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FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND NINETY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 13 June 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Miss Tessa A.H. Solesby (United Kingdom of
Great Britain and
Northern Ireland)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 595th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I would like to extend a warm welcome on behalf of the Conference to the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand, the Honourable Douglas Graham, who is addressing the Conference today as our first speaker. The Minister was first elected to Parliament in July 1984. In addition to his specific responsibilities in the field of disarmament, he also holds the portfolios of Justice and Arts and Culture. He has also been long active in academic life. I am sure that the Conference will follow his statement with particular interest.

I would also like to welcome the Honourable Madam Manae Kubota, who is at present with us at this plenary meeting, a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Upper House in Japan and Director of the Women's Division in the Office of the Prime Minister. Madam Kubota was also Director of the Women's Advancement Branch of the United Nations between 1978 and 1982.

I have on my list of speakers today the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand, the Honourable Douglas Graham, as well as the representatives of Egypt, Austria and Bulgaria. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will introduce a recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee concerning intersessional work during the month of July.

After the list of speakers is concluded, I will put that recommendation before the Conference for adoption. We shall also take up for decision a request by a non-member State.

I now have great pleasure in giving the floor to the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand, the Honourable Douglas Graham.

Mr. GRAHAM (New Zealand): It gives me great pleasure to address the Conference, for the first time, on behalf of New Zealand. It also gives me particular pleasure to see you in the Chair, Madam President. I am confident that under your leadership the Conference will make rapid progress on the issues before it.

I would like this morning to present New Zealand's views on some specific items on this Conference's agenda. Let me first, however make a few observations about disarmament and arms control in the changing international climate. There is wide recognition that changes in East/West relations, and more recently events in the Gulf, have opened a new chapter in international relations. We have the opportunity to make real progress towards a world where international peace and security are maintained by collective effort on the basis of the United Nations Charter. Was that after all not the hope of those far-sighted signatories to the Charter in 1945. We have also seen a counterpoint to that vision. Iraq's brutal invasion of Kuwait involved a total disregard of international law. We must strive together to prevent similar actions in the future by any nation.

(Mr. Graham, New Zealand)

Arms control is one of the most important tools we have to create a new world order - a world order in which the sovereignty of States is respected by others and guaranteed by the United Nations. Too often in the past arms control has been hostage to other political, and indeed economic, considerations. However, arms control is an essential and practical means to enhance security in a world where change and uncertainty abound. And, what is more, the peoples of the world now more than ever demand that we, their representatives, put aside our differences and achieve long-lasting positive results in order to preserve the global peace. We have seen how arms control has helped improve confidence and security between East and West. The challenge is to project that globally.

New Zealand is a small country, fortunate to be distant from the major sources of international tension. But in an increasingly interdependent world our security, like that of other States, is affected by events well beyond our immediate area. My Government believes very strongly in international cooperation to enhance security. That is why we contributed to the collective security measures in the Gulf. That is also why we strongly support multilateral efforts for disarmament and arms control, and applaud successful bilateral negotiations when they occur. We intend to take a practical approach to these issues. Fine words and fine gestures are wasted if they do not result in progress where it counts. I hope nevertheless that we may be entering a period where idealism on the one hand, and realism on the other, will not be seen as mutually exclusive. It is vital to take advantage of the opportunities now offered by the transformation of East/West relations. The Gulf conflict has injected impetus into arms control and in particular on specific agenda items. The climate is right for positive action.

One challenge that must be resolutely faced is in the area of conventional weaponry. Despite the existence of weapons of mass destruction, it is conventional weapons which have caused almost all death and destruction in war. They also consume the bulk of the world's excessive military expenditure, which could so better be used to improve the lot of mankind. I am not talking about the modest level of forces which States legitimately have for defensive security purposes. But the ease with which a State can build up its forces well beyond these legitimate requirements is a different matter. For too long this aspect of arms control has been neglected. World opinion now expects us to make serious efforts to improve the situation. We have been given a lead by progress in Europe. The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe is an important part of arrangements to enhance security and stability both in Europe and globally.

New Zealand warmly welcomes the CFE Treaty and the recent resolution of difficulties over its implementation. But we must ensure that disarmament in one region does not lead to rearmament in another. We fully support the consensus of last year's Disarmament Commission that the principal method of effecting reductions should be the destruction of equipment. The export of surplus equipment, or its redeployment to areas not covered by a particular treaty, only transfer the problems - and instability - elsewhere.

(Mr. Graham, New Zealand)

Dealing with disequilibriums in conventional weaponry is not an easy task. Greater openness about military capabilities is essential. The Vienna Document on confidence- and security-building measures offers some promise in this area. It may also embrace concepts which could be used by other regions as well, although regional problems obviously require measures tailored to those specific conditions. While the CFE Treaty may not be a model for other regions, it does demonstrate what can be done if countries have the political will to make progress.

I hope that States in other regions will take appropriate measures to enhance peace and security, through arms reductions, confidence-building and greater political cooperation. I look forward to further international consideration of these issues. I note in particular the useful role that the United Nations regional disarmament centres are playing in this area. New Zealand has been impressed for example with the discussions which have taken place under the auspices of the Asia/Pacific Centre in Kathmandu and will continue to support its work.

Fundamental to the problem of the massive accumulation of conventional weapons is their production and transfer between countries. We have seen what consequences can ensue from the uncontrolled flow of weapons into unstable regions where tensions run high. We need to develop new ways to provide transparency in the arms trade and restraint among suppliers and recipients. All States need to take greater national responsibility for the production and export of arms. Each State must ensure that international arms transfers do not result in insecurity and instability. We support the concept of a United Nations arms transfer register to bring transparency to the arms trade. Greater transparency would be an important confidence-building measure and would give warning of dangerous arms build-ups. This idea needs to receive serious and urgent consideration when the expert group assigned to study it reports back to the United Nations later this year.

New Zealand has only a low level of arms imports and exports. Nevertheless, we are more than willing to contribute to a United Nations register, as we do already to the United Nations questionnaire on military expenditure.

Transparency of itself is not sufficient however. It will never prevent the deliberate sale of armaments to potentially volatile regions if the projection of political power or commercial considerations are given priority. We therefore fully support proposals that those countries primarily involved in the supply of conventional arms address this problem in a coordinated way. Such coordination should promote mutual restraint so that the security of other States, and of the international community as a whole, is not jeopardized by transfers which exceed legitimate defence requirements. We do not pretend that this task will be easy. Nevertheless, global security demands nothing less.

The casualties of the Gulf war were not only human ones. The deliberate destruction of the environment is a terrible new development in modern warfare which has rightly attracted widespread international condemnation. While it

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may say little for human wisdom that many find the indiscriminate destruction of wildlife more horrific than the loss of human life, the oil-coated cormorant today has become a symbol of the very fragility of human existence in the modern world. The consequences of environmental warfare extend far beyond the countries immediately involved in conflict and the damage is not easily repaired. Although this issue is not strictly a matter of arms control, we must all ensure that the international community and international law are properly able to deal with this serious development. My Government will cooperate fully in endeavours to this end.

As disarmament and arms control loses some of its East/West focus, many of the problems we face can be resolved only through multilateral forums. The Conference on Disarmament should have a central role in this. New Zealand will do what it can to assist in a practical way. We have argued for some time, however, that the multilateral disarmament machinery must be made equal to the task before it. There have been some promising signs in that respect. The changes that have taken place in the United Nations Disarmament Commission are welcome, as is the continuing progress towards rationalizing the work of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.

I also welcome moves under way to improve the functioning of this Conference. I hope that further steps will be taken to make the agenda and procedures more flexible and responsive to the urgent needs of the 1990s. Lack of adequate progress on the nuclear testing issue, for example, led some States to establish an alternative forum for discussion. It would indeed be tragic if this Conference were to be seen more as an obstacle to arms control in some areas than a catalyst for change. In particular the Conference needs to respond, in a flexible manner, to the question of its expanded membership. A final decision cannot be postponed indefinitely. We urge the Conference, taking into account recent changes in the political situation, to put into effect the decision taken in principle to increase its membership.

The area where we look for the most immediate results is chemical weapons. The urgent need for a global convention has been demonstrated yet again, this time by the Gulf War. Like others, New Zealand units with the multinational force faced exposure to possible chemical attack. Threats to use chemical weapons against civilians were particularly barbaric, and are a reminder to us all of the need to outlaw these dreadful weapons for all time. New Zealand is firmly committed to the conclusion of a comprehensive convention prohibiting chemical weapons. We are pleased to note the progress being made on a number of important issues, including the drafting of an appropriate definition of chemical weapons and the order of destruction of stockpiles.

It has been clear for some time that greater momentum needs to be given to the negotiations. We welcome President Bush's announcement that the United States will drop its right of retaliation and destroy all its chemical weapon stocks within 10 years of the convention coming into force. We hope that this will provide some of the necessary impetus for the early conclusion of the negotiations. We believe that further impetus may well be provided by a meeting at ministerial level of the CD at an appropriate time.

(Mr. Graham, New Zealand)

Drafting the convention is not, of course, an end in itself. For the convention to work it must attract the widest possible international support. It is therefore essential that the convention should not impose a burden, that for practical reasons, would tend to discourage smaller countries from acceding. This has implications in a number of areas, not least regarding the costs and complexity of the controls being established. There is no area in which this is more relevant than verification, particularly challenge inspections and the verification of legitimate chemical activity. Here we must find an appropriate balance between verification which is sufficient to provide confidence in the régime, but which does not place an undue burden on the States and industries concerned. I suggest that we should not be looking for - and cannot afford the burden of - a perfect régime. We need a sufficient régime - one that is sufficient to deter a would-be violator because there would be a real prospect of being detected. I know these concerns are shared by others.

It was consistent with these concerns that New Zealand's trial inspection, the results of which were tabled earlier this year, looked at means by which small countries with modest chemical industries could comply with the convention. It remains inevitable, however, that there will be substantial costs in implementing this convention. It will be necessary - but may not be easy - to come up with a wholly equitable formula to determine where they fall. It is true that countries will benefit from the enhanced security offered by the convention. However, in the IAEA context New Zealand, which has no nuclear industry at all, pays a safeguards contribution equivalent to that paid by six shielded countries, all of them larger than us, which operate 29 nuclear power plants between them. I do not believe that the present inequitable IAEA funding system is sustainable in the long run, and we must not sow the seeds for similar inequities in the chemical weapons convention.

The destruction of all chemical weapons is our ultimate objective. That is a huge and costly task, not the least because of the absolute necessity to protect the environment in the process. In our view these weapons ought to be destroyed in situ and subject to proper controls. In this respect we accept that the United States has acted openly and responsibly in endeavouring to alleviate concern about the destruction of chemical weapons at Johnston Atoll in the Pacific. Provided that the process continues to operate in an environmentally safe manner, we also accept that the chemical weapons stocks on the atoll should be destroyed there. Of fundamental importance to us, however, is the United States' assurance that there is no prospect of further stocks being brought into the region for destruction at Johnston Atoll.

Controlling the transfer of technology and components intended for chemical weapons production is one way of limiting the spread of the weapons themselves. We have recently expanded the list of chemical weapons precursors subject to export controls in New Zealand. New Zealand believes it is essential for Governments to work hand in hand with the private sector on these questions. In the chemical area, the New Zealand Government maintains close contact with the New Zealand Chemical Industry Council. We are pleased that the Council has recently taken self-regulatory steps in adopting a

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programme of "responsible care" similar to that in other countries. We also welcome initiatives by the United States and others to tighten controls on exports which contribute to the production of weapons of mass destruction. New Zealand already maintains controls on the export of strategic goods and is a participant in the Missile Technology Control Régime.

I would now like to turn to the question of nuclear weapons. This remains an issue of great concern to the New Zealand Government and to New Zealanders. For too long the inability of the nuclear-weapon States to cut their arsenals frustrated many countries, including my own. Our frustration was accentuated by the testing of nuclear weapons in the Pacific. Despite the improvement in East/West relations, this testing regrettably continues. We remain firmly opposed to it.

The legacy of those years will be with us for some time. The cost in terms of international trust is difficult to measure. However, the prospect of future progress in nuclear arms reductions requires us to look forward rather than backward. The recent achievements in the nuclear arms control negotiations are very welcome to New Zealand. After the crucial breakthrough made in the INF Treaty, the prospect of significant reductions in strategic nuclear weapons is now within our grasp. New Zealand hopes that hindrances to a START agreement will be speedily removed. The 1990s will, we hope, allow the nuclear-weapon States to make substantial reductions in the number of nuclear weapons. The trust and confidence engendered by such steps would, I believe, make a significant contribution to the building of a new world order. The responsibility for nuclear arms reductions falls primarily on the nuclear-weapon States. But all countries have a vital interest in this issue and must make a contribution.

Despite the encouraging progress in the bilateral arms control negotiations, there is continuing unease about the prospects of nuclear proliferation. As the danger of global nuclear conflict diminishes, it is unacceptable that we may face an increasing risk of nuclear weapons becoming a factor in regional conflict. We believe that in the aftermath of the Gulf war there should be a strengthened international commitment to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. New Zealand and other South Pacific countries have already shown our commitment to non-proliferation through the Treaty of Rarotonga which is an important regional measure.

At the global level the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty continues to play a crucial role. In our view the Treaty should continue in force indefinitely after 1995. Using the Treaty's extension as a lever to achieve concessions in other arms control areas, however well intended, is playing with stakes that are simply too high. The NPT is a key factor in the security of us all. It is too important to bargain away.

New Zealand believes that universal membership is important for the strength of the NPT. That is why we have welcomed France's decision, in principle, to accede to the Treaty. Equally we welcome the accession of Tanzania and Zambia. We hope that this will lead to the situation before long where all the nuclear-weapon States are members of the NPT, and where all of

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them participate in this Conference's Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. We also support efforts to increase the effectiveness of the non-proliferation régime, including the application of full-scope safeguards to all nuclear transfers. It has therefore been a matter of particular concern to New Zealand that a country in our Asia/Pacific region with substantial nuclear facilities has until now declined to honour its treaty obligation to conclude a safeguards agreement. Bilateral disputes are no grounds for a party to ignore the obligations which it has undertaken vis-à-vis all other parties to the Treaty. I am pleased that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has now decided to conclude a standard safeguards agreement with the Agency. We look forward to the completion of an ununconditional agreement as soon as possible.

I shall be speaking this afternoon in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, where I shall set out New Zealand's position on nuclear testing in detail. This has been a long-standing concern for New Zealand Governments. The need for a comprehensive test ban has not diminished. Indeed, increasing world concerns about the potential spread of nuclear weaponry make it all the more important for the nuclear-weapon States to agree to a total test ban. The technical aspects of a nuclear test ban have always been important. That is why we participate in the Ad Hoc Seismic Group and in the Group's technical test, the full-scale phase of which was completed only a few days ago. I shall be introducing in the Ad Hoc Committee a discussion paper on the verification of a CTB, which I hope will contribute to consideration of that topic.

The events of the last few years have created a window of opportunity to make progress in disarmament and arms control which has not been seen before. We have the vision to know what must be done. We must now have the determination to see that it is done. Recently the world community united together to face a common threat. It acted resolutely to meet the challenge. It is my hope that this Conference will produce the same cooperation and determination as we jointly seek a better world for this and future generations. I can assure you of New Zealand's commitment to that end.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand for his important statement and also for the kind words. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Elaraby, to whom, if I may, I would like to extend warm congratulations on his recent appointment to a new and important post. You have the floor, Ambassador Elaraby.

Mr. ELARABY (Egypt): Madam President, since this is the first time I have taken the floor this session, allow me to express my sincere congratulations to you on your assumption of the post of President of the Conference on Disarmament during this important period. Our two countries have enjoyed throughout two centuries close relations. Sometimes, if you will allow me to say so, they were too close. However, for many years now, I am happy to state, our two countries have enjoyed excellent relations. We are confident that with your well-known leadership and diplomatic skills you will be able to steer our proceedings to a successful conclusion, and in this

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

context I would like to thank you for addressing congratulations to me on my assumption of the post of Permanent Representative in New York. It gives me great pleasure to express my delegation's appreciation to the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand, the Honourable Douglas Graham, for his important statement.

This year's session of the Conference on Disarmament began in an atmosphere fraught with mixed feelings of hope and fear, anxiety and trepidation. Precious time was lost and our schedule was delayed. However, what is important to highlight at this stage is the special responsibility accorded our body as the single United Nations multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. It must be underscored that the Charter of the United Nations in its quest for the maintenance of international peace and security has recognized the organic link that exists between disarmament and world peace. We are duty-bound to continue our task expeditiously and embark on serious work covering all items on the agenda. The United Nations membership has bestowed upon us their trust, and the CD's performance is the focus of scrutiny and the subject of assessment. We must live up to our commitments and their expectations.

Two relevant shortcomings need to be highlighted and addressed in any appraisal dealing with improved and effective functioning of the work of the CD. The first centres on the definition of consensus, which is the basis for arriving at decisions in the CD. While rule 18 of the rules of procedure states that the Conference shall conduct its work and adopt its decisions by consensus, rule 25 stipulates that "the approval by consensus of reports shall not be interpreted as affecting in any manner the essential requirement that such reports must reflect faithfully the positions of all the members of the respective organs".

Consensus was, therefore, incorporated in the rules of procedure to ensure a democratic process of decision-making in our Conference. However, as we all realize, over the years it has been misinterpreted, misused, abused and overstretched. Any member can block our work by casting a negative vote. Not only so, but we have repeatedly witnessed, as well as lived under, the threat of a resort to a negative vote, which ultimately became sufficient to hinder our work. This process has led to conferring the powers of veto on all members of the Conference on Disarmament. It meant not only blocking the final outcome of negotiations, but more regrettably, it frustrates any progress and renders the Conference on Disarmament helpless as well as stagnant. Consensus, in the view of my delegation, is a process to encourage compromise and accommodation in a spirit of mutual understanding and good will. It should not be constantly brandished to block meaningful progress.

The second point deals not with our modus operandi, as such, but with the raison d'être of the CD itself. It is well-known that the General Assembly has entrusted to the Conference on Disarmament special tasks as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. The basic question I would like to pose is: How much does negotiation occur in our negotiating forum? Most of the ad hoc committees established under the aegis of the CD do not enjoy a negotiating mandate and are thereby reduced to the status of deliberative

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bodies. How different then is the CD from the UNDC, or from the First Committee of the General Assembly? In my intervention of 21 April 1988, I cautioned against this. In fact I clarified how important the CD is for the future of disarmament negotiations.

The net result has been that the international community has hitherto failed to translate the integrated approach contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament into binding, legal instruments, since the achievements of the CD have remained limited in nature and its balance sheet, I am afraid to say, unimpressive.

The accumulation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly in certain regions such as the Middle East, creates a destabilizing environment that endangers international peace and security. The spectre of the use of weapons of mass destruction impels us to redouble our efforts for the early conclusion of a comprehensive and verifiable chemical weapons convention and to address all other weapons of mass destruction. This should be done without delay in order to make our world a safer place to live in.

Egypt proposed on 8 April 1990, the declaration of the Middle East as a region free of all weapons of mass destruction. On 24 April 1990, I was instructed to introduce our proposal in the CD, and I stated on that occasion the following:

"The rationale of the proposal is to spare a region fraught with tension from the scourge of a possible recourse to any type of weapon of mass destruction".

I went on to state in that same intervention:

"It is the considered opinion of the Government of Egypt that the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East merits urgent attention and serious examination. ... I believe a careful perusal of its contents will contribute to a better and more profound appreciation of our proposal. It is our earnest hope that this proposed comprehensive approach will command the active support of all ... States".

As of late, proposals have been announced by the United States and France which we hope will contribute to the attainment of this important objective. The Security Council has also adopted resolution 687, which recognized in paragraph 14 the necessity to establish such a zone. Paragraph 14 reads:

"Takes note that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the present resolution represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons".

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

Egypt considers the Security Council's reference to the proposal on weapons of mass destruction to be an acknowledgement of the merit of the Egyptian proposal. As a follow-up my delegation hopes that adequate machinery, as well as specific measures, under the supervision of the Security Council, will be soon undertaken. The Council may even discuss such measures during its upcoming meeting to review the steps taken by Iraq in the field of disarmament.

One further integral element that would facilitate the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East and ensure regional collective accession to it could be the encouragement of all States in the region to adhere to the international legal instruments that comprise the juridical régimes regulating weapons of mass destruction. These legal instruments are the non-proliferation Treaty, the biological weapons Convention of 1972 and the chemical weapons convention which is under preparation now at the CD. The successful employment of confidence-building measures in the Middle East will undoubtedly be augmented through the adherence of all parties in the region to these important legal instruments.

Last year a highly qualified group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General finalized and presented a study on effective and verifiable measures which could facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The study noted in paragraph 110 that

"there is broad agreement that an effective zone would be a great improvement over the present situation. The problem is how to create the conditions in which a zone becomes a realistic development".

This represents the basic challenge for the implementation of a stream of General Assembly resolutions that date back to 1974, when Egypt and Iran presented this proposal for the first time to the General Assembly and have been adopted by consensus at every General Assembly session since 1980.

I turn now to the NPT. Egypt attaches the utmost importance to the non-proliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of the non-proliferation régime. Towards the goal of strengthening and enhancing the NPT régime beyond 1995, my delegation addressed several important issues at the fourth NPT review conference, which convened here in Geneva last summer. The problems still confronting us, 23 years after the signing of the NPT, emanate from the fact that this treaty lacks universal adherence. Key States with significant nuclear programmes opted to remain outside the NPT, while others which do not possess similar significant nuclear programmes relinquished this option and joined the NPT. This asymmetrical approach to rights and obligations, especially in conflict-torn regions, has created a situation of ambiguity and uncertainty. The case of the Middle East is abundantly clear.

Additionally, the NPT does not provide for credible security assurances. The neutral and non-aligned States, not belonging to military alliances, are particularly vulnerable and feel the need for assurances from the international community.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

Egypt considers that the security dimension is of paramount importance for every non-nuclear-weapon State, particularly the neutral and non-aligned States. It is essential, therefore, to focus on the security aspects. It is generally recognized that there is no one single formula to provide security to non-nuclear-weapon States. Some States perceive that their security will be enhanced through acquiring negative security assurances from nuclear-weapon States through legally binding instruments. Nigeria presented to the fourth NPT review conference a proposal worthy of consideration. This proposal has its merits and would provide adequate assurances to many States. There is, however, an additional approach which Egypt is advocating. This approach tallies fully with the original Charter design of entrusting a central role to the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security. The positive assurances approach is anchored on the assumption that appropriate action by the Security Council will be forthcoming. The Council did adopt a rather truncated version of the positive approach in 1968 which merits closer examination.

It will be recalled that in the course of the General Assembly's resumed session in May 1968, many countries emphasized the importance of incorporating provisions for security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States in the NPT. This demand, however, was not looked upon with favour by the nuclear-weapon States. Consequently, the NPT did not contain a clause providing for security assurances. As a compromise, the issue of security assurances was referred to the Security Council, which, on 18 June 1968, adopted resolution 255.

The matter of highest concern to my delegation is to increase the effectiveness of that resolution and make it compatible with the realities of our contemporary world. This could be achieved by the adoption of the following measures: the expression of unequivocal resolve to adopt immediate procedures in order to deter a nuclear threat or nuclear aggression, a determination to act in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter against any aggressor, providing for more comprehensive assistance, including technical, financial, as well as humanitarian assistance to non-nuclear-weapon States subject to the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons, and finally the imposition of sanctions against any State party or non-party to the NPT which uses nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty.

During the last NPT review conference, Egypt presented a proposal to this effect. The Conference, however, could not agree on a final document, and our proposal was, therefore, not formally adopted. However, we consider the finalization and the general agreement on its language to be a significant step that could pave the way for future consultations and hopefully actions between the parties concerned. The language of the agreed text was confined to a call on all nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty to conduct consultations collectively or individually with the nuclear-weapon States not currently party to the Treaty, on the issue of security assurances, taking into account Security Council resolution 255 of 1968, and to inform other States party to the Treaty of any progress on appropriate actions by the Council that may result from these efforts. Despite the modest language of

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this compromise agreement, Egypt considered it a sound basis and a point of departure for a process we hope will soon gain momentum. The prevailing propitious international climate could lend support to this outcome.

My delegation welcomes the work done so far in the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, as well as reaching an agreement on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. In the absence of a comprehensive agreement pertaining to the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, the ability of developing countries to securely and confidently make use of peaceful uses of nuclear energy will be substantially hindered.

Furthermore, one additional matter of highest concern to my delegation is that of radioactive waste. The dumping of radioactive waste in Africa has serious repercussions and a drastic impact on the health, welfare and environment of our continent. We therefore hope that the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological weapons will endeavour to formulate the necessary modalities for studying the serious implications of this problem.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Egypt for his statement and also for his kind words. I now give the floor to the representative of Austria, Ambassador Ceska.

Mr. CESKA (Austria): President, it is with particular pleasure that I take the floor under your leadership. Your personal skills and engagement, your high profile in the field of disarmament are well known to all of us and the token for successful proceedings of the Conference on Disarmament. Furthermore, you are representing a country with which Austria has long-standing intensive relations of friendship.

May I start by expressing the deep satisfaction of my Government with regard to the recent initiative taken by President Bush in the field of chemical weapons? The unconditional renouncement of any use of chemical weapons upon entry into force of the chemical weapons convention expressed therein represents an important step towards the global abolition of this category of weapons. In this context, we are also aware of the importance of cooperation for the destruction of chemical weapons as requested by the United States initiative. At the same time, we are in favour of intensifying the negotiations - in their quantitative as well as qualitative aspects - with a view to finalizing the draft convention within the coming 12 months.

Besides the above-mentioned questions, there are still a number of other issues under discussion which also require political settlement apart from technical solutions. In particular, I am referring to the questions of verification and decision-making. The essential problem we are facing in the field of verification relates to the identification of objective criteria to allow for inclusion of the most relevant facilities and installations into the control régime. In this context, we support the concept of "capability" as an essential criterion, while, at the same time, we agree with those who argue in favour of restricting this concept to the most relevant facilities and

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installations capable of producing schedule 1, 2 and 3 chemicals. This should satisfy both the political and technical needs with regard to the scope of verification. Politically speaking, this would help to overcome reluctance displayed by industry representatives as well as by countries hosting a large number of chemical facilities and installations. Furthermore, financial implications could be kept to an acceptable level. From the technical point of view, such a further selection would help "separate the wheat from the chaff".

Concerning the decision-making mechanism to be adopted under the future convention, let me refer to three principles which seem the most crucial. They relate to the questions of geographical distribution of seats, transparency and flexibility. In the light of the regional as well as global interests of all States, all regions of the world should be adequately represented in the pattern of decision-making. In this regard, the number of seats in the executive organ of the control organization could be limited to 20, using a commonly acceptable mechanism for the selection of candidates. Such a system could, however, comprise some additional criteria in order to allow for more frequent representation of highly concerned States.

In order to ensure comprehensive confidence in the work of the organization, maximum transparency in the decision-making process would be required. This has also to be guaranteed in all other areas of work of the future organization, taking into account, however, information restrictions due to commercial secrecy requirements and security interests involved.

The necessity for flexibility relates to the need for swift political and organizational reaction. A changing international environment as well as rapid advances in science and technology necessitate the flexible application as well as interpretation of the convention. In view of the security interests involved, the administrative side of the organization should also be handled in a flexible manner, ensuring comprehensive satisfaction of particular security concerns. Consequently, in order to meet these requirements, the future control organization should dispose of adequate information and evaluation machinery.

Let me welcome the important initiative recently taken by President Mitterrand of France which contains proposals relating to weapons of mass destruction as well as other categories of weapons. In particular the proposed acceleration of the CW negotiations and their possible conclusion, still in 1991, by a ministerial meeting are aimed at intensifying the negotiations in order to bring them to an early end. We likewise welcome the decision of the French Government to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, thereby strengthening it decisively.

Let me reiterate once more that my country attaches the utmost importance to the achievement of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. It is with this understanding that Austria has intensified its commitment to the negotiating process and continues to offer to serve as host country for the

(Mr. Ceska, Austria)

future control organization. In this context, let me give more details of our understanding of the role of the future control organization as well as our offer.

The future control organization will have to exercise a number of different functions in order to allow for comprehensive and forward-looking implementation of the convention. One of these functions relates to verification activities in the large sense, including periodic updating of verification means and related methodology. In this regard, the establishment of a special unit dealing with science-and-technology-related issues would seem appropriate. Another area of activity would cover peaceful cooperation in the field of chemistry, which would largely constitute a clearing-house function. Furthermore, education programmes for inspectors as well as students and the broad public could be envisaged.

Let me mention one more idea, which relates to the question of environmental protection. As is often pointed out in the context of destruction of chemical weapons, minimum environmental standards will have to be observed. As the future day-to-day work of the organization will allow for collection of comprehensive environmental knowledge also in other areas, a specific environmental unit might be created. This unit could help foster international cooperation programmes in the specific environmental context of highly toxic chemicals, drawing also on existing knowledge within WHO.

Thus, in our view the future control organization should be a comprehensive and easily accessible servicing body of the international community of States. For this purpose, its location should allow for optimum cooperation and coordination with other relevant international bodies and the international community as a whole. Excellent working conditions including generous privileges and immunities should render this task as easy as possible. Austria is prepared to offer such conditions, comprising equivalent treatment for the staff of the organization as well as for the permanent missions accredited to the organization equivalent to those of bilateral missions, as a contribution to the future success of the work of the organization.

Turning now to the forthcoming third review conference of the biological weapons Convention taking place in Geneva in September this year, let me start with some general remarks. In our understanding, the biological weapons régime as contained in the Convention has proved satisfactory. At the second review conference in 1986, the time was not felt to be ripe to take action on institutional as well as other questions in the light of the then expected conclusion of the chemical weapons convention negotiations. In the mean time the then prevailing expectation concerning the possibility of simply merging the chemical weapons convention and the biological weapons Convention implementation institutions has proven unfeasible, as at least a specialized unit dealing with biological-weapons-related issues seems needed. Consequently, precise proposals could now be foreseen in order to allow for enhanced implementation of the biological weapons Convention while at the same time not excluding the possibility of integrating such a specialized unit into the future chemical weapons control organization.

(Mr. Ceska, Austria)

At the third review conference, special consideration will have to be given to questions relating to the implementation as well as to the possible extension of the confidence-building measures accepted in 1987. This enlargement of scope might even encompass legally binding verification measures. Such considerations will also have a direct bearing on institutional questions when considering enhanced organizational arrangements.

Another question relates to the national implementation of the confidence-building measures and to the processing of information obtained. In light of the health-related content of the information thus provided, as well as knowledge already gained by WHO regarding chemical and biological weapons, the enlargement of tasks in this field by WHO might be considered. This might be done in the form of strengthening the existing special unit within WHO dealing with chemical weapons and biological-weapons-related issues.

As far as future institutional arrangements are concerned, the starting point might be found in the form of a small secretariat unit, possibly within the United Nations Disarmament Department. At the same time, the establishment of a preferably open-ended committee of States parties dealing with implementation questions could be envisaged. For any questions regarding compliance, the existing consultative mechanism would seem the appropriate forum of action.

Since the successful conclusion of the chemical weapons negotiations can now be foreseen, it seems appropriate to tackle the question of reservations to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. This could take the form of a special meeting of States parties dealing solely with implementation questions with regard to the Protocol. On this occasion, a solemn declaration could be adopted endorsing the withdrawal of all reservations to the Geneva Protocol as soon as possible, but in any case not later than at the time of entry into force of the chemical weapons convention. Such a step would undoubtedly enhance the security of all States and thereby support efforts towards universal adherence to all three legal instruments.

Let me conclude by expressing satisfaction that the full and unconditional implementation of the treaty on conventional force reductions in Europe seems now well on its way, thereby allowing us to proceed to negotiations on a second treaty foreseeing even deeper cuts in conventional armaments as well as reductions of existing military structures.

Likewise, I would express my sincere hope that the forthcoming summit meeting between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev will allow for the awaited signing of the START agreement. In view of this development, we are encouraged to expect further steps in nuclear disarmament and arms control in the foreseeable future.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Austria for his statement and also for his kind words. I now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Ditchev.

Mr. DITCHEV (Bulgaria): Madam President, it is a privilege for me to address the Conference on Disarmament during your presidency. Let me congratulate you on this occasion and express confidence that your guidance will help us advance considerably our work. I assure you of the full support of my delegation, which believes that in spite of recent developments which might have reduced the feeling of urgency shared by many countries before, arms control and disarmament preserves its important place in world politics and international relations.

I hardly need to say much to substantiate such a conclusion. The very fact that in the course of this year the Conference on Disarmament has been addressed by quite a number of high-ranking government officials, including the first speaker of today, the distinguished Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand, the Honourable Douglas Graham - all that testifies to the interest of States in advancing disarmament. And rightly so. Arms control and disarmament have always been related to security. New developments, however positive they are, do not seem to have changed yet the nature of this fundamental relationship. Small countries in particular - Bulgaria is no exception in this regard - are naturally interested in options for improving national security that emerge in the arms control process.

In the aftermath of the Gulf war, non-proliferation objectives with respect to weapons of mass destruction and missile technology have acquired added international importance. We share the view that proliferation of such weapons and unrestricted transfers of conventional armaments undermine international security and increase the risk of armed conflicts. It may be expected that in the foreseeable future these issues will be treated with higher attention, both bilaterally and multilaterally, including in global disarmament forums.

Recently, the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a declaration of support for the latest initiative of President Bush concerning the Middle East. The declaration expresses, inter alia, the belief that this initiative could have a much broader impact on efforts aimed at strengthening peace and security on a global scale. I also wish to inform you in this connection that steps are currently being undertaken in Bulgaria to introduce a comprehensive national system of export control. We are seeking to use the experience acquired by other countries in this field. The aim is to contribute to the viability of the existing internationally agreed guidelines trying to curb the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and missile technologies. Speaking about non-proliferation, I would also like to welcome the decision of France to accede to the NPT. We regard this development as a major contribution to the viability of the treaty and to international security as a whole. My delegation listened with great attention to the statement of the distinguished Ambassador of France, Ambassador Errera, introducing the arms control and disarmament plan put forward some days ago by President Mitterrand. We find that this plan contains a number of valuable ideas which will be thoroughly examined, no doubt in positive terms.

(Mr. Ditchev, Bulgaria)

Today I wish to address the agenda item dealing with chemical weapons. I shall start by saying that Bulgaria is much interested in the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention. It is in this context that we consider positively the recent initiative of President Bush. Bulgaria cannot but welcome this initiative, as we have always favoured the idea of speeding up the work on the CW convention, including through continuous negotiations. In the view of the Bulgarian delegation, it is entirely within reach to have all outstanding issues resolved by the end of 1991 and the convention completed within 12 months.

Unilaterally at the 1989 Paris CW conference, and together with the other CSCE countries at the 1990 Paris summit meeting, Bulgaria has declared its intention to become an original party to the chemical weapons convention. We therefore support the United States call upon all States to do likewise and to declare their chemical weapons stockpiles. My country has entered a process of intensive national preparations to meet well in time its future obligations. A proposal has been tabled in the Bulgarian Council of Ministers for setting up a national commission to prepare for accession of the country to the convention. This commission may well turn later on into a national authority as provided for under article VII of the chemical weapons convention.

The formal renunciation by the United States of America of the use of chemical weapons for any reason, including retaliation, conforms with the will of all other States participating in the negotiations, Bulgaria included. We have always insisted that article I of the future convention should contain the obligation not to use chemical weapons under any circumstances. Accordingly, our Government is in a process of withdrawal of the reservation of Bulgaria to the 1925 Geneva Protocol made a long time ago. We welcome also the new unconditional United States commitment to destroy all of its chemical weapon stocks and production facilities within 10 years of entry into force of the convention. Inclusion of such provisions seems to hold the highest promise of speeding up the finalization of the convention. The United States' expressed readiness to provide assistance to other States in the speedy, safe and environmentally sound destruction of all existing stockpiles of chemical weapons is another positive step which may facilitate the successful completion of this process within the envisaged 10 years.

My delegation believes that the proposal to forswear the trade in CW-related materials with States with which are not parties to the convention may need some further clarification. The "rolling text" already contains the provision that transfer of schedule 1 chemicals may be done only between States parties to the convention. As of now, this provision does not apply to the chemicals under the remaining two schedules. A closer look at the draft text of article XI may also be needed. It is clear, however, that inclusion of a consensus provision of this kind in the convention would encourage more States to join the convention, and would therefore contribute to achieving its universality.

(Mr. Ditchev, Bulgaria)

Bulgaria will support inclusion of provisions for sanctions against those States which violate the convention, and especially for severe sanctions against any State that initiates the use of chemical weapons. We are also committed to a strong verification régime, with challenge inspection being one of its main elements. Once the promised new proposals by the United States are made we shall define our position on the matter.

Finally, the delegation of Bulgaria has been happy to note the prompt and positive reaction of the Soviet Union to the United States proposals, as expressed in the plenary statement of the Soviet delegation on 23 May. This is yet another evidence that the necessary prerequisites for early conclusion of the CW convention are being created. We are confident that the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will be in a position, under the able guidance of its chairman, Ambassador Serguei Batsanov, to accomplish this task.

My delegation will take an active stand in the negotiations on these and all other remaining issues. In the present new context of the negotiations, we appreciate even more the idea of calling a CW meeting at the level of foreign ministers in Geneva to help finally solve all the pending political issues of the CW convention.

In conclusion, I should like to stress the following. You, Madam President, are guiding the work of the Conference on Disarmament at a time when the negotiations on CW have entered probably the most difficult and also the most rewarding stage. An early and successful outcome of these negotiations is to add to the credibility of this forum and demonstrate again that it is able to deal with and resolve in an effective way most complex and sensitive issues related to security. It is a time of unprecedented opportunities which we all should use to the maximum of our abilities.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement and also for his kind words. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Batsanov of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): You have called upon me, Madam President, in my capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. However, first of all, as the head of the Soviet delegation, I should like to sincerely congratulate you on taking up the post of President and to express our great appreciation of the very effective manner in which you are directing the work of the Conference. I also consider it necessary to state that your leadership, among other things, has had a positive impact on the resolution of several issues now before the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. Actually, it is in connection with one such issue that I have asked to take the floor. I should like to present to the Conference a recommendation which was adopted yesterday by consensus in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and which has been distributed here today as document CD/CW/WP.343. This is an Ad Hoc Committee document dated 12 June. It calls for the Ad Hoc Committee to hold an additional regular session during the period from 8 to 19 July, that is, right

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

up to the beginning of the third part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament. The necessity for this additional session arises out of the fact that the work of the Ad Hoc Committee has entered a new stage, which requires the significant intensification of negotiations in order to achieve progress towards the early completion of the convention on chemical weapons. This recommendation adopted yesterday by the Ad Hoc Committee should not, in the view of the participants in the CW negotiations, pre-judge any possible further decisions regarding work during the period following the conclusion of the third part of the Conference on Disarmament, which is scheduled for the beginning of September. Consultations are still under way on this question. I should like to express the hope that the Conference on Disarmament will adopt our recommendation, which would then provide the "legal basis" required to continue negotiations on chemical weapons during the second and third weeks of July.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for introducing the recommendation contained in document CD/CW/WP.343. We shall be returning to that question later. I would now like to give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Chadha.

Mr. CHADHA (India): Madam President, as this is the first time I am taking the floor under your presidency, may I begin by extending to you my warm felicitations upon your assumption of this office and best wishes for a successful and fruitful term? It gives us particular pleasure to see a representative from the United Kingdom, a country with which India has very close ties, occupying the Chair at this crucial stage of our deliberations in the Conference on Disarmament. I would also like to join the earlier speakers in welcoming in our midst the Honourable Douglas Graham, Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control of New Zealand. I would like to thank him, in particular, for the interest he has shown in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, which I have the honour to chair, and we indeed look forward to listening to him this afternoon.

I have asked for the floor only to make a very brief statement on some recent positive developments which we believe would give an impetus to the negotiations which are now under way on chemical weapons at the Conference on Disarmament. I am referring to the statement made by President Bush on 13 May 1991 formally forswearing the use of chemical weapons for any reason against any State and unconditionally committing the United States to the destruction of its chemical weapons stocks within 10 years of the entry into force of a chemical weapons convention. The Government of India has already welcomed this statement, which, we believe, will make a crucial and important contribution to the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. India is strongly opposed to chemical weapons and has a long-standing commitment to the total worldwide elimination of chemical weapons and to outlawing their use unconditionally. To this end, India fully supports the call made by President Bush for an intensification of our negotiations here at Geneva in order to resolve all outstanding issues by the end of this year and to complete this convention by mid-1992. India will contribute in every possible manner to achieve the objectives of the total renunciation of chemical weapons, the commitment not to use chemical weapons under any circumstances

(Mr. Chadha, India)

and the destruction of all existing chemical weapons stockpiles. We will support the efforts of all like-minded delegations in the CD to these ends.

As my delegation has had occasion to state on many occasions in the past, a convention that can enjoy universal adherence must be non-discriminatory and must provide for equal rights and obligations of all States, whether or not they possess chemical weapons. It must contain an effective system of verification that reassures all States parties about compliance. The convention should ensure the unimpeded right of the States parties to develop, produce, use, exchange and transfer chemicals and technology for peaceful purposes and not hinder or impede international cooperation in peaceful areas of chemical industry development. The ideal way to ensure universal adherence to this convention is to make it attractive for those who join it. To this end, the interests of those who possess chemical weapons must be matched by the interests of those who do not and who will accept curbs on their chemical industry, which plays an important role in their development in the hope of achieving enhanced security. The routine verification system which will be developed must therefore ensure that the need for compliance is centred around the chemical industry itself, is focused, is easily implementable and is affordable. The issue of challenge inspection in the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention has now been discussed for a number of years. We believe that once a request for challenge inspection is received, the area of interest is enlarged and becomes the concern of all States parties, who are then legitimately involved in seeking reassurance that the convention is not being violated. The multilateral character of challenge inspection therefore needs to be ensured. The interests of security in the chemical weapons convention will have to be matched with the objectives of development. I am sure that all delegations negotiating on this issue in the CD share our sense of urgency and realize that the chemical weapons negotiations are at a critical stage. All efforts should be made to achieve our goal and India will fully support and complement endeavours towards this end.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his statement and also for his kind words, and perhaps now we can return to the document CD/CW/WP.343, the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons concerning the holding of an additional regular session, of limited duration, of the Ad Hoc Committee during the period 8 to 19 July. I propose that we now take action on that recommendation. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The secretariat shall inform the Division of Conference Services of the United Nations Office at Geneva, accordingly.

The Conference also has before it document CD/WP.406, containing a note by the President on a request addressed to us by a non-member State, concerning participation in the work of the Conference. As on previous occasions, I have already informed the coordinators that no objection had been received to that request. This being the case, may I suggest that we deal with the request directly at this formal plenary meeting? There seems to be

(The President)

no need now for an informal meeting, it being of course understood that this action does not set a precedent for the future consideration of requests from non-members. I shall now proceed to the adoption of the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The Permanent Mission of Ireland will be informed of this decision.

We shall now proceed to consider the timetable of meetings to be held next week by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies. The timetable has been circulated in an informal paper and is merely indicative and subject to change, if needed. If I hear no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I have no other business for this plenary meeting. Before adjourning it, may I recall that, in accordance with the timetable for this week and the decision taken at the end of our last plenary meeting, the Conference shall hold an informal meeting on the substance of agenda items 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" and 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", immediately after this plenary meeting?

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 20 June, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.