. Whereas the Western Powers would establish the control organ first, the USSR would leave it until later and would make the control organ of a secondary and provisional nature. All the USSR proposals, even those of 10 May 1955, suffered from the lack of emphasis on the essential element, control, which was always relegated to a secondary position. The second principal point of difficulty was inspection. The United States had proposed (DC/53, annex 4) that the control organ should be given precise powers, which it should be able to exercise immediately without appeal. Effective inspection presupposed the taking of measures, subject to appeal later, since measures suspended until after the appeal had been disposed of nullified the purpose of inspection. Exceptions could not be claimed by one party on grounds of sovereignty. In that connexion, he wondered if the recent *rapprochement* had reached the stage at which the USSR could accept the proposal for inspection, including the right of inspectors to go everywhere and to order remedial measures with immediate effect not subject to suspension.

57. He recalled that he had also pointed out (692nd meeting) that the right of veto in case of violation of the convention in the territory of an ally of a great Power would, under the USSR proposal, apply when the complaint came to the Security Council. He had told Mr. Vyshinsky that there could be no solution so long as recourse to the Security Council was involved. In response (692nd meeting), Mr. Vyshinsky had evaded the point by replying that he could not modify

the Charter. Indeed, the proposal which he had then advanced had unfortunately received very little support. 58. In the face of such difficulties in the matter of control, the United Nations had the right to ask everything of the peoples of the world and of Providence, including the discovery of means of detecting stockpiles and the acceptance of limitations on sovereignty. It must certainly continue to work towards those ends. Meanwhile, the stockpiles increased ominously. The race was one in which gains could be wiped out very rapidly. Little had so far been accomplished in disarmament. The problem constituted a whole; if one aspect presented difficulties, the over-all problem, as the Western Powers said, became itself more difficult. They could not advance without effective control. Mr. Moch had held forth a ray of hope in pointing out at the 47th meeting of the Disarmament Commission the possibility of control on production. Agreement was possible on that point and it was therefore clear that there was no retreat by the Western Powers, but only a change—perhaps the word “reservation” was unfortunate—which was the inevitable consequence of altered circumstances.

59. One of the hopeful elements in the situation had been created by President Eisenhower's momentous proposal for a mutual opening of skies to aerial inspection and for an exchange of blueprints. Recalling the circumstances of that proposal, he paid tribute to President Eisenhower's deep devotion to peace and applauded that gesture, which constituted a milestone in the history of man's progress towards peace and had created the “spirit of Geneva.” That spirit had weakened, but could not be allowed to die. Prime Minister Bulganin had responded to President Eisenhower's proposal with another proposal regarding inspection, which could well complement it. All those proposals might not constitute prohibition or reduction, it was true, but they must aim at the possible rather than the ideal. He could see no justification for tacking on to the Eisenhower proposal the ghost of a prohibition which could not be made subject to effective control.

60. The joint draft resolution (A/C.1/L.150) was optimistic, in that it included both of the plans to which he had referred and would instruct the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee to continue their work. Mr. Belaúnde felt that he had the right, in view of his impartiality as the representative of a small country and of the fact that his criticism had never been bitter, to appeal to the USSR not to insist on amendments incompatible with current realities. In conclusion, Mr. Belaúnde expressed his wholehearted support for the proposals advanced at Geneva by the great Powers and hoped that President Eisenhower's recovery would be paralleled by a recovery in the atmosphere of international relations.

The meeting rose at 6.5 p.m.