

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND NINETEENTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Tuesday, 7 July 1987, at 10 a.m.

President:

Mr. T. Terrefe

(Ethiopia)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 419th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference today begins its discussion of agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". In accordance with Rule 30 of its Rules of Procedure however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject pertinent to the work of the Conference.

At the outset, I wish to extend my warm welcome to His Excellency Ambassador Kahiluoto, Director for Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, who is addressing us today as first speaker. I am sure that all members appreciate the contributions made by Finland to our work and will follow his statement with particular interest.

I should also like to cordially welcome to the Conference today the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, who is present at this plenary meeting.

I would also like to welcome the participants present today in this conference hall in the 1987 United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme. We wish them well and success in their work.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Finland, Norway, Japan and Poland. In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference at its 387th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the first speaker, the Director for Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, Ambassador Kahiluoto.

Mr. KAHILUOTO (Finland): Mr. President, may I begin by congratulating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of July. I am sure that the work of the Conference this month will greatly benefit from your experienced guidance. I am also very grateful for the warm words of welcome which you just addressed to me when giving me the floor.

I shall devote my statement to the issue of chemical weapons. A complete ban on chemical weapons is one of the foremost goals of international disarmament efforts. It is, to us, a priority item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, and the subject of intensive negotiations.

This is rightly so. Chemical weapons are repugnant weapons of mass destruction. Innocent and unprotected civilians are at particular risk in the event of their use. Yet, chemical weapons are perceived to be militarily useful. A number of States are believed to possess chemical weapons, although only two States have so far openly acknowledged that they do. Moreover, many States, in the developed and developing world alike, possess the required industrial capabilities to manufacture lethal chemicals for weapons purposes. Clearly, the danger of proliferation exists. Indeed, it will grow unless effective steps are taken.

(Mr. Kahiluoto, Finland)

The Geneva Protocol of 1925 bans the use of chemical weapons in war. Yet this fundamental norm of international law is being violated. In the Iran-Iraq conflict, the use of chemical weapons by Iraq has been demonstrated by the team of experts repeatedly dispatched to the area by the United Nations Secretary-General. Persistent reports that chemical weapons may also have been used elsewhere add to our deep concern.

Finland condemns the use of chemical weapons. Their use in the Gulf war threatens to undermine seriously the authority of the Geneva Protocol to the detriment of the security of each and every one of us.

Such a serious breach of international law underlines the urgent need to terminate the Iran-Iraq conflict by peaceful means as soon as possible. Finland supports the efforts by the United Nations Security Council to bring this about and urges the two belligerents to co-operate with the Council to this effect.

Finland has consistently supported a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons on a global basis. At this Conference, we have sought to contribute to the achievement of this goal primarily through our technical expertise on verification of various aspects of the future convention. I shall return to this contribution in somewhat greater detail later on in my statement.

We have noted with satisfaction the considerable progress made in the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention lately, particularly towards the end of last year and this year. We are grateful to the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, for the firm guidance he has given and continues to give to this important and highly complex negotiation.

Despite progress, a number of difficult problems remain to be solved. Some are simply difficult in technical terms. Others require difficult political decisions. We are encouraged by the fact that both major military alliances have, in their recent statements, reiterated their determination to achieve early agreement on a chemical weapons convention.

Let me briefly mention three outstanding issues relating to the convention which we consider to be of major significance.

First, there is the issue of existing stocks and their destruction. There is by now widespread agreement that all chemical weapon stocks and their locations should be declared very soon -- 30 days -- after the convention enters into force for the State party concerned. We welcome this progress. In our view, it is of cardinal importance to the credibility of the convention that all existing stocks be declared from the very beginning, and that their destruction be promptly initiated according to an order of destruction yet to be agreed upon. In our view, such an order of destruction needs to foreclose any possibility for proliferation of chemical weapons once the convention enters into force.

(Mr. Kahiluoto, Finland)

Second, verification of the fact that no new chemical weapons will be produced once the convention enters into force is of essential importance. Arrangements concerning non-production, unlike those concerning destruction of existing stockpiles, do not have a fixed time-limit.

Arrangements concerning non-production must avoid unduly hampering the legitimate operations of civilian chemical industry. There seems to be general agreement on this point. At the same time, we feel, like many others, that the additional supervision of the industry stemming from the verification régime of non-production will not prove to be too burdensome. The civilian chemical industry is already heavily regulated because of the potential hazards it poses to health and the environment.

Third, challenge inspection undoubtedly remains the major unresolved issue at this point. Sensitive security concerns of States are intimately involved here. It is encouraging, however, that a reasoned dialogue on this issue seems to have begun. Differences are being narrowed. In view of the grave consequences which suspicions of undeclared stocks or production facilities, if not promptly and satisfactorily allayed, would have for the convention and international security in general, an effective system of challenge inspections is clearly a necessity.

It has been quite clear from the very beginning that effective verification of compliance with the provisions of the chemical weapons convention is essential for the parties to have any confidence in it. Verification involves not only working out the necessary procedures in the convention itself, but also development of reliable technical methods and instruments to carry out specific verification tasks that those procedures entail.

It is precisely this latter aspect of chemical weapons verification to which Finland has devoted considerable efforts and resources since 1973. Our research project, conducted by a team of scientists from a number of Finnish universities and funded by the Finnish Government, develops instrumental methods for the detection, analysis and identification of chemical warfare agents. Since 1977, the results of the work have been presented to the Conference on Disarmament (and its predecessor) in the form of handbook-type annual reports, the so-called Finnish Blue Books.

Altogether, 11 Blue Books have been published so far, including this year's report. The latest report (CD/764) was introduced in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons this past Friday. It is our hope that once a chemical weapons convention is concluded and enters into force, the Finnish Blue Books will constitute a kind of technical verification data base from which all States parties, and the Technical Secretariat in particular, may benefit.

Let me now briefly summarize the work done so far. The first 10 years of the project were devoted to developing analytical methods for three types of laboratories -- portable detection kits, trailer-installed field laboratories and stationary central laboratories -- as well as for collection of identification data on chemical warfare agents, their precursors, and degradation products. The findings were drawn together in the 1984 report.

(Mr. Kahiluoto, Finland)

In the 1985 report, attention was turned to air monitoring of chemical warfare agents. The report describes in detail various techniques for collecting and analysing low-volume, medium-volume and high-volume air samples. The two latest reports describe how these techniques were tested in practice by means of large-scale field experiments. Kilogram amounts of harmless simulants of warfare agents were released into the atmosphere as finely dispersed aerosols. Air samples were then collected as far away as 200 kilometres downwind. At all distances, all the simulants released could be detected and identified.

This is significant in two ways. First, the experiments prove that the techniques developed really work in actual field conditions and are highly selective and sensitive. Second, the experiments prove that even very small releases of chemical warfare agents can be discovered at great distances if a network of detection stations is available.

While verification of compliance with the convention will be primarily based on data reporting and inspections, it is, in our view, important to have available, as a complement, methods which can reliably detect and identify atmospheric releases of chemical agents regardless of source.

Since air monitoring facilities are also needed for surveillance of ambient air for reasons of environmental protection, it would not, in our view, be necessary to establish a monitoring network solely for the purpose of chemical weapons verification provided that the facilities are designed with both purposes in mind. We will shortly present a working paper to this Conference on this aspect of air monitoring.

Another important subject recently addressed by the Finnish Project on Verification of Chemical Disarmament is automatic monitoring. In February this year, the project organized a workshop in Helsinki for the purpose of studying the potential applications of automatic monitoring systems in the context of verifying a chemical weapons convention. Twenty-odd qualified experts from a number of countries involved with the chemical weapons negotiations participated. The proceedings of the workshop have just been circulated to the Conference on Disarmament as document CD/765. They were introduced in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons last Friday.

We in Finland appreciate the work done on various aspects of arms control verification in many countries, members and non-members of the CD alike. We have followed with interest the Norwegian research programme of verification of alleged use of chemical weapons since it was initiated in 1981. We are also aware of the important work on this and other subjects of verification carried out by Canada.

May I take this opportunity to thank the Governments of Canada and Norway for the valuable meetings they organized for our benefit among others, in the month of May. We found the Outer Space Workshop in Montreal as well as the Oslo Symposium on the Chemical Weapons Convention most informative on the issues concerned.

(Mr. Kahiluoto, Finland)

At this advanced stage of chemical weapons negotiations, a certain amount of co-ordination among the various national-level chemical weapons verification projects might be in order. After all, they do have a common goal: the rapid conclusion and effective functioning of a chemical weapons convention. Specifically, we have in mind a division of labour where outstanding technical verification issues would be apportioned among the various interested projects for in-depth study.

The Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons would, in our view, be the most competent body to help to identify such outstanding technical issues for this purpose, perhaps even indicating an order of priority for their examination. Based on such guidance, representatives for the various interested projects could then agree among themselves on which of them would do what.

Today I have addressed only one item on the agenda of this Conference. As you are surely aware, my country attaches great importance to the other items as well.

We note with particular interest the fact that this Conference has, after a certain pause, re-established an ad hoc committee for the consideration of the question of negative security assurances. This is an issue to which Finland has devoted several statements in the past. We continue to regard it as very important and wish the Chairman, Ambassador von Stülpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany, every success in his difficult task.

We remain ready to participate in the discussion of this and the other items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. Hopefully, we can do so as a full member of this important body in the not too distant future.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Finland for his statement and for the kind remarks he addressed to the President. In conformity with the decision of the Conference at its 387th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the representative of Norway, Ambassador Huslid.

Mr. HUSLID (Norway): Mr. President, permit me at the outset to congratulate you, the distinguished representative of Ethiopia, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of July.

I have asked for the floor today to introduce -- and I consider this as a special honour -- to introduce on behalf of Canada and my own country, Norway, a concrete proposal in connection with the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. These negotiations have also just been extensively dealt with by my Finnish colleague, and I am grateful for the positive comments he made on the research made by the two countries. The proposal I have the honour to introduce is contained in document CD/766, of 2 July 1987, which concerns procedures for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Huslid, Norway)

We know that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons in war. That Protocol is adhered to by more than 100 countries. It has, however, no verification provisions. For this reason, an understanding was reached in this Conference in 1983 to incorporate in the convention on which we are now negotiating a prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. It is, of course, necessary to see to it that this is done in a way which does not erode the status of the Geneva Protocol, which is one of the oldest arms control treaties. The incorporation of a prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in the chemical weapons convention could, in fact, reinforce the Geneva Protocol.

It is therefore necessary to devise a proper verification mechanism which could be included in the new convention and applied in cases of allegations of use of chemical weapons. In order to contribute to this, both Canada and Norway initiated research programmes on verification of alleged use of chemical weapons in this field in 1981. The results of this research have been submitted to the Conference on Disarmament. It follows from the documents which have already been submitted that Canada and Norway have studied all phases of the verification of alleged use of chemical weapons, i.e. from establishment of an inspection team and the team's investigation to submission of its report.

Against this background and taking into account the advanced phase of the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention, Canada and Norway have jointly elaborated a draft treaty text concerning general procedures for the verification of alleged use of chemical weapons.

Any allegation of the use of chemical weapons would, of course, be a matter of the most serious concern to the States parties to a convention banning chemical weapons altogether. Immediate on-site inspection, whether at the invitation of the State party on whose territory the alleged use of chemical weapons occurred or at the request of another State party, would be necessary for the purpose of maintaining the effectiveness and authority of the convention. Thus provisions in article IX concerning consultations, co-operation and fact-finding have relevance to verification of alleged use of chemical weapons, and the procedures applicable for verifying such an event should be included in an annex to article IX. We have thus elaborated a proposal for such an annex. In drawing up this proposal we have consulted a number of countries.

I cannot here go into any detail as to the concrete content of this proposal, and I refer to the paper, but I would like to mention a few salient points. The proposal requires that, upon receipt of a request from a State party for an inspection, the International Authority shall immediately notify the State party (or States parties) concerned of the requirement to conduct on-site inspection within 48 hours. The State party (or States parties) so notified shall make the necessary preparations for the arrival of the inspection team. The team should comprise a number of International Inspectors with the necessary qualifications, experience and training, as well as supporting staff with special skills or training, who may be required to assist the International Inspectors.

(Mr. Huslid, Norway)

The International Inspectors shall be permitted to take with them the necessary equipment and supplies and have unimpeded access to the site or sites. They shall collect enough samples so that a reliable conclusion may be reached as to the allegation of the use of chemical weapons and also interview people who may have been affected by the alleged use.

The samples shall be analysed by at least two designated laboratories. The Technical Secretariat shall draw up a list of certified laboratories, which must be in possession of standardized equipment for the type or types of analysis to be conducted. The Executive Council shall approve this list. The Technical Secretariat shall compile the results of the laboratory analyses of samples so that these results may be taken into account with the report of the inspection team.

The report of the International Inspectors shall be submitted to the Technical Secretariat within 10 days of the completion of the inspection. The report shall be factual in nature and contain the findings of the International Inspectors. The Technical Secretariat shall provide a copy of the report to the State party that requested the inspection, to each State party that received the inspection, to the State party alleged to have used chemical weapons, and to the members of the Executive Council.

Finally, Mr. President, I would like to add that the proposal contains a clause which states that the Technical Secretariat, under the supervision of the Executive Council, shall elaborate, and revise as necessary, technical procedures and interview questionnaires for the guidance of International Inspectors in the conduct of an on-site inspection.

The proposal tabled by Canada and Norway is based on six years of research by our two countries in the field of verification of alleged use. Canada and Norway submit this proposal as a basis for negotiations on the text for an annex to article IX concerning general procedures for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. We hope that the content of this proposal can be included prior to the beginning of the 1988 session of the Conference on Disarmament in the rolling text, which will reflect the status of the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention at that time.

The proposal which I have presented today, should be seen in light of the commitment of both Canada and Norway to contribute to an early conclusion of the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. It concerns a question which so far has not been dealt with in detail in the negotiations. In fact, the proposal is the first full-fledged text covering all phases of the procedures for verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. We commend the proposal for your constructive consideration.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Norway for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair and I now give the floor to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Yamada.

Mr. YAMADA (Japan): Mr. President, I would like first of all to express our warm welcome to you upon your assumption of the presidency for the month of July. I am certain that under your eminent leadership we will make still

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further progress in our deliberations. Japan and Ethiopia, though located far apart, enjoy close and friendly relations. When we learnt in 1984 of the hardships that had befallen your people, the Japanese people responded in the spirit of solidarity by assisting your people in their brave efforts to overcome the tragic situation. May I also express our sincere gratitude to Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt for guiding us in the month of June.

I am happy to see Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Under-Secretary-General in charge of the Department of Disarmament, at the rostrum today. Of my compatriots, he occupies the highest post in the United Nations and I wish him every success in his new assignment.

I would also like to welcome the United Nations Disarmament Fellows who are here with us today. I hope that they all gain valuable experience through the programme, including the visit to Japan sponsored by my Government.

Today, I would like to address the question of outer space. While Japan has been improving space technology for peaceful purposes, it has always maintained the view that we should examine thoroughly the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We share the common wish that outer space, the last frontier for mankind, should not become the means or arena of armed conflicts. This wish is expressed in the United Nations General Assembly's resolution 1884 (XVIII), in which the Assembly "solemnly calls upon all States to refrain from placing in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer space in any other manner".

To date, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have possessed by far the largest share of the technical ability to make practical use of outer space, for example, in communicating via electro-magnetic waves transmitted outside the atmosphere and in transporting various hardware or at times men into outer space. In this context, my delegation welcomes the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States have been engaged since 1985 here in Geneva in comprehensive bilateral arms control negotiations, including negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Furthermore, my delegation especially appreciates the resolution, with the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee at the spring session of the Conference on Disarmament in 1985, of the problem, which had been pending since 1982, of a subsidiary body on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In the Ad hoc Committee last year we examined a wide range of substantial issues and, above all, exchanged concrete views on the legal issues, including the question of definitions.

I would like to make a few remarks on the relationship between the United States-Soviet nuclear and space talks and the discussions on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation holds the general view that there is an organic interrelationship between the United States-Soviet bilateral negotiations and the multilateral arms control and disarmament negotiations. Given also the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union play a predominant part in current space activities, the progress of their bilateral negotiations has a

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

critical impact on our discussions in the Conference on Disarmament. Japan therefore urges both the United States and the Soviet Union to make yet further efforts for early progress in their negotiations. At the same time, outer space is open to all and is not a possession of any country. An arms race in outer space would directly affect the security not just of the two Powers but of all other countries in the world as well. We cannot afford to be indifferent to this important issue. In view also of the rapid progress in space development recently made by countries other than the United States and the Soviet Union, we should proceed with our work in the Conference on Disarmament to examine fully what kind of multilateral agreements would be useful.

What concrete approach should we take in the Conference on Disarmament to the question of that prevention of an arms race in outer space? Arms control and disarmament have a direct and important bearing on the security of each country. My delegation's approach to the work of the Conference on Disarmament is therefore based on the recognition that our disarmament objectives should be realized in a manner which will ensure and enhance the security of each country. We feel that we should work towards effective and realizable goals, instead of preoccupying ourselves with political declarations. This is how we should approach the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space as well.

First, we need to know fully and objectively how outer space is actually being used. For example, early-warning satellites no doubt have military functions, but they may also play a useful role in preserving strategic stability. On the other hand, meteorological satellites collect meteorological data over vast areas of the earth and serve important non-military purposes -- in agriculture, fisheries and transport -- but they may also be used for a military purpose. These factors need to be seen in perspective.

We should endeavour to find what measures would eventually best ensure our security in consideration of these many aspects. It would not be in consonance with reality to take, without delving into such issues, a sweeping, generalized approach in the name of the non-militarization or the prevention of the militarization of outer space. To do so would not ensure our security. Instead, the approach we should take is to intensify our efforts to gain an accurate grasp of exactly how outer space is being used in many areas. It is only on the basis of a solid grasp of the facts that we can formulate an objective judgement as to what kinds of activities in outer space may endanger international peace and security. We may then proceed to consider what measures may be mutually acceptable, effective and realizable on a multilateral basis.

Based on the concept of our approach that I have just described, I would like to make some observations on the main issues being discussed in the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

Mutual trust among States is a key element in arms control and disarmament efforts. This applies in outer space as well. To strengthen mutual trust, it is indispensable that all States should adhere strictly to the principles of the United Nations Charter and to the principles of international law concerning the maintenance of international peace and security. It is also necessary to free disarmament discussions from political propaganda.

The necessity for objective information for confidence-building among States is set out in the first operative paragraph of last year's General Assembly resolution 41/59 B, in which the Assembly "reaffirms its conviction that a better flow of objective information on military capabilities could help relieve international tension and contribute to building of confidence among States on a global, regional, or subregional level and to the conclusion of concrete disarmament agreements". It goes without saying that our deliberation on the basis of objective information is a prerequisite for fruitful results. Above all, the United States and the Soviet Union, the leading States in space developments, have a very important role to play in providing information. We note in this context that the substantive information provided thus far by the Soviet Union is, in our view, far from sufficient. It is hoped that this situation will be remedied.

The proposal to formulate a code of conduct as one of the confidence-building measures touches on the fundamental issue of how we go about regulating or controlling the activities of States in outer space, which is singularly different from the Earth. It would entail highly complex problems to try to apply an order or rules based on the relationships among States on the Earth to activities outside the atmosphere or even beyond the solar system, where physical conditions are quite different from those on the Earth. We need to proceed carefully and thoughtfully in examining the adequacy or limits of such application in the context of reviewing the international laws on arms control and disarmament in outer space.

In connection with the necessity for objective information, the deliberations on the expansion or strengthening of the reporting requirement under the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched in Outer Space are of considerable significance. My delegation supports the basic idea behind such a proposal. As is clear from General Assembly resolution 1721 B (XVI), entitled "International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space", article IV of the Convention was drawn up on the basis of the understanding that the independent judgement of each country should be respected and taking into account how information was actually provided by the countries concerned in accordance with the General Assembly resolution.

The items listed for obligatory reporting under article IV are therefore limited to the minimum necessary for the identification of space objects. It is true that such a registration régime based on the Convention is not necessarily complete, but on the whole it has probably been effective with respect to the peaceful use of outer space. My delegation believes it necessary for us to examine fully from various aspects whether this proposal

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would lead to concrete and pragmatic measures of arms control and disarmament. There seem to be many difficult problems involved, especially as regards the acceptability of the obligation to report military information, which relates to the problem of verification.

I would like to touch upon the protection of space objects and their activities. As the number of States that participate in space development increases and their activities become more sophisticated and diversified in the future, the need to protect space objects and their activities will become more urgent. Up to now, Japan has launched 36 satellites for such purposes as experimental launching, weather forecasting, communications and broadcasting. We are planning to launch about 10 more satellites by 1990. Japan thus has a keen interest in this issue of satellite protection. My delegation believes that space objects and their activities for peaceful purposes should not be attacked and should be duly protected.

In this context, it is highly significant that a proposal has been made to grant immunity to satellites in order to exempt them from attack. If the purport of this proposal lies in non-interference with those satellites which play an important role as NTM (national technical means) of verification, it will contribute to greater stability between the East and the West, and my delegation can support it. However, we should be very careful to make sure that satellite immunity would not in fact protect some activities which might endanger the outer space activities of other States. Much will need to be done to determine what satellites should be granted immunity. At this point, we should pay special attention to the fact that the purpose of protecting satellites cannot be achieved solely by concluding a declaratory international convention on the non-use of force.

Finally, I would like to touch upon a few basic legal issues which are under discussion in the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

In reviewing the international law related to arms control and disarmament in outer space, we cannot bypass the basic issue of definition of a "space weapon". There are a number of complex problems which would make an abstract definition quite inadequate. For example, how do we deal with dual-purpose technologies? How do we set the criteria for defining a weapon? Which should be regarded as more important, the purpose of use or the objective function? It would seem much more practical to seek, through our work to grasp how outer space is being actually used, to identify the instances of military use, to categorize them, and to consider such measures as may be called for.

As measures to secure compliance with article IV of the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the installation of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction in space and other celestial bodies, we may recall article XI of the same Treaty, which stipulates for the provision of information on space activities and was later developed into the Convention on Registration, and article XII, which stipulates for the opening of all stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the Moon and other

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

celestial bodies to representatives of other States parties on a basis of reciprocity. However, as I said earlier, the information to be provided under the Convention on Registration is limited. Article XII of the Outer Space Treaty, which was one of the key provisions seriously discussed in negotiating the Treaty, stipulates for nothing with respect to outer space other than celestial bodies. Therefore, those provisions are of only limited relevance in relation to verification. We need to see if these limited provisions are adequate to cope with the verification needs that arise from current space activities.

There have been truly remarkable developments in space technology compared to 1967 when the Outer Space Treaty was concluded. A large-scale space tracking radar can provide crucial information and a satellite in itself can apparently play an important role as a means of verification. Based on these changes in circumstances, it would be useful to examine what kind of technical verification means would be applicable to a multilateral verification system. Conversely, if we can identify available verification means, we may also be able to go on to see what kind of prohibiting provisions can be agreed on multilaterally.

One important proposal in this regard relates to the establishment of an ISMA (international satellite monitoring agency). There will be a number of legal, financial, and technical problems to be resolved on this proposal. However, my delegation shares the hope that such a proposal can contribute towards the solution of the verification issues, and it is keenly interested in seeing how the proposal is dealt with and developed in the future.

I have tried to set forth briefly the views of my delegation on the issues before us. As a country devoted to technological development for the peaceful use of outer space, we wish to continue to contribute to the deliberations in the CD on developing a sharper focus on verification and other problems, bearing in mind the technologies available to us.

I am hopeful that we will make substantial progress in our considerations this year under the able leadership of Ambassador Pugliese of Italy, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Government of Canada for organizing a very useful workshop on outer space in Montreal in May. As a participant, I would like to say how grateful I was to Ambassador Beesley for his personal attention to us.

Ever since the seventh century, the star festival has been observed all over Japan in July, that is today. The festival owes its origin to the old Chinese legend that the star Vega (the Weaver), who is separated by the Galaxy from the star Altair, her lover, is allowed to meet him only once a year, on this evening. The children make their wishes, while looking up at shooting stars. Let us keep our sky ever beautiful and romantic.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Japan for his statement, for the kind words he addressed to the Chair and for the reference he made regarding the friendly relationship and very fruitful co-operation that exists between our two countries.

I now give the floor to the last speaker on my list for today, the representative of Poland, Ambassador Turbanski.

Mr. TURBANSKI (Poland): It gives me pleasure to welcome you, Ambassador Terrefe, the distinguished representative of Ethiopia, a country with which Poland enjoys friendly relations of close co-operation. Let me congratulate you on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament in July, which is usually a month of intensive work. I am sure you will preside over the Conference's work in a most efficient and effective manner and I pledge my delegation's support and co-operation in your endeavours to achieve progress in our work. I also wish to use this opportunity to express my delegation's sincere gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Alfarargi of Egypt, for his skilful presidency in June. It is also my pleasure to welcome the new head of the United States delegation, Ambassador Friedersdorf. I wish him a successful stay in Geneva and we look forward to the continuation of the co-operative relations we usually had with his delegation and, of course, I wish him a speedy recovery. May I as well warmly welcome in our midst today Mr. Akashi, the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs.

For some time now, developments in international relations have been marked by a particularly intensive search for disarmament. The multi- and bilateral dialogues on security and disarmament have been intensified and a number of important initiatives and proposals have been put forward. Of particular significance in this respect are the Soviet Union's proposals of 15 January 1986 and their follow-up. Attempts are being made to establish a new forum for disarmament talks in Europe, the region where the military potentials of the two alliances are of particular density and magnitude.

All these efforts have a common source -- the feeling that the world is really at a crossroads, that present actions will determine the future for many decades to come, that every State, large or small, non-aligned or member of an alliance should make its contribution toward barring the way to a continuation of the arms race.

From this feeling of common responsibility for common security there also follow Poland's recent proposals concerning nuclear and conventional disengagement in Central Europe. The plan was first outlined by Wojciech Jaruzelski, the Chairman of the Council of State of the Polish People's Republic in his statement on 8 May 1987; permit me, in this connection, to call to your attention document CD/754, which contains that outline. Later, Poland's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Orzechowski, elaborated upon the plan at the Vienna CSCE meeting. Let me briefly discuss the main ideas of the plan.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

The plan aims at curbing the threat of armed conflict in Europe. It provides for reducing armaments, both nuclear and conventional, qualitative and quantitative restraints on the arms race, and the building of confidence in the heart of the continent. The implementation of the plan should, on the basis of equal security for all parties, result in assured military stability at a relatively low level.

The territorial scope of the proposed measures would cover an extended region of Central Europe (the territories of the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland), with a possibility of its extension to cover the entire continent from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The measures proposed involve both nuclear and conventional armaments, military doctrines and security-building and confidence-building. The plan contains four main elements.

Firstly, the gradual disengagement and reduction of jointly agreed operational and battlefield types of nuclear arms. The aim is to commence the withdrawal and reduction of mutually agreed types of nuclear arms -- not only rockets, but also nuclear payloads, including those delivered at distances under 500 km. All types of nuclear weapons should be covered by international negotiations so that no "grey area" can emerge in this sphere.

Secondly, the gradual disengagement and reduction of jointly agreed kinds of conventional weapons, in the first place those with the greatest power and precision of destruction, suitable for use in a surprise attack. In other words, conventional weapons with remarkable striking power and precision which are capable of use in offensive operations should also be subject to an agreement. We are prepared to jointly specify the types of such weapons and negotiate their withdrawal and reduction.

Thirdly, evolution of the character of military doctrines so that they are mutually recognized as strictly defensive. A reorientation of military doctrines so as to render them strictly defensive, in the mutual perception of the parties, would facilitate the application of the proposed measures. It is our view that both the content of military doctrines and the role they play take on increased significance within the context of disarmament undertakings. The consideration of a concept of non-offensive defence could be of substantial importance.

Fourthly, a continuous search for, and agreement on, new confidence-building and security-building measures and on a mechanism for strict verification on the commitments undertaken. These confidence-building and security-building measures should be both political and military in character, and should be associated with measures for verification of compliance with the obligations assumed. Specific provisions for observation and inspection, mutually considered as effective, will have to be worked out.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

The plan forms a comprehensive entity. However, every one of its four elements may be seen as an autonomous offer as well. It is also a flexible proposal, as we are ready to modify, complement and broaden its particular elements. The details of the plan are being elaborated, and will be presented in the near future.

The Polish plan has a common denominator with the 1986 Budapest communiqué of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, as well as with the other concepts of European disarmament on a subregional scale, for instance the initiative of three political parties -- the German Socialist Unity Party, the Social Democratic Party of Germany and the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia -- concerning a nuclear-weapon-free corridor. In drafting the plan we have been inspired by experience going back to the Rapacki and Gomulka Plans, by the ideas of the Palme Commission and by other concepts. Their shared philosophy has been that of a search for reduced armaments and gradual disengagement of the military potentials of military alliances in the centre of Europe, the region of crucial importance for the security of the entire continent and for the relationship between the two alliances.

This new Polish proposal is based on our unchanging conviction that regional solutions can not only bring security to specific regions but, by increasing confidence and enhancing political stability, also facilitate the global construction of an infrastructure of peaceful co-existence.

The measures proposed in the plan are of direct and significant relevance to at least three agenda items of the Conference on Disarmament. They could be taken into consideration during the Conference's work on item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament", item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", and item 8, "Comprehensive programme of disarmament".

All the items on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament contain problems of great importance and complexity. The highest priority, however, is generally accorded to a broad range of problems of nuclear arms and nuclear disarmament. Is it not a paradox that this is exactly the area where the Conference has done so little?

Poland, like the majority of States represented here, is not a nuclear-weapon Power. We do not feel, however, released from the sacred duty of persistent activity in all international forums in support of halting the growth of nuclear arsenals and starting the process of their elimination.

We believe that the Conference on Disarmament has not only the right but a moral duty to tackle the problems of nuclear disarmament more deeply and in a more concrete, business-like way.

While acknowledging the particular responsibility of the big Powers and the need for the process of nuclear-arms reduction to be initiated by them, we can hardly agreed with the unfortunate reality that a Conference attended by all the nuclear Powers still devotes much more attention to procedural disputes than to working out concrete measures. The bilateral talks between the USSR and the United States will continue to play a significant role in

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

stopping the nuclear-arms race and reducing nuclear arsenals, but full-scale nuclear disarmament can only be achieved as a multilateral undertaking with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. Unfortunately, despite the efforts of the Soviet Union and the socialist States, as well as many other States, the existing political realities, and especially the position of some nuclear Powers, are not conducive to such business-like negotiations. In our mind this should not, however, be regarded as a justification for the situation, but, on the contrary, as an incentive to search for tentative or partial solutions which are possible in the existing circumstances. It is rather rare in any disarmament negotiations that it is possible to achieve an ultimate solution in one step.

The May 1987 session of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held in Berlin, stressed the overriding need for urgent, practical measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. One of the measures singled out in the communiqué of the session is a "comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapons testing as a high-priority measure designed to put an end to the development, manufacture and refinement of nuclear arms to bring about their reduction and elimination".

For years the nuclear-test ban has been the first item on the agenda of this Conference, which after all has all the predispositions to begin concrete, business-like work leading to a treaty banning nuclear-weapon testing. As has been stressed in this hall time and again, all arguments invoking the need for continued testing for reasons of strengthening of security are now unwarranted. The Soviet Union, by its moratorium on nuclear testing, which lasted more than a year and a half, demonstrated both goodwill and much political courage. They have not, however, been reciprocated.

The socialist countries have come forward with yet another significant initiative and submitted for the Conference's consideration a document containing "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests". This approach of ours is a flexible one. The "Basic provisions" outline a possible framework for goal-oriented work for a long overdue ad hoc committee. We are ready, however, to consider any other proposal that will offer a basis for work leading to a conclusion of a treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear tests.

The "Basic provisions" do not contain, in our opinion, ideas unacceptable to other groups of countries at the Conference. On the contrary, in drafting this document its authors broadly took into consideration the views of other States and their security concerns. The document also contains new ideas and develops some concepts already raised at this or other forums.

In short, it is a product of new political thinking. But thinking, no matter how progressive, will remain only a philosophical concept unless supported by common action. We need such common action at this Conference if we are to deal seriously with the nuclear-test ban. The "Basic provisions" are an open invitation to common thinking and common action. We would very much welcome the opinions of other delegations, as well as their own proposals. Stimulating an exchange of views can only lead to more goal-oriented work.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

I listened with great interest to this morning's statements by the distinguished representatives of Finland and Norway devoted to chemical weapons. Those statements are still further proof of their countries' deep and active interest in, and important contributions to the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. Before I finish my statement, I would also like to touch briefly on the work of the Committee on Chemical Weapons.

My task is easier today as Ambassador Y.K. Nazarkin of the Soviet Union, in his statement on 2 July 1987, gave an evaluation of the present stage of the negotiations with regard to a chemical weapons convention and expressed his delegation's uneasiness at the slowing down of the pace of work of the Committee. My delegation fully shares his analysis and conclusions. In our opinion, if we are to achieve decisive progress this year, as is professed to be the desire of all, we have to concentrate our efforts more on the still outstanding priority aspects of the convention rather than on issues of lesser importance or urgency.

In particular, more goal-oriented and intensive work should and can be done with regard to the finalization of articles IV, V and VI, including the definition of a production facility, the order of destruction of chemical weapons and régimes for super-toxic lethal chemicals remaining outside schedule [1]. Moreover, challenge inspection, usefully dealt with by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee during the spring session, should be taken up by the Committee more vigorously.

We are grateful to the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, and to the cluster co-ordinators, Mr. Krutzsch, Mr. Macedo and Mr. Nieuwenhuys, for their strenuous efforts, but real progress can only come as a result of the common endeavours of all delegations and their genuine will to make such progress.

Poland, being a country which does not produce, possess or intend to acquire chemical weapons, is doing its best within its power to contribute to the prompt finalization of the convention. The destruction of existing chemical weapons and their elimination from military arsenals for ever will be a long and difficult process, demanding strict and so far unheard-of international control. It is therefore in our common interest to begin the process as soon as possible. We support all initiatives which may be helpful to eliminating chemical weapons, including regional solutions.

On the other hand, we are deeply concerned with some States' activities leading toward the initiation of production of a new generation of chemical weapons. Likewise disquieting are proposals put forward at our Conference which would allow for the production of chemical weapons after the process of destruction has started. Such an attitude, in our opinion, runs against the spirit and the letter of the future convention. Indeed, we hope that the authors of CD/757 will reconsider their position in favour of our common goal -- an effective convention on a chemical-weapons ban.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

We strongly believe that the remaining part of the summer session of the Conference, as well as the time available before the beginning of the 1988 session, will, as in previous years, be used to the benefit of the convention. We are glad to note that a similar view was expressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, His Excellency Hans van de Broek. We hope other delegations will be able to demonstrate a similar approach.

The PRÉSIDENT: I thank the representative of Poland for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Is there any other member wishing to take the floor at this point? I see none.

Members will recall that immediately after this plenary meeting the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons will meet in this conference room.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 9 July, at 10 a.m. After that plenary meeting, the Conference will hold an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 2. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.