



CONTENTS

	Page
Report of the Economic and Social Council (chapters IV and V) (continued).....	191

Chairman: Mr. G. F. DAVIDSON (Canada).

Report of the Economic and Social Council (chapters IV and V) (A/2430, E/2447, A/C.3/L.366, A/C.3/L.367 and Add.1, A/C.3/L.368, A/C.3/L.369, A/C.3/L.371, A/C.3/L.372, A/C.3/L.374, A/C.3/L.376 and Add.1, A/C.3/L.385) (continued)

[Item 12]*

MOTION CONCERNING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF A DRAFT RESOLUTION

1. Mr. AZMI (Egypt) observed that the Canadian draft resolution (A/C.3/L.385) had been submitted after the time limit on which the Committee had agreed (511th meeting). Nevertheless, he thought it a useful contribution to the Committee's work and proposed that it should be entertained.

2. Mrs. AFNAN (Iraq) supported that proposal. The Canadian draft resolution certainly warranted consideration.

3. Mr. PAZHWAQ (Afghanistan) objected to consideration of the Canadian draft resolution for procedural reasons.

4. The CHAIRMAN agreed that the draft resolution had been submitted after the expiry of the time-limit. As it was a draft resolution, not an amendment, it was for the Committee to decide whether it would reverse its own decision, in accordance with rule 122 of the rules of procedure, in order to admit the draft resolution.

5. After a procedural discussion, in which the CHAIRMAN, Mr. ENCINAS (Peru), Mr. PAZHWAQ (Afghanistan), Mrs. AFNAN (Iraq), Mr. AZMI (Egypt), Mr. ORBAN (Belgium), Mrs. EM-MET (United Kingdom), Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) and Mr. P. CHENG (China) took part, the CHAIRMAN put to the vote the motion by the delegations of Egypt and Iraq for reconsideration of the time-limit set for the submission of draft resolutions, in order to admit the Canadian draft resolution (A/C.3/L.385).

The motion was adopted 45 votes to 1, with 3 abstentions.

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

FREQUENCY OF MEETINGS AND COMPOSITION OF THE SOCIAL COMMISSION (continued)

DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY IRAQ (A/C.3/L.376) (concluded) AND DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY CANADA (A/C.3/L.385)

6. Mr. JUVIGNY (France) supported part 1 of the operative paragraph of the Iraqi draft resolution (A/C.3/L.376) in principle; it would express the Committee's great interest in the development of international social activities. The debate had, however, shown the need to find a solution on the broadest possible basis.

7. The Netherlands amendment (A/C.3/L.382) seemed to provide such a basis. It left the Economic and Social Council free to make the final decision, but asked it to review the status of the Social Commission. The Council itself had not, by its resolution 414 (XIII), shut the door on all further discussion, but had expressly stated that the Secretary-General might make, and the Council approve, other proposals in special circumstances. The adoption of some such wording as that proposed by the Netherlands or Canada (A/C.3/L.385) would thus achieve the purpose intended by Iraq.

8. Part 2 of the operative paragraph of the Iraqi draft resolution would require a premature decision on a very important matter. Such a decision might well constitute a precedent, of which other functional commissions might take advantage. At that stage the Third Committee was quite unable to decide the structure and functions of the Council's subsidiary organs.

9. Mrs. HARMAN (Israel) observed that her delegation had consistently stressed the need for the greatest possible social activity on the part of the United Nations and for the full use of all possible facilities. Israel was a member of the Social Commission and was vitally interested in its work; but it was not convinced that annual sessions would necessarily be more efficacious. Discussion in the Social Commission was concentrated on setting the general policy for specific questions. The report of the Commission's ninth session (E/2437) showed that those questions were far-reaching, detailed and complex and required the adaptation of specialized knowledge to the problems of widely differing regions. The documentation for the Commission's sessions required thorough preparation by experts in the field if it was to be of the greatest possible use. The governments would have to study it thoroughly and comment on it. The Secretariat could not always prepare the full documentation far enough in advance of the session for governments to give their representatives complete instructions. Biennial meetings would give both the governments and the Secretariat time to make the fullest possible use of the material.

10. If additional funds were to be required, she agreed with the suggestions that meetings of *ad hoc* com-

mittees of experts would give better results than annual sessions of the Commission; they would be able to supply the Commission with information and help the Secretariat in its day-to-day work and in the field. She did, however, appreciate the predicament of members who would perhaps serve for only one session if sessions were biennial and hoped that the Council might be able to work out some new system for the term of appointment.

11. If the Secretary-General maintained close contact with the national correspondents on social welfare matters appointed at his request, he should be able to appraise progress. In the year in which the Social Commission was not sitting, he might well draw up a progress report and request the written comments of governments thereon.

12. Most of the problems with which the Commission dealt were long-term, and, despite rapid progress in some quarters, social situations did not change appreciably in two years. If some violent upheaval occurred, there was nothing to prevent the convening of a special session.

13. The representatives who served on the Commission were usually pivotal government officials and often found it hard to leave their work for at least three weeks every year; they would prefer to do so for at least four weeks every two years.

14. With regard to part 2 of the operative paragraph of the Iraqi draft resolution, she agreed that representation on the Commission should ensure the full participation of the under-developed countries, but she could not agree that the Commission should have more members than the Social Committee. Large committees were unwieldy, especially when dealing with highly specialized matters.

15. She would support the Peruvian (A/C.3/L.384) and Netherlands (A/C.3/L.382) amendments; the latter did not conflict with the Canadian draft resolution (A/C.3/L.385).

16. Mr. MENESES PALLARES (Ecuador) supported the Peruvian and Netherlands amendments; it was for the Economic and Social Council to decide whether the reasons for restoring annual sessions of the Social Commission were weighty enough. In doing so, it should take as its criteria the Commission's terms of reference, its current work programme and the new work assigned to it by the General Assembly at its eighth session. The General Assembly should accept the Council's decision, whatever it might be, as the Council's technical competence should be respected.

17. He could not support part 2 of the operative paragraph of the Iraqi draft resolution; under the Charter of the United Nations the Council might not have more than eighteen members. The time to discuss any change would come when the revision of the Charter was under consideration. The Peruvian amendment (A/C.3/L.384) was a good alternative to that text but only to that one.

18. He proposed, therefore, that the preamble of the Iraqi resolution (A/C.3/L.376) should be retained and that the text proposed by the Netherlands (A/C.3/L.382) should be used for part 1 of the operative paragraph, and the text proposed by Peru (A/C.3/L.384) for part 2. The prospects of achieving a consolidated text seemed favourable.

19. Mr. VENKATARAMAN (India) expressed the view that the Canadian draft resolution (A/C.3/L.385)

represented the wishes of the majority of the Committee and proposed that a vote should be taken on it before the Committee voted on the Iraqi draft resolution.

20. Biennial meetings of the Social Commission were sufficient and would allow time for adequate preparatory work by its members, and by the *ad hoc* bodies suggested by the Philippine representative, between sessions. Moreover, the decision taken by the Council at its thirteenth session (resolution 414 (XIII), section B.I, para. 18 (g)) should be given a fair trial. Financial considerations justified an increase neither in the frequency of meetings nor in the membership of the Social Commission, which, as a technical body, would become unwieldy with more members.

21. He would accordingly oppose the Iraqi draft resolution (A/C.3/L.376).

22. The Netherlands amendment (A/C.3/L.382) was unnecessary.

23. Mr. BEAULIEU (Canada), introducing his draft resolution (A/C.3/L.385), said that he shared the Iraqi representative's desire to see the programme of concerted practical action function effectively. The Iraqi representative had not, however, suggested any particular number to which the membership of the Social Commission should be increased. Any increase might induce the other functional commissions, for the sake of prestige or for other reasons, to seek a like increase in their own membership, with consequent financial problems for the United Nations. For a functional commission to be a more representative body than the parent council would, furthermore, weaken the Council's standing. The Committee should also heed the Chinese representative's warning (516th meeting) that an increase in the membership of the Social Commission would mean an increase in the Executive Board of UNICEF and that also would affect United Nations finances.

24. The Committee could either make definite recommendations to the Council or note the reorganization of functional commissions it had begun in 1951 and the review it was to undertake in 1954. The former course was unwise; the latter, which he proposed, would enable the Council to consider the Social Commission along with the other functional commissions, bearing in mind all the proposals and suggestions made in the Committee.

25. Miss BERNARDINO (Dominican Republic) thought that the under-developed countries should be more effectively represented on the Social Commission; the twenty countries of Latin America were represented by only three countries from one part of South America. It was, however, illogical that a subsidiary of the Council should be larger than the Council. The objection that the General Assembly should not overrule the Council's decisions was based on a misconception: Article 66 of the Charter clearly related the Council's performance of its functions to the General Assembly's recommendations. The Canadian draft resolution might reconcile the different views expressed on the Iraqi proposal.

26. Despite the close connexion between the respective functions of the Social Commission and UNICEF Executive Board, the *de facto* amalgamation of them was absurd, and the Council should separate them.

27. Mrs. ELMEN (Sweden) agreed with previous speakers that, as the Council would reconsider the or-

- ganization of its functional commissions in 1954, there was no need to single out the Social Commission for special attention.
28. It was also inadvisable that the Commission should be given a bigger membership than other commissions and the Council itself.
29. With regard to the Peruvian amendment (A/C.3/L.384), she could not go along with any proposal which would give the impression that she was in favour of the creation of new bodies unless it was shown that they were really needed and that the work could not be done by utilizing existing organs.
30. Mr. ESTRADA DE LA HOZ (Guatemala) said that financial argument against the Iraqi draft resolution had not convinced him: social questions were given due weight in the United Nations Charter and were as important as other fields of action.
31. The Commission's membership was too small for its work. The illogicality lay, not in the suggestion that the Social Commission should have more than eighteen members, but in the fact that the Council had so few as eighteen. Moreover, as the functional commissions and the Council had different functions, uniformity of numbers was not essential. The underdeveloped countries were alarmingly under-represented on the Social Commission, and Central America was not represented at all. Seventeen of the sixty Members of the United Nations, including Guatemala, had never been represented on any commission.
32. The use of observers was not an adequate substitute for an increase in the Commission's membership; if the practice was used in commissions, it could be argued that it should be extended to the General Assembly itself.
33. Since the Peruvian amendment introduced a new subject into the Iraqi draft resolution, he submitted an amendment (A/C.3/L.386) to the effect that it should be included in that resolution as a third part of the operative paragraph, instead of replacing the two existing parts, as the Peruvian representative had proposed.
34. The first part of the operative paragraph of the Iraqi draft resolution was preferable to the Netherlands amendment, which he could not support.
35. Mr. KOS (Yugoslavia) said that he would vote on the Iraqi draft resolution as he had indicated at the preceding meeting.
36. He could not accept the Netherlands amendment.
37. The Peruvian amendment introduced a new question, which could not be resolved without study, and he would abstain when it was put to the vote.
38. The Canadian draft resolution represented a procedural approach; if the Iraqi proposal was later withdrawn as a result of it, it was right that that proposal should be among the documents forwarded to the Council for consideration.
39. Dr. MAYO (United States of America) supported the Canadian draft resolution and the Indian proposal. His Government was a firm supporter of the social programme of the United Nations but it was not convinced that the proposals before the Committee provided the best means for promoting social action. The Canadian proposal was constructive and would bring the General Assembly's suggestions before the Council without interfering with the Council's responsibility for its own subsidiary organs.
40. Mr. DUNLOP (New Zealand), supported by Miss JOHNSEN (Denmark), proposed that, in view of the variety and value of the written proposals and oral suggestions put forward, the word "proposals" in paragraph 1 of the operative part of the Canadian draft resolution (A/C.3/L.385) should be amended to read "suggestions".
41. Mr. MUFTI (Syria) said that he had voted against consideration of the Canadian draft resolution purely on procedural grounds. He would vote against the draft resolution itself because it was better for the General Assembly, as the most representative organ of the United Nations, to declare itself on the motions submitted to it and give instructions to the Council. He was not opposed in principle to the Council's considering proposals made in the Third Committee; but the Canadian draft resolution, if adopted, would have the effect of sweeping away all other proposals before the Committee and would diminish their chances of being considered by the Council.
42. He would vote against the Peruvian amendment (A/C.3/L.384) because it altered the whole nature of the Iraqi draft resolution (A/C.3/L.376).
43. Mr. ENCINAS (Peru) stated that his amendment (A/C.3/L.384), contrary to the New Zealand representative's interpretation, did not single out one method of solving the Social Commission's problems, but proposed that the Council should consider, among various procedures, the method of appointing expert committees.
44. The Canadian draft resolution provided the best solution to the problem because it provided for a thorough consideration by the Council of all the views propounded in the Committee. He would therefore support the Indian motion that the Canadian draft resolution should be voted on first.
45. Mr. AMANRICH (France) stated that his delegation would vote for the Canadian draft resolution. It would enable the Economic and Social Council to take a well-considered decision.
46. Mrs. TSALDARIS (Greece) said that she shared the Iraqi representative's views on the need to implement the programme of concerted practical action in the social field, but in view of the difficulties raised in connexion with the Iraqi draft resolution she would vote for the Canadian draft resolution, which would serve to transmit to the Council all the constructive suggestions made in the Committee. She hoped that the Iraqi representative would withdraw her proposal in favour of the Canadian draft, which took the salient features of the Iraqi draft resolution into account.
47. Mr. P. CHENG (China) pointed out that the New Zealand representative's oral amendment to the Canadian draft resolution did not altogether correspond to the facts. There was a difference between written resolutions and amendments on the one hand, and oral suggestions on the other.
48. He therefore proposed that the word "draft" should be inserted before the word "proposals" in the fourth paragraph of the preamble and in paragraph 1 of the operative part of the Canadian text. Reference should also be made to the Guatemalan amendment (A/C.3/L.386) in the fourth paragraph of the preamble.
49. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) agreed with the Chinese representative that the proposals before the Committee could not be referred to as suggestions, but

thought that the issue could not be prejudged to the extent of referring to the proposals as drafts. The Iraqi representative had not withdrawn her proposal and might insist that it should be voted on first.

50. Mr. BEAUFORT (Netherlands) thought that the debate had shown the Committee's interest in United Nations social action. The objections to the Iraqi draft resolution had related to methodology and financial implications, not to substance.

51. The Peruvian amendment (A/C.3/L.384) seemed to reflect the ideas of some delegations, and embodied a new idea of methods to be followed by the Council in improving the Social Commission's work. The Netherlands amendment (A/C.3/L.382), however, was closer to the original Iraqi concept, and, moreover, gave the Council full latitude to find new ways of solving the problem. The Canadian draft resolution (A/C.3/L.385) seemed to provide an even more generally acceptable solution. It would therefore be wiser to vote on that text first.

52. Mr. ESTRADA DE LA HOZ (Guatemala) did not consider that a vote on the Canadian proposal precluded a vote on the Iraqi draft resolution. His amendment (A/C.3/L.386) to the Peruvian amendment (A/C.3/L.384) had been submitted in writing and he did not regard it as suggestion made to the Committee. He therefore urged that the Iraqi draft resolution should be voted on first.

53. Mrs. AFNAN (Iraq) asked that no departure should be made from the accepted procedure of voting on proposals in chronological order.

54. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that, under rule 130 of the rules of procedure, he was bound to put the Iraqi proposal to the vote first unless the Committee decided otherwise. The Indian representative had made a formal proposal that the Canadian draft resolution should be voted on first. In his opinion, the Iraqi and Canadian proposals were mutually exclusive and a vote on one would preclude a vote on the other.

55. Mr. PAZHAWAK (Afghanistan) pointed out that, of the two draft resolutions, the Iraqi proposal was the more substantive. It was therefore clear that the Canadian draft resolution should be voted on first. Otherwise, if the Iraqi draft resolution were rejected, the Canadian text would contain references to documents which were no longer before the Third Commit-

tee or the General Assembly. He was in favour of the ideas in the Iraqi proposal and therefore did not wish them to be nullified. If the Canadian proposal were adopted, those ideas would be conveyed to the Council.

56. The CHAIRMAN observed that the rules of procedure contained no provision whereby the Canadian proposal should automatically be voted on first. Under rule 130, it was for the Committee to decide that question.

57. He put to the vote the Indian proposal that the Canadian draft resolution (A/C.3/L.385) should be voted on first.

The proposal was adopted by 30 votes to 14, with 7 abstentions.

58. Mr. BEAULIEU (Canada) accepted the Chinese representative's suggestion for the inclusion of the word "draft" before the word "proposals" in the fourth paragraph of the preamble and in paragraph 1 of the operative part of his delegation's draft resolution.

59. Mr. SAKSIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that his delegation would support the Canadian draft resolution, with two amendments. He proposed the inclusion of a reference to Article 61 of the Charter in the first paragraph of the preamble and the deletion of the words "for its guidance and information" in paragraph 2 of the operative part.

60. Mr. BEAULIEU (Canada) said that he would accept the first USSR amendment, but wished to maintain the text of paragraph 2 of the operative part.

61. Mr. DUNLOP (New Zealand) withdrew his amendment to paragraph 1 of the operative part and replaced it by a proposal to replace the word "consider" in that text by the words "take into account".

62. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia) proposed that the first two paragraphs of the preamble of the Iraqi draft resolution should be introduced into the Canadian draft resolution.

63. After a procedural discussion in which Mr. AZMI (Egypt), Mrs. PINTO DE VIDAL (Uruguay), Mrs. AFNAN (Iraq), Mrs. EMMET (United Kingdom), Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia), and Mr. PAZHAWAK (Afghanistan) took part, the CHAIRMAN suggested that an informal working group should meet to prepare a revised text for the next meeting.

The meeting rose at 6.5 p.m.