

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND THIRTIETH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Thursday, 13 August 1987, at 10 a.m.

President      Mr. Pierre Morel      (France)

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I call to order the 430th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference will today continue its consideration of the reports of its ad hoc subsidiary bodies and of its annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to raise any matter relevant to the work of the Conference may do so.

The secretariat has today circulated document CD/778, which contains the progress report on the twenty-fourth session of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. The Chairman of the Ad hoc Group, Mr. Ola Dahlman, of Sweden, will introduce this report to the Conference today at the end of the list of speakers.

I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Mexico and the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, His Excellency Ambassador Ekéus.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): Mr. President, may I first express my delegation's delight at seeing you preside over the Conference during this difficult month of August. We are convinced that your many personal qualities will indeed help to steer us through the many difficulties facing the Conference and bring this year's session to a successful conclusion. My delegation pledges its full support to your endeavours. I would ask the delegation of Ethiopia to convey to His Excellency Ambassador Terrefe our gratitude for the calm and effective manner in which he directed the work of the Conference during the month of July.

Ambassador Saad Alfararqi is now leaving the Conference. His presidency during the month of June was characterized by the great diplomatic skills and political judgement with which he has represented Egypt in the Conference for more than four years. On a personal note, I must say that close co-operation with Ambassador Alfararqi during those years has been of great support to me and my delegation. It is also with great regret that we have noted the departure of Ambassador Cromartie from the Conference. I had from my arrival the privilege of working closely and for long periods, on a daily basis, with Ambassador Cromartie, particularly on the chemical weapons convention. His intellectual capacity, combined with a rare sense of fairness and reason, will be badly missed. I ask the delegation of the United Kingdom to convey to Ambassador Cromartie our wishes for a speedy recovery. I would also take this opportunity to bid farewell to Ambassador Tonwe of Nigeria and to wish him every success in his important assignment in Nigeria. May I also take this opportunity to welcome His Excellency Ambassador Azambuja of Brazil and His Excellency Ambassador Rodrigo of Sri Lanka. We are looking forward to co-operating with the two Ambassadors within the Group of 21 as well as within the Conference.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

In my intervention today I shall focus on the issue of radiological weapons, and specifically on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. In doing so I should like first of all to express the gratitude of my delegation to Ambassador Meiszter of Hungary for his skilful chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, and to the two co-ordinators of contact groups A and B, Mr. Numata of Japan and Mr. Wayarabi of Indonesia.

Having introduced the item concerning the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities as far back as 1980, Sweden is known to give priority to the early completion of a draft treaty on this subject, which constitutes a major security concern for Sweden, as it does for many other countries. It is therefore natural that I should make special mention of the untiring efforts of Mr. Wayarabi of Indonesia, who, as Co-ordinator of Contact Group B, has been able through patience, dedication and skill to obtain some clarity on the different views and approaches to the subject entrusted to him.

Despite efforts by many delegations, work on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities in 1986 and 1987 has been disappointing. As far as the work is concerned, we are now back in 1983, but at that time at least we seemed to share a common goal and issues of substance were discussed among delegations. In the past two years we have seen how the very purpose of a prohibition of attacks on nuclear installations has been questioned. This has not only affected our chances of making progress towards banning attacks on nuclear facilities, but could also imperil the role of this Conference as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body.

The first and foremost question to be addressed is this: What is the aim of the treaty or treaties that we are trying to elaborate in the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons? In this context we might well keep in mind that the Committee was set up under an agenda item entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons".

A definition of weapons of mass destruction was given right back in 1948 in resolution S/C.3/30 of the then Commission for Conventional Armaments under the United Nations Security Council. "Radioactive material weapons" were then defined as weapons of mass destruction. Other such weapons were "atomic explosive weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above".

The specific question of radiological weapons was raised for the first time at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly in 1969, when the Assembly in resolution 2602 C (XXIV), invited the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, inter alia, to consider effective methods of control against the use of radiological methods of warfare, independently of efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament. It is interesting to note that as early as 1969 the General Assembly did not limit the issue to radiological weapons but addressed the whole concept of radiological warfare.

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This fundamental approach is equally valid today. It is thus our firm view that the main purpose in dealing with this agenda item should be to prohibit radiologically-caused mass destruction. This means that the use of radioactive material for hostile purposes causing destruction, damage or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material should be prohibited irrespective of the method applied. From this point of view it matters little whether the radioactive material causing mass destruction comes from the attacker's weapons or from nuclear installations in the country of the attacked.

One delegation has argued -- its position is reflected in a footnote to the report of Contact Group B -- that a treaty based on the criterion of mass destruction would "weaken the protection afforded to nuclear facilities under present international law". My delegation is not aware of any international law that provides such protection. The only specific international norm in this respect is contained in the 1977 additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions on the rules of war. The Swedish delegation considers the articles in question far too vague and conditional to be satisfactory. They do not cover all kinds of installations capable of producing mass destruction if destroyed, but only "nuclear electrical generating stations". Furthermore, they leave far too much scope for subjective assessments by individual commanders for the protection to be satisfactory. Let me quote article 56, paragraph 2 (b) of Protocol I: it states that the protection against attack shall cease if the nuclear electrical generating station "provides electric power in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support".

The insufficiency of such a prohibition was recognized by the negotiators of the Protocol themselves. In article 56, paragraph 6 they state that the high contracting parties "are urged to conclude further agreements among themselves to provide additional protection for objects containing dangerous forces". It is thus difficult to understand how such a legal régime can be weakened by a prohibition based on the mass destruction criterion, which stems from the very title of the item addressed in the Committee.

Finally, I note with regret that very few countries have even ratified this Protocol. For instance, none of the members of the CD belonging to the two military pacts has ratified it.

It has been stated in the same context that a treaty as proposed by Sweden would amount to "legitimizing attacks on nuclear facilities" that are not covered by the specifications. Such an argument is unacceptable to my delegation. If any progress we make in any given field of arms limitation and disarmament that prohibits a particular kind of warfare or a special kind of weapon is interpreted as legitimizing other kinds of warfare or other kinds of weapons, then the whole process of disarmament will be called into question. For Sweden, the basic rule of the non-use of force is laid down in the Charter of the United Nations. Any specific agreed prohibition serves to strengthen the Charter, not to weaken it.

It has also been proposed that the treaty should cover nuclear reactors and "any other facility for the production, handling, treatment, processing or storage of nuclear fuel or other nuclear material". Such a definition is

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meaningless unless the term "nuclear material" is well defined. As it stands, most industrial processes would be covered. Nuclear material is present in television sets, watches, hospital equipment, construction elements and, indeed, in the human body itself. However, no definition of the term has been forthcoming.

What is probably meant by such a proposal is that all installations connected with the nuclear power industry should be covered, that is to say, that the aim of a prohibition of attacks should be to protect nuclear installations themselves so as to ensure the sovereign right of States to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The promotion of nuclear energy is not a task for a disarmament body. The task given to the Conference on Disarmament is not the protection of industrial installations but the prohibition of the use for hostile purposes of the radioactive material in nuclear installations as a means of mass destruction.

This calls for a clear definition that specifies which nuclear facilities contain amounts of radioactive material such as to cause damage substantial enough to qualify as mass destruction. Having endeavoured to identify the facilities that would meet this criterion, Sweden has concluded that a prohibition of attacks should cover four categories of facilities. They are nuclear reactors, intermediate spent-fuel storages, reprocessing plants and waste deposits. Furthermore, these facilities must be of a certain size or capacity in order to contain enough radioactive material to qualify as being potentially dangerous from the viewpoint of mass destruction.

The basic norm used by Sweden to calculate mass destruction is a military one: immediate denial of an area of more than one square kilometre would be considered mass destruction. This norm is different from the one frequently used in discussing radioactive protection in peacetime, which is the making of permanent residence in a specified area impossible for a certain period.

It has thus been estimated that the amount of radioactive material required -- uniformly spread over one square kilometre -- to kill people who stay in the area for a few hours would be of the order of  $10^{18}$  becquerels. It has further been estimated that a reactor of more than about 10 megawatts thermal power operating at radioactive saturation level would contain enough radioactive material to provide  $10^{18}$  becquerels or more for 10 hours after an attack on the reactor -- the time required for release and settling on the ground.

The figures given --  $10^{18}$  becquerels and 10 megawatts -- are order-of-magnitude values. They are derived from a reasonable assumption related to area denial of one square kilometre. Therefore, they could certainly be subject to discussion. If a value higher than  $10^{18}$  becquerels is chosen, fewer facilities will be covered and a lower value will increase the number of facilities covered. The increase in the number of facilities which results from lowering the value of  $10^{17}$  becquerels and 1 megawatt is not very large, however.

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A significant factor in the release of radioactive material from a reactor in operation is the driving force provided by the reactor itself. Smaller reactors would provide a smaller driving force, and thus the effect would be less radioactivity.

It has been argued that the imposition of such thresholds would be considered discriminatory against developing countries, since in many cases their nuclear facilities do not reach the threshold. The fact is that a number of developing countries have nuclear installations that would be covered by the mass destruction criterion. Some 16 power reactors are in operation in developing countries, and almost 20 more are under construction. This adds to the importance of the problem for developing and industrialized countries alike. A dozen research reactors with a capacity of 10 megawatts or more also operate in developing countries. In the range 1-10 megawatts there are another 20 reactors.

Given an in-depth discussion of the criterion and negotiations on the relevant thresholds, the concept just outlined seems to have the overwhelming support of members of the Conference, in all kinds of groups too. The fact that this approach is based on the very premise of the 1979 joint United States-USSR proposal, namely a commitment not "to employ radioactive material by disseminating it to cause destruction, damage or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material", gives us hope that both authors of that proposal will seriously consider an attack prohibition based on the mass destruction criterion.

However, many delegations which support the mass destruction criterion want to add yet another, namely that only installations used for peaceful purposes should be covered by the provisions of a treaty. Some delegations want the treaty to cover only IAEA-safeguarded installations. The concern is that military facilities and production for military purposes would otherwise be exempt from attack. While fully understanding such concerns, my delegation submits that the potential for mass destruction is the same whatever the intended use of a particular facility. In the opinion of Sweden, the necessity of preventing mass destruction should at any given moment have priority over military interests.

Furthermore, typical military installations such as nuclear weapon production plants are not included. Secondly, the provisions cover only attacks that would cause the release or dissemination of radioactive material. Thirdly, the Swedish proposal includes on-site verification of installations proposed for inclusion in the register. Sweden is of the opinion that, if a State party chooses to comply with these regulations, the possible military or non-military nature of a facility would be considered to be of less concern to the international community than the need to prevent mass destruction. If our proposal is studied in detail, it should become quite clear that any concern about the possible sanctioning of military activities is not called for.

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It should be emphasized that this approach does not introduce additional criteria to that of mass destruction. It treats all nuclear facilities in an equal manner -- be they under IAEA safeguards or not. It treats all States in an equal manner -- be they parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or not.

When considering whether the prohibition of attack should apply irrespective of the peaceful or military use of a certain facility, the crucial question to ask is whether or not an attack -- apart from the mass destruction effect -- would effectively damage the war effort of the country attacked. As I have stated, the categories which do pose a mass destruction risk are limited in number. The relevant facilities are nuclear electricity generating reactors, reprocessing plants, spent fuel storages, waste storages and larger research reactors.

It is obvious that the first type of facility, the power reactor, could make a direct contribution to a country's war effort through that country's electricity supply. It therefore represents a credible military target. However, with the high precision of modern weaponry, the electricity supply could be cut without attacking the reactor itself.

It could also be urged that reprocessing plants, which can produce plutonium for weapons purposes, pose a more serious problem. However, there is a considerable time-lag between plutonium production and subsequent nuclear weapon production. It is therefore difficult to see that any real military advantage could be gained during a conflict by attacking a military reprocessing plant, especially in view of the arsenals of nuclear weapons already existing in the world.

In the opinion of my delegation a treaty covering these kinds of installation with a view to preventing mass destruction is not only necessary, but also realistic and feasible from a military point of view. Finally, the other categories of nuclear facility such as spent-fuel and nuclear-waste deposits do not represent credible military targets and could therefore also realistically be covered by a prohibition of attacks.

To sum up, Sweden's position regarding a prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities is, we believe, clear, realistic and feasible. In the report of Contact Group B, my delegation would have preferred different sets of elements to be combined in a way that made the choices plain. We were, however, for some reason not able to reach a consensus on maximum clarity in the report. Still, a footnote to the "Scope" provision based on the mass destruction criterion makes clear that there exists only one approach that constitutes a consistent set of elements for a draft treaty. If we are to use the Conference on Disarmament to reach a global prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities, a basis for such a ban is provided in that alternative.

Permit me in this statement also to make some brief remarks related to another item on our agenda, the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

The continued deliberations of the Ad hoc Committee, under the able leadership of Ambassador Pugliese, have been very useful. The Committee has benefited from valuable presentations, such as that of the Canadian PAXSAT for space-to-space and space-to-earth verification. The analysis of legal and technical matters, as well as definitions, which has taken place this year has made a valuable contribution.

Substantive proposals have been made. I can, for instance, refer to the main provisions of a treaty text submitted by two delegations, the German Democratic Republic and Mongolia. As nothing indicating the contrary has been brought forward in the Committee, my delegation also finds quite interesting the idea voiced by Argentina that the Conference's report could register statements by member States that they have not permanently deployed weapons in space.

The centrepiece of the work of the Committee has been and, in the opinion of my delegation, must continue to be proposals and initiatives aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space. Only the need to examine possible measures to that end warrants the efforts of the Conference on the item. That such an examination takes place does as such not prejudice the conclusions to be drawn by the Committee. Statements made have illustrated substantial differences of opinion among States on the adequacy of present legal barriers to an arms race in outer space, on the urgency of additional measures and on the scope and contents of such measures. It has also been disputed whether such measures could be verified at all. The fact that positions are indeed divergent does not, however, detract from, but add to the importance of continued and deepened consideration of the matter.

One aspect of military space activities that might constitute a threat to the vital national interests of many States is the development of anti-satellite weapons. There is a strong case for pursuing the matter of a global prohibition of ASAT weapons and ASAT warfare. A comprehensive ban would cover the development, testing, deployment and use of such weapons.

A number of political and technical problems would have to be solved before such a comprehensive ban could be realized. It has been emphasized that a workable definition of ASAT weapons must be laid down. Verification arrangements, possibly of a very far-reaching character, would have to be devised. The Ad hoc Committee should continue to explore problems of this nature in order to prepare the ground for substantive negotiations.

A number of partial measures to control or constrain ASAT developments have been discussed. They range from registration and information on relevant activities to arrangements to prevent incidents and restrictions on the testing and deployment of specific, dedicated ASAT systems. Substantive consideration of those proposals can also hopefully serve to bring about a common understanding on the role of various types of satellite for international security, and on desirable approaches to avoid the deployment of ASAT weapons.



(Mr. Ekéus, Sweden)

The implementation of even limited measures to check such a development could be of major significance. Any measure restricting the possibility of carrying out an ASAT mission in a reliable way may reduce crisis instability, and thus benefit international security.

On several occasions my delegation has made it clear that the Conference on Disarmament would benefit from the contribution of scientific expertise on space technology. Scientific and technological development in outer space activities is dynamic. Our work is suffering from a lack of up-to-date information on such developments. The deliberations in the Ad hoc Committee would be greatly facilitated if it became possible to obtain a jointly shared perception of basic elements in space technology and development that is of relevance for the work of the Conference. The Outer Space Workshop in Montreal, Canada, in May this year was an effective demonstration of the usefulness of a scientific presentation of the state of the art relating to outer space techniques.

With these considerations and experiences in mind, my delegation would deem it an important step if the Conference could consider the possibility of organizing a meeting of scientific or technical experts on space issues during its 1988 session, preferably during the first part of the session. During such a meeting, which should be of ad hoc character and of limited duration (one to two weeks), definitions and verification techniques relevant to anti-satellite weapons and anti-satellite warfare could be addressed. Furthermore, trends and long-term prospects regarding the possible or potential weaponization of space could be addressed. Deepened knowledge and expanded overviews would make the delegations better equipped to advance the work of the Ad hoc Committee in a serious and constructive way.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement and for his kind words to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, His Excellency Ambassador Nazarkin.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): In its statement today, the Soviet delegation intends to concentrate on two issues, a nuclear test ban and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Like many other delegations present in this hall, we cannot help being concerned about the fact that item 1 on the agenda of the Conference continues to be considered item 1 only formally, without finding expression in concrete negotiations leading to a complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

Cessation and prohibition of such tests undoubtedly depends above all on the Soviet Union and the United States, which, in accordance with the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, bear special responsibility for achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament. The Soviet Union's position on this problem is imbued with awareness of that responsibility. Suffice it to recall that we

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maintained a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions for more than 18 months. There is no forum -- bilateral, trilateral, or multilateral -- in which the Soviet Union would not be prepared to participate in order to work towards a radical solution of the nuclear test issue.

Unfortunately, the United States has a diametrically opposite position: both in the Conference on Disarmament and in the Soviet-United States bilateral meetings of experts in Geneva, the United States is objecting to the holding of full-scale negotiations on a complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. The main "argument" in this respect has been that, in the current circumstances, the cessation of nuclear tests would undermine the concept of "nuclear deterrence" and that a stage-by-stage advance towards a complete cessation of nuclear tests will be possible in the future in proportion to the progress in the field of nuclear and conventional disarmament. This approach leaves the international community to console itself with the thought that, when there are no nuclear weapons, there will be nothing to test. And when account is taken of another statement by the United States delegation to the effect that nuclear weapons will, for the foreseeable future, remain the basis of the United States security, the present United States position can hardly be considered positive. That position signifies a notable withdrawal by the United States from what it had been advocating until a relatively short while ago.

The United States last reaffirmed its agreement in principle to a nuclear test ban as an independent priority measure in July 1980. I am referring to the joint report to the Committee on Disarmament by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union as the participants in the tripartite negotiations on banning nuclear tests. Paragraph 4 of the report stated that:

"The negotiating parties are seeking a treaty that for decades has been given one of the highest priorities in the field of arms limitation, and the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States continue to attach great importance to it".

That report was transmitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union to the Committee as document CD/130, of 30 July 1980. The report also emphasized the importance attached by the three sides to the prohibition of nuclear tests.

Paragraph 6 of the report stated:

"The objectives which the negotiating parties seek to achieve as the result of this treaty are important to all mankind. Specifically, they seek to attain a treaty which will make a major contribution to the shared objectives of constraining the nuclear arms race, curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, and strengthening international peace and security" (CD/130).

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

It is well known that these tripartite negotiations, which were close to a successful conclusion, were never resumed owing to the new position on the matter adopted by the United States under the Reagan Administration. That the United States position had changed was stated, in particular, in the speech made by the then Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Rostow, at the meeting of the Committee on Disarmament on 9 February 1982. It was clear from that speech that the Reagan Administration had transferred test-ban issues from the category of first-priority goals to that of long-term goals, and that it had begun to relate a nuclear test ban "to the ability of the Western nations to maintain credible deterrent forces". "We do not believe" said Mr. Rostow, "that, under present circumstances, a comprehensive test ban could help to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons or to maintain the stability of the nuclear balance" (CD/PV.152, p. 13).

Later, the United States expressed its position in the formula which was, in particular, repeated by Ambassador Hansen at the meeting of the Conference on Disarmament on 24 February this year. That formula reads:

"The United States sees a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing as a long-term objective which must be viewed in the context of a time when the United States and its allies do not depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability" (CD/PV.391, p. 11).

I am recalling this since, even in the period prior to the 1980s, when the United States recognized the priority of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, it stood by the concept of nuclear deterrence. What has happened now? Why has the United States abruptly changed its position? I address this question to the United States delegation and I call upon it to demonstrate a more constructive attitude to an issue that rightfully occupies the first place on the agenda of the Conference.

It goes without saying that Soviet-United States agreement in favour of a test ban would be of great significance. However, because of their bilateral character the Soviet-United States talks cannot provide a complete and general solution to this problem. Consequently, we also consider it necessary to begin concrete negotiations within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament as well. The concurrent holding of multilateral negotiations -- within the framework of the Conference -- and bilateral negotiations with the United States would not be contradictory. On the contrary, the concurrent pursuit of negotiations in this way would merely hasten the achievement of the ultimate goal.

With a view to stimulating an immediate start on negotiations at the Conference, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have submitted a set of "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests". It was introduced in the Conference on Disarmament on 9 July this year by Mr. V.F. Petrovsky, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and has been circulated as document CD/756. We regard this document as a possible basis for multilateral negotiations aimed at elaborating the treaty in question. At the same time, we are ready to study constructively any other proposals or views aimed at ensuring the early conclusion of such a treaty.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

In drafting the "Basic provisions", the sponsors took into account numerous views and ideas expressed earlier by other participants in the Conference. To a large degree, this concerns the problem of verification. The document proposes an extremely varied "assortment" of forms and methods of verification, both national and international, including some not previously suggested or discussed.

I would like to recall that the socialist countries' proposal envisages the use of national technical means of verification, the creation of an international seismic verification system with a network of standard seismic stations that would function with the participation of representatives of an international inspectorate, verification -- again with the participation of international inspectors -- of the non-conduct of nuclear explosions at test sites, and mandatory on-site inspections without the right of refusal. The proposal also envisages co-operation in the international exchange of data on atmospheric radioactivity. I should like to dwell on this matter a little later.

It is clear that the concrete needs for particular forms of verification, including seismic verification, can be determined only in the process of devising the entire system for verifying the non-conduct of nuclear explosions. In our view, the time has come to start developing such a system.

This is what prompted the Soviet Union's proposal for the establishment of a special group of scientific experts charged with preparing scientifically based recommendations on the structure and functions of a verification system for any possible agreement not to conduct nuclear weapon tests. This proposal was put forward in the statement by E.A. Shevardnadze, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, on 6 August. Such a group could consider all the aspects of verification in their relationship to one another, including seismic data exchange, on-site inspections, standard characteristics of seismic stations, means of monitoring atmospheric radioactivity, etc. Attention should also be paid to the possible financial implications of the establishment of a verification system.

In making this proposal for a group of scientific experts, we also proceed from the need to put work on a nuclear test ban on a practical footing as soon as possible. I should like to take this opportunity to express our support for the draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on item 1 of the agenda that was recently formally submitted by Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela and Yugoslavia as document CD/772. As is well known, because of the difficulties concerning a mandate for an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1, no such work is yet being done.

With regard to the group of scientific experts on verification, we suggest that, before the end of this year's session, the Conference on Disarmament should take a decision in principle to establish the proposed group at the beginning of the Conference's next annual session.

The fact that the Soviet Union has put forward the idea of establishing a group of scientific experts does not, of course, detract from the role that we ascribe to the work of the seismic experts, on which their distinguished

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

Chairman, Mr. Dahlgren, is, it seems, to report to the Conference today. That group is currently working on an important development designed to lift the machinery for seismic verification to a qualitatively new stage -- the exchange of level II seismic data. It also has important tasks to fulfil in connection with preparations for the international experiment next year, 1988.

Our proposal for the establishment of a group of experts on verification is, on the whole, aimed at accomplishing the logical next step.

In his statement before the Conference on Disarmament on 6 August, Minister Shevardnadze mentioned that the USSR Academy of Sciences had reached a new agreement with United States colleagues on the installation of monitoring instruments and on the exchange of data from them. This agreement on the Soviet-United States "Verification of compliance with a nuclear-test-ban treaty" project provides in particular that, in Soviet territory, three seismic stations in Kazakhstan will continue work under the project until at least 15 December this year. In August or September of this year, a chemical explosion with a yield of up to 10 tonnes will be carried out at or near a test site in Kazakhstan in order to calibrate the seismic stations. Use will also be made for calibration purposes of industrial explosions in the vicinity of the stations.

Beginning in January 1988, the three stations in Kazakhstan will be relocated at a distance of over 1,000 kilometres from the test site. The purpose of this transfer is, firstly, to test the possibility of low-threshold monitoring of explosions of about 1 kiloton and, secondly, to support the international experiment in the exchange of level II seismic data in 1988.

However, besides seismic devices, there are also many other achievements of modern science and technology that can be used for verification purposes.

I should like to recall in this context that, in his statement before the Conference, Minister Shevardnadze proposed the establishment of an international system of global radiation safety monitoring using space communication links. The main functions of such a system could be making monitoring of compliance with a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests more effective; monitoring the status of pollution of the atmosphere, the soil, and ground and sea water on a global and regional scale; collecting, collating and analysing data on, and identifying trends in the radiation situation; prompt acquisition of data on the radiation situation as a result of accidents at nuclear facilities and nuclear power stations or of unauthorized nuclear explosions; forecasting of the possible consequences, etc.

We proceed from the idea that such a system of global radiation safety monitoring could be established even before the entry into force of the treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. The question of establishing this system could be discussed within the special group of scientific experts on verification that we are proposing.

Permit me now to move on to item 5 of the Conference's agenda, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

The Soviet Union considers the task of preventing the transfer of the arms race to outer space as one of the most urgent of our time and it intends, as the USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs, E.A. Shevardnadze, emphasized in his statement, to work towards "a strict and universal ban on deployment of any weapons in outer space".

Our proposals for the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the deployment in outer space of weapons of any kind and of a treaty banning the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the Earth remain on the table.

We have reaffirmed on more than one occasion our willingness to come to an agreement even on partial measures, for example, on the immunity of artificial Earth satellites not carrying weapons of any kind on board and on banning the development of new anti-satellite systems and eliminating the existing ones.

The Conference also has before it a joint document from the delegations of the German Democratic Republic and Mongolia, entitled "Main provisions of a treaty on the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons and on ways to ensure the immunity of space objects" (CD/777 of 31 July this year), which we support.

The views expressed by a number of other delegations also deserve most serious consideration. For example, in his statement on 21 July this year, the head of the Indian delegation, Ambassador Teja, showed the urgent need for the prohibition as soon as possible of the development, testing and deployment of new anti-satellite systems and for elimination of such systems as already exist, and also expressed interesting ideas about ensuring the immunity of artificial Earth satellites. In his statement on 7 July, the distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Yamada, also expressed support for the view that "space objects and their activities for peaceful purposes should not be attacked and should be duly protected". We have also noted the readiness expressed by the delegation of China to proceed, as a first step, to negotiations on the banning of anti-satellite systems and we are, of course, in full agreement with Ambassador Fan's view that this measure must be complemented by other steps aimed at preventing an arms race in space. Interesting views on agenda item 5 have been expressed today by the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Ekéus. We shall, of course, study those views attentively.

The socialist countries' proposals, together with the ideas of other delegations, constitute for the Conference on Disarmament useful assets that could serve as a good basis for business-like work on preventing an arms race in outer space.

It goes without saying that agreement on this issue without reliable verification is unthinkable. In this connection, I should like to recall that, on 17 March this year, the Soviet delegation proposed that consideration should be given to the possibility of establishing an international system, to include an international inspectorate, for verifying the non-deployment in outer space of weapons of any kind. Our proposal met with great interest and a number of questions were put to us in order better to understand its essence.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

Many of those questions were answered in principle in the statement by the USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs, E.A. Shevardnadze, on 6 August. Today, the Soviet delegation would like to make some further clarifications.

The Soviet Union is proposing that a start should be made on establishing a verification system right away, without waiting for the conclusion of the corresponding agreement on space, so that the system can be operational as soon as possible. The principal purpose of such verification would be to determine that objects launched into space were not weapons and were not equipped with weapons of any kind. The concrete list of the systems and devices that the verification bodies should not allow to be launched into space would have to be agreed upon in the course of negotiations. The intention is that the verification system could be refined if an international agreement or agreements are drawn up.

We are convinced that on-site inspection immediately before launch is the simplest and most effective way of making sure that objects launched into space are not equipped with weapons of any kind. The distinguished Ambassador of Argentina, Mr. Cámpora, also talked about this point in his statement on 21 July. Such inspection might begin not long before the object to be launched into space is installed on the carrier rocket or other launch vehicle. However, should the future agreement provide for a complete ban on space strike weapons, the Soviet Union would, as Minister Shevardnadze stated, be "willing to extend inspections to storage facilities, industrial plants, laboratories, testing centres, etc." The verification system we propose would provide for groups of inspectors to be present permanently at all sites for the launching of space objects with a view to verifying all such objects irrespective of their means of launching. In addition, representatives of the secretariat would be given in good time information on each upcoming launch, including the site, the type of launch vehicle, general information about the object to be launched and the time of the launch. In cases where launches were infrequent, use could be made of inspections on the basis of prior notifications of the launches, instead of permanently stationing inspectors at the launch sites. Should an undeclared launch be suspected, the inspectorate would have the right to request the relevant information from specially designated observatories, a list of which would be compiled by the time the verification system became operational, and also to make, if necessary, a special on-site inspection if the launch could have been made from an undeclared launching site.

What is meant here is, of course, the verification of the non-stationing in space of weapons of any kind, and not the verification of launches of ballistic missiles unconnected with the placing of any devices in an orbit for an artificial Earth satellite or on a flight path towards other celestial bodies.

Although we view an international inspectorate as the principal element of a possible verification system, this does not preclude the possibility of establishing other structures, for example, means of tracking space objects, within the framework of the inspectorate.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

As experience of negotiations that have reached an advanced stage -- for example, those on prohibiting and eliminating chemical weapons -- shows, it would be advisable to make provision within the framework of the verification system for some central executive body and secretariat. The corps of inspectors and the number of inspection groups would have to be defined taking into account the need for the verification to cover all sites or ranges for the launching of space objects. From the organizational point of view, the verification system could function either independently or within the framework of a world space organization once that is set up. It would be advisable to provide for a certain link between the verification system and the United Nations bodies to which States already, as is provided for by the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, send general information on the objects they launch into space.

Naturally, specific questions relating to the composition, structure, organization and financing of the verification system should be the subject of negotiation. Account might be taken in this respect of the experience in devising measures and machinery for verifying compliance with disarmament agreements in other fields.

In conclusion, I should like to express thanks to all the delegations which have expressed support for the Soviet proposal for a system to verify the non-stationing of weapons in space.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement. I have noted the reminder of his country's proposal of last week for a special group of scientific experts, which will entail the appropriate consultations.

I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, His Excellency Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I would like to begin this brief statement by expressing my delegation's pleasure at your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, and at the fact that this has happened in what could well be considered the most important month of each year as far as the work of the Conference is concerned. I take this opportunity to place on record once again my delegation's appreciation for the exemplary manner in which your predecessor, the distinguished representative of Ethiopia, Ambassador Terrefe, carried out his functions. I am pleased to welcome among us the new representative of Brazil, Ambassador Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja, and the new representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Nihal Rodrigo. Lastly, I wish to state how much we regret the fact that Ambassador Saad Alfarargi will soon be leaving. For almost four years he has headed the delegation of Egypt, and just two months ago he gave us tangible proof of his skill in conducting the deliberations of a multilateral body such as this.



(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

At the latest meeting of the Conference on Disarmament two days ago, the distinguished representative of Japan, Ambassador Yamada, speaking, in his words, "on behalf of a group of Western delegations" and referring to agenda item 1, said that they were still prepared "to start practical work in an ad hoc committee at the earliest possible opportunity" with a view to finding "common ground among the various positions thus far expressed."

Shortly afterwards, at the same meeting, the distinguished representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler, said that his delegation "was included in the group of States for which the Ambassador of Japan was speaking", that they had "made a proposal to which there has been no answer", and that what could move us towards consensus on this issue "would be for delegations to accept the proposal made by a group of Western States ... on the basis of the proposal that has been made by the President for the month of April".

In order to place things in their context, it is important to have clear ideas which correspond to reality on the following basic points. First of all, the only -- I emphasize this, the only -- draft mandate submitted to the Conference on Disarmament in the current year 1987 is that reproduced in document CD/772 sponsored by the delegations of Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. This mandate faithfully reflects the request addressed to the Conference on Disarmament by the General Assembly in paragraph 5 of resolution 41/46A, which was adopted on 3 December 1986 by the overwhelming majority of 135 votes in favour and only 3 against.

Secondly, in submitting this draft to the Conference on behalf of the sponsors at the 422nd meeting on 16 July last, we stated the following:

"We venture to hope that the objective study of this draft and its comparison to those circulated between 1984 and now will highlight its constructive spirit and its flexibility, which allows for interpretations which are not in conflict with any of the points of view which can legitimately be maintained in connection with this matter, a matter to which the Assembly has quite rightly been giving the highest priority and which also takes pride of place on the agenda of our Conference".

Thirdly, at last Tuesday's meeting I had the following to say in an off-the-cuff statement with respect to CD/772:

"My delegation has always sought to back up its words with deeds. Thus, for example, when we stated and repeated that we are prepared to seek a formula that would lead to consensus on the issue of putting an end to all nuclear tests, we tried to follow up our words with something concrete, a text that would serve this purpose. That has been the case again this year. My delegation, together with seven other delegations, which are members of the Group of 21, has sponsored document CD/772, which contains a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee on item 1 of our agenda ....

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"The text to which I have referred, which appears in document CD/772, is before the Conference, and those delegations like the distinguished delegation of Japan, which has just taken the floor, may of course express their support for the draft if what they wish is to give concrete evidence — practical evidence, to use the word that is customary in such cases -- that they really are seeking results.

"What does the draft say? The draft says that the Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc committee on item 1 of its agenda 'with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the cessation of all nuclear test explosions'.

"'With the objective' is a formula which is open to a wide variety of interpretations. For my delegation it is an immediate objective, but for other delegations — for example, the delegation of the United States, which has stated this in similar terms on several occasions — it is a long-term objective. For this reason, if the draft mandate is adopted, the delegation of Mexico might issue a statement indicating its interpretation thereof. The delegation of the United States, or any other delegation, would also be able to state its own interpretation. Thus, this mandate can be approved by consensus without any of the delegations present here having to abandon its position.

"What does the draft go on to say? The draft says that the ad hoc committee will set up two working groups which will deal, respectively, with the following interrelated questions: Working Group I — Contents and scope of the treaty; Working Group II — Compliance and verification. This shows that we do not wish to overlook any of the aspects of this issue."

We would like to know the position of the delegation of Australia with respect to the mandate we have proposed, which certainly cannot be criticized as being supported by only "a handful of delegations", since we can state without fear of contradiction that it enjoys the support of approximately two thirds of the membership of the Conference.

For our part, we make this offer: if the informal suggestion by the President for last April were to be formalized in a Conference document, as in the case of CD/772, whether under his sponsorship or that of the members referred to by the distinguished representatives of Japan and Australia, we would be prepared to express our position on this and explain the reasons for it in detail.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and for his kind words to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Australia.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): In the statement just made by the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, remarks that were made by me at the last plenary session of the Conference were addressed and, at the end of the statement, a question was posed to my delegation. With your permission, Mr. President, I would like to respond briefly and I think it is appropriate that I do so immediately.

In the first instance, the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico sought to quote from remarks that I made, as he did last week, on an unprepared basis, and in two cases I regret to say that what was quoted was not in fact what I said. But in particular, of those two cases, I would like it to be clear that I did not under any circumstances say, as is now suggested in page 4 of the Spanish version of the Ambassador of Mexico's statement, I did not in any way say that the text of a mandate provided in CD/772 was supported by only a handful of delegations. I said the reverse. I said that we are being prevented from working on item 1 of our agenda by only a handful of delegations, so that, having made that correction, it is easy for me to state that I agree with the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico when he claims that the text he has tabled together with six other delegations in document CD/772 has the very widespread support -- I think he said support by at least two thirds -- of the Conference. It is perfectly clear to my delegation that that is a statement of fact.

He posed a particular question to me with regard to my own delegation's attitude towards the draft mandate in CD/772. I would hope it would be clear to him and every other member of this Conference that Australian policy on the issue of a nuclear test ban is such that, on a national basis, we would be able to accept the mandate provided in document CD/772.

But, Mr. President, that is not the point. I find it interesting -- I am not sure how useful -- that the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico has asked me to say what our position is. I have merely repeated what is our well-known policy position. The point is not why my delegation's position is; the point is how do we find consensus on this issue? And I would like immediately to express my gratitude to the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico for what he said in the closing paragraph of the statement he made this morning, namely, that his delegation would be prepared to participate with others in an examination of the draft mandate provided by the President for the month of April, Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia, with a view to achieving such consensus, that being our task: not to identify the views of individual delegations, but to find consensus. What I asked for on Tuesday was precisely such an expression, an expression of willingness to sit down together and work towards consensus on the basis of what the distinguished Ambassador of Czechoslovakia proposed as President in April, and what I have heard the distinguished representative of Mexico say this morning is that he, and he hopes others, are prepared to do just that. That is the answer to the question which had not previously been given, and I suggest that it has now been given this morning and I would hope it is not too late for us to start work on the basis of that proposal made in April and hopefully come to consensus this year so that we can begin our work immediately next year.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Australia for his statement and I give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of Australia for some of the ideas in his statement.

Unfortunately, it would seem that the text on which he based himself does not correspond to reality, or is it perhaps that the Spanish text (because the text that we wrote is Spanish) is not really being interpreted correctly by the members of the Australian delegation? What I said in that text, in the final paragraph on page 4, I will now try to translate into English as faithfully as possible, and the members of my delegation inform me that the simultaneous interpreters interpreted that paragraph very correctly. The paragraph says the following (It will not be very elegant English, but I am going to put it into English as I have it in Spanish):

"In what concerns us, we offer that if the informal suggestion that the President of last April were to be made a formal proposal in a document of the Conference, as is the case of the document CD/772, be it under the sponsorship of that President, or under the sponsorship of the members which were referred to by the distinguished representatives of Japan and Australia, we would be ready to express our position concerning that proposal and to explain in detail the reasons which are the basis for that position".

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Mexico and I give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): I am grateful to the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico for his clarification of the last paragraph of this statement. I can see now from his excellent English translation and from reading the Spanish as he gave that translation that I was mistaken as to one element of what he said in his statement.

I cannot purport to speak for the Western Group on this subject, on the proposal that he has made that the April President's proposal first be made a formal proposal of the Conference before we can consider it; I am sure that other delegations will want to think about that. I would have to say from my standpoint though, that I am not clear -- and perhaps we can solve this in informal consultations -- I am not clear why that proposal is made, what difference it makes. The proposal by the President of April has been there since April; we have since that time stated our willingness, that is, we, a number of Western States, have stated our willingness to enter into consultations on the basis of that proposal. We have not until today even had the degree of answer that we have now been given, of answer to our proposal that we discuss this issue on the basis of the April draft. I am not quite sure what difference it makes to actually table it formally, but I am sure others of the Conference will want to consider that. I would still remain

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

grateful, however, that for the first time this morning we have been given an indication that it will be possible, perhaps under formal circumstances, but that it would be possible, to talk about the substance of what was proposed in April, which, we have indicated since that time, we are prepared to discuss.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Australia for his statement, and I give the floor to the representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Taylhardat.

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): It is rare for us to have an opportunity in the Conference on Disarmament for such a dynamic exchange of opinions among delegations.

I should like to say for the present that we fully subscribe to what was said by Ambassador García Robles in his statement. However, I asked for the floor to refer to a comment that Ambassador Butler made in his statement last Tuesday and reiterated in the statement he made a few moments ago, his comment that a handful of countries has prevented the formation of a consensus concerning the mandate for the ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. That in effect means that a group of countries, or the handful of countries to which he referred, is obstructing the work of the Conference. I am not going to comment on that assertion, but I do believe that it requires some reflection as to its implications. At the same time, I should like to emphasize that, according to the statement made by the representative of Australia, which was also quoted in the statement by the Ambassador of Mexico, Mr. García Robles, it would seem that the point of view of the countries on whose behalf the Ambassador of Japan spoke and to which the Ambassador of Australia subscribes means that the only possibility of consensus is on the basis of the proposal made by that group, because it says here that that group made a proposal to which there has been no response and that what could "move us towards consensus on this issue would be for delegations to accept the proposal made by a group of Western States" -- that, to judge from that statement, the only possibility of consensus would be on the basis of the proposal by the Western States, which is in a way saying that there would only be consensus in one direction.

Those are just a few comments that I wanted to make to contribute to this morning's exchange.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Venezuela and I give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): To respond quickly to what has just been said by my friend and colleague from Venezuela, two points. First of all, when I said on 30 July, then again yesterday and again today, that it is our perception that progress on this issue is being impeded by only a handful of States, I made clear that the reason for mentioning this -- what I believe to be a fact -- was to lament that we are so close to agreement that the step involved to find agreement is, and should be, quite small. Secondly, there is a misunderstanding with regard to the proposal of the West to enter into

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

discussion on the basis of the mandate provided in the draft by the President for April, and I think this misunderstanding is, in fact, repeated on the first page of the statement made by the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico today. I cannot pretend to be in any way fluent in the Spanish language, but it does seem to me from the second paragraph of that statement, and this has just been reflected by what our colleague from Venezuela has said, that we have been understood, Ambassador Yamada has been understood, as saying that we are prepared to work only on the basis of the proposal advanced by the President in April, and indeed, the implication is given that we are saying, "Take this or leave it; this or nothing else".

Now, this is what has just been repeated by the distinguished Ambassador of Venezuela, and it is not correct. The statement made on behalf of a group of Western countries said that we preferred the document in CD/521, but that we were prepared to enter into discussions, negotiations if you will, on the basis of the April President's proposal, and it should be very, very clear that what is not being said is "Take the April President's proposal or nothing else". In other words, it is not the one-way street that you have just been suggesting that it might be. What we have said is that we would hope to have an answer to the proposal, that we look into the matter, we have a discussion, on the basis of what the President for April proposed -- and, of course, that discussion would be one without prejudice in any way. It would be an open discussion to see whether or not there is the basis of consensus. It is a position that is not accurately reflected as being a demand that consensus be built in only one way, namely, our way.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Australia and I give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Perhaps the most suitable procedure for making it very clear and very definite what the terms of a proposal are is to submit it to the secretariat for it to be circulated as a document of the Conference. At least, that is what has always been done in this connection. That would be the first step, and then the next one is the one that has just been made by the distinguished representative of Australia.

Our draft resolution, before being a formal draft resolution, was a well-known preliminary draft, known to all the members of the Conference on Disarmament from the "spring session", and we still hope that the delegations to which Ambassador Yamada or Ambassador Butler referred will come and discuss it with us. We then took the next step and made and formalized the proposal and it has been circulated as document CD/722. And, in my statement today, I said, in the final paragraph on page 4, "We would like to know the position of the delegation of Australia with respect to the mandate we have proposed". Naturally, instead of Australia, one could also say "the entire group of delegations for which Ambassador Yamada was the spokesman". We do not see why a proposal that does not even exist as a document should be taken as a basis for talks.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement. Are there any further speakers on this matter? The representative of the United States has requested the floor; I give the floor to Ambassador Friedersdorf.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): I do not want to prolong the session this morning unduly, but the distinguished Soviet Ambassador in his remarks this morning on a nuclear test ban and outer space, which contained much useful and interesting material for our consideration, did mention the United States in his remarks and again attacked the Western policy of deterrence. I would like to just respond very briefly if I might, because he asked a very direct question at one point. In referring to documents in the nuclear-test-ban area in July 1980, he referred to those documents, and then asked a rhetorical question: What has happened? Why has the United States abruptly changed its position? and he addressed this question to our delegation. I would just respond that what happened and what changed was that there was a Presidential election in the United States, which occurs every four years. Several parties compete and issues are discussed, and my recollection of that campaign was that the President of our country, Mr. Reagan, campaigned on a platform calling for strengthening of the United States defence and security posture in the face of an increased Soviet threat. I recall that campaign very well. As a result of that campaign in 1980, the American people responded overwhelmingly with a landslide election mandate, which was repeated in 1984 by an even larger majority. Part of this Reagan policy, enunciated during both these campaigns and overwhelmingly adopted by the American people, one of its cornerstones and concepts was nuclear deterrence, so I just want to point out to the distinguished Soviet Ambassador that these abrupt changes in policy do occur every four years in the United States through our electoral process.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): Before giving the floor to the Chairman of the Group of Experts and in view of the exchange of opinions that has taken place, I believe it may be helpful to remind the Conference of what I said in my opening statement and have said in each of the consultations that I, as President, have had with the groups, namely that I remain at the disposal of the members of the Conference should there be any development with regard to the agenda items on which it has not yet been possible to reach any procedural agreement, that is, items 1, 3 and 7.

I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, Mr. Ola Dahlman, who will introduce the Group's report, which is contained in document CD/778.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): Mr. President, I am pleased to present to you the results of the recent meeting of the Ad hoc Group and to introduce its progress report contained in document CD/778, which is in front of you.

The meeting took place from 27 July to 7 August 1987 and experts from 25 countries attended the session; I am pleased to inform you that this is the widest representation we have had for many sessions. The World Meteorological Organization was also represented. As you may recall, we had a schedule problem with this meeting and the Group was, during the first week, allocated the usual Conference services only if they were available within the

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

resources already assigned to the Conference. The secretariat and the Group's Secretary, Mr. Cassandra, made, in my view, an admirable and successful effort to arrange an adequate number of meetings even during that first week and also by providing outstanding services throughout the session. I would also like to thank those CD Committees that kindly shared some of their scheduled time with us to make these meeting arrangements possible.

At our two previous sessions, in August 1986 and March 1987, we reached agreement in principle on the design and testing of a modern international seismic data exchange system, as documented in CD/721 and CD/745 -- a system which is based on the expeditious exchange of all available seismic information from all detected signals and the routine use of all data at international data centres (IDCs).

At this latest session we have been adding technical details to these general principles earlier agreed upon.

To work out all the technicalities of this new system is a demanding and time-consuming task which has to be supported by extensive work at the national level. A number of national contributions were presented. Some of those documents were quite extensive and detailed and reflected the fact that considerable efforts already have been initiated in some countries towards the practical design and development of the new system. Informal experiments on the exchange of wave-form data have also been undertaken by a number of countries and tentative results were reported.

The discussions were aided by several informal meetings and presentations. The Japanese delegation arranged informal meetings on waveform data exchange. The United States delegation gave a presentation on global satellite communication. The Group also received from the United States delegation an invitation to a workshop on IDCs to be held in Washington, D.C., in October this year. The Swedish delegation demonstrated, through computer simulation, possible ways to conduct the tasks at IDCs. This demonstration was followed by a number of informal meetings on how to design IDCs. Such informal and usually very technical activities are most valuable in supporting the work of the Group.

During the session, five open-ended study groups were established to further elaborate on the design concept and to assist the Group's Scientific Secretary, Dr. Frode Ringdahl of Norway, in his important work to prepare a draft report describing a tentative design of the system. Each study group is headed by two convenors, as listed in annex I of the progress report.

An important task for the study group on stations and the station network is to pursue further the issue of modern prototype "CD stations". The ultimate aim is to achieve a standardized global network of modern stations. A "CD station" should be able to collect and exchange high-quality wave-form data from seismic events at all distances. Such a design concept should include array stations able to improve the detection capability and to provide preliminary locations of detected events.



(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

One study group is to focus on the functioning of national data centres, which are to be established in each country as an authorized point of contact with the international system. The group will primarily work on the technical means and procedures for the extraction of parameter and wave-form data from participating stations in each country to be transmitted to the international data centres.

Efficient and reliable data communication would be a most important component of the global system. The Group agreed earlier that high-capacity, dedicated data communication links, using satellite data transmission or other means, should be established between IDCs. These dedicated links should be operated in such a way that any data transmitted from a national to an international data centre would automatically and instantaneously be transmitted to all other IDCs. National data centres would communicate with the international centres using the most efficient and appropriate communication channels available in the regions concerned. There still exists some disagreement within the Group as to the practical arrangements needed to satisfy these requirements. Two study groups have been established to study communications between national and international data centres.

One of these groups will study data exchange through the Global Telecommunication System of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO/GTS). This communication system was used almost exclusively during the Group's technical test in 1984. The representative of the World Meteorological Organization reviewed the status of WMO/GTS and its current capabilities and also the prospects for its further development. The far larger data volumes to be exchanged within the new system make it necessary to study carefully to what extent and in which part of the world WMO/GTS will prove to be useful. The Group greatly appreciates the continued co-operation with the World Meteorological Organization on these matters.

Another group will study data exchange between national and international data centres using other available means of communication. This could include modern computer-to-computer communication, or less sophisticated dial-up telephone connections.

The fifth group will study the international data centres. It will be headed by four convenors, each representing one of the four planned such centres. This group will elaborate the technical means and procedures for the collection and analysis of seismic wave-form and parameter data. This implies considerable new development, as the necessary methods and procedures for the joint analysis of globally collected wave-form data do not exist today and have to be developed. The Group will further elaborate on the establishment of high-capacity dedicated communication links between the IDCs and on the distribution of the results of their analyses.

The Group earlier agreed that a large-scale experiment should be conducted using a stage-by-stage approach to test proposed concepts for the envisaged system. The Group agreed to appoint Mr. Peter Basham of Canada as the principal co-ordinator of the experiment. This is in my view a most

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

important decision and I am confident that Mr. Basham will guide the planning and conducting of the experiment most successfully. I would like to express to Mr. Basham my great appreciation for his willingness to undertake this demanding task.

To facilitate the co-ordination of the test, assistant co-ordinators at each of the four IDCs have been appointed, as listed in annex II of the progress report. It was further agreed that a co-ordinator at each participating national data centre will be identified later.

The Ad hoc Group suggests that, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, its next session should be convened in Geneva from 7 to 18 March 1988.

This concludes my presentation and my introduction of the Group's progress report (CD/778).

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts for introducing the report. I give the floor to the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Nazarkin.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): First of all, I should like to express my gratitude to the Ambassador of the United States of America, Mr. Friedersdorf, for his reaction to the question that I addressed to the United States delegation in my statement. Perhaps because of inaccurate interpretation, I unfortunately received no answer to that question. It goes without saying that a change of administration in the United States is an important event, but my question had to do with a somewhat different aspect. I will repeat it briefly. Nowadays, the current United States administration is linking changes in its position on tests to nuclear deterrence. On the other hand, the concept of nuclear deterrence lay at the basis of United States foreign policy even prior to the Reagan Administration, beginning in 1946. Notwithstanding, until the 1980s this concept did not prevent the United States from participating in negotiations on a comprehensive test ban, did not prevent it terming a comprehensive test ban a priority objective. So, my question is: why, with the advent of the Reagan Administration and although the concept of nuclear deterrence has apparently remained the same, has it begun to impede United States participation in negotiations on a comprehensive test ban and caused a comprehensive test ban to be transferred from the category of priority goals to that of long-term goals? That was my question.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for his statement and I give the floor to the representative of the United States, Ambassador Friedersdorf.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): I would concede that the distinguished Ambassador's English is much better than my Russian and if I misinterpreted the remarks, I apologize. But, since the text is in English I think I got the gist of it. I do not think that I am capable of giving the Ambassador the type of answer he would like to hear, but I will try to answer his question again. As I said before, at the time of the election the President campaigned on a platform of modernizing and strengthening the

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United States defence and security programme in the face of a Soviet threat, and if that strengthening requires the necessity of nuclear testing, I think that the President puts the security of our nation above disarmament. I think that all of us at this table represent 40 nations that are critically interested in the field of disarmament, or else we would not be here. I do not question anybody's, and certainly not our own, dedication to that field, but I think that each of our 40 national Governments does have a responsibility in the area of security for their own people and this is the decision that our national leader has made.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States for his statement. Are there any delegations that would like to take the floor either on the report of the Ad hoc Group or on any other matter? I see none.

I should like to draw your attention to the fact that paragraph 17 of the report of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts that has just been introduced contains, as the Group's Chairman pointed out, a recommendation to the Conference concerning the dates for the Ad hoc Group's next session, which are proposed as 17 and 18 March 1988. In keeping with the practice of the Conference, I shall submit that recommendation to a decision by the Conference during the plenary session that will be held on Thursday, 20 August. I invite delegations wishing to speak on the work of the Ad hoc Group before that recommendation is adopted to do so no later than that date.

The secretariat has today distributed to you, at my request, an informal document containing the schedule of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. As usual, that schedule is only tentative and can, if necessary, be amended later as the work of the Conference requires.

As I announced on Tuesday, the schedule provides for an informal meeting on Tuesday, 18 August, immediately after the plenary meeting, to commence the first reading of document CD/WP.287, which contains the procedural part of the Conference's report to the forty-first session of the General Assembly on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and the first reading of the report of the Conference itself to the forty-second session of the General Assembly, which will be distributed in the official languages between today and tomorrow under symbol CD/WP.288. Documents CD/WP.287 and CD/WP.288 will be available in delegations' pigeon-holes.

The schedule also provides for informal consultations, open to all delegations, on the substantive paragraphs concerning the agenda items for which the Conference has not established subsidiary bodies, that is to say, items 1, 2, 3 and 7. The relevant drafts will be available as from Tuesday, 18 August. The Conference will examine the results of the informal consultations at an informal meeting.

If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference accepts the schedule.

It was so decided.

(The President)

I have been asked to remind you that the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons will meet in this room immediately after the plenary meeting.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 18 August, at 10 a.m. This plenary meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.