

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 23 July 1987, at 10.30 a.m.

President:

Mr. T. Terrefe

(Ethiopia)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 424th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

Before I read the list of speakers for today, I would like to welcome the Ambassador of Sri Lanka, Mr. Nihal Rodrigo.

I have on the list of speakers for today the representatives of Belgium, the United States of America, Japan, New Zealand and Hungary. Since the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium is coming a little bit later, I will give him the floor as soon as he comes. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Friedersdorf.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Mr. President, the United States delegation welcomes you on your return to Geneva to preside over Conference work this month. You have a long record of distinguished service to this Conference, it is now being extended by your tenure in the Chair during July.

I am also pleased to extend a warm welcome to His Excellency Leo Tindemans, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, whom we are looking forward to hearing later this morning.

Our delegation also bids farewell to our departing colleagues, Ambassadors Dhanapala of Sri Lanka and Tonwe of Nigeria. We wish them every success in their new endeavours. In addition, I want to convey to Ambassador Cromartie, through our friends on the delegation of the United Kingdom, our deep regret at the announcement of his departure from this Conference. Ian Cromartie worked long and hard with the delegations in this Conference to advance our shared objectives. The significant progress recorded in the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under his able leadership will stand as eloquent testimony to his dedication to the cause of peace. To him and his family we send our heartfelt thanks and best wishes.

Today I would like to devote my statement to the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Looking back for a moment, much important and useful work was accomplished during the spring part of the 1987 session under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden. The Ad hoc Committee developed text on the activities of verification and monitoring of chemical weapons stocks and production facilities. Additional text was developed outlining the makeup and functions of the technical secretariat, preparatory commission and modalities for revision of lists. Work began on elaborating the composition and tasks of an inspectorate. This new material, along with other texts, was appended to the rolling text to serve as the basis for further discussion. The rolling text itself was updated and revised in April to reflect the work in the spring. This valuable, detailed work, and important changes in the positions of some delegations, generated a sense of momentum. The spring part of the session ended with an air of optimism.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

At the midpoint of the summer part of the session, the atmosphere has somewhat changed. I have begun to hear from a number of delegations that morale is low, and that people are pessimistic regarding the negotiating pace, and unhappy at the amount of time required to achieve a convention. I am concerned that such a perspective will have a negative impact on work remaining to be done. I believe that unexpectedly rapid developments in the spring raised unrealistic expectations that a chemical weapons convention would be in hand by the end of this year. This unfounded optimism masked what remained to be done.

This summer, as the negotiations have delved more deeply into key aspects of a chemical weapons ban, new issues surfaced. Additionally, delegations have begun to grapple with some of the difficult issues which had in the past been set aside for future discussion to allow work on some less controversial areas to proceed. These are natural developments in any negotiation as work progresses from one level to the next.

I do not entirely share the pessimism expressed by others. We have been doing some constructive work this summer. More delegations are participating actively in the discussions. Difficult issues previously put aside are being addressed, and this is a reason for encouragement. However, no one should expect the negotiation of an effective chemical weapons convention to be an easy task. It is a complex undertaking in which elaboration of certain details is of great significance. To have an effective convention, we must thoroughly think through the issues, work out our differences and develop the necessary detail. We must, throughout this process, keep our focus on what we are trying to achieve -- not on artificial deadlines that could only yield a worthless agreement, but on a convention which will provide us with security and a true sense of confidence that the threat of chemical warfare will be removed.

This effort requires constructive suggestions, not polemics. We need ideas, not rhetoric. In this spirit, I would like to respond to some comments made before this Conference on 2 July by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Nazarkin.

The statement of 2 July mischaracterized my own plenary statement of 30 June to assert that the United States is not committed to the completion of an effective, verifiable ban on chemical weapons as rapidly as possible. Let me reassure all of the delegations to the Conference that the United States remains committed to this goal. We introduced a comprehensive draft convention in 1984 and have contributed numerous papers and proposals since then to help advance the negotiations. However, development of a comprehensive chemical weapons ban requires careful work and consideration, and we should not and will not be pressed to proceed hastily at the expense of ensuring the convention's effectiveness.

I was disappointed by the critical Soviet remarks about the United States invitation to visit the chemical weapons destruction facility at Tooele, Utah,

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a facility which many other CD delegation members visited during our 1983 workshop. I believe that, when Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agreed in April to an exchange of visits to the American and Soviet facilities, they saw this as an opportunity for the United States and the Soviet Union to build mutual confidence by exchanging information on the subject of the destruction of chemical weapons. This is, after all, a vital part of a chemical weapons convention. I hope that the Soviet Union will soon respond positively to the United States invitation.

Ambassador Nazarkin's statement also indicated that he felt that the United States position on challenge inspection remains unclear. The United States view that challenge inspection should cover all relevant locations and facilities of a State party without distinction between private property or government ownership was correctly noted. The United States specifically amended its draft convention in April 1986 to make this position even clearer, in response to Soviet concerns. If the Soviet delegation continues to have difficulties, I would suggest that they propose alternative language for consideration.

The Soviet statement of 2 July characterized the Ad hoc Committee's work on Cluster III, concerning the non-production of chemical weapons, as "walking in circles". I cannot agree with this characterization. The Committee has made advances in this area this summer under the leadership of Ambassador Ekéus and Mr. Pablo Macedo of Mexico. As examples, a successful chemical industry experts' meeting clarified a number of issues and identified areas of general consensus and areas needing further work. Another example, discussions on commercial supertoxic lethal chemicals resulted in a text that will serve as a basis for further discussions. Another example, for its part, the United States tabled a well-received working paper on production capacity.

In the Soviet statement of 2 July, the United States was criticized for planning to produce chemical weapons while negotiations are under way in Geneva. The recently announced cessation of Soviet production of chemical weapons suggests that their production continued during the eighteen-year period since the United States stopped production unilaterally in 1969. Our delegation sees no reason why the long-overdue modernization of the small United States stockpile is an obstacle to successful completion of the negotiations under way here. Chemical weapons negotiations in fact began and continued throughout the period of the large Soviet build-up of chemical weapons stocks. There is no good reason why the negotiations should not continue to progress as the United States responds to the large imbalance that has been created since the United States ceased the production of chemical weapons eighteen years ago. The massive Soviet stockpile of chemical weapons, unmatched by any other nation, puts all our security at risk and requires remedial action until the storage of chemical weapons can be eliminated from all military arsenals by an effective, comprehensive, global ban.

Also on 2 July, the problem of activities taking place on the territory of States not parties to the convention was raised. This is a serious issue that is much broader than the narrow question of multinational corporations. In fact, the United States does not believe that production of chemical

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weapons by multinational corporations on the territory of a State not a party to the convention is a special problem. Any corporation incorporated under United States law, wherever its activities actually take place, would be prohibited from aiding a non-party in chemical weapons production. In the United States view, the real question of relevance to all parties is activities related to the convention taking place on the territories of States that are not parties to that instrument, regardless of who is conducting them. The source of the problem, in fact, is apt to be the Government of the non-party State. In such a case, political pressure, including pressure to join the convention, would be the appropriate response. The Soviet approach to dealing with activities on the territory of non-party States is not at all clear at this time. Our delegation would ask the Soviet Union to present its own position so that we may study it.

To date, only two countries -- the United States and the Soviet Union -- have stated that they possess chemical weapons. There are approximately 15 other States that are believed to possess, or to be seeking to acquire, chemical weapons. It is of considerable concern to the United States that some of these States might remain outside the convention and continue to possess chemical weapons after States parties destroy their deterrent stocks. Such States would pose a risk to States parties. Clearly, such a situation would affect the United States decision on ratification, and, I am sure, other countries' as well. We should focus our attention here in this forum on measures that can be taken to reduce this risk.

The United States statement of 23 April proposed that confidence-building in this area start with greater openness on the part of all members of the Conference on Disarmament. It expressed concern that some other States participating in these negotiations have been secretive about their chemical weapons programmes, and noted that confidence is seriously undermined when countries possessing such weapons refuse to acknowledge such capabilities during the negotiations.

Several countries have indicated that they do not possess chemical weapons. However, many States members of this body have remained silent on this issue. Our delegation calls upon its negotiating partners to indicate whether or not they possess chemical weapons and chemical weapon production facilities. We also request the Soviet Union, and others who may acknowledge possession of chemical weapons, to provide detailed information on their chemical weapons capabilities, as the United States has already done. The United States raised this point with the Soviet Union three years ago, but no response has been received. We are hopeful this information and data will be forthcoming during current bilateral talks which began this week. Serious intentions of progress on both sides have been expressed. We believe data exchange can be the keystone of such progress.

Greater openness should also apply to commercial industrial information. As the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Minister of State David Mellor, remarked in his plenary statement on 14 July, "What we need is not more speeches, but more facts and figures. We need to know what other Governments have, where they have it and what they do with it". My delegation

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supports Minister Mellor's call for the Soviet Union and other States to be more open about their commercial chemical activities, as well as about their chemical weapons capabilities.

Before I conclude, I would like to note that the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has yet to take up challenge inspection this summer. As my delegation noted on 23 April, informal discussions in the spring indicated some areas where views appeared to be converging. I look forward to efforts to record and build on these areas of convergence.

Finally, when the report on the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is adopted in August, it will likely reflect that much work has been accomplished this year. It may also reflect that much remains to be done, not only to resolve key issues, but also to develop detailed procedures that are necessary to implement the convention. One particularly important result of this summer's work will not, unfortunately, appear in the report. That is the gradual convergence of views of delegations on many issues. Such convergence will serve as the basis for the further development of text. We have made progress this year and we have laid the groundwork for even further progress. We should be proud of this accomplishment. It should cause us to renew our commitment to pursue the work ahead.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Yamada.

Mr. YAMADA (Japan): At this half-way point in the work of the Conference on Disarmament in the summer session, I wish to make an overview of the current stage of the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention and to express the views of my delegation with the hope of contributing to the work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

In the spring part of this session, under the able and active chairmanship of Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden, we adopted a new work formula and achieved many concrete results. Among them are:

(a) Agreement on the destruction of all declared chemical weapons, eliminating the possibility of diversion. Diversion would have complicated verification;

(b) Agreement on the framework of the detailed procedures for destruction of chemical weapons, with the exception of the issue of the order of destruction;

(c) Detailed consideration for the first time of the destruction of chemical weapons production facilities, in line with the framework for the destruction of chemical weapons;

(d) Consideration, in the context of draft article VI on permitted activities, of the modalities for revision of lists and of guidelines for schedule (1) chemicals;

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(e) Consideration, with regard to the organizational aspects, of the preparatory commission and of guidelines on the international inspectorate.

I wish to express the high appreciation of my delegation for these results which have opened new ground, to help us through this complex and advanced stage of the negotiations. I wish to call upon all delegations to maintain the momentum of the spring part of this session and to build upon it, so that we may be able to conclude the convention at the earliest opportunity, thus meeting the fervent expectation of the international community.

As the negotiations get more complex -- as they are at present -- it is all the more important never to lose sight of what the basic objectives of the chemical weapons convention are. These objectives are: first, "destruction", namely the destruction of existing chemical weapons and related production facilities; and second, "non-production", namely the prohibition of the future development or production of chemical weapons. These two objectives of "destruction" and "non-production" are inseparable, as it were the two wheels of a cart. They must occupy balanced places in the convention régime. I must also emphasize that our work is to ban chemical weapons. Nothing else. We must not create impediments to the legitimate activities and development of the chemical industry for peaceful purposes, which advances the welfare and the standard of living of mankind.

My delegation attaches significant importance to the destruction of existing chemical weapons and related facilities. Japan possesses no chemical weapons and has no intention of acquiring them. By adhering to the convention, she legally binds herself as a non-chemical-weapon State, while chemical-weapon States have 10 years to dispose of their chemical weapons. For the security of my country, it is indispensable that all the existing chemical weapons and production facilities be placed, from the beginning of the entry into force of the convention, under strict international control and be eliminated according to the internationally agreed formula.

As I have already stated, we were able to agree on a framework of the detailed procedures for destruction of chemical weapons in the course of the spring part of this session. I would like to note that we have the following common understandings on this important issue:

(a) The chemical weapons to be destroyed shall be all chemical weapons "under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, regardless of location";

(b) All chemical weapons shall be destroyed "beginning not later than 12 months and finishing not later than 10 years";

(c) States parties may destroy their stocks at a faster pace;

(d) Chemical weapons shall be destroyed only at specifically designated and appropriately designed and equipped facility(ies).

And, with regard to the verification measures:

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(a) States parties shall take such measures as they consider appropriate to secure their storage facility(ies) and shall prevent any movement of their chemical weapons,

(b) States parties shall provide access to any chemical weapons, destruction facilities and the facilities' storage for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification,

(c) International Inspectors shall have unimpeded access to all parts of the storage facilities and may request clarification of any ambiguities arising from the inspection.

My delegation earnestly hopes that, taking due account of these common understandings, we will bring our work to a successful completion.

Security of a State during the entire destruction stage is a legitimate concern which we must attend to. While the procedures for destruction of chemical weapons stocks should start simultaneously for all chemical-weapon States, the mechanism of destruction at an accelerated pace for the State possessing larger stockpiles should be explored in view of the considerable imbalance in the size of existing stockpiles.

I should also like to call upon all chemical-weapon States to announce at an early stage their possession, as well as the composition of, and other factors pertaining to their stockpiles. Such actions on the part of chemical-weapon States, as well as the announcement of non-possession by non-chemical-weapon States, as is the case with Japan, will not only contribute to our work for the solution of the problems facing us, but will also help planning of the verification work at the outset of the Convention. I sincerely hope that other States will follow the example given by the United States in 1986 and provide the relevant information.

The other aspect with regard to destruction is the issue of chemical weapons production facilities. Much has also been developed in the past on the issue. We have the common understandings which we should not undermine. They are:

(a) The chemical weapons production facilities will be declared and destroyed within 10 years,

(b) Such facilities to be destroyed shall be all chemical weapons production facilities "under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, regardless of location",

(c) Chemical weapons destruction facilities shall be declared within 30 days, which declaration shall be promptly confirmed through on-site inspection,

(d) States parties shall immediately cease all activity at each chemical weapons production facility and, within three months, close such facility,

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(e) International systematic monitoring shall be initiated as soon as possible after the closure of such facility and shall continue until this facility is eliminated within 10 years.

As destruction of chemical weapons stocks proceeds and controls are placed on the civil chemical industry, the prolonged existence of chemical weapons production facilities may increase the potential danger to the convention régime. It is the desire of my delegation to see that such facilities are dismantled at the earliest opportunity.

Next, I should like to deal with the issue of "non-production". I wish to express our appreciation of the work done so far in identifying the chemical substances to be controlled and the régimes to which they would be subject under the convention. The recent meeting of the representatives of the industry was also extremely useful. Despite the detailed discussions which have taken place on this matter, I nevertheless feel that it is important to place the issue in perspective so that the problems may be sorted out and progress made towards final agreement.

The negotiations on the issue of non-production have dealt with two different aspects:

(i) the non-production of chemical weapons per se, and (ii) the monitoring of the production, etc. of certain substances in the chemical industry. The discussions to this date may at times have tended to confuse these two differing aspects. Under article VI, those chemical substances whose production is to be prohibited or subjected to other controls are subdivided into three categories. They are listed in one of the three schedules of the annex, on each of which methods of control are being developed.

Schedule (1) relates to the first aspect, that is non-production of chemical weapons per se, which is the main objective of the convention. On the other hand, schedules (2) and (3) relate to the second aspect, the chemical substances listed in these schedules are intended for peaceful purposes, but are placed under a monitoring régime to preclude their misuse for weapon purposes. The aim is to enhance confidence in the convention régime. We feel that there are distinct conceptual differences between the two.

The lists and the control régimes developed to this date are, in our view, generally reasonable. In order to expedite our work for final agreement, we must have a clear idea of the correlation among the various chemical substances in the schedules. We must also give due consideration to the legitimate concerns raised at the recent meetings of representatives of the industry.

We have not addressed ourselves to the issue of definition for some time now. The existing wording in draft article II was formulated before the recent development in our negotiations. We have now clarified many aspects of the destruction of chemical weapons and production facilities. We have

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identified chemical substances to be controlled and the régimes to which such substances will be subjected. In the light of these achievements, we should re-examine the issue of definition, bearing in mind the general purpose criterion.

The issue of challenge verification, the verification safety-net, is by its nature a complex and difficult problem. I wish to note that four areas of common understanding identified by Ambassador Ian Cromartie on this issue (CD/734) are very relevant. The interrelated aspects of the procedure for requesting challenge, the time frame for the dispatch of international inspectors, their access to the site and facility, the safeguarding of the legitimate security concerns of both the challenging and challenged States and the necessary follow-up will all require much examination and careful elaboration through businesslike considerations of the various aspects of the issue.

The verification measures envisaged to ensure compliance with the convention will comprise data exchange, routine inspections, the use of monitoring equipment, and challenge inspections, etc. These verification measures will be required to monitor the various declarations concerning chemical weapons stockpiles, production facilities, destruction facilities and non-production, as well as the issues concerning "use", and clandestine stockpiles and production facilities. They will require much manpower, and material and financial resources. I feel that we should keep a realistic perspective in our work on the convention in identifying the substances to be controlled and the extent to which they will be so controlled so that a practical, rational and cost-effective verification régime may be established under this convention.

In the very crowded schedule of meetings at this advanced stage of negotiations, we sometimes fail to see the wood for the trees. Let us always remember the basic and original purpose of our work and the principles which we have already agreed upon. We should also bear in mind that we are aiming to draw up a convention which must enjoy universal acceptance, and which will not be overly difficult to implement and thus not be too complex. The time remaining in the summer part of this session is not too long, but I hope that it will be put to good use in building common and tangible agreements one by one.

In closing, allow me to thank the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus, and the three Item Co-ordinators, Messrs. Nieuwenhuys of Belgium, Macedo Riba of Mexico and Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic, for their untiring efforts, and pledge my delegation's commitment to the cause of the early realization of chemical weapons disarmament.

I would also like to pay a tribute to Ambassador Ian Cromartie of the United Kingdom for what he has done for us on our work in chemical weapons. I wish him an early recovery and a life in comfort. I also associate myself with my distinguished colleagues in wishing Ambassador Dhanapala of Sri Lanka and Ambassador Tonwe of Nigeria every success in their new assignments. May I

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extend my delegation's warmest welcome to the new representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Rodrigo, to our Conference. I am looking forward to working closely with him.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for his statement. I now bid a warm welcome to the Conference to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, His Excellency Leo Tindemans, who will address this plenary meeting at this time. Mr. Tindemans has held his high position since 1981 and it was in that capacity that he also spoke in the then Committee on Disarmament on 14 June 1983. He has had an outstanding role in public affairs, having been a member of successive Governments in his country since 1968 and was Prime Minister between 1974 and 1978. I am sure that the Conference will listen to his statement with particular interest and wish him a successful visit to Geneva.

Mr. TINDEMANS (Belgium) (translated from French): Mr. President, first of all I must thank you for your kind words of welcome. May I congratulate you on your election as President of the Conference for the month of July. You have a reputation as an experienced and shrewd practitioner of multilateral disarmament and you have confirmed that reputation during your presidency, an office you are not, in fact, holding for the first time, because you were already in the Chair in 1981. You are, I know, admirably assisted by the secretariat of the Conference under the direction of Ambassadors Komatina and Berasategui, whose diplomatic skills are known to all.

This morning I was the victim of an air traffic controllers' strike, that is why my plane arrived too late. I do apologize for that.

When Belgium became a member of the Conference when it was established in January 1979 it entered, as stated by its Minister for Foreign Affairs at the opening meeting, with the firm intention of pursuing through dynamic action the common disarmament goals of the world community. Those goals had just been set by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The Final Document of that session established the priorities. It highlighted the universality of the cause of disarmament, which is the responsibility of all Powers, nuclear and non-nuclear, and in this spirit set up a single multilateral negotiating body that took over from the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which was too limited. These developments came in the wake of the 1960s and 1970s, which had seen considerable effort devoted towards limiting and eliminating arms. The atmosphere in international relations was propitious and gave hope that the establishment of a multilateral negotiating body would lend decisive impetus to the cause of disarmament.

The Conference on Disarmament is indeed the only negotiating body that brings together permanently a group of States representative of the entire international community. As such, it bears within itself the legitimate aspirations of all those throughout the world who, whether members of the Conference or not, place their hopes in the strengthening of peace, the halting of the arms race and gradual arms reduction.

(Mr. Tindemans, Belgium)

When we measure the modicity of the distance that we have covered since 1979 and the still greater modicity of the contribution the Conference on Disarmament has made in the course of almost 10 years to the disarmament process and when we look at the reasons behind this, a number of inescapable conclusions emerge that it would be wise to bear in mind for the future. First of all, disarmament falls within the context of political reality and its progress is dependent on the international situation, and not the reverse. Next, disarmament cannot be reduced to the status of a mere slogan or a remote goal forming the subject of ritual, almost incantatory prayers. But disarmament is not, either, an end in itself. It is an instrument in the service of peace and stability. The goal must be to strengthen the security of all, which implies a realistic approach, a gradual process, steadfast effort, and the taking into account of the major political and military balances, which it would be futile to ignore.

In addressing the Conference in 1983, I stressed how far the deterioration of international relations that we witnessed at the start of this decade was responsible for the sudden, almost total paralysis of negotiations in the sphere of arms control and disarmament. There is now a serious hope of seeing the negotiations between the super-Powers lead to concrete, perhaps even spectacular results. I say this all the more readily as those results would not be without impact on Belgium, since the elimination of INF is of direct concern to us. The other negotiations in Geneva -- bilateral, as is only normal since they relate only to United States and Soviet systems -- are, admittedly, outside the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, but they will unquestionably have, by their repercussions, an entrancing effect on its work. It will, after all, be the first time that an arms control agreement leads to a significant reduction in capabilities in the particularly sensitive area of the weapons known as weapons of mass destruction. That will be an achievement that goes considerably beyond the context of European security.

There is no doubt that a great deal remains to be done before we see the treaty on the elimination of INF to which we aspire drafted and signed. I would like to express the hope that the last few difficulties can be ironed out in time for an agreement to be concluded before the end of the year. My country will provide all the support it can to the negotiators. In particular, it will, together with its allies concerned by deployment, strive to ensure progress in the resolution of the problems linked to verification. As of now I can declare that it is prepared to accept, for its part, the application of strict measures in its territory.

Disarmament should be seen in terms of processes and priorities. The indissociability of the constituent elements of security does not mean that we should try to negotiate on everything at one and the same time. It is all a matter of sequences and priorities.

Belgium, whose security needs fall within the specific context of the East/West balance of power, sees its priorities as follows: first of all, conclusion of the INF agreement that I have just mentioned and, if possible, conclusion in the very near future of an agreement on the 50 per cent

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reduction of the Soviet and United States strategic arsenals, establishment of conventional stability in Europe at a reduced level of forces (the opening at the start of next year of a new conference on this matter would make an essential contribution to the development of the efforts already being undertaken in the sphere of arms control), early conclusion of an agreement on the total prohibition of chemical weapons (at present, this is the main activity and, I would even say, the main responsibility of the Conference on Disarmament). These priorities, which should not be seen in a chronological order, cover all the areas in which efforts at arms control will certainly have to develop further. However, progress cannot be envisaged without first securing the preservation of what has already been achieved. I am thinking in particular of the ABM Treaty, an essential instrument if we wish to prevent the development of an arms race in outer space. The ABM Treaty clearly raises serious problems of interpretation that the parties will have to resolve among themselves. It does not appear reasonable to us to seek to put a veto on thinking about transition to a form of deterrence that would include more of a defensive element than is the case today. It goes without saying that the overall balance must not suffer from it and that stability must emerge strengthened to the benefit of all, if possible at a reduced level of forces.

All these areas -- space, strategic, nuclear and, finally, conventional weapons -- are closely linked, but each also has its own peculiar features and therefore requires specific treatment. Each negotiation should therefore be conducted in parallel as far as possible, without, however, giving rise to disequilibrium such as would challenge the internal consistency of the security system which each State is free to adopt in the light of its own geostrategic context. Substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the two super-Powers, beginning with the elimination of INF, are possible and desirable without challenging that consistency. Similarly, we would all welcome total elimination of the chemical threat. There remains the issue of conventional weapons, which, in a way, is destined to dominate the arms control scene in the coming years, especially if the objectives that I have just mentioned in the nuclear and chemical areas are achieved, as I hope.

The Western defence system is based on an interrelationship between conventional and nuclear weapons. As the balance of forces now stands, for the allies to subscribe to a proposal for total denuclearization would be inconceivable. There is therefore a limit -- which I am not in a position to identify -- beyond which pursuit of reductions in nuclear capability would have the effect of threatening their security. It would, indeed, call in question the bases of the system of deterrence which for 40 years has proven that it continues to maintain peace.

I would now like to touch on issues which directly concern the work of the Conference on Disarmament, the most important of them being, to my mind, the prohibition of chemical weapons and the halting of nuclear tests. Belgium is of the view that the possibilities of progress, even success, are now real.

It is high time, more than 70 years after the first use of chemical weapons on Belgian soil, finally to put aside the mutual hesitations and suspicions which have so far impeded progress towards the concretization of a

(Mr. Tindemans, Belgium)

complete ban on this particularly inhuman type of weapon. Despite significant progress in the negotiations that concern us here, the use and proliferation of chemical weapons remain, sadly, a reality. These weapons are still being used, particularly in the conflict between Iran and Iraq. This has been observed by investigations organized by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. An escalation is in progress in which not even the civilian populations are spared. Aware of the growing number of countries that possess chemical weapons, Belgium is participating, together with its European partners and other countries, in an international system for controlling the export of several important chemical substances so as to reverse this trend and make it more difficult to produce such weapons. This system is only a temporary measure aimed at ensuring compliance with the Geneva Protocol pending the appearance of a universal convention.

My country has actively supported the attainment of this objective since it entered the Conference on Disarmament this year. This year, Belgium is chairing Working Group B, which has responsibility in particular for preparing the provisions of the future convention on chemical disarmament, especially the destruction of existing stocks and of chemical weapons production facilities.

The international verification of the storage and destruction of chemical weapons has been accepted as regards its principles and numerous modalities have already been defined. The same applies to monitoring of the closure and elimination of production facilities.

The system for the verification of non-production is also under preparation. The known combat agents and their precursors have been taken stock of and it has already been agreed that they will be placed under international surveillance because they can all be used for peaceful purposes, if only for research. Significant progress has been made in this area that it was essential to cover. We welcome the dispelling of the apparent confusion between chemical weapons and chemical substances produced for non-prohibited purposes. We also appreciate the fact that the need to avoid unduly impeding the development of the chemical industry and of research is now beginning to be recognized by all.

Whatever progress has been or may yet be made in the areas of verification that I have just mentioned, they will none the less be incomplete until a satisfactory solution has been found to the crucial problem of challenge inspection. The very usefulness of the verification of installations coming under the convention depends, in the final analysis, on compliance with the obligation to declare them, whether they be chemical weapons stockpiling facilities or factories making dual-purpose substances. The régimes for systematic verification must, therefore, be complemented and strengthened by an effective and binding régime for challenge inspection so as to form a coherent set of measures to discourage violations by making them detectable wherever they may occur.

(Mr. Tindemans, Belgium)

The international organization to be set up will be the spearhead of verification of chemical disarmament. It should be able to begin its activities as soon as possible after the entry into force. We welcome the fact that, as can be seen from the excellent working paper that the United Kingdom introduced here on 14 July last, there has been concrete thinking on the subject. In this regard I am pleased to be able to announce that my country would give favourable consideration to hosting the international organization if the Conference so requested.

The negotiations taking place in the Conference on Disarmament aim at ensuring lasting compliance with the ban on the use of chemical weapons established by the Geneva Protocol of 1925. But it must be stressed that the success of such an endeavour will depend on the support that it gets from the international community in the form of accession and ratification by the greatest possible number of countries. That implies broad participation in the negotiating process. Each and everyone should be able to present his proposals and describe his position with respect to the various aspects of the draft convention.

Universal acceptance of the future convention will be encouraged if we manage to take into account certain concerns. Of these, the need for undiminished security is probably the most important and it should be resolved in the context of the order of destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons. In this regard, it is clear that account will have to be taken of the very marked differences, both quantitative and qualitative, between the stocks that countries hold.

The universal character of the future convention could be jeopardized if the convention is not legally consistent. It will be important for the future convention to be structured logically around the fundamental principles expressed in its first article so that the wording used lends itself as little as possible to dubious or ambiguous interpretations.

Finally, it is essential that there should be no confusion as to the actual definition of chemical weapons. My country advocates a legal definition of the weapon itself and hopes that it will be possible to go beyond a mere enumeration of the material elements of which such weapons may consist. Suggestions have been informally advanced by the delegation of Belgium to other delegations with a view to discussion of this matter.

Belgium has no chemical military capability and has no intention of acquiring such a capability. The obsolete chemical munitions that are to be found in a part of Belgian territory and which date from the First World War pose specific problems. My country insists that the future convention must not uselessly complicate the problems that these old chemical munitions already pose for the countries that have inherited them.

The halting of nuclear testing is another priority topic for the Conference on Disarmament. In this area, too, the need is to be realistic and to proceed step by step. The total halting of nuclear tests is justified from the point of view of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. As far as we

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are concerned, I have said that such elimination seems to us unlikely in the short or medium term. None the less, Belgium subscribes to the objective of halting nuclear testing once the conditions have been met and significant progress has been made beyond the 50 per cent reduction of the strategic stockpiles of the two super-Powers.

Meanwhile, we must tackle the problem of halting nuclear tests in the form of a gradual process. Belgium welcomes the contacts and discussions taking place between the super-Powers on this matter. Significant progress seems to have been made in the area of verification. I am also pleased to note that a more open and constructive attitude seems to be emerging. The halting of nuclear tests can only be achieved on the basis of a verification system that gives everybody the necessary assurances. The entry into force of the TTBT and of the PNET would unquestionably mark a step in the right direction. The development of a system for the exchange of information concerning test programmes, their prior notification, and the invitation of experts to monitor yields would also contribute to our objective. In the same line of thought, the placing of a maximum limit on the number of tests and, perhaps, the reduction of that number in the light of the progress made in arms control and reduction of nuclear capabilities would also be useful measures. They would permit the initiation of a process that would lead to a total halt, even if the time required for that cannot be set in advance. It seems to me that this is the direction the work of the Conference on Disarmament should take. I believe that realism compels us to see things in this way if we are not to doom our proceedings to sterile declarations.

I shall now briefly address two further points that the Conference on Disarmament discusses, namely outer space and radiological weapons.

Belgium welcomes the examination by the Conference on Disarmament of a number of concerns relating to the arms race in outer space. The problem of the protection of satellites, the elaboration of an appropriate multilateral régime and the drawing-up of an international code of conduct are, in particular, the questions that the Conference on Disarmament could usefully debate at the multilateral level. They are independent of the ABM Treaty and the SD I, which, in our opinion, remain within the direct competence of the two super-Powers concerned.

As regards radiological weapons, the new approach prevailing within the Conference on Disarmament gives hope that it will be possible to negotiate the convention on the abolition of such weapons without artificial linkage with the negotiation of a convention prohibiting attacks on nuclear power stations. That being so, a positive outcome should be possible in this area too.

By way of conclusion, I should like to say that it is heartening to see encouraging progress in our work. Permit me, also, to repeat, for the point is essential, that Belgium considers the definitive elimination of chemical weapons to be an urgent priority and will spare no effort to achieve it. To

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that end, it readily endorses the suggestions that have been made for a possible prolongation of the work outside the official sessions of the Conference on Disarmament.

I should like to make a strong appeal for the elimination, through reciprocal political will, of everything that may still impede the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons. The credibility of the Conference on Disarmament and, beyond that, the credibility of all the efforts in the sphere of disarmament are at stake.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of New Zealand, Ambassador Fortune.

Mr. FORTUNE (New Zealand): Mr. President, this is the first time I have taken the floor as representative of New Zealand in the Conference on Disarmament, it is indeed an honour, especially to follow such a distinguished and important speaker as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Mr. Tindemans, and also to speak during the period of your Chairmanship. New Zealand's support for this body is well known. Our observer status is something to which we attach a great deal of importance, since it allows us to follow the work of the Conference closely. When the opportunity arises New Zealand plans to seek full membership of the CD.

We believe small countries have a particular role to play in the disarmament process. The CD, as the single multilateral body tasked with negotiating arms control agreements, provides a vehicle through which small and non-nuclear Powers can make a contribution.

It is important that the CD fulfil the expectation of the international community that it will negotiate effective measures of arms control, and also complement and support the steps being taken to this end by the nuclear-weapon States, particularly the super-Powers. Nowhere is the need for urgent and effective action more evident today than in the area of chemical weapons. My delegation is reassured by the progress that has been made this year towards agreement on a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, but much remains to be done.

The need for such a treaty is not in dispute. It is only two months since the Secretary-General issued the report of his mission of specialists confirming that chemical weapons were continuing to be used in the conflict between Iran and Iraq. As the Secretary-General noted, the unanimous findings of the specialists -- that there has been repeated use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces by Iraqi forces, that civilians in Iran have also been injured by chemical weapons, and that Iraqi military personnel have sustained injuries from chemical warfare agents -- must add new urgency to the grave concern of the international community.

We cannot too strongly condemn this continuing use of chemical weapons and those repeated violations of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The message and

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law of the Protocol is that chemical poisons are cruel and barbarous, and that their use in war can never be justified. That Iranian civilians, including women and children, have been subjected to attacks with chemical weapons is a new and abhorrent aspect of recent reports. It is of profound concern to us that the appeals of the Secretary-General have been disregarded, as have the demands of the Security Council that the provisions of the Protocol be strictly respected and observed.

All this reinforces the need for a new convention that will strengthen and extend existing prohibitions against chemical warfare. The New Zealand delegation looks to the CD to give renewed impetus to its negotiations so that a comprehensive chemical weapons convention can be adopted soon.

Just as there is reason for optimism that chemical weapon negotiations can be brought to a conclusion before long, so are there grounds for hope that negotiations towards the elimination of intermediate range missiles from Europe -- perhaps even global elimination -- may be concluded even sooner. If the outstanding issues can be resolved, there will be a very real prospect of a summit later in the year and the signature by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev of an intermediate range nuclear forces treaty. It goes without saying that this would be warmly welcomed by New Zealand.

The significance of such a treaty cannot be over-emphasized. Granted, intermediate range forces constitute only a small fraction of the nuclear arsenal. But agreement on their elimination will be much more than a confidence-building measure. As the first ever nuclear arms reduction agreement, it will signal an about-turn in the arms race. It will prove that security is not necessarily dependent on an ever-increasing number of nuclear weapons but can be enhanced by their reduction or, as in this case, by the elimination of entire classes of weaponry. Such a major shift in thinking about security is, in New Zealand's view, long overdue.

Like any arms race, the nuclear arms race had its roots in the search for security and the need to deter aggressors through the assertion of power. There is nothing new about deterrence -- it has provided the basis for mankind's security for thousands of years. Although it was given a new dimension with the coming of the nuclear age, and although that development raised enormously the stake of all countries in not upsetting the balance of deterrence, it is a theory that can never be proved successful. It remains a paradox that, although one can be certain, when it is too late, that deterrence has failed, one can never have absolute proof of its success.

Another paradox is this: in order to deter war you have to be able to convince potential opponents that you can win the war you are trying to deter. But the power of nuclear weapons is so awesome that such calculations of superiority are meaningless. Even a limited nuclear war would be devastating to both combatants, and possibly the rest of the world as well. As President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed at their November 1985 summit: "A nuclear war cannot be won, and must never be fought". The idea of "us" deterring "them" has, in the nuclear age, a new and

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absurd meaning. It is now a case of the nuclear arsenals threatening the security of all of us. The search for security has, in the perception of many, left the whole world less secure than ever before.

Despite this, reliance continues to be placed on nuclear deterrence. In Europe, NATO and Warsaw Pact countries confront each other with heavy concentrations of nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons. The theory of deterrence has been used to justify this situation. But the size of the nuclear inventory in Europe is clearly excessive. So, too, is the size of the other arsenals. Effective deterrence would be possible at a much lower level of weaponry than exists today and, in the right circumstances, without nuclear weapons at all. We can only be thankful that this has at last been recognized, and that the move away from dependence on nuclear weapons to preserve security has begun in earnest. Agreement on the elimination of intermediate range missiles from Europe will be heralded everywhere as the turning point in the arms race. We all welcome, in the words of Sir Geoffrey Howe, "the prospect of a less nuclear world".

In such a world, it seems inevitable to New Zealand that there will need to be a greater emphasis on regional, conventional security co-operation. In Europe, a common defence posture, working through a revitalized Western European Union, or a European defence force is, we understand, one option being canvassed. Around the globe, similar reassessments of regional commitments and obligations are being made. The goal must be a world freed from the threat of nuclear annihilation.

Because of the huge arsenals of nuclear as well as chemical and conventional weapons possessed by the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, it is perhaps inevitable that perceptions of global security are coloured by concerns about security in Europe. As a Western country in the South Pacific, New Zealand has difficulty in accepting that security in our part of the world is indivisible from that in Europe. Statements to that effect ignore the reality of the situation.

The fact is that, in contrast to Europe, there are no nuclear weapons deployed in the South Pacific. We in the region appreciate our good fortune in living in an area free of great-Power confrontation -- let alone nuclear confrontation. Security has already been preserved by a -- thankfully -- low level of conventional forces. The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, which entered into force on 11 December 1986, is aimed at ensuring that the existing balance is not upset through the introduction of nuclear weapons. New Zealand's domestic anti-nuclear legislation, passed last month, fulfils a similar purpose.

The New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act prohibits the entry into New Zealand of ships or aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. As a serious restraint on the deployment of nuclear weapons, it goes to the heart of what constitutes real arms limitations. For too long, nations have proclaimed the importance of nuclear disarmament, while the proliferation of nuclear weapons has gone unchecked.

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New Zealand has made a real move to break out of the cycle. The Nuclear Free Zone Act, our commitment to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, and our determination to continue to meet regional security obligations in conventional terms, all complement each other. They are the end result of a serious analysis of New Zealand's security imperatives. Having assessed the threats to our security, we have developed policies appropriate to the level and nature of those threats. That analysis is no different from that undertaken by every other country. The outcome -- a non-nuclear South Pacific -- is a reflection of the particular strategic circumstances which exist in our region.

We acknowledge that Europe has different security imperatives. That is why we do not expect our policies to be replicated by countries in Europe. Equally, however, New Zealand does not accept that Western security must be indivisibly reliant on nuclear weapons. We believe that alternatives to nuclear deterrence do exist. As a responsible Western member of the international community, we need to help promulgate that message. We do so in a way that we believe does not compromise Western security interests. Indeed, it would be short-sighted and ultimately self-defeating for us to push for policies which had the effect of weakening the security not only of Western countries but also of those neutral and non-aligned countries which depend for their existence on a stable and secure world. Our policies demonstrate that there are other than nuclear options and that these should be seriously explored.

We take heart from the positive outlook of the current bilateral talks that this is finally happening. It is the responsibility of every country, and particularly those which are members of the Conference on Disarmament to support the United States and the Soviet Union in their negotiations. If they fail, we all fail. But if they succeed, the whole world will take new heart in its efforts to achieve a more secure and certain future.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of New Zealand for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Hungary, Ambassador Meiszter.

Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary): Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to express our congratulations and best wishes to you on the occasion of your presidency. Being near to the end of your presidency, it is not simply a compliment when I express our satisfaction for the calm manner in which you have conducted our deliberations and our high appreciation for your contribution to the substantive advancement of the work of the Conference. The same goes to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Alfarargi, who guided our proceedings successfully and with remarkable devotion.

Let me also seize this opportunity to say how pleased my delegation is to have seen in our midst, a few moments ago, the Foreign Minister of Belgium, His Excellency Mr. Leo Tindemans, and to have listened to his interesting statement. I would like at the same time, to extend a warm welcome to Ambassador Nihal Rodrigo of Sri Lanka, and may I assure him of the

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co-operation of my delegation. Among my words of courtesy, may I bid farewell to our colleagues; to Ambassadors Tonwe, Dhanapala and Cromartie, who have left us or are about to leave us, and wish them all the best in their future activities. I would especially like to ask the delegation of the United Kingdom to transmit to Ambassador Cromartie our wishes for his quick recovery.

As the Conference on Disarmament gets deeper into the substantive consideration of the disarmament issues on its agenda, a remarkable exchange of views is unfolding around a subject which strictly speaking, may not be a disarmament question, but which has a crucial bearing on the fruitfulness of the efforts aimed at achieving results in this field. I have been following with interest the views expressed in connection with the concept of nuclear deterrence and its impact -- direct or indirect -- on the negotiations on priority tasks of disarmament. Let me refer only to some of the statements, for instance, to that of Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, Vladimir Petrovsky, on 9 June, to the statement made by President Raul Alfonsín of Argentina on 11 June, or to that of Ambassador Fortune of New Zealand a few minutes ago.

It is commonplace to say in our days that efforts aimed at achieving real measures of disarmament remain unfruitful. The question rightly emerges: is there a direct interrelationship between professing and practising the concept of deterrence and the fruitlessness of disarmament efforts?

Supporters of the concept of deterrence consistently profess that nuclear weapons or, in a wider sense, credible military force is the guarantee of the security of their States. They hold that the doctrine of deterrence has prevented war for the last four decades between East and West. With the same effort, one can say that there has been no war in Europe against and irrespective of the operation of the doctrine of deterrence. Such an opinion may equally be true as far as the perception of causes of the absence of war is concerned. If one adds to this that deterrence has not prevented war elsewhere outside Europe, then the myth of the might of deterrence becomes even less credible.

Supporters of the doctrine of deterrence assert that the guarantor of peace is the force of arms. According to this line of thinking, there are arms because there is mistrust among nations and not vice versa. Nevertheless, the suggested remedy, instead of eliminating the causes of distrust, is to uphold and strengthen the credibility of deterrence -- which, in practical terms, means modernization and development of new weapons and weapons systems, increasing their destructive power and precision, that is, their credible and actual war-fighting capability.

Opponents of the doctrine -- and I am one of them -- hold that the myth of deterrence is a self-deception, an effort to avoid facing the realities of our world. Upholding the credibility of deterrence is the code-word for the arms race. In a world where security of States depends on deterrence based on the lack of trust, the arms race inevitably becomes a self-generating

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process. It reproduces mistrust, because it produces the dubious substitute for trust: ever more sophisticated weapons. The main deficiency of this way of thinking is -- even if I accept for the sake of theoretical analysis that the starting point is right -- that this way of thinking is completely a static one. It does not take into account that the end-products of this process, the ever more sophisticated weapons, carry in themselves the seeds of everyone's insecurity, including that of the owners of these weapons, and the more sophisticated they become, the more they are the inherent source of insecurity, independently of the wish of the Governments in question. The way out of this vicious circle in which lack of trust leads to an arms race and the latter in its turn amplifies distrust is to identify and build-down the causes of mistrust on the one hand. On the other, practical steps should be taken for the gradual elimination of the means of war, which in its turn will result in strengthening confidence. This may bring about a self-sustaining, self-generating process -- like the arms race, but in the opposite direction -- which is bound to lead to real comprehensive security for all States. To bring about such a security system requires the joint efforts of all the participants in international relations in the crucial and interrelated areas of disarmament. Any result in this -- small or big, partial or comprehensive, symbolic or substantive -- is of paramount importance. The first result that is achieved in this process will have a special psychological significance in setting the ball rolling.

This is why we welcome and attribute the greatest importance to the bilateral talks between the USSR and the United States of America on crucial issues of nuclear disarmament and on preventing an arms race in outer space. This is why we attribute equally great importance to the achievement by the Conference on Disarmament of tangible results on any of the items on its agenda. The possibilities are there. While we recognize the weight of the so-far-unresolved problems, a convention on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons would be within reach given the firm political determination of all parties concerned. A step towards a CTB would be of paramount importance in curbing the nuclear arms race. And finally, there are specific possibilities in the prevention of the arms race in outer space, a subject I would like to dwell on in some detail. But, before turning to the substance of the matter, I would not miss this opportunity to express our thanks and appreciation to the delegation and, through it, to the Government of Canada for arranging the Workshop in Montreal this May on issues related to outer space.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space has a special place in the line of thinking that I was expounding in the previous part of my statement. Outer space is an area where the military technical means of a credible deterrence has not yet been deployed although the existing aspirations are well known. Consequently, any tangible result in preventing an arms race in outer space, even if concerning only a specific aspect of it, would be most welcome.

The proceedings of the Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space under the able and devoted chairmanship of Ambassador Pugliese testify to a need for more streamlined work directed towards working out specific measures to strengthen

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the international legal régime governing the activities of States in outer space. Positions show a great divergence of views as far as the issue of outer space as a whole is concerned. Statements made at the plenary meetings or in the proceedings of the Committee, however, tend to converge on the necessity to provide protection for the satellites in orbit around the globe, that is to assure their immunity for the sake of their unimpeded functioning. Statements made on this issue have generally declared this wish, but delegations have not elaborated on the concrete ways and means of providing protection for satellites.

In our opinion, this could be an aspect to which the Committee on Outer Space should pay specific attention in its future work. Even during the remaining part of the present session the Committee might consider if its work could be focused on examining and perhaps outlining specific measures aimed at ensuring the unimpeded functioning of satellites. In this regard, I listened with great interest to the statement of His Excellency Leo Tindemans, referring to the possible steps in this field in connection with outer space. Concerning this question some important questions may arise which perhaps would merit serious in-depth consideration from the Committee.

Some of those questions are relatively easy to answer, for instance, the one whether all the parties concerned are interested in providing immunity to satellites. The answer, it seems to me, is an unequivocal yes. All States, irrespective of whether they possess or do not possess satellites, are vitally interested in the normal and safe functioning of satellites. It seems to me that there is widespread recognition that the world would run into chaos without them.

Some other issues are not so simple to answer, although positions show a convergence to a considerable degree. These questions are the following: Is the present international legal régime sufficient to guarantee beyond doubt the safe functioning of satellites in orbit, or are some further, appropriate multilateral legal measures required to provide the necessary guarantees? Should all satellites -- military and civilian -- enjoy adequate protection? Is it necessary and possible to make a distinction between civilian and military satellites, taking into account that none of them -- at least as of now -- is equipped with weapons? Do the satellites with military assignments perform functions vital enough for international security to make them eligible for protection? Should the problem of the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons be appropriately dealt with in this context? Can the existence of ASAT weapons be considered compatible with the aim of guaranteeing the normal functioning of satellites? Should the measures to be worked out be of a legally-binding character? Is it desirable that the measures to be worked out should be multilateral, with an appropriate adherence?

These are but some of the fundamental questions to be addressed by those taking part in the proceedings of the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. The expert of my delegation will elaborate on these questions in further detail in the forum of that Committee. I am sure that thorough consideration of such issues would give a concrete and useful direction to its proceedings.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the President.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor at this time? I see none.

May I now turn to the timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies next week. The timetable, which has been circulated by the secretariat, is merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. It has been prepared in consultation with the chairman of subsidiary bodies, with whom I had a meeting yesterday. As a result of our exchange of views, there may be a need to make further arrangements in the timetable. If this is the case, a revision will be issued by the secretariat. If I see no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

In accordance with the timetable for this week, I should like to recall that immediately after this plenary meeting, the Conference will hold an informal meeting devoted to the substance of agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

Before I adjourn this plenary meeting, I wish to inform the Conference that the Group of 21 has requested that the draft mandate for an Ad hoc Committee on agenda item 3 which is contained in document CD/515/Rev.3 be put before the Conference for decision at our next plenary meeting on Tuesday, 28 July. I shall proceed accordingly. In accordance with existing practice, we shall take up that question at the end of the list of speakers, first at an informal meeting and then at a resumed plenary. There is one further announcement. The Co-ordinator of Contact Group B of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons invites delegations for informal consultations regarding issues presently under discussion in Contact Group B on Thursday, 23 July 1987, at 4 p.m. in Room I.

As there is no other business for today, I intend to adjourn this meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 28 July, at 10 a.m. This plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.