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FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND THIRTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 16 June 1987, at 10. a.m.

President: Mr. S. Alfarargi (Egypt)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I declare open the 413th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. Distinguished delegates, consultations as you know are still going on on the programme of work for the second part of the 1987 session. I intend in the light of those consultations to convene as soon as we finish our list of speakers an informal meeting of the Conference in order to consider that question. We shall then resume the plenary meeting in order to formalize any agreement which may have been achieved at the informal meeting. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Hungary, Bulgaria, France and Pakistan. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, His Excellency Ambassador David Meiszter, head of the delegation of Hungary to the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary): Let me, at the outset of my statement, congratulate you on the assumption of the responsible post of President of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of June. In wishing you success in guiding the proceedings for this auspicious body, I would like to assure you that my delegation will fully co-operate with you in any of your efforts to move the work towards tangible results. May I be permitted to express the thanks and appreciation of my delegation to your distinguished predecessor in the chair, Ambassador Milos Vejvoda, for his genuine efforts in reaching real advance in high-priority tasks. I would like also to welcome in our midst our new colleague, Ambassador Max Friedersdorf, head of the delegation of the United States of America. I am looking forward to co-operating with him as I did with his distinguished predecessors.

The session of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty held at the end of May in Berlin, the documents of which were presented to the Conference the other day by Ambassador Harald Rose, rightly drew the attention of world public opinion time and again to the overriding need for urgent, tangible results in the field of nuclear disarmament. The communiqué issued by the session placed particular emphasis on a new way of thinking, a new approach to the issues of war and peace, disarmament and other complex global and regional problems, and the abandonment of the concept of "nuclear deterrence", which supposes that nuclear weapons are the guarantee for the security of States. Specific details of the new thinking were highlighted by Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir F. Petrovsky of the USSR in his statement to the Conference to which my delegation fully subscribes.

To translate those goals into reality, practical steps need be taken in the field of nuclear disarmament. One such step could be to proceed as soon as possible to the conclusion of an agreement on eliminating all medium-range missiles in Europe, coupled with the elimination of shorter-range missiles. Another step in that direction could be a radical reduction in offensive strategic weapons along with strengthening of the ABM Treaty régime. One cannot but welcome and render unconditional support to the efforts under way, and hope that the bilateral talks between the USSR and the United States will produce tangible results in the very near future.

I have listened with interest to positions explained by some delegations concerning the interrelationship between nuclear and conventional disarmament in the context of the elimination of all European medium-range nuclear

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missiles. Although the issue of conventional disarmament is not one of the subjects actively dealt with here in this body, I find it appropriate to recall that several proposals have been made to this effect by the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Just to mention some of them:

Last June my delegation submitted to the Conference the Budapest Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty Organization concerning the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. That proposal still stands;

The Berlin session of the Warsaw Treaty Organization discussed ways of implementing the programme submitted by its States parties with a view to achieving a 25 per cent reduction in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe during the early 1990s. The reductions are scheduled to take place simultaneously with and in conjunction with reductions in tactical nuclear systems;

Furthermore, the Berlin session, responding to the concerns raised, expressed its awareness of the asymmetric structures of the armed forces maintained by the two sides in Europe, and stated its preparedness to have the imbalance that has arisen in certain elements redressed in the course of the reductions, proposing that the side which has an advantage over the other should make the appropriate cut-backs.

May I draw attention to the fact that thereby not only has this concern been addressed, but this has been done using the very term "redressed" that may be familiar to those raising the concern.

Nuclear disarmament as a complex of specific disarmament issues has been from the beginning a top-priority task of the Conference on Disarmament too. The fact that promising efforts are being undertaken in the USSR-United States bilateral talks does not relieve this body of its responsibility to make its own contribution as envisaged in its mandate. On the contrary, the progress in talks between the USSR and the United States should be a factor prompting this body to prove that the Conference itself is not outside the mainstream of international trends towards a safer world.

During the first part of this year's session, efforts were made by the presidents of the Conference as well as by individual delegations or groups of delegations, in plenaries and in informal consultations alike, to find a way to proceed, but in vain. In assessing what the Conference on Disarmament has accomplished so far, it should be noted that the steps taken fall far short of the task inscribed in our mandate, without mentioning the even more ambitious proposals found in abundance in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly or the proposals made by the USSR on 15 January 1986, or in several other documents.

The least we should be able to do here is to specify the areas where we could contribute to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and to nuclear disarmament. There is a wide range of possibilities for that, starting with working out a phased programme for eliminating nuclear weapons and ranging up to the initiation of practical work on such particular issues as the cut-off of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

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The central issue in proceeding towards nuclear disarmament is the comprehensive cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. It is the well-known position of my delegation that the eventual aim of a CTB should be to prohibit all test explosions by all States in all environments for all time, and to work out effective measures to prevent circumvention of the ban under the pretext of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. A CTB could be one step capable of greatly contributing to advancing the limitation, reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

Partial steps towards a full scale CTB -- such as reducing the number and yield of nuclear explosions -- might facilitate reaching the above goal, provided such measures are not offered as a substitute. At the same time one may agree that working out such practical steps is better suited to the ongoing bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the United States.

During its spring session the Conference invested an enormous amount of work to create the necessary procedural framework for commencing negotiations on the issue, but it failed. My delegation is aware of the conflicting views as far as the substance and the appropriate procedure are concerned. Nevertheless, I cannot agree that this is enough reason to put off the commencement of work. Even though a State or States may for the time being consider the CTB as a long-term objective, that should not exclude the commencement of practical work. The time needed to work out a treaty is not a matter of months. Take the example of the prohibition of chemical weapons with its decades-old negotiating history.

My delegation strongly urges all those concerned to put aside stereotyped positions, show flexibility and start practical work. To set up an Ad hoc Committee on a CTB without further delay is indispensable. The scope of a future CTB should not cause too many difficulties, since it is almost self-evident. On that understanding our practical efforts might be concentrated on other crucial aspects, among others verification.

In the view of my delegation, the proposal presented by Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky of the USSR on behalf of the group of socialist delegations contains all the necessary major elements that provide a solid basis for sensible work. Whether a CTB is a short-term or long-term objective may well prove to be of less importance once the work has been started.

As one of the sponsors of the "Basic provisions" of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, I would like at this stage to highlight some of its features we find especially important. An outstanding feature of the proposal is that it provides for a ban on nuclear-weapon testing as far as the scope of a future treaty is concerned. As a first step the ban would apply to the two major nuclear Powers for a period of five years. The proposal leaves no doubt, however, that the final aim is a universal ban on nuclear-weapon testing by virtue of subsequent accession to it by the other nuclear Powers. This approach to the scope of participation is meant to accommodate well-known positions held by some of the nuclear Powers.

The most remarkable feature of these provisions is undoubtedly the part dealing with verification of the test ban. It provides for the application of

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national means of verification, and access to the results of such verification for other States. Another provision for verification is the establishment of a network of international seismic stations, including the exchange of Level II seismic data and the measuring of atmospheric radioactivity and the exchange of the data obtained from such measurements.

Radical provisions are proposed for on-site inspection in cases when suspicions or doubts emerge concerning strict compliance with the treaty. Under its terms all parties would have the right to demand, and the challenged party would be obliged to provide access for, an on-site inspection to clarify events giving rise to suspicion on the basis of an appropriately substantiated request, through procedures to be elaborated.

We continue to hold that strict compliance with a future treaty is a must to ensure the effective functioning and authority of a CTBT. A verification régime on the lines proposed could meet that requirement. It could greatly contribute to dispelling long-held reservations to the effect that finding the appropriate verification mechanism may cause insurmountable difficulties.

There is a further specific item in the vast domain of nuclear disarmament I would like to dwell on: the question of negative security assurances. Strengthening of the security of States, and particularly those which have renounced the nuclear option, has been an issue ever since the world was divided into nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States. Amplified by the emergence of the NPT and its review conferences, this task is coming more and more to the forefront. It is not an exaggeration to say that assuring non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons has become a permanent subject of any multilateral conference held on nuclear issues.

This question was actively dealt with at earlier stages of the work of this Conference, in plenary and in working bodies. However, it was progressively moved to the periphery of attention, not without an unfounded sense of scepticism. This in our view is a deplorable development, especially if we add that the Conferences's performance in other nuclear fields has been meagre to say the least. It is a matter of consolation that this year the ad hoc committee set up to deal with the subject will start substantive work under the chairmanship of Ambassador von Stülpnagel.

The question of assuring non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons has mainly been considered so far in the context of unilateral undertakings assumed by the nuclear-weapon States. Efforts to merge these undertakings — different in substance and wording to a large extent -- into a single international instrument of legally binding character turned out to be a futile exercise. Not that the final aim was wrong, but perhaps the approach pursued or the political conditions were unfavourable. We continue to hold that States which have renounced the nuclear option are entitled to enjoy firm, unconditional assurances that they will never be subjected to the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. We are still of the view that the appropriate form for such assurances would be a single international instrument of legally binding character.

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An approach to the subject from the narrow angle of unilateral undertakings by the five nuclear-weapon States may rightly be considered obsolete now. Recent developments in international politics provide a reliable substantive basis to seek and find a broader, fresh approach better suited to the prevailing political circumstances.

During their summit meeting in Geneva, General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan reached a historic political understanding to the effect that "a nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought". The USSR has repeatedly declared that it strictly adheres to the policy of non-first-use. Documents of the Berlin session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization contain numerous elements relating to this issue. As far as the East-West aspect of the question is concerned, the Stockholm Conference also contributed a significant element to the issue of negative security assurances: the participants made a firm political commitment to refrain from the use of military force, be it nuclear or conventional. One could go on with the enumeration of the favourable elements providing the substantive basis for a fresh approach based on new thinking.

My delegation feels it appropriate that the ad hoc committee, when resuming its work this year, should survey the latest developments relevant to its work -- including those mentioned a minute ago -- and take advantage of the new situation created by the latest favourable developments in international politics. Given goodwill on the part of all, the Committee should find a way out of the impasse regarding the problem of negative security assurances.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank His Excellency Ambassador David Meiszter for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to myself and to my predecessor, Ambassador Vejvoda. The next speaker on my list today is His Excellency Ambassador Konstantin Tellalov, head of the delegation of Bulgaria to the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): Mr. President, may I express my pleasure at seeing you, the representative of Egypt, with which my country enjoys friendly relations, in the chair as President of the Conference for the month of June. Your personal abilities which you displayed as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, and of other United Nations bodies, make me confident that you will discharge your important duties in a most efficient manner. I assure you of the full support and co-operation of my delegation in your task to give a good start to the work of our summer session. I also wish to extend to your predecessor, Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia, my delegation's sincere thanks for the efforts he made and for the skilful way in which he guided the Conference during the month of April and in May. I would like to seize the opportunity to welcome in our midst Ambassador Max Friedersdorf, the new head of the delegation of the United States of America. We are looking forward to co-operating with him as we did with his predecessor.

The Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty reaffirmed in its Berlin Declaration that the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty, being a defensive one, is subordinated to the task of

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preventing war, whether nuclear or conventional. It is not my intention to dwell in detail on the constituent elements of the Declaration, since its text has been circulated as an official document (CD/755) and was very well introduced by Ambassador Harald Rose on 9 June.

My delegation would like to emphasize, however, that the States parties singled out in their communiqué the need for renewed efforts to agree upon practical measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. They are calling for:

Immediate conclusion of an agreement to eliminate all United States and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe;

Simultaneous elimination of the Soviet and United States shorter-range missiles in Europe and opening of negotiations on such missiles stationed in the eastern parts of the Soviet Union and on the territory of the United States;

Settlement of the issue of tactical nuclear weapons, including tactical missiles, in Europe through multilateral negotiations;

Conclusion of an agreement on radical reductions in offensive strategic weapons coupled with a strengthening of the ABM Treaty régime;

Conclusion of a total ban on nuclear testing.

The negotiations between the USSR and the United States on intermediate nuclear forces are now at a crucial point. The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty have made their contribution in order to facilitate the reaching of agreement at the negotiations. In the course of his recent visit to the Federal Republic of Germany, the President of the State Council of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov, stated, inter alia:

"The USSR and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty went far beyond the well-known 'zero option'. This unique chance for European nations should not be missed. Reaching an agreement would not just have major political importance. It would change to a significant degree the psychological atmosphere on our continent. And this would open the way to other important agreements in the field of disarmament."

Mr. President, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence has been the most powerful booster of the arms race and, in particular, the nuclear-arms race in the aftermath of the Second World War. The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty reject the doctrine of nuclear deterrence as amoral and dangerous. Nuclear weapons are not and cannot be a guarantee of security. Quite the contrary. The more nuclear weapons are piling up in the arsenals, the more the risk of nuclear catastrophe grows. My delegation shares the view expressed in this hall by the President of the Argentine Republic that it is high time "to abandon once and for all the theories that require us to comprehend the incomprehensible, to accept the unacceptable ...".

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An agreement on intermediate nuclear weapons can and must be a first step towards a higher goal: the gradual reduction and total elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere. To make more tangible the prospects for achieving this goal, two important measures are needed: a halt to all nuclear testing, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The Berlin meeting of the Political Consultative Committee stressed once again the importance of a general and complete prohibition of nuclear testing as a measure to halt the development, production and refinement of nuclear arms and achieve the gradual reduction and ultimate elimination of these weapons, as well as to prevent an arms race in outer space. Being deeply convinced of the urgent necessity for the Conference to begin substantive work on item 1 of its agenda, my delegation is co-sponsoring document CD/756, "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests". This document was presented by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, V.F. Petrovsky, in a most detailed and eloquent manner.

The nuclear-test ban is not an end in itself. This is a problem which has been examined for more than 30 years now, and on which the General Assembly has adopted more than 50 resolutions. It is generally recognized that no single multilateral agreement could have a greater effect on limiting the further refinement of nuclear weapons than a nuclear-test ban. It is obvious that the continuance of nuclear-weapon testing intensifies the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war. The Secretary-General of the United Nations was undoubtedly right in pointing out, at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly, that the readiness to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty was "the litmus test of the real willingness to pursue nuclear disarmament".

In 1963 the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom undertook, in article I of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, to conclude a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of nuclear testing. This undertaking was reiterated in 1968 in the preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Furthermore, article VI of this Treaty embodied a legally binding commitment to take effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race and to nuclear disarmament.

In a report submitted to the Committee on Disarmament on 30 July 1980, the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR stated, inter alia, that they were "mindful of the great value for all mankind that the prohibition of nuclear-weapon test explosions in all environments will have", as well as "conscious of the important responsibility placed upon them to find solutions to the remaining problems". Against this background it is unacceptable today to hear that some countries regard the nuclear-test ban as a long-term objective.

In co-sponsoring document CD/756, my delegation hopes that it will impart new vigour to the efforts aimed at commencing practical work on item 1. The document puts in a single perspective the positive stock of many years of efforts; it contains ideas and proposals advanced by many countries, including the Six States from Five Continents. The content of the draft

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treaty is imbued with the spirit of new political thinking which, as Deputy Minister Petrovsky stressed, "requires that diplomatic practice should be brought into line with the realities of the nuclear and space age".

The issue of verification and control is a case in point. For years it was argued by a number of delegations that this problem is the main stumbling-block on the road towards an agreement. The joint proposal of the group of socialist countries is clear proof of their readiness to explore all avenues with a view to establishing a solid system of verification and control to be embodied in an agreement on a nuclear-test ban. Use of national technical means of verification, establishment of an international system of seismic verification, international exchange of data on atmospheric radioactivity, ensuring the non-functioning of nuclear-weapon test sites, on-site inspection: no idea has, in our view, been forgotten in the document tabled by the socialist countries. And it is worth mentioning again that the Group of socialist countries puts forward the idea that an international inspectorate should be established, something which was not envisaged either in the 1982 USSR proposal or in the tripartite report submitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom.

At the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly the political climate of the test ban issue was a bit improved, and a trend towards convergence of views emerged. There were also clear signs of greater openness on the matter during our spring session. Valuable work is being performed by the Group of Seismic Experts, which is preparing a second global collection and analysis test in 1988. There is no doubt in our mind that it is long overdue for the Conference to begin substantive work immediately on its agenda item 1.

My delegation would like to make very briefly some points about the work of the ad hoc committees.

In the communiqué issued by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Berlin recently, the States parties reiterated "their preparedness to complete the preparation of an international convention banning chemical weapons and providing for the destruction of the stockpiles of such weapons and the industrial basis for their production by the end of this year". In this regard they recalled their Moscow Declaration of 25 March 1987.

The "rolling text" entitled "Current stage of the negotiations on a Chemical Weapons Convention" registers the progress achieved so far. The Ad hoc Committee took the only logical decision: to use the "rolling text" as a basis for negotiations during the summer session of the Committee. My delegation would like neither to underestimate nor to overestimate the problems that remain to be resolved by the Ad hoc Committee. It seems to us, however, that there is a trend towards convergence of views with regard to the outstanding political problems: issues pertaining to non-production of chemical weapons, fact-finding, including challenge inspection, the organization and functions of the Consultative Committee and its organs, just to mention, perhaps, the most important ones. The task of negotiating

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solutions to those problems could be carried out provided that there is a clear political will not to artificially complicate the negotiations, not to become bogged down in never-ending discussions on technical details.

For three years now discussions have been going on in the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. There are different views as to what has been done and what needs to be done. It is clear that the present legal régime raises some barriers to an arms race in outer space, but that in many crucial areas this régime is far from complete. Hence, on the one hand, existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral, must be strictly adhered to. On the other hand, the work of the Ad hoc Committee must be broadened and deepened with a view to considering specific measures and undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

At its forty-first session, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus a decision providing for the Conference to conclude the elaboration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament during the first part of its 1987 session. Although some progress was registered, one has to recognize that the finalization of the draft Programme continues to elude the Conference. It is clear that time is running out, because the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament is coming closer and closer. Therefore, we believe that the summer session of the Conference is duty-bound to do what the spring session failed to achieve on item 8.

At the end of the spring session an exchange of views took place on how best to proceed further with item 7. Having worked over the last few years on the basis of a unitary approach, the Ad hoc Committee decided to discuss the two tracks -- "Radiological weapons in the traditional sense" and "Prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities" -- separately in two contact groups. One must not, however, overlook the fact that procedural devices per se do not produce concrete results unless they are coupled with more flexible positions on substance. In other words, the challenge to make headway on item 7 remains as great as ever.

Before concluding, I would like to point out that my delegation welcomes the setting up of a working group to examine ways and means of improving the work of the Conference. We believe that the group should, among other things, recognize the need for the Conference to work on all issues included in its agenda and consider them in a substantive manner, regardless of whether an ad hoc committee has been established or not.

If now my delegation does not dwell on items 2 and 3 of the agenda, it is due to the fact that our position was laid out on 28 April.

On the eve of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament we should try to move forward on as many issues on the agenda as possible. The work of the Conference is going to be reviewed. Therefore, the best possible thing for the Conference to do is to make progress and begin producing concrete results. After all, we must give the international community what it has asked us to do. We have a chance, so let us take it.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank His Excellency Ambassador Konstantin Tellalov of the delegation of Bulgaria to the Conference on Disarmament for his statement, and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair and to my predecessor Ambassador Vejvoda, as well as for having reminded us of the close relationship binding Egypt and Bulgaria. The next speaker on my list is His Excellency Ambassador Pierre Morel, representative of France to the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. MOREL (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, in introducing the French document on the maintenance of a security balance among all the parties to the convention during the 10-year period of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons, which will be distributed to members of the Conference under the number CD/757, I wish to emphasize the paramount concern underlying this paper, that is the search for security within the framework of the convention. I will elaborate on the various practical applications before I come to the indispensable complement, that is verification. I now turn to the first part, the security imperative and its consequences.

Having already set out our general concerns at the end of the spring half of the session, on 28 April, suffice it this time for me to recall that in our view the convention, in order to be credible, must guarantee all parties to the convention security from the very moment of its entry into force, and not only a future security once all chemical weapons have been eliminated. The 10-year period must not be a period of diminished security. It is the first phase of the application of the convention, the development of which, in conditions of security acceptable to all, is indispensable in order to reach the second and final phase of the convention.

The order of destruction of stockpiles, as has already been pointed out by many States, is in this regard of decisive importance. But this is not simply a technical problem. The matter is eminently political since it is a question of establishing, for the whole of the 10-year period of stock destruction, a security balance based on security stocks which are limited, homogeneous and verifiable. Let us look more closely at these two concepts.

First of all, security balance. The future convention must be based on strict equality between all parties. No signatory country can claim special treatment at one moment or another. This is indeed the final goal, since the aim is a final ban on possession and production by all the States parties to the convention. But this equality must also be the rule during the 10-year period. Otherwise, in the initial stages, the convention will follow in the steps of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a treaty for the disarmament of disarmed countries, organizing maintained armaments for some and disarmament for others.

The provisions of the convention will play a decisive role in this respect. One must start from two observations which very seriously complicate the smooth course of the 10-year period.

First observation: stockpiles will be declared only 30 days after the entry into force of the convention. The precise state of affairs as regards chemical warfare will not therefore be technically known or politically recognized until after the accession of most States.

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Second observation: we already know, but in a very unclear way, in the absence of declarations on the part of the major chemical-weapon States, that the capacities are very unequally distributed and that a single European State alone possesses considerable resources. Whatever the order and volume of destruction of stockpiles, the linear or stage-by-stage schedules which have been contemplated so far would in fact lead, in the early years of the convention, to an oligopolistic situation in stock-holding until the end of the 10-year period, with small stockpiles cut down to insignificant volumes in the very first years.

In our view, this pattern cannot be considered a temporary drawback. Ten years is a very long period for the security of a State. For the sake of the credibility of the convention, and thus in order to ensure full accession by all States, we cannot go from everything to nothing because of an uncertain and profoundly inequitable mechanism.

Nor can one rule out the risk of delay due to technical reasons, or a crisis in the implementation of the agreed timetable for destruction of stocks during this 10-year period. Everything must be done to avoid this, but we cannot altogether set aside the possibilities that could arise. Here again one or two States might be in a position to deal with such a situation, whereas all the others would be taken unawares. In order to remedy this major drawback of lack of balance in the implementation of the destruction programme, and to ensure the fairness and therefore the full credibility of the convention, there is a need to establish a security balance which will enable all States that feel it is necessary to have a minimum chemical weapon capacity. Obviously this would not involve a sort of quantitative levelling out, but, for the period required, 10 years, guarding against any attempt to use or threaten the use of chemical weapons, thus affording a serious guarantee of a smooth transition from the present situation to the final régime of elimination and total prohibition.

Other approaches to the transition could in theory be contemplated to ensure security balance. They are set out in the French document. One would consist of a prior Soviet-United States agreement which would enter into force immediately to bring the stocks held by the most heavily armed Powers into line with those of the others, the entry into force of the convention being delayed correspondingly. The other possibility would be to arrange the 10-year period in such a way that the first half would apply only to the United States and the USSR.

For practical as well as political reasons, the drawbacks of these options are clearly greater than the advantages, if only because they delay the entry into force of the convention at a time when the possibility of chemical weapons becoming commonplace must be seriously considered. We therefore set them aside, and cast our vote for the full application of the convention and recognition of the right to maintain limited security stocks during the 10-year period.

Now to the security stocks themselves. In the document before the Conference today, France suggests that a distinction should be drawn, in the declaration made on the thirtieth day after the entry into force of the convention, between stockpiles other than security stocks, which fall under

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the general régime already being developed, and security stocks as such, subject to a specific régime, which would remain unchanged until the end of the eighth year, and would then be destroyed in simultaneous and very carefully defined phases during the two last years of the 10-year period.

These stocks should meet specific criteria, and the following are the main characteristics.

They should be optional: the establishment of a security stock may appear necessary to one party or another to the convention, which might consider at the time the convention enters into force that it needs to ensure security balance vis-à-vis other Powers holding chemical weapons. But it goes without saying that the convention cannot impose this on any party. It is thus an option open to all member States for a period of 10 years, subject to very strict constraints which will be set out in detail later on.

The stocks should be limited; we suggest a level which is very low but still of military significance, that is, in our view, between 1,000 and 2,000 tons. In order for the stocks to remain credible until the last year of the 10-year period, we propose an amount equal to at least twice the minimum volume regarded as militarily significant. The exact level would have to be determined by agreement among the parties before the entry into force of the convention. But at all events the proposed range makes it possible to appreciate the difference between this stockpile and the present capacities of the major Powers, which are measured in tens of thousands of tons on the one side, and hundreds of thousands of tons on the other. This gap on its own is sufficient to show that security stocks can only have a purely defensive role against the possibility of a chemical weapon attack. There is therefore no conflict with the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

The stocks should be identical for all parties, that is to say at the same level for all countries, in accordance with the reasons just given above.

The stocks should be homogeneous, in other words made up exclusively of munitions containing V-nerve agents. Monitoring would thus be simplified, but also the inevitable maintenance of protection programmes against an attack by chemical weapons during the 10-year period.

The stocks should be verifiable from the entry into force of the convention right up until complete destruction. This particularly sensitive point will be elaborated on in the second part of this statement.

The stocks should be backed up by a single production facility for the countries that so desire. This provision may be surprising in a prohibition convention, but it meets two considerations which stem from technical constraints on the one hand and respect for the convention on the other.

From the technical point of view, provision should be made for maintaining the security stock in condition or renewing a portion of it over an eight-year period: it is not possible to rule out the possibility of storage accidents, defective munitions or, more generally, the need for maintaining the level of part of the security stock. In a broader context, associating a production facility with the security stock should go a long way

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towards deterring any party to the convention which might be tempted to cheat, and also persuading non-signatory States that they cannot gain a clear advantage by staying outside the convention.

The corollary of this particular provision is of course that this single production facility must be declared from the date of entry into force of the convention and placed under international control until its destruction at the end of the 10-year period.

The main characteristics of the security stock having thus been set out, I will merely add that our document describes the setting-up arrangements when the two distinct régimes come into force: the régime for security stocks, as just outlined, and the régime for stockpiles other than security stocks, in accordance with the provisions at present being negotiated in the draft convention. It also sets out how, after eight years, when all other stocks and related facilities have been destroyed, a start would be made on the simultaneous destruction of security stocks and each single production facility.

Let me now turn to verification, which is obviously one of the essential elements of the system proposed. Since this is a transitory régime and one which is at odds with the ultimate aim of the convention, it is indispensable to ensure that it cannot be diverted from its final purpose. Verification is of decisive importance for the whole of the convention, but it is of course particularly significant for security stocks.

I will not return here to the production facility which is under permanent international control and which will be closed down during the ninth year and destroyed before the end of the tenth year. This is a relatively simple case of complete verification -- "unlimited", one might say -- whereas the definition of the verification régime for the security stock is inevitably a matter of greater complexity. As a matter of principle the security stock must be subject to challenge inspection. But, as can be seen from the current work of the Conference on this subject, access to storage facilities has led to the search for balance between security considerations (and confidentiality) on the one hand, and the need to ensure full respect for the convention on the other. Our latest exchanges of views have shown that there is no ready-made a priori formula, but that it should be possible to establish a régime which is both strict and balanced and which will ensure effective and realistic verification.

We believe therefore that the verification régime for security stocks is simply one special case within the more general framework of verification of the convention, and that it does not merit special treatment. That is why we have refrained in this document from defining a single and therefore final formula, and have set out, together with the formula we prefer, other options which are less satisfactory in our view. The choice to be made between these various options will of course depend on the answers to three major questions.

The first, a particularly sensitive one, is that of location. In our wish to take part in an open exercise which would make it possible to appreciate, before choosing, the advantages and drawbacks of the various possible formulae, we are ready to envisage the declaration of the location of

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a security stock as from the very entry into force of the convention. This undoubtedly offers an advantage with regard to verification. But at the same time, we must appreciate the real and serious drawback as regards security, since declaring the location might also encourage a pre-emptive attack in the event of a crisis. That is why our preference falls on the option under which the location would not be declared publicly, but recorded in a sealed envelope which would be opened in the event of a challenge inspection. The possibility of transfer to another location would naturally have to be kept open, but this would then be subjected to the same conditions; that is to say, with the new location indicated in a sealed envelope.

The second question concerns the number of locations for security stocks, whether the location is declared or not. Here again, security considerations would lead us to believe that several locations would be preferable; but if the monitoring is to be effective, agreed limits are required, which we would suggest be set at five locations.

The third difficulty which should be pointed out here is the question of direct access in the case of challenge inspection. I raise this matter here for the record; the solution to be chosen with regard to security stocks will in the final analysis be the same as that decided on for the general régime.

Whatever the final balance determined for the monitoring of security stocks, we must recall that this will be carried out within a strictly defined framework, which will place heavy burdens on all the parties to the convention:

Initial declaration within 30 days of the entry into force of the convention, specifying the volume, composition and location of the place of storage, either publicly or in a sealed envelope;

During the first eight years, régime of challenge inspection which varies according to whether the location is known or not;

At the end of the eighth year, opening of the sealed envelopes where appropriate, and in any case placing of stocks under international control preparatory to phased destruction. The challenge inspection régime thus remains the indispensable instrument for verification.

This very brief recapitulation of the verification mechanisms enables us to emphasize that we do not intend to leave any escape clause in drawing up the régime which will be finally adopted.

There is still one point which can be linked to verification. This is what has been presented -- wrongly -- as the risk of CW proliferation which it is claimed would stem from the approach adopted by France. Some have stated that, by providing for the possibility of constituting a limited security stock for a period of 10 years, this would at least indirectly sanction CW proliferation. This is a complete misunderstanding. The risk of CW proliferation can be defined only in relation to a ban; it necessarily exists in any convention arrangement simply because sovereign States cannot be forced to accede to a convention. Everything which, like the security stocks, will help to enhance the effectiveness, the non-discriminatory character and the equality of all parties in the course of the 10-year period, will

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strengthen the credibility of the convention and encourage States to accede. But let me add above all that the provisions related to verification, and the destruction of security stocks and the sole production facility referred to above, clearly show that these provisions do not in any way encourage acquisition of a CW capability. The limited option proposed contains binding and very stringent provisions. Far from encouraging proliferation, the instrument we have suggested introduces clarity and equity in the relations between all the States parties in the decisive period of the first 10 years of implementation of the convention.

Having thus set out the principal reasons which led us to put this document before the Conference, we are aware of the fact that the provisions suggested for security stocks may have certain relatively new elements. But we would also like to recall that France put this question before the Conference for its attention as much as two years ago. To date it has not been possible to embark on a detailed discussion of this issue, and so it is essential to do so today, because the problem cannot be avoided.

We also know that security stocks are not the only important issue that has not been dealt with so far: much remains to be done, for example, in defining super-toxic lethal substances, on guarantees, which have been wisely raised by the delegation of Pakistan, or on the strictly industrial aspects of the convention.

None of these issues in our view is of such central importance in the structure of the convention as that of security stocks. Without constantly assured security there will be no stable, credible and lasting convention. It would be better to deal with this issue before concluding negotiations and do this in an open-minded way, with great clarity of approach, so as to arrive at a workable mechanism which will be the best guarantee of the success of the convention, rather than leaving it until afterwards, in an atmosphere of uncertainty and distrust.

And in order to dispel misunderstanding, in order to avoid the repetition of unfounded allegations such as those that have appeared in the press recently, I would like to conclude by reiterating vigorously that our goal is the complete elimination of chemical weapons, as our Prime Minister recalled recently in Moscow: "The day when there is a verified disappearance of chemical weapons, we will be the first to destroy our own: I can make this formal commitment: we will be at zero level at the same time as the others."

This is the best way to sum up the proposal we have just made, which we hope will be considered by the Conference with all the attention it deserves.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank Ambassador Pierre Morel, the representative of France to the Conference, for his statement. Now I give the floor to Ambassador Mansur Ahmad, the representative of Pakistan to the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. President, permit me first of all to express my pleasure at your assumption of the presidency of the Conference for the month of June. Pakistan and Egypt are bound to each other by many ties and work closely together in international forums. May I therefore assure you

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that in the fulfilment of your responsibilities as President of the Conference, you will have the full co-operation of my delegation. Your diplomatic skill and experience are known to all, and I am confident that under your guidance the work of the Conference will be conducted in a most able manner. I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to compliment your predecessor, Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia, who presided over the Conference in April with great distinction and skill.

I should also like to extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues who have joined us since I took the floor last time, the distinguished Ambassadors of Indonesia and the United States, and to wish them a successful tour of duty in Geneva.

In my statement on 16 April, I gave the views of my delegation on the nuclear and nuclear-related items of our agenda. It is gratifying that, since then, the Conference has appointed Ambassador Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on item 6. It is our hope that substantive work on this important question will commence at an early date and will lead to positive results.

While I do not intend today to dwell at any length on issues which I touched upon in my last statement, I cannot help expressing a strong sense of disappointment that the Conference has yet to come to an agreement on an appropriate organizational framework for dealing with the first three items on its agenda, relating to several priority questions in the area of nuclear disarmament. The address by the President of the Argentine Republic, His Excellency Mr. Raúl Alfonsín, to the Conference last week was an eloquent call for nuclear sanity, and we hope it will be heeded by those who seem to believe that the only way of assuring their own security and that of their allies is to hold mankind hostage to the threat of a nuclear holocaust.

I would now like to turn to items 4, 5 and 8 of our agenda. Pakistan has always supported a comprehensive, effective, verifiable and equitable ban on chemical weapons. My delegation is therefore gratified at the progress which is being made under item 4 of our agenda in negotiating a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Last year and in the inter-sessional period, the Ad hoc Committee was able to elaborate the text of several important parts of the convention under the chairmanship of Ambassador Cromartie of the United Kingdom. Further significant progress was recorded during the spring part of the current session under the able guidance of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, notably in the agreement that elimination of stocks should take place only through destruction, and towards drafting texts concerning verification of declarations on production facilities, their interim monitoring and the verification of their elimination, modalities for the revision of lists under article VI and some details of the institutional structure to be established under the convention.

We are confident that the momentum of the negotiations will be maintained during the summer part of the session. A complete ban on chemical weapons now seems to be within our reach, and we would urge all parties to join in an effort to bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion before the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament next year.

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We are not unmindful of the outstanding issues, some of them of considerable complexity, which have yet to be resolved. Foremost among them are the questions of challenge inspection and of non-production of chemical weapons in civil industry. At the heart of both these issues lies the same consideration, that of effective verification. There has been no dearth of proposals on the question of challenge inspection. My delegation too submitted one such proposal last year in an attempt to bridge the differences which have prevented an agreement so far. We have been heartened by indications of a gradual convergence of views during the spring part of the session. It is evident, however, that considerable work remains to be done before this convergence is translated into treaty language. The issue of challenge inspection raises two considerations: one the one hand, the need for a stringent verification régime which would make it extremely difficult for any violation of the convention to go undetected, and on the other hand, the right of a State to protect installations of a highly sensitive nature having relevance to its supreme security interests from unreasonable and unjustified scrutiny. In our view, these two considerations are not irreconcilable, and we are confident that it would be possible to work out a mechanism which takes due account of both. One way of doing so would be to entrust the Executive Council with decision-making authority in disputed cases under an appropriate voting mechanism which guarantees that such differences are settled with all possible dispatch.

In the context of challenge inspection, some concern has been expressed about the possibility of what are described as "frivolous" challenges. My delegation feels that these fears are largely exaggerated. We do not subscribe to the view that some States or their leaders act responsibly while others do not. In any event, more harm would be done by placing undue impediments on the right of a State to request inspection than would result from a resort to "frivolous" challenge.

My delegation has consistently taken the view that declarations regarding chemical weapon stockpiles and production facilities should be made at the earliest possible stage, and should be comprehensive and detailed in order to be fully verifiable. We therefore welcome the flexibility shown by the Soviet delegation earlier during this session on the question of the declaration of locations of chemical weapon stocks and their verification. We hope that the Ad hoc Committee will soon be able to finalize the relevant provisions of article IV of the convention.

Despite encouraging progress in several areas, a number of important questions remain open besides those I have already mentioned, including questions relating to scope, the definition of chemical weapons, the definition of production facilities and measures to be taken for their elimination, and organizational questions. Nor should we forget articles X and XI dealing retrospectively with assistance and with economic and technological development. The importance of the final clauses (articles XII to XVI) should also not be underestimated. Articles X and XI are of great interest to the developing countries, and we are happy to note that the programme of work of the Ad hoc Committee envisages their being taken up during the current session. My delegation has submitted a proposal on the question of assistance which we hope will receive consideration when work on article X commences.

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An important subject to which the Conference should address itself is that of adequate follow-up action to established violations of the convention. In this context, the question of sanctions to be taken against a State which has been found to have acted in violation of its obligations under the convention deserves serious examination. To withdraw from such a State its rights and privileges under the convention can hardly be regarded as a response commensurate with the gravity of an act posing a threat to the objectives of the convention. The States parties to the convention ought to go further and undertake collective action to remedy the situation.

My delegation has noticed a tendency to enter into too many technical and procedural details in drafting the convention. We feel that many of these details could be left to the international authority and its organs which will be established under the convention. In trying to settle all these matters at this stage by including them in the text of the convention or its annexes, we run the risk of unduly delaying its conclusion. There is also a more pragmatic reason why we feel this should not be attempted. It is quite likely that, after the entry into force of the convention and with the benefit of actual experience, a need might be felt to improve some of the technical and procedural details relating to implementation. If all these details are contained in the text of the convention, the necessary modification may be extremely difficult to bring about in view of the obvious difficulties in amending a multilateral international agreement. My delegation therefore does not favour introducing into the convention such an element of rigidity which may not be in the interest of its effective implementation.

Before I pass on to other items on our agenda, may I say that my delegation has been dismayed at the statement just made by the distinguished Ambassador of France. The proposal that parties to the Convention should be permitted to maintain secret security stockpiles of chemical weapons would negate the main objectives of the ban. It would also seriously undermine confidence in the observance of the convention, and only deepen mutual suspicion among States parties with all its perilous consequences. It comes at a particularly inopportune time in view of the progress that is being made in the negotiations taking place in this Conference.

The question of prevention of an arms race in outer space has been on the agenda of the CD since 1982. It has been identified by the General Assembly as a priority item. However, the discussions which have been held in the plenary, and since 1985 in the Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space, have been largely confined to an academic discussion of some of the issues which this problem raises. This is so largely because of the inadequacy of the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee, which does not permit it to embark upon the practical work of negotiating an agreement or agreements for the prevention of an arms race in this zone. As long as a suitable mandate which would enable the Committee to exercise its negotiating responsibility is denied to it, the prospects of making meaningful progress will remain limited. The Pakistan delegation therefore regrets that the efforts made by the Group of 21 at the beginning of the session to improve the mandate of the Ad hoc Committee were not fruitful because of the inflexible position taken by one group. My delegation is, however, prepared to work constructively and make its modest contribution to the consideration of this issue in this Committee under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Pucliese of Italy.

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Mankind today stands at the threshold of an important turning-point. Outer space, which is the common heritage of mankind, is today being used extensively for military purposes. The majority of the space objects now in orbit serve military functions. There is a growing threat of the emergence of active space weapons and of ASAT and ABM weapons. Unless effective measures are taken to avert this danger, outer space will become yet another area of military competition and confrontation, severely restricting its use for peaceful purposes to promote the scientific, economic and social development of all countries.

Competition in the military uses of outer space would have grave consequences. It would exacerbate the current state of instability inherent in the deployment of global nuclear arsenals, give the arms race a qualitatively new dimension, undermine existing disarmament agreements and jeopardize the disarmament process as a whole.

The imminent threat of "weaponization" of outer space which faces us today underscores the urgency of initiating negotiations in the Conference. While it is relatively easy to stop the development of a weapon in its initial stage or before it is actually tested and deployed, it becomes much more difficult to prohibit after its production and deployment. The Conference must not therefore delay shouldering its important responsibility in this area; otherwise it may soon be too late to reverse this dangerous trend.

It is sometimes pointed out that the question of an arms race in outer space is best left to the two super-Powers, which are already engaged in talks on the subject in Geneva. My delegation finds this argument unconvincing. While we are prepared to admit that, by reason of their actual or potential military capabilities, the two super-Powers, which are also the two principal space Powers, have a special responsibility in this connection, questions relating to outer space are no longer today of concern only to them but equally to other members of the international community. Bilateral talks therefore do not diminish the need for multilateral negotiations. Only multilateral negotiations in the Conference can fully protect the rights of the international community. The super-Powers also have a responsibility to keep this Conference, and through it the General Assembly, informed of the progress of their talks.

The current legal régime regarding outer space is clearly inadequate for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The rapid technological developments which have been taking place in the area of outer space have revealed serious deficiencies and loopholes in existing agreements. There is no agreement on such basic terms as "peaceful purposes" or "militarization". Agreements currently in force leave considerable room for various military activities, including deployment of a wide range of weapons, in particular ASAT weapons. Further developments in space technology could erode the existing space law and make it completely irrelevant.

The goal that we must set for ourselves is the complete prohibition of all space weapons, including weapons directed against targets in space such as ASAT systems, weapons which interfere in the functioning of space objects, and space-based ABM systems. Such a ban must also provide for effective verification provisions, including on-site inspection. Pending the

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achievement of a comprehensive ban on space weapons, certain interim or partial measures could also be profitably negotiated. Priority in this regard could be given to the questions of a moratorium on the development, testing and deployment of ASAT weapons, and the immunity of space objects.

The United States-Soviet ABM Treaty of 1972 imposes important though limited restrictions on the development of space-based ABM systems. There have recently been disquieting reports that the restraints imposed by this agreement may be weakened. Such a development would be fraught with extremely serious consequences. Without these restraints, there would be an unrestrained arms race in both offensive and defensive systems. We therefore call upon the two parties to adhere strictly to its terms. Pakistan's proposal last year for an international instrument to supplement the ABM Treaty was made with the objective of strengthening the restraints contained in this treaty and making them applicable to all technologically advanced States.

There are some who maintain that the functions performed by many satellites have a stabilizing effect as they contribute to crisis management, early warning, communication and the verification of arms control agreements. My delegation does not wish to quarrel with this argument, except to point out that information gathered by reconnaissance and surveillance satellites has also been used in support of military operations. However, if the functions performed by reconnaissance and surveillance satellites are as benign as they are sometimes made out to be, one may well ask why this capability should remain the monopoly of the space Powers. Should we not entrust surveillance and reconnaissance activities by satellites to an international agency in order to monitor compliance with disarmament agreements? In this context, the proposal for the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency deserves serious consideration. Such a multilateral verification capability could supplement and support bilateral arrangements and national technical means of verification.

The Registration Convention of 1974 provides a useful instrument as a confidence-building measure. The present system of declarations could be strengthened and, if properly implemented, could give greater transparency to outer space activities. So far the space Powers have not described the military functions of their satellites, although it is a well-known fact that most of these are performing such functions. The Review Conference of the Registration Convention which is to be held in 1989 could provide a useful opportunity for strengthening this Convention.

Mr. President, I will now turn to the last item on which I would like to express the views of my delegation, namely the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. The Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament did some useful work during the spring part of the session under the dedicated leadership of Ambassador García Robles, but was unable to complete its work in accordance with General Assembly decision 41/421. While we recognize the complexity of some of the remaining issues, we do not think it is impossible to resolve them if the necessary good will and flexibility is demonstrated by all sides, especially some nuclear-weapon States. Regrettably, this spirit does not seem to be much in evidence on the part of some of the delegations which have begun to question parts of the Programme earlier agreed upon by consensus and to reopen issues which appeared to have

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been settled. My delegation will not, however, fail to make its due contribution with a view to the elaboration of a meaningful Programme before the third special session on disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): I thank His Excellency Ambassador Mansur Ahmad, head of the delegation of Pakistan to the Conference on Disarmament, for his statement. I also thank him for having paid tribute to the close relationship between Egypt and Pakistan. I thank him for the kind words addressed to me and to my predecessor Ambassador Vejvoda. As I announced at the opening of this plenary meeting, the Conference will hold a five-minute informal meeting to consider the draft programme of work for the second part of the 1987 session. After we conclude our consideration of that subject, we shall resume the plenary meeting in order to formalize any consensus that emerges at the informal meeting. The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 11.45 a.m. and resumed at 12 noon.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): The 413th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed. As a result of our exchange of views at the informal meeting, I intend to put before the Conference for decision a draft programme of work for the second part of the 1987 session. The draft programme of work is contained in document CD/WP.282, as amended at the informal meeting. I intend now to repeat those amendments for the record. First, agenda item 6, entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", and item 7, entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons", will be considered in plenary meetings during the period 27 to 31 July. Secondly, agenda item 8, entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament", will be considered during the period 3 to 7 August. Thirdly, reports of ad hoc subsidiary bodies and the annual report to the United Nations General Assembly will be taken up from 10 to 28 August, which would then become the closing date for the 1987 session. If there is no objection I shall take it that the Conference adopts the programme of work for the second part of the 1987 session, as contained in document CD/WP.282, with the amendments that I have read out. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference is agreeable to that.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Arabic): This concludes our business for today. I intend now to adjourn the plenary. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 18 June at 10 a.m. sharp. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.06 p.m.