



CONTENTS

	Page
Agenda items 17 and 66:	
Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction: report of the Disarmament Commission (<i>continued</i>).....	285
Measures for the further relaxation of international tension and development of international co-operation (<i>continued</i>)	285

Chairman: Sir Leslie MUNRO (New Zealand).

AGENDA ITEMS 17 AND 66

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/2979, A/3047, A/C.1/L.149/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.150/Rev.1 and 2, A/C.1/L.152 and Rev.1, A/C.1/L.153/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.154/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.156) (*continued*)

Measures for the further relaxation of international tension and development of international co-operation (A/2981 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.151) (*continued*)

1. Mr. LODGE (United States of America), explaining the positions of the sponsors of the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/L.150/Rev.1) on the various amendments, stated that their intention from the very beginning of the debate had been to meet the consensus of views expressed in the Committee as far as they could possibly do so within the framework of the draft resolution.

2. They were accordingly pleased to be able to accept in their entirety or in substance no fewer than five Soviet Union and seven Indian suggestions. They also welcomed the amendment submitted by Costa Rica, Mexico and Pakistan (A/C.1/L.154/Rev.1). The United States delegation supported the motion made (809th meeting) by the representative of the United Kingdom that priority should be given to the joint draft resolution under rule 132 of the rules of procedure.

3. Since the first revision of the joint draft resolution had been submitted, the sponsors had had time to study the revised amendments (A/C.1/L.153/Rev.1) submitted by India. Because of their desire to see the widest possible measure of agreement on a subject so vital to all, they were now prepared to revise their

text a second time to include as many as possible of those new amendments.

4. The sponsors accepted point (i) of the second Indian amendment. Accordingly, operative paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (a), of the joint draft resolution would now read:

“Should continue their endeavours to reach agreement on a comprehensive disarmament plan in accordance with the goals set out in resolution 808 (IX).”

5. The sponsors were also prepared to accept part of point (ii) of the second Indian amendment, and to insert the words “as initial steps” in sub-paragraph (b) of their operative paragraph 1, so that it would now read:

“Should, as initial steps, give priority to early agreement on and implementation of.”

6. The sponsors accepted most of point (iii) of the second Indian amendment. The new paragraph 1(b) (ii) would therefore read:

“All such measures of adequately safeguarded disarmament as are now feasible.”

Having inserted the words “as initial steps” above, they thought it would be redundant to repeat them, as suggested by the Indian amendment.

7. The sponsors had also made a careful study of the first Indian amendment. They had decided that, if it was considered desirable by others, they could actually quote the language of resolution 808 (IX), which was recalled in the first paragraph of the preamble. It seemed unnecessary to them to add a long quotation to an already lengthy text, but, in a spirit of accommodation, here, too, they would accept the first version of that amendment as it had appeared in document A/C.1/L.153. The first paragraph of the preamble of the joint draft resolution would then begin as follows:

“Recalling its resolution 808 (IX) of 4 November 1954, which established the conclusion ‘that a further effort should be made.’ . . .”

8. Turning to those amendments submitted by the Indian and USSR delegations to which the sponsors of the joint draft resolution objected, Mr. Lodge first took up the Indian amendments (A/C.1/L.153/Rev.1). The revised version of the amendments reaffirmed in blanket fashion, without discrimination and without reference to changing circumstances, all of the operative provisions of General Assembly resolution 808 (IX), including the provision for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Practically every representative who had spoken in the debate had recognized the impossibility of totally accounting for nuclear weapons materials by any scientific means known at the present time, which made total elimination of those weapons scientifically impossible at present. In the light of those facts, therefore, the sponsors did not see how they could proceed now to draw up a disarmament conven-

tion, as resolution 808 (IX) recommended, incorporating a provision which could not be enforced. It was inconsistent with paragraph 1(c) of that resolution, which called for effective control. It was inconsistent with the seventh and eighth paragraphs of the preamble of the present joint draft resolution, which recognized the difficulties of such control. It was inconsistent with the debate which had taken place in the First Committee and with the facts known today. Until success rewarded the scientific search recommended in paragraph 3 of the joint draft resolution, and until fully adequate inspection and control was agreed upon, nuclear weapons could not be totally eliminated. Paragraph 1(a) of the joint draft resolution called for a continued search for agreement on a comprehensive disarmament plan in accordance with the goals set out in resolution 808 (IX). That meant all those goals which could be effectively controlled. When the elimination of nuclear weapons could be effectively controlled, it could be provided for in a comprehensive plan, but not before. Also, the question was not merely one of making a further effort to reach agreement; it was a matter of technical fact, which only new technical developments could alter.

9. Referring to that part of the second amendment proposed by India which the sponsors of the joint draft resolution had not accepted, Mr. Lodge stated that they had not incorporated the word "equal" in point (ii) of the amendment. Both sections of paragraph 1(b) of the joint draft resolution were on the same general plane of priority, and in that sense they were equal. However, the sponsors did not believe that agreement on the carrying out of one should of necessity await agreement on and the carrying out of the other. The sponsors hoped that both could be carried out together, but they did not want that to be a requirement.

10. The sponsors of the joint draft resolution had not been able to accept the third Indian amendment, which dealt with the enlargement of the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee. The United States believed that the problem of enlarging the Commission must be considered when the size and composition of other major organs was reviewed in the light of any decision reached on the admission of new Members. Such a review would be necessary and would have to be undertaken as soon as possible, but it would be a mistake to attempt now to alter the composition of that important Commission in the absence of new Members which, once admitted to the United Nations, should have a voice in such a decision.

11. With regard to the fifth Indian amendment, the United States believed that agreement on disarmament should eventually be embodied in such a convention, but while lack of agreement on so many vital points still existed, it was exceedingly difficult to draft any kind of legal instrument which would be reasonably complete or which would make any sense at all. Mr. Menon's suggestion was no doubt put forward with the laudable purpose of applying a little more pressure in order to achieve tangible results. However, it could have results opposite to what he intended. The time spent in trying to draw up a convention would be better spent in coming to grips with the issues.

12. The sponsors had not been able to incorporate in their joint draft resolution some of the amendments submitted by the USSR (A/C.1/L.152). The wording of the first paragraph of the Third Soviet amendment conveyed a misleading idea of the extent of the agreement reached in the Sub-Committee and in the Dis-

armament Commission. The text of the joint draft resolution acknowledged that there had been some progress towards agreement, which gave an accurate picture of what had in truth taken place.

13. The second paragraph of the Third Soviet amendment overstated, in the view of the sponsors of the joint draft resolution, the extent of agreement on levels of armed forces, prohibition and timing. The sponsors were against proposing total and immediate prohibition until they could be assured that such prohibition would be effective. With reference to the levels of armed forces, the United States believed the ultimate figure must be established in the light of what could be done about nuclear weapons and effective inspection and control. There had not been substantial agreement on the order to be followed in a comprehensive disarmament programme. The Soviet Union would not say when control could be installed; moreover, it wanted to pass from one stage of disarmament to another automatically rather than in accordance with the findings and judgment of the international control authority. Furthermore, it called for the total prohibition and elimination of atomic weapons to take place somewhere in that sequence, even though it knew that total prohibition was impossible to check. Above all, there was a vast difference of opinion on what constituted effective control.

14. The sixth Soviet Union amendment would completely transform the sense of the joint draft resolution. It gave the Soviet proposals of 10 May and 21 July 1955 (A/2979, annexes I and II)¹ first priority. The former brought in a host of political issues which were not in the competence of the Disarmament Commission, such as the settlement of Far Eastern questions, the dismantling of all bases abroad, and the removal of foreign troops from Germany. It cut the heart out of the forward-looking approach adopted in the joint draft resolution, namely, to do all that could be done now, even while work continued toward comprehensive disarmament in accordance with the ultimate goals expressed in resolution 808 (IX), and while efforts went on to tackle the scientific barriers and the barriers of international distrust which block solution of the problem of comprehensive disarmament.

15. A second revision of the joint draft resolution incorporating those amendments which had been accepted would be circulated shortly. The sponsors believed that the revised text pointed out the most promising path of progress for the Disarmament Commission and the Sub-Committee. It faced squarely the fact that new technical difficulties had arisen in regard to the control of nuclear weapons material, and it recognized that international suspicions must be cleared away if progress was to be made toward comprehensive disarmament.

16. Knowing the world's great yearning for at least a start, a first instalment on disarmament, the sponsors had included a directive to the Governments concerned to take every action which was now feasible. That was a significant step. The draft resolution directed the States concerned to make such initial reductions as could be adequately controlled, at the earliest opportunity, without waiting for agreement on a comprehensive plan, although work for such a plan continued.

17. The joint draft resolution also requested the Governments concerned to start now to carry out the Eisenhower and Bulganin plans. The United States wanted both the Eisenhower plan and a beginning on disarma-

¹ See also DC/71, annexes 15 and 18.

ment, together if possible, to go into effect as soon as possible. It did not, however, believe that the Eisenhower plan should be postponed while efforts were made to get agreement on even the initial measures of disarmament which were currently feasible and controllable.

18. The sponsors hoped that, with the adoption of their joint draft resolution, which represented an attempt in good faith to meet the desires that had been expressed by representatives of all countries in the Committee, deliberation on disarmament would finally lead to that immediate action for which the world had waited so anxiously for so many years.

19. The CHAIRMAN announced that, to facilitate the work of the Committee, he would read the text of a Syrian amendment² to the revised Indian amendments (A/C.1/L.153/Rev.1) which would shortly be circulated. It read as follows:

"For paragraph 3, substitute the following:

'3. Insert the following as paragraph 4:

'4. *Decides* to reconstitute and enlarge the Disarmament Commission by adding to its membership for the year 1956 the representatives of seven countries, namely, Argentina, Egypt, India, Philippines, Poland, Sweden and Yugoslavia, and requests the Disarmament Commission to expand its Sub-Committee as appropriate'."

20. Mr. DE LA COLINA (Mexico) noted with regret that no great progress had been achieved in the work of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. In spite of that fact, however, its efforts had not been entirely wasted. The Sub-Committee and the Disarmament Commission should therefore continue their work with the encouragement of the General Assembly.

21. The Mexican delegation would support the joint draft resolution and trusted that the amendments now introduced in the original text would enable it to be adopted unanimously.

22. Referring to the amendment submitted by the delegations of Costa Rica and Pakistan, and later co-sponsored by his own delegation (A/C.1/L.154/Rev.1), Mr. de la Colina expressed the hope that some, even if only a small part, of the funds now being spent on armaments would soon be utilized for improving the standard of living in the under-developed countries. The delegation of Mexico was happy to note that the sponsors of the joint draft resolution had accepted the amendment.

23. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan) pointed out that there was a link between the question of allocating savings from disarmament and the question of disarmament. The General Assembly had, in a number of resolutions, borne witness to the fact that, particularly in the present state of world tension, the advancement of the under-developed countries could contribute towards the achievement of international peace and security. In that connexion, he cited General Assembly resolution 724B (VIII).

24. In thanking the sponsors of the joint draft resolution for having accepted the amendment submitted by the delegations of Costa Rica, Mexico and Pakistan, Mr. Shahi stated that that was one more proof of the deep and continuing concern which those countries had shown in the development of under-developed countries.

25. Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia) stated that the essential criterion, in the opinion of his delegation, must be to what extent the draft resolutions before the Committee were capable of assisting in the achievement of the main task, which was the early drafting and conclusion of an international disarmament convention. The four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.150/Rev.1) did not bring the common objective any closer, but on the contrary, sought to carry the issue into another and entirely different sphere. The course of the discussion had shown that the Western Powers were in fact abandoning the idea of drafting a comprehensive disarmament programme. The draft resolution's primary objective was, first and foremost, support of President Eisenhower's plan for the exchange of military information and for aerial inspection.

26. Another characteristic feature of the four-Power draft resolution was its disregard of one of the essential elements and objectives of the disarmament programme, the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. The Czechoslovak delegation was fully in agreement with the amendments moved by the delegation of the USSR (A/C.1/L.152) and by the delegation of India (A/C.1/L.153/Rev.1). Those amendments directed the four-Power draft resolution back to the sphere of disarmament and thereby placed it within its proper context.

27. In the opinion of the Czechoslovak delegation, the resolution which would ultimately be adopted on the question of disarmament should not give undue emphasis to, or exaggerate, the existing points of disagreement, but on the contrary, should accent the progress made in the course of the preceding year in the negotiations on disarmament. A declaration recording agreement on those issues could not but strengthen the spirit of co-operation and mutual understanding, and would create favourable conditions for further negotiations on the drafting of a comprehensive disarmament programme. The future work of the Disarmament Commission's Sub-Committee should, in the opinion of the Czechoslovak delegation, primarily focus on the consideration of all the proposals submitted on the problem of disarmament. The amendments submitted by the USSR were designed to achieve that objective and the Czechoslovak delegation would accordingly vote in favour of those amendments. It would likewise vote in favour of the Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.149/Rev.1), which requested States to initiate negotiations to effect suspension of experimental explosions of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons and requested the Disarmament Commission to submit proposals without delay for the establishment of an armaments truce. The Czechoslovak delegation concurred with the view expressed at the 804th meeting by the representative of France that progress on the complex question of disarmament required unanimity. He trusted that the Western Powers, in a spirit of co-operation, would adopt the amendments submitted by the USSR.

28. Turning to the item proposed by the USSR on measures for the further relaxation of international tension and the development of international co-operation, Mr. Nosek stated that the General Assembly would be failing in its duties if it did not express its satisfaction at the efforts undertaken by States towards that goal and if it did not call upon all States to continue such efforts. The draft resolution submitted by the USSR (A/C.1/L.151) adequately dealt with that most

² Subsequently issued as document A/C.1/L.156.

important issue. The Czechoslovak delegation would accordingly vote in favour of that draft resolution.

29. Mr. ALPHAND (France) stated that the French delegation, faithful to the conciliatory role which the French Government had endeavoured to play in international affairs and to the initiative which it had taken especially with regard to the discussion of the disarmament problem, had associated itself with the revised joint draft resolution, which was designed to meet some of the points raised in the various amendments. In a spirit of understanding, it had agreed to mention in the second paragraph of the preamble the principal conferences which had met during the preceding year. That included the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, a passage of whose final *communiqué* called for grave reservations on the part of the French Government, since it went counter to the understanding of peoples. He wished to make it clear that the reference in the joint draft resolution related to the other parts of the Bandung Conference *communiqué*, especially the part dealing with disarmament. In particular, he would like to tell the representative of India that the explanations he had offered, concerning the absence of any alliance on the part of States which had taken part in the Bandung Conference and the perfect harmony of their general views with the Articles of the Charter concerning the individual and collective security of States, prompted the French delegation to go as far as it possibly could along the lines of the amendments which had been presented.

30. Mr. Alphand was very happy to find in one of the amendments, that of Costa Rica, Mexico and Pakistan (A/C.1/L.154/Rev.1), the echo of the plan presented by the Prime Minister of France at the Conference of the Heads of Government of the four great Powers. That plan had already been mentioned in the original joint draft resolution. By incorporating the three-Power amendment, the revised version brought out more fully and with greater weight the initiative of Mr. Edgar Faure.

31. Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) supported the Syrian amendment (A/C.1/L.156) calling for the expansion of the membership of the Sub-Committee. An enlarged membership would ensure a more representative character for the Sub-Committee and would undoubtedly contribute to more fruitful work by it.

32. He suggested that, since a number of new amendments to the four-Power draft resolution had been submitted and were being submitted and since a second revision of that draft resolution was about to be circulated, a short recess should be called to enable delegations to study the new document in its final form.

33. The CHAIRMAN stated that he would, of course, bear in mind what the representative of the USSR had to say on the point.

34. Mr. NUÑEZ (Costa Rica) stated that Costa Rica had been very happy to hear the proposal, made in Geneva by the Government of France, that the funds resulting from disarmament should be utilized for improving standards of living throughout the world and, in particular, in the less developed countries. The delegation of Costa Rica had joined Mexico and Pakistan in suggesting the insertion of an operative paragraph in the four-Power draft resolution, in order that the French proposal would, in the future studies by the Disarmament Commission, be considered as an integral part of the disarmament plan.

35. He expressed his appreciation to the sponsors of the joint draft resolution for having accepted the three-Power amendment (A/C.1/L.154/Rev.1).

36. Mr. NUTTING (United Kingdom) appealed to the delegations of Syria and India not to press their amendments regarding the enlargement of the Disarmament Commission. He himself was not excluding all possibilities of enlarging the Disarmament Commission in the future. Indeed, if new Members were added to the United Nations, presumably the Security Council would be enlarged and the Disarmament Commission would automatically also be enlarged. At the present moment, however, the Committee should concentrate on giving the Disarmament Commission more to do.

37. No reason had been given in the debate to show that some arbitrary expansion, whether by seven or by four, or by any particular number of countries, would improve the efficiency of the Commission in discharging its duties. Under the present system, apart from the permanent members of the Security Council and Canada, each country serving on the Commission had two years' experience, both in Security Council work and in work connected with disarmament. That two years' experience enabled them to make a full contribution on that very complex topic. Merely to add a given number of countries to serve in 1956, as proposed by the delegation of India, would not give the same experience, particularly because the meetings of the Sub-Committee inevitably occupied much time during the year.

38. In any case, it was preferable to wait and see whether the new Members were admitted to the United Nations. If they were not, the situation could be reviewed later to determine whether it would be advisable to expand the Disarmament Commission to include more Members or possibly even non-Members of the United Nations, for example, some of the present applicants. If the new Members did get in, then the Security Council would almost certainly be enlarged consequentially, and the Disarmament Commission would then be composed of fourteen or fifteen countries, which seemed to him to be about the right size and certainly the maximum for efficient working.

39. In addition, under rule 28 of the Disarmament Commission's rules of procedure any Member of the United Nations which was not a member of the Commission or any State not a Member of the United Nations "may be invited as the result of a decision of the Disarmament Commission, to participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Disarmament Commission when the Disarmament Commission considers that the interests of that State are specially affected." He had no doubt that the Disarmament Commission, if it would perform more work in the future, and if the Sub-Committee would report to it more regularly and more frequently, would not only make more use of itself, but would also make full and proper use of rule 28, which would enable other Members of the United Nations and non-Members to appear before it and to make their contribution.

40. For those reasons he would not accept at the present stage the amendment submitted by the delegation of Syria, and he would ask both the Syrian and Indian representatives not to press their amendments.

41. Mr. MENON (India), before taking up the various draft resolutions and amendments, wished to make a preliminary observation that the disarmament item in the future should be discussed at an earlier stage

in the proceedings of the General Assembly, so that, after the opening discussion, the debate could be adjourned in order to allow delegations to obtain instructions from their Governments and to carry on private talks.

42. The Indian amendments were based on the conviction that disarmament was a preliminary step towards the renunciation of war. Therefore, any attempt to think of the problem of disarmament in terms of the difficulties confronting those who wished to achieve it, so that no comprehensive disarmament was immediately possible, was not acceptable. India could not subscribe to the doctrine of a peace based on hydrogen bombs. The only way to deal with atomic destructive power was to eliminate it. Weapons of mass destruction should not be used by any nation for any purpose whatsoever. To say that they would not be used except in case of aggression was a travesty. All wars that had been waged were proclaimed not as aggressions but as defence of peoples or principles.

43. The pattern of past draft resolutions on the question of disarmament, as initially submitted, had been to keep the Sub-Committee in being without doing much. Subsequently, amendments had come in from various sides of different persuasions, and the sponsors had accepted them. The main impetus for the work on disarmament came during the discussions in the Assembly from States who were not members of the Disarmament Commission or its Sub-Committee. Greater participation by those other Member States, who made their main contribution to the work of the Disarmament Commission only during the few weeks' debate in the General Assembly, should make possible greater accomplishment. For that reason, the delegation of India wished to state its position and submit its suggestions so that, through the general interplay of ideas, the General Assembly could reach its ultimate decision. Although disarmament could not be brought about without the agreement of the great Powers—and, if facts were to be faced, without the agreement of the United States and the Soviet Union—it was also a matter of concern to other States. The Government of India would never accept the view that, however powerful some Governments might be, they could sit down and decide on the arms of other States. Notice should therefore be taken of the views of all countries. The Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission had never been intended to be a body either plenary or plenipotentiary. Now the Sub-Committee seemed to have got into the saddle of the Disarmament Commission itself.

44. The situation reached in the disarmament debates indicated a recession on the fundamental position, although the urgency of the question was greater than ever. The debates also displayed an objection to the disarmament question being referred to Member Governments for their fuller study.

45. Referring to the first paragraph of the preamble of the revised four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.150/Rev.2). Mr. Menon expressed his appreciation of the attempt and the achievement of the sponsors to meet the Indian amendment thereto as far as they could. Although in the revised text (A/C.1/L.153/Rev.1) that amendment suggested the words "recalling and reaffirming its first operative paragraph," he did not wish to press for the insertion of the word "reaffirming." That word had not been contained in the original text (A/C.1/L.153). The sponsors of the four-Power draft

resolution had pointed out that operative paragraph 1 of their draft resolution included such a reaffirmation, although not in the categorical terms set out in the Indian amendment. The objection to the word "reaffirming" was not valid and had the effect of creating suspicion in the minds of people. The argument of the representative of the United States that reaffirmation was not possible in view of the difficulties that had arisen about the detection of nuclear weapons material was totally untenable. If there were more difficulties, there should be more endeavours. Nevertheless, the Indian delegation was prepared to accept the revision of the draft resolution as submitted, in the belief that the assertion contained in operative paragraph 1 (a) was reaffirmation and in the light of the explanation given.

46. He wished to express appreciation to the sponsors of the joint draft resolution for having accepted point (i) of the second Indian amendment.

47. With regard to point (ii) of the second amendment, he hoped that it would be possible to insert the word "equal" and thus to accept the equality of priorities, or, at any rate, to make some statement that would enable the Indian delegation to support paragraph 1 of the joint draft resolution.

48. In view of the explanation given by the representative of the United States that the words "initial steps" in sub-paragraph (b)(i) of operative paragraph 1 covered sub-paragraph (b)(ii), he did not wish to insist upon point (iii) of his second amendment.

49. Turning to the appeal made by the representative of the United Kingdom with regard to the reconstitution of the Disarmament Commission, Mr. Menon stated that the business of the United Nations need not be held up on account of the admission of new Members. If the new Members came in, they would have a contribution to make. The amendment was submitted in the light of existing circumstances and, when a new circumstance arose, it would be possible further to enlarge or change the composition of a body.

50. Rule 28 of the Commission's rules of procedure, cited by the representative of the United Kingdom, had been inoperative. The Government of India had submitted proposals, had written to the Secretary-General about them and had never been invited to the Disarmament Commission. Rule 28 was therefore not a safeguard, but a dead letter. If the sponsors of the joint draft resolution were to say that rule 28 would henceforth be invoked, that would be a different matter.

51. Mr. Menon said that there were two reasons why the Disarmament Commission should be reconstituted. First, there were various Member States which might make contributions and assist in resolving the deadlocks. Secondly, it would be a reminder to the Sub-Committee that it derived its authority from General Assembly resolution 715 (VIII) which suggested that the Disarmament Commission set it up. It should be recalled that at the eighth session the Indian delegation had originally proposed (A/C.1/L.74) that the General Assembly should appoint the Sub-Committee, and it was at the suggestion of the United Kingdom delegation that a change had been made so that the General Assembly would request the Commission to set up the Sub-Committee.

52. India was concerned about the future of atomic weapons. There was no great distinction between being killed by atomic weapons and conventional weapons, but in previous wars humanity had not acquired the

capacity of self-extinction. The network of military pacts had a bearing upon the problem, for in any military alliance the weapons available to one member were no less available to the other partners. Since the existing military alliances had at their centers the three great "hydrogen Powers," the danger of the atomic weapon had increased a great deal since those weapons were in effect, accessible to many more States. The ominous implication of the so-called defensive pacts was that at least atomic weapons, though not necessarily the hydrogen bomb, would be spread about over the whole world.

53. It had been proposed that the membership of the Disarmament Commission be enlarged for 1956 because, as in the case of the Security Council, its membership changed each year. It was not possible to arrive at agreements about proportions and numbers without taking into consideration other factors such as the increase of forces in quantity and quality. Accordingly, India believed that the Disarmament Commission should be enlarged so that additional positions could be represented and so that the usual considerations kept in mind in establishing committees could be met. With regard to the Syrian amendment, Mr. Menon would be prepared to consider a proposal which set forth the idea in principle, leaving the implementation to a later stage. In any event, the Disarmament Commission should meet more regularly and have the co-operation of States which had concern in the matter. It was the diversity in the General Assembly which made its disarmament debates more real, more urgent, and less obstructed by fixed positions.

54. India intended, as a matter of principle, to press its fifth amendment, which would add a new paragraph 6 to the draft. In General Assembly resolution 502 (VI) of 19 November 1951 establishing the Disarmament Commission, the Commission was directed to prepare proposals to be embodied in a draft treaty or treaties and a number of objectives were listed. The passage of time did not kill resolutions which had been adopted unless they were specifically rescinded, but some of those objectives were being departed from to a certain extent. The General Assembly had started off with the idea of preparing a convention, but year after year the matter had been forgotten.

55. Moreover, the preparation of a convention was one way of assisting in breaking the deadlock. A draft convention would place before Governments specific propositions. If there was no agreement on some points, two or more alternatives could be presented. The present procedure of proposing something new the moment an agreement seemed to be approaching could not lead towards a settlement. The Government of India desired work to begin on drafting a convention, because it would keep the attention of Member States focused on the matter and enable them to make contributions. There would be something concrete, rather than slogans, to discuss. It would enable Parliaments to be informed of the current situation. The circulation of a draft convention during the course of the year was of vital importance.

56. The Indian delegation had presented its amendments and its views because of the belief that the urgency of the problem was not adequately realized. Man had acquired the capacity to destroy the entire species, and the approach of the General Assembly to the problem was not in keeping with those circumstances, although the representatives of Canada (805th meeting) and France, (804th meeting) had referred to their great

sense of urgency. The peoples of the world were entitled to be kept informed of the consequences of an atomic war. Recently a United States scientist, Colonel Victor Burns, had described how an atomic explosion could explode the retina of the human eye at a distance of forty miles. A member of the United States Atomic Energy Commission had discussed the hazards of the radio-active strontium released by any nuclear explosion. Prior to the atomic age, he had said, there had been no radio-active strontium, and in the event of an explosion some it is shot up into the stratosphere, in which it is diffused and slowly descends over a period of years. The radio-active strontium would pass from the earth's soil into food and so into the human body where it would be absorbed into the bone structure and could cause bone tumours. Because there was a limit to the tolerable amount of radio-active strontium which could be absorbed, there was a limit to the number of large thermo-nuclear explosions that the human race could withstand without harmful bodily effects. Another statement had recently been made by a British scientist, which also referred to the capacity of those bombs to destroy the whole of humanity. In the circumstances, the General Assembly could not depend only on the labours of the Sub-Committee nor be satisfied if the great Powers were nearer to an agreement on peace by horror. All Governments and Parliaments had to be assured that the problem of disarmament was being actively considered, and for that reason India asked for the early circulation of a draft convention.

57. There was nothing new in the idea, which had been established by resolution 502 (VI). It was not, as the United Kingdom representative had said, to put the cart before the horse. Drafting the convention was one of the methods of reaching an agreement which had been adopted in other contexts and might well be followed in the present question. One way of getting out of the morass was to enable the public opinion of the world to make its impact. If it were proposed that the amendment should be changed so that the idea of drafting the convention should be taken into immediate consideration, India might be willing to consider such a proposal. However, India could not agree to deleting the whole idea.

58. The Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.149/Rev.1) contained three elements. One related to the suspension of explosions and another to a suggested armaments truce. Those ideas had been incorporated in the revised four-Power draft resolution, which said that account should be taken of them. The question of suspension of explosions had been before the General Assembly for two years, and it was now asked that negotiations should take place between the "atomic Powers" with a view to reaching agreement. The four-Power draft resolution represented an advance in that it would make some beginning towards considering the problem. However, in effect, it would not take the matter any further than it had been taken in the previous year, when the Assembly had unanimously referred an Indian draft resolution on the subject to the Disarmament Commission (resolution 808 B (IX)). The advance in substance which India desired was immediate talks between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union with a view to suspending those explosions. India hoped that the adoption of the draft resolution would mean the beginning of those negotiations.

59. The other element in the Indian draft resolution was that the tenth session should stand recessed so

that the President could reconvene it for consideration of the disarmament problem. India believed that, because of the urgent need for progress, the Assembly should always be available for consultation and for speeding up the process. The proposal did not prejudice the question of the final decision concerning reconvening the Assembly. Nothing would be lost if the President were empowered to reconvene it as had been done in the case of other grave problems.

60. Mr. Menon stated in conclusion that the first, second and third Indian amendments had been withdrawn, with the request that the sponsors might be able to include in the revised draft resolution the words "equal priorities."

61. Mr. MARTIN (Canada) said that in the main he was in accord with the statements of the representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the United States. He wished to repeat, however, that he assumed that all agreed that disarmament was a problem of the greatest urgency. The revised joint draft resolution would not create false hopes, and yet it provided for recognition of the broad objectives.

62. A considerable number of amendments submitted by India and the Soviet Union had been accepted, and the suggestions made by Costa Rica, Mexico and Pakistan had found their place in the text. Some of the Indian amendments, however, had not been accepted, and Mr. Martin believed their rejection had been wise. They had a value in themselves apart from the draft resolution, but would not really be helpful. In particular, he referred to the proposal to increase the size of the Disarmament Commission. Mr. Martin agreed that the Disarmament Commission should have a more active role, but the circumstances in which the Sub-Committee had come into being should be recalled. The Commission had been considered too unwieldy for detailed negotiations. On the basis of his own experience in attending meetings of the Sub-Committee, Mr. Martin could not agree with the suggestion that it should be expanded. Among other things, such a move might convey a false sense of the measure of progress which was to be anticipated.

63. There was a great deal of value in public discussion, and there could be no doubt that all Members of the General Assembly shared the same sense of urgency. However, the fact was that no progress in disarmament would be made unless agreement was reached between the great Powers, on whom the primary responsibility rested. If the question could not be resolved by those four, it would confront the world indefinitely. There had been some dissatisfaction with the Sub-Committee, but there was an important provision in the draft resolution requesting the Sub-Committee to give early and careful consideration to the views expressed in the First Committee. Therefore, the Sub-Committee should be given the earliest opportunity to resume negotiations, without which there could be no progress. Moreover, results were more likely to emerge if the discussion was private. The Disarmament Commission could be given the responsibility of engaging in public discussion.

64. On the question of enlarging the Disarmament Commission, Mr. Martin believed that there was point to the observation that it was one of the United Nations bodies to which the principle of enlargement would be extended when the matter of new Members was dealt with.

65. Mr. Martin hoped that it would be possible for the Sub-Committee to resume its work in a more orderly

manner, that there would be a carefully prepared general debate, that long statements would not be found necessary, that there could be questions and discussions instead of formal statements, that the Members would take advantage of the intimate arrangement, that greater use would be made of the scientific skills available, and that there would be more delegation of functions to technical bodies.

66. Mr. Martin urged the Committee to accept the four-Power joint draft resolution, which in its second revised form represented the maximum amount of opinion that was practical. He hoped that the representative of India would not press his amendment for the enlargement of the Commission, and that, while the important role of the Commission was recognized, the value of meetings of the Sub-Committee along the lines he had suggested would also be recognized.

67. The CHAIRMAN stated that he intended to proceed to the vote during the following meeting and to conclude the question. He further stated, with respect to the question of West Irian, that he had every reason to believe that agreement had been reached on the matter and that that item also could be dealt with during the afternoon meeting.

Mr. Abdoh (IRAN), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

68. Mr. NASZKOWSKI (Poland) said his delegation considered that the four-Power draft resolution did not meet the requirements set out in resolution 808 (IX), which called for the conclusion of a convention on the reduction of armaments, the prohibition of atomic weapons, and the institution of effective control. The draft resolution was focused on control, while failing to specify the object of such control. Essentially it was a return to control without disarmament. The representative of the United States had tried to give assurances that the plan for aerial photography was to be part of, or a gateway to, a comprehensive disarmament programme. Those were mere words, however, and one of the main gaps in the draft was the omission of the problem of the elimination of nuclear weapons, which in the operative part ceased to be an integral part of the disarmament programme. Far from contributing to progress towards disarmament, the four-Power draft resolution would direct the work in a wrong direction.

69. The revised version did not alter the essence of the proposal. It retained priority for studies on inspection without any recommendation for working out a convention on reduction and prohibition. The Polish delegation, therefore, opposed the draft resolution in its present form.

70. The Soviet Union amendments took as their basis the directives contained in resolution 808 (IX) and took account of recent developments. They appealed for a continuation of efforts towards a solution of the whole disarmament problem, rather than just a fragment of it. It was particularly necessary to modify operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution. It was not acceptable to give priority exclusively to control and inspection and to touch only vaguely the problem of reductions and to pass over in silence the prohibition of atomic weapons. The Sub-Committee should base its future deliberations on the Soviet Union proposals of 10 May 1955, which incorporated the whole disarmament plan, as well as on other proposals submitted. Such would be the effect of the Soviet Union amendment.

71. The Indian amendments would bind future work on disarmament more closely to the principles of resolution 808 (IX). In particular, Poland supported the

idea of making the membership of the Disarmament Commission more representative. It would also be desirable to recommend that the Commission undertake without delay the drafting of a disarmament convention.

72. The Polish delegation supported the Indian draft resolution and especially the request for negotiations to suspend experimental explosions. The adoption of that draft would constitute a step towards the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction.

73. Finally, the Polish delegation supported the Soviet Union draft resolution (A/C.1/L.151), which responded to the aspirations of the peoples who wanted to live in peace and tranquillity. It appealed for further efforts towards the relaxation of tension and the building of confidence. The General Assembly could not refuse to endorse those noble objectives.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.