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THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA

Report of the Secretary-General

Addendum

Consolidated inter-agency 90-day Plan of Action for Emergency
Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia

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INTRODUCTION

1. The integrated Plan of Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia, covering a 90-day period, sets out the modalities and inputs required for the accelerated and expanded delivery of urgent humanitarian assistance to people in all parts of Somalia. The Plan has been compiled within the context of resolution 746 (1992) which was adopted by the Security Council on 17 March 1992.

2. In that resolution, the Security Council strongly supported the Secretary-General's decision to dispatch urgently to Somalia a United Nations technical team to prepare an operational plan for the monitoring of the cease-fire agreement between the two factions engaged in conflict at Mogadishu. In the same resolution, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to pursue his humanitarian efforts in Somalia and to use all the resources at his disposal, including those of the relevant United Nations agencies, to address urgently the critical needs of the affected population.

3. In view of the severe security constraints on ongoing relief efforts in many parts of Somalia, the Secretary-General requested the Technical Team to look into possible mechanisms to ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to people in need. To facilitate this action, the Technical Team included the Secretary-General's Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia, two representatives from the Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat and a representative from the non-governmental organization (NGO) community.

4. The Team, which was dispatched to Somalia from 23 March to 1 April 1992, visited Mogadishu, Kismayo and Hargeisa and met with the authorities and clan leaders from north-east Somalia and from the south-west of the country. A report of the Team's findings has been submitted to the Secretary-General (S/23829). The present document describes the current situation in the areas visited and the agreements that were made with the various authorities and clan leaders for the delivery of humanitarian assistance through the collaborative efforts of the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and NGOs.

5. The difficulties of providing relief assistance under prevailing conditions in many parts of Somalia are evident and the safety of relief personnel engaged in humanitarian assistance remains a paramount concern. Nevertheless, given the magnitude of the crisis and its threat to the stability of other countries within the Horn of Africa, no time can be lost in mounting large-scale relief efforts. In this regard, the paradox facing the international community should be noted: without security, relief assistance will continue to be severely constrained, but without relief assistance programmes, the prospects for security are at best precarious.

6. In view of the situation, a pragmatic approach has been adopted in the determination of inputs for the 90-day Plan and modalities for the delivery of

assistance. Hence, while emergency relief requirements for the 90-day period have been based on needs assessments undertaken earlier in the year and incorporated into the Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal for the Horn of Africa of 1 February 1992, the Plan has also attempted to provide sufficient quantities of relief food to reduce the risk of further deterioration in the already volatile situation, as well as to promote the demobilization of large numbers of military personnel.

7. It must be recognized, however, that even with such an approach, the effectiveness of the 90-day Plan will be determined by the observance by all parties of the basic principles of international humanitarian assistance, including parity of relief distributions and safe passage for relief personnel and supplies through designated "corridors" and "zones of peace".

8. To date, there has been only limited financial support from donors for the Somalia portion of the Horn of Africa Appeal. Thus it should be noted that the prompt and generous support of the international community in providing sufficient funds for identified needs is essential. Given the fluidity of circumstances in Somalia, revised needs assessments, within the overall context of the 1 February 1992 Appeal, will need to be carried out during the course of the next three months. Thus the Plan should be seen as part of an ongoing process, which will continue to update needs in targeted areas and identify new needs as they emerge, as well as determine inputs required for longer-term programmes.

I. BACKGROUND

9. Four years of civil war, against a backdrop of years of neglect and lack of investment in human development, basic services and infrastructure, have left much of Somalia in ruins. Major cities in northern Somalia have been reduced to rubble; houses, public buildings, communications and water systems have been destroyed and an already inadequate health sector has been rendered incapable of providing even the most rudimentary services. Agricultural production and Somalia's vital livestock trade have been crippled and an entire generation of Somali children is growing up without access to education.

10. In the 14 months that have passed since the overthrow of the former President Siad Barre, the situation in many parts of Somalia has continued to deteriorate. There is no functioning Government and political instability prevails throughout the country. The struggle for power, which has resulted in inter-clan and intra-clan conflict, has plunged towns and cities into a nightmare of bloodshed and violence. The disruption that has been caused by prolonged conflict and insecurity has seriously affected normal commercial and foreign aid, including donated food supplies. Consequently, the lives of 1.5 million Somali people are at most immediate risk and 3.5 million more also require some form of relief assistance.

11. At Mogadishu, where intense fighting has continued between the two main factions of the United Somali Congress (USC) since November 1991, a cease-fire

agreement was signed in February 1992. The relative calm in the city, however, is fragile. Gangs of armed men and boys continue to prowl the streets, while other sub-clans and factions remain in control of key installations.

12. In the north, which enjoyed almost 12 months of relative stability in 1991, recent months have seen a worsening security situation and increased banditry. In the south, relief efforts are ongoing but intra-clan rivalry and looting of relief supplies has prevented the expansion of activities. Services are thus inadequate and cannot cope with current needs. In recent months there has been further internal displacement of people. Over 100,000 other Somalis have also crossed the border into Kenya as refugees, placing severe strains on already exhausted camp structures and food supplies.

13. In the midst of the chaos that prevails throughout many areas, ICRC and NGOs, with support from the United Nations, have continued to work alongside Somali doctors, nurses, indigenous NGOs and local United Nations staff to alleviate the plight of those most in need. Over the months, however, banditry and looting have become commonplace, resulting in the deaths of a number of local and expatriate relief staff and further disruption of relief efforts.

II. CURRENT SITUATION

A. Mogadishu

14. At Mogadishu, the recent upsurge in factional conflict between Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman of USC (Hawiye clan), for control of the city and the breakdown of law and order have left over 25,000 people dead or wounded and an estimated 500,000 people totally devoid of even rudimentary services.

15. Following the intervention of the Secretary-General and the signing of a cease-fire agreement by the two parties, a joint mission comprising the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) was dispatched to Somalia from 29 February to 3 March 1992. An agreement was reached with the two sides for a United Nations technical team to visit Mogadishu to work out modalities for monitoring the cease-fire.

16. Since that time, fighting has subsided and large numbers of people who had fled to the outskirts of the city have taken advantage of the break in hostilities to return to the capital to rebuild their homes. Water and food shortages, along with fuel supplies, however, are acute. In spite of significant amounts of non-food relief assistance, shelter, health care and sanitation services continue to be inadequate.

17. Although some food supplies have been brought into Mogadishu by traders, prices in the markets are high and beyond the means of most of the population. Relief food distributions have been halted since November 1991,

when the intense fighting between the two factions began. In January 1992, 7,000 metric tons of food from the World Food Programme (WFP) stored at the port of Mogadishu were looted. Attempts by WFP on 4 March 1992 to deliver food to the capital had to be aborted following an attack on the WFP vessel in Mogadishu harbour. As a result of continued food shortages, it is now estimated that some 700,000 people in Mogadishu are in need of urgent assistance. Of most concern are the displaced persons still living on the outskirts of the city, those who have recently returned to the capital and a further 80,000 representing highly vulnerable groups.

18. Although most of the diplomatic community evacuated the capital in 1991, seven international and indigenous NGOs are presently operating in Mogadishu. The International Medical Corps (IMC) is working in two hospitals in the south of the city and hopes to expand its activities to the north. Médecins sans frontières - France is involved in war-related surgery, the supply of essential drugs to the city's three main hospitals and to health centres. Save the Children Fund (SCF) of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has established 12 maternal and child health (MCH) clinics, supplementary and therapeutic feeding services and is providing nurses to work in the hospitals.

19. SOS and Comitato Internazionale Sviuppo Populi (CISP), an Italian NGO, are also involved in the health care and feeding of malnourished groups, along with similar assistance provided by indigenous NGOs. ICRC is working closely with the Somali Red Crescent Society and focusing its activities on surgical and medical assistance for the wounded in hospitals on the north and south sides of the city. ICRC has also provided medical, surgical, pharmaceutical and other health-related supplies to hospitals and clinics.

20. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has provided coordination and logistics assistance for United Nations and NGO efforts at Mogadishu and elsewhere in the country through a project executed under the Obligations and Payments System. The total value of the indicative planning figure (IPF) project, which has provided aircraft, consultants and radio equipment, is US\$ 3.6 million. Until the end of 1991, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) had supplied over US\$ 10 million in cash and relief items, mainly to NGOs working in the capital. Since re-establishing its presence at Mogadishu in December 1991, UNICEF, using WFP aircraft on loan from the Sudan, airlifted 256 tons of emergency supplies for people in need on both sides of the city. Some fuel has also been supplied to hospitals in order to maintain essential medical services.

21. As part of the airlift operation, the airstrip in the north of the city was rehabilitated. A major breakthrough was achieved during the operation when UNICEF was able to transport supplies by road from the south to the north of the city for the first time since the conflict erupted. In recent weeks, UNICEF has also established six MCH centres in the capital, with plans to extend such services to areas presently uncovered. In the past three months, the World Health Organization (WHO) has supplied emergency health, surgery and laboratory kits, along with essential drugs and medical supplies to support NGO programmes.

B. Central Somalia

22. Owing to conflict and insecurity, around 120,000 people have fled from Mogadishu and are living in precarious conditions around the small coastal port of Merca, south of the capital. Although the needs of the area are urgent, delivery of relief food assistance has been extremely difficult owing to disruptions caused by armed gangs from Mogadishu. Apart from an indigenous NGO, the Committee Against Hunger, which has established a feeding unit for an estimated 1,000 children and about 300 adults, no other NGOs are currently working in the Merca area.

23. The region of Belet Uen, which lies between the riverine environment of the Shabelle river and the drier regions to the north, is also a major cause for concern. The return over the last year of many thousands of people has placed severe strains on food supplies and the nutritional condition of large numbers of people is extremely poor. Because of not being able to use the port of Mogadishu, ICRC has recently started an airlift of food supplies to alleviate the plight of people in the area. The combined total of people in need of food assistance in the region, including Merca, is estimated to be 500,000.

C. North-west Somalia

24. The north-west suffered greatly in the civil war. Its main city, Hargeisa, once home to over 500,000 people, was abandoned by the population, most of them fleeing to refugee camps in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. Although many of these people have now returned, some 85 per cent of homes and public buildings in the city were destroyed during aerial and ground bombardment and are no longer habitable. Health care services, water systems, schools and sanitation services, as well as communication and banking systems, were virtually wiped out throughout the region. In addition, hundreds of thousands of mines were laid, particularly in and around Hargeisa and Burao. Along with the vast amounts of unexploded ordnance, they remain a major risk to the lives of both Somalis and relief workers.

25. In many areas of the north, the September-October Dayir (short rains) failed, seriously affecting pasture and water availability. Consequently, there has been unusually high mortality of livestock. This has been exacerbated by the spread of diseases owing to the almost complete lack of veterinary care over the last four years. The loss and poor condition of animals threaten the future of a substantial portion of the population. In addition, there was little crop cultivation in 1991 and what was planted largely failed owing to the drought.

26. Although the area saw relative peace for almost a year following the overthrow of Siad Barre, in recent months conditions have seriously deteriorated owing to intra-clan conflict and a subsequent breakdown of law and order. The Government formed by the Somali National Movement (SNM) after its declaration of independence barely controls Hargeisa. Earlier attempts to

start demobilizing the army that fought in the civil war have also been interrupted and the armies of the opposing factions are reported to be poised for battle. In January 1992, intra-clan conflict spilled over to Burao, resulting in the displacement of large numbers of people.

27. The return of peace to the region in 1991 led to a relatively large number of NGOs re-establishing their programmes in various areas. SCF (United Kingdom) opened three MCH centres and monetized 2,500 tons of food through market traders, as well as providing seeds and tools. The agency also carried out an important nutritional survey of seven of the major cities in the north and a socio-economic assessment of the rural areas in late 1991. Médecins sans frontières (MSF) of the Netherlands has opened five MCH centres and is assisting two hospitals - one at Burao and one at Sheik - as well as a therapeutic feeding centre.

28. Oxfam (United Kingdom) has undertaken emergency water rehabilitation programmes at Hargeisa and other towns in the north and has assisted in the management of water tankers at Hargeisa. Partner Aid International, working mainly in the Sanaag region, has been involved in agricultural rehabilitation, including the supply of vegetable seeds, pest and disease control and gravity-fed irrigation systems. Handicap International, based at Hargeisa, has provided prosthesis assistance. Other NGOs working in the north-west include Help the Aged International, German Emergency Doctors, Action Aid, COPI (an Italian NGO) and Hands.

29. ICRC has been running a hospital at Berbera, catering mainly to victims of the war, and has provided drugs for other hospitals and veterinary supplies. The running of the hospital was recently handed over to the Somali Red Crescent Society, with assistance from the Norwegian Red Cross. Some food rations have also been provided by ICRC for vulnerable groups.

30. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has maintained a presence in Hargeisa from October 1991 to prepare for its planned repatriation programme for 300,000 returnees from refugee camps in eastern Ethiopia. Although large numbers of people have already returned spontaneously from these camps, the official repatriation programme has had to be put on hold owing to prevailing security conditions. Preparatory activities have continued, however, with the pre-positioning of food and non-food items in Djibouti for transshipment to north-west Somalia at the appropriate time. To facilitate the return of refugees, UNECR has supported NGOs in the region with supplies for MCH centres and hospitals. In 1991 UNHCR provided US\$ 500,000 for the funding of accelerated demining efforts, with an additional US\$ 2.8 million for demining activities anticipated in 1992. This is in support of an earlier programme financed by the Government of the United States of America and the European Community (EC) and implemented by MSF (Netherlands). UNDP also plans, with bilateral cost-sharing, to assist with the expansion of demining activities in 1992.

31. UNICEF has been active in the north-west since May 1991, mainly in the health, water, sanitation and nutrition sectors. UNICEF has rehabilitated

water systems at Hargeisa and Berbera and has carried out immunization programmes, in addition to providing support to international and indigenous NGOs in the rehabilitation of basic health services, including MCH centres. Maternity and paediatric wards of six hospitals have also been assisted. WHO has provided emergency health, surgical and laboratory kits, essential drugs and supplementary feeding materials to hospitals, NGOs and for local health authorities. Health education and training materials were also supplied by WHO to MSF (Netherlands) and SCF (United Kingdom) for the School of Nursing at Hargeisa.

32. WFP, through Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere, Inc. (CARE), has provided food for a monetization programme aimed at making food available at affordable prices and generating cash for rehabilitation projects. Some 6,000 tons out of a proposed 15,000 tons of food assistance for the WFP programme was delivered in 1991. Of this total, 4,500 tons was successfully monetized. The remaining food stocks, however, along with the proceeds of the monetization programme, were looted in February 1992. Following threats to its staff, CARE recently withdrew from the region. In addition, at the end of 1991, 2,518 tons of food was provided by WFP to UNICEF for vulnerable group feeding. Less than 400 tons of these supplies were able to be distributed. The rest was stolen in the escalating incidents of banditry. Between January and March 1992, large numbers of relief vehicles were stolen; houses and compounds of United Nations and NGOs attacked and looted and warehouses robbed of food aid, medical supplies and water equipment.

D. North-east Somalia

33. The north-east region from the port of Bosaso down to the central region, as far as Galcaio, is largely controlled by the Darod/Majerteyn clan. Although the security situation throughout most parts of the north-east has been relatively stable, clashes have occurred in areas south of Galcaio between the controlling north-east party, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and USC. The port of Bosaso, however, has remained active for commercial traffic, with reported off-take of up to 20 trucks a day ferrying supplies to central Somalia, the Ogaden regions of Ethiopia and as far as Mogadishu.

34. Following scant rains in 1991, the area is experiencing severe drought and pasture-land is depleted. This has had serious repercussions on an economy highly dependent on livestock. Owing to poor livestock health and lack of veterinary services, export markets have been lost and there has been a significant drop in the value of animals. In addition, over the course of the past year, hundreds of thousands of Majerteyn clan members have returned to their homeland from other parts of Somalia, particularly from Mogadishu and the south. The displaced persons are placing a heavy burden on an already destitute community. To date, little relief assistance has been delivered to the north-east. Although there was considerable interest in assisting the region in late 1991, UNICEF, WFP/CARE and NGO plans to begin food aid and non-food assistance were halted, following the murder of a UNICEF doctor at Bosaso. Two other relief workers were wounded in the attack.

E. South-east Somalia

35. The region of Kismayo and Gelib encompasses both the town of Kismayo and the lower part of the Jubba valley. The Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), mainly Darod clan, claims control of the vast areas from the north (Brava, 75 kilometers from Mogadishu and 300 kilometres from Kismayo), south and west to the Kenya (Liboi) border. However, three separate factions - SSDF, the Somali National Front (SNF) and the United Somali Party (USP) - occupy various areas of the region. No one single party has total control over either the region or Kismayo and there has been intermittent conflict and tension.

36. Although towns and villages were not significantly damaged during the civil war, mass displacements of people have occurred both into and out of the region. While factional fighting resulted in large-scale population movements out of Kismayo, the population of Kismayo itself has increased from an estimated 50,000 people in 1990 to around 200,000 owing to influxes of displaced, mostly from Mogadishu. Make-shift shelters housing the displaced are scattered throughout the town and on its outskirts.

37. The consequences of mass movements of populations, together with conflict and disruption to agricultural activities, have been catastrophic. The resources of villages and small towns have been exhausted and severe malnutrition is reported in several areas. In some clinics at Kismayo, 80 per cent of the children seen were malnourished - over a third suffering from severe malnutrition. In addition to Somalis, approximately 250,000 people of Bantu origin, without any affiliation to the Somali clans, are also located in the region and are in urgent need of food aid assistance.

38. The health of large numbers of people throughout the region remains a serious concern. Many deaths from malaria, dysentery and tuberculosis have already occurred. Owing to insecurity and banditry, few relief agencies have re-established programmes in the area. Apart from ICRC and some indigenous NGOs, only World Concern, MSF (Belgium) and UNICEF are working at Kismayo and it has not been possible to reach most of the rural areas. World Concern began implementing an emergency health programme in December 1991 and has established two MCHs and seven medical clinics in key locations along the Jubba river and operates a mobile medical dispensary. MSF (Belgium) has established a surgical unit at Kismayo and is planning to extend its operations to Merca. Peace Aid Somalia, a local NGO, runs four camps for the displaced at Kismayo, providing assistance to over 3,000 people. Two other camps, run by the Somali Women's Concern, are assisting 2,000 people.

39. UNICEF has been working at Kismayo since December 1991 and is providing support to ongoing programmes, including those run by indigenous NGOs. In addition to medical supplies for the Kismayo hospital and shelter materials for the displaced, UNICEF has also provided UNIMIX (a high-protein cereal blend) for supplementary feeding programmes through regular airlifts into the city. WHO has provided UNIMIX and emergency health kits in Kismayo for NGO and ICRC programmes.

40. ICRC has been operating at Kismayo since early 1991. In addition to assisting the Somali Red Crescent Society to operate an MCH clinic and an Outpatients Department at the Kismayo hospital, ICRC has been the only agency to deliver food supplies to the region in recent months. Other relief services provided by ICRC include treatment of the war-wounded, sanitation activities, seeds and drug supply. Some 10 tons of seeds have already been supplied along the south coast and a further 90 tons will be delivered along the coastal areas over the next two months. Fishing lines and hooks are also being delivered to 50,000 families along the Jubba River and the Somali coast.

41. North of Kismayo, the enclave of Brava along the coast is essentially cut off from both Mogadishu and Kismayo. The area was severely affected by fighting throughout 1991 and the population is barely surviving on fishing and a very expensive local market. Malnutrition is reported to be severe.

F. South-west Somalia

42. Owing to conflict and intra- and inter-clan tensions, large numbers of people have fled to the Liboi/Doble region on the borders of Kenya. Although many have crossed into Kenya as refugees, up to 200,000 people still remain in makeshift shelters along the border areas. ICRC has begun a cross-border feeding operation from Kenya, but given the pressures on refugee camps in Kenya and the need to stanch the refugee flow, the situation remains a major concern. Catholic Relief Services (CRS), which recently fielded a mission to the area, reports that water holes have dried up owing to drought and that cattle are dying. To support ICRC activities in the Liboi area, WHO has supplied ICRC with emergency health kits.

43. The Gedo and Bay areas have been recently visited by ICRC for the first time and a basic assessment has taken place. The area is under the control of the former Head of State, Siad Barre, and there are political complications in terms of access. Of particular concern, however, is the plight of some 20,000 Ethiopian refugees who have remained in the area and are reported by ICRC to be in extremely poor condition.

III. MODALITIES FOR ASSISTANCE

44. It is now estimated that the lives of 1.5 million people in various parts of the country are seriously threatened by lack of access to food and health care provision. A further 3.5 million Somalis are also in urgent need of humanitarian assistance. As the need for urgent action increases daily, however, deteriorating security conditions throughout many parts of the country continue to be a major impediment to the delivery and expansion of relief assistance.

45. The high value of food commodities has made the delivery of food aid to people in need particularly problematic and dangerous. Food aid shipments have been attacked and prevented from being discharged at ports; warehouses

have been looted and food aid supplies hijacked by armed gangs or at the instigation of local authorities. In the process of trying to deliver food supplies to those in urgent need, a number of relief workers have been killed and injured. In view of the risks involved, expatriate relief staff have been reduced to a minimum and most relief organizations are no longer prepared to handle food aid assistance.

46. In spite of these severe constraints, the humanitarian crisis facing the people of Somali must be rapidly addressed and opportunities found to provide assistance to affected groups. As already evidenced by the flow of refugees from Somalia into Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia, the crisis has regional consequences and there are grave concerns about the effects such population movements will have on the Horn of Africa. Measures to encourage Somalis who also might seek refuge in neighbouring countries to stay in their homeland need to be explored as a matter of urgency.

47. Special attention is also needed to address the plight of Somali women who, despite their role as family providers and sources of family stability, have become increasingly exposed to rape and violence. In addition, with the onset of the rainy season in mid-May, the need to accelerate relief efforts to avoid further serious health hazards and spread of communicable diseases amongst an already weakened population is of paramount importance.

48. The safety of relief workers engaged in the provision of humanitarian assistance in the midst of a complete collapse of law and order and continuing conflict remains a major concern. The 90-day Plan thus relies heavily on the recommendations of the Technical Team and has assumed that security measures, including United Nations security personnel, will be quickly put in place to protect relief workers and relief supplies. It also assumes that agreements reached with the various authorities, factions and clan leaders on facilitating relief assistance will be upheld and that the major ports in the country will be accessible. Furthermore, it must be accepted that designated "corridors" and "zones of peace" must be maintained. These zones include ports, airports and areas in which United Nations and NGO activities are under way.

49. Even with such measures and agreements in place, conditions prevailing in Somalia still call for a pragmatic approach. Conventional mechanisms for the delivery of relief assistance no longer exist and in the absence of government structures, maximum use will have to be made of existing local structures and organizations. Traders, who thus far have been able to continue to bring in commercial food supplies, will also be used to deliver food to various parts of the country.

50. The Plan attempts to address the problems of Somalia on a nation-wide basis to reduce the risk of further deterioration in already volatile conditions and to avoid further large-scale population movements in search of food. Distribution of food supplies, in particular, will be carried out simultaneously in as many areas as possible to lessen the risk of disruptions at distribution sites.

51. Owing to factors already outlined in the present document, ICRC is currently the only relief agency involved in food aid delivery. Modalities used by ICRC to deliver and distribute food rely mainly on the involvement of the traditional clan elders and chiefs, who under the ICRC programme assume responsibility for the collection, transport and distribution of food supplies. In some areas, however, including Mogadishu, clan structures are now either no longer functioning, or have varying degrees of effectiveness. This has meant that other mechanisms to enable food to reach people in need have had to be considered.

52. Within the context of the 90-day Plan, ICRC will collaborate with the United Nations to enable the immediate acceleration and expansion of food assistance. In Mogadishu, both ICRC and WFP, through its implementing partner, CARE International, have agreed to share responsibility for the delivery of food aid assistance. ICRC will continue its ongoing programmes along the coast, including to Kismayo, as well as to Belet Uen and the cross-border operation from Kenya. WFP will provide food for the north-west and north-east Somalia. In addition to food rations for vulnerable groups and displaced persons, supplementary food assistance will be provided for 180,000 people and a further 100,000 soldiers will be targeted for assistance under special demobilization programmes in Mogadishu and the north-west of Somalia.

53. Livestock remain central to the economy of the Somali people and of critical importance is the need to re-establish the livestock trade. Towards this end, quarantine centres in all of the major trading ports are required to enable disease-free animals to be sold at optimum market rates. The success of such centres will depend upon full-scale vaccination campaigns. Some 3,500 tons of seeds will also be required to enable people to resume agricultural production. Although commitments for vegetable seeds appear to cover needs in areas in the north-west of the country, funds are urgently needed to enable the purchase and delivery of cereal seeds.

54. As regards the health sector, even prior to the civil war, Somalia had some of the lowest social and economic indices in the world, characterized by low levels of development, high infant and maternal mortality rates and high levels of dependency upon food aid. The present crisis has exacerbated an already dire situation. In the light of the dramatic movements of people throughout the country and the impact on areas not normally covered by relief efforts, a major thrust of the 90-day Plan will be to expand non-food assistance to previously unserved areas, such as the south-west and central regions.

55. Of the estimated 70 hospitals functioning in Somalia in 1988, only 15 remain operational and these for the most part are totally dependent on external assistance and are predominantly curative in nature. Most have no water, electricity, drugs or even basic medical equipment. Malaria, tuberculosis and vaccination programmes have collapsed, along with the primary health care structure. The most immediate need thus entails the provision of a basic minimum of essential medical supplies as well as materials for the repair and rehabilitation of hospitals and MCH clinics. Salaries and food supplies will be required as incentives to encourage health personnel to

return to work. Throughout the country, there is also an urgent need to facilitate the resumption of a semblance of family life amongst those who have been displaced in the crisis through the supply of shelter materials, clothing and household items.

56. Although some major water rehabilitation programmes have been completed, ongoing projects have had to be suspended owing to insecurity and looting of supplies. In addition, some rural areas have experienced a two-year drought. Fuel, pumps, piping and technical assistance are required to enable water programmes to continue and new projects to be undertaken. Priority must be given to the provision of water supplies to health facilities and in displaced camp settlements. In areas with no existing water sources, it will be necessary to truck water and provide storage tanks, household water containers and fuel. The sanitation situation is also extremely serious throughout the country. Contamination of water sources by human excreta, animal carcasses and refuse poses a major public health threat. Shovels, pickaxes and other supplies will also be required for major clean-up campaigns under the 90-day Plan.

57. Under the present circumstances and given the plethora of authorities that exist in each of the targeted regions, it has become impractical to treat Somalia as one entity. The differing conditions, political and security environment of each of the regions have dictated that specific modalities for the delivery of humanitarian assistance be designed according to the prevailing situation in each of the regions. The following sections provide details of inputs required and modalities for delivery of assistance in the six regions targeted under the 90-day Plan.

A. Mogadishu

58. While the present security situation at Mogadishu remains precarious and the cease-fire extremely fragile, the needs of over 700,000 displaced persons and other vulnerable groups in the capital make the provision of humanitarian assistance of paramount importance.

59. To facilitate the resumption of large-scale humanitarian assistance, it was agreed by both USC factions that the port of Mogadishu would be reopened to enable sufficient relief supplies to reach the capital. Both sides have agreed to ensure efficient and equitable distribution of food and non-food assistance to areas of the city under their influence and that the port, airports, hospitals, NGO locations and routes to and from food and non-food distribution points will be declared "corridors and zones of peace".

60. The two parties also agreed to the deployment of adequate United Nations security personnel to protect United Nations and NGO relief personnel and to the formation of a Joint Relief Committee composed of nine members equally divided among the parties and the United Nations. The Committee will be chaired by the United Nations and will meet on United Nations premises for the purpose of addressing issues directly related to effective distribution of humanitarian assistance.

61. Even with these agreements in place, recent experience has shown that owing to the nature of the shifting and loose coalitions that have been formed by both sides with their forces and the need to factor in other neutral sub-clans and factions, the delivery of relief assistance and in particular food aid is likely to continue to be extremely difficult. Efforts are thus continuing to identify leaders from other sub-clans and factions in Mogadishu in order to enlist their cooperation in the delivery of assistance through the 90-day Plan. The large number of armed gangs that are not controlled by either side and the lack of affordable food in the city also pose very serious problems. Currently, all NGOs, ICRC, Somali Red Crescent Society and the United Nations have to employ large numbers of armed guards to protect their personnel and relief supplies.

62. In view of these factors and based on the recommendations of the Technical Team, United Nations security personnel will be needed for the port and to enable the safe passage of relief personnel and humanitarian supplies through agreed "corridors" and "zones of peace".

63. WFP and ICRC will take responsibility for shipments of food supplies to the port of Mogadishu. As regards WFP food, an initial allocation will arrive at the port as soon as appropriate arrangements for the receipt of the food, storage, handling and distribution are in place. WFP and CARE, in consultation with the Joint Relief Committee, will designate amounts of food for onward transport and delivery to beneficiaries. Food deliveries to the port will be consigned to WFP. CARE will arrange storage and transportation from the port through local transport contracts under the auspices of monitors provided by the Joint Relief Committee.

64. At the district level, local relief committees composed of clan elders, religious leaders and local security personnel will undertake food distribution to the predetermined beneficiaries. Distribution of supplies will be undertaken in the displaced camps by the Health Committees that have already been established. Until such a time that a detailed assessment of needs can be carried out, an interim apportionment of food aid will be made to each USC faction. It is anticipated that the WFP/CARE free food distribution programme will be used by the authorities to undertake demobilization activities and to enhance security arrangements. Precise modalities for this programme still need to be formulated and agreed.

65. An estimated 80,000 children will receive supplementary rations, either dry, take-home commodities or wet feeding at MCH centres. A number of additional therapeutic feeding units will need to be established for the severely malnourished.

66. If the security situation in and around Mogadishu is adequate and "zones of peace" are respected, UNICEF, WHO and NGOs will also seek to expand their provision of primary health care, water and communicable disease control programmes, as well as programmes for supplying essential drugs and rehabilitating hospitals. UNICEF will re-establish the municipal water supply system at Mogadishu and NGOs, ICRC and UNICEF will continue their efforts to

provide adequate water facilities to displaced camps in and around the city. Given the scarcity of adequate water supplies, some water tankers are needed immediately. Shelter materials also remain priority items since the rains have already begun to fall and many people are still without basic shelter.

67. To reduce costs as much as possible, maximum use will be made of sea and road transport. The port at Mogadishu is technically sound and five of the six berths are open and access routes from the port are in good condition. There is, however, a severe problem with fuel supplies since the looting and subsequent fire in the fuel depot. Relief shipments into Mogadishu will need to be accompanied with sufficient fuel stocks for onward forwarding. It is assumed that based on arrangements made for use of Mogadishu port, "corridors" and "zones of peace" can be extended so that the port can be used to serve Merca, Baidoba, Belet Uen and Galcaio.

68. In the 90-day Plan, a substantial and carefully coordinated airlifting and air passenger operation will be required to deliver drugs, medical supplies and supplementary foods to both the north and south of the city, as well as to facilitate the movement of relief personnel. Currently, the traditional Mogadishu international airport in the southern part of the city in the area controlled by General Aidid and an airstrip 12 kilometres north of the city in the Mahdi section are used for the delivery of relief supplies.

B. Central Somalia

69. ICRC will continue to provide assistance to the displaced and other highly vulnerable groups situated around the coastal ports of Merca, Adele and Obbia. Distribution of supplies will be undertaken by the clan elders and chiefs. UNICEF will complement the efforts of ICRC by providing medical supplies to health facilities and equipment such as weight-for-height charts, health education materials and, in conjunction with WFP, food items for supplementary feeding, fuel and operating resources.

70. At the same time, ICRC, along with international NGOs, will provide assistance to the displaced persons in Belet Uen. Until the port of Mogadishu can be used, ICRC intends to airlift approximately 2,000 tons of food aid per month into the area. Three international NGOs will support ICRC food activities through the provision of primary health care assistance and medical services, including the supply of medicines and essential drugs.

C. North-west Somalia

71. The threat of renewed conflict in the region has already led to a breakdown of law and order in the north-west and has caused serious disruptions to ongoing relief activities. In recent days, further deterioration in the situation and an unprecedented increase in the level of armed robberies and looting of relief warehouses and compounds have resulted in the withdrawal of most NGO and United Nations staff.

72. Although recent surveys indicated that nutritional levels have not yet reached emergency levels, food aid is nevertheless urgently required for vulnerable groups and to reduce tensions in the region and to promote stability. There is also the need to provide food and other assistance for the thousands of Somalis who have spontaneously returned from refugee camps in Ethiopia and for those who have yet to return under the planned UNHCR repatriation programme.

73. Agreements were reached by the United Nations Technical Team with the authorities at Hargeisa and with clan chiefs and elders for the resumption of relief assistance, including food aid. Thus, a considerable improvement in the security situation, the 90-day Plan will aim to address four critical areas: food and non-food assistance to highly vulnerable groups, with particular emphasis on the displaced; assistance for promoting demobilization; community-based assistance to returnee impacted areas and emergency income-generation activities. It should be noted, however, that as with other areas, implementation of activities proposed in the Plan will be dependent upon agreements reached with the Technical Team being upheld, including the safe passage of all relief workers and supplies and the ability to expand current activities.

74. Based upon this premise, WFP will provide, through the port of Berbera, food assistance to the government authorities to support a military demobilization programme. WFP will also supply additional quantities of food to assist institutional stabilisation and rehabilitation measures. One option for delivery of food supplies is through off-shore market sales schemes, but the modalities for such schemes are still being explored.

75. Therapeutic feeding will be needed through hospitals for the most severely malnourished. Supplementary feeding will also be undertaken and expanded to presently uncovered areas of the north-west, if required. To facilitate the UNHCR repatriation programme and to alleviate the pressure on areas impacted by people who have spontaneously returned from refugee camps in Somalia, emphasis must be given as quickly as possible to income-generating opportunities and to the rehabilitation of agriculture. Towards this end, FAO and ICRC are providing seeds, tools and pesticides through NGOs, in addition to what will be provided through the international NGOs themselves.

76. Livestock vaccination programmes also need to be resumed, along with rapid distribution of basic veterinary drugs. In order to protect livestock production from further losses, there is an urgent need to rehabilitate rural water points. The acceleration of demining activities is also of critical importance. Particularly affected areas are Hargeisa city and the areas south-west of Hargeisa and east and south of Burao towards the Ethiopian border. UNDP, in close collaboration with UNHCR, intends to intensify demining activities in the Hargeisa area; further assistance is required for other areas. UNHCR will also continue pre-positioning supplies in Djibouti in preparation for a full-scale repatriation programme.

77. In spite of the efforts of NGOs, UNICEF, WHO and UNHCR, the level of health services available to people in the north-west remains inadequate. Mortality rates are very high, especially among children and women. Many of these deaths could be avoided through immunization programmes. There is also a very serious problem in communicable diseases, in particular tuberculosis. Under the 90-day Plan, UNICEF will provide drugs and essential supplies to the MCHs and expanded programme on immunization (EPI) activities will be strengthened. Training of health staff in EPI activities is planned. In the same areas where therapeutic feeding centres are established, or already exist, nutritional surveillance units will be created at regional level and training provided to health staff for monitoring purposes. Again assuming that security is stable, WHO will undertake to develop a training programme in communicable disease control. In order to reduce the risk of losses and demotivation of staff, payments for local health workers are needed.

78. Drought has also caused serious water shortages, particularly in the east of the region and again, if security permits, the rapid expansion of water programmes should be undertaken within the framework of the 90-day Plan. The ongoing rehabilitation of the Sheik water supply system could be completed in the next three months, with works directly undertaken by UNICEF. Additionally the urban water systems of Burao and Las Anod could also be completed by Oxfam with funds provided by UNHCR and UNICEF. The recently started urban sanitation programme in Hargeisa should also be reactivated and similar projects initiated in other towns for garbage collection and waste disposal.

79. Fuel stocks to run water supply systems and for hospitals will be needed for the next three months. In view of the fact that a whole generation of Somalis is growing up without education, UNICEF, UNDP and NGOs also intend to undertake activities to establish urgently needed educational facilities and programmes.

80. The main port of entry to north-west Somalia is Berbera and there are large numbers of private and public warehouses in the town. However, other ports can be considered. Zeila port, for example, could be used for the transport of supplies to the Adwal area. In the Sannag region, Mait port can be used for the transport of supplies to the Erigavo area and Las Qorey port for the transport of supplies to the Badhan district. A smaller port, Hys, could be used for transport of supplies to El-Afweyn. It may also be possible to secure agreements with the authorities in the north-east for the routing of supplies for Las Anod and Sool through the port of Bosaso.

81. The best airstrip in the north-west is at Berbera, which is capable of handling all types of aircraft. The airstrip at Hargeisa can handle Hercules, Antonov and other large cargo carriers. Small aircraft can be flown into Boroma, Burao, Las Anod, Erigavo, Sheik and Odweyne. Roads in the north-west are generally good, particularly the main trunk road from Berbera to Las Anod via Sheik and Burao. Security, however, remains a major problem along most of the routes.

D. North-east Somalia

82. The security situation in the north-east has not allowed for a recent assessment of needs. However, it is evident that the mainstay of the economy is livestock production for export. Following conflict and drought, the livestock sector has been severely disrupted and, owing to lack of veterinary services, export of animals has been substantially reduced. In needs assessments undertaken in 1991, veterinary programmes, water supplies and health care provision were amongst activities most urgently needed. To address this problem, ICRC intends to provide immediate veterinary assistance to the area, including the rehabilitation by ICRC of the quarantine centre at the port of Bosaso.

83. Following the murder of the UNICEF doctor at Bosaso in early January 1992 and the public threats to all relief personnel, there have been very few visits to the area. Information from the region, however, indicates that between 300,000 and 500,000 displaced persons located between Bosaso and Gardo are in need of assistance. Following an inter-agency/NGO assessment of the region, WFP will seek to supply food under the 90-day Plan for offshore market sales schemes to provide resources for the rehabilitation of the social infrastructure. During the proposed needs assessments, arrangements will also be explored with local authorities for the use of the port of Bosaso to serve as a main logistical base for supplying large parts of central and northern Somalia. Bosaso is currently capable of handling ships of up to several thousand tons.

E. South-east Somalia

84. Within the framework of the 90-day Plan, ICRC will continue to supply food to the region. Given the increasing number of displaced persons at Brava and Kismayo, ICRC intends to provide up to 5,000 tons of food supplies monthly through free delivery. In the past, owing to the constant wrangling and negotiations between the clans and looting, the execution of food relief programmes has been problematic. While not totally satisfactory, the problems in food distribution have been partially solved through arrangements with ICRC that the clan elders and chiefs are responsible for the collection, transport and delivery of food aid supplies to their people.

85. Based on these arrangements, ICRC recently delivered 2,000 tons of food to Kismayo and both delivery and distribution is reported to have gone relatively smoothly. ICRC will thus continue using this system for delivery and distribution of future supplies. Food aid will be brought in through the port of Kismayo. The port functions well and has the capacity to handle the required tonnage.

86. From available information, malnutrition is widespread in the region. Food shortages, however, are most severe in the riverine villages, where looting of food and money by occupying forces has caused most families to resort to eating "famine foods", such as wild edible plants and green

mangoes. All villages south of Fanoole have lost most of their grain reserves. At Kismayo, some food is available in the markets but is priced beyond the means of much of the population. Evidence suggests that until food supply levels significantly improve, the health of vulnerable groups will remain at grave risk and looting of food and other supplies will continue.

87. In order to help address the food shortage problems and supplement rations provided by ICRC, UNICEF and WHO will work closely with the traditional communities and authorities to target assistance at the vulnerable groups and the displaced. Supplementary feeding programmes, health care services and the provision of shelter items and water supplies will be expanded. A priority objective will be to organize the estimated 30,000 displaced persons at Kismayo into manageable camps and provide them with adequate shelter, sanitation, water and basic medical and nutritional assistance. An additional 390 tons of food supplies will be needed per month for these 30,000 people.

88. UNICEF will strengthen its presence at Kismayo and collaborate closely with all international and local NGOs to ensure coordination of efforts. As part of its emergency plan, UNICEF intends to establish at least two more MCH centres at Kismayo and one in each accessible town in the region, as well as to expand the provision of medical supplies and equipment to 15 MCH centres in selected districts. As security permits, World Concern will also open up 22 more rural clinics.

89. Given the severe disruption to agricultural activities and the loss of seeds and livestock in the region, UNICEF will collaborate with ICRC and FAO to provide veterinary supplies, seeds, farming equipment.

90. A major constraint to effective delivery of humanitarian assistance is the shortage of human resources. Although, for example, there are many nurses in the region, most are displaced from Mogadishu and their training and technical experience varies. Under the Plan, UNICEF will undertake to organize refresher and in-service training to local health workers so that they can be mobilized to staff the expanded health care programme envisaged under the Plan. There are also a number of indigenous NGOs, such as Peace Aid Somalia and Somali Women's Concern, that are running camps for displaced persons. These NGOs will be supported by UNICEF to extend their programmes. Other international NGOs will be encouraged and supported to establish programmes in the region, including the extension of health services to Brava.

91. To facilitate the 90-day Plan, the Technical Team discussed the provision of humanitarian assistance with the respective leadership of each of the sub-clans at Kismayo and a number of agreements were reached. These were the guaranteed safe movement of international and local personnel working within and outside Kismayo, free and safe passage for all relief supplies and arrangements pertaining to use of Kismayo port.

92. In addition to the Somalis in need in the region, approximately 250,000 people of Bantu origin - without any affiliation to the Somali clans - are reported to be suffering from severe rates of malnutrition. The needs of this group will be one for priority assessment and response.

F. South-west Somalia

93. Grave problems appear to be developing along the Somali side of the Somali-Kenyan border, where an estimated 200,000 people have gathered, poised to cross into Kenya. ICRC is currently the only relief organization assisting these areas through cross-border programmes and it is clear that a major emergency could develop. An inter-agency/NGO assessment mission will be dispatched as quickly as possible to determine the extent of the needs. In the interim, ICRC will continue its food supply programme to the region.

94. Access to the area is best achieved by road through Kenya, but during the rains these roads will be impassible and alternative transport arrangements, such as airlifting, will be required. CRS is currently considering supporting the ICRC programme in at least two of the four ICRC cross-border points (Liboi-Doble and El Wak). Some agricultural inputs may also be provided under the CRS programme.

IV. COORDINATION MECHANISMS

95. The present Plan of Action has attempted to establish modalities that will facilitate the urgent delivery of humanitarian assistance to all parts of Somalia. However, given prevailing conditions and limited financial and staff resources, it should be clear from the outset that prevention of a high death-toll in Somalia from lack of food and basic services, such as health care, water and sanitation, can only succeed through a carefully coordinated and collaborative effort on the part of the local leadership, clan elders, the international community, ICRC, NGOs and the United Nations system.

96. In addition, given prevailing conditions in many parts of Somalia, the political initiatives which have led to the current cease-fire agreement at Mogadishu must be continued and expanded to other areas of Somalia. "Corridors of peace" for the safe passage of relief workers and supplies and "zones of peace" to enable target groups to receive assistance are of paramount importance.

97. To enable effective coordination of efforts and to ensure that maximum use is made of resources, the Secretary-General has appointed a Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia. Key to the 90-day Plan is the recognized coordinating role of the United Nations and the increased and active presence of United Nations agencies in Somalia. To facilitate coordination and collaborative efforts, the Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance will be based at Mogadishu, as well as maintaining close links with NGOs and donors located in both Nairobi and Djibouti.

98. To support the important work of the national and international NGOs and to ensure that there is close cooperation amongst all partners involved in the implementation of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, the United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia will undertake to hold regular meetings with all members of the NGO community, ICRC and donors who

are actively involved in relief efforts in the country. The United Nations will encourage local authorities to establish effective mechanisms that will facilitate the work of all relief personnel, including NGOs, and will also assist NGOs through the provision of difficult-to-deliver supplies, including fuel. While currently there is no provision for umbrella security arrangements for all relief personnel in Somalia, further discussion on the matter is urgently needed. Given the security constraints in Somalia, as well as in a number of other countries experiencing complex emergencies, the need to explore such arrangements should be brought to the attention of the Security Council as quickly as possible.

99. UNDP is providing direct support to the United Nations Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance in the form of staff, office accommodation, administrative and logistical back-stopping, including the revision of an existing project that will provide two light aircraft, a communications network and demining activities, hopefully with bilateral co-financing. Staff in the Coordinator's office will be responsible for receiving and disseminating information to the NGO and donor community. Field officers, reporting to the Coordinator, will be posted in offices at Hargeisa and other key locations. Aircraft services and the communications systems will be made available for the use of all relief partners.

100. WFP will be responsible for the coordination of logistics and for the delivery of WFP food supplies for general food distribution, supplementary feeding, demobilization programmes and market sales schemes in the north. At Mogadishu, supplies will be brought into the port in the name of WFP and handed over to CARE for onward delivery. WFP will provide food monitors. These will complement CARE's 3 expatriate and 15 national staff, who will assist in the distribution of humanitarian assistance. The WFP market sales programme is presently under preparation with CARE.

101. UNHCR continues to have primary responsibility for all matters relating to refugees and returnees. Under the 90-day Plan, UNHCR will continue to work closely with other United Nations agencies and NGOs in the provision of activities for refugee-impacted areas and to pre-position supplies in readiness for its planned repatriation programme for refugees still to return from Ethiopia. Demining activities will be accelerated, if security conditions permit.

102. UNICEF will be responsible for the coordination of non-food assistance and will increase its international staff presence in regions to be targeted for assistance. UNICEF will also significantly increase the number of Somali contract staff in order to serve as non-food relief assistance monitors, as well as enable its own direct implementation of water, health care, immunization and other essential non-food relief programmes.

103. WHO will continue to provide support for all areas of Somalia through international NGOs and where possible with health authorities and with national relief agencies. WHO will support therapeutic feeding centres through the provision of UNIMIX and will supply emergency health and drug kits

for health care centres and hospitals. As soon as security permits, WHO will embark on the rehabilitation of the health system and establish a health information and disease surveillance system, training programmes and the repair and rehabilitation of health facilities.

104. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) will continue to support the reactivation of the agricultural and livestock sectors through the provision of seeds and tools, pesticides and veterinary programmes, including livestock watering points and mobile clinics for livestock vaccination.

105. The United Nations Volunteers (UNV) programme has already submitted a proposal for the provision of up to 50 voluntary specialists who can assist the various United Nations agencies and relief organizations in carrying out their work under the 90-day Plan and on longer-term programmes. The recruitment and fielding of UNVs in support of a wide variety of activities, including logistics, communications, agriculture and health, will be undertaken in response to specific requests made by United Nations agencies and other organizations, including NGOs.

Annex

LOGISTICS OVERVIEW

A. Mogadishu

1. The port of Mogadishu is technically sound. Five of the six berths are open. Berth No. 4 is closed because of a sunken tug boat. There is also a sunken tug boat near the breakwater. The port has two operational tugboats and one pilot boat. The port sheds in berths No. 1 to 3 were damaged in the January 1992 looting.
2. The port handling equipment has been looted and is available for hire on the private market. The port has two mobile cranes although it is unclear whether they are functioning.
3. The port administration and labour force are, for the most part, still at Mogadishu living in both the Aidid and Mahdi areas of the city. The port administration building is still intact. The port does not have any electricity as the generator is damaged and all electrical wiring has been looted. There are many containers scattered around the port, many of which have been damaged in the fighting.
4. Access to roads to and from the port are in good condition. There appears to be ample supply of trucks on the local market. While most are single-owned operators, two larger transport entities continue to function. Both are based in the Aidid part of the city. There is a severe shortage of fuel since the looting and subsequent fire in the Mogadishu fuel depot. All relief shipments must be accompanied with fuel supplies for onward transport.
5. The Mogadishu road network appears basically intact and in good condition. However, because of the looting of the city's underground wiring network which has left deep trenches next to many roads, it is feared that the rains will cause irreparable damage to many streets.
6. Currently the traditional Mogadishu international airport in the southern part of the city, controlled by the Hawadle sub-clan in an area bordering Aidid's sector, and an airstrip 12 kilometres north of the city in the Mahdi-controlled area are used for the delivery of relief assistance. The Mogadishu south airport can receive any type of aircraft, while the Mogadishu north airstrip can receive only C-130 or Antonov-12 class aircraft. Labour is available at both sites. Access to the Mogadishu south airport is good, but the access road to Mogadishu north is a sandy track, which may be affected by the rain.

F. South-west Somalia

13. Traditionally this region was served by Mogadishu and Kismayo ports, but because of insecurity, this is no longer possible. The main points of entry in use presently are overland from Kenya via El Wak and via Mandera. The routes are traditionally affected by rain during mid-May to September. The Baidoba airport is reported to be open.

