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FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 721 (1991)

INTRODUCTION

1. The present further report is being submitted to the Security Council pursuant to its resolution 721 (1991), which was adopted unanimously on 27 November 1991. In addition, it takes into account resolution 727 (1992) of 8 January 1992, which the Council also adopted unanimously and by which, inter alia, it approved my report 1/ of 5 January 1992.

2. It will be recalled that the Security Council, in its resolution 721 (1991), expressed the hope that the Secretary-General would present early recommendations to the Council including the possible establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia. In resolution 724 (1991), the Security Council endorsed my predecessor's view, expressed in his report 2/ of 11 December 1991, that the conditions for establishing a peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia still did not exist. In resolution 727 (1992) the Council welcomed the signing of an implementing accord at Sarajevo on 2 January 1992, concerning modalities for implementing the unconditional cease-fire agreed to by the parties at Geneva on 23 November 1991, 3/ and endorsed my intention to send to Yugoslavia a group of up to 50 military liaison officers to promote maintenance of the cease-fire.

3. The military liaison mission, headed by Col. John Wilson (Australia) and consisting of unarmed officers detached from three existing United Nations peace-keeping operations, arrived in Yugoslavia on 14 January 1992. On Thursday, 23 January, I received a visit from Mr. Branko Jovic, Chairman of the Federal State Committee for Cooperation with the United Nations on Peace-keeping Matters. On the same day I received a visit from Mr. F. Greguric, Prime Minister of the Republic of Croatia. Both visitors reiterated the commitments of their respective authorities to the cease-fire and requested the earliest possible deployment of a peace-keeping operation. I responded that there remained a number of obstacles in the way of such a deployment, bearing in mind the resolutions of the Council on the subject, but that I had asked the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs,

Mr. Marrack Goulding, to travel to the area to assess the state of the cease-fire and to examine how those obstacles could be removed. This was also intended to be a signal to the parties that I wished to be of help to them. Mr. Goulding arrived in Belgrade on 26 January 1992, accompanied by Col. Heikki Purola, my Deputy Military Adviser, and Mr. Shashi Tharoor, Special Assistant to the Under-Secretary-General. Col. Wilson also formed part of the delegation.

4. Mr. Goulding held discussions in Belgrade on 26 January 1992 with political and military leaders there. On the following day he met leaders of the Serbian community in Eastern Slavonia and then travelled to Knin for discussions with the leadership of the Serbian community in the region of Krajina, the largest of the proposed United Nations Protected Areas. On 28 January he met with the Croatian leadership in Zagreb. On 29 January he held further consultations in Belgrade with the political and military leadership there and met a delegation of the Serbian community of Western Slavonia. The meetings with the leaders of the Serbian communities in the three United Nations Protected Areas took place in response to requests by the Federal and Serbian leaderships that Mr. Goulding should give the local leaders a further explanation of the plan for a United Nations peace-keeping force and respond to the concerns which they had expressed about it. Mr. Goulding and his team returned to New York on 30 January 1992. A full description of their programme is attached as annex I to the present report.

I. SUMMARY OF DISCUSSIONS AND FINDINGS

5. During his discussions with political and military leaders in Yugoslavia, Mr. Goulding sought to identify ways of removing the principal obstacles that remained to the deployment of a peace-keeping operation. He pointed out to the parties that, before such an operation could be deployed, it would be necessary for them to observe an unconditional and effective cease-fire, the modalities for the implementation of which had been agreed in the Sarajevo accord; 1/ to accept, fully and explicitly, the concept paper for a United Nations peace-keeping force 4/ and the practical details of its implementation; and to make an unconditional commitment to ensure full cooperation with such a peace-keeping force should the Security Council decide to establish it. The paragraphs that follow summarize the main points in the report which Mr. Goulding has made to me.

A. The cease-fire

6. In its resolution 721 (1991), the Security Council had endorsed the statement of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, that the deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation could not be envisaged without, inter alia, full compliance by all parties with the agreement signed at Geneva on 23 November 1991. 3/ Of the provisions of that agreement, the unblocking and withdrawal of Yugoslav National Army (JNA) units

in Croatia had taken place, and satisfactory progress had been made in relation to the humanitarian aspects of the agreement, though the overall humanitarian situation remained grave. However, in my most recent report 1/ of 5 January 1992, I had observed that a lasting, effective and unconditional cease-fire had so far eluded the parties. Following the Sarajevo accord, the mission of the military liaison officers was aimed at assisting the parties to achieve and maintain such a cease-fire by facilitating communication between them and providing good offices to help to defuse any tensions that might arise. A full description of the composition, deployment and functions of the military liaison mission is attached in annex II to the present report.

7. During their two weeks on the ground in Yugoslavia, the military liaison officers have received daily allegations of cease-fire violations. None the less, since the Sarajevo accord went into effect on 3 January 1992, the cease-fire has been generally observed, although there have been sporadic violations. It is, sadly, the case that people are still dying, although the majority of the alleged cease-fire violations on both sides have been comparatively minor. There have been almost no complaints of movements of formations of platoon size or larger and the commanders on both sides have shown evidence, which was lacking before, of a readiness to make serious efforts to respect the cease-fire. Unfortunately, however, the military forces on both sides continue to include irregular armed elements who are not fully under the control of the established military commands and who have been responsible for a substantial proportion of the alleged cease-fire violations. Both parties assured Mr. Goulding that they have taken, and will strengthen, actions to bring these elements under their effective control.

B. The United Nations plan

8. The plan for the deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping force, which had been endorsed and accepted by the principal signatories of the Geneva agreement, as confirmed in paragraphs 11 to 14 of my earlier report, 1/ rests on two central elements: on the one hand, the withdrawal of JNA from all of Croatia and the demilitarization of the United Nations Protected Areas; on the other, the continuing functioning, on an interim basis, of the existing local authorities and police, under United Nations supervision, pending the achievement of an overall political solution to the Yugoslav crisis. This concept had been described in explicit terms to all the principal parties during the recent missions of my Personal Envoy, Mr. Vance, and of the Preparatory Group sent to the area under resolution 724 (1991).

9. On this basis, and in response especially to concerns expressed by the Serbian communities in the United Nations Protected Areas, Mr. Goulding provided the following clarifications and explanations to all interested parties:

(a) As stated in paragraph 5 of the plan, 4/ and subject to the agreement of the Security Council, the United Nations force would not be withdrawn before an overall political solution was found to the Yugoslav

crisis, it being understood that rapid progress would need to be made in the Conference on Yugoslavia;

(b) The deployment of the force would not prejudice the outcome of the political process; on the contrary, its purpose would be to stop the fighting and to create the conditions in which political negotiations could take place;

(c) In respect of arrangements for local government and the maintenance of law and order in the United Nations Protected Areas, the deployment of the force would not change the status quo; police arrangements would be as provided for in paragraph 19 of the plan; 5/

(d) Following from this, the United Nations Protected Areas, as at present, would continue not to be subject to the laws and institutions of the Republic of Croatia during the interim period pending a political settlement;

(e) The force would protect the local population and ensure its safety during and after the demilitarization of the United Nations Protected Areas.

10. In the course of his discussions in Belgrade, Mr. Goulding again received unqualified assurances from Mr. Branko Kostic, Vice-President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Mr. Borisav Jovic, Chairman of the State Committee for Cooperation with the United Nations on Peace-keeping Matters, and General Blagoje Adzic, Acting Federal Secretary of Defence of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Chief of Staff of JNA, that they accepted the plan and would cooperate fully in its implementation. President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia also reiterated his full acceptance of the plan. Mr. Goulding explained to his interlocutors what would be expected of them in relation to the implementation of the plan and was satisfied that they fully understood and accepted their obligations under it.

11. Also in Belgrade, Mr. Goulding met on 27 January with Mr. Goran Hadzic, leader of the Serbian community in the region of Eastern Slavonia, one of the proposed United Nations Protected Areas. Following an exposition of the principles spelled out in paragraph 10 above, Mr. Hadzic expressed reservations about only one aspect of the plan: the reference 6/ to the United Nations Protected Areas being "in Croatia", which in his view prejudged a pending political issue. When Mr. Goulding said that I would record that view in the present report and explore with the Security Council the possibility of emphasizing in a future resolution the point that the peace-keeping force did not prejudice the political negotiations, Mr. Hadzic confirmed his acceptance of the United Nations plan and undertook to cooperate with it. Similar assurances were obtained from Mr. Veljko Dzakula and other members of the leadership of the Serbian community of a second proposed United Nations Protected Area, Western Slavonia, in a meeting with Mr. Goulding on 29 January 1992. (However, subsequent press reports suggest that Mr. Hadzic may have revised his position.)

12. Mr. Milan Babic, the leader of the Serbian community in the third proposed United Nations Protected Area, with whom Mr. Goulding had five hours of discussions in Knin on 27 January, declared his inability, and that of his

colleagues in the "Government" of the self-proclaimed "Republic of Serbian Krajina", to accept the United Nations plan. Like Mr. Hadzic, Mr. Babic expressed the view that the plan's reference to the United Nations Protected Areas as being "in Croatia" was unacceptable because it prejudged the political solution, but he did not consider Mr. Goulding's proposal to cover that point in a Security Council document as offering adequate reassurance. Further, Mr. Babic rejected the demilitarization of the United Nations Protected Areas, stating that, if that was to occur, the Croatian armed forces should also be disarmed. He did not believe that United Nations forces could sufficiently protect the population of the Krajina from Croatian attack, particularly since recent public statements by President Tudjman had portrayed the prospective United Nations operation as a means of asserting the authority of the Republic of Croatia over the territories included in the United Nations Protected Areas. In addition, Mr. Babic stated that the recognition of the Government of Croatia by certain countries and the establishment of the "Republic of Serbian Krajina" required, in accordance with the "doctrine of changed circumstances", a revision of the plan. The plan had been approved by the Security Council before those events; it needed to be recast to resolve the main problem, which was the one existing between his "Government" and that of the Republic of Croatia. Mr. Babic added that only his "Government" could enter into commitments on behalf of his community vis-à-vis the Security Council. The population of the Krajina would therefore refuse to cooperate with the United Nations plan, to surrender their weapons or to permit JNA to withdraw. As an alternative, Mr. Babic proposed that United Nations forces should deploy along either side of the present front lines of the conflict, an option already rejected by the Croatian authorities. Mr. Goulding declined to alter a plan that had already been agreed by the main parties and approved by the Council.

13. In Zagreb on 28 January, President Franjo Tudjman and senior members of his Government also stated that they could not accept a fundamental aspect of the plan, thus retracting the full and unconditional acceptance of it that had been conveyed to my Personal Envoy, Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, on 1 January. Mr. Tudjman's objection related to the proposed arrangements for local government and the maintenance of public order. 7/ He said that he could not accept any formula that did not provide for the immediate restoration of the full authority of the Republic of Croatia in the United Nations Protected Areas. The latter would have to function under the Constitution and laws of Croatia and all local government institutions (including the police) would have to be accountable to Zagreb. When it was pointed out that the United Nations force's deployment would be for an interim period only pending the outcome of political negotiations on an overall settlement, Mr. Tudjman stated that, following the international recognition of his Republic, there were no political issues left to negotiate. Mr. Goulding pointed out that that retraction of Mr. Tudjman's acceptance of the plan would, if maintained, remove one of its two central elements and invalidate the basis on which the other parties had accepted it. However, despite five hours of discussion, Mr. Goulding was unable to overcome this new and unexpected obstacle to the deployment of the United Nations force.

II. OBSERVATIONS

14. There are a number of positive and encouraging elements in Mr. Goulding's report and one discouraging element.

15. The cease-fire is generally holding. In recent days there has, however, been a marked increase in the number of allegations of cease-fire violations, although it has not been possible to confirm most of them. It is important that both sides should redouble their efforts to bring irregular elements under control and that they should respect scrupulously all other provisions of the Sarajevo accord of 2 January 1992. But I am persuaded that the level of violations reported by Mr. Goulding, which I hope, of course, will be reduced, is not sufficiently grave to make it impossible to deploy a United Nations peace-keeping force, if the other necessary conditions for such deployment are fulfilled.

16. To judge from its first two weeks of operations, the group of United Nations military liaison officers that was deployed to Yugoslavia in mid-January is making a significant contribution to the efforts of the international community to help the Yugoslav parties to maintain and strengthen the cease-fire. In particular, I am pleased to learn that a workable division of labour with the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) has been established and that the two groups are working together in a harmonious and complementary way to achieve the common goal. In paragraph 22 below I recommend that the United Nations group should now be modestly enlarged for technical reasons related to the fact that its deployment in Yugoslavia now seems likely to be rather longer than originally envisaged.

17. Mr. Goulding was able to confirm that two of the signatories of the Geneva agreement of 23 November 1991, together with the remaining elements of the Federal leadership in Belgrade, continue to maintain their complete acceptance of, and support for, the plan and are indeed anxious that the United Nations force should be deployed at the earliest possible time. At his meetings, Mr. Goulding was also able to win acceptance of the plan by the local Serbian leaders in two of the three areas where the force would be deployed, although one of his interlocutors appears to have had second thoughts.

18. I am also encouraged by the decision of Lord Carrington, Chairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia, to visit Yugoslavia in the coming days in order to discuss with the parties concerned the next stages of the Conference's work. The main purpose of the United Nations force is, of course, to help to create conditions for the Conference to succeed in negotiating an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. I do not believe that the members of the Security Council would wish a large and expensive force to remain deployed in Yugoslavia indefinitely, and it is important, therefore, that all the Yugoslav parties should demonstrate their readiness to work purposefully and quickly in the Conference on Yugoslavia.

19. The discouraging element in the situation reported by Mr. Goulding is that one of the signatories of the Geneva agreement and another party on whose cooperation the United Nations force's ability to carry out its tasks would depend appear to have rejected key elements in the plan. I regret to have to conclude that the positions currently adopted by the Government of Croatia and by the local leaders in what would be the Krajina United Nations Protected Area would, if maintained, constitute major obstacles to a decision by the Security Council to establish and deploy the peace-keeping operation described in annex III to my report of 11 December 1991, 2/ which was approved by resolution 724 (1991).

20. If this operation is to be launched, as is widely desired in Yugoslavia and by the international community at large, action needs to be taken to convince the Government of Croatia and the Serbian leadership in Krajina that the early deployment of a United Nations force, accompanied by a resumption of the work of the Conference on Yugoslavia, is the best, and perhaps the only, available way to create the conditions for a peaceful resolution of the Yugoslav crisis. On 3 February 1992, the Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia transmitted to me a communication from the Vice-President of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Mr. Branko Kostic, informing me that "the Serbian representatives" of the proposed United Nations Protected Areas had given their consent to the plan. Mr. Kostic's letter is attached as annex III. However, on the same day a number of messages were received from Mr. Milan Babic denying that he had accepted the plan and repeating his objections to it. The question of whether or not a peace-keeping force deployed in the Krajina United Nations Protected Area would receive the necessary cooperation thus, unfortunately, remains unclear.

21. In these circumstances it is all the more necessary for action to be taken quickly in order to forestall any tendency for the current cease-fire to unravel. In this context, I have been disturbed to hear of allegations, including in the media, that the arms embargo imposed by the Security Council in resolution 713 (1991) is not being observed. In the circumstances, it is all the more essential that the arms embargo be scrupulously respected, and the Security Council will no doubt wish to keep the situation under careful scrutiny in order to ensure this. In addition, it would be helpful if the Council could urge that all those who are in a position to influence the parties would make every effort to convince them to accept, and cooperate with, the United Nations peace-keeping plan. I, my Personal Envoy and my staff remain ready to extend any assistance which the Council may consider appropriate.

22. It is clear that the circumstances described above do not permit me to recommend the deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping force at this time. This makes it necessary to consider the future of the United Nations military liaison officers who were deployed in Yugoslavia in January 1992 to help to consolidate the cease-fire. Their mission was conceived of as a brief interim arrangement, pending an early decision by the Security Council on the possible deployment of a larger force. The group's strength was accordingly decided on the assumption that its mission would be for a period of only four weeks. The group has shown that it is able to make an important contribution to the maintenance of the cease-fire, and I therefore recommend that it should

remain in existence. However, its strength needs to be increased for strictly technical reasons, now that it has become clear that it may be required for a longer period than originally envisaged. On the basis of advice received from Col. Wilson, I propose that the authorized strength should be increased to 75 military liaison officers, who would continue to be drawn from existing United Nations peace-keeping operations. Some additional international and local support staff would also be required. A preliminary estimate of the costs of this increase will be presented shortly to the Security Council as an addendum to the present report.

Notes

- 1/ S/23363.
- 2/ S/23280.
- 3/ S/23239.
- 4/ S/23280, annex III.
- 5/ Ibid., para. 19, the text of which reads as follows:

"The maintenance of public order in the United Nations Protected Areas would be the responsibility of local police forces who would carry only side-arms. Each of these forces would be formed from residents of the United Nations Protected Area in question, in proportions reflecting the national composition of the population which lived in it before the recent hostilities. The local police forces would be responsible to the existing opstine councils in the United Nations Protected Areas. Any existing regional police structures would remain in place, provided that they were consistent with the principle described above concerning the national composition of the local police forces."

- 6/ Ibid., paras. 7 and 8.
- 7/ Ibid., para. 19.

Annex I

Programme of the mission led by Mr. Marrack Goulding,
Under-Secretary-General, to Yugoslavia

26-30 January 1992

Sunday, 26 January 1992

- 1530 Arrive Belgrade
- 1600 Briefing by Col. John Wilson, Senior Military Liaison Officer
- 1715-1900 Meeting with Mr. Branko Kostic, Vice-President of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and members of the State Committee for Cooperation with the United Nations on Peace-keeping Matters
- 1915-2115 Meeting and working dinner with Mr. Slobodan Milosevic, President of the Republic of Serbia, and Mr. Vladislav Jovanovic, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Serbia
- 2125-2245 Meeting with General Blagoje Adzic, Acting Federal Secretary of Defence of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), accompanied by Admiral Stane Brovet, Deputy Secretary, Colonel-General A. Raseta and Major-General Slavko Jovic

Monday, 27 January 1992

- 0915-1045 Meeting with Mr. Goran Hadzic, "President" of the "Government of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sovem" and his delegation
- 1100 Departure by air for Bihac
- 1215 Departure by helicopter for Knin
- 1315-1530 Meeting with Mr. Milan Babic, "President" of the "Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina" and his delegation
- 1530-1700 Working lunch with members of Mr. Babic's delegation
- 1710-1815 Meeting with Major-General Ratko Mladic, Commander of the Knin Corps of JNA
- 1920-2345 Resumed meeting with Mr. Babic and his delegation, followed by a working dinner

Tuesday, 28 January 1992

- 0530 Working breakfast with General Mladic
- 0615 Departure by road for Zagreb
- 1115 Arrival in Zagreb, having crossed the front lines at Karlovac
- 1130-1200 Meeting with Ambassador Joao Salgueiro, Head of the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM)
- 1215-1545 Meeting with Mr. Franjo Tudjman, President of the Republic of Croatia, accompanied by Mr. D. Sarinic, Chef de Cabinet; Mr. G. Susak, Minister of Defence; Mr. Z. Separovic, Foreign Minister; Mr. B. Salaj, Minister of Information; and Mr. M. Nobilo, Adviser
- 1545-1700 Working lunch with President Tudjman and his colleagues
- 2000-2240 Resumed meeting with President Tudjman and, in addition to earlier delegation, Mr. Franjo Greguric, Prime Minister, Mr. S. Mesic, former President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and General Anton Tus, Chief of Staff of the Croatian Army
- 2300 Dinner with Ambassador Salgueiro and senior members of ECMM

Wednesday, 29 January 1992

- 0830 Briefing by United Nations military liaison officers, Zagreb sector, followed by courtesy visit to Brigadier-General Stolnik, Croatian Army
- 0930 Depart by road for Bihac
- 1230 Depart by air from Bihac
- 1330 Arrive Belgrade
- 1430 Briefing by United Nations military liaison officers, Belgrade sector
- 1530 Meeting with Mr. B. Jovic, Chairman of the State Committee for Cooperation with the United Nations on Peace-keeping Matters and members of the Committee
- 1700 Meeting with Mr. Veljko Dzakula, "President of the Government" of Western Slavonia, and his delegation
- 1745 Meeting with President Milosevic and Foreign Minister Jovanovic
- 1930-2300 Meeting with General Adzic and his staff, followed by working dinner

Thursday, 30 January 1992

- 0900 Departure for Belgrade airport
- 1030 Arrive in Vienna; meeting at airport with Mr. Alois Mock, Foreign
Minister of Austria
- 1145 Departure for New York

Annex II

Composition, deployment and functions of the United Nations Military Liaison Mission in Yugoslavia

A. Composition and deployment

1. Fifty military liaison officers of the following nationalities, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Finland, France, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Malaysia, Norway, Russian Federation, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Venezuela, detached from existing peace-keeping operations (United Nations Angola Verification Mission II, United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission and United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine) were assembled in Vienna for briefings on 12 and 13 January 1992 with the assistance of the United Nations Office at Vienna and with exemplary cooperation from the Austrian authorities.

2. Some of the military liaison officers were deployed to both sides in Yugoslavia on 14 January 1992, by road to Zagreb and by air to Belgrade, with the cooperation of the parties. The remainder travelled from Vienna to the United Nations Supply Depot at Pisa and picked up vehicles, equipped high frequency radios and other essential equipment, which they then drove to Yugoslavia. The deployment of the military liaison officers was completed by 19 January 1992.

3. The military liaison officers are deployed at the General Headquarters of the Croatian Army in Zagreb, the General Headquarters of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) in Belgrade and at zone headquarters of the Croatian Army and corps headquarters of JNA at the following locations:

<u>JNA</u>	<u>Croatian Army</u>
Belgrade	Zagreb
Dalj	Osijek
Sid	Bjelovar
Banja Luka	Karlovac
Bihac	Krasno Polje
Knin	Zadar
Bilece	Dubrovnik

B. Functions

4. The military liaison officers have been instructed:

(a) To establish permanent, direct and secure United Nations communications between the military liaison officers attached to the General Headquarters and corps/zone headquarters of each side;

(b) To make their good offices available to promote maintenance of the cease-fire;

(c) To facilitate communications between the two sides;

(d) To help the two sides to determine measures, based on the provisions of the Sarajevo accord, that can be taken to avoid violations of the cease-fire or to restore the status quo after violations occur.

5. The military liaison officers have worked harmoniously with the European Community Monitors. The Senior Military Liaison Officer has coordinated the activities of the liaison officers with his ECMM counterpart through regular contact with the ECMM headquarters in Zagreb and Belgrade. ECMM has remained primarily responsible for monitoring breaches of the cease-fire on the ground, in accordance with the existing memoranda of understanding, which have remained unchanged. The military liaison officers have fulfilled a liaison function across the lines, at the levels of General Headquarters and zone/corps headquarters. The military liaison officers and ECMM exchange daily situation reports. Both the head of ECMM, Ambassador J. Salgueiro, and the Senior Military Liaison Officer, Colonel J. Wilson, have assured Mr. Goulding that the present arrangement is working very well.

Annex III

Letter dated 3 February 1992 from the Permanent Representative
of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General

I have just received a message from the Vice-President of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Mr. Branko Kostic, concerning the United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia, which I am forwarding to you.

(Signed) Darko SILOVIC
Permanent Representative of
Yugoslavia to the
United Nations

Enclosure

Letter dated 3 February 1992 from Mr. Branko Kostic,
Vice-President of the Presidency of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia addressed to the
Secretary-General

I would like to inform you that the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has conducted extensive consultations with all the relevant factors in the country concerning the arrival and engagement of United Nations peace forces in Yugoslavia, proposed by your personal envoy Mr. Cyrus Vance.

During these consultations, carried out on 31 January and 1 and 2 February, the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia secured the consent to the proposed peace operation plan and the engagement of United Nations forces also of the Serbian representatives in the afflicted areas, which will, according to item 9 of the plan, a/ be placed under the protection of the United Nations.

Accepting the arrival of the peace forces, the legitimate representatives of the population of these areas made some proposals, which Mr. Marrack Goulding, United Nations Under-Secretary-General was informed of during his recent visit to Yugoslavia, and which were also supported and agreed to by the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as meriting discussion and being taken into consideration. However, irrespective of this, the competent federal bodies and the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia hereby extend full guarantees to the Security Council for the unhindered reception and efficient action of United Nations forces, as well as the cooperation of local authorities in the mentioned areas, with a view to preserving peace and ensuring conditions for a peaceful and comprehensive settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.

In view of the above, the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia looks forward to the full understanding and support of the Security Council for the earliest possible adoption of a decision on sending United Nations peace forces to Yugoslavia.

Notes

a/ S/23280, annex III, para. 9.
