



**SECURITY COUNCIL
OFFICIAL RECORDS**

UN LIBRARY

JUN 8 1980

TWENTY-EIGHTH YEAR

UN/SA COLLECTION

1759th MEETING: 14 DECEMBER 1973

NEW YORK

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1759)	1
Adoption of the agenda	1
Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488): report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus (S/11137)	1

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

Documents of the Security Council (symbol S/. . .) are normally published in quarterly *Supplements* of the *Official Records of the Security Council*. The date of the document indicates the supplement in which it appears or in which information about it is given.

The resolutions of the Security Council, numbered in accordance with a system adopted in 1964, are published in yearly volumes of *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council*. The new system, which has been applied retroactively to resolutions adopted before 1 January 1965, became fully operative on that date.

SEVENTEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-NINTH MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 14 December 1973, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. HUANG Hua (China).

Present: The representatives of the following States: Australia, Austria, China, France, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Yugoslavia.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1759)

1. Adoption of the agenda.
2. Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488): report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus (S/11137).

The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488): report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus (S/11137)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Chinese*): The representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece, in letters addressed to the President of the Security Council, have requested to be invited to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion of the question on the agenda. In accordance with the provisional rules of procedure and with the established practice of the Council I propose, if there is no objection, to invite the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece to take places at the Council table and to participate, without vote, in the Council's discussion.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Z. Rossides (Cyprus), Mr. O. Olcay (Turkey) and Mr. C. P. Panayotacos (Greece) took places at the Security Council table.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Chinese*): Before this meeting was scheduled, I engaged in consultations with all members of the Council, as well as with the representatives of the parties concerned, with a view to preparing a draft resolution which could be placed before the Council at this time. As a result of those consultations, a draft resolution has been circulated in document S/11154, which

follows the wording of the Council's previous resolutions on this question. As it appears from my consultations that this text is generally acceptable, it is my intention to put it to the vote now, as the Council has often done in the past, and to call upon representatives to take the floor after the voting has been completed, in accordance with the order of their inscription on the list of speakers.

3. Accordingly, I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document S/11154.

A vote was taken by show of hands:

In favour: Australia, Austria, France, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: China.

The draft resolution was adopted by 14 votes in favour, none against, with 1 abstention.¹

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Chinese*): The first name on the list of speakers is that of the representative of Cyprus, on whom I now call.

5. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): Mr. President, I should like at the outset to thank you and the members of the Council for inviting my delegation to participate in this meeting. I should also like to express to you our congratulations upon your assumption of the office of President of this august body. We are happy that the deliberations on this subject today will be guided by the representative of a great nation, which is an ever-living inspiration in respect of its ancient civilization and its modern achievements. Your country is one of the greatest in size, population and power with a historic past of enormous value. My country, on the other hand, is one of the smallest and weakest in terms of power in this Organization, but one also having its own cultural history and past civilization. It is because of the benevolent influence of the Charter of the United Nations that it has become possible for our two countries to work together constructively in many fields on the basis of the Charter and the principles of equality, non-interference and friendly co-operation between countries, large and small, principles which are the cornerstone of the Charter.

6. We have before us the report of the Secretary-General [S/11137] reflecting the situation in the island and the

¹ See resolution 343 (1973).

activities of the United Nations during the last six months. As appears from the report, the situation has remained practically unchanged since last June. The new element in the report is the reduction of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus. My Government, in its desire to render easier the task of the Secretary-General, has repeatedly declared that it would agree to any decision of the Secretary-General regarding the numerical strength of the Force. My Government is ready now and at any time to co-operate closely with UNFICYP, as it has steadfastly done in the past, in order to achieve the purposes under its mandate by virtue of Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964. However, it has to be made clear that my Government will not consent to any change in the mandate of UNFICYP under that resolution or to any action in disregard of the sovereign rights of the Republic of Cyprus, which cannot be made the subject of discussion. Those rights are clearly defined in the said resolution. Nor can my Government agree to the injection of third parties in the functions of the United Nations Force, whose presence in the island is by the consent of the Government of Cyprus alone. It is our hope that the endeavours made by the Government in co-operation with UNFICYP towards normalization and the creation of a better climate of relaxation will be enhanced by the willingness, understanding and goodwill of all sections of the people of Cyprus, so that this further reduction of UNFICYP may be safely facilitated.

7. In any case, I want to make it crystal clear that we are co-operating entirely in the sense of a reduction of the Force, with due regard, of course, to the circumstances prevailing in the island, which we hope will develop in a positive way towards better normalization, towards improved confrontation and towards a relaxation of tension that will make the conduct of the talks more fruitful in the sense of co-operation and a common purpose.

8. Renewed and commendable efforts have been made by UNFICYP towards a measure of relaxation in the unnecessary armed confrontation between the two sides. The reports of the Secretary-General for a number of years now have repeatedly emphasized the uselessness of that confrontation and the irritability that it inevitably creates, particularly by reason of its closeness.

9. My Government, needless to say, has always demonstrated its readiness to co-operate with UNFICYP from the very beginning and to comply with its proposals for total or partial deconfrontation. However, regrettably, the Turkish Cypriot side has not agreed so far even in the renewed efforts of UNFICYP towards such deconfrontation. We believe that deconfrontation is perhaps the first element required for the reduction of the United Nations Force; and in this respect we hope that a more reasonable approach to this problem will be taken by the Turkish Cypriot leadership so that the efforts of UNFICYP in this regard may become more fruitful. I know very well that UNFICYP is devoting great efforts in that direction and has made a number of proposals. I hope that within the next period those efforts will materialize.

10. Similarly, on normalization and freedom of movement there has been again no appreciable change. The forcible

blocking of a number of public and main communication roads by Turkish Cypriots from the enclaves still continues, with the result that the Greek Cypriot people, constituting the overwhelming majority of the population, still suffer the inconvenience and the hardship of a deprivation and curtailment of their freedom of movement for their daily needs. This is a peculiar anomaly at a time when the Turkish Cypriots enjoy full freedom of movement. All of them, whether they have been part of the fighting force—or whatever it is—have complete freedom of movement throughout the island; and this has been going on for a number of years, particularly since 1968 when, because of the lack of response from the Turkish Cypriot side concerning the proposals for the bilateral removal of check-points, the President of Cyprus and the Government took the initiative for a unilateral measure in that direction by lifting all check-points unilaterally at great risk to internal security at the time. And this step was in some quarters criticized as very perilous, but it was done in a spirit of goodwill and, as a result, since that year, the Turkish Cypriots enjoy full freedom of movement.

11. There has been no response, I said. However, the Government adheres steadfastly to its policy of peaceful development towards normalization. It is true that, under resolution 186 (1964), which provides that the Government of Cyprus has responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions, UNFICYP has the corresponding task of contributing towards that maintenance of law and order; therefore, the Government had the right to use any means for restoring law and order. Yet, as I said, it adheres steadfastly to its policy of avoiding the use of force at all times for any reason and pursuing a peaceful policy through close co-operation with UNFICYP.

12. The result of this anomaly is that although the majority has no freedom of movement whereas the minority has such freedom over the whole island, this does not, however, in any way affect the policy of my Government. It continues in its goodwill and hopes that, through UNFICYP and through better counsel, this anomaly will be removed with the resulting relaxation of tension.

13. It must be said, however, that when this unilateral lifting took place, although there was no response, there has been a rewarding satisfaction in having taken that step, from the very fact that it was the occasion for the gratifying feeling in observing, as the Secretary-General said in his report of 9 March 1968, "the ease with which ordinary people of both communities were beginning to resume their former amicable relations" [S/8446, para. 149]. This is a very strong indication of the need to encourage these trends.

14. In that report the Secretary-General referred to normalization measures by the Government of Cyprus as deserving of "special mention". These measures, he said, "have contributed to the relaxation of tension", particularly after they were extended to the main Turkish Cypriot enclave in Nicosia.

15. The situation resulting from the Government's action has demonstrated unmistakably, as the report points out,

that ordinary Greek and Turkish people desire to live in peace and harmony and already seem prepared to accept and support reasonable compromises.

16. Regrettably, the natural progress towards conciliation, friendliness and co-operation—the essential elements required for the solution of the problem—has been interrupted and impeded in its natural and automatic expression by the persistent imposition upon the Turkish Cypriot people of a policy of divisiveness and alienation, against the better judgement and wishes of those people themselves. As emphasized in a number of the Secretary-General's reports, the continuing restriction of freedom of movement is one of the most serious irritants to Cypriots of both—and I repeat both—communities. Indeed, both the illogical continuation of close armed confrontation and the unjustified restrictions on the freedom of movement are instrumental factors in preventing relaxation of tension and the creation of a better psychological climate towards more positive progress in the talks. It is hoped, however, that the futility of the negativeness of such a policy will eventually be realized by the Turkish Cypriot leadership in the better conceived interests of both sides.

17. However that may be, my Government will continue with patience and tolerance in its policy of peaceful development towards normalization and towards positive progress in the talks. These talks, which originated in 1968, went through various stages and a number of agreements appear to have been reached on legislative, judicial and executive aspects. From the beginning, they were conducted on an agreed basis of a unitary State for an independent and sovereign republic of Cyprus. This is shown also in all the areas of agreement reached on constitutional structure. They were all on the basis of a unitary State. According to the report,

“... the intercommunal talks have proceeded cautiously and slowly towards the common goal of reaching a satisfactory accord on the outstanding constitutional problems and ... even though a large measure of concurrence has already been reached ... a great amount of detailed work still needs to be done.” [S/11137, para. 76.]

18. These talks seem to have run into difficulties on the aspect of local government. It should be remembered that in the 1959-1960 Constitution of Cyprus, which is still in force, there is no provision for local government. Therefore, this is a new element. There has been no objection to having this element introduced in the existing unitary State of Cyprus. The differences seem to arise chiefly with regard to the extent of the local government within the framework of a unitary State. The question of interpretation of local government has arisen; however, it could not in fact create any difficult problem regarding interpretation, for local government is a well-defined legal term, one of constitutional law, that could not admit of misinterpretation. There are various forms of local government, but all fall within the definition of local government in its main characteristics. To try to dispute the definition of so well known a term is merely an effort to introduce an element of confusion, perhaps as a means of escape, but this does not help the positive progress of negotiations.

19. There is ample authority as to the meaning and scope of local government. In the talks, the Greek Cypriot side has gone to all possible lengths towards granting a liberal interpretation of local government, giving more rights to local government within, of course, the framework of the unitary State and the essential definition of local government, for going beyond these generally accepted terms would inevitably disrupt the cohesion of the State by creating a State within a State.

20. As to the unitary State itself being the agreed basis of the talks, there has been some attempt to cast a doubt on this being the basis. There can be no reasonable doubt, however, in the light of the explicit statements to that effect in the reports of both Secretary-General U Thant and of his successor, Secretary-General Waldheim. This was the basis since the very start of negotiations in 1968, when the structure of the State was first discussed; thereafter negotiations proceeded on the basis of a unitary State in every respect. No reservations were made at the time the talks originally started or at any relevant time thereafter. An attempt to change position from that agreed basis at this late stage would appear to be an act that would not be compatible with the importance and seriousness of the subject under discussion. We therefore dismiss that eventuality as being improbable, if not impossible, and in any case, unacceptable.

21. It must in this respect be remembered that, as I said before, the fundamental structure of the Republic of Cyprus from the very start of its establishment was admittedly that of a unitary State, and it could not have been otherwise in view of the realities of the geographical distribution of an intermingled population throughout such a small island, without any pattern of natural territorial separation, as was so categorically observed by the eminent constitutional authority, Lord Radcliffe, who was commissioned by the British Government to deal with the subject shortly before independence. Moreover, Mr. Galo Plaza, who was appointed Mediator under resolution 186 (1964), which is the chief resolution on this subject, took exactly the same view and elaborated more emphatically. He said, in his report of 26 March 1965, that “The establishment of a federal régime requires a territorial basis, and this basis does not exist.” [S/6253, para. 150]. This was because of the island-wide intermingling of the population. Federation, according to Mr. Galo Plaza, would involve the disaster of “a compulsory movement of ... many thousands [of persons], contrary to all the enlightened principles ... of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” [ibid., para. 153]. It would, furthermore, “entail ... economic and social disruption which could be such as to render neither part of the country viable” [ibid.]. He also stated “In fact, the arguments for the geographical separation of the two communities under a federal system of government have not convinced me that it would not inevitably lead to partition” [ibid., para. 154]. Thus a claim to federation is but a disguised claim for partition.

22. Similarly, the report of Lord Radcliffe dismissed both the view of partition and that of federation as being wholly inapplicable in Cyprus. Yet, very recently we heard a discreet but sufficiently audible sound about a federated

system in Cyprus. I hope that it is not a prelude to a louder call and, perhaps, a further shift of positions.

23. But, as we had occasion to remark in another context, partition is the worst calamity that can befall any nation. The experience of the world over the past two decades has amply demonstrated that partition, like splitting the atom, creates the most explosive and devastating situation of endemic war and human suffering, posing, moreover, the gravest threat to international peace and security. Even in cases where territorial separation made partition appear possible, it afterwards proved a great destruction to that State. Whether it be in Asia, the Middle East or Europe, the evils of partition are now manifest. They compellingly call for persistent efforts towards reunification, and we are happy to welcome the positive progress in such endeavours in the historic Irish nation where now an all-Ireland council is being discussed in respect of this country.

24. In order to move forward from the present impasse in the talks in Cyprus it must be made clear and be realized by the parties concerned that progress towards solution cannot be sought through increasing division but only through growing unity, not through accentuated antagonisms but only through developing co-operation, not by always lingering on differences but on embracing common interests, not by moving against but with the positive trends of an interdependent world.

25. This is the position of my Government in respect of the question before the Council and I venture to express the hope that by the next meeting of this Council we may have more positive results in a new move forward towards the essential elements of solving the problem, towards the needed co-operation and spirit of adjustment.

26. Before concluding I should like once again to exercise the pleasant duty of expressing our sincere and deep feelings of gratitude to our eminent Secretary-General and his collaborators, both here at Headquarters and in Cyprus, for their untiring efforts and their devotion in promoting the principles of the Charter and the objectives of the United Nations in Cyprus, and particularly the objectives of Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 under which this Force was established in Cyprus.

27. I wish to assure the Secretary-General, as well as Mr. Guyer, Mr. Urquhart, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, General Chand, and all those associated with them in this endeavour in Cyprus that we are fully cognizant of the magnitude of their contribution and deeply appreciate it.

28. Our sincere gratitude is due also, and particularly, to the Governments of the countries which, through a noble sense of responsibility and of devotion to the concept of peace keeping through the United Nations, make the operation of UNFICYP possible by means of their generous contributions in men and money.

29. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Chinese*): I now call on the representative of Turkey.

30. Mr. OLCAIY (Turkey): Mr. President, it is particularly agreeable to be allowed to participate in a meeting presided

over by the representative of China. I consider it one of the greatest sources of satisfaction in my diplomatic career to have had a modest role in the establishment of relations between our two friendly countries. I should also like to thank all members of the Council for having allowed me to take part in its deliberations.

31. The Security Council has once again extended the mandate of UNFICYP for another period of six months. We are grateful to the Governments concerned for their continued support of this operation, which contributes to the maintenance of an atmosphere in which negotiations are made possible in Cyprus. The rather academic argument that the extended presence of the Force does not encourage or accelerate an agreed solution is fallacious. It is only with a reduced level of intercommunal tension that any meaningful negotiation can take place.

32. In paragraph 92 of the report of the Secretary-General [S/11157] it is stated that "Although the talks have continued . . . in a constructive atmosphere, only limited progress has been made on the outstanding basic issues."

33. In paragraph 93 the Secretary-General goes on to express the opinion that:

" . . . with mutual goodwill and understanding and with concessions on both sides, an agreed accommodation can in fact be arrived at within the framework of the intercommunal talks that would protect the vital interests of all parties."

I should like to underline the words "concessions on both sides". As stated in paragraph 78 of the report, the Turkish community has indicated its willingness to make certain concessions in respect of its rights as embodied in the 1960 Constitution in return for local autonomy. To arrive at an accommodation, however, reciprocal concessions are necessary. They are also required in order to preserve the bi-communal nature of the State, as well as the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. I shall come back to this point in a moment.

34. Everyone familiar with the historical background of the Cyprus question for the last 20 years will recall the original Turkish position and the point to which it has evolved. Turkey must insist now, however, on preservation of the bi-communal State based on the partnership of the two communities in the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of Cyprus. With these remarks, I should like to associate myself with the hope and expectations expressed by the Secretary-General with regard to the enlarged intercommunal talks.

35. On the pessimistic side, I have to put on record our renewed apprehensions about the revival of intentions for the clandestine importation of arms among some Greek Cypriot quarters. The Greek Cypriot House of Representatives, at its meeting on 29 October 1973, discussed the question of arming the Greek Cypriot National Guard with modern weaponry without further delay, ostensibly "in order that the National Guard can be ready and able to meet any danger". Coming from none other than Mr. Glafcos Clerides, the President of the House, that

formulation, innocent as it sounds, cannot, however, dispel doubt about the existence, in certain quarters at least, of less innocent intentions. At that meeting it was decided that these discussions and preparations should be continued in closed session.

36. The importation of arms which may ultimately be used against the Turkish community cannot be regarded by my Government simply as an innocent measure for self-defence. In the light of experience, and against our deep concern for the security of the Turkish community, such an act can only be considered as a serious breach of the *status quo*. In this connexion, I should like to put on record that the local newspapers referred to in paragraph 46 of the Secretary-General's report do not belong to the Turkish community.

37. My pessimistic list again, unfortunately, includes many items in the area of activities towards a return to normal conditions. The Secretary-General himself indicates that "only slight progress has been made in extending essential public services and restoring others to Turkish Cypriots" [*ibid.*, para. 60]. Electricity, water, social insurance, postal services, grain subsidies, and even the issuance of birth certificates to the Turkish Cypriots born since 1964 are among the outstanding issues. Although a slight increase in Turkish Cypriot participation in projects sponsored by the United Nations Development Programme is reported, the fact remains that the Turkish community's share in the benefits of United Nations technical assistance is far from satisfactory or proportionate.

38. To this picture must be added the 15,000 Turkish Cypriot displaced persons who still live away from their homes and villages. In a forum where it has, unfortunately, come to be customary to talk about human suffering in terms of millions, this figure of 15,000 may seem small at first glance, but not relievingly so, considering that Cyprus itself has a total population of about 600,000. In speaking about the sufferings of the 15,000 Turkish Cypriot displaced persons, this fact should never be lost sight of; it is like having 15,000 refugees in a small town. The limited number of displaced persons who have been permitted to resettle their villages, mentioned in paragraph 65 of the report, must in turn be compared against this total number of 15,000. Even in the case of the few villages that have been resettled, the hardships created and conditions imposed by the Greek Cypriots must also be noted.

39. All these factors are witness to the conditions of extreme hardship and deprivation which have persisted for 10 years now in the daily lives of the Turkish Cypriots. After such a decade of suffering, one conclusion must now be clear to everyone: the Turkish community is determined not to give up its right to exist as a distinct community, no matter how much deprivation it has to put up with. It is against this background that the minor inconvenience mentioned by Ambassador Rossides with regard to restrictions of movement in some areas vital to the security of the Turkish Cypriots should be considered.

40. On the subject of deconfrontation, I would point to paragraph 38 of the report in which it is stated that the Turkish Cypriots feel that their security is threatened by

the presence of larger armed forces on the Government's side, whose mobility is not constrained as is that of the Turkish Cypriot fighters. The violent incidents within the Greek Cypriot community resulting from an argument over when and by whom *enosis* should be realized, hardly create an atmosphere conducive to dispelling this feeling of insecurity on the part of the Turkish community.

41. At any rate, it should be borne in mind that it is the Greek community which started the threat and which has the capacity to maintain it or cease it. The necessarily defensive position of the Turkish Cypriot community, after 10 years now, should not be forgotten.

42. The United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus had a further usefulness, that of being in the area when the United Nations Emergency Force was established by Security Council resolution 340 (1973) on the situation in the Middle East. The existence of such a force, with vast accumulated experience and dedicated personnel, facilitated the establishment of UNEF without delay. We have watched with great admiration the efficiency and speed with which the Secretary-General was able to transfer the Austrian, Finnish, Irish and Swedish contingents serving with UNFICYP to the Middle East as an urgent interim measure. We also deeply appreciate the prompt replacement of the Austrian, Finnish and Swedish personnel in UNFICYP. In this connexion, I would like to join the Secretary-General in expressing our gratitude to the Irish peace-keeping contingent whose services dedicated to the noble cause of peace are now required elsewhere.

43. It is with the greatest admiration and esteem that my Government regards the UNFICYP operation. We are grateful to the Secretary-General, his Special Representative, the Force Commander and all the members of UNFICYP for their efforts and devotion. The Secretary-General suggests a second phase of reductions in UNFICYP. We do not think that the circumstances in Cyprus are opportune for such a reduction. For us, the security of the Turkish community, which is at stake, remains the predominant consideration, and under no circumstances can we forego this consideration. Any reduction in the security of the Turkish community will necessarily result in an increase in our concern. Having said this, and although we have doubts as to the timeliness of such a reduction, I believe that the Secretary-General and the Force Commander may be relied upon to decide, after consultation with the parties, whether they find it possible to go ahead with the second phase of reductions without compromising the security of the Turkish community. For our part, we can only reiterate the readiness of the Turkish community, which has no voice of its own here, to co-operate with UNFICYP, as in the past.

44. I had originally intended to conclude my statement at this point. But some of the remarks of Ambassador Rossides have constrained me to add a few of my own.

45. I am sorry that every time in response to Ambassador Rossides, I have to repeat myself in saying that I am most reluctant to enter here into discussion of the form of government or State in Cyprus, which is currently the subject-matter of the intercommunal talks, because I do not

believe in the usefulness of such an academic discussion and I do not feel that my knowledge of administrative or constitutional law is up to the standard required to maintain such a high level of discussion here.

46. I wish Ambassador Rossides could bring himself to feel the same. Apparently he cannot help it. He has to score some points in the absence of a Turkish Cypriot representative here. In response to what he has said, I need only point to the Turkish position in the intercommunal talks which makes it abundantly clear that neither the Turkish community nor Turkey can accept Ambassador Rossides' unitary State.

47. I would also like to add—and this is based on personal knowledge—that it has never been the agreed basis of the talks. I think I have as much right to go back and dig into my own memory as Ambassador Rossides regarding the so-called "unitary State" as a basis for discussion. I remember my many negotiations on this subject in my various capacities and never recall having agreed to such a definition of the terms of reference. Nor do any of my predecessors.

48. One of the elements in Ambassador Rossides' speech is the fact that, regrettably, he speaks of tolerance, of understanding, almost—not perhaps in so many words—of magnanimity towards the Turkish community. Nowhere is there mention of their constitutional rights as one of the co-founders of the Republic some 13 years ago. The main problem we are being faced with in this Council, and in other forums, is that we are being told by the Greek Cypriots that no State is respectable unless it is unitary and that no other form is viable. I am thinking of all those among the membership of the United Nations, even of this august body of the Council, that do not conform to this pattern, and I almost shudder.

49. Ambassador Rossides has also mentioned that there are shifts—he has said in fact further shifts—of position on the part of the Turkish Government or the Turkish Cypriot community. There is, unfortunately, one position which has never shifted: that—not even disguised—of very eminent Greek Cypriot statesmen who have never brought themselves to agree to denounce or deny *enosis*. The reason why Ambassador Rossides cannot have a unitary State is not here, but in Cyprus. He need not look elsewhere than in Cyprus. There cannot be a unitary State in the definition that he seems to give to it because there is no unitary nation in Cyprus. States are the reflections of the needs of nations. Where there are two nations there cannot be a unitary State. As I mentioned earlier, the United Nations—and even this Council—is full of examples. Cyprus came into being as a bi-communal State and it will remain so because that is the wish of one of the communities mainly responsible for its independence. One should not forget that the Turkish community in Cyprus is the reason why Cyprus is an independent State. If it were otherwise, if it were a one-community State, a one-nation State, obviously it would be part of Greece. The preservation of the bi-communal State is therefore an essential guarantee for the maintenance of the independence of Cyprus.

50. Having said all that, I have not really put forward any legal arguments. I have just spoken of the facts of the

matter. The legal arguments, as I have had occasion to say both today and earlier, belong to those who are discussing the matter in Cyprus with a view to reaching an agreed solution, which we are all hoping for and which will take this subject outside this body once and for all.

51. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Chinese*): I now call on the representative of Greece.

52. Mr. PANAYOTACOS (Greece): I should like to begin by thanking the members of the Security Council for giving my delegation the opportunity of participating in this debate on Cyprus. May I also offer you, Mr. President, our sincere congratulations as you preside over the Security Council this month and our appreciation of the skill with which you have prepared the ground for this debate.

53. Bearing in mind the trying times the Council has just experienced with a major and challenging question, I shall try to limit my statement strictly to essentials. After all, to use Shakespeare's phrase, "brevity is the soul of wit", especially in this forum.

54. The extension for the twenty-fifth time of the mandate of UNFICYP has just been decided, on the basis of the Secretary-General's carefully balanced and informative report on the present state of the United Nations peace-keeping operations in Cyprus in accordance with Security Council resolution 186 (1964). In this context I should like once again to express our deep appreciation of the beneficial results of the constant interest and tireless endeavours of the Secretary-General and his able assistants, the Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Guyer, and his Special Representative in Cyprus, Mr. Osorio-Tafall. I wish also to express our gratitude to the Commander of the United Nations Force in Cyprus, Major-General Chand, and the officers and men under his command for their painstaking efforts, their impartiality, goodwill and patient work to prevent any deterioration of the situation.

55. The successful carrying out of their mandate has been proved beyond any doubt by the very fact that the Security Council, by its resolution 340 (1973) of 25 October 1973, concerning the sending of a new United Nations Emergency Force to the Middle East, unanimously agreed to a proposal by the Secretary-General that, as an urgent interim measure, the bulk of four contingents serving with UNFICYP should at once be airlifted to Egypt.

56. We find grounds for encouragement in the fact that this temporary though substantial reduction of the strength of UNFICYP has been made possible without any objection by those directly concerned. It constitutes additional and corroborative evidence that the general situation in Cyprus has improved during the last six months, thanks mainly to the relaxed atmosphere and the optimism created by the reactivated intercommunal talks.

57. On the other hand, it should be remembered that Council resolution 186 (1964) also recommended the "return to normal conditions" in the island. In this respect, however, we are witnessing the fact that the interlocutors, in spite of their sincere efforts to reduce the areas of discord, will still have to take more steps along the road to

an agreed accommodation by displaying a spirit of courage, mutual goodwill and understanding. On this point we share the Secretary-General's view that the parties directly concerned must first of all refrain from any action or any hasty individual or collective initiative that might stir up passions and misunderstandings, thus rendering a solution difficult. We do believe that, under the auspices of the United Nations, men of goodwill can work towards the day when the rule of law and justice will replace the danger of military confrontation in the island.

58. From the very beginning Greece has envisaged, and has made known again and again, even very recently, that it considers the reactivated intercommunal talks to be the only chance and the best procedure for arriving at a viable solution, taking into consideration the well-being and the vital interests of the people of Cyprus as a whole, as well as the independence, integrity and unity of the Republic. We are therefore firmly convinced that the procedure now being followed must be continued until its successful consummation. However, we cannot but express our regret that the Greek Government's well-known views on the very basis of the intercommunal talks have been passed over in silence in the Secretary-General's report.

59. With regard to the implementation of a new reduction of the United Nations commitment in Cyprus, in terms both of finance and of manpower, which the Secretary-General has been obliged to consider as the so-called second phase of the economy measures, I should like to emphasize the following points in order to facilitate the task of the Security Council and without any prejudice to the sovereign rights of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

60. First, the Greek Government reiterates its commitment to maintain and strengthen, in close co-operation with UNFICYP, its present policy of ensuring that significant intercommunal incidents are prevented. Secondly, it furthermore expresses the hope that the proposals for measures of deconfrontation, submitted to the parties directly concerned by Mr. Osorio-Tafall in July 1973, may be agreed upon by the parties. Thirdly, Greece will continue to pay its substantial share of the financing of UNFICYP.

61. My delegation cannot, however, but express once more its disappointment that so few members both of the Security Council and of the Organization have so far been contributing to the financial needs of the peace-keeping operation in Cyprus, the more so since, as I said earlier, UNFICYP has by no means outlived its usefulness, not only in the island but also in a wider context, by providing the nucleus of the newly created United Nations Emergency Force.

62. Regarding more particularly the latter, we have witnessed with gratification the willingness of the Security Council members to accommodate and harmonize their positions for the benefit both of the parties in dispute and of the international community. This happy development was made possible thanks to their constructive efforts to work out adequate solutions. It has furthermore led to a new consensus regarding the financing of the United Nations Emergency Force, for which a special scale of assessments to share the cost among all the Members of this Organization has been successfully devised.

63. It seems desirable, therefore, that in order to keep UNFICYP workable as long as it is needed, all members of the Security Council should agree to take seriously into consideration the proposal made by the representative of Canada in his statement of 28 November in the Special Political Committee, regarding guidelines for United Nations peace-keeping operations. I should like to quote some relevant parts of that important statement:

"There had been, in the past, protracted disagreements over the matters of operation and financing for peace-keeping missions. Those disagreements had also led to considerable disruption in the activities of the United Nations and had placed it in a financial situation from which it had not yet fully recovered. . . . Members should seize the present opportunity and the new mood in the Security Council and the General Assembly to examine how methods of financing other peace-keeping operations, such as UNFICYP, might be reviewed in order to put them on a firmer and more equitable footing."²

64. In concluding, allow me to say that my delegation believes that this is as good a moment as any to remind ourselves that we all share jointly and severally the responsibility to fulfil the mandate of the Charter and make the United Nations a really workable instrument of world peace. In our opinion, this could be better achieved in the framework of a generally agreed equitable system of financing United Nations peace-keeping operations, including UNFICYP, thus contributing effectively to the maintenance of international peace and security in the strife-torn Eastern Mediterranean area.

65. Mr. FAKIH (Kenya): My delegation voted in favour of the resolution that the Council has just adopted, having three considerations in mind.

66. Firstly, during the last six months UNFICYP has played, as usual, a constructive role and helped create a period of peace and tranquillity in Cyprus.

67. Secondly, the Force is still regarded as necessary, as the report of the Secretary-General indicates in paragraph 98, by the Governments of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. So long as the Council is in a position to influence or provide a framework through which a mutually acceptable settlement can be reached, it should not fail to play such a role. We believe in the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus and the security of all its peoples.

68. Thirdly, our vote is an expression of thanks and confidence in the efforts of the Secretary-General, the Force, and all concerned, for the efforts they are making to search for a solution of the Cyprus question.

69. I would like to recall the good service that the presence of the Force in Cyprus gave this Council in its hours of dire need, pursuant to the adoption of resolution 340 (1973) on the Emergency Force for the Middle East.

70. My delegation is grateful that the Government of Cyprus, the other Governments involved, and the Govern-

² See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Special Political Committee*, 899th meeting, para. 12.

ments from which the contingents were drawn, readily agreed to the Force serving in the Middle East.

71. Peace has a price and the cost of maintaining the Force for the next six months has been estimated at \$6.5 million. To cover this amount and the accumulated deficit, we shall need \$29.6 million. No wonder that in paragraph 15 of the Secretary-General's report, he informs us that the Force has been reduced by 439 men of all ranks.

72. The previous report of the Secretary-General on Cyprus [S/10940] six months ago, was very optimistic on agreement being reached in four months. We note, unfortunately, that no agreement has yet been reached. But we must keep on trying.

73. Mr. ANWAR SANI (Indonesia): The Security Council has again decided to renew the mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus on the basis of the report of the Secretary-General. On a previous occasion my delegation already stated its views on this matter and subsequent developments in Cyprus have not persuaded my delegation to change its stand.

74. Although certain positive developments have occurred, the overall situation in Cyprus still necessitates the presence of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in the island, not only to continue its peace-keeping efforts, but also to enable peace-making efforts to reach a positive and final conclusion. My delegation, however, continues to be disturbed by the question as to how long this situation is going to linger on.

75. Therefore, in supporting the decision of the Council to extend the mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus, my delegation wishes to place on record its sincere hope that increased efforts will be undertaken by all parties concerned with regard to the search for solutions of the frustratingly complex problems of the island, so that the operations of UNFICYP may come to a positive end within a reasonable period of time.

76. My delegation is happy to note that the recent deployment of UNFICYP to the Middle East did not adversely affect the comparatively peaceful situation in Cyprus. We see it as a fortunate omen for further developments which will enable us seriously to consider reducing the manpower of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, as well as streamlining and reorganizing its operations. My delegation is prepared to lend its support to efforts which could lead to the reduction of the United Nations commitment in terms of finances and manpower, without, however, jeopardizing the effectiveness of UNFICYP.

77. My delegation continues to be concerned by the controversy that still surrounds the interested parties with regard to the concept of an independent, sovereign and unitary State of Cyprus. This controversy proved to be the insurmountable barrier for the two communities to reach agreement on the constitutional framework that will provide for the adequate participation of the two communities in the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. My delegation hopes that the two communities may find themselves able to exert further efforts in order to achieve a

permanent solution of this sensitive issue, a solution that can safeguard the integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus as an independent non-aligned country, enabling all groups of the people of Cyprus to live in peace, unity and harmony.

78. In conclusion, my delegation would like to express its great appreciation to the Secretary-General, his Special Representative, the Force Commander, and members of UNFICYP, for their efforts and dedication in assisting the groups in Cyprus in their search for an agreed solution of their problem.

79. Sir Laurence McINTYRE (Australia): Let me first say that my delegation wishes once again to praise the efforts of the Secretary-General and his staff, the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, the Force Commander of UNFICYP, General Chand, and the troops and police under his command, to bring about the settlement in Cyprus called for by this Council in its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964. We believe that the tireless and patient work of all those concerned deserves the Council's highest praise and commendation. The fact that their efforts have not so far been rewarded to the extent we would all wish can in no way be attributed to lack of determination or application on their part.

80. The Secretary-General has once again provided us with a comprehensive and frank report on the present state of the United Nations operation in Cyprus; and once again he has been forced to conclude that the prevailing circumstances on the island call for the continued presence of UNFICYP. My delegation has carefully studied the situation as described in the report, and agrees with the Secretary-General's recommendation that the mandate of UNFICYP be extended for a further period of six months. We have accordingly voted in support of the draft resolution just adopted. In doing so, we have been mindful of the fact that in the period of the present mandate the Secretary-General has felt able to effect reductions in the United Nations commitment by implementing phase I of a proposed two-phase restructuring and redeployment of the Force. These changes, which were foreshadowed in the Secretary-General's previous report, are welcomed by my Government, not only because of the restraining effect they will have on the mounting costs of the Organization, which is a source of continuing concern to all of us, but also, and more importantly, because the existing degree of stability and security in the intercommunal situation would appear to be such as to allow for these reductions without jeopardizing the effectiveness of the force in discharging its mandate.

81. For the same reasons, we support and endorse the Secretary-General's more far-reaching proposals for phase II reductions in the force outlined in chapter I, section B, of his report. Given that the prevailing conditions on the island are maintained, my delegation is in favour of the early implementation of these proposals and will hope that these reductions, provisionally scheduled for the spring rotations of 1974, can be put into effect at that time. As far as the Australian civilian police are concerned, it is our intention to maintain a contingent in Cyprus for the period of the extended mandate. At the same time we would have no objection to accepting reductions in the size of our

contingent along with those of other countries, and we shall be ready for further consultations on this with the Secretary-General and with other contributing Governments.

82. The Secretary-General's report again reveals the inherently tense and restless nature of the situation in Cyprus. Although the military situation seems to have remained quiet over the period under review, we note with regret that there has been little progress towards military deconfrontation and that the proposals submitted by UNFICYP to the Government and to the Turkish Cypriot leadership have not secured the necessary degree of agreement of both groups to enable them to be put into effect. Continuing allegations of illegal or clandestine importation of arms for use by both sides and the recurrence of incidents serious enough for UNFICYP to consider breaches of the cease-fire are also disturbing. We note, too, that by no means all violent incidents were intercommunal in origin but were the result of activities within the Greek community which, because of their effect on the Turkish community, may themselves have threatened to impede the process of deconfrontation and reduction of tension on the island.

83. As I had occasion to say in June [1727th meeting], while there continues to be a significant degree of economic activity within each of the two communities, the disparity in their respective rates of progress remains and, as the Secretary-General notes, the tendency towards separate development of the economic life of the Turkish Cypriot community is still evident. My Government continues, therefore, to believe that the best prospect for some permanent accommodation between the two parties, and with it hopefully a diminution of the mutual suspicion which seems to characterize their relation, lies in the intercommunal talks that continue to take place with the participation of the Secretary-General's Special Representative and the constitutional experts made available by the Governments of Greece and Turkey. Progress in the talks has been manifestly slow, but perhaps not unexpectedly, given the magnitude of the problems involved and the caution from which both sides seem unable to escape. It is gratifying at least to note that the Special Representative feels that there are no insurmountable obstacles that would prevent a constitutional accommodation from being reached between the two communities. We can only urge the two parties to continue their efforts to reach a satisfactory agreement.

84. In conclusion, I would like to couple my delegation's appreciation with that of the Secretary-General for the timely and invaluable assistance rendered by the Governments of Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom in the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force. At a time when speed and efficiency were supremely important, both qualities were admirably shown by all those concerned in UNFICYP.

85. Mr. JAMIESON (United Kingdom): As we have demonstrated by our vote in favour of the resolution, the United Kingdom delegation supports the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus for a further six months. I propose to confine my remarks this morning principally to questions arising from the renewal of the mandate.

86. The Secretary-General's report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus over the past six months clearly shows, in those sections which deal with the situation in the island and the attempts to promote settlement, that the role of the United Nations Force continues to be of great value. My delegation once more wishes to record its gratitude to the Secretary-General and his collaborators in the Secretariat, to his Special Representative in Cyprus, to the Force Commander, and to all those who contribute to UNFICYP. My delegation remains convinced of the requirement for the United Nations Force to maintain a close watch on developments in the island and to help to prevent confrontations and to promote harmony.

87. My delegation agrees with the Secretary-General that progress in the direction of removing the problem of military confrontation could do much to reduce tension. We are disappointed that he was unable to report progress in this field during the past six months. We look to those concerned to facilitate the efforts which the Secretary-General and his representatives continue to make. My delegation likewise hopes that the remaining problems under discussion in the intercommunal talks will be overcome. We have noted, from the statements made after the last meeting between Mr. Clerides and Mr. Denktash, that the tempo of their work has been stepped up. We agree that the remaining difficulties should be capable of solution.

88. At the 1727th meeting of the Council on 15 June, my delegation welcomed the Secretary-General's intention to achieve economies in the United Nations operation in Cyprus. We were glad to take part in the consultations which were held in October and we welcome the reductions which have already been made as mentioned in paragraph 15 of the report.

89. The question also arises whether a further reduction in the size of the Force is possible. In the view of my delegation a further modest reduction is not only possible but also, for financial as well as other reasons, necessary, provided, however, that the situation in Cyprus does not undergo any significant deterioration. We say this because, whatever those concerned are or are not prepared to say, we believe that they all have the good sense to regard a further reasonable reduction in the size of UNFICYP on the scale suggested by the Secretary-General as a positive step and the goodwill not to allow incidents to grow. And in any case, a substantial Force, some 2,300 strong, would still remain in Cyprus to help even after the completion of the second phase of the reductions.

90. My delegation also felt that the Council might find it useful to include some reference to further reduction in the size of UNFICYP in the resolution adopted today. As members of the Council will be aware, my delegation has in the last few days been having discussions on this matter and we had hoped that we would be able to suggest suitable wording to our colleagues in the Council. Unfortunately, partly because for reasons outside our control time has been a little short, it has not been possible to arrive at agreement on suitable wording. However, I think it is fair to add that our consultations revealed that there was no substantive objection to the basic idea that the Secretary-

General should proceed, at the earliest appropriate opportunity, with the reduction of the Force to a total of about 2,300. For our part, we very much hope that the political situation in Cyprus will not deteriorate—on the contrary, that it will improve—and that the appropriate opportunity for the Secretary-General to proceed will be found to be the occasion of the next troop rotation.

91. Since we support the extension of the mandate of the Force, my Government pledges to maintain our troop contingent in Cyprus for the period of the mandate and also to maintain our logistic support to the Force.

92. Finally, the need for further reductions in UNFICYP is underlined by the financial burden carried by those who are contributing to the operation, either with troops or finances, and indeed underlined also by a further deterioration in the financial situation of the operation as a whole, which is revealed in chapter VI of the Secretary-General's report. As far as my own Government's contribution is concerned, there has been another significant increase in the cost which we bear. This is now estimated to be running at an annual rate of nearly £2.5 million. My delegation must therefore continue to advocate stringent budgetary control to ensure that the present—and future—reductions in the size of UNFICYP will bring about a corresponding fall in the financial burden of the contributing countries. We are not unaware of the efforts made by the Secretary-General and his staff to control costs and indeed we pay a tribute to what they have done, but we must urge the Secretary-General once more to keep the size of UNFICYP under continuing review and to ensure all possible economies in its operation.

93. Mr. ABDULLA (Sudan): On studying the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus [S/11137], we are pleased to note that the intercommunal talks have continued and that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General participated in the exercise of the Secretary-General's good offices. In the period under consideration, 14 such meetings have taken place. We agree with the Secretary-General that, in the circumstances prevailing in Cyprus, these talks remain the main hope for understanding between the Turkish and Greek communities. We cannot, however, draw full satisfaction from the fact that these "talks have proceeded cautiously and slowly towards the common goal of reaching a satisfactory accord on the outstanding constitutional problems" [*ibid.*, para. 76]. The report draws the conclusion that "the success of the intercommunal talks cannot as yet be taken for granted" [*ibid.*, para. 77]. One of the main difficulties would still appear to be the mutual suspicion and mistrust of the two communities, according to the report. However, we hope that the continuation of the talks will help to replace mistrust by understanding.

94. Turning to the actual situation that prevails in the island, we learn from the report that few incidents have taken place between the two communities and that the intercommunal situation has been quiet during that period. Meanwhile, we regret to note that there has been no significant progress towards a return to normal conditions, which is a focal point in two resolutions adopted by the Council in 1964. This is not a result from which this

Council can draw any satisfaction after nine years. It is good, however, that the activities of United Nations specialized agencies are providing a useful medium, though very modest, for fruitful co-operation between the two communities.

95. I am drawing attention to that because we note in the report that certain modest progress has been made in the co-operation between the two communities in the implementation of the activities of United Nations specialized agencies.

96. It will be worth while, however, to consider seriously the possibility of promoting understanding and co-operation between the two communities by increasing and intensifying the activities of United Nations specialized agencies through a phased and planned reduction in the United Nations Force and transferring all, or a great portion, of the funds so saved to these activities. It is no doubt a slow process, and like all human experiments it will be so, but ultimately it will produce better and more durable results than the continued stationing of forces.

97. Although the aforementioned experiment can be considered on a long-term basis, it is interesting and revealing to observe that the two communities, as well as the Government, have shown sufficient capacity for self-restraint and a sense of responsibility during the first phase of the reduction of the Force and the sudden transfer of an appreciable number of troops to the Middle East. As this reduction has generated a sense of responsibility and self-restraint in the parties concerned, it will be reasonable to assume that perhaps more and more responsibility will be encouraged. If the funds so released from a Force reduction are to be transferred to the activities of United Nations specialized agencies, as suggested earlier, a motive for further understanding and co-operation between the communities will be provided.

98. In venturing to advance these ideas my delegation is motivated by the very good relations which my Government and my people entertain with the Government and people of Cyprus. We are therefore not only well-wishers, but it is also our profound hope and our policy that Cyprus will be master of its own peace. It is in the interest of my country and of the region to which my country belongs, that the people of Cyprus should freely unite and that the country will accede to independence and sovereignty as a non-aligned State.

99. Finally, in this spirit my delegation voted in favour of the resolution just adopted in the hope that the Council will see fit to consider promoting confidence and co-operation between the two communities by intensifying the existing concrete United Nations activities as an ultimate alternative to maintaining a Force. As the process of increasing United Nations activities through its specialized agencies is linked to the reduction of forces and is phased out, an orderly reduction should lead to smooth total withdrawal of the United Nations Force. It is hoped that by then complete normalcy will prevail in the island.

100. Before I conclude, my delegation wishes to express its deep appreciation of the positive and dedicated efforts

of the Secretary-General and his collaborators at Headquarters, of his Special Representative, and of the Commander of the Force and his men towards the promotion of peace and tranquillity in Cyprus.

101. Mr. BOYD (Panama) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The Panamanian delegation is in agreement with the resolution just adopted which extends for a further period ending 15 June 1974 the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force that was originally established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964). We take this position for the following reasons.

102. On 18 December 1965, Panama was a sponsor of General Assembly resolution 2077 (XX) since we considered that that was the best way of reaffirming the national unity of Cyprus without in any way interfering with or diminishing or reducing its position and capacity as an independent State. We are highly sensitive to this problem, for Panama together with Cyprus also had a régime of tutelage imposed upon it that was against all norms of international law, in exchange for guarantees of our independence. The only solution that we find to the Cypriot problem lies in the consolidation of a united and indivisible nation in which the rights of minorities are guaranteed.

103. As the danger of a confrontation between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots receded, thanks, largely to the presence of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, so we come closer to the ideal of Cyprus as a free, independent and united State.

104. During this year when throughout the world we especially celebrate human rights, my delegation expressed the hope that all inhabitants of the island of Cyprus will speedily be able to enjoy all freedoms and liberties without restriction, in a spirit of reconciliation and peace. The voices of wisdom and moderation that we have heard this morning from the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece regenerate our hopes for a speedy understanding among the inhabitants of Cyprus.

105. I would like to state that Panama will always advocate respect for the territorial unity and integrity of all States, and particularly of those States which, like Cyprus and Panama, suffer from attacks that undermine and weaken our sovereignty and national unity. To those who have voluntarily contributed to the maintenance of the United Nations Force, we address Panama's appreciation, as well as our thanks to the Secretary-General and, particularly, the Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Guyer, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, and all those whose efforts have contributed towards improving the situation in the complex question of Cyprus.

106. I would not conclude my statement without expressing our acknowledgement of the goodwill and sacrifice made by the military contingents stationed on Cyprus when they were dispatched urgently to the Middle East to carry out another peace-keeping mission.

107. Mrs. Jeanne Martin CISSE (Guinea) (*interpretation from French*): Once again the Security Council has before

it a resolution just adopted to extend for six months the stay in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force. In voting in favour of this resolution, my delegation supported the view that the presence of the United Nations Force in Cyprus remains necessary for the maintenance of peace in that island.

108. However, as it emerges from the report of the Secretary-General, there has been practically no progress since our meeting in June 1973. In the report, the Secretary-General stresses that:

"During the period under review there has . . . been no significant progress towards a return to normal conditions. The tendency towards separate development of the economic life of the Turkish Cypriot community is still evident, and only slight progress has been made in extending essential public services and restoring others to Turkish Cypriots". [S/11137, para. 60.]

109. My delegation sincerely regrets that the efforts at mediation have remained deadlocked since the presentation of the last report because of very clear-cut differences between the two sides. Paragraphs 78 and 79 of the report refer to certain facts which merit our attention. Indeed, we understand the concern of the parties to achieve a situation that would safeguard the lives and goods of Cypriots. We note with satisfaction that:

"Mr. Clerides has reiterated his agreement to constitutional arrangements that will (a) ensure security of life and property, not only for the Turkish Cypriots but for all the people of Cyprus, because these are fundamental human rights; (b) secure, without discrimination, a fair participation of the Turkish Cypriot community in the affairs of the State; (c) assist in that community's economic development; and (d) establish a political structure that would give to the Turkish Cypriots, in addition to the autonomy in communal affairs embodied in the 1960 Constitution, a measure of local self-government." [ibid., para. 79.]

He also stresses the fact that:

"he strongly opposes a virtually total autonomy for the Turkish Cypriot community that would include functions which in his view are within the exclusive competence of the State." [ibid.]

110. That opinion is perfectly in accord with that of my delegation, devoted as we are to the principles of unity and respect for the integrity and sovereignty of every State in our support of all peoples struggling to attain these goals. It is within this framework that we support Cyprus, a non-aligned country like Guinea, in the legitimate claims set forth in certain parts of the report. We reaffirm, together with the Secretary-General, that the reactivated intercommunal talks are the best instrument for achieving a satisfactory, lasting and agreed solution based on the concept of an independent, sovereign and unitary State with the adequate participation of the two communities.

111. The statements made by the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece give us hope that at an early

date, thanks to the positive co-operation among the three parties concerned, the Council will succeed in settling this problem which has for so long—since 1964, in fact—been a matter of concern to it.

112. My delegation approves of the reduction of forces proposed by the Secretary-General in paragraphs 15 and 16 of his report, and expresses the firm conviction that such a reduction will in no way be detrimental to the effectiveness of the Force in the performance of its task as defined in resolution 186 (1964).

113. Before concluding, we should like to convey our congratulations to the Secretary-General and his Special Representative on their efforts in Cyprus. Furthermore, we should like to thank the personnel of the United Nations Force in Cyprus and express our gratitude to the Governments concerned for the valuable assistance they have been giving the international community in the maintenance of peace in Cyprus.

114. Mr. LECOMPT (France) (*interpretation from French*): This being a question that the Security Council has dealt with at least twice a year for 10 years, I shall limit myself to referring very briefly to the most significant developments of the last six months. The general situation in Cyprus not having changed too much in that period, it does not, in fact, seem necessary to dwell further on its main aspects, even though they continue, unfortunately, to give rise to legitimate concern. In reading the extremely interesting report of the Secretary-General, three comments come to mind.

115. First of all, despite the temporary detachment of personnel from the Force itself in response to the urgent needs of the Middle East, no confrontation or serious incident has taken place between the two communities, which have given manifest proof of a high sense of responsibility by maintaining close co-operation with the Force in order to avoid any incidents during these exceptional times. This demonstration of goodwill deserves special stress.

116. Secondly, in accordance with the intentions expressed in his last report, the Secretary-General has outlined a very specific programme for reducing the Force which meets the desires expressed repeatedly by the Council. We wish to convey our thanks to him for this. The first stage has already been accomplished without the conditions for use of the Force having had to be modified. The second phase, however, will call for a reorganization and change in methods. There are certain risks inherent in this second phase which explain the precautions the Secretary-General wishes to take. Basing ourselves on the experience of the last few weeks, we do not expect any difficulties. The co-operative attitude required of the parties directly concerned is actually quite in keeping with the trust they have traditionally shown in the Force and its commanders. This is logical, since the operation is being carried out for the benefit of the two communities, as all its past action attests. It is, furthermore, reasonable that there should be such an attitude since it relies on the assistance precisely of those who are responsible for the security and welfare of the two communities. It is a welcome step, because it may

contribute to the establishment of a climate of reduced mistrust in relations between the two communities. Furthermore, we have every hope that the Greek and Turkish Governments will bring to the implementation of the Secretary-General's aims the support and backing required of them, which must stand as a guarantee for the parties directly concerned.

117. Thirdly, the intercommunal talks are marking time. Last June, they seemed to be developing favourably, since the Special Representative of the Secretary-General went so far as to say that it was possible for a satisfactory conclusion to be reached within four months. Today, however, as the report shows, the assessment made is extremely reserved, since the success of the intercommunal talks cannot as yet be taken for granted, although, at the present juncture, there are no insurmountable obstacles. That differences of view should exist on such fundamental questions as the safeguarding and protection of the identity of each of the communities, or the establishment of viable and effective institutions, is perfectly normal. That difficulties should arise when it comes to deciding upon specific ways of implementing certain accepted principles can surprise no one. The stakes are too high, and indeed too vital, for the parties concerned, with all the experience they have had, to accept blurred compromises. At the same time, the *status quo* must not be taken as a lesser evil, as a comfortable haven that does away with the fear of the unknown to which new constitutional arrangements would give rise. The intercommunal talks, accepted by all parties concerned, have been encouraged by the Security Council ever since they were resumed. Having for a long time assumed special responsibilities regarding peace and security in Cyprus, the Council cannot now be complacent over the threat of deadlock in the talks. While it is true that it is the communities themselves that must find a solution to the constitutional problems dividing them, it is nevertheless our duty to warn them against the long-range effects of excessive procrastination which might lead us to reconsider the terms of our own commitment.

118. The French delegation eagerly hopes that the proof of wisdom and goodwill shown in the last few weeks by both communities will help overcome the mistrust and suspicions dividing them and will lead to establishment of the indispensable psychological conditions conducive to a harmonious coexistence which we wholeheartedly expect and hope for.

119. Mr. JANKOWITSCH (Austria): On the basis of the report by the Secretary-General and, specifically, the recommendations contained in paragraph 98 thereof, the Security Council has just renewed the mandate of the United Nations peace-keeping operation in Cyprus and thus extended once more the stationing of the United Nations forces on the island for a further six-month period.

120. As I said on previous occasions at meetings of the Council on this subject, Austria remains deeply committed to bringing about a just and lasting solution to the problems of the island of Cyprus, a sovereign and independent State Member of the United Nations and a country with which Austria has long-standing and close ties of friendship. This commitment finds its first and foremost expression in

Austria's continued participation in this peace-keeping operation of the United Nations, which, at least for the time being, seems to hold the only promise of maintaining general calm on the island and in this way undoubtedly provides the most adequate basis for the acceleration of the search for a political settlement.

121. In expressing the appreciation of my delegation to the Secretary-General for his clear and comprehensive report, I wish to say at the outset that my delegation fully shares his view—as stated on several occasions in the report—that the intercommunal talks hold the best and most constructive prospect of coming to a solution acceptable to both communities on the island. At the same time, my delegation too, like previous ones who spoke this morning, cannot refrain from noting disappointment over the fact that these talks are progressing at a pace which still permits us to entertain doubts as to their ultimate success.

122. Only the most efficient peace-keeping operation of the United Nations can, to a high degree, guarantee the maintenance of general calm and prevent the outbreak of renewed hostilities. What the United Nations involvement alone will not be able to bring about is to change a situation which is still fundamentally unstable. This can only be done if a political solution, geared to command the active support—or at least the acceptance—of both communities, can be achieved. In this connexion we are encouraged by the fact that the role the United Nations, through the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, to whose untiring efforts we should once again like to pay a tribute, was again able to play in Cyprus went beyond one of just keeping the peace in the sense of merely preventing the outbreak of renewed hostilities. All the efforts by the Secretary-General and Mr. Osorio-Tafall to contribute to the political settlement, therefore, deserve our full support and our high appreciation.

123. It has already been pointed out this morning by other speakers that one chapter in the report of the Secretary-General is of particular significance as far as the Force itself is concerned. I am referring to the paragraphs dealing with the plans for the reduction and possible restructuring of the Force. The Secretary-General has devised a two-phase plan, according to which a total reduction of the Force of about 25 per cent will be achieved, as compared with its former strength in May 1973. This plan, once fully implemented, will not only be significant in terms of savings in manpower and financial expenditure, but could eventually have a corresponding impact on the basic *modus operandi* of the Force. This is precisely why, in the view of my delegation, a cautious approach may commend itself. It is understandable that those countries which, like mine, are directly participating in this operation by providing troops and financial support, have a special interest in all the plans and undertakings relating to a reduction and eventual restructuring of the Force. We, therefore, find ourselves also in agreement with the line of thinking of the Secretary-General and support the statement of necessary prerequisites which appears in paragraph 18 of the Secretary-General's report.

124. My Government has co-operated with the Secretary-General in carrying out phase one, which is now success-

fully completed, and pledges its continued support and co-operation in implementing phase one. As I have indicated before, our support for phase two is related to the satisfactory realization of the prerequisites of paragraph 18 of the report. Such prerequisites, once fulfilling the judgement of the Secretary-General, could, in our opinion, achieve a double goal. This goal would not only clear the way for a reduced United Nations commitment—including a relatively small, but badly needed, financial relief for the operation—but perhaps one even more important: the prerequisites could be a very significant and important step on the road towards achieving a further general military deconfrontation on the island.

125. In renewing my Government's support for this peace-keeping action of the United Nations—both in continuing to provide troops as well as financial support—I wish, at the same time, to express our sincere hope, and perhaps even expectation, that developments towards a lasting political solution may progress in such a way as to make this kind of commitment unnecessary in the not too distant future.

126. Mr. MOJSOV (Yugoslavia): My delegation has voted for the resolution just adopted by the Council, guided by the same considerations as on three previous occasions in 1972 and 1973, during our present term as a member of this Council. Namely, the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus continues to remain a basic instrument and major presence on which the maintenance of peace in the island still largely depends. It provides, together with the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, a calming influence, a kind of mediating agency that can, and does, contribute necessary additional energy for the more active pursuance of such important approaches as the intercommunal talks for the final and just settlement of difficult problems between two communities, and thus for the normalization of the situation in and around Cyprus which we all desire and support. We do so in the hope that this normalization will soon come after so many efforts invested by all interested parties in that direction, and also after the many efforts made by the Security Council itself which, up to today, has adopted in all 28 resolutions and two consensus statements concerning the question of Cyprus and United Nations peace-keeping forces in Cyprus.

127. Consequently, UNFICYP, which is under permanent supervision and control of the Security Council, remains an element of stability in the wider and very sensitive area of the East Mediterranean, for which the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, an active non-aligned State and an equal Member of the United Nations, free from any interference in its own sovereign, internal affairs, are the essential prerequisites.

128. Here I should like to express our appreciation of all those factors which made it possible to have UNFICYP lend urgently its most pressingly needed contingents and services for the initial phase of the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Suez Canal area, which represented a tremendous contribution by the United Nations.

129. The Secretary-General's report gives us a mixed picture of some positive aspects of the situation since our last semi-annual consideration of the matter, such as the absence of any major intercommunal incidents, some progress in the intercommunal talks and some reduction of the Force—actually by 416 in the first phase—and some negative aspects, such as lack of progress in the military deconfrontation in the island, lack of substantial progress in the integration of the economic life of the two communities and, of late, a loss of momentum in the progress in the intercommunal talks, explained in the report by developments outside the Republic of Cyprus.

130. In the debate of June of this year we stated that a gradual reduction in UNFICYP was both necessary and desirable. The excellent performance of the Force, of all its ranks, officers and commanders of all national contingents, especially in the trying circumstances of serving as a crucial stop-gap UNEF operation, indicates that this is eminently possible; and here we think that, while attention must be paid to prevailing circumstances in and around the island in deciding on the further stages in the reduction of the Force, reductions cannot, on the other hand, come out of some ideal situation. Rather, we think, it should be at least partly the other way around and the definite knowledge that reductions are going to take place should serve to all those directly concerned as an added reason for more and better co-operation in the solution of the problems.

131. We want to see a strong, flourishing, peaceful Cyprus, with its two communities enjoying a well-integrated life, finally—and soon—emerge from the divisions and confrontations that weigh upon it so heavily. The present state of affairs, if allowed to drift or to freeze indefinitely, could be used as a device for entrenching a *de facto* separation. We hope that the Greek and Turkish populations of Cyprus, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and their two communities will find a way of living in their sovereign, independent, united and unified State, enjoying equal rights and on the basis of the relevant Security Council resolutions of 1964, in which the sovereign rights of the Government of Cyprus are recognized. The usual experience of such situations is that when communities like the Greek and the Turkish people of Cyprus find a way of standing together with their rights and interests anchored in the strong, independent policy of their own State, their own Republic, any manipulation of them by and for any outside interests whatsoever becomes more and more difficult.

132. It is because of my country's abiding interest in the peace and security of the whole Mediterranean region, in keeping with the normal friendly relations and historic traditions that we have and seek with our neighbours, Greece and Turkey, and because—and I want to emphasize this particularly—of the especially close relations and friendship that Yugoslavia and Cyprus, our two Governments and our two Heads of State have developed, particularly in the framework of non-alignment—because of all those important reasons, that we want the mission of UNFICYP to be successfully accomplished and completed as soon as possible.

133. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): In connexion with the adoption

by the Security Council of a new resolution on the Cyprus question, the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would like to state that the Soviet Union has always believed that the problem of Cyprus should be settled by peaceful means in the interests of the people of Cyprus by the Cypriots themselves and in such a way as to further the cause of relaxation of tension in this important part of the world.

134. We have often pointed out that the settlement of this question should be based on observance of the freedom and respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus as a State Member of the United Nations which pursues a policy of peace, non-alignment with any military bloc and the development of friendship and co-operation among peoples. It is quite clear that the normalization of the situation in Cyprus, the strengthening of its security and the expansion of co-operation on an equal footing with other States will promote the growth of the international authority of that State as an important factor for the stabilization of the situation in the eastern Mediterranean.

135. The solving of the internal problems of Cyprus is a matter for the Cypriots themselves, and in this regard the legitimate rights and interests of every Cypriot, irrespective of national origin, must be observed and respected.

136. The Soviet Union has always been and will continue to be against attempts to solve the Cyprus question by means of outside interference, against attempts to infringe upon the sovereignty of the Republic and against any intention to solve the problem counter to the will of the people of Cyprus, to the detriment of their vital interests or the advantage of outside imperialist forces. It is, of course, extremely important for ensuring the independence, integrity and sovereignty of the Republic that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from its territory and that all foreign military bases in Cyprus should be removed.

137. Having studied the Secretary-General's report on the situation in Cyprus for the period 1 June to 1 December 1973, we have noted as a positive element the information given on the intercommunal talks. We have also noted, with some regret, that only limited progress has so far been made in these talks. We cannot, therefore, help but agree with the conclusion in paragraph 93 of the Secretary-General's report to the effect that "with mutual goodwill and understanding and with concessions on both sides, an agreed accommodation can in fact be arrived at within the framework of the intercommunal talks that would protect the vital interests of all parties".

138. In this regard the delegation of the USSR would like to express the hope that all the remaining difficulties will be overcome in future talks and that the talks will be successfully concluded in the interests of the people of Cyprus and for the benefit of the strengthening of peace in this important area.

139. We have also noted in this regard the proposal of the Secretary-General for a reduction of the strength of the United Nations Force in Cyprus. While supporting this idea in principle, the Soviet delegation would like first to know

the views of the Government of Cyprus itself on the matter. In any event, it is quite clear that this idea should be implemented in such a way as to avoid prejudicing the vital interests of either community and bringing about a general deterioration of the situation in Cyprus. It goes without saying that an essential condition for undertaking such a measure must be the concurrence of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, which bears the full weight of responsibility for ensuring normal conditions so that the Cyprus problem may be resolved.

140. In this connexion, we cannot but agree with the view and the conclusion of the Secretary-General that pursuant to the urgent decision adopted by the Security Council to dispatch a United Nations Emergency Force to the Middle East, the United Nations Force in Cyprus played a significant positive role, since it was precisely this Force which formed the advance elements of the new detachment of the United Nations Emergency Force. In these troubled times in the Middle East the rapid transfer of United Nations troops from Cyprus to Cairo did not lead to any complications in the situation on the Island. However, on the basis of this alone it is hardly feasible to draw a hasty conclusion about a further immediate reduction of the United Nations Force in Cyprus.

141. The Soviet delegation did not object to the Security Council adopting the Secretary-General's recommendation to extend the stationing of United Nations troops on Cyprus for a further period of six months in order to ensure normal conditions for the continuation and possible successful conclusion of the intercommunal talks. In this context, naturally, the position of the interested parties on this matter was taken into account and above all, of course, the position of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus.

142. In casting its vote in favour of the resolution endorsing this recommendation, the Soviet delegation proceeded from the assumption that the extension of the stationing of the United Nations Force in Cyprus for a further period ending 15 June 1974 is to be carried out in full compliance with the provisions of the original resolution of 4 March 1964 and the subsequent decisions of the Council on the Cyprus question; that is to say, the troops are to continue with their present functions and the present voluntary system of financing them is to be maintained.

143. Mr. SCHAUFLE (United States of America): It has been nearly 10 years since the Security Council began its efforts to promote peace and reconciliation in Cyprus. For nearly 10 years this Council has been urging accommodation of the differences which divide that country's two communities. During this period, the Council set up, and has periodically renewed the mandate of an international peace-keeping force for Cyprus. And for nearly a decade, the Council has persistently expressed the hope that sufficient progress could be made to permit the early withdrawal, or at least a substantial reduction of the United Nations Force.

144. Now, as we approach the decennial anniversary of the Cyprus peace-keeping Force, my delegation believes that it is time to take stock of what we have accomplished and where we are going, in order that we may bring our

peace-keeping efforts in Cyprus into line with present circumstances there.

145. Six months ago, the United States delegation strongly supported the intention of the Secretary-General to make a thorough study of means to reduce the United Nations financial and manpower commitment in Cyprus. My delegation is grateful for the excellent beginning he has made. Reductions already made as a part of phase I of the Secretary-General's plan, together with those contemplated in phase II, are an important first step in achieving needed economies and in adapting the United Nations presence to current realities in Cyprus.

146. The more difficult stages in the Secretary-General's plan involve the restructuring of the Force, as contemplated in paragraphs 19 and 20 of his report. The United States supports the report's premise that the primary function of the United Nations Force in Cyprus is preventive action; that is, conciliation and persuasion rather than the interposition of military force. In practice, UNFICYP has been playing this role for some years.

147. We note and appreciate that the Secretary-General has avoided prejudging the size of any such redefined and restructured force. For our part, we believe that this essentially mediator/observer role of UNFICYP can be accomplished with substantially fewer personnel. Accordingly, we most strongly urge the Secretary-General and his colleagues to examine closely all reasonable opportunities for additional phased reductions in the course of 1974.

148. My delegation is aware, of course, of the belief by some that certain assurances by the parties are necessary before major reductions in UNFICYP can be considered. We recognize that these concerns are real to those on the scene and we cannot ignore them. In my Government's estimation, however, explicit assurances by the parties are not necessary since conditions in Cyprus are conducive now to a substantial reduction and restructuring of the Force.

149. The United States would again like to express its gratitude to Major-General Chand and the officers and men of the eight countries contributing forces to UNFICYP. We also wish to commend the dispatch with which the experienced body of peace-keepers responded to the Council's call for the establishment of a United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East.

150. The United States delegation would like to reiterate its deep appreciation for the valuable services of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, and to commend the Secretary-General for his report on the problems and prospects of the current situation in Cyprus.

151. With respect to the situation in Cyprus, the United States is moderately encouraged about the future. Although the intercommunal talks have not resulted in breakthroughs on basic questions, the negotiations continue. Likewise, the military situation remains calm. We encourage all sides to take advantage of the opportunities that now exist for substantive progress. We expect that eventually all elements of the Cypriot nation will find that they can live peacefully

with each other in a sovereign, independent and united Cyprus.

152. My Government continues to be encouraged by the responsible attitudes held by the neighbouring Powers. We commend the constructive positions taken by Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. We are gratified that the new Government of Greece has confirmed its policy of strengthening good relations with its close neighbours, Turkey and Cyprus. This is a substantial contribution to the improvement of the situation on the island and to international peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean.

153. Regrettably, the Secretary-General has again had to inform us of the continuing financial deficits in the operation of the United Nations Force. The Secretary-General estimates that the deficit may soon reach \$23.1 million. We believe every effort should be made to reduce, if possible to eliminate, and certainly not to increase this deficit. We are disappointed that the special efforts of the present contributors have not been matched by others, especially those who support this operation by their votes and have interests in the area. Nevertheless, we again urge all Members of the United Nations, and especially members of this Council as well as those who benefit most directly from UNFICYP's presence, to co-operate in efforts to put UNFICYP on a sound and current financial basis.

154. The United States delegation supports the extension of the United Nations Force in Cyprus for another six months. This force, its strength brought into line with current needs, will continue to enhance the preservation of law and order in Cyprus and contribute to the security of the Eastern Mediterranean.

155. Mr. SEN (India): The Council has met every year for nearly a decade—and recently in the middle of June and again in the middle of December—to renew the mandate of the United Nations forces in Cyprus. The statements made by the various delegations on each occasion understandably become somewhat repetitive. This fact enables me to be very brief indeed.

156. First, the Force has done good work and we should thank it and its Commander.

157. Second, we would all wish the Force to be reduced as soon as possible and to be withdrawn completely when circumstances permit. We were encouraged that the recent transfer of a substantial part of the Force to the Middle East did not have any noticeable effect on the internal situation in Cyprus. For this welcome feature, credit must of course go to the people of all communities of Cyprus, and particularly to the Government of Cyprus. We have also noted, with satisfaction, that the first phase of reduction of the United Nations forces, however modest, has been completed.

158. Third, in the political field progress has not been as rapid as we expected, but nonetheless we are hopeful that agreement will be reached on the basis of the principles which have been accepted since 1964. These principles are that Cyprus must continue as an independent, sovereign, unitary State with complete territorial integrity and with

the necessary guarantees to all communities. We, in the Indian delegation, have also worked on the principle that Cyprus will continue as a non-aligned country and that any hint or suggestion of any kind of partition must be firmly rejected, both on moral and practical grounds. We are also conscious that Cyprus as a sovereign State must continue to exercise all its prerogatives for maintaining its internal and external peace and security.

159. Lastly, we should like to thank the Secretary-General and his representatives for the efforts they are making and to wish the parties the best success. We are particularly gratified that the representatives of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus have brought us up to date with regard to the developments in the intercommunal talks and of the difficulties which have arisen. In our view, these difficulties can be overcome as long as all sides firmly abide by the principles I have mentioned.

160. We hope that when the Council meets again political progress in the island will have been sufficient to enable the withdrawal of most, if not the whole, of the Force to be made.

161. Mr. PEREZ DE CUELLAR (Peru) (*interpretation from Spanish*): We voted in favour of the draft resolution contained in document S/11154. We did so because the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period 1 June to 1 December 1973, which has earned our appreciation and respect because of its balance and fullness, indicated significant hopes for progress, albeit slow, in the intercommunal talks, the military situation and the observance of the cease-fire. Despite the fact that agreement in principle on the structure and the function of the governmental institutions has not as yet been achieved entirely, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, whose work has earned our praise, feels that there are no insurmountable obstacles.

162. Furthermore, we have noted in the statements made by the representatives of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, that there is a shared view, namely, the desire to arrive at concrete solutions that will ensure peace and security in the island of Cyprus.

163. We believe that the achievement of such goals still calls for the presence of the United Nations Force in order to maintain peace in the island, but that there is hope that the Force can be reduced as the fears and suspicions between the two communities diminish.

164. We believe that neither the parties concerned nor the Security Council nor the United Nations as a whole should lose sight of the fact that the ultimate solution will only be achieved within the framework of respect for the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus.

165. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Chinese*): I now call on the Secretary-General.

166. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I have listened carefully to the discussion which has just been concluded on my report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus. I

have noted in particular the remarks made by the members of the Council and by the representatives invited to participate in the Council's debate concerning the plan for the reduction of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force.

167. In the light of these remarks, it is my intention to undertake consultations shortly with the representatives of countries providing contingents for UNFICYP and with the representatives of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, with a view to finalizing arrangements for the implementation, during the current mandate, of phase II of the reduction plan.

168. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Chinese*): I call on the representative of Cyprus.

169. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): There are certain points to which I have to reply that were made by my colleague and friend, the representative of Turkey, particularly with regard to the unitary State. That was part of the agreement and I have here many statements in which they themselves have admitted it. For instance, Mr. Eralp, stated that the Turkish community "has sat down to talk with the Greek community in order to work out a system whereby they can live together in a unitary State" [1474th meeting, para. 43]. So they knew it very well. Mr. Bayülken, as successor, said subsequently to that, "As regards [Mr. Rossides'] remarks on the unitary State, the leader of the Turkish community did not object to a unitary State. The whole question is how the unitary State would be framed." [1521st meeting, para. 145.] That is another matter. It is a matter of interpretation and so on. We said so. But the basis of a unitary State is undisputed. I shall not take time to quote many other cases of Turkish admissions that the basis of the talks was a unitary State.

170. In any case, I wish to make it crystal clear that my Government will not accept or consider any deviation from the agreed basis of an independent, sovereign and unitary State. Any deviation would mean that the five years of work on talks would be wasted and thrown into the waste-paper basket because of changed positions from the Turkish side. Any such deviation would be in reality to undermine the very foundation upon which the talks are based. It is our view that the United Nations and the Security Council should very emphatically discourage these changes of shifting positions and destroying the very concept of the talks.

171. I should also wish it to be understood that no other constitution than that of a unitary State could possibly apply to or be workable in a State like Cyprus, with an intermingled population throughout the island. The representative of Turkey said, "Is no other form of constitution possible than a unitary State?", which really means again that he wants some kind of federation. I have already stated Mr. Galo Plaza's views and it is so obvious that the Turkish idea of a federation is merely camouflage for partition. But no other kind of unitary State can apply to Cyprus.

172. There are many other points that I should like to have answered but there is no time.

173. However, he did say that they do not have sufficient electricity. Here, in the Secretary-General's last report, it is

stated that "the Government is reluctant to extend electricity services to Turkish Cypriot villages which its employees cannot enter freely and where bills may not be paid or electrical equipment may be interfered with." [S/11137, para. 63.] The Secretary-General understands the situation. The electricity workers are not allowed to enter without asking beforehand and getting permission. Difficulties are put in the way of rendering public service. The same applies to water. They do not pay. Three million pounds are due on electricity services which have not been paid by the Turkish community, and yet they are still supplied with electricity.

174. What is the reason for this separatism that makes them even destroy the interests of the Turkish Cypriots? Where is Turkey's concern for the interests of the Turkish Cypriot community when their opposition to an integrated economy makes the standard of living of the Turkish Cypriots go down? Why should there be lists of punishments for a Turkish Cypriot who associates with a Greek Cypriot in a friendly manner? What is the reason for their insistence on a continued military confrontation after it has become obvious that it is unnecessary? What is the reason for not allowing freedom of movement in the enclaves? What is the reason for the enclaves now, and what is the reason for setting them up?

175. Mr. Galo Plaza says clearly in his report that the enclaves were artificially set up to be presented as a territorial separation with the divisive objective of a federation. But, as Mr. Galo Plaza points out, they have completely failed because the enclaves are scattered over the island rather than being in one part. They do not form a separate entity and they contain less than half of the population of the Turks in Cyprus and in extent they represent less than 4 per cent of the area of Cyprus. The other half lives with the rest of the people, intermingled. And why should those in the enclaves require armed posts to protect them, while the rest of the Turks have no fear and live in peace with the rest of the population? What is the reason for this primary concern for separateness and this insistence on it against the interests of the Turkish Cypriots themselves and against their wishes?

176. A number of reports show that the Turks in Cyprus want to live in peace and conciliation. Lord Caradon made the point very clearly in a statement in the Council. Having served in Cyprus twice, and having been Governor, he could testify that they lived in peace and amity and had done so for a hundred years as far as he knew. What is the reason for this artificial enmity now? All this is the objective of partition which underlies every movement.

177. I do not need to answer the representative of Turkey on all points because, fortunately, a great number of the members of the Council have answered him by emphasizing the need for deconfrontation, by emphasizing the need for freedom of movement, the need for normalization, the need for unity. Almost all the representatives on the Security Council spoke of unity. So that is the answer to the representative of Turkey in his wish to throw away the unitary State because it means unity. Who can suggest in this Council, or anywhere else, that any problem can be solved by accentuated and forced division, and not by co-operation and understanding?

178. Who, then, is opposing the solution of the problem and procrastinating but those who oppose conciliation, understanding and co-operation and who want to force a division? That is why we have this situation here after 10 years, which will continue because the moment there is any possibility of reaching an agreement in the talks, there is an immediate shifting and then escalation to something more divisive. How can a problem be solved in this sense? And, of course, everything is brought to bear—fears, fears about *enosis*. They know very well it has been customary for the Turkish representatives over the years to use *enosis* as a pretense of fear in order to obstruct the independent and sovereign Cyprus in its peaceful progress and to bring about partition.

179. I apologize to the President for having taken a little time. I understand the urgency, but these things have to be said. Before closing I wish to thank all the participants for their constructive statements in support of the independence, sovereignty and unity of Cyprus and of the solution of this problem.

180. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Chinese*): I call on the representative of Turkey.

181. Mr. OLCAY (Turkey): First, I wish to have it on record that I have no great reverence for the views of Mr. Galo Plaza.

182. The second point that I wish to place on record is that quotations out of context cannot provide arguments in favour of one view or another. The bases for the enlarged intercommunal talks do not contain such an agreement as to result in the creation of a unitary State alone. I know of at least one State which was a member of this Council very recently whose constitution was modified into just the opposite of what is implied in the word "unitary".

183. There have been references to the wish of the Turkish community—or the Turkish Government—to have partition as their ultimate aim. I can say very firmly that there is no such aim in the mind of the Turkish Government or of the Turkish community in the island.

184. Unfortunately, it is not possible to speak in the same terms with regard to the question of *enosis*. I expect an answer now, or when the time is opportune; but on this question, I think that I have never received, and will never receive an answer.

185. But I will say one final word. We should not indulge in idle discussions here. There are well-known political, historical, juridical facts. All these facts are, I hope, being taken seriously into consideration by all concerned in Cyprus while discussing the ultimate fate of the constitution of the independent and sovereign State of Cyprus. It is there in Cyprus that the solution, one hopes, will be found. But the solution may be found not by offering the Turkish community human rights or minimal basic rights enjoyed by citizens of every civilized State, but by recognizing the rights to which they are entitled in the exercise of their right to self-determination as one of the founding communities of the independent State of Cyprus. I insist that Cyprus is a bicomunal State and, as I said before, had it not been a bicomunal State, it would not have been a State.

186. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Chinese*): I call on the representative of Cyprus.

187. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): The representative of Turkey again tending towards partition, spoke about a "bicomunal State"—and everyone here would think that these would be balanced communities; they are comprised of a majority of 82 per cent and a minority of 18 per cent, artificially formed into the Republic of Cyprus—merely for the sake of other purposes, as I have said. Therefore, we cannot accept the view that they will have equal rights, that the 82 per cent will be equated with the 18 per cent. We will accord to them the maximum rights to which they are entitled within a unitary State.

188. But the reason that we insist on a unitary State is not because federation is not to be respected but because circumstances do not allow federation. Therefore, if my colleague will go along with the idea of co-operation and unity we shall solve the problem.

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.