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Chairman: Mr. Otto R. BORCH (Denmark).

AGENDA ITEM 41 (continued)

Question of Korea (A/9027, A/9145 and Add.1-5, A/9146, A/C.1/1034, 1038, 1042, 1043, A/C.1/L.644 and Corr.1, 645, 657-661, 664):

- (a) Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
- (b) Creation of favourable conditions to accelerate the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea

1. Mr. KHALID (Pakistan): I should like to begin by expressing the deep satisfaction my delegation feels at the presence in the United Nations for the first time since debates began on the Korean question of a delegation of the Democratic People's Republic and at the fact that that delegation has been able to participate in the debate in this Committee. My delegation has in the past consistently supported draft resolutions in this Committee calling for the participation in these debates of both parts of Korea without any preconditions and I should like to extend to them our very warm welcome.

2. The presence of a North Korean delegation here is the first step by this Organization to move towards a more objective approach to the question of Korea. It is twenty years since the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed.¹ Much has happened in these years that has changed the pattern of relationships among States in that part of the world and in the world at large. The basic purpose of the presence of the involvement of the United Nations in Korea has been to assist in the reunification and rehabilitation of that war-torn country. The fact remains that the Organization has not been able to take any concrete measure to remove the barrier that artificially divides the Korean people along the 38th parallel.

3. The time has come to examine in what fashion the United Nations can contribute to the achievement of the goal which has been its declared purpose in Korea. We must examine whether the form and shape in which the United

Nations is represented in Korea is capable of furthering this purpose. This is not the first time the Committee has debated the Korean item but it is the first time the Committee has had the opportunity to hear representatives of both sides on a question which concerns the future of that country and the well-being of its people. It is apparent that important and fundamental differences exist between them, not on the ultimate aim of reunification but on how it might be achieved. It would be idle to pretend that the gulf can be bridged in the course of our debates here or by skilful draftsmanship. We should like, nevertheless, to concentrate, as many other delegations have done, on those points which are common to the respective positions of the two sides. For our purpose here must be to avert conflict and confrontation and to further the process of conciliation which the two parties themselves have initiated.

4. We are encouraged by the success that has been achieved through the recent series of meetings held between the North and the South under the auspices of the Red Cross. After nearly two decades of stagnant confrontation the two parts of Korea have, in direct talks and in a comparatively short period, reached agreement on the basic principles upon which their future relations will be built. In the South-North Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972² both parts agreed on the three principles upon which national reunification would be based. The principle that reunification should be achieved independently and without reliance upon or interference by outside force provides, in our view, the only basis on which a sovereign, independent and freedom-loving people can solve what are essentially its internal problems. The horrors of war to which the people of Korea were subjected and which devastated both the North and the South are all too fresh in the world's memory. The pledge by both North and South that the reunification of their country should be achieved by peaceful means, without recourse to the use of arms against each other, is to be welcomed because it will relieve the Korean people from the burden of the fruitless military confrontation it has carried for the last two decades and because it contributes to the easing of tensions in Asia and elsewhere.

5. We welcome in particular the formation of the South-North Co-ordinating Committee, charged with the task of solving the problems in the way of Korean reunification. It attests to the seriousness of the resolve lying behind the agreement published in their Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972.

6. The armistice reached in Korea more than 20 years ago must of course be maintained. This is implicit in the

¹ Official Records of the Security Council, Eighth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1953, document S/3079, appendix A.

² Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 27, annex I.

agreement of the two sides to seek reunification through peaceful means. However, an armistice, by definition, is transitory and must give way in due course to a more lasting arrangement. It would be contrary to the interests of the Korean people, incompatible with the declared aim of the United Nations in Korea and inconsistent with the principles of the Charter if protection of the armistice were to become an end in itself and the armistice lines turned into a quasi-frontier dividing brother from brother. The problems in the way of Korean reunification are fundamentally of a political nature. Their solution and the establishment of true and lasting security in Korea can be achieved through the creation of proper political conditions and by using the appropriate political means.

7. The two Korean parties themselves have initiated the process by entering into direct talks, as we know, after reaching an agreement on broad principles. In these circumstances, we must seriously consider whether the continued presence of foreign forces, under whatever flag they might be stationed there, can contribute to the creation of the desired political climate and facilitate progress along the road to settlement.

8. We know, of course, that the forces now stationed in South Korea belong to the United States. It is no secret either that their presence there was not unconnected with the cold war of the 1950s, a cold war which is gradually giving way to more constructive relationships among States. It seems anomalous to us that foreign troops under the United Nations flag should continue to be stationed in South Korea at a time when tensions are easing all over the world and great-Power rivalry is giving way to détente and co-operation. We were pleased to find in the statement made by the representative of the United States a willingness to consider the eventual withdrawal of troops from Korea. We do not believe that this process should be long drawn out and would urge that serious consideration should be given to this matter here and in other appropriate organs of the United Nations. Such a step would be a logical complement to the proposed dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK). On this latter proposal, there is of course no difference of opinion, the Commission itself having proposed dissolution in its current report [A/9027].

9. Pakistan, as the Committee is aware, was an active member of UNCURK until 1967, when it came to the conclusion that the Commission was not capable of assisting in the reunification or rehabilitation of Korea. Last year Pakistan formally withdrew from the Commission, in view of the fact that the two parts of Korea had entered into a direct dialogue for the purpose of resolving their problems and reuniting the country.

10. It is against the same background, namely, the desire of the Korean people for unity and the commitment of the United Nations to that goal, that my delegation views the suggestion that as an interim measure both North and South Korea should become Members of the United Nations. In terms of procedure, this question cannot properly, in the first instance, be considered in the General Assembly.

11. Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Charter provides that admission of new Members to the United Nations has to be "effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council". The correct sequence is, therefore, that consideration by the Security Council precedes consideration by the General Assembly. This interpretation of Article 4, paragraph 2, is reflected in chapter X of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council and chapter XIV of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

12. At the time when these rules were being considered for adoption by the Security Council and the General Assembly, a recommendation was made by the representative of Australia at the Security Council's 41st meeting, on 16 May 1946, when the report of the Committee of Experts relating to rules of admission of new Members was being considered, to place a different interpretation on the provisions of Article 4, paragraph 2, and to formulate a set of rules whereby such questions would be considered by the General Assembly prior to their reference to the Security Council. These recommendations were rejected by the Security Council at its 42nd meeting, on 17 December 1946. It was felt then, and it is true now, that prior reference of questions of admission of new Members to the United Nations by the General Assembly is purposeless, because the Assembly cannot take a decision on such questions without a recommendation from the Security Council.

13. However, there is a more fundamental objection to the idea of admitting two Korean States to the United Nations. This is that such a step would run counter to the deeply felt desire of the Korean people for unity and to the agreement of the two sides to work towards the peaceful achievement of that goal. The role of the General Assembly in this matter should be to encourage both States to move along the road which they themselves have chosen and to refrain from doing anything which might create political, legal or psychological obstacles in the way.

14. My country is situated far from the shores of Korea, but over the years we have developed the most friendly and mutually beneficial relations with the people of Korea in various fields. Despite wars, suffering and division, the Korean people have made economic progress which excites the admiration of all those who have witnessed it. The people of Pakistan respect and admire the courage and determination of the Korean people. They have the greatest regard for their achievements. We see Korea as a major Asian country which artificial division prevents from playing the significant role in world affairs which rightfully belongs to it. It is our hope that the desire of its people to reunite their country will find fulfilment. Pakistan would welcome the end of military confrontation between the two parts of the same nation and the restoration of the fraternal bonds between the Korean people. That is the task to which this Organization must devote its renewed efforts. It is the promotion of this objective that must command all our vigour and have priority above all others.

15. Mr. HOLLAI (Hungary): The Hungarian People's Republic has constantly been one of the sponsors of draft resolutions entitled "Creation of favourable conditions to accelerate the independent and peaceful reunification of

Korea". Together with other firm friends and allies of the Korean people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Hungary has for a long time been striving to ensure that the positive changes in the world are duly reflected also in the discussion of the so-called question of Korea here at the United Nations. We sincerely hope that the debate at this twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly will not cause—as it has so often done in the past—disappointment to the peace-loving peoples of the world.

16. The Hungarian delegation is of the opinion that there exists now every condition for the discussion of the question of Korea to be successful. First of all, for the first time we are discussing the issue in the presence of the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

17. The Government and the people of the Hungarian People's Republic are united by close ties of friendship with the Government and the heroic people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. I wish to take this opportunity also to extend my respectful and comradely greetings to Comrade Li Jong Mok, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and to all members of his delegation. The fact that the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are taking part in the discussion is a great victory for the Korean people, for the socialist countries, and for all other progressive forces of mankind. But that fact is significant also for the United Nations, which without the active participation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would never have been able to fulfil the duties and responsibilities imposed on it in this respect. Of similarly high importance is the fact that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has recently opened its official observer's office at the Headquarters of the United Nations.

18. The effectiveness of our work here can be enhanced also by the essential processes we are witnessing, both in the world situation and in the land of Korea, in relations between the North and the South. Highly valuable and detailed information relevant to this matter was supplied by Deputy Foreign Minister Li Jong Mok in his statement at the 1957th meeting.

19. It is common knowledge that the so-called question of Korea has fallen to the United Nations of today as a dismal inheritance from the bitterest days of the cold-war period. This we should not forget today either, when we can work under conditions that are different in many respects. While, as a result of the peaceful coexistence and co-operation of countries with differing social systems, there is a growing détente in considerable areas of the world, the forces of aggression in other areas have become rather isolated. A victory of the forces of socialism, progress and peace in any part of the world helps the countries and peoples everywhere that are fighting against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. The increased role of the socialist countries has radically changed power relationships and makes it possible for the historic programme of peace to score successes pushing through against the forces of reaction. For peaceful co-operation among countries and peoples generally to prevail, however, it is necessary to remove the remains of the cold war.

20. I have already said that the current debate in the General Assembly can be made fairly effective also by essential changes in Korea. The outstanding results attained by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as it engages in building socialism rightly deserve general attention.

21. Not everyone knows the immense damage caused to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by alien troops under the flag of the United Nations in the period from 1950 through 1953. Cities of the country were destroyed, and its national economy and population suffered immeasurable losses.

22. In spite of this, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea not only liquidated in a very short time the backwardness of the country inherited from the past, but also reconstructed its cities with amazing speed. According to data of *per capita* production, its industry today holds second place in Asia. This work of economic construction and the continuous improvement of the people's well-being can serve as examples to be followed by many developing countries.

23. It is also well known that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea pursues a consistent socialist policy of peace. It is steadily expanding its relations with countries in all corners of the world, and it is an active member of several international organizations. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea deserves credit for its struggle waged for the peaceful and democratic reunification of Korea and for the five-point programme formulated under the guidance of Comrade Kim Il Sung [*ibid.*, para. 19].

24. After the Second World War the road was opened to the independent development of Korea as a sovereign State. The defeat of fascism and colonialism made it possible for the Korean people's dream of many decades to come true—the formation of a united, democratic independent Korea.

25. Unfortunately, this did not come to pass. The promising prospect was not to the liking of the forces of the cold war. What they wanted to impose was not democracy but dictatorship, not social progress but retrograde social conditions, not independence but subjection. The only way to achieve this was to block the unity of Korea by dividing the country. The principle of "divide and rule" this time served as a weapon of the neo-colonialists.

26. Following a notorious recipe of cold-war policy, the United States of America made the United Nations, which at the time was still in the service of the cold-war forces, recognize only the régime of the South.

27. Later it unleashed an armed conflict in which it degraded the United Nations, presenting it as a belligerent party facing the Democratic People's Republic of Korea building a new society. It made Korea a pretext for transforming the United Nations still more into a tool for the enforcement of their foreign policies.

28. In this process the Charter of the United Nations was flagrantly violated. The promoters of the cold war went so far as virtually to invalidate the Charter by having the resolution on "Uniting for Peace" adopted, and it was not

because of their doing that the Organization survived the crisis. They caused immense damage to the United Nations and dangerously impaired thereby the future effectiveness of the world Organization.

29. My delegation does not wish to dig up old grievances when it reminds the General Assembly that the subsequent problems in United Nations peace-keeping activities were to no small extent consequences of the unscrupulous imperialist policy that culminated in the war of aggression against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

30. The task ahead of our Organization today is to try to make amends, in part at least, for the harm done to the interests of the Korean people from 1950 onwards.

31. The United Nations was employed as a tool for intervention in the internal affairs of the Korean people, as a tool for foreign military occupation. It is obvious that this role was at that time—as it is today—contrary to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the Organization.

32. Therefore the most essential task of the United Nations today is to put an end to foreign intervention in the affairs of Korea. By doing so, it will not only heighten its own authority and return to the letter and the spirit of the Charter, but also help the Korean people terminate the arbitrary division of their country. The history of the past 25 years has proved beyond all question that, the tool of division being foreign intervention, only the termination of that intervention can guarantee the reunification of Korea and its peaceful, democratic development.

33. To the question whether the people of Korea are capable of independent development, the answer of the United Nations can only be yes. This is an answer which, as is true of the question, the world Organization cannot evade.

34. Similarly, it has to have the question of what lies behind the manoeuvres aimed at the admission of two Koreas to membership in the United Nations. Many here can still recall how desperately the South Korean régime and its supporters opposed even the idea of representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea attending the debates here of direct concern to their country. It may be much to their surprise that the same quarters are now pressing for the admission of the two parts of Korea.

35. In the meantime, as is well known, talks have begun between the North and the South about reunification of the country and have resulted in an important agreement on the principles for reunification. And it is just at this juncture that a proposal is made for the admission of both Korean parties as Members. I wonder why.

36. It is hardly necessary to point out that the motive behind the proposal is an endeavour to delay thereby the inevitable result of the efforts at unification. That is the reason the true friends of Korea are opposed to the proposal, which essentially is meant to perpetuate the division of Korea.

37. Of course, the ship of intervention is sinking, and that is not a local phenomenon of Korea; it is a universal trend.

38. The so-called United Nations Command is no exception either. The Security Council of the United Nations has never appointed a commander and has never received any substantive report from such a commander. Nobody in this room really knows what units those so-called United Nations Forces consist of, where they are stationed, who finances them, what are their expenses and so on and so forth. Consequently, the termination of this outrageous situation would significantly heighten the prestige of the United Nations and would rid it of the far from honourable role imposed upon it by the forces of the cold war.

39. My delegation does not wish to deal in detail with the arguments which the supporters of foreign intervention have brought forth in favour of the continued maintenance of the so-called United Nations Command and the use of the United Nations flag. Those arguments do not invite serious debate. They are like those the same countries have employed for a decade to oppose the participation of the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the relevant debates of the First Committee. They are no better than those used for years against the dissolution of UNCURK by those who today are compelled to propose its dissolution. They have already been answered by the representative of Algeria [1957th meeting].

40. We wish to make only one remark: does the South Korean régime really believe that its authority is heightened by its stubborn insistence on a certain foreign military presence in its country?

41. Permit me to take this opportunity to point out that the harmful and illegal activity of UNCURK not only did political harm but involved a serious financial burden for our Organization, as has been stressed by several speakers in this debate. We cannot, however, leave it unsaid that the budget of our Organization is today still taxed by illegal and unjustified expenditures of this kind. The Hungarian delegation wishes also to emphasize here its reservations concerning the practice of including the maintenance costs of the so-called United Nations Memorial Cemetery in the regular budget of the Organization. This state of affairs should be changed as promptly as possible.

42. It is no secret that in the past two years—namely, since the Korean dialogue between the North and the South on the possibilities of reunification began—two diametrically opposed views have also been conflicting here in the debates of the United Nations concerning the tasks and duties of the world Organization. Put in clear and explicit terms, they can be formulated as follows. The first view, which is also firmly supported by the Hungarian delegation, urges the United Nations collectively and Member States individually to do everything they can to ameliorate the conditions in Korea, to liquidate the remnants of the cold war, to terminate the so-called United Nations presence there. Contrary to that, the other view argues that the United Nations should do practically nothing, or only very little, because any decision or action on our part might supposedly upset the situation, the relation of forces prevailing in Korea.

43. Everyone knows that more than 28 years have passed since the forcible division of Korea. Two decades have passed even since the conclusion of the armistice between

the North and the South. It is also common knowledge that not one foreign soldier is stationed in the northern part of the country, in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

44. The Hungarian delegation is firmly convinced that the best judge to decide the future of Korea and the means for its peaceful development is the Korean people. Neither under the auspices of the United Nations nor by any other kind of foreign intervention is it permitted to disturb the dialogue between the North and the South, the peaceful independent development of Korea. All those who are really friends of Korea should help the Korean people live without foreign patronage and build their beautiful country for themselves in peace.

45. In concluding, I would give a personal impression concerning Korea. When visiting Panmunjom last spring, I saw a tree that had grown right on the tracks of a railway because there had been no traffic between the North and the South during the past decades. To me that appeared to be a symbol of the unnatural state of affairs, a paradoxical symbol of the unnatural represented by the natural growth of vegetation. During these past decades a new generation has grown up and a lot has changed in the world. But that tree is still there, manifesting the total separation of the two parts of one nation, one people. We should see to it that that separation is ended and that the unnatural growth of obstacles in the way of reunification disappears. That is what is expected of the United Nations, and no less.

46. Mr. SMIRNOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translation from Russian*): First of all we should like to express our satisfaction at the fact that for the first time representatives of the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are taking part in the discussion of the Korean question in the General Assembly of the United Nations. Because of the discriminatory attitude of certain countries, for twenty-six years that country had been denied the right to take part in the discussion in the United Nations of questions directly affecting its vital interests. For the first time in the whole history of the discussion in the United Nations of questions relating to Korea, we have heard the voices of those who represent the real interests of the Korean people. We view this as a triumph of reason and as evidence of the positive changes that have been occurring in the world and in the United Nations. The invitation to the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea indicates the position taken by the socialist countries and many other peace-loving countries which from the very beginning of the discussion of the Korean problem in the United Nations have supported the interest of the Korean people.

47. Twenty-eight years have passed since South Korea was forcibly detached from the North as a result of United States intervention, and twenty years have elapsed since establishment of the armistice. However, the reunification of Korea has not yet come about.

48. Who is to blame for that? The answer to that question has been most cogently given in the memorandum of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea entitled "Creation of favourable conditions to accelerate the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea" contained in document A/C.1/1034 dated 10 October 1973.

49. United States troops have impeded the reunification of Korea, have occupied liberated southern Korea and illegally implanted there a military administration and unilaterally annulled international agreements on Korea, thrown together a separate régime in Korea and, under the illegal cover of the United Nations flag, provoked aggressive war in Korea. Foreign intervention has impeded and continues to impede the peaceful, independent reunification of the country.

50. A number of countries, in spite of the obvious futility of their position, continue to put obstacles in the way of the unification of Korea by means of making proposals, such as those contained in draft resolution A/C.1/L.645 and other similar proposals.

51. All this is done in spite of the clear and repeatedly expressed will of the Korean people that it is necessary to accelerate an independent, peaceful reunification of Korea.

52. In the memorandum of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, we find the following statement: "The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the political parties and social organizations in the northern half have advanced proposals for peaceful reunification on as many as over 130 occasions since liberation up to date."

53. Finally, we have the joint view of North and South Korea. On 4 July 1972 the North and South of Korea agreed in a Joint Communiqué with the following principles for national reunification. The unification of the country shall be achieved through independent Korean efforts without being subject to external imposition or interference; unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, and not through the use of force against each other; a great national unity shall be sought above all.

54. Now we must enable the Korean people itself to resolve its own destiny.

55. In order to improve relations between North and South Korea and to accelerate the peaceful reunification of the country, we should above all support the initiative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which consists of five points and was contained in the statement of President Kim Il Sung of 23 June 1973.

56. That initiative from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea takes into account the facts of the situation in the Korean peninsula and proceeds from the belief that the cause of the unification of Korea, even though it is a very arduous cause, is something which is entirely feasible if only the conditions for it are created and the obstacles to it are eliminated.

57. A contribution should be made by the United Nations also to implement these proposals and to the cause of easing tension in this area and to create conditions for the speedy, independent, peaceful unification of Korea. A good basis for this, in the view of the Byelorussian SSR delegation is to be found in the proposals contained in the draft resolution sponsored by 35 States in document A/C.1/L.644 and Corr.1. Among the concrete measures proposed is the dissolving of the United Nations Com-

mission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. This organ was imposed upon the United Nations in order to protect not the interests of the United Nations or the Korean people but the interests of imperialist circles. Accordingly, from the moment it was founded the Commission has not complied with its terms of reference because its activities were not designed to attain the unification and rehabilitation of Korea or its reunification, but on the contrary was designed to defend the occupation of South Korea by foreign troops and to perpetuate the division of the country.

58. The unvarying reports of the Commission have been used to discredit the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, its régime, its achievements and its success in the building of a new society based upon genuinely democratic principles in the interests of the whole Korean people. At the same time, those reports concealed the facts of the militarization of the economy and the rampaging terror which was designed to crush all opponents of the régime and supporters of the unification of the country. Freedom in South Korea was trampled underfoot by the foreign military boot and democracy was crushed by the military police régime. In fact we need not have said anything at all about this Commission had it not been for its report with its old habit of ignoring the facts and lavishing fulsome praise on the bankrupt régime.

59. In this way the Commission did nothing and is doing nothing to promote the achievement of the unification of Korea but is, on the contrary, being used as a tool in the flagrant, totally unjustified intervention in the internal affairs of the Korean people and is doing everything it can to hinder the resolution of the problem of the unification of the country and has justified the occupation by foreign troops of the South of Korea. Therefore, it is quite obvious that it needs to be dissolved, but it should not dissolve itself.

60. The fact that the Commission is useless and a failure is confirmed even in the draft resolution of its active supporters. Therefore, it would seem to be the correct approach not to consider the report of the Commission as a document of the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly. Normally, just before people die they repent of their sins. The Commission, however, is going on its way to hell unrepentant and confirming in its report its former sins.

61. In connexion with the forthcoming elimination of the Commission, the question arises: why was a decision of this kind not taken 20 years ago when the socialist countries proposed it? After all, the Commission has not changed since that time. So if such a decision is correct now it would have been correct 20 years ago.

62. And there is another fact that should be added: it is that this unnecessary and even harmful Commission, throughout the period of its existence, has had spent on it out of the United Nations budget about \$5 million—not to mention the other expenditures totalling millions of dollars, which were the result of the foreign intervention imposed upon the United Nations, the intervention in the affairs of the Korean people under the United Nations flag.

63. However, the proposal of the socialist countries to dissolve the Commission was not adopted at the right time. That was the result of the shortsightedness of the imperialist States.

64. Of course, it is very difficult to expect them to do anything else, but this example once again confirms the truth that the position of the socialist States on international questions is in keeping with the requirements of the day and the future, while the position of the imperialist countries is one that defends what is outmoded, outdated, what is past, reactionary and everything that puts a brake on the progress of mankind.

65. There are more than sufficient examples of this. The imperialist States for more than 20 years failed to recognize and discriminated against the German Democratic Republic; for many years they opposed the dissolution of the so-called Commission for the Peaceful Unification of Korea; they were against the creation of the office of the Permanent Observer of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the invitation to the delegation of that country to attend the United Nations for the discussion of the Korean question. And that list could be extended. How much better it would have been for mankind if all these and other questions had been resolved in the proper way at the right time, that is 20 years or more ago, as was proposed by the socialist countries.

66. As to the use of the United Nations flag by foreign troops stationed in South Korea, and also the United Nations Command, it is quite obvious that the longer foreign intervention continues in this area, the worse it will be for the Korean people and the world community at large. That is why the 35 States that are sponsoring the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.644 and Corr.1, including the Byelorussian SSR, have proposed the annulment of the right of the foreign troops stationed in South Korea to use the United Nations flag, the dissolution of the "United Nations Command" and the withdrawal of all foreign troops stationed in South Korea so that further steps can be taken for accelerating the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea.

67. That is the only correct way to solve the problem. At the present time there is no basis whatsoever for the presence of foreign troops in South Korea. The occupation of South Korea by foreign troops was from the very beginning illegal and a flagrant violation of the Armistice Agreement on Korea which provided for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and is in contravention of the principles of the United Nations.

68. The Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, Mr. Scali, speaking here at the 1959th meeting, attempted to justify the presence of American troops in South Korea. The following is what the military specialists of the United States say about this. I quote from *The New York Times* of 16 November, precisely one day after Mr. Scali spoke, where it was reported from Seoul that "Senior American military officers have conceded that there is no sound military reason for maintaining the American contingent." Apart from American forces there are also others which have an interest in the preservation of American troops in the Korean peninsula.

69. The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has repeatedly declared—and did so once again here in its statement at the 1957th meeting—that it had no intention of invading the South and, indeed, there have been no military actions between the North and the South since the armistice—if we leave aside the violations of the armistice by United States troops and by South Korea. As is well known, the two sides have solemnly proclaimed in their own country and in the Joint South-North Communiqué, with other States as witnesses, that they would never use armed force against each other. In these circumstances, therefore, any pretext for perpetuating the presence of foreign troops in South Korea is totally without foundation.
70. There are no foreign troops whatsoever on the territory of the northern part of the Republic and the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has urged a reduction in the strength of the armed forces of the North and the South to 100,000 men.
71. Certain speakers here, particularly the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.645, have attempted to justify the presence of foreign troops in South Korea by various means of juridical juggling in referring to resolutions of the United Nations. But every straight-thinking person can see that the so-called United Nations troops in South Korea, from the very beginning of their operations, had nothing whatsoever to do with the United Nations.
72. Neither Kurt Waldheim, as Secretary-General of the United Nations, nor his predecessors have ever given any instructions to the so-called United Nations troops in South Korea. Can anyone here name a single order given to those troops by the Security Council over the course of 20 years? No one can. In actual fact, those troops which have occupied South Korea get their orders not from the Security Council but from the war ministry of a foreign State.
73. The United Nations must immediately take a decision to put an end to such injustice and thus create the conditions for the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea.
74. The Byelorussian SSR delegation, like many other delegations, firmly opposes the admission of two Koreas into the United Nations, since that would be only one more imperialist action out of the arsenal of dirty tricks connected with Korea.
75. The Deputy Foreign Minister of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Comrade Li Jong Mok, has adduced numerous cogent facts and arguments exposing the machinations in respect of the admission to the United Nations of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and South Korea.
76. For the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR, the proposal for admission of two Koreas to the United Nations is unacceptable and it rejects this proposal, which impedes the reunification of Korea and perpetuates its division.
77. That is why the draft resolution on the Korean question [A/C.1/644 and Corr.1] submitted by Algeria on behalf of 35 peace-loving countries is entirely in keeping with the interests of the Korean people and of peace in Asia and throughout the world. That draft resolution is entirely convergent with the resolution of the fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held in Algiers last September, which supported the just struggle of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the whole Korean people for the reunification of the country on an independent, peaceful basis, without any foreign intervention, called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops stationed in South Korea and the cessation of foreign intervention in any form in the internal affairs of Korea, and stated that the admission of Korea to the United Nations could be achieved only in the name of a single State, after the complete reunification of the country or after the establishment of a confederation of North and South.
78. The decision of the Conference of non-aligned countries has once again underlined the just nature of the struggle which has been waged for so many years by the socialist and other peace-loving countries in the international arena for the acceleration of the peaceful reunification of Korea.
79. The struggle of the Korean people for the independent and peaceful reunification of the country is a part of the over-all struggle of the peoples of the world against imperialism, neo-colonialism and racism and for national liberation, independent development and the struggle for peace in Asia and throughout the world, which enjoys the whole-hearted support and approval of the peace-loving peoples of our planet.
80. The peoples of the whole world share the aspirations of the Korean people, and the ranks of those who support and are sympathetic to the just cause of the Korean people are growing from day to day.
81. The people of the Byelorussian SSR, like all the peoples of the other socialist and peace-loving States, warmly support the just struggle of the Korean people for the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea and for the peaceful democratic reunification of their country. We believe that, relying on the fraternal solidarity of the socialist countries and progressive world public opinion, the Korean people will be able to carry out this important national task.
82. The CHAIRMAN: Before calling on the next speaker I wish to inform the Committee that the delegations of Ghana and Lebanon have become sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.661.
83. Mr. JAMIESON (United Kingdom): The question of Korea has not been discussed by this Committee since 1970. Despite that fact, or perhaps even because of it, progress has been made in the meantime in normalizing the situation in the Korean peninsula. The first step was the institution, at the suggestion of the Republic of Korea, of meetings between the Red Cross Societies of South and North Korea. Those meetings were followed by the issue, in July 1972, of the South-North Joint Communiqué, announcing the agreement of both sides to seek the reunification of Korea by independent and peaceful means and to

carry out exchanges in many fields in order to foster an atmosphere of mutual trust between the South and the North. A further step was the admission of North Korea to the World Health Organization and other international organizations this year and the establishment of permanent observer missions in Geneva and here in New York. I join with the many previous speakers who have welcomed those steps and, indeed, in welcoming the presence among us in this Committee of representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

84. That is the background against which we have resumed our discussion of the Korean question.

85. This has never been a debate in which polemics would be appropriate. On the contrary, as with all matters which are raised in the United Nations, it is right, we believe, to concentrate and build upon that which unites us, that on which we are in agreement. I think we are agreed on two basic points. First, we are agreed that, however justified as a temporary expedient during the last stages of the Second World War and immediately thereafter, the division of Korea at the 38th Parallel was and is an artificial division. Secondly, we are agreed in all hoping for the peaceful reunification of Korea by the efforts of the Korean people themselves, the people of both parts of Korea. However, between the agreed historical fact and the agreed future aspiration there is somewhat of a gap, and it is in this area, I believe, that there is some danger of over-simplification.

86. That is the spirit in which my delegation approaches this debate.

87. I think that the oversimplification begins with views expressed on the origins of the Korean problem. I had wondered whether I should say something this morning to counter some of the statements on this aspect made by some of those who spoke before me in this debate. I came to the conclusion, however, that to do so, to follow them in reverting to the past, would involve the danger of raking over the coals of old controversies. In any case I do not think that any of us, and least of all the people of Korea and the cause of Korean unification, have anything to gain from arguing about what took place well over 20 years ago, because it is to the future that we must look. Suffice it to say that my delegation cannot accept the version of past events which has been expounded by some previous speakers.

88. Let us, therefore, turn to the future. Here the first main point I want to make is that it is an oversimplification not to accept that it is a fact, a regrettable fact but nevertheless a fact, that at present there are two distinct political entities in the Korean peninsula, as indeed the presence of two very different Korean delegations here amongst us evidences. That does not mean that the present situation of two distinct political entities is immutable: far from it. But politics is the art of the possible, and policies of change must start from the existing facts of life. There are at present two political entities, and in promoting the reunification of Korea—our agreed goal—we, the Members of the United Nations, would be doing ourselves and the people of Korea a disservice if we did not recognize that fact. It is therefore an oversimplification to say that the Korean problem is purely an internal matter. We also do

ourselves and the people of Korea a disservice if we do not recognize that peaceful reunification cannot come about unless at all stages in the process towards it there is stability in the peninsula, stability between the two parts of Korea. The maintenance of stability is not—and I must stress this—synonymous with the maintenance of the *status quo*. It is on the contrary an essential precondition for bringing about peaceful change—and I stress both words, “peaceful” and “change”.

89. It is in that context that I should like to touch, very briefly, upon the question of Korean membership of the United Nations. I must confess that I cannot quite understand the position of the North Korean Government and its supporters on this question. The separate membership of international organizations, the separate representation in observer missions, are in themselves recognition of the fact that there are at present two political entities in the peninsula. As I have said, we welcome these steps and, clearly, it is accepted by all concerned that they in no way freeze the division of Korea. Particularly when such steps have already been taken, I cannot for the life of me see why simultaneous membership of the United Nations itself by two parts of what is recognized to be a divided country in any way precludes that country's reunification. This may, perhaps, be an academic matter. It is not a matter which the General Assembly can decide—and, incidentally, the draft resolution [A/C.1/L.645] which my delegation has co-sponsored does not attempt to have it do so—but I have touched upon it mainly as an illustration of my theme that the starting point for efforts by the United Nations to create favourable conditions to accelerate the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea must be the fact that at present there are two distinct political entities.

90. In those circumstances, what is the proper role for the United Nations? I think we can start by saying what it is not. It is certainly not to take sides on the merits of the Governments of the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or on the merits of the proposals for reunification put forward by the two sides. That would indeed constitute interference in matters which are properly the concern of the two parts of Korea and interference in the process of reunification—and I thought it had been accepted that such interference was not admissible. Here I think there has been, perhaps, some inconsistency. One speaker at the beginning of the debate said in one breath that there must be no interference in the affairs of Korea, and went on to say in almost the next breath that the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which controls a population of some 17 million inhabitants, was the authentic voice of the Korean people as a whole, numbering over 50 million. Other speakers have lauded the five-point programme for reunification which was put forward by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. That is their prerogative. Others, my delegation amongst them, see very great merit in the position adopted by the Government of the Republic of Korea. But it is not for the United Nations to pronounce on these matters. What we can pronounce on, by welcoming, is when the two parts of Korea are in agreement, as in the case of the South-North Joint Communiqué of 4 July 1972.

91. It is in this same spirit of leaving the modalities of reunification to the Koreans themselves that my delegation

accepts the recommendation in the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea that the Commission should be dissolved. That is not because the Commission was a useless one. Indeed, I should like to place on record our deep appreciation of the services which it has performed over the years. But it remains true that, for reasons into which I shall not go, the potential value of the Commission was not fully exploited; and in any case the need for it has now been replaced by the opening of the South-North dialogue.

92. Nevertheless, the United Nations has an important continuing role in the creation of conditions favourable to the peaceful reunification of Korea, and it has a continuing responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in the Korean peninsula. The essential role of the United Nations is to avoid and prevent action which could disturb the still precarious stability between the two parts of Korea. It is here that the Armistice Agreement of 1953 remains so important, because it is this agreement which is the corner-stone of stability. It is essential to preserve the Armistice Agreement and the practical arrangements made under it for its continued observance and enforcement.

93. It is against that background that we have to consider the question of the United Nations Command. Let me say first of all, however, that any call for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Republic of Korea, as in operative paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.644 and Corr.1, reveals an inconsistency. Any Government has the right to invite foreign troops to be stationed on its territory, and I doubt whether there are many Members of this Organization which have not at some stage in their history exercised that right. Such a call for withdrawal would therefore be indeed the type of interference which I thought we had all agreed should be avoided.

94. The use of the United Nations flag and the continuance in being of the United Nations Command is, however, a separate matter. I can quite understand that, without prejudice to the legality of the setting up of the United Nations Command, of which my delegation has no doubts whatsoever, the Members of the United Nations who were not Members at the time may feel that it is a matter which should be reviewed. But there are two things to point out here. The first is that this is a matter for decision by the Security Council rather than the General Assembly, since the United Nations Command was established by a resolution of the Security Council. Secondly, it is the United Nations Command which was a signatory of the Armistice Agreement, the continued observance of which, as I have pointed out, is essential. My delegation is willing that the Security Council should in due course examine this matter if that is the general wish. Paragraph 4 of the draft resolution of which we are one of the sponsors provides for that. However, we are concerned to see to it that if the United Nations Command is abolished—before, that is to say, we accept the disappearance of the signatory on one side of what was in origin a military agreement between military commanders—adequate arrangements are made for the continued observance of the Armistice Agreement and the continuation in force of the machinery set up under it.

95. Before I conclude, I should like to say a few more words about peaceful change in conditions of stability, because that, it seems to me, is the nub of the matter in so far as the peaceful reunification of Korea is concerned. We have heard a good deal in this debate about *détente*, something that we all welcome. But *détente* and the lessening of tension is not just a matter of declarations or communiqués. We have seen in the European context that much patient negotiation is needed. In the European context too, and with particular reference to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, we see clearly that what is needed to bring about real *détente* is a series of confidence-building measures. We have seen also—and I think that this has been generally accepted in the Vienna talks on the reduction of forces—that at all stages in the process all concerned must feel assured of the same security as they had at the outset of the process. In the French language the word *tension* is used also for blood pressure. Well, you can of course reduce your blood pressure, reduce tension, by cutting your own throat. But that is not the sort of *détente* that any of us is talking about. These considerations apply equally to the process of the reunification of Korea. It is not enough to say that *détente*, the lessening of tension, is something which has already been achieved. It has to be proved by much hard work. We believe that the will to progress to peaceful reunification of Korea in conditions of *détente* is present on both sides. It is in that spirit that we the United Nations, while mindful of our responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, should welcome the contacts between the two parts of the too-long divided country in the discharge of their responsibility for seeking its reunification.

96. It was with these considerations in mind, and in this spirit, that my delegation co-sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/L.645, a draft resolution which was itself intended as a non-controversial one capable of adoption by general agreement. However, certain other proposals and ideas with the same purpose of arriving at general agreement have begun to emerge. My delegation finds these very interesting, and we hope that in one way or another we shall be able to arrive at a conclusion which really does—to quote my own words from earlier in this statement—“concentrate on that which unites us” and avoids contention and controversy.

97. The CHAIRMAN: The representative of Saudi Arabia wishes to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/L.664 and I call on him.

98. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): Like many of the representatives around this table, I learned yesterday that our dear colleague, Ambassador Scali, had to undergo open-heart surgery in Phoenix, Arizona. I am sure that all of us wish him a speedy recovery and hope that he will return to the United Nations as hale and hearty as ever.

99. Thank you, Sir, for giving me the opportunity to present draft A/C.1/L.664. There is nothing new in the substance of that draft resolution as it consists of the amendments that I had submitted a few days ago to apply to the Algerian and the Australian draft resolutions on the Korean question. Why, then, did I submit a draft resolution? Some might say that I cemented those draft amendments because they no longer obtained. In a way, it is true.

100. My delegation was not consulted with regard to private talks between the sponsors of the Algerian and the Australian draft resolutions. Far be it from me to consider this action as a slight; on the other hand, I think it would have been more appropriate to take those of us who had submitted draft resolutions into confidence because these amendments of mine applied to the draft resolutions that I have just mentioned.

101. But it is not for that reason that I transformed the amendments into a draft resolution of Saudi Arabia; it is because I have witnessed what has happened since 1950 in the Korean question and I wanted to put the whole imbroglio—if I may call it so—in its own perspective and to point to the *raison d'être* of that imbroglio, lest we forget the genesis and start from another false foundation which will not benefit the Korean people and the so-called two States of Korea.

102. I listened very carefully to what was said by Mr. Jamieson, the representative of the United Kingdom. He reminded us of an old saying—that politics is the art of the possible. This saying, in certain situations, should be amended, and it should be taken into account that politics is not a supernatural force, but is of man's doing. In the latter part of the twentieth century the saying should be that politics should pave the way to achieve what may be "probable" instead of "possible". When there is good will and mutual trust between the Powers—and more so between the super-Powers—then I am sure everything becomes possible. Politics is not an earthquake over which we have no control. As human beings, we can have control of our actions.

103. Twenty-three years have elapsed since the war broke out in Korea, and 20 years since the Armistice Agreement came into effect. And it took some of us—I am talking of myself now—many years after 1953 to find that there was a tacit agreement between the major Powers to maintain the *status quo*. And now we find that, after consultations with the delegations of North Korea and South Korea, an understanding was reached between the two delegations and also between the sponsors of both of the major draft resolutions before us. I believe that it is laudable to bring about an understanding between North Korea and South Korea and to prod them to continue negotiations in the hope that they will end by reunifying their country.

104. But there is no assurance that the difficulties will be removed, although we all hope that the two sides will come to an understanding. This is why I thought that the delegations of North Korea and South Korea present here should be concerned with the genesis of the problem. Many of them are young. Many of them may have forgotten the genesis of their own problem, and this explains the preambular paragraphs of the draft resolution which I am now submitting. I request representatives to bear with me, and if anyone around this table challenges what I say I hope that I shall be corrected if I am wrong. I shall welcome correction if I am wrong.

105. The first preambular paragraph reads:

"Noting that the artificial separation of the Korean people at the 38th parallel was the outcome of political

arrangements agreed upon by the major Powers to serve extraneous, strategic and ideological interests, regardless of the common will or widespread consent of the Korean people to such arrangements".

Who can refute the letter and the substance of that preambular paragraph?

106. The second preambular paragraph reads:

"Regretting that the separation of the Korean people at the 38th parallel was tantamount to arbitrary partition of the Korean peninsula into North and South zones, notwithstanding the fact that ethnologically, culturally and linguistically the people of both zones constitute a single national entity".

Who can refute that preambular paragraph?

107. I have explained those two paragraphs before, but my explanations bear repetition in order to remind our friends from North Korea and South Korea that the partition was not the making of their own people, regardless of whether they live in the southern part of the peninsula or the northern part. Who can refute those two preambular paragraphs?

108. Now I come to the operative paragraphs. Paragraph 1

"Calls upon all Powers, and especially the major Powers, to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of Korea and to undertake to respect the sovereignty of the Korean people as a whole".

109. Some of those major Powers have now become lesser Powers—I do not have to name them. There is nothing wrong in being a lesser Power. Two of them have become super-Powers. My good friend, Mr. Jamieson, should have addressed those super-Powers, asking them to put an end to their strategic interests in the Korean peninsula, and perhaps their ideological interests too, I do not know—ideology is fading out of the picture now; the communists trade with the capitalists and they send deputations. So it is their strategic interests.

110. Well, I see him standing there, my good friend Mr. Jamieson. I thought the United Kingdom had disengaged itself from its Empire. Mr. Jamieson, who is very eloquent and persuasive, says—as the Americans say—that everything is now quiet since both delegations have been brought together; he forgets that under the United Nations flag there are still 30,000 or 40,000 troops—I do not know the exact figure, but it is a substantial number of troops—and the majority of them are American troops. Why do they not hoist the American flag, so that the fiction that they are United Nations troops may be dissipated? They are American troops—with perhaps a few exceptions. Therefore I consider this the acme of hypocrisy. They are American nationals. This was especially true in 1950, when only 16 of the 52 Member States of the United Nations were marshalled—or shall I say conscripted—to wage war in Korea. That was an American war under the banner of the United Nations. And now, although we number 135 States, the United Nations flag still waves over those American troops. Whom do you think you are fooling? Why not call a spade

a spade, saying: We the United States have interests in Korea; and we succeeded, when we emerged from the Second World War as a strong country, in bringing with us 15 other States to be engaged in the Korean war. Let us put things into their proper perspective.

111. I feel sorry for my good friend, Mr. Jamieson. No, not because he is whispering to someone. I feel sorry for you, my good friend, because sometimes you use platitudes, even though you are a very capable gentleman. I have known you for many years. I am sure I could learn a lot from you. But I am not British. I do sometimes use those platitudes, those slogans—"Politics is the art of the possible"—but you know how to use them better than I. I cannot use them as skilfully.

112. I feel sorry for Mr. Jamieson because he has to talk for the United States. The United States keeps silent; the one who is telling us about all this is the United Kingdom, not the United States.

113. We in the United Nations cannot go on hiding the fire under a bush, because the bush catches fire. And I am telling you the purpose of this question of Korea was to serve, at least in the South, the strategic interests of the United States and its allies. In the North, our friends the Russians have strategic interests. This was the agreement between the great Mr. Stalin, on the one hand, and Mr. Truman, on the other. And this explains my preambular paragraphs.

114. Who are those Korean people? "They are Asians, they are yellow. We the white race are supreme". When something happens here in the host country without the consent of the white people, good God! —there will be a revolution. But why did not the United States treat the Korean people as it treats its own people, by finding out what they want? You partitioned them just because you are white and the whites, for the last two or three hundred years, have been exercising their supremacy over Asia and Africa. Those days are done with, however, and, as I said, I have put things in their proper perspective.

115. What assurance do we have that those strategic interests will be cast aside and that you major Powers will not continue to interfere in the affairs of the Korean people? What assurance do we have? Just because you say, "Let those two parties, the North and the South, continue negotiating", what assurance do we have that you will forgo your strategic interests in the area? We have no assurance from you. Why do you not declare that you will withdraw the troops from South Korea? And in the North, Russia and China should also leave the Korean people alone; let them deal with and work out their problems and find solutions to them.

116. We have no assurance from you, only your platitudes. You meet in caucuses and come here and face us with a fait accompli. Consensus? Right, consensus is laudable, provided it is not a very low common denominator to see to it that your interests are perpetuated.

117. And then your strategic interests are reaffirmed by some secret agreement—or, rather, agreements, because you three major Powers have differences among yourselves.

118. What assurance do we have? Why do you not come out and make a declaration of that sort, that all of us will not interfere in the internal affairs of Korea? You do not do that. You give us plausible arguments. Sometimes those arguments beguile some of us, but many of us are not beguiled by them.

119. So I think paragraph 2 is in keeping with what the North and South Koreans will one day put into practice, as we hope. It reads:

"Expresses the hope that, in the spirit of universality, the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will resume constructive negotiations with a view to reunification by merger"—that would be the ideal form of reunification—"confederation . . ."

and so that it may not appear that we are dictating to them the type of reunification, I have said also "or any other instrumentality they deem fit". There may be other ways and means of reunification. What is wrong with that formula? Does it conflict with the consensus I hear has been worked out between the sponsors of the two major draft resolutions about which we have been concerned? I do not think so. This would give the Koreans the right to determine their type of Government. The paragraph continues:

" . . . so that they may ultimately consider membership in the United Nations as a single national State and thereby further the means of promoting the maintenance of peace and security in the area."

120. This draft resolution does not conflict with the consensus. It supplements the consensus; it fortifies the consensus. And I do not know why some representatives here this morning told me, "Baroody, do not rock the boat. A consensus has been arrived at." I do not yet know the phraseology of that consensus. What are we, second-class citizens here in the United Nations, that we are kept in the dark? "Oh no; it is for practical reasons. You see, you are not a sponsor of the so-called Algerian draft resolution, nor of the Australian draft resolution. Perhaps you will interfere and upset our plan."

121. Why should you think that way? It amounts to thinking that way: that we are going to rock the boat and spoil the consensus. But we are not that simple, we small Powers, that we should do that, because once we knew the South and the North were in agreement it would be superfluous to say we did not accept what they had agreed upon.

122. But this draft resolution of Saudi Arabia complements and reaffirms any consensus the two parties may have arrived at. But, oh, it comes from an Asian country—or it could have come from an African country—and immediately, certain Western Powers begin to find loop-holes and it becomes a sieve, there are so many holes. "Oh, you should not say this and you should not say that."

123. Then why do we occupy our seat here? We have a brain, as you do. We do not say it is superior, and I hope it is not inferior. We have a tongue, which wags more than your tongue. We have two ears; we can listen. And we have judgement.

124. Who are you? You were barbarians ten centuries ago. We were barbarians 6,000 years ago. This superiority complex should have disappeared now that the lions of Africa that were dominated by you are sitting here. Do you still think that because they were erstwhile colonial peoples they should be treated differently? That is a figment of your imagination. They are as capable as—we shall not say more capable than—any one of you here. And that applies to the Asian peoples and the peoples of Latin America. Of course, New Zealand and Australia are part of the Commonwealth, are they not?

125. Believe me, I could put everybody on the spot, but I am not a troublemaker. I could ask for a roll-call vote on this draft resolution, because it is factual; it is clear; it is not controversial. But it does not suit the secret diplomacy of certain Powers. That is the long and the short of it.

126. The United Nations is not predicated on secret diplomacy. It is predicated on open negotiations.

127. What should I do? Should I antagonize my colleagues and press this draft to the vote, and for that matter ask for a roll-call vote? I could easily do that. But in deference to the so-called two Koreas—there is only one Korean people—I shall not press my draft resolution to the vote, with the following proviso: that I do hope the Committee will have no objection to this draft resolution figuring verbatim in the report of the Rapporteur when he reads it from the podium of the General Assembly. And I can promise you I shall not bother you with more explanations in the General Assembly.

128. I do this on account of the agreement between the delegations of North and South Korea to accept the substance of the consensus, which I hope you, Mr. Chairman, will disclose to us because many of us are in the dark. But since there was an agreement between the delegations of North and South Korea, far be it from any of us to put a spoke in the wheel, so to speak. We will welcome negotiations between them with a view to reaching an accord that will ultimately pave the way to the admission of a single Korean State to membership of the United Nations.

129. Why am I insisting on the inclusion of my draft resolution word for word in the report of the Rapporteur? So that when both parties, North and South, discuss their differences, the substance of that draft resolution will remind them how they became the victims of external forces, and to see to it that they will not let anybody in the future play with their destiny as a single nation.

130. My request to you, Sir, is to ascertain whether such a solution is acceptable to the Committee. If it is not acceptable, I can assure you that I stand on my right to submit this draft resolution to a roll-call vote, no matter what the result of that vote may be.

131. Mr. DRISS (Tunisia) (*interpretation from French*): Following the statement made by Ambassador Baroody regarding our colleague Ambassador Scali, may I suggest that you, Sir, take the initiative of sending Ambassador Scali a telegram on behalf of the Committee wishing him a speedy recovery?

132. The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Ambassador of Tunisia for that suggestion. I am sure the Committee fully agrees with it, and I shall see that the telegram is sent.

133. Mr. REIS (United States of America): I would, on behalf of the United States Mission to the United Nations, express our appreciation to the representative of Tunisia for his suggestion and to the representative of Saudi Arabia for this remarks with regard to the health of our Permanent Representative. I know that it will be of very considerable comfort to the Permanent Representative and to his good wife to receive the Committee's good wishes.

134. The CHAIRMAN: As members are surely aware, there has been a new and promising development during the past few days. As a result of careful consultations among the sponsors of draft resolutions A/C.1/L.644 and Corr.1 and 645, I am now able to read out a statement—behind which I believe the whole Committee can unite—setting out the action that the Committee recommends that the General Assembly should take in regard to agenda item 41, the question of Korea.

135. With that in mind I propose to conclude the general debate at this stage. Naturally, members whose names are already inscribed on the list, as well as those whose names are not, will be given a full opportunity to speak in explanation of their positions. Similarly, members will of course have the right to speak in exercise of the right of reply. Irritating though it may be to see good prose go to waste, I hope that members will agree with me that it is not tragic.

136. If I hear no objection, therefore, I shall now declare the general debate concluded.

It was so decided.

137. In application of rule 130 of the rules of procedure, I shall now read out the following statement which I propose should become the consensus of the Committee:

“After consultations with the co-sponsors of the two draft resolutions on the Korean question, the Chairman is authorized to announce consensus that the two draft resolutions on the Korean question will not be put to the vote at the current session of the General Assembly. The Chairman is further authorized to make the following statement:

“1. It is noted with satisfaction that a Joint Communiqué was issued by the North and the South of Korea on 4 July 1972, which provides for the following three principles on the reunification of Korea:

“(a) The reunification of the country should be achieved independently, without reliance upon outside force or its interference;

“(b) The reunification of the country should be achieved by peaceful means, without recourse to the use of arms against the other side;

“(c) Great national unity should be promoted.

"2. It is the general hope that the South and the North of Korea will be urged to continue their dialogue and widen their many-sided exchanges and co-operation in the above spirit so as to expedite the independent peaceful reunification of the country.

"3. The General Assembly decides to dissolve immediately the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea."

138. May I take it that it is the desire that this recommendation to the General Assembly should form the consensus of this Committee?

139. Mr. DRISS (Tunisia) (*interpretation from French*): On behalf of the sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.661, I should like to make the following statement in the hope that it will appear in the Committee's report.

140. When we announced and subsequently submitted our draft resolution, we stated our readiness to work for a compromise, to strive to achieve a consensus. We wanted to see the two Korean delegations resume their negotiations, and intensify them further, without outside interference, in accordance with their *Joint Communiqué* of 4 July 1972. The consensus that has been arrived at by the sponsors of draft resolutions A/C.1/L.644 and Corr.1 and 645 meets the objective that we had set. We should like to express our congratulations to both groups. We consider that the consensus fully reflects the spirit of our own efforts.

141. The initiative that we took has been, to a certain extent, crowned with success. Our delegations will not, therefore, press to a vote the draft resolution submitted by us and circulated in document A/C.1/L.661. However, we would be grateful if the text of that draft resolution were to appear in the report, attesting to the efforts made by our delegations and also to the concession made by us in order to speed up the process of reconciliation and peace in Korea.

142. The CHAIRMAN: I should like to remind the Committee that we are now proceeding under rule 130. That means that no one can be allowed to speak except on a point of order relating to the process of deciding on the consensus. Delegations will have a full opportunity to explain their views on the consensus after the consensus has been adopted. Therefore, I would appeal to members to agree that we should now deal finally with the text of the consensus that I have read out, and then proceed to a final decision on the other two draft resolutions, A/C.1/L.661 and 664, which have not been covered by the consensus. We have been informed by the sponsors of those two draft resolutions that they will not be pressed to a vote. I think that if members would wait to make their statements until after the consensus has been agreed upon that would expedite matters.

143. Mr. TRAORÉ (Mali) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. Chairman, I do apologize for interrupting, but I think you will agree with us that those delegations which were prepared to make statements now find themselves in a rather exceptional position. You have read out a consensus, but my statement is actually a request for clarification.

144. We have just heard one of the sponsors of one of the draft resolutions, and, as you have said, the compromise relates to draft resolutions A/C.1/L.644 and Corr.1 and 645, so, logically, there will be no vote on them. You have also told us that those who have not yet spoken can do so after the adoption of the consensus. The question I want to ask is, when will it be possible for those delegations which would like to make statements to do so, not in explanation of vote—because that would necessitate fundamental changes in their texts—but, as they had proposed originally in accordance with the normal practice of this Committee?

145. The CHAIRMAN: Let me say that the Committee has decided, without objection, to conclude the general debate and to limit itself to statements in explanation of positions or in the exercise of the right of reply. That is the Committee's decision. The opportunity for explanations will be afforded members as soon as we have dealt, in accordance with rule 130, with the consensus text and the draft resolutions not covered by that consensus text, namely, those in documents A/C.1/L.661 and 664. I hope that fully answers the point raised by the representative of Mali.

146. Mr. QUARM (Ghana): As a sponsor of the draft resolution, I do not think that that wording is sufficiently explicit. It should begin as follows: "After consultations with the sponsors of draft resolutions A/C.1/L.644 and Corr.1 and A/C.1/L.645 on the Korean question, the Chairman . . .

147. The CHAIRMAN: I believe that the representative of Ghana has made a valid point. May I take it that the Committee agrees that it should be reflected in the consensus statement?

It was so decided.

148. May I then take it that this Committee is ready to adopt the text I have read out, with the amendment suggested by the representative of Ghana, as the consensus of this Committee?

It was so decided.

149. We come now to draft resolution A/C.1/L.661. As members of the Committee have heard, the sponsors of that draft resolution do not wish to press it to a vote. At the same time, they wish to see the draft resolution fully reflected in the Rapporteur's report when that report is submitted to the General Assembly.

150. May I take it that the Committee agrees to that?

It was so decided.

151. We come now to draft resolution A/C.1/L.664. As members of the Committee have heard, the representative of Saudi Arabia, who is the sponsor of that draft resolution, does not intend to press for a vote on it but wishes to see the text of it reflected in full in the Rapporteur's report.

152. May I take it that the Committee agrees with that suggestion?

It was so decided.

153. There will now be an opportunity for members to explain their positions on the consensus at this meeting or at the meeting this afternoon. I think that the Committee is entitled to congratulate itself on the outcome of this debate. For my part, I wish to congratulate in particular the sponsors of draft resolutions A/C.1/L.644 and Corr.1 and

645 on the efforts they made to achieve this result. Our appreciation goes also to the representatives of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and to the representatives of the Republic of Korea.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.