

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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Appendix I/Volume I
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REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX I

VOLUME I

List and text of documents issued by the
Conference on Disarmament

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REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX I

VOLUME I

List and text of Documents issued by the Conference
on Disarmament

Document No.	T i t l e
CD/8/Rev.3	Rules of Procedure of the Conference on Disarmament
CD/908/Rev.1 CD/OS/WP.29/Rev.1	Letter dated 22 March 1990 addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Mission of Venezuela transmitting a list of existing proposals on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.
CD/957	Letter dated 16 November 1989 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of Poland to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the Communiqué of the Meeting of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held in Warsaw on 26 and 27 October 1989
CD/958	Egypt: Report on the National Trial Inspection
CD/959	Letter dated 26 January 1990 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the resolutions and decisions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session
CD/960 CD/CW/WP.274	France: Second National Trial Inspection
CD/961	Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on Disarmament on its work during the period 16 January to 1 February 1990
CD/962	Letter dated 1 February 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Mexico addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the message to the Conference on Disarmament of His Excellency Carlos Salinas de Gortari, President of Mexico, on the occasion of the opening of the 1990 session

Document No.	Title
CD/963	Agenda for the 1990 session and Programme of work for the Conference on Disarmament
CD/964	Decision on the re-establishment of an <u>ad hoc</u> committee on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
CD/965	Decision on the re-establishment of an <u>ad hoc</u> committee on radiological weapons
CD/966 CD/CW/WP.275	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Trial Challenge Inspection at a military facility
CD/967	Letter dated 12 February 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Nigeria addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of a proposed agreement on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
CD/968	Decision on the re-establishment of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Chemical Weapons
CD/969 CD/CW/WP.277	Hungary: Provision of data relevant to the Chemical Weapons Convention
CD/970	Letter dated 16 February 1990 from the Chargé d'affaires of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a statement issued by the People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Co-operation in Tripoli on 13 February 1990
CD/971	Letter dated 15 February 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Austria addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a document containing additional information on Austrian production data relevant to the future Chemical Weapons Convention
CD/972	Letter dated 12 February 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Austria addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting an Aide Mémoire on the Austrian offer to host the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in Vienna

Document	Title
CD/973	Letter dated 20 February 1990 from the Representative of the United States of America addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting documents from the Wyoming and Moscow Meetings between the United States Secretary of State James A. Baker, III and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze
CD/974	Letter dated 20 February 1990 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the President of the Conference transmitting documents from the Wyoming and Moscow Meetings between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Eduard A. Shevardnadze, and the United States Secretary of State, James A. Baker III
CD/975 CD/CW/WP.278	Federal Republic of Germany: Report on a trial challenge inspection
CD/976	Mandate for an <u>ad hoc</u> committee under item 5 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament entitled "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space"
CD/977	Letter dated 8 March 1990 from the Permanent Observer of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in connection with disarmament on the Korean Peninsula, issued in Pyongyang on 5 March 1990
CD/978	Letter dated 9 March 1990 from the Representative of the United States of America addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the statement issued by the President of the United States of America, Mr. George Bush, in commemoration of the Twentieth Anniversary of the entry into force of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
CD/979 Corr.1 in Spanish only; Corr.2 in all languages	Hungary: Provision of military data
CD/980	Czechoslovakia: List of experts and laboratories for examination and analyses in the event of an investigation of reports of possible use of chemical, bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons

Document No.	Title
CD/981	Progress Report to the Conference on Disarmament on the twenty-ninth session of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events
CD/982	Yugoslavia: Report on the National Trial Inspection
CD/983 CD/CW/WP.283	Federal Republic of Germany: Report on the Second Trial Inspection (challenge inspection) in the Federal Republic of Germany
CD/984 CD/CW/WP.284 Corr.1 in Spanish only	Federal Republic of Germany: <u>Ad hoc</u> verification: the Establishment of National Registers
CD/985 CD/CW/WP.289	Poland: Provision of data relevant to the Chemical Weapons Convention
CD/986	Letter dated 18 April 1990 addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament from the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Czechoslovakia transmitting the Memorandum on the European Security Commission presented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Czechoslovakia, 6 April 1990
CD/987 CD/CW/WP.290	Canada: National Trial Inspection at a Single Small-scale Facility
CD/988 CD/CW/WP.291	Letter dated 19 April 1990 from the Permanent Mission of India addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a document entitled "Report of the National Trial Inspection conducted by India"
CD/989	Letter dated 19 April 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Egypt addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a letter addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations from Dr. Ahmed Esmat Abdel Meguid, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, concerning the establishment of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and President Hosni Mubarak's statement in this regard
CD/990	Letter dated 18 April 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Canada addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting compendia on outer space comprising plenary statements and working papers from the 1989 session of the Conference on Disarmament

Document No.	Title
CD/991	Letter dated 23 April 1990 from the Permanent Mission of Denmark addressed to the Secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting documentation concerning multi-lateral data exchange prior to the signing of a Chemical Weapons Convention
CD/992	Letter dated 23 April 1990 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting compendia on chemical weapons comprising plenary statements and working papers from the 1989 session of the Conference on Disarmament
CD/993	Letter dated 23 April 1990 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a Report entitled "Verification methods, handling, and assessment of unusual events in relation to allegations of the use of novel chemical warfare agents"
CD/994	Letter dated 23 April 1990 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a document entitled "Role and Function of a National Authority in the Implementation of a Chemical Weapons Convention"
CD/995	Letter dated 23 April 1990 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the fifth issue in the verification brochures series entitled "Canada and International Safeguards: Verifying Nuclear Non-proliferation"
CD/996 CD/CW/WP.292	German Democratic Republic: Report on a Trial Challenge Inspection in a Chemical Industry Plant
CD/997 CD/CW/WP.293	German Democratic Republic: Inspection Methodology for Challenge Inspections in Industrial Chemical Plants
CD/998 CD/CW/WP.294	German Democratic Republic: Application of Trace Analysis to Exploit Memory Effects in Challenge Inspections
CD/999 CD/CW/WP.295	Austria: Report on a National Trial Inspection

Document No.	Title
CD/1000	Letter dated 12 June 1990 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the Agreement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on Destruction and Non-production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons, the Agreed Statement in connection with that Agreement and the USSR-United States Joint Statement on Non-Proliferation
CD/1001	Letter dated 12 June 1990 from the Acting Representative of the United States of America addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Destruction and Non-production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons, the Agreed Statement in connection with that Agreement and the United States-USSR Joint Statement on Non-Proliferation
CD/1002	Letter dated 13 June 1990 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the texts of a press release and a declaration adopted at the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty in Moscow on 7 June 1990
CD/1003	Programme of work for the second part of the 1990 session of the Conference on Disarmament
CD/1004	Letter dated 19 June 1990 from the Representative of the United States of America addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting Joint Statements on the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms and on Future Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms and Further Enhancing Strategic Stability, adopted at the United States-Soviet Summit Meeting in Washington on 1 June 1990
CD/1005	Letter dated 19 June 1990 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting Joint Statements on the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms and on Future Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms and Further Enhancing Strategic Stability, adopted at the Soviet-United States Summit Meeting in Washington on 1 June 1990
CD/1006	Letter dated 19 June 1990 from the Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a document adopted at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Turnberry, United Kingdom on 7 and 8 June 1990

Document No.	Title
CD/1007	Letter dated 15 June 1990 from the Permanent Observer of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a new disarmament proposal adopted at the joint meeting of the Central People's Committee, the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly and the Administration Council of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea held in Pyongyang on 31 May 1990
CD/1008 CD/CW/WP.298	Norway: Use of sorbent extraction in verification of alleged use of chemical weapons
CD/1009	Letter dated 4 July 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Finland addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the latest volume of the Blue Book series on verification of chemical disarmament entitled "International Interlaboratory Comparison (round-robin) Test, F.1 Testing of Existing Procedures"
CD/1010	Norway: Verification of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban - Report on the Workshop on Seismological Aspects of Nuclear Test Ban Verification in Oslo, Norway, 14-17 February 1990
CD/1011	Letter dated 6 July 1990 from the Representatives of Peru and Venezuela addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the "Galápagos Declaration: Andean Agreement on Peace, Security and Co-operation" signed at Galápagos (Ecuador) on 18 December 1989 by the five Heads of State of the countries members of the Andean Group and the corresponding section of the "Machu Picchu Act" (Cuzco, Peru) signed by the leaders of the five countries on 23 May 1990
CD/1012 CD/CW/WP.304	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention: Practice challenge inspections of Government facilities: Analysis of results
CD/1013	Letter dated 13 July 1990 from the Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a document entitled "Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London on 5-6 July 1990"
CD/1014/Rev.1 CD/CW/WP.305/Rev.1	Romania: Data relevant to the Chemical Weapons Convention

Document No.	Title
CD/1015 CD/OS/WP.42	Argentina: Working paper on Proposals for the strengthening of the régime established by the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space
CD/1016	Mandate for an <u>ad hoc</u> committee under agenda item 1 "Nuclear Test Ban"
CD/1017	Bulgaria: Submission of data in connection with the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
CD/1018 CD/CW/WP.307	The Netherlands: Report on a Trial Challenge Inspection
CD/1019	Letter dated 20 July 1990 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of Norway addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a research report entitled "Use of Sorbent Extraction in Verification of Alleged Use of Chemical Warfare Agents. Part IX"
CD/1020 CD/CW/WP.310	German Democratic Republic: Report on a Trial Challenge Inspection
CD/1021 CD/CW/WP.311	The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: Report on a Trial Challenge Inspection at a Chemical Facility
CD/1022 CD/CW/WP.312	The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: Report on a Trial Challenge Inspection at a Military Facility
CD/1023 issued in English and French only	Letter dated 25 July 1990 from the Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a document entitled "Results of the Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Disarmament"
CD/1024 CD/CW/WP.313	Peru: New article of a convention on chemical weapons relating to the environment.
CD/1025 CD/CW/WP.314	Peru: Proposal by Peru for the inclusion in the Chemical Weapons Convention of an article on "Duration"
CD/1026 CD/CW/WP.315	Federal Republic of Germany: CW Verification Workshop Munster 14-15 June 1990
CD/1027	Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Radiological Weapons
CD/1028	Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons

Document No.	Title
CD/1029 CD/CW/WP.318	France: Report on a Trial Challenge Inspection
CD/1030/Rev.1 CD/CW/WP.319/Rev.1	Canada: Report on a National Trial Inspection
CD/1031 CD/CW/WP.320	China: Fundamental position and propositions on challenge inspection
CD/1032	Progress Report to the Conference on Disarmament on the thirtieth session of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events
CD/1033 Corr.1 in Spanish only	Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Chemical Weapons to the Conference on <u>Disarmament</u>
CD/1034	Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
CD/1035	Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban
CD/1036	Decision on the Improved and Effective Functioning of the Conference on Disarmament
CD/1037	Letter dated 22 August 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Canada addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a study on "The Chemical Weapons Convention and the International Inspectorate: A Quantitative Study"
CD/1038	Letter dated 22 August 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Canada addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting a study on "Toxicity Determinations and the Chemical Weapons Convention"
CD/1039 Corr.1 in Spanish only	Report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly of the United Nations

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/8/Rev.3
21 August 1990

Original: ENGLISH

RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

INTRODUCTION

These rules of procedure were adopted taking into account the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, including the agreement reached following appropriate consultations among the member States during that session which the General Assembly welcomed in the Final Document.

I. Functions and membership

1. The Conference on Disarmament (hereinafter referred to as the Conference) is a disarmament negotiating forum open to the nuclear weapons States and 35 other States (Annex I).
2. The membership of the Conference will be reviewed at regular intervals.
3. All member States of the Conference shall take part in its work in conditions of full equality as independent States, in accordance with the principle of sovereign equality enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

II. Representation and accreditation

4. The delegation of a member State of the Conference shall consist of a head of delegation and other representatives, advisers, and experts, as may be required.
5. Each delegation shall be accredited by a letter on the authority of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the member State, addressed to the President of the Conference.
6. The delegations shall be seated following the English alphabetical list of membership.

III. Sessions

7. The Conference shall have an annual session divided into three parts of 10 weeks, 7 weeks and 7 weeks respectively. The first part shall begin the

penultimate week of the month of January. The Conference shall decide the actual dates of the three parts of its annual session at the close of the previous year's session.

8. The President of the Conference, in full consultation with and with the agreement of all its members, may convene the Conference in special session.

IV. Presidency

9. When the Conference is in session, the Presidency of the Conference shall rotate among all its members; each President shall preside for a four-working-week period. The rotation which began in January 1979, based on the English alphabetical list of membership, shall be followed.

10. If the head of the delegation which performs the function of President cannot be present, he may be replaced by a member of his delegation. If no member of the delegation holding the chair is able to perform the function of President, the delegation next in order of rotation shall temporarily assume this function.

11. Apart from exercising the normal functions of a presiding officer and in addition to the powers conferred upon him elsewhere by these rules, the President shall, in full consultation with the Conference and under its authority, represent it in its relations with States, with the General Assembly and other organs of the United Nations and with other international organizations.

12. During the period when the Conference is not in session the functions of the President shall be carried out by the representative of the member State which presided over the last plenary meeting of the Conference.

V. Secretariat

13. At the request of the Conference the Secretary-General of the United Nations, following consultations with the Conference, will appoint the Secretary-General of the Conference, who shall also act as his personal representative, to assist the Conference and its President in organizing the business and timetables of the Conference.

14. Under the authority of the Conference and its President, the Secretary-General shall, inter alia, assist in the preparation of both the provisional agenda of the Conference and the first draft of the reports of the Conference to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

15. At the request of the Conference the Secretary-General shall provide professional assistance to the Conference by preparing background papers and bibliographies on issues which are the subject of negotiations in the Conference as well as by compiling data and information relevant to the conduct of negotiations.

16. The Secretary-General shall also perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these rules or by the Conference.

17. The Secretary-General of the United Nations will be requested to provide the staff as well as the necessary assistance and services needed by the Conference and any subsidiary bodies which it may establish.

VI. Conduct of work and adoption of decisions

18. The Conference shall conduct its work and adopt its decisions by consensus.

VII. Organization of work

19. The work of the Conference shall be conducted in plenary meetings, as well as under any additional arrangements agreed by the Conference, such as informal meetings with or without experts.

20. The Conference shall convene in plenary meetings in accordance with a schedule to be agreed upon. These meetings shall be held in public unless the Conference decides otherwise. In the event that it is decided to hold a private meeting, the Conference shall also decide whether to issue a communiqué of the meeting. The communiqué shall adequately reflect the substance of the proceedings and decisions taken by the Conference.

21. If the Conference is unable to take a decision on the substance of an item under negotiation, it will consider the subsequent examination of that item.

22. The Conference may hold informal meetings, with or without experts, to consider as appropriate substantive matters as well as questions concerning its organization of work. When requested by the Conference, the Secretariat shall provide unofficial summaries of those meetings in the working languages.

23. Whenever the Conference deems it advisable for the effective performance of its functions, including when it appears that there is a basis to negotiate a draft treaty or other draft texts, the Conference may establish subsidiary bodies, such as ad hoc sub-committees, working groups, technical groups or groups of governmental experts, open to all member States of the Conference unless the Conference decides otherwise. The Conference shall define the mandate for each of such subsidiary bodies and provide appropriate support for their work.

24. The Conference shall decide if its own rules of procedure may be adapted to the specific requirements of its subsidiary bodies. The meetings of the subsidiary bodies shall be informal unless the Conference decides otherwise. The Secretariat shall provide assistance to the subsidiary bodies, as requested, including the preparation of unofficial summaries of the subsidiary bodies' proceedings in the working languages of the Conference.

25. The approval by consensus of reports shall not be interpreted as affecting in any manner the essential requirement that such reports must reflect faithfully the positions of all the members of the respective organs.

26. The Conference and its subsidiary bodies shall normally meet at the Office of the United Nations at Geneva.

VIII. Agenda and programme of work

27. At the beginning of each annual session, the Conference shall adopt its agenda for the year. In doing so, the Conference shall take into account the recommendations made to it by the General Assembly, the proposals presented by member States of the Conference and the decisions of the Conference.

28. On the basis of its agenda, the Conference, at the beginning of its annual session, shall establish its programme of work, which will include a schedule of its activities for that session, taking also into account the recommendations, proposals and decisions referred to in rule 27.

29. The provisional agenda and the programme of work shall be drawn up by the President of the Conference with the assistance of the Secretary-General and presented to the Conference for consideration and adoption.

30. The subject of statements made in plenary meetings will normally correspond to the topic then under discussion in accordance with the agreed programme of work. However, it is the right of any member State of the Conference to raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference at a plenary meeting and to have full opportunity of presenting its views on any subject which it may consider to merit attention.

31. While the work of the Conference is in progress member States may request the inclusion of an urgent item in the agenda. The Conference shall decide whether and when it should be considered.

IX. Participation by States not members of the Conference

32. Representatives of non-member States shall have reserved seats in the conference room during plenary meetings and, if the Conference so decides, at other meetings.

33. Interested States not members of the Conference may submit to the Conference written proposals or working documents on measures of disarmament that are the subject of negotiation in the Conference and may participate in the discussion of the subject-matter of such proposals or working documents.

34. The Conference will invite States not members of the Conference, upon their request, to express views in the Conference when the particular concerns of those States are under discussion. Having considered such a request, the Conference will, through its President, transmit an invitation to that effect to the State or States concerned.

35. The Conference may also decide to invite the States referred to in rules 33 and 34 to participate in informal meetings and in meetings of its subsidiary bodies, in which case the procedure of rule 34 is applicable.

36. The provisions of rules 4 and 5 shall also apply to delegations of non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

X. Languages, records and documents

37. Simultaneous interpretation, verbatim records of public plenary meetings and documents shall be provided in the languages used within the United Nations system by member States of the Conference participating in its work. Any representative may speak in his own language provided he makes available simultaneous interpretation into a working language.

38. Numbers shall be given in the order in which documents are received by the Secretariat. Check lists of all documents reproduced by the Secretariat shall be available from time to time.

39. Documents of the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC), the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and the Committee on Disarmament (CD) series may be referred to without their re-submission.

40. Verbatim records and formal and other relevant documents of the Conference shall be distributed to States Members of the United Nations normally within two weeks. Official documents of the Conference will be made available for public use.

XI. Invitations to organs of the United Nations system

41. The Conference may decide to invite specialized agencies, the IAEA and other organs of the United Nations system to provide information as appropriate if the Conference decides that doing so would advance its work.

XII. Non-governmental organizations

42. All communications from non-governmental organizations to the Conference, to the President or to the Secretariat, shall be retained by the Secretariat and be made available to delegations upon request. A list of all such communications shall be circulated to the Conference.

XIII. Reports to the United Nations General Assembly

43. The Conference shall submit, through the President, reports to the United Nations General Assembly annually or more frequently as appropriate.

44. The drafts of such reports shall be prepared by the President of the Conference with the assistance of the Secretary-General and shall be made available to all member States of the Conference for consideration at least two weeks before the scheduled date for their adoption.

45. The reports of the Conference shall be factual and reflect the negotiations and work of the Conference. Unless the Conference decides otherwise, the drafts shall contain:

(a) The agenda;

(b) A summary of specific requests addressed to the Conference by the United Nations General Assembly at its preceding regular session;

(c) Sectional headings in accordance with items comprised in (a) and (b) above and other matters raised in the Conference during the year;

(d) Conclusions and decisions;

(e) A table of contents and an index of verbatim records, by country and subject, of the period covered by the reports;

(f) Working papers and proposals submitted during the year;

(g) Verbatim records of the meetings held during the year, distributed as a separate annex;

(h) Other relevant documents.

46. The Conference shall adopt the annual report at the end of its session. This report shall be made available to all Member States of the United Nations before the opening of the regular sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. All other reports shall be circulated without delay.

XIV. Amendments

47. These rules of procedure may be amended by decision of the Conference.

ANNEX I

Algeria	Japan
Argentina	Kenya
Australia	Mexico
Belgium	Mongolia
Brazil	Morocco
Bulgaria	Myanmar
Canada	Netherlands
China	Nigeria
Cuba	Pakistan
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic	Peru
Egypt	Poland
Ethiopia	Romania
France	Sri Lanka
German Democratic Republic	Sweden
Germany, Federal Republic of	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Hungary	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
India	United States of America
Indonesia	Venezuela
Iran, Islamic Republic of	Yugoslavia
Italy	Zaire

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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CD/OS/WP.29/Rev.1
27 March 1990

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LETTER DATED 22 MARCH 1990 ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION
OF VENEZUELA TRANSMITTING A LIST OF EXISTING PROPOSALS ON THE
PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

The Permanent Mission of Venezuela presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament and has the honour to request him to arrange for the attached paper to be distributed as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

This paper was presented by Venezuela during the 1989 session of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/908, 31 March 1989). It has been updated and contains the list of the proposals concerning item 5 of the agenda that had been submitted to the Conference on Disarmament as of 31 August 1989.

This document is being submitted as a contribution to the structured discussion of item 3 of the programme of work of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

VENEZUELA

EXISTING PROPOSALS ON THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE

Following is a list of the various proposals on the prevention of an arms race in outer space submitted to the Conference on Disarmament as of 31 August 1989. In each case, reference is made to the document containing the proposal or to the verbatim record of the session in which the proposal was presented.

This document is presented as a contribution to the structured discussion of point 3 of the work programme of the Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

I. Comprehensive proposals

- Treaty prohibiting the use of force in outer space or from space against the Earth (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, CD/476)
- Treaty prohibiting the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, CD/274)
- Amendment to Article IV of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty or additional protocol thereto (Venezuela, CD/PV.398, CD/PV.471, CD/851)
- Amendment to the Outer Space Treaty, multilateralization of the ABM Treaty and ban of ASAT systems other than space-based systems (Peru, CD/PV.428, CD/PV.472)
- Amendment of the Outer Space Treaty (Peru, CD/939).

II. Proposals addressing specific aspects of the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space

- Definition of space weapons (Venezuela, CD/709/Rev.1 and CD/OS/WP.14/Rev.1; Bulgaria and Hungary, CD/OS/WP.14/Rev.1; China, CD/OS/WP.14/Rev.1; Sri Lanka, CD/OS/WP.14/Rev.1; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, CD/OS/WP.14/Rev.1; German Democratic Republic, CD/OS/WP.14/Rev.1/Add.1)
- Declarations on the non-deployment of weapons in space (Argentina, CD/PV.423 and CD/PV.465)
- Main provisions of a treaty on the prohibition of ASAT weapons and ways to ensure the immunity of space objects (German Democratic Republic and Mongolia, CD/777)
- General treaty on the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons with specific protocols applicable to different categories of satellites (India, CD/PV.423)
- Prohibition of untested anti-satellite system (France, CD/PV.263, CD/PV.303)
- Prohibition of dedicated ASAT weapons (Sri Lanka, CD/PV.404)

- Multilateral instrument to supplement the 1972 ABM Treaty (Pakistan, CD/708)
- Step-by-step approach to the protection of satellites, including identifying which satellites should be subject to protection, followed by identification of an appropriate protection régime for such satellites (Australia, CD/PV.374)
- Protection régime for satellites that contribute to stability and to verification, and their associated ground stations (Australia, CD/PV.279)
- Multilateralization of provisions of bilateral agreements relating to the immunity of satellites (France, CD/375, CD/PV.263 and CD/PV.339; United Kingdom, CD/PV.311)
- Proposals concerning monitoring and verification and satellite immunity (France, CD/937)
- "Rules-of-the-road" agreement (Federal Republic of Germany, CD/PV.318 and CD/PV.345)
- Code of conduct (France, CD/PV.390)
- Confidence-building measures (France, CD/375)
- Confidence-building measures (Poland, CD/941)
- Measures aiming at greater transparency in space activities (Japan CD/PV.419; Australia CD/PV.374; Canada, CD/PV.468)
- Strengthening of the 1975 Registration Convention (France, CD/PV.263, CD/PV.303; Sweden, CD/PV.252; Sri Lanka, CD/PV.404; Pakistan, CD/PV.413, CD/PV.460; Argentina, CD/PV.423; India, CD/PV.423; Canada, CD/PV.468)
- International satellite monitoring agency (France, A/S-10/AC.1/7)
- World space organization (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, CD/PV.337)
- International Space Inspectorate (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, CD/817)
- Establishment of a group of experts (Sri Lanka, CD/PV.325, CD/PV.354; Sweden CD/PV.385, CD/PV.430; India, CD/PV.423)
- Proposal concerning a satellite image processing agency (France, CD/945)

III. Interim measures

- ASAT moratorium (Pakistan, CD/708; Sweden, CD/PV.288 and CD/PV.301; Mongolia CD/PV.297; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, CD/PV.302).

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/957
30 November 1989

ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH/FRENCH
RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 16 NOVEMBER 1989 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF POLAND TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON
DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE
MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY, HELD IN WARSAW ON
26 AND 27 OCTOBER 1989

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the Communiqué
of the Meeting of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States
Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held in Warsaw on 26 and 27 October 1989.

I would be grateful if you could arrange for the circulation of the text
of this communiqué as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Andrzej TOWPIC
 Chargé d'Affaires a.i.

COMMUNIQUE

of the Meeting of the Committee of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of
the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty

1. The Committee of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty on Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance held a regular meeting on 26 and 27 October in Warsaw. The meeting was attended by the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Ivan Ganev, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Jaromir Johanes, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, Oskar Fischer, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Polish People's Republic, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Ioan Totu, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary, Gyula Horn, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Eduard Shevardnadze. Also present were the Minister at the Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Khristo Khristov; the Minister of Foreign Trade of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Josef Sterba; the Minister of Foreign Trade of the German Democratic Republic, Gerhard Beil; the Minister for Foreign Economic Relations of the Polish People's Republic, Marcin Swiecicki; the Minister and Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Economic Relations of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Cornel Pinzaru; the Vice-Minister of Trade of the Republic of Hungary, Piroska Apro; and the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Economic Contacts of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Alexander Kachanov.
2. The ministers reviewed the state of and trends in the development of international relations. They noted the validity of the assessments contained in the documents of the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty held in Bucharest on 7 and 8 July 1989, regarding both the positive trends in the international situation and the phenomena determining its character, which is complex and contradictory in many respects. In that connection, the ministers reiterated the determination of their respective States to work further towards disarmament, the strengthening of peace, security and confidence, the democratization of relations between States and the development of broad international co-operation.
3. The participants in the meeting agreed that, although the situation is not straightforward, conditions in Europe are ripening to achieve a radical breakthrough in the relations between the countries of the continent, gradually overcome its division, and eliminate once and for all the relics of the "cold war". One of the essential prerequisites for the building of a secure, peaceful and indivisible Europe is respect for the right of each nation to decide independently about its fate and freely choose the path for its social, political and economic development, with no external interference. Of fundamental importance for the construction of the "common European house", given the diversity of social and constitutional systems between countries, is unconditional respect for the inviolability of the existing frontiers, territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of States, and respect for the generally accepted principles and standards of international law, the provisions of the CSCE Final Act and other documents adopted within the framework of the Helsinki process. Any attempts to

destabilize the situation, question the post-war borders and revive debate on this issue harm the process of building confidence and stability in Europe. It is imperative to respect fully the prerogatives of sovereign States, including those relating to citizenship, in keeping with obligations stemming from international law. At the meeting, attention was drawn to the danger that neo-nazism and revanchism would gain strength in some West European States. The ministers shared the view that the settlement of bilateral disputes is not facilitated by the involvement of the military-political alliances. The way to resolve such problems is solely through constructive dialogue, on an equal footing, between the States concerned.

4. The participants in the meeting pointed out the importance of progress in the Helsinki process in all fields for the establishment of solid foundations for security and closer co-operation between all States. They reaffirmed their determination to facilitate in every way the implementation of the decisions reached at the Vienna meeting and, generally, within the framework of the CSCE process. The ministers noted with satisfaction the positive progress of the Vienna negotiations involving the 23 countries of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO concerning conventional armed forces in Europe. They expressed their resolve to spare no effort to reach a first agreement on significant reductions in armed forces and conventional arms as early as next year. The agreement would be signed before the end of 1990 at a conference of heads of State or Government from Europe, the United States and Canada. The conference would be preceded by a meeting of ministers for foreign affairs. The reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments would be accomplished over a period of two to three years. That would make it possible to lower the levels of armaments and military spending substantially, unlock huge material and human reserves to support social and economic development, and strengthen stability and security on the continent. The participants in the meeting came out in favour of the adoption by the negotiators in the talks among the 35 CSCE countries concerning confidence-building and security-building measures, of a set of new measures encompassing all kinds of military activity, including the activities of air and naval forces. The establishment of a centre for the reduction of the danger of war and the prevention of a surprise attack in Europe would be of great importance. The ministers expressed the hope that the seminar of the 35 CSCE countries on military doctrines will promote confidence-building in Europe. The participants in the meeting called for an urgent start to separate negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

5. The allied States consider disarmament to be the key question of our time. They declare their dedication to the cause of the elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons. The ministers stressed the importance of the implementation of the Soviet-United States Treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and called for the earliest possible conclusion by the USSR and the United States of a treaty on 50 per cent reductions in their strategic armaments. The meeting noted the need to observe the Soviet-United States ABM Treaty in the form in which it was signed in 1972. The participants in the meeting pointed to the need for a halt to all nuclear arms testing. They called for a reciprocal renunciation of efforts to modernize such weapons. The ministers called for the earliest possible conclusion of an international convention on the complete prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons, and called on the participants in the Geneva negotiations to settle the outstanding issues in 1990. They stressed the importance of increasing the effectiveness of the Geneva Conference on

Disarmament as a whole. The participants in the meeting favoured the starting of negotiations on naval forces, involving all the States concerned, and first and foremost those with the largest potential in that area. The ministers exchanged views on a proposal to establish an "open skies" régime. The participants in the meeting reviewed issues relating to the conversion of arms production facilities to peaceful uses, and expressed their preparedness to hold international consultations on the issue. The ministers reaffirmed the validity of the stance and proposals on disarmament issues contained in the statement adopted by the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty at its Bucharest meeting, entitled "For a stable and secure Europe free of nuclear and chemical weapons, for a substantial reduction of armed forces, armaments and military spending".

6. The Ministers expressed concern over the insufficient development of pan-European economic co-operation. The establishment of extensive economic co-operation is in keeping with the growing interdependence between the countries of the continent, and constitutes an indispensable prerequisite for the formation of the material basis of détente and the raising of Europe to a qualitatively new economic and technical level of development. These objectives should be facilitated by fuller and deeper participation by all the countries of the continent in the present-day system of the international division of labour, and in world trade on the basis of generally recognized principles and rules, including the principles of mutual benefit, non-discrimination and most-favoured-nation status. It is necessary to eliminate the barriers and restrictions standing in the way of broader economic, trade, scientific, technical and manufacturing ties, as well as the practice of limiting such ties on political grounds. The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty are in favour of expanded bilateral and multilateral economic co-operation on an equal footing, including co-operation between economic organizations in Europe. An important role in this work should be played by the 1990 Bonn conference. The importance of expanded international co-operation in environmental protection was stressed. Fresh incentives to such co-operation based on the treatment of the continent as an ecological whole should be provided by the CSCE meeting on the protection of the environment in Sofia. The participants in the meeting noted the successful conduct of the conference and expressed the hope that it would end in concrete conclusions and recommendations, which would positively affect the further development of the all-European process.

7. The participants in the meeting expressed their conviction that an inseparable component of the process of building the "common European house" and a unified Europe in its diversity is full implementation in each country of the entire range of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the realization of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights, irrespective of race, sex, language, religion and national origin. Co-operation and business-like dialogue between States in the humanitarian sphere is becoming an important component of international security and co-operation. In that connection, the ministers came out in favour of broader human contacts and co-operation in the field of information, culture and education. They exchanged views on preparations for the Copenhagen and Moscow sessions of the Conference on the human dimension of the CSCE and the Krakow symposium on the European cultural heritage.

8. The participants in the meeting expressed their conviction that progress in disarmament, confidence-building and development of co-operation as well as the construction of an indivisible Europe will make it possible to establish a pan-European system of collective security and simultaneously dissolve the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO. The implementation of this objective would be facilitated by the establishment of contacts between the two alliances in various fields.

9. The ministers came out in favour of earliest possible settlement, by way of negotiations, of the existing regional conflicts and hotbeds of tension, and pointed out the need to further strengthen the role of the United Nations in this field. The participants in the meeting came out in favour of a comprehensive political settlement of the Afghan problem on the basis of national reconciliation, and the existence of Afghanistan as a unified, sovereign and non-aligned State whose people has the right to decide its fate with no outside interference. They came out in favour of the efforts mounted by the Republic of Afghanistan toward this end.

10. In the light of the results of the Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned countries in Belgrade, the participants noted the important contribution being made by the non-aligned movement to the resolution of the major problems of our time. The ministers underlined their States' intention to expand and deepen their co-operation with the movement.

11. The meeting expressed a shared aspiration to further develop co-operation between the allied States in many fields, on a basis of equality. The meeting was held in an atmosphere of friendship, mutual understanding and co-operation. The next meeting will be held in Bucharest.

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Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons

EGYPT

Report on the National Trial Inspection

Introduction

1. Egypt conducted a national trial inspection (NTI) at one of its chemical plants in order to contribute to the success of international efforts aimed at a total ban on chemical weapons and the destruction of the stocks of such weapons, pursuant to the proposal of the Ad hoc Committee at its summer session in 1988.

2. It should be noted that Egypt neither possesses nor produces chemical weapons. The plant under inspection is fully capable of producing chemical weapons of all kinds, and the Egyptian delegation is ready to discuss this trial with other delegations at the Conference on Disarmament with a view to improving procedures for genuine routine inspection.

Preparations

3. The inspectors undertook to protect the confidentiality of technical information on production processes at the plant under trial inspection.

Objectives of the national trial inspection (NTI)

4. The principal objective of inspection was to verify the following:

(a) Whether data on the production and processing of the chemical substance to be inspected were consistent with the records;

(b) That the facility was not being used to produce any chemical listed in schedules [1] or [2];

(c) That the reaction could not be stopped at a specific stage with a view to producing another chemical listed in schedules [1] or [2].

The degree of realism of the NTI

5. In order to ensure the realistic and positive nature of the NTI, the following steps were taken:

(a) The facility to be inspected was notified of the time of the NTI only a short time before the start of the inspection;

(b) The inspection team was present at all times from the start of operation of the unit to be inspected until the information of the final product;

(c) The inspection team consulted the documents and records concerning the product under inspection in order to verify their consistency with the actual production.

Selection of the inspection team

6. The political, scientific and technical authorities were keen to make this trial a success. Therefore, it was essential that the inspection team should include a specialist in the chemical industries with practical experience in this field, the technical expert representing the Egyptian delegation during the drafting of the convention on chemical weapons, and a representative of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs familiar with this subject. It was necessary to seek the help of some of the facility's personnel especially for the conduct of analyses under the supervision and control of the inspection team.

Selection of the facility

7. A multi-purpose facility in a chemical company belonging to the Ministry of Industry was selected for the conduct of the NTI. This facility is used basically for the production of limited quantities of various chemical products not included among the substances listed in schedules [1] and [2].

8. A multi-purpose unit was chosen to ensure the monitoring of the production stages from the start of the production process until the formation of the final product.

Selection of the chemical substance

9. Sodium toluene sulphonate (STS) was selected, although this substance is not included among substances listed in the chemical schedules annexed to the convention. However, for purposes of inspection and verification, it was regarded as being among the substances included in the draft convention.

The confidentiality of the NTI

10. In order to ensure the confidentiality of the information and data provided by the company to be inspected, it was agreed that the following conditions would be observed:

(a) Confidential business documents and technical records and information would be consulted only at the premises of the facility;

(b) As far as possible, only data stripped of information that might help to transfer the production technology to competing companies would be consulted;

(c) The inspection team would consist of Egyptian citizens only.

The conduct of the NTI

11. The NTI was conducted in accordance with the procedures laid down in document CD/213 as follows:

(a) Initial visit

The inspection team visited the plant to be inspected and met the responsible officials with a view to:

- (i) Clarifying the objectives of the convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons;
- (ii) Determining the steps to be taken before, during and after the NTI in order to ensure its success;
- (iii) Reaching agreement on the protection of the confidentiality of information and the manner in which it should be handled during the NTI;
- (iv) Defining methods for the taking and analysis of samples;
- (v) Listening to a complete explanation of the stages of the production of the chemical substance under inspection;
- (vi) Designating the company's escort team;
- (vii) Obtaining from the company an initial declaration containing information concerning the company, the chemicals produced in the multi-purpose unit to be inspected, and the quantities of the chemical substance under inspection that were produced during the year preceding the inspection;
- (viii) It was agreed with the responsible officials at the plant that the time of commencement of the inspection would coincide with the date set for the commencement of production of a batch of the substance STS;
- (ix) The company provided specific information concerning the facility and the chemical processes to be inspected.

(b) Conduct of the actual inspection

The inspection was conducted in accordance with article VI (2). The purpose of this type of inspection, known as "routine inspection", is to verify whether the actual production processes and the utilization of the facility correspond to the description in the declaration.

(c) Activity at the facility during the inspection

The inspection took place while the STS was being produced and stored. The inspectors were able to observe visually the most important operations in the production of this substance.

(d) Composition of the inspection team

The inspection team was made up as follows:

- (i) A chemical expert representing the Ministry of Industry, Chemical Industries Sector;
- (ii) A chemical expert, representing the Ministry of Defence;
- (iii) A representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
- (iv) The director of the company's research department;
- (v) The production manager of the multi-purpose unit.

(e) Inspection equipment

The facility provided the inspection equipment (sampling and safety equipment). The use of safety equipment was obligatory in accordance with the safety regulations at the facility (safety goggles, masks, hard hats).

(f) Duration of inspection and initial visit

- (i) Initial visit 1/2 day
- (ii) Inspection 1 1/2 days

12. General description of the production process

(a) The multi-purpose unit at the facility under inspection produces 600-800 tonnes of the chemicals needed for the production process. The unit operates in accordance with a batch system. The inspection was carried out while the unit was producing STS.

(b) Toluene was transferred from tank "V-102" to the reaction vessel "R-101", where oleum was added to it from one of the two vessels "V-107" and "V-108". The sulphonation process was then carried out.

(c) The substance produced, which is an intermediate product, was poured into the vessel "V-105", where neutralization took place using sodium hydroxide, which resulted in the formation of the final product, which was pumped into the vessel "V-201".

(d) The product was then dried in order to assume its final form.

(e) A difference of 1/2 tonne (loss) in the quantity of toluene was observed on comparing the theoretical calculations with the actual measurements. The reasons for this were:

- (i) The reaction does not take place to the extent of 100 per cent, resulting in a loss of 8.9 per cent.
- (ii) A loss of 1.1 per cent is incurred during the neutralization and transportation processes.

Conclusion

The theoretical calculations correspond to the actual production, if the above-mentioned considerations are taken into account.

Samples and sample-taking procedures

13. A member of the facility personnel took the samples required by the inspectors as follows:

- (a) Samples from the contents of the reactor, the tanks and the vessels connected with the reactor.
- (b) Samples from the raw feedstock used for the production of STS.
- (c) Random samples of the product STS.
- (d) Samples from effluents at different points in the facility.

Sample handling and analysis

14. Each sample was recorded in a record book, allocated a code number, labelled and then opened in the facility's laboratory. Analysis was conducted by the facility's personnel in the presence of the inspectors. Simple descriptive methods for qualitative and quantitative analysis were applied, using the primitive analytical equipment available in the laboratory. No off-site analyses were carried out. All the results obtained confirmed the correctness of the chemical process at all its stages up to the formation of the final product.

Evaluation by the inspectors

15. The evaluation carried out by the inspectors included:

- (a) The problems encountered;
- (b) The usefulness of the inspection;
- (c) The conclusions that could be drawn concerning the activities at the facility.

Closing conference

16. At the closing conference, the inspectors reviewed their on-site activities and their conclusions. The conference lasted about one hour.

The effect of inspection on the operations of the facility

17. The NTI had no noticeable effect on the operation of the plant. However, without the full co-operation between the facility personnel and the inspection team, the inspection would have impeded or even halted some of the operations. Moreover, the costs of inspection, in regard to the time taken and the efforts made by the facility personnel in the preparation of the initial declaration and their participation in the conduct of the NTI, must also be taken into consideration.

Conclusions and matters to be discussed further in regard to verification on a routine basis

18. In the course of the NTI, it became clear that several provisions of the draft convention concerning verification inspection on a routine basis require further discussion.

(a) Concerning multi-purpose facilities

How is it possible to determine the number, intensity, duration and timing of a verification inspection on a routine basis if the production process of the declared schedule [2] substance:

- (i) can be shifted from one multi-purpose facility to another;
- (ii) operates in batch mode;
- (iii) is discontinuous by reason of factors relating to supply and demand?

Is there any means, other than checking mass balance at a subsequent inspection, to ascertain whether a declared activity has been carried out in the multi-purpose facility in the interval between inspections or during the inspection itself?

(b) Concerning the consultation of confidential information and protection of confidentiality

How is it possible to ensure that the inspectors respect the confidentiality of the information to which they have access and that they refrain from leaking it to competing companies?

To what extent would the inspected facility be entitled to take legal action in the event of the disclosure of its industrial secrets and, in such a case, who would be liable for the loss suffered by the facility?

(c) Concerning the inspection procedures themselves

It is well known that the process of producing a complete batch may take several days. Would it be necessary for the inspectors to monitor and observe the entire process?

To what extent would a company under inspection be required to bear the financial costs of the inspection?

The inspector cannot verify the correctness of the declaration concerning the production of the chemical substance without having access to the data concerning the chemical process and the standard operating procedures, which increases the degree of intrusiveness of the routine inspection of the facility.

The inspector cannot determine the necessity and timing of inspections and samplings if he is uncertain about the precise timing of the production batch and the stages of the production process, which increases the degree of intrusiveness of the routine inspection of the facility.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/959
31 January 1990

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 26 JANUARY 1990 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE
RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS ON DISARMAMENT ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
AT ITS FORTY-FOURTH SESSION

I have the honour to transmit herewith the texts of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session, which entrust specific responsibilities to the Conference on Disarmament in 1990. The relevant provisions of those resolutions are reproduced in the Annex.

For the information of the Conference, you will also find attached the texts of other resolutions and decisions, dealing with or related to disarmament matters, which were adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session.

(Signed) Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

ANNEX

I. Resolutions dealing with disarmament matters

(A) Resolutions that entrust specific responsibilities to the Conference on Disarmament

At its forty-fourth session, the General Assembly adopted the following resolutions entrusting specific responsibilities to the Conference on Disarmament:

- 44/105 "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions"
- 44/107 "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty"
- 44/110 "Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"
- 44/111 "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"
- 44/112 "Prevention of an arms race in outer space"
- 44/114 A "Reduction of military budgets"
- 44/115 A "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons"
- 44/115 B "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and to support the conclusion of a chemical weapons Convention"
- 44/116 A "Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons"
- 44/116 H "Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes"
- 44/116 O "Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof"
- 44/116 R "Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes"
- 44/116 T "Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons"
- 44/117 C "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons"
- 44/119 A "Comprehensive programme of disarmament"
- 44/119 B "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war"

44/119 D "Report of the Conference on Disarmament"

44/119 E "Cessation of the Nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war"

The Conference's attention should be drawn, in particular, to the following provisions contained in those resolutions:

(1) In resolution 44/105, operative paragraph 5 appeals to all States members of the Conference on Disarmament to promote the establishment by the Conference at the beginning of its 1990 session of an ad hoc committee with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear-test explosions; and operative paragraph 6 recommends to the Conference on Disarmament that such an ad hoc committee should comprise two working groups dealing, respectively, with the following interrelated questions: contents and scope of the treaty, and compliance and verification.

(2) In resolution 44/107, operative paragraph 2 urges that the following actions be taken in order that a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty may be concluded at an early date: (a) The Conference on Disarmament should intensify its consideration of item 1 of its agenda entitled "Nuclear-test ban" and initiate substantive work on all aspects of a nuclear-test-ban treaty at the beginning of its 1990 session; (b) States members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, and all other States should co-operate in order to facilitate and promote such work; (c) The nuclear-weapon States, especially those which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, should agree promptly to appropriate verifiable and militarily significant interim measures, with a view to realizing a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty; (d) Those nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so should adhere to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water; operative paragraph 3 also urges the Conference on Disarmament: (a) To take immediate steps for the establishment, with the widest possible participation, of an international seismic monitoring network with a view to the further development of its potential to monitor and verify compliance with a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty; (b) To take into account, in this context, the progress achieved by the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, including work on the routine exchange and use of wave-form data, and other relevant initiatives or experiments by individual States and groups of States; (c) To encourage the widest possible participation by States in the technical test that will take place in 1990 concerning the global exchange and analysis of seismic data; (d) To initiate detailed investigation of other measures to monitor and verify compliance with such a treaty, including an international network to monitor atmospheric radioactivity; and operative paragraph 4 calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session on progress made.

(3) In resolution 44/110, operative paragraph 2 recommends that the Conference on Disarmament pursue intensive negotiations in its Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons at the beginning of its 1990 session, with a view to reaching such an

agreement, taking into account the widespread support in the Conference for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective.

(4) In resolution 44/111, operative paragraph 2 notes with satisfaction that in the Conference on Disarmament there is no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although the difficulties as regards evolving a common approach acceptable to all have also been pointed out; operative paragraph 4 recommends that further intensive efforts should be devoted to the search for such a common approach or common formula and that the various alternative approaches, including, in particular, those considered in the Conference on Disarmament, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties; and operative paragraph 5 recommends that the Conference on Disarmament should actively continue negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective.

(5) In resolution 44/112, operative paragraph 5 reiterates that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects; operative paragraph 6 requests the Conference on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space; operative paragraph 7 also requests the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, taking into account relevant proposals and initiatives, including those presented in the Ad hoc Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space at the 1989 session of the Conference and at the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly; operative paragraph 8 further requests the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish an ad hoc committee an adequate mandate at the beginning of its 1990 session, with a view with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects; operative paragraph 9 urges the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to pursue intensively their bilateral negotiations in a constructive spirit aimed at reaching early agreement for preventing an arms race in outer space, and to advise the Conference on Disarmament periodically of the progress of their bilateral sessions so as to facilitate its work; and operative paragraph 12 requests the Conference on Disarmament to report on its consideration of this subject to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session.

(6) In resolution 44/114 A, operative paragraph 1 welcomes the work of the Disarmament Commission on the identification and elaboration of a set of principles that should govern further action of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military budgets; and operative paragraph 2 takes note of these principles, as annexed, and decides to bring them to the attention of Member States and of the Conference on Disarmament as useful guidelines for further action in the field of the freezing and reduction of military budgets.

(7) In resolution 44/115 A, operative paragraph 1 notes with satisfaction the work of the Conference on Disarmament during its 1989 session regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons, and, in particular, appreciates the progress in the work of its Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on that question and the tangible results recorded in its report; operative paragraph 3 again urges the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to intensify, during its 1990 session, which will be of pivotal importance, the negotiations on a convention and to reinforce its efforts further by, inter alia, increasing the time that it devotes to such negotiations, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, with a view to the final elaboration of a convention at the earliest possible date, and to re-establish its Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for that purpose with the mandate to be agreed upon by the Conference at the beginning of its 1990 session; and operative paragraph 4 requests the Conference on Disarmament to use the political momentum generated by the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other Interested States and the recognition by that Conference that a global ban on chemical weapons is of universal concern and interest, to achieve the conclusion at the earliest possible date of such a convention; and operative paragraph 5 also requests the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session on the results of its negotiations.

(8) In resolution 44/115 B operative paragraph 3 urges the Conference on Disarmament to pursue as a matter of continuing urgency its negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

(9) In resolution 44/116 A, operative paragraph 2 requests once again the Conference on Disarmament to intensify further its efforts to reach, as early as possible, an agreement prohibiting armed attacks against nuclear facilities.

(10) In resolution 44/116 H, the operative paragraph requests the Conference on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to pursue its consideration of the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration.

(11) In resolution 44/116 O, operative paragraph 5 requests the Conference on Disarmament, in consultation with the States parties to the Treaty, taking into account existing proposals and any relevant technological developments, to proceed promptly with consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof; and operative paragraph 7 also requests the Conference on Disarmament to report on its consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof to the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session.

(12) In resolution 44/116 R, operative paragraph 5 requests the Conference on Disarmament to continue to take into account, in the ongoing negotiations for a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, the deliberate employment of nuclear wastes to cause destruction, damage or injury

by means of radiation produced by the decay of such material; and operative paragraph 7 also requests the Conference on Disarmament to include in its report to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session the developments in the ongoing negotiations on this subject.

(13) In resolution 44/116 T, operative paragraph 2 recognizes that in 1989 the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons made a further contribution to the clarification and better understanding of different approaches that continue to exist with regard to both of the important matters under consideration; operative paragraph 3 takes note of the recommendation of the Conference on Disarmament that the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons should be re-established at the beginning of its 1990 session; and operative paragraph 4 requests the Conference on Disarmament to continue its substantive negotiation on the subject with a view to the prompt conclusion of its work, taking into account all proposals presented to the Conference to this end and drawing upon the annexes to its report as a basis of its future work, the result of which should be submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session.

(14) In resolution 44/117 C, operative paragraph 1 reiterates its request to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations, as a matter of priority, in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons annexed to the present resolution; and operative paragraph 2 also requests the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session on the results of those negotiations.

(15) In resolution 44/119 A, operative paragraph 1 calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to consider, at the beginning of its 1991 session, the resumption of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament with the aim of resolving the outstanding issues in order to conclude the elaboration of the programme.

(16) In resolution 44/119 B, operative paragraph 3 requests the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on the item in its agenda concerning prevention of nuclear war and to consider, inter alia, the elaboration of an international instrument of a legally binding character laying down the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

(17) In resolution 44/119 D, operative paragraph 1 reaffirms the role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community; operative paragraph 2 notes with satisfaction that further progress has been made in the negotiations on the elaboration of a draft convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, and urges the Conference on Disarmament to intensify further its work with a view to completing negotiations on such a draft convention as soon as possible; operative paragraph 3 calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its work, to further its mandate more earnestly through substantive negotiations, within the framework of ad hoc committees as the most appropriate mechanism, and to adopt concrete measures

on the specific priority issues of disarmament on its agenda, in accordance with the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly; operative paragraph 4 urges the Conference on Disarmament to provide negotiating mandates to ad hoc committees on all agenda items, in keeping with the fundamental role of the Conference as identified in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session; and operative paragraph 5 requests the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session.

(18) In resolution 44/119 E, operative paragraph 4 requests the Conference on Disarmament to establish ad hoc committees at the beginning of its 1990 session on both the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war with adequate mandates in order to allow a structured and practical analysis of how the Conference on Disarmament can best contribute to progress on these two urgent matters; and operative paragraph 5 also requests the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session on its consideration of these subjects.

In the above-mentioned resolutions 44/112, 44/116 O, 44/116 R and 44/116 T, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all relevant documents. They are the following:

44/112 A/44/27, A/44/134, A/44/228, A/44/293-S/20653, A/44/295,
 A/44/318-S/20689, A/44/347-S/20702, A/44/386,
 A/44/409-S/20743, A/44/551-S/20870, A/C.1/44/L.10,
 A/C.1/44/L.16, A/C.1/44/L.19, A/C.1/44/L.28.

44/116 O A/C.1/44/L.43.

44/116 R A/44/27, A/44/652, A/C.1/44/L.55.

44/116 T A/44/27, A/44/621, A/C.1/44/L.1, A/C.1/44/L.57.

The relevant records of the consideration of the subjects covered by those resolutions transmitting documentation are contained in documents A/44/PV.4 to 31, A/44/PV.81, A/C.1/44/PV.3 to 25 and A/C.1/44/PV.32, 35, 40 and 41.

All those documents and records were distributed during the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly to all Members of the United Nations, including all members of the Conference on Disarmament.

(B) Other resolutions and decisions dealing with disarmament matters

At the forty-fourth session, the General Assembly also adopted the following resolutions dealing with disarmament matters:

44/104 "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 43/62 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)"

- 44/106 "Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water"
- 44/108 "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East"
- 44/109 "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia"
- 44/113 A "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa"
- 44/113 B "Nuclear capability of South Africa"
- 44/114 B "Military budgets"
- 44/115 C "Implementation of the recommendations of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction"
- 44/116 B "Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations"
- 44/116 C "Conventional disarmament"
- 44/116 D "Nuclear disarmament"
- 44/116 E "Objective information on military matters"
- 44/116 F "Conventional disarmament"
- 44/116 G "Implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament"
- 44/116 I "Confidence- and security-building measures and conventional disarmament in Europe"
- 44/116 J "Conversion of military resources"
- 44/116 K "Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations"
- 44/116 L "Relationship between disarmament and development"
- 44/116 M "Naval armaments and disarmament"
- 44/116 N "International arms transfers"
- 44/116 P "Defensive security concepts and policies"
- 44/116 Q "Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament: report of the Disarmament Commission"
- 44/116 S "Conventional disarmament on a regional scale"
- 44/116 U "Contribution of confidence- and security-building measures to international peace and security"

- 44/117 A "World Disarmament Campaign"
- 44/117 B "Regional disarmament"
- 44/117 D "Nuclear-arms freeze"
- 44/117 E "United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services programme"
- 44/117 F "United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament in Africa and Asia and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean"
- 44/118 A "Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security"
- 44/118 B "Science and technology for disarmament"
- 44/119 C "Report of the Disarmament Commission"
- 44/119 F "South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty"
- 44/119 G "Disarmament Week"
- 44/119 H "Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade"
- 44/120 "Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace"
- 44/121 "Israeli nuclear armament"
- 44/122 "Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements"
- 44/123 "Education for disarmament"

In addition, the General Assembly adopted decision 44/430 entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects", decision 44/131 entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament" and decision 44/432 entitled "International co-operation for disarmament".

II. Resolutions relating to disarmament matters

It should be noted that, at its forty-fourth session, the General Assembly adopted the following resolutions which are relating to disarmament matters:

- 44/11 "Achievements of the International Year of Peace"
- 44/13 "Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency"

- 44/20 "Zone of peace and co-operation of the South Atlantic"
- 44/21 "Enhancing international peace, security and international co-operation in all its aspects in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations"
- 44/31 "Peaceful settlement of disputes between States"
- 44/32 "Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind"
- 44/37 "Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the strengthening of the Role of the Organization"
- 44/45 "Effects of atomic radiation"
- 44/46 "International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space"
- 44/49 "Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects"
- 44/51 "Protection and security of small States"
- 44/124 "Question of Antarctica"
- 44/125 "Strengthening of security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region"
- 44/126 "Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security"

Also the General Assembly adopted decision 44/433 entitled "Comprehensive approach to strengthening international peace and security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations".



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/44/104
8 January 1990

Forty-fourth session
Agenda item 49

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/44/771)]

44/104. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 43/62 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967, 3262 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3473 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 32/76 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 33/58 of 14 December 1978, 34/71 of 11 December 1979, 35/143 of 12 December 1980, 36/83 of 9 December 1981, 37/71 of 9 December 1982, 38/61 of 15 December 1983, 39/51 of 12 December 1984, 40/79 of 12 December 1985, 41/45 of 3 December 1986, 42/25 of 30 November 1987 and 43/62 of 7 December 1988 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), 1/

Taking into account that within the zone of application of that Treaty, to which twenty-three sovereign States are already parties, there are some territories which, in spite of not being sovereign political entities, are nevertheless in a position to receive the benefits deriving from the Treaty through its Additional Protocol I, to which the four States that de jure or de facto are internationally responsible for those territories may become parties,

Considering that it is not fair that the peoples of some of those territories are deprived of such benefits without being given the opportunity to express their opinion in this connection,

1/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 634, No. 9068.

Recalling that three of the States to which Additional Protocol I is open - the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of America - became parties to the Protocol in 1969, 1971 and 1981, respectively,

1. Deplores that the signature of Additional Protocol I by France, which took place on 2 March 1979, has not yet been followed by the corresponding ratification, notwithstanding the time already elapsed and the pressing invitations which the General Assembly has addressed to it;

2. Once more urges France not to delay any further such ratification, which has been requested so many times and which appears all the more advisable, since France is the only one of the four States to which the Protocol is open that is not yet party to it;

3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session an item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 44/104 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/44/105
8 January 1990

Forty-fourth session
Agenda item 50

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[(on the report of the First Committee (A/44/772)]

44/105. Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind that the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, which has been examined for more than thirty years and on which the General Assembly has adopted more than fifty resolutions, is a basic objective of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, to the attainment of which it has repeatedly assigned the highest priority,

Stressing that on eight different occasions it has condemned such tests in the strongest terms and that, since 1974, it has stated its conviction that the continuance of nuclear-weapon testing will intensify the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war,

Recalling that the Secretary-General, addressing a plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 12 December 1984, after appealing for a renewed effort towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty, emphasized that no single multilateral agreement could have a greater effect on limiting the further refinement of nuclear weapons and that a comprehensive test-ban treaty is the litmus test of the real willingness to pursue nuclear disarmament, 1/

1/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-ninth Session, Plenary Meetings, 97th meeting, para. 302.

Taking into account that the three nuclear-weapon States that act as depositaries of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water 2/ undertook in article I of that Treaty to conclude a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear-test explosions, including all those explosions underground, and that such an undertaking was reiterated in 1968 in the preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 3/ article VI of which further embodies their solemn and legally binding commitment to take effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,

Noting that the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in its Final Declaration 4/ adopted on 21 September 1985, called upon the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to resume trilateral negotiations in 1985 and upon all the nuclear-weapon States to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, as a matter of the highest priority, in the Conference on Disarmament,

Recalling the disarmament document adopted by the Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade from 4 to 7 September 1989, which underlined that the immediate suspension of and comprehensive ban on nuclear tests remained one of the highest priorities of nuclear disarmament, 5/

Recalling also that the leaders of the States associated with the Six-Nation Initiative on peace and disarmament affirmed in the Stockholm Declaration, 6/ adopted on 21 January 1988, that "Any agreement that leaves room for continued testing would not be acceptable",

Taking note with satisfaction of the continuing progress made in the Conference on Disarmament by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events on the seismic verification of a comprehensive test ban, 7/

2/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 480, No. 6964.

3/ Ibid., vol. 729. No. 10485.

4/ Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part I (NPT/CONF.III/64/I) (Geneva, 1985), annex I.

5/ See A/44/551-S/20870, annex, p. 22, para. 10.

6/ A/43/125-S/19478, annex.

7/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/44/27), para. 29.

Expressing its concern that, after six years of efforts, the Conference on Disarmament has not yet succeeded in establishing an ad hoc committee on item 1 of its agenda, entitled "Nuclear test ban",

1. Reiterates once again its grave concern that nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated, against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States;

2. Reaffirms its conviction that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the highest priority;

3. Reaffirms also its conviction that such a treaty would constitute a contribution of the utmost importance to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race;

4. Urges once more all nuclear-weapon States, in particular the three depositary Powers of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to seek to achieve the early discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to expedite negotiations to this end;

5. Appeals to all States members of the Conference on Disarmament to promote the establishment by the Conference at the beginning of its 1990 session of an ad hoc committee with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear-test explosions;

6. Recommends to the Conference on Disarmament that such an ad hoc committee should comprise two working groups dealing, respectively, with the following interrelated questions: contents and scope of the treaty, and compliance and verification;

7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/44/106
12 January 1990

Forty-fourth session
Agenda item 51

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/44/773)]

44/106. Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests
in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water

The General Assembly,

Reiterating its conviction that a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is the highest-priority step towards nuclear disarmament,

Recalling its resolution 1910 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963, in which it noted with approval the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, 1/ signed on 5 August 1963, and requested the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament 2/ to continue with a sense of urgency its negotiations to achieve the objectives set forth in the preamble to the Treaty,

Convinced that, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, the nuclear-weapon States should suspend all nuclear-test explosions through an agreed moratorium or unilateral moratoria,

Noting that article II of the Treaty provides a procedure for convening a conference of the parties to the Treaty to consider amendments to the Treaty,

Noting also that, in its resolution 42/26 B of 30 November 1987, it recommended that the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty formally submit an amendment proposal to the Depositary Governments with a view to convening

1/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 480, No. 6964.

2/ The Committee on Disarmament was redesignated the Conference on Disarmament as from 7 February 1984.

a conference at the earliest possible date to consider amendments to the Treaty that would convert it into a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and that, by its resolution 43/63 B of 7 December 1988, it welcomed the submission of such an amendment proposal,

Noting further that the Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade from 4 to 7 September 1989, supported the initiative to convene, as soon as possible in 1990, an amendment conference to convert the Treaty into a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, 3/

Considering that more than one third of the parties have requested the convening of a conference to consider such an amendment, and that Depositary Governments have announced their intention to comply with their obligations under the Treaty,

Convinced that such a conference will serve to strengthen the Treaty,

1. Recommends that a preparatory committee, open to all parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, should be established to make arrangements for the amendment conference and that such preparatory committee should meet at United Nations Headquarters from 29 May to 1 June 1990, followed by a one-week session of the conference from 4 to 8 June 1990 and a second substantive session from 7 to 18 January 1991;

2. Recommends also that the costs of the amendment conference and its preparatory committee should be shared among the States parties to the Treaty, on the basis of the present scale of assessments of the United Nations;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and provide such services, including summary records, as may be required for the amendment conference and its preparation;

4. Invites the amendment conference to transmit to the General Assembly the documents it deems appropriate to keep the Assembly duly informed of its ongoing work;

5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

3/ See A/44/551-S/20870, annex, p. 22, para. 10.



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/44/107
16 January 1990

Forty-fourth session
Agenda item 52

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/44/774)]

44/107. Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty

The General Assembly,

Convinced that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,

Convinced also of the consequent urgent need for an end to the nuclear-arms race and the immediate and verifiable reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons,

Convinced further that an end to nuclear testing by all States in all environments for all time is an essential step in order to prevent the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons and their further proliferation and to contribute, along with other concurrent efforts to reduce nuclear arms, to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing the recent progress made in the negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, as reflected in their joint statement of 23 September 1989, 1/ towards improved verification arrangements and the ratification of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests, 2/ signed on 3 July 1974, and the Treaty between the United States

1/ A/44/578-S/20868, annex.

2/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/9627), annex II, document CCD/431.

of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, 3/ signed on 28 May 1976, and urging both countries to complete that process,

Welcoming the ongoing implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles 4/ and the agreement in principle on and further progress made towards an agreement for 50 per cent reductions in their strategic nuclear forces,

Recalling the disarmament document adopted by the Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade from 4 to 7 September 1989, 5/

Recalling also the proposals by the leaders of the Six-Nation Initiative to promote an end to nuclear testing, 6/

Convinced that the most effective way to achieve the discontinuance of all nuclear tests by all States in all environments for all time is through the conclusion, at an early date, of a verifiable, comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty that will attract the adherence of all States,

Reaffirming the particular responsibilities of the Conference on Disarmament in the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty,

Taking note of the work being undertaken within the Conference on Disarmament by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative

3/ The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. I: 1976 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.77.IX.2), appendix III.

4/ Ibid., vol. 12: 1987 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.88.IX.2), appendix VII.

5/ A/44/551-S/20870, annex, pp. 20-25.

6/ See the Joint Declaration issued on 22 May 1984 by the heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania (A/39/277-S/16587, annex; for the printed text, see Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-ninth Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1984, document S/16587, annex), reaffirmed in the Delhi Declaration issued on 28 January 1985 (A/40/114-S/16921, annex; for the printed text, see Official Records of the Security Council, Fortieth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1985, document S/16921, annex), the Mexico Declaration issued on 7 August 1986 (A/41/518-S/18277, annex I), the Stockholm Declaration issued on 21 January 1988 (A/43/125-S/19478, annex) and the Declaration issued on 22 May 1989 on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the launching of the Six-Nation Initiative (A/44/318-S/20689, annex).

Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events in preparation for the next phase of the technical test, to take place in 1990, concerning the global exchange and analysis of seismic data, 7/

1. Reaffirms its conviction that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States in all environments for all time is a matter of fundamental importance;

2. Urges, therefore, that the following actions be taken in order that a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty may be concluded at an early date:

(a) The Conference on Disarmament should intensify its consideration of item 1 of its agenda, entitled "Nuclear test ban", and initiate substantive work on all aspects of a nuclear-test-ban treaty at the beginning of its 1990 session;

(b) States members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, and all other States should co-operate in order to facilitate and promote such work;

(c) The nuclear-weapon States, especially those which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, should agree promptly to appropriate verifiable and militarily significant interim measures, with a view to realizing a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty;

(d) Those nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so should adhere to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water; 8/

3. Also urges the Conference on Disarmament:

(a) To take immediate steps for the establishment, with the widest possible participation, of an international seismic monitoring network with a view to the further development of its potential to monitor and verify compliance with a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty;

(b) To take into account, in this context, the progress achieved by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, including work on the routine exchange and use of wave-form data, and other relevant initiatives or experiments by individual States and groups of States;

7/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/44/27), para. 54.

8/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 480, No. 6964.

(c) To encourage the widest possible participation by States in the technical test that will take place in 1990 concerning the global exchange and analysis of seismic data;

(d) To initiate detailed investigation of other measures to monitor and verify compliance with such a treaty, including an international network to monitor atmospheric radioactivity;

4. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session on progress made;

5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/44/108
19 January 1990

Forty-fourth session
Agenda item 53

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/44/775)]

44/108. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/71 of 10 December 1976, 32/82 of 12 December 1977, 33/64 of 14 December 1978, 34/77 of 11 December 1979, 35/147 of 12 December 1980, 36/87 of 9 December 1981, 37/75 of 9 December 1982, 38/64 of 15 December 1983, 39/54 of 12 December 1984, 40/82 of 12 December 1985, 41/48 of 3 December 1986, 42/28 of 30 November 1987 and 43/65 of 7 December 1988 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recalling also the recommendations for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East consistent with paragraphs 60 to 63, and in particular paragraph 63 (d), of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/

Emphasizing the basic provisions of the above-mentioned resolutions, which call upon all parties directly concerned to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East and, pending and during the establishment of such a zone, to declare solemnly that they will refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

weapons on their territory by any third party, to agree to place all their nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and to declare their support for the establishment of the zone and deposit such declarations with the Security Council for consideration, as appropriate,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of all States to acquire and develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,

Emphasizing also the need for appropriate measures on the question of the prohibition of military attacks on nuclear facilities,

Bearing in mind the consensus reached by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security,

Desirous of building on that consensus so that substantial progress can be made towards establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Emphasizing further the essential role of the United Nations in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General, 2/

1. Urges all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and, as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; 3/

2. Calls upon all countries of the region that have not done so, pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

3. Takes note of the request made by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency to its Director General in resolution GC(XXXIII)/RES/506 "to consult with the States concerned in the Middle East area with a view to applying Agency safeguards to all nuclear installations in the area, keeping in mind the relevant recommendations contained in paragraph 75 of the report attached to document GC(XXXIII)/887 and the situation in the area of the Middle East, and to report on the matter to the Board of Governors and to the General Conference at its thirty-fourth regular session";

2/ A/44/430 and Add.1 and 2.

3/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 729, No. 10485.

4. Invites all countries of the region, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, to declare their support for establishing such a zone, consistent with paragraph 63 (d) of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and to deposit those declarations with the Security Council;

5. Also invites those countries, pending the establishment of the zone, not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit the stationing on their territories, or territories under their control, of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices;

6. Invites the nuclear-weapon States and all other States to render their assistance in the establishment of the zone and at the same time to refrain from any action that runs counter to both the letter and the spirit of the present resolution;

7. Extends its thanks to the Secretary-General for his report containing the views of parties concerned regarding the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East;

8. Takes note of the above-mentioned report;

9. Requests parties of the region to submit to the Secretary-General their views and suggestions with respect to the measures called for in paragraph 8 of resolution 43/65;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session a progress report on the implementation of the present resolution;

11. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

81st plenary meeting

15 December 1989



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/44/109
16 January 1990

Forty-fourth session
Agenda item 54

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/44/776)]

44/109. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3265 B (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3476 B (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/73 of 10 December 1976, 32/83 of 12 December 1977, 33/65 of 14 December 1978, 34/78 of 11 December 1979, 35/148 of 12 December 1980, 36/88 of 9 December 1981, 37/76 of 9 December 1982, 38/65 of 15 December 1983, 39/55 of 12 December 1984, 40/83 of 12 December 1985, 41/49 of 3 December 1986, 42/29 of 30 November 1987 and 43/66 of 7 December 1988 concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia,

Reiterating its conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world is one of the measures that can contribute effectively to the objectives of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and general and complete disarmament,

Believing that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, as in other regions, will assist in the strengthening of the security of the States of the region against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting with appreciation the declarations issued at the highest level by the Governments of South Asian States that are developing their peaceful nuclear programmes, reaffirming their undertaking not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons and to devote their nuclear programmes exclusively to the economic and social advancement of their peoples,

Welcoming the recent proposal for the conclusion of a bilateral or regional nuclear-test-ban agreement in South Asia,

Taking note of the proposal to convene, under the auspices of the United Nations, a conference on nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia, as soon as possible, with the participation of the regional and other concerned States,

Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraphs 60 to 63 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly 1/ regarding the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, including in the region of South Asia,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General, 2/

1. Reaffirms its endorsement, in principle, of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;
2. Urges once again the States of South Asia to continue to make all possible efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and to refrain, in the mean time, from any action contrary to that objective;
3. Calls upon those nuclear-weapon States which have not done so to respond positively to this proposal and to extend the necessary co-operation in the efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to communicate with the States of the region and other concerned States in order to ascertain their views on the issue and to promote consultations among them with a view to exploring the best possibilities of furthering the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;
5. Also requests the Secretary-General to report on the subject to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session;
6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

2/ A/44/363 and Corr.1.



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/44/110
16 January 1990

Forty-fourth session
Agenda item 56

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/44/778)]

44/110. Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned at the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war,

Considering that, until complete nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective arrangements to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting the general desire to conclude effective international measures to that end at an early date,

Taking note of the unilateral declarations on the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, made by all nuclear-weapon States,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ the first special session devoted to disarmament,

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

Recognizing that effective measures of such security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States would constitute an important contribution to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,

Aware of the in-depth negotiations on this subject in the Conference on Disarmament during the past ten years,

Recalling the relevant parts of the special report of the Committee on Disarmament 2/ submitted to the General Assembly at its twelfth special session, 3/ the second special session devoted to disarmament, and of the special report of the Conference on Disarmament submitted to the Assembly at its fifteenth special session, 4/ the third special session devoted to disarmament, as well as of the annual report of the Conference on its 1989 session, 5/

Welcoming the unanimous support in the Conference on Disarmament for continuing the search for a common approach to the substance of negative security assurances, which could be included in a legally binding instrument,

Recognizing the need for a fresh look at the issue, in particular by the nuclear-weapon States, in order to overcome the difficulties encountered at the negotiations in previous years,

Taking note of the proposals on this subject submitted to the Conference on Disarmament, 5/

1. Reaffirms the urgent need, pending the achievement of complete nuclear disarmament, to reach an early agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

2. Recommends that the Conference on Disarmament pursue intensive negotiations in its Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons at the beginning of its 1990 session, with a view to reaching such an agreement, taking into account the widespread support in the Conference for conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective;

2/ The Committee on Disarmament was redesignated the Conference on Disarmament as from 7 February 1984.

3/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Supplement No. 2 (A/S-12/2), sect. III.C.

4/ Ibid., Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 2 (A/S-15/2), sect. III.F.

5/ Ibid., Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/44/27), sect. III.F.

/...

3. Appeals to all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate willingness and to exercise the flexibility necessary to reach agreement on a common approach to, including the possibility of a common formula in, an international instrument or instruments of a legally binding character to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

81st plenary meeting

15 December 1989



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/44/111
16 January 1990

Forty-fourth session
Agenda item 57

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/44/779)]

44/111. Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the need to allay the legitimate concern of the States of the world with regard to ensuring lasting security for their peoples,

Convinced that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and to the survival of civilization,

Deeply concerned at the continuing escalation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, and the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Also convinced that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war,

Taking into account the principle of the non-use of force or threat of force enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,

Deeply concerned also about the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Recognizing that the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States need to be safeguarded against the use or threat of use of force, including the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

Recognizing also that effective measures to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons can constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

Recalling its resolutions 3261 G (XXIX) of 9 December 1974 and 31/189 C of 21 December 1976,

Bearing in mind paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Desirous of promoting the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session,

Recalling also its resolutions 33/72 B of 14 December 1978, 34/85 of 11 December 1979, 35/155 of 12 December 1980, 36/95 of 9 December 1981, 37/81 of 9 December 1982, 38/68 of 15 December 1983, 39/58 of 12 December 1984, 40/86 of 12 December 1985, 41/52 of 3 December 1986, 42/32 of 30 November 1987 and 43/69 of 7 December 1988,

Recalling further paragraph 12 of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, contained in the annex to its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, which states, inter alia, that all efforts should be exerted by the Committee on Disarmament 2/ urgently to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Noting the in-depth negotiations undertaken in the Conference on Disarmament and its Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, 3/ with a view to reaching agreement on this item,

Taking note of the proposals submitted under that item in the Conference on Disarmament, including the drafts of an international convention,

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

2/ The Committee on Disarmament was redesignated the Conference on Disarmament as from 7 February 1984.

3/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 27 and corrigendum (A/40/27 and Corr.1), sect. III.F.

Taking note also of the decision of the Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade from 4 to 7 September 1989, 4/ as well as the relevant recommendations of the Organization of the Islamic Conference reiterated in the Final Communiqué of the Eighteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held at Riyadh from 13 to 16 March 1989, calling upon the Conference on Disarmament to reach an urgent agreement on an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, 5/

Noting also the support expressed in the Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as the difficulties pointed out in evolving a common approach acceptable to all,

1. Reaffirms the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
2. Notes with satisfaction that in the Conference on Disarmament there is no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, although the difficulties as regards evolving a common approach acceptable to all have also been pointed out;
3. Appeals to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula that could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character;
4. Recommends that further intensive efforts should be devoted to the search for such a common approach or common formula and that the various alternative approaches, including, in particular, those considered in the Conference on Disarmament, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties;
5. Recommends also that the Conference on Disarmament should actively continue negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into account the widespread support for the conclusion of an international convention and giving consideration to any other proposals designed to secure the same objective;

4/ See A/44/551-S/20870, annex.

5/ See A/44/235-S/20600, annex, para. 36.

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/44/112
19 January 1990

Forty-fourth session
Agenda item 58

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/44/780)]

44/112. Prevention of an arms race in outer space

The General Assembly,

Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man's entry into outer space,

Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Reaffirming that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind,

Reaffirming also the will of all States that the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be for peaceful purposes,

Recalling the obligation of all States, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from the threat or use of force, including in their space activities,

Recalling also that the States parties to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 1/ have undertaken, in article III, to carry on

1/ Resolution 2222 (XXI), annex.

activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations, in the interests of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding,

Reaffirming, in particular, article IV of the above-mentioned Treaty, which stipulates that States parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner,

Reaffirming also paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 2/ in which it is stated that in order to prevent an arms race in outer space further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty,

Noting its resolutions 36/97 C and 36/99 of 9 December 1981, as well as resolutions 37/83 of 9 December 1982, 37/99 D of 13 December 1982, 38/70 of 15 December 1983, 39/59 of 12 December 1984, 40/87 of 12 December 1985, 41/53 of 3 December 1986, 42/33 of 30 November 1987 and 43/70 of 7 December 1988 and the relevant paragraphs of the Declaration adopted by the Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade from 4 to 7 September 1989, 3/

Recognizing the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space and the readiness of all States to contribute to that common objective,

Gravely concerned at the danger posed to all mankind by an arms race in outer space and, in particular, by developments that could further undermine international peace and security and retard the pursuit of general and complete disarmament,

Encouraged by the widespread interest expressed by Member States in the course of negotiations on and following the adoption of the above-mentioned Treaty in ensuring that the exploration and use of outer space should be for peaceful purposes, and taking note of proposals submitted to the General Assembly at its tenth special session and at its regular sessions and to the Conference on Disarmament,

Noting the grave concern expressed by the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space at the extension of an arms race

2/ Resolution S-10/2.

3/ See A/44/551-S/20870, annex.

into outer space and the recommendations 4/ made to the competent organs of the United Nations, in particular the General Assembly, and also to the Committee on Disarmament, 5/

Noting also that in 1989 the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, taking into account its previous efforts since its establishment, undertook the examination and identification of various issues, existing agreements and existing proposals, as well as future initiatives relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, 6/ and that this contributed to a better understanding of a number of problems and to a clearer perception of the various positions,

Convinced that additional measures should be examined in the search for effective and verifiable bilateral and multilateral agreements in order to prevent an arms race in outer space,

Emphasizing the paramount importance of strict compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements relevant to outer space, and with the existing legal régime concerning the use of outer space,

Emphasizing also the necessity of maintaining the effectiveness of relevant existing treaties, and in this context reaffirming the vital importance of a strict compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, 7/

Recognizing that bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America could facilitate the multilateral negotiations for the prevention of an arms race in outer space in accordance with paragraph 27 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,

Noting the importance in this context of bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America that have continued since 1985, including at their summit meetings in Washington and Moscow on a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms,

Hopeful that concrete results would emerge from these negotiations as soon as possible,

4/ See Report of the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Vienna, 9-21 August 1982 (A/CONF.101/10 and Corr.1 and 2), para. 426.

5/ The Committee on Disarmament was redesignated the Conference on Disarmament as from 7 February 1984.

6/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/44/27), para. 90.

7/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 944, No. 13446.

Emphasizing the mutually complementary nature of bilateral and multilateral efforts in the field of preventing an arms race in outer space,

Taking note of that part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament relating to this question, 8/

Welcoming the re-establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space during the 1989 session of the Conference on Disarmament, in the exercise of the negotiating responsibilities of this sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, to continue to examine and to identify, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space,

1. Reaffirms that general and complete disarmament under effective international control warrants that outer space shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and that it shall not become an arena for an arms race;

2. Recognizes, as stated in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, that the legal régime applicable to outer space by itself does not guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space, that this legal régime plays a significant role in the prevention of an arms race in that environment, the need to consolidate and reinforce that régime and enhance its effectiveness, and the importance of strict compliance with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral; 9/

3. Emphasizes that further measures with appropriate and effective provisions for verification to prevent an arms race in outer space should be adopted by the international community;

4. Calls upon all States, in particular those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space and to take immediate measures to prevent an arms race in outer space in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding;

5. Reiterates that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects;

6. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space;

8/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/44/27), sect. III.E.

9/ Ibid., para. 90 (para. 77 of the quoted text).

7. Also requests the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, taking into account relevant proposals and initiatives, including those presented in the Ad Hoc Committee at the 1989 session of the Conference and at the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly;

8. Further requests the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish an ad hoc committee with an adequate mandate at the beginning of its 1990 session, with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects;

9. Urges the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to pursue intensively their bilateral negotiations in a constructive spirit aimed at reaching early agreement for preventing an arms race in outer space, and to advise the Conference on Disarmament periodically of the progress of their bilateral sessions so as to facilitate its work;

10. Calls upon all States, especially those with major space capabilities, to refrain, in their activities relating to outer space, from actions contrary to the observance of the relevant existing treaties or to the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space;

11. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General on the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, 10/ submitted in accordance with resolution 42/33 of 30 November 1987;

12. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to report on its consideration of this subject to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session;

13. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this subject by the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session;

14. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

10/ A/43/506 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2.



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/44/113
8 January 1990

Forty-fourth session
Agenda item 59

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/44/781)]

44/113. Implementation of the Declaration on the
Denuclearization of Africa

A

Implementation of the Declaration

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa 1/ adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964,

Recalling its resolution 1652 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, its earliest on the subject, as well as its resolutions 2033 (XX) of 3 December 1965, 31/69 of 10 December 1976, 32/81 of 12 December 1977, 33/63 of 14 December 1978, 34/76 A of 11 December 1979, 35/146 B of 12 December 1980, 36/86 B of 9 December 1981, 37/74 A of 9 December 1982, 38/181 A of 20 December 1983, 39/61 A of 12 December 1984, 40/89 A of 12 December 1985, 41/55 A of 3 December 1986, 42/34 A of 30 November 1987 and 43/71 A of 7 December 1988, in which it called upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

Recalling that in its resolution 33/63 it vigorously condemned any overt or covert attempt by South Africa to introduce nuclear weapons into the continent of

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes,
agenda item 105, document A/5975.

Africa and demanded that South Africa refrain forthwith from conducting any nuclear explosion in the continent or elsewhere,

Bearing in mind the provisions of resolution CM/Res.1101(XLVI)/Rev.1 2/ on the denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its forty-sixth ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa from 20 to 25 July 1987,

Having taken note of the report of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research entitled "South Africa's nuclear capability", 3/ undertaken in co-operation with the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat and in consultation with the Organization of African Unity, as well as of the report of the Disarmament Commission, 4/

Noting the actions taken by those Governments which have taken measures to restrict co-operation with South Africa in nuclear and other fields,

Expressing regret that, despite the threat that South Africa's nuclear capability constitutes to international peace and security and, in particular, to the realization of the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, the Disarmament Commission, although it considered the question during its substantive session in 1989, failed once again to reach a consensus on this important item on its agenda,

1. Strongly renews its call upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone;

2. Reaffirms that the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity would be an important measure to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security;

3. Expresses once again its grave alarm at South Africa's possession and continued development of nuclear-weapon capability;

4. Condemns South Africa's continued pursuit of a nuclear capability and all forms of nuclear collaboration by any State, corporation, institution or individual with the racist régime that enable it to frustrate the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, which seeks to keep Africa free from nuclear weapons;

2/ See A/42/699, annex I.

3/ A/39/470.

4/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/44/42).

5. Calls upon all States, corporations, institutions and individuals to desist from further collaboration with the racist régime that may enable it to frustrate the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa;
6. Demands once again that the racist régime of South Africa refrain from manufacturing, testing, deploying, transporting, storing, using or threatening to use nuclear weapons;
7. Appeals to all States that have the means to do so to monitor South Africa's research on and development and production of nuclear weapons and to publicize any information in that regard;
8. Demands once again that South Africa submit forthwith all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency;
9. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance that the Organization of African Unity may seek regarding the modalities and elements for the preparation and implementation of the relevant convention or treaty on the denuclearization of Africa;
10. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

B

Nuclear capability of South Africa

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on South Africa's nuclear capability, 5/

Recalling its resolutions 34/76 B of 11 December 1979, 35/146 A of 12 December 1980, 36/86 A of 9 December 1981, 37/74 B of 9 December 1982, 38/181 B of 20 December 1983, 39/61 B of 12 December 1984, 40/89 B of 12 December 1985, 41/55 B of 3 December 1986, 42/34 B of 30 November 1987 and 43/71 B of 7 December 1988,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa 1/ adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964,

5/ A/44/655.

Recalling that, in paragraph 12 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 6/ it noted that the massive accumulation of armaments and the acquisition of armaments technology by racist régimes, as well as their possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, present a challenging and increasingly dangerous obstacle to a world community faced with the urgent need to disarm,

Recalling also that, in its resolution 33/63 of 14 December 1978, it vigorously condemned any overt or covert attempt by South Africa to introduce nuclear weapons into the continent of Africa and demanded that South Africa refrain forthwith from conducting any nuclear explosion in the continent or elsewhere,

Bearing in mind the provisions of resolution CM/Res.1101(XLVI)/Rev.1 2/ on the denuclearization of Africa adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its forty-sixth ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa from 20 to 25 July 1987,

Noting with regret the non-implementation by apartheid South Africa of resolution GC(XXX)/RES/468 7/ adopted on 3 October 1986 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency during its thirtieth regular session,

Having taken note of the report of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research entitled "South Africa's nuclear capability", 3/ undertaken in co-operation with the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat and in consultation with the Organization of African Unity,

Expressing regret that, despite the threat that South Africa's nuclear capability constitutes to international peace and security and, in particular, to the realization of the objective of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, the Disarmament Commission, although it considered the question during its substantive session in 1989, failed once again to reach a consensus on this important item on its agenda,

Alarmed that South Africa's nuclear facilities, particularly those that remain unsafeguarded, enable it to develop and acquire the capability of producing fissionable material for nuclear weapons,

Also alarmed that, by its own public admission at Vienna on 13 August 1988, the apartheid South African régime has now acquired nuclear-weapon capability,

Deeply concerned about recent reports of apartheid South Africa's active military collaboration with Israel in the production of nuclear-tipped medium-range missiles with completed testing facilities and the consequences for the peace and security of African States,

6/ Resolution S-10/2.

7/ See International Atomic Energy Agency, Resolutions and Other Decisions of the General Conference, Thirtieth Regular Session, 29 September-3 October 1986.

Gravely concerned that South Africa, in flagrant violation of international law and the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, has continued its acts of aggression and subversion against the peoples of the independent States of southern Africa,

Deeply indignant at the persistent policy of hostility by the racist régime of South Africa as demonstrated by its constant encroachment into the territory of neighbouring States, which constitutes an act of aggression against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of those countries,

Expressing its grave disappointment that, despite appeals by the international community, certain Western States and Israel have continued to collaborate with the racist régime of South Africa in the military and nuclear fields and that some of these States have, by a ready recourse to the use of veto, consistently frustrated every effort in the Security Council to deal decisively with the question of South Africa,

Recalling its decision taken at the tenth special session that the Security Council should take appropriate effective steps to prevent the frustration of the implementation of the decision of the Organization of African Unity for the denuclearization of Africa, 8/

Stressing the need to preserve peace and security in Africa by ensuring that the continent is a nuclear-weapon-free zone,

1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General on South Africa's nuclear capability;
2. Condemns the massive buildup of South Africa's military machine, in particular its frenzied acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability for repressive and aggressive purposes and as an instrument of blackmail;
3. Also condemns all forms of nuclear collaboration by any State, corporation, institution or individual with the racist régime of South Africa, in particular the decision by some Member States to grant licences to several corporations in their territories to provide equipment and technical and maintenance services for nuclear installations in South Africa;
4. Takes note with great concern of recent reports that collaboration between Israel and South Africa has resulted in the development by South Africa of a nuclear-tipped missile;
5. Calls upon the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of qualified experts, to investigate those reports, bearing in mind their implications for the implementation of the policy of denuclearization of Africa and for the security of African States and, in particular, the front-line and other neighbouring States;

8/ See resolution S-10/2, para. 63 (c).

6. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a preliminary report on his investigation to the Disarmament Commission at its substantive session in 1990 and a final report to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session;
7. Reaffirms that the acquisition of nuclear-weapon capability by the racist régime constitutes a very grave danger to international peace and security and, in particular, jeopardizes the security of African States and increases the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons;
8. Expresses its full support for the African States faced with the danger of South Africa's nuclear capability;
9. Commends the actions taken by those Governments which have taken measures to restrict co-operation with South Africa in nuclear and other fields;
10. Demands that South Africa and all other foreign interests put an immediate end to the exploration for and exploitation of uranium resources in Namibia;
11. Calls upon all States, corporations, institutions and individuals to terminate forthwith all forms of military and nuclear collaboration with the racist régime;
12. Requests the Disarmament Commission to consider once again as a matter of priority during its substantive session in 1990 South Africa's nuclear capability, taking into account, inter alia, the findings of the report of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research on South Africa's nuclear capability;
13. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance that the Organization of African Unity may seek regarding the modalities and elements for the preparation and implementation of the relevant convention or treaty on the denuclearization of Africa;
14. Commends the adoption by the Security Council of resolutions 558 (1984) of 13 December 1984 and 591 (1986) of 28 November 1986 on the question of South Africa, with a view to blocking the existing loopholes in the arms embargo so as to render it more effective and to prohibiting, in particular, all forms of co-operation and collaboration with the racist régime of South Africa in the nuclear field;
15. Demands once again that South Africa submit forthwith all its nuclear installations and facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency;
16. Requests the Secretary-General to follow very closely South Africa's evolution in the nuclear field and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session;

/...

17. Also requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session on the military assistance that apartheid South Africa is receiving from Israel and any other sources in advanced missile technology as well as the supporting technical facilities.

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/44/114
12 January 1990

Forty-fourth session
Agenda item 61

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/44/783)]

44/114. Reduction of military budgets

A

Reduction of military budgets

The General Assembly,

Desirous of reversing the arms race and military expenditures, which constitute a heavy burden for the economies of all nations and have harmful effects on world peace and security,

Convinced that the reduction of military expenditures as a result of the progress in disarmament negotiations will have favourable consequences on the world economic and financial situation,

Reaffirming that the resources released through the reduction of military expenditures could be reallocated to the economic and social development of all States, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries,

Firmly convinced that the reduction of military expenditures will have a positive impact on the process of strengthening confidence and improving international security and co-operation among States,

Desirous of bringing its contribution to the achievement of these goals,

1. Welcomes the work of the Disarmament Commission on the identification and elaboration of a set of principles that should govern further action of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military budgets; 1/
2. Takes note of these principles, as annexed to the present resolution, and decides to bring them to the attention of Member States and of the Conference on Disarmament as useful guidelines for further action in the field of the freezing and reduction of military budgets;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-sixth session a progress report on the implementation of the present resolution;
4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-sixth session the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

ANNEX

Principles that should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military budgets

1. Concerted efforts should be made by all States, in particular by those States with the largest military arsenals and by the appropriate negotiating forums, with the objective of concluding international agreements to freeze and reduce military budgets, including adequate verification measures acceptable to all parties. Such agreements should contribute to genuine reductions of armed forces and armaments of States parties, with the aim of strengthening international peace and security at lower levels of armed forces and armaments. Definite agreements on the freezing and reduction of military expenditures are assuming special importance and should be reached within the shortest period of time in order to contribute to the curbing of the arms race, alleviate international tensions and increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.
2. All efforts in the field of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures should take into account the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly. 2/

1/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/44/42), para. 41.

2/ Resolution S-10/2.

3. Pending the conclusion of agreements to freeze and reduce military expenditures, all States, in particular the most heavily armed States, should exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures.
4. The reduction of military expenditures on a mutually agreed basis should be implemented gradually and in a balanced manner, either on a percentage or on an absolute basis, so as to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage, and without prejudice to the right of all States to undiminished security and sovereignty and to undertake the necessary measures of self-defence.
5. While the freezing and reduction of military budgets is the responsibility of all States, to be implemented in stages in accordance with the principle of greatest responsibility, the process should begin with those nuclear-weapon States with the largest military arsenals and the biggest military expenditures, to be followed immediately by other nuclear-weapon States and militarily significant States. This should not prevent other States from initiating negotiations and reaching agreements on the balanced reduction of their respective military budgets at any time during this process.
6. Human and material resources released through the reduction of military expenditures should be devoted to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.
7. Meaningful negotiations on the freezing and reduction of military budgets would require that all parties to such negotiations have accepted and implemented transparency and comparability. The elaboration of agreed methods of measuring and comparing military expenditures between specified periods of time and between countries with different budgeting systems would be required. To this end States should utilize the reporting system adopted by the General Assembly in 1980. ^{3/}
8. Armaments and military activities that would be the subject of physical reductions within the limits provided for in any agreement to reduce military expenditures will be identified by every State party to such agreements.
9. The agreements to freeze and reduce military expenditures should contain adequate and efficient measures of verification, satisfactory to all parties, in order to ensure that their provisions are strictly applied and fulfilled by all States parties. The specific methods of verification or other compliance procedure should be agreed upon in the process of negotiation depending upon the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement.
10. Unilateral measures undertaken by States concerning the freezing and reduction of military expenditures, especially when they are followed by similar measures adopted by other States on the basis of mutual example, could contribute to favourable conditions for the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements to freeze and reduce military expenditures.

^{3/} See Reduction of Military Budgets: International reporting of military expenditures (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.81.I.9), para. 98.

11. Confidence-building measures could help to create a political climate conducive to the freezing and reduction of military expenditures. Conversely, the freezing and reduction of military expenditures could contribute to the increase of confidence among States.

12. The United Nations should play a central role in orienting, stimulating and initiating negotiations on freezing and reducing military expenditures, and all Member States should co-operate with the Organization and among themselves, with a view to solving the problems implied by this process.

13. The freezing and reduction of military expenditures may be achieved, as appropriate, on a global, regional or subregional level, with the agreement of all States concerned.

14. The agreements on the freezing and reduction of military budgets should be viewed in a broader perspective, including respect for and implementation of the security system of the United Nations, and be interrelated with other measures of disarmament, within the context of progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The reduction of military budgets should therefore be complementary to agreements on the limitation of armaments and disarmament and should not be considered as a substitute for such agreements.

15. The adoption of the above principles should be regarded as a means of facilitating meaningful negotiations on concrete agreements on the freezing and reduction of military budgets.

B

Military budgets

The General Assembly,

Welcoming the encouraging progress achieved in arms limitations and disarmament,

Noting that further progress in disarmament negotiations could also lead to reductions in military expenditures,

Stressing that increased information on military matters is an important prerequisite for achieving agreements on the reduction of armed forces,

Recalling that an international system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures ^{3/} has been introduced in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 35/142 B of 12 December 1980, and that national reports on military expenditures have been received from a number of Member States belonging to different geographic regions and having different budgeting and accounting systems,

Convinced that more transparency and comparability could be reached through broader participation in the standardized system of the United Nations for reporting military expenditures,

/...

1. Considers that transparency requires also agreed methods of measuring and comparing military expenditures between specified periods of time and between countries with different budgeting systems;

2. Accordingly calls upon all States to make use of the reporting system adopted by the General Assembly;

3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-sixth session an item entitled "Transparency and reduction of military budgets".

81st plenary meeting

15 December 1989



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/44/115
12 January 1990

Forty-fourth session
Agenda item 62

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/44/784)]

44/115. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

A

Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions relating to the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and to their destruction,

Reaffirming the urgent necessity, particularly following recent United Nations reports, of strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, 1/

Welcoming the broad participation in and the positive results of the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other Interested States on the prohibition of chemical weapons, held in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, and noting with satisfaction the resulting additional accession of States to the 1925 Protocol,

1/ League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138.

Endorsing the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference 2/ as an important contribution to the aim of the total elimination of chemical weapons,

Recognizing that the effectiveness of a convention for the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and for their destruction will benefit from the support and co-operation of the chemical industry,

Commending, in that regard, the initiative of the Government of Australia to strengthen and expand the co-operation of the chemical industry with Governments 3/ by convening at Canberra from 18 to 22 September 1989 a Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons,

Reaffirming the urgent necessity of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972, 4/

Taking note of the Final Document of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, adopted by consensus on 26 September 1986, 5/ and, in particular, of article IX of the Final Declaration of the Conference, 6/

Having considered the report of the Conference on Disarmament, 7/ which incorporates, inter alia, the report of its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, 8/ and noting that, following the precedents set over the past five years, consultations are continuing during the inter-sessional period, thus increasing the time devoted to negotiation,

Convinced of the necessity that all efforts be exerted for the continuation and successful conclusion of negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction,

2/ A/44/88, annex.

3/ See A/C.1/44/4 and A/C.1/44/5.

4/ Resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex.

5/ BWC/CONF.II/13.

6/ BWC/CONF.II/13, part II.

7/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/44/27).

8/ Ibid., para. 87.

Emphasizing the importance of the widest possible participation of States in the negotiations on the draft convention in order to ensure universal adherence on its conclusion,

Conscious of the need to share data relevant to the negotiations on a future convention banning all chemical weapons on a global basis and of the fact that the provision of such data would be an important confidence-building measure,

Noting the bilateral and other discussions, including the ongoing exchange of views between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in the framework of the multilateral negotiations, on issues related to the prohibition of chemical weapons,

Noting with appreciation the efforts made at all levels by States to facilitate the earliest conclusion of a convention for the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction and, in particular, the concrete steps designed to promote confidence and to contribute directly to that goal,

1. Notes with satisfaction the work of the Conference on Disarmament during its 1989 session regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons, and, in particular, appreciates the progress in the work of its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on that question and the tangible results recorded in its report;

2. Notes, while regretting that a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been concluded, that there exists an ever-growing will to resolve the pending problems at the earliest possible date;

3. Again urges the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to intensify, during its 1990 session, which will be of pivotal importance, the negotiations on such a convention and to reinforce its efforts further by, inter alia, increasing the time that it devotes to such negotiations, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, with a view to the final elaboration of a convention at the earliest possible date, and to re-establish its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for that purpose with the mandate to be agreed upon by the Conference at the beginning of its 1990 session;

4. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to use the political momentum generated by the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other Interested States and the recognition by that Conference that a global ban on chemical weapons is of universal concern and interest, to achieve the conclusion at the earliest possible date of such a convention;

5. Also requests the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session on the results of its negotiations;

6. Calls upon all States to abide by the commitments undertaken in the Final Declaration of the Paris Conference;

/...

7. Welcomes the renewed declarations of commitment by Governments represented at the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons to conclude and implement a convention at the earliest possible date, and welcomes also the first collective statement by representatives of the chemical industry of their commitment to co-operate with Governments to that end; 9/

8. Recognizes that constructive proposals were discussed at the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons that could contribute momentum to the Geneva negotiations and assist in the conclusion and early implementation of such a convention;

9. Recognizes also the importance of declarations made by States on whether or not they possess chemical weapons and of further international exchanges of data in connection with the negotiations on such a convention;

10. Encourages Member States to take further initiatives to promote confidence and openness in the negotiations and to provide further information to facilitate prompt resolution of outstanding issues, thus contributing to an early agreement on, and universal adherence to, such a convention.

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

B

Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and to support the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention

The General Assembly,

Recalling its previous resolutions, and those adopted by the Security Council, on the use of chemical weapons,

Recalling also the provisions of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, 1/ and of other rules and principles of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict,

Welcoming in that regard the reaffirmation in the Final Declaration of the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and other Interested States, 2/ held in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, of the importance and the continuing validity of the 1925 Protocol,

Recalling further the necessity of the adherence by all States to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of

9/ A/C.1/44/4, annex II.

Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed in London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972, 4/

Expressing deep dismay at the use and the risk of use of chemical weapons as long as such weapons remain and are spread,

Acknowledging that prompt and impartial investigation of reports of possible use of chemical and bacteriological weapons will further enhance the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General 10/ on the proposals of the group of qualified experts established in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 42/37 C of 30 November 1987, concerning technical guidelines and procedures available to the Secretary-General for the timely and efficient investigation of reports of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons,

Noting that, upon conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, these guidelines and procedures should be adapted in the light of the obligations under the convention,

1. Renews its call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and condemns vigorously all actions that violate that obligation;

2. Calls upon all States that have not yet done so to accede to the 1925 Geneva Protocol;

3. Urges the Conference on Disarmament to pursue as a matter of continuing urgency its negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to carry out promptly investigations in response to reports that may be brought to his attention by any Member State concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons that may constitute a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of customary international law in order to ascertain the facts of the matter, and to report promptly the results of any such investigation to all Member States;

5. Welcomes, in that regard, the proposals of the group of qualified experts concerning technical guidelines and procedures to guide the Secretary-General in the conduct of timely and efficient investigation of the reports of use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons; 11/

10/ A/44/561 and Add.1 and 2.

11/ A/44/561, annex.

6. Calls upon all States to consider the implementation of those guidelines and procedures for investigation, inter alia, by putting at the disposal of the Secretary-General qualified experts and/or consultants as well as laboratories for analysis;

7. Notes with satisfaction that the Security Council decided to consider immediately, taking into account the investigations of the Secretary-General, appropriate and effective measures in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; 12/

8. Urges all States to exercise restraint and to act responsibly in accordance with the need for the early conclusion and entry into force of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction;

9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

C

Implementation of the recommendations of the Second Review
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on
Their Destruction

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2826 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, in which it commended the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 4/

Recalling also that the Second Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention was held at Geneva from 8 to 26 September 1986 in order to review the operation of the Convention with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble to and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, were being realized,

Taking note of the confidence-building measures agreed upon by the Second Review Conference for further strengthening the authority of the Convention and for enhancing confidence among States,

12/ Security Council resolution 620 (1988).

Acknowledging that the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference 6/ expressed the need to give further consideration to, inter alia, the implementation of the Convention in all its aspects,

Confirming the common interest in strengthening the authority and the effectiveness of the Convention to promote confidence and co-operation among Member States as well as the necessity to comply with the obligations set forth in the Convention,

1. Notes with appreciation that, in accordance with the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, an Ad Hoc Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts from States parties to the Convention was held at Geneva from 31 March to 15 April 1987, which adopted by consensus a report 13/ finalizing the modalities for the exchange of information and data agreed to in the Final Declaration, thus enabling States parties to follow a standardized procedure;

2. Calls upon all States parties to the Convention to provide such information and data to the Secretary-General on an annual basis and not later than 15 April;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services as may be required for the implementation of the relevant parts of the Final Declaration;

4. Notes that the Second Review Conference decided, in its Final Declaration, that a Third Review Conference should be held at Geneva at the request of a majority of States parties not later than 1991;

5. Recalls in that regard the decision that the Third Review Conference should consider, inter alia, the issues set out in article XII of the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference;

6. Also requests the Secretary-General to circulate to the States parties to the Convention not later than four months prior to the convening of the Third Review Conference a report on the implementation of the confidence-building measures agreed upon by the Ad Hoc Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts from States parties;

7. Welcomes the fact that there are more than one hundred States parties to the Convention, including all the permanent members of the Security Council, and that since the holding of the Second Review Conference four more States have forwarded their instruments of ratification of the Convention, two more States have declared their accession to the Convention and one State has withdrawn its reservations to it;

13/ BWC/CONF.II/EX/2.

8. Calls upon all States that have not ratified or acceded to the Convention to do so without delay, thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention and to the strengthening of international confidence.

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/44/116
19 January 1990

Forty-fourth session
Agenda item 63

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/44/785 and A/44/L.59)]

44/116. General and complete disarmament

A

Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling
and use of radiological weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 37/99 C of 13 December 1982, 38/188 D of 20 December 1983, 39/151 J of 17 December 1984, 40/94 D of 12 December 1985, 41/59 A and I of 3 December 1986, 42/38 F of 30 November 1987 and 43/75 J of 7 December 1988 on, inter alia, the conclusion of an agreement prohibiting military attacks against nuclear facilities,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General on this subject submitted pursuant to resolution 43/75 J, 1/

Gravely concerned that armed attacks against nuclear facilities, though carried out with conventional weapons, could be tantamount to the use of radiological weapons,

Recalling also that Additional Protocol I of 1977 2/ to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 3/ prohibits attacks on nuclear electricity-generating stations,

1/ A/44/621.

2/ A/32/144, annex I.

3/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75, Nos. 970-973.

Deeply concerned that the destruction of nuclear facilities by conventional weapons causes the release into the environment of huge amounts of dangerous radioactive material, which results in serious radioactive contamination,

Firmly convinced that the Israeli attack against the safeguarded nuclear facilities in Iraq constitutes an unprecedented danger to international peace and security,

Recalling further resolutions GC(XXVII)/RES/407 and GC(XXVII)/RES/409, adopted in 1983 4/ by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in which the Conference urged all member States to support actions in international forums to reach an international agreement that prohibits armed attacks against nuclear installations devoted to peaceful purposes,

1. Reaffirms that armed attacks of any kind against nuclear facilities are tantamount to the use of radiological weapons, owing to the dangerous radioactive forces that such attacks cause to be released;

2. Requests once again the Conference on Disarmament to intensify further its efforts to reach, as early as possible, an agreement prohibiting armed attacks against nuclear facilities;

3. Requests again the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide the Conference on Disarmament with the technical studies that could facilitate the conclusion of such an agreement;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session on the progress made in the implementation of the present resolution.

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

B

Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations

The General Assembly,

Recalling that at their meeting at Geneva in November 1985 the leaders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America committed themselves to the objective of working out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, 5/

4/ See International Atomic Energy Agency, Resolutions and Other Decisions of the General Conference, Twenty-seventh Regular Session, 10-14 October 1983.

5/ See A/40/1070, annex.

Noting the progress reflected in the joint statement issued by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America following their meetings in Washington, and Wyoming from 21 to 23 September 1989, 6/

Noting also that, since their meetings in Moscow from 29 May to 1 June 1988, 7/ bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations have been intensified,

Noting further the importance of the verification procedures contained in the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles 8/ as an example of the high standards of verification that are now achievable in arms control agreements, both bilateral and multilateral,

Believing that, through negotiations pursued in a spirit of flexibility and with full account taken of the security interests of all States, it is possible to achieve far-reaching and effectively verifiable agreements,

Firmly convinced that early agreement in these negotiations, in accordance with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments, would be of crucial importance for the strengthening of international peace and security,

Convinced that the international community should encourage the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America in their endeavours, taking into account both the importance and the complexity of their negotiations,

1. Welcomes the fact that the provisions of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles are being implemented by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

2. Calls upon the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America to spare no effort in seeking, in accordance with the security interests of all States and the universal desire for progress towards disarmament, the attainment of all the agreed objectives in the negotiations, that is, the resolution of a complex of questions concerning space and strategic nuclear arms with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship;

6/ A/44/578, annex.

7/ See A/S-15/28, annex.

8/ The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 12: 1987 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.88.IX.2), appendix VII.

3. Invites the two Governments concerned to keep other States Members of the United Nations duly informed of progress in their negotiations, in accordance with paragraph 114 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly; 9/

4. Expresses its firmest possible encouragement and support for the bilateral negotiations and their successful conclusion.

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

C

Conventional disarmament

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the determination to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war as expressed in the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 9/ and particularly its paragraph 81, which provides that, together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament, and which stresses that States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions,

Also recalling that in the same document it is stated, inter alia, that priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces, and that it stresses that nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently,

Further recalling that in the same document it is stated that effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority, and that real progress in the field of nuclear disarmament could create an atmosphere conducive to progress in conventional disarmament on a world-wide basis,

Aware of the dangers to world peace and security originating from, and the loss in human life and property caused by, wars and conflicts fought with conventional weapons, as well as of their possible escalation into a nuclear war in regions with a high concentration of conventional and nuclear weapons,

9/ Resolution S-10/2.

Also aware that with the advance in science and technology, conventional weapons tend to become increasingly lethal and destructive and that conventional armaments consume large amounts of resources,

Believing that resources released through disarmament, including conventional disarmament, can be used for the social and economic development of people of all countries, particularly the developing countries,

Noting that the ongoing conventional disarmament negotiations in Europe have gained increasing importance,

Bearing in mind its resolution 36/97 A of 9 December 1981 and the Study on Conventional Disarmament 10/ conducted in accordance with that resolution, as well as its resolutions 41/59 C and 41/59 G of 3 December 1986, 42/38 E and 42/38 G of 30 November 1987 and 43/75 D and 43/75 F of 7 December 1988, and the consideration by the Disarmament Commission at its 1989 session of the question of conventional disarmament, 11/

Bearing in mind also the efforts made to promote conventional disarmament and the related proposals and suggestions, as well as the initiatives taken by various countries in this regard,

1. Reaffirms the importance of the efforts aimed at resolutely pursuing the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament;
2. Believes that the military forces of all countries should not be used other than for the purpose of self-defence;
3. Welcomes the new negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe;
4. Urges the countries with the largest military arsenals, which bear a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions, and the States members of the two major military alliances to continue their intensive negotiations on conventional armaments, through appropriate forums, with a view to reaching early agreement on the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional armaments and forces at lower levels under effective international control in their respective regions, particularly in Europe, which has the largest concentration of arms and forces in the world;
5. Encourages all States, while taking into account the need to protect security and maintain necessary defensive capabilities, to intensify their efforts and take, either on their own or in a regional context, appropriate steps to promote progress in conventional disarmament and enhance peace and security;

10/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.85.IX.1.

11/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/S-15/3), para. 57.

6. Requests the Disarmament Commission to consider further, at its 1990 substantive session, issues related to conventional disarmament;

7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Conventional disarmament".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

D

Nuclear disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 41/59 F of 3 December 1986, 42/38 H of 30 November 1987 and 43/75 E of 7 December 1988,

Reaffirming the determination to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war as expressed in the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations,

Convinced that the most acute and urgent task of the present day is to remove the threat of a world war - a nuclear war,

Recalling and reaffirming the statements and provisions on nuclear disarmament set forth in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 9/ and, in particular, provisions that "effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority", contained in paragraph 20, and that "in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility", contained in paragraph 48,

Also recalling that paragraph 55 of the same document states that "Real progress in the field of nuclear disarmament could create an atmosphere conducive to progress in conventional disarmament on a world-wide basis",

Bearing in mind that the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Noting that the leaders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America agreed in their joint statement issued at Geneva on 21 November 1985 5/ that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought" and the common desire they expressed in the same statement calling for early progress in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of a 50 per cent reduction in the nuclear arms of the Soviet Union and the United States appropriately applied,

Noting also that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have conducted intensive negotiations on various issues of disarmament,

/...

Noting further that the Conference on Disarmament has not played its due role in the field of nuclear disarmament,

Believing that the qualitative aspect of the arms race needs to be addressed along with its quantitative aspect,

Bearing in mind that the Governments and peoples of various countries expect that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America will reach agreement on halting the nuclear-arms race and further reducing nuclear weapons,

1. Welcomes the continued implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles; 8/

2. Urges the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, further to discharge their special responsibility for nuclear disarmament, to take the lead in halting the nuclear-arms race and to accelerate negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement on the drastic reduction of their nuclear arsenals;

3. Reiterates its belief that bilateral and multilateral efforts for nuclear disarmament should complement and facilitate each other;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Nuclear disarmament".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

E

Objective information on military matters

The General Assembly,

Recalling paragraph 105 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 9/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, in which the Assembly encouraged Member States to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments and to concentrate on the danger of escalation of the arms race and on the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Taking into account the attention paid to the questions of openness and of ensuring an exchange of objective information in the military field at its fifteenth special session, the third special session devoted to disarmament,

/...

Noting with satisfaction that recent agreements in the field of arms limitation and disarmament have provided for qualitatively new standards of openness,

Noting also with satisfaction an increased number of steps and proposals by different States aimed at achieving openness and transparency in military activities,

Believing that the adoption of confidence-building measures to promote openness and transparency would reduce the risk of misperceptions of military capabilities and intentions which could induce military rivalries between States, leading to their undertaking armaments programmes and the acceleration of the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race, to heightened international tensions, and ultimately, to conflict,

Believing also that balanced and objective information on all military matters, in particular of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would contribute to the building of confidence among States and to the conclusion of concrete disarmament agreements, and thereby help to halt and reverse the arms race,

Recognizing that greater openness and transparency would contribute to enhancing security,

Convinced that greater openness on military activities, inter alia, through the transmittal of relevant information on these activities, including on the levels of military budgets, would contribute to increased confidence among States,

Taking into account the work undertaken in the Disarmament Commission on the reduction of military budgets, 12/

Noting with satisfaction that an increased number of States have provided annual reports on military expenditures in conformity with the international system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures under the auspices of the United Nations,

Recalling its resolution 43/75 G of 7 December 1988, in which it invited all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General their views on ways and means of further consolidating the emerging trend towards greater openness in military matters, specifically with regard to the provision of objective information on military matters, for consideration by the Disarmament Commission at its 1990 session,

12/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/44/42), para. 44.

1. Takes note of the report of the Secretary-General on this subject to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament; 13/
2. Reaffirms its firm conviction that a better flow of objective information on military capabilities would help to relieve international tension and contribute to the building of confidence among States on a global, regional or subregional level and to the conclusion of concrete disarmament agreements;
3. Recommends that those States and global, regional and subregional organizations which have already expressed support for the principle of practical and concrete confidence-building measures of a military nature on a global, regional or subregional level should intensify their efforts with a view to adopting such measures;
4. Recommends also that all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, should implement the international system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures, with the aim of achieving a realistic comparison of military budgets, facilitating the availability of objective information on, as well as objective assessment of, military capabilities and contributing to the process of disarmament;
5. Invites all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General before 30 April 1990 measures they have adopted towards these ends, for submission to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session;
6. Requests the Disarmament Commission to include in the agenda for its 1990 session an item entitled "Objective information on military matters";
7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Objective information on military matters".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

F

Conventional disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 43/75 D of 7 December 1988,

Taking into account the decisions and recommendations appearing in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 9/ particularly in paragraph 114,

13/ A/S-15/7 and Add.1 and 2.

Also taking into account that conventional disarmament is a necessary part of the disarmament process,

Having examined the report of the Disarmament Commission, 14/

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the extensive discussion of the question of conventional disarmament during the 1989 session of the Disarmament Commission;

2. Recommends that the report should provide a basis for further deliberations on the subject by the Disarmament Commission; 15/

3. Requests the Disarmament Commission to continue at its 1990 session the substantive consideration of issues related to conventional disarmament and to report to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session with a view to facilitating possible measures in the field of conventional arms reduction and disarmament;

4. Also requests the Disarmament Commission for this purpose to include in the agenda for its 1990 session the item entitled "Substantive consideration of issues related to conventional disarmament";

5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Conventional disarmament".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

G

Implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field
of disarmament

The General Assembly,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General, 16/

Recalling paragraph 115 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 9/ in which it is stated, inter alia, that the Assembly has been and should remain the main deliberative organ of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and should make every effort to facilitate the implementation of disarmament measures,

14/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/44/42).

15/ Ibid., para. 48.6

16/ A/44/495 and Add.1.

Considering that the implementation of the recommendations of the General Assembly in the field of disarmament can play a significant role in the attainment of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Deems it important that all Member States show their resolve to arrive at mutually acceptable, comprehensively verifiable and effective disarmament measures, including through the implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament;

2. Invites all Member States to contribute to the elaboration of draft resolutions in the field of disarmament that will permit, in so far as possible, their adoption without a vote, in order to facilitate their appropriate implementation;

3. Also invites Member States to consider the proposals and ideas contained in the report of the Secretary-General;

4. Invites all Member States that have not yet done so to make available to the Secretary-General their views and suggestions on ways and means to enhance the implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-sixth session a progress report on the implementation of the present resolution;

6. Decides to continue its consideration of the issue of the implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament at its forty-sixth session.

81st plenary meeting

15 December 1989

H

Prohibition of the production of fissionable material
for weapons purposes

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 33/91 H of 16 December 1978, 34/87 D of 11 December 1979, 35/156 H of 12 December 1980, 36/97 G of 9 December 1981, 37/99 E of 13 December 1982, 38/188 E of 20 December 1983, 39/151 H of 17 December 1984, 40/94 G of 12 December 1985, 41/59 L of 3 December 1986, 42/38 L of 30 November 1987 and 43/75 K of 7 December 1988, in which it requested the Conference on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of the implementation of the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 9/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, and of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to consider urgently the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear

/...

explosive devices and to keep the Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration,

Noting that the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament for 1989 included the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects" and that the programme of work of the Conference for both parts of its 1989 session contained the item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament", 17/

Recalling the proposals and statements made in the Conference on Disarmament on those items, 18/

Considering that the cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and the progressive conversion and transfer of stocks to peaceful uses would be a significant step towards halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race,

Considering also that the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices would be an important measure in facilitating the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and explosive devices,

Requests the Conference on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to pursue its consideration of the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration.

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

I

Confidence- and security-building measures and
conventional disarmament in Europe

The General Assembly,

Determined to achieve progress in disarmament,

Recalling its resolution 43/75 P of 7 December 1988,

17/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/44/27), paras. 6 and 8.

18/ Ibid., sect. III.A and B.

1. Notes with satisfaction the successful conclusion of the deliberations of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe;

2. Welcomes the opening of two negotiations in the framework of the process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, one on the elaboration of new confidence- and security-building measures and the other on conventional armed forces in Europe;

3. Also welcomes the progress achieved so far in those negotiations, and expresses the hope that they will be successfully concluded at an early date.

81st plenary meeting

15 December 1989

J

Conversion of military resources

The General Assembly,

Conscious that many States wish to convert their military resources to civilian purposes,

Noting that such conversion ought to be carried out gradually following a careful study of the basic aspects and practical details of the reorientation of military production and personnel,

Noting also the importance of the appropriate knowledge and reporting of military expenditure,

Noting further that the efficient conversion of military production may require relevant administrative and legislative measures, as well as appropriate organizational, financial and other mechanisms,

Aware that economic, social, financial and other aspects ought to be taken into account in elaborating a national conversion programme,

Recalling its resolution 43/73 of 7 December 1988 on the reduction of military budgets,

Recalling also that there exist studies on certain aspects of conversion which could be used by the international community,

Desirous of promoting an exchange of experience, within the United Nations framework, on modalities for the conversion of military resources to civilian purposes,

/...

1. Invites Member States to submit to the Secretary-General by 30 April 1991 their views concerning various aspects of the conversion of military resources to civilian purposes;

2. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-sixth session an item entitled "Conversion of military resources to civilian purposes".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

K

Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 43/75 A of 7 December 1988,

Recalling also the Declaration and the document on international security and disarmament of the Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade from 4 to 7 September 1989, 19/

Stressing that general rapprochement between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America contributes to the relaxation of international tensions and the creation of basic prerequisites for establishing lasting peace,

Encouraged by the positive developments in the field of disarmament brought about by the implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles 8/ and by recent agreements between the two sides,

Concerned, however, that the world is still threatened by the massive nuclear arsenals, which are being further refined and added to, and that the only hope for nuclear disarmament lies in discarding the balance of fear and in the nuclear-weapon Powers' embracing the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons,

Stressing also the importance of the strengthening of international security through disarmament and the halting of the qualitative and quantitative escalation of the arms race,

Aware of the fact that both the nuclear and the conventional disarmament processes cannot be carried out without a contribution by all States and especially

19/ See A/44/551-S/20870, annex.

by the major military Powers and their alliances, which have the greatest responsibility in that regard,

Mindful that, while it is the responsibility and obligation of all States to speed up the emerging process and to channel it in a direction that would benefit all, lasting peace and security can only be achieved by pooling the efforts of the international community and with all countries participating and contributing on the basis of equality,

Stressing further that general and complete disarmament under effective international control is by its very nature unattainable unless all countries join in its implementation,

Emphasizing that, since nuclear war threatens the very right to live, the prevention of nuclear war remains the principal task of our times,

Affirming that bilateral and multilateral negotiations on disarmament should facilitate and complement each other and that progress at the bilateral level should not be used to postpone or impede action at the multilateral level,

1. Welcomes the positive developments in the bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on disarmament issues, as well as the commencement of the implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles;

2. Calls upon the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to exert every effort to achieve the goal they set themselves of a treaty on a 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive arms as part of the process leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons;

3. Also calls upon the two Governments to intensify their efforts to achieve agreements in other areas, in particular the issue of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban as a matter of urgency;

4. Further calls upon the two Governments to reach agreement to ensure that outer space is kept free of all weapons;

5. Invites the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to keep the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament duly informed of progress made in their negotiations.

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

L

Relationship between disarmament and development

The General Assembly,

Recalling the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly 9/ related to the relationship between disarmament and development,

Recalling also the adoption on 11 September 1987 of the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, 20/

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General 21/ and actions undertaken in accordance with the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to take action, through the appropriate organs and within available resources, for the implementation of the action programme adopted at the International Conference; 22/

3. Also requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

M

Naval armaments and disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 38/188 G of 20 December 1983, in which it requested the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, to carry out a comprehensive study on the naval arms race,

20/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.87.IX.8.

21/ A/44/449.

22/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.87.IX.8, para. 35.

Recalling also its resolution 40/94 F of 12 December 1985, in which it requested the Disarmament Commission to consider the issues contained in the study entitled The Naval Arms Race, 23/ both its substantive content and its conclusions, taking into account all other relevant present and future proposals, with a view to facilitating the identification of possible measures in the field of naval arms reductions and disarmament, pursued with the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament, as well as confidence-building measures in this field,

Recalling further its resolution 43/75 L of 7 December 1988, in which it requested the Disarmament Commission to continue, at its 1989 session, the substantive consideration of the question and to report on its deliberations and recommendations to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session,

Having examined the report of the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission on the substantive consideration of the question of the naval arms race and disarmament during the 1989 session of the Commission, 24/ which met with the approval of all delegations participating in the substantive consultations and which, in their view, could form the basis of further deliberations on the subject,

1. Takes notes with satisfaction of the report of the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission on the substantive consideration of the question of the naval arms race and disarmament;

2. Requests the Disarmament Commission to inscribe on the agenda for its 1990 session the item entitled "Naval armaments and disarmament";

3. Also requests the Disarmament Commission to continue, at its forthcoming session in 1990, the substantive consideration of the question and to report on its deliberations and recommendations to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Naval armaments and disarmament".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

N

International arms transfers

The General Assembly,

Taking note of its resolution 43/75 I of 7 December 1988,

23/ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.86.IX.3.

24/ A/CN.10/134.

Noting the views of Member States submitted to the Secretary-General in the past year on this issue, 25/

Looking forward to the United Nations study on international arms transfers and the report of the study group to be submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-sixth session,

Also noting the substantive deliberations initiated within the Disarmament Commission on matters related to the issue of international arms transfers,

1. Invites all Member States that have not yet done so to make available to the Secretary-General their views and proposals on the matters contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 43/75 I;

2. Requests the Disarmament Commission to continue its deliberation on the matters contained in the above-mentioned resolution during its 1990 session under the item of conventional disarmament;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to make available within the framework of resolution 43/75 I all relevant information on this matter;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "International arms transfers".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

0

Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2660 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, in which it commended the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof,

Convinced that the Treaty constitutes a step towards the exclusion of the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the arms race and towards a treaty or treaties on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

25/ See A/44/444 and Add.1 to 3.

Recalling also that the States parties to the Treaty met at Geneva from 19 to 28 September 1989 to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty were being realized,

Noting with satisfaction that the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof concluded that the obligations assumed under article I of the Treaty had been faithfully observed by the States parties,

Noting that in its Final Declaration 26/ the Third Review Conference affirmed its belief that universal adherence to the Treaty, particularly by those States possessing nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction, would enhance international peace and security,

Noting also that the States parties to the Treaty reaffirmed their strong support for and continued dedication to the principles and objectives of the Treaty, as well as their commitment to implement effectively its provisions,

Noting further that all States parties to the Treaty confirmed that they had not emplaced any nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed outside the zone of application of the Treaty as defined by its article II and had no intention to do so,

Recognizing that in the Final Declaration the States parties to the Treaty reaffirmed the commitment undertaken in article V to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof,

1. Welcomes with satisfaction the positive assessment by the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof of the effectiveness of the Treaty since its entry into force, as reflected in its Final Declaration;

2. Reiterates its expressed hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty, and invites all States that have not yet done so, particularly those possessing nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction, to ratify or accede to the Treaty as a significant contribution to international peace and security;

3. Affirms its strong interest in avoiding an arms race in nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof;

4. Calls again upon all States to refrain from any action which might lead to the extension of the arms race to the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof;

5. Requests the Conference on Disarmament, in consultation with the States parties to the Treaty, taking into account existing proposals and any relevant technological developments, to proceed promptly with consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents of the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly relevant to further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof;

7. Also requests the Conference on Disarmament to report on its consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof to the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session;

8. Also requests the Secretary-General to report by 1992, and every three years thereafter until the fourth Review Conference is convened, on technological developments relevant to the Treaty and to the verification of compliance with the Treaty, including dual-purpose technologies for peaceful and specified military ends, in carrying out which task he should draw from official sources and from contributions by States parties to the Treaty and may use the assistance of appropriate expertise;

9. Urges all States parties to the Treaty to assist the Secretary-General accordingly by providing information and drawing his attention to suitable sources;

10. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-seventh session an item entitled "Further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

P

Defensive security concepts and policies

The General Assembly,

Recalling the principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,

/...

Reaffirming the obligation to maintain international peace and security in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

Bearing in mind the reports of the Secretary-General transmitting the study on the relationship between disarmament and international security 27/ and the study undertaken by the Group of Governmental Experts to Carry Out a Comprehensive Study of Concepts of Security 28/ submitted to the General Assembly in 1981 and 1985, respectively,

Recognizing that since then a number of important developments have taken place in the areas of disarmament and security concepts and that new opportunities have emerged for arms limitation and disarmament, for ending regional conflicts and for developing among States constructive and co-operative relations,

Noting the ongoing international dialogue on matters of security, including the renewed search for common security as well as for common denominators for the security requirements in different regions,

Convinced that in the nuclear age national policies of restraint and co-operative efforts are essential to eliminate eventually the risk of war and global destruction,

Stressing that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,

Believing that security concepts and policies should be aimed at removing the danger of war and securing peace at progressively lower levels of armaments and armed forces, and welcoming activities by States to implement this goal by negotiated disarmament measures,

Bearing in mind the specific political and security requirements in different regions,

1. Considers the development of an international dialogue on defensive security concepts and policies to be of great importance for promoting the process of achieving disarmament and strengthening international security;

2. Invites Member States to initiate or intensify the dialogue on defensive security concepts and policies at the bilateral, regional or multilateral levels and to keep the General Assembly informed about the progress achieved;

27/ Relationship between Disarmament and International Security (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.4).

28/ Concepts of Security (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.86.IX.1).

3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session an item entitled "Defensive security concepts and policies".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

Q

Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of
disarmament: report of the Disarmament Commission

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 39/151 G of 17 December 1984, 40/94 O of 12 December 1985, 41/59 O of 3 December 1986, 42/38 O of 30 November 1987 and 43/75 R of 7 December 1988,

Bearing in mind that the primary purpose of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security,

Reaffirming its conviction that genuine and lasting peace can be created only through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Reaffirming that the United Nations, in accordance with its Charter, has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament,

Recognizing the need for the United Nations, in discharging its central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament, to play a more active role in the field of disarmament in accordance with its primary purpose under the Charter to maintain international peace and security,

Taking into account the part of the report of the Disarmament Commission relating to this question, 29/ and noting the progress made in the consideration of the question at the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly, the third special session devoted to disarmament, 30/

Bearing in mind the common desire expressed at the third special session devoted to disarmament on the necessity to strengthen the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and the increased reaffirmation of faith in the United Nations as an indispensable instrument for international peace and security,

29/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/44/42), para. 46.

30/ Ibid., Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/S-15/3), para. 47.

1. Requests the Disarmament Commission to continue its consideration of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament as a matter of priority at its next substantive session, in 1990, with a view to the elaboration of concrete recommendations and proposals, as appropriate, taking into account, inter alia, the views and suggestions of Member States as well as the aforementioned documents on the subject;

2. Also requests the Disarmament Commission to submit its report on the subject, including findings, recommendations and proposals, as appropriate, to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session;

3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament: report of the Disarmament Commission".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

R

Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind resolution CM/Res.1153 (XLVIII) concerning the dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa, adopted on 25 May 1988 by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its forty-eighth ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa from 19 to 23 May 1988, 31/

Bearing in mind also resolution CM/Res.1225 (L) adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its fiftieth ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa from 17 to 22 July 1989, 32/

Welcoming resolution GC(XXXIII)/RES/509 on the dumping of nuclear wastes, adopted on 29 September 1989 by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its thirty-third regular session,

Considering its resolution 2602 C (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, in which it requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, inter alia, to consider effective methods of control against the use of radiological methods of warfare,

Aware of the potential hazards underlying any use of nuclear wastes which would constitute radiological warfare and its implications for regional and international security and in particular for the security of developing countries,

31/ See A/43/398, annex I.

32/ See A/44/603, annex I.

Desirous of promoting the implementation of paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 9/ the first devoted to disarmament,

Aware also of the consideration of the question of dumping of radioactive wastes in the Conference on Disarmament during its 1989 session,

Recalling its resolution 43/75 Q of 7 December 1988, in which it requested the Conference on Disarmament to include in its report to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session the developments in the ongoing negotiations on this subject,

Recalling also its resolution 43/75 T of 7 December 1988, in which it requested the Secretary-General, inter alia, "to prepare a report, in consultation with relevant international organizations, on the dumping of radioactive wastes in all its aspects in Africa, including all steps taken or envisaged to monitor, control and put a halt to such activities",

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the dumping of radioactive wastes, 33/

1. Takes note of the above-mentioned report;
2. Takes note also of the part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament 34/ relating to the dumping of radioactive wastes;
3. Expresses grave concern regarding any use of nuclear waste that would constitute radiological warfare and have grave implications for the national security of all States;
4. Calls upon all States to take appropriate measures with a view to preventing any dumping of nuclear wastes that would infringe upon the sovereignty of States;
5. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to continue to take into account, in the ongoing negotiations for a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, the deliberate employment of nuclear wastes to cause destruction, damage or injury by means of radiation produced by the decay of such material;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this item by the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session;

33/ A/44/652.

34/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/44/27).

7. Also requests the Conference on Disarmament to include in its report to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session the developments in the ongoing negotiations on this subject;

8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session an item entitled "Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

S

Conventional disarmament on a regional scale

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 40/94 A of 12 December 1985, 41/59 M of 3 December 1986, 42/38 N of 30 November 1987 and 43/75 S of 7 December 1988,

Taking note of the final documents of the Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade from 4 to 7 September 1989, 19/

Reiterating the primary responsibility of nuclear-weapon States and militarily significant States for halting and reversing the arms race, particularly the nuclear-arms race,

Convinced that effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority,

Drawing attention to the fact that, together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on the balanced reduction of armed forces and on conventional disarmament, based on the principle of equal and undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower level of military forces, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security,

Aware that, as a consequence of the continuing military application of scientific and technological developments, conventional weapons have become more lethal and destructive,

Taking into account the fact that conventional weapons consume large amounts of resources, especially in militarily significant States, which could be utilized for the social and economic development of the people of all countries, particularly the developing countries,

Affirming that regional and subregional disarmament processes that take into account the characteristics of each region, as well as the views of all parties concerned, and are implemented in accordance with the principles and norms embodied

/...

in the Charter of the United Nations enhance and complement global disarmament efforts,

Noting with satisfaction the positive trend towards the peaceful settlement of various regional and subregional conflicts and the important role played in that regard by the United Nations,

1. Welcomes the initiatives towards arms limitation and disarmament undertaken jointly or unilaterally by some countries at the regional and subregional levels, as well as the systematic implementation of confidence-building measures, limitations of the acquisition of conventional weapons and the reduction of military spending, with a view to achieving equal and undiminished security at a lower level of armaments, as well as to allocating the resources thus released to the social and economic development of the people of all countries, particularly the developing countries;

2. Again expresses its firm support for the United Nations system, and for the Secretary-General in particular, in the efforts to find solutions to conflict situations, thereby reaffirming a fundamental role of the United Nations in promoting peace and disarmament, and for the strict observance of the principles and norms embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;

3. Urges all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States and militarily significant States, to intensify their efforts in the negotiation and implementation, in appropriate forums, of regional and subregional disarmament and arms limitation measures, taking into account their particular responsibility in this matter and the principle of equal and undiminished security for all parties, aimed at enhancing international peace and security;

4. Requests the United Nations, in conformity with its mandate to promote international peace and security, to provide assistance to States that might request it with a view to establishing disarmament measures at the regional and subregional levels;

5. Appeals to all States to facilitate the progress of regional disarmament, refraining from any action, including the use or threat of use of force against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of States and intervention or interference in internal affairs of States, that might hinder the achievement of this objective;

6. Invites all Member States to convey to the Secretary-General their views on ways and means aimed at strengthening regional and subregional disarmament and arms limitation efforts, taking into account recent developments that have taken place in this sphere;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session on the implementation of the present resolution, taking into consideration the views expressed by Member States in accordance with paragraph 6 above;

8. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Conventional disarmament on a regional scale".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

T

Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling
and use of radiological weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 43/75 C of 7 December 1988,

1. Takes note of the part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament on its 1989 session that deals with the question of radiological weapons, in particular the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons; 35/
2. Recognizes that in 1989 the Ad Hoc Committee made a further contribution to the clarification and better understanding of different approaches that continue to exist with regard to both of the important matters under consideration;
3. Takes note also of the recommendation of the Conference on Disarmament that the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons should be re-established at the beginning of its 1990 session;
4. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to continue its substantive negotiation on the subject with a view to the prompt conclusion of its work, taking into account all proposals presented to the Conference to this end and drawing upon the annexes to its report as a basis of its future work, the result of which should be submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference on Disarmament all relevant documents relating to the discussion of all aspects of the issue by the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session;
6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

35/ Ibid., para. 96.

U

Contribution of confidence- and security-building measures
to international peace and security

The General Assembly,

Mindful of the importance of confidence-building in the bilateral, regional and global context for the peaceful settlement of existing international problems and for the improvement and promotion of international relations based on justice, co-operation and solidarity,

Recognizing that commitment to confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament,

Recalling previous resolutions on the subject of confidence-building, in particular resolution 43/78 H of 7 December 1988,

1. Welcomes the implementation of confidence-building measures as contained in the Final Act of Helsinki 36/ and on that basis the positive experience gathered since 1987 with the implementation, by the thirty-five States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, of the measures agreed at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe;

2. Expects the ongoing Vienna negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures to build upon and expand the results already achieved at the Stockholm Conference with the aim of elaborating and adopting a new set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe;

3. Reaffirms its invitation to all States to consider the possible introduction of confidence-building measures in their particular regions and, where possible, on the basis of initiatives of the States of the region concerned, to negotiate on them in keeping with conditions and requirements prevailing in the respective region;

4. Also welcomes the consideration, inter alia, of confidence-building measures in United Nations regional disarmament workshops and in the United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament in Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean.

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

36/ The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was signed at Helsinki on 1 August 1975.



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/44/117
12 January 1990

Forty-fourth session
Agenda item 64

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/44/786)]

44/117. Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly

A

World Disarmament Campaign

The General Assembly,

Recalling that in paragraph 15 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, it declared that it was essential that not only Governments but also the peoples of the world recognize and understand the dangers in the present situation and stressed the importance of mobilizing world public opinion on behalf of disarmament,

Recalling also its resolution 43/76 C of 7 December 1988,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General of 20 October 1989 2/ on the implementation of the programme of activities of the World Disarmament Campaign by the United Nations system,

Having also examined the part of the report of the Secretary-General of 26 October 1989 dealing with the activities of the Advisory Board on Disarmament

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

2/ A/44/647.

Matters relating to the implementation of the World Disarmament Campaign, 3/ as well as the Final Act of the Seventh United Nations Pledging Conference for the Campaign, 4/ held on 25 October 1989,

Noting with appreciation the contributions that Member States have already made to the Campaign,

1. Reiterates its commendation of the manner in which, as described in the above-mentioned reports, the World Disarmament Campaign has been geared by the Secretary-General in order to guarantee "the widest possible dissemination of information and unimpeded access for all sectors of the public to a broad range of information and opinions on questions of arms limitation and disarmament and the dangers relating to all aspects of the arms race and war, in particular nuclear war"; 5/

2. Recalls that, as was also agreed by consensus in the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, it is likewise an essential requisite for the universality of the Campaign that it receive the co-operation and participation of all States; 5/

3. Endorses once more the statement made by the Secretary-General on the occasion of the Third United Nations Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign 6/ to the effect that such co-operation implies that adequate funds be made available and that consequently the criterion of universality also applies to pledges, since a campaign without world-wide participation and funding will have difficulty in reflecting this principle in its implementation;

4. Urges States that have not yet done so, especially those with the largest military expenditures, to make an initial financial contribution to the Campaign;

5. Decides that at its forty-fifth session there should be an eighth United Nations Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign, and expresses the hope that on that occasion all those Member States that have not yet announced any voluntary contributions will do so, bearing in mind the objectives of the Third Disarmament Decade and the need to ensure its success;

6. Reiterates its recommendation that the voluntary contributions made by Member States to the World Disarmament Campaign Voluntary Trust Fund should not be earmarked for specific activities inasmuch as it is most desirable that the

3/ A/44/654, para. 7.

4/ A/CONF.149/1.

5/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Annexes, agenda items 9 to 13, document A/S-12/32, annex V, para. 4.

6/ See A/CONF.131/SR.1.

Secretary-General enjoy full freedom to take the decisions he deems fit within the framework of the Campaign previously approved by the General Assembly and in exercise of the powers vested in him in connection with the Campaign;

7. Notes with appreciation that the Secretary-General has given permanent character to his instructions to the United Nations information centres and regional commissions to give wide publicity to the Campaign and, whenever necessary, to adapt, as far as possible, United Nations information materials to local languages;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session a report covering both the implementation of the programme of activities of the Campaign by the United Nations system during 1990 and the programme of activities contemplated by the system for 1991;

9. Also requests the Secretary-General to assess the achievements and shortcomings of the World Disarmament Campaign so far and to submit a brief report in this regard to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session;

10. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "World Disarmament Campaign".

81st plenary meeting

15 December 1989

B

Regional disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 37/100 F of 13 December 1982, 38/73 J of 15 December 1983, 39/63 F of 12 December 1984, 40/94 A of 12 December 1985, 41/59 M of 3 December 1986 and 42/39 E of 30 November 1987, relating to regional disarmament,

Reaffirming that all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, have the responsibility of halting and reversing the arms race,

Considering that regional disarmament measures enable all States to contribute to the general process of arms reduction and disarmament,

Confirming the importance and potential effectiveness of regional disarmament measures taken at the initiative of the region and with the participation of all the States concerned, in that they can contribute to the realization of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control and therefore to security and stability,

/...

Stressing that any regional disarmament enterprise must take into account the specific conditions characteristic of each region,

Also stressing that it is for the countries themselves of a region to take appropriate initiatives in common and to prepare agreements that will allow the achievement of regional disarmament,

Further stressing that disarmament efforts in a region cannot be isolated either from the disarmament efforts in other regions or from global disarmament efforts both in the nuclear and conventional field,

Taking into account Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations and the decisions and recommendations appearing in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ particularly in paragraph 114,

Aware of those studies which have already been carried out and of the views of States which are of interest for regional disarmament,

1. Expresses its thanks to the Secretary-General for his report submitted pursuant to resolution 42/39 E; 7/

2. Notes with concern that conflicts continue to threaten regional and global peace and security but that prospects are emerging for the peaceful settlement of certain regional conflicts;

3. Notes with satisfaction the importance of the regional measures that have already been adopted and the regional efforts undertaken in the field of nuclear and conventional disarmament;

4. Welcomes the progress made since its forty-second session with respect to:

(a) The process initiated by the agreement of 7 August 1987 on the "Procedures for the establishment of a firm and lasting peace in Central America" (Esquipulas II) between the countries of Central America 8/ in order to arrive at a lasting peace in that region and that has resulted in the Tela agreements of 7 August 1989; 9/

7/ A/44/513.

8/ A/42/521-S/19085, annex. For the printed text see Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-second Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1987, document S/19085, annex.

9/ See A/44/451-S/20778.

(b) The resumption, in Vienna, of negotiations in the area of confidence- and security-building measures, as well as the new negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe, both within the framework of the process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which have been characterized by rapid progress since they began in March 1989;

5. Encourages all States to consider and develop, as far as possible, regional solutions in the matter of arms reduction and disarmament;

6. Invites all States and regional institutions associated with regional disarmament efforts to report thereon to the Secretary-General;

7. Requests the United Nations to lend its assistance to States and regional institutions that may request it, with the view to the institution of measures within the framework of an effort for regional disarmament;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the General Assembly regularly informed of the implementation of resolutions on regional disarmament and of the activities which the Secretariat, in particular the Department for Disarmament Affairs, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research are conducting in the field of regional disarmament;

9. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-sixth session the item entitled "Regional disarmament: report of the Secretary-General".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

C

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The General Assembly,

Convinced that the existence and use of nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to the survival of mankind,

Conscious that the ongoing nuclear-arms race increases the danger of the use of nuclear weapons,

Convinced also that nuclear disarmament is the only ultimate guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons,

Convinced further that a multilateral agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should strengthen international security and help to create the climate for negotiations leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

Recalling that, in paragraph 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ it is stated that all States should actively

/...

participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed upon and that would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

Reaffirming that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity, as declared in its resolutions 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, 33/71 B of 14 December 1978, 34/83 G of 11 December 1979, 35/152 D of 12 December 1980 and 36/92 I of 9 December 1981,

Noting with regret that the Conference on Disarmament, during its 1989 session, was not able to undertake negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis the text annexed to General Assembly resolution 43/76 E of 7 December 1988,

1. Reiterates its request to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations, as a matter of priority, in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons annexed to the present resolution;

2. Also requests the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session on the results of those negotiations.

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

ANNEX

Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

The States Parties to this Convention,

Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons,

Convinced that any use of nuclear weapons constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity,

Convinced that this Convention would be a step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons leading to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Determined to continue negotiations for the achievement of this goal,

Have agreed as follows:

/...

Article 1

The States Parties to this Convention solemnly undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

Article 2

This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

Article 3

1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State that does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

3. This Convention shall enter into force on the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-five Governments, including the Governments of the five nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of the Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The depositary shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, as well as of the receipt of other notices.

6. This Convention shall be registered by the depositary in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 4

This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send duly certified copies thereof to the Government of the signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention, opened for signature at _____ on the ____ day of _____ one thousand nine hundred and _____.

/...

D

Nuclear-arms freeze

The General Assembly,

Recalling that, in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, adopted in 1978 and unanimously and categorically reaffirmed in 1982 during the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, 10/ the second special session devoted to disarmament, the Assembly expressed deep concern over the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race,

Convinced that, in this nuclear age, lasting world peace can be based only on the attainment of the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Welcoming the new trends that have led to an improvement in the international security environment,

Convinced also of the urgency further to pursue negotiations for the substantial reduction and qualitative limitation of existing nuclear arms,

Considering that a nuclear-arms freeze, while not an end in itself, would constitute an effective step to prevent the continued increase and qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weaponry during the period when the negotiations take place, and that at the same time it would provide a favourable environment for the conduct of negotiations to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons,

Convinced further that the undertakings derived from the freeze can be effectively verified,

Welcoming the announcement that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will cease production of highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons purposes by the end of 1989 and had begun the process of shutting down its reactors producing weapons-grade plutonium,

Noting with deep concern that all nuclear-weapon States have not so far taken any collective action in response to the call made in the relevant resolutions on the question of a nuclear-arms freeze,

1. Urges once more both the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, as the two major nuclear-weapon States, to reach agreement on an immediate nuclear-arms freeze, which would, inter alia, provide for

10/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Annexes, agenda items 9 to 13, document A/S-12/32.

a simultaneous total stoppage of any further production of nuclear weapons and a complete cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

2. Calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to agree, through a joint declaration, to a comprehensive nuclear-arms freeze, whose structure and scope would be the following:

(a) It would embrace:

- (i) A comprehensive test ban on nuclear weapons and on their delivery vehicles;
- (ii) The complete cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles;
- (iii) A ban on all further deployment of nuclear weapons and of their delivery vehicles;
- (iv) The complete cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

(b) It would be subject to appropriate and effective measures and procedures of verification;

3. Requests the nuclear-weapon States to submit a joint report, or separate reports, to the General Assembly, prior to the opening of its forty-fifth session, on the implementation of the present resolution;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Nuclear-arms freeze".

81st plenary meeting

15 December 1989

E

United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory
services programme

The General Assembly,

Recalling its decision, contained in paragraph 108 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament, as well as its decisions contained in annex IV to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, 10/ the second special session devoted to disarmament, in which it decided, inter alia, to continue the programme and to increase the number of fellowships from 20 to 25 as from 1983,

/...

Noting with satisfaction that the programme has already trained an appreciable number of public officials selected from geographical regions represented in the United Nations system, most of whom are now in positions of responsibility in the field of disarmament affairs in their respective countries or Governments,

Recalling also its resolutions 37/100 G of 13 December 1982, 38/73 C of 15 December 1983, 39/63 B of 12 December 1984, 40/151 H of 16 December 1985, 41/60 H of 3 December 1986, 42/39 I of 30 November 1987 and 43/76 F of 7 December 1988,

Noting also with satisfaction that the programme, as designed, has enabled an increased number of public officials, particularly from the developing countries, to acquire more expertise in the sphere of disarmament,

Believing that the forms of assistance available to Member States, particularly to developing countries, under the programme will enhance the capabilities of their officials to follow ongoing deliberations and negotiations on disarmament, both bilateral and multilateral,

1. Reaffirms its decisions contained in annex IV to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly and the report of the Secretary-General 11/ approved by resolution 33/71 E of 14 December 1978;
2. Expresses its appreciation to the Governments of the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America for inviting the 1989 fellows to study selected activities in the field of disarmament, thereby contributing to the fulfilment of the overall objectives of the programme;
3. Expresses its gratitude to the Government of Nigeria for serving as host to the United Nations Regional Disarmament Workshop for Africa, which examined African security perceptions and requirements, including related regional issues, and to the Government of Norway for making financial contributions for the Workshop;
4. Commends the Secretary-General for the diligence with which the programme has continued to be carried out;
5. Requests the Secretary-General to continue the implementation of the programme within existing resources;
6. Also requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session on the implementation of the programme.

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

F

United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament in Africa and Asia and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 40/151 G of 16 December 1985, 41/60 D of 3 December 1986, 42/39 J of 30 November 1987 and 43/76 D of 7 December 1988 on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, 41/60 J of 3 December 1986, 42/39 K of 30 November 1987 and 43/76 H of 7 December 1988 on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 42/39 D of 30 November 1987 and 43/76 G of 7 December 1988 on the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia,

Reaffirming its resolutions 37/100 F of 13 December 1982, 38/73 J of 15 December 1983, 39/63 F of 12 December 1984, 40/94 A of 12 December 1985, 41/59 M of 3 December 1986 and 42/39 E of 30 November 1987 on regional disarmament,

Taking note of the final documents of the Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade from 4 to 7 September 1989, 12/ and noting in particular the importance placed by the Heads of State or Government on the activities of the United Nations regional centres in Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean,

Convinced that the initiatives and activities mutually agreed upon by Member States of the respective regions aimed at fostering mutual confidence and security, as well as the implementation and co-ordination of regional activities under the World Disarmament Campaign, would encourage and facilitate the development of effective measures of confidence-building, arms limitation and disarmament in these regions,

Expressing its gratitude to the Member States and international governmental and non-governmental organizations that have contributed to the trust funds of the three regional centres,

Bearing in mind the need to provide the centres with financial stability so as to facilitate the planning of their activities,

12/ A/44/551-S/20870, annex.

Taking note with appreciation of the reports of the Secretary-General on the regional centres in Africa, 13/ Asia 14/ and Latin America and the Caribbean, 15/ and of the efforts of the Secretary-General in providing the necessary administrative measures to permit the establishment of the three centres,

Convinced that the appointment of a Director to head each of the three regional centres is essential to ensure the continued effective functioning of the centres,

Noting that the responsibilities of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia include the Asia-Pacific region,

1. Appeals once again to Member States, as well as to international governmental and non-governmental organizations, to make voluntary contributions in order to strengthen the effective operational activities of the centres;

2. Commends the Secretary-General for all the efforts he has made in favour of the centres, and requests him to continue to provide all the necessary support to their activities;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to establish, as soon as practicable, the post of Director at each of the regional centres so as to ensure the effective functioning of the centres;

4. Decides to rename the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia as the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific;

5. Also requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session on the implementation of the present resolution.

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

13/ A/44/582.

14/ A/44/583.

15/ A/44/584.



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/44/118
16 January 1990

Forty-fourth session
Agenda item 65

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/44/787)]

44/118. Scientific and technological developments and their
impact on international security

A

Scientific and technological developments and their impact
on international security

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 43/77 A of 7 December 1988,

Noting with concern the potential in technological advances for application to military purposes, which could lead to the emergence of an entirely new class of weapon systems,

Recognizing that such a development will have a negative impact on the security environment and cause a major setback to disarmament efforts,

Stressing, in this context, the importance of preventing this negative impact by effectively addressing this problem and ensuring that scientific and technological developments are harnessed for the common benefit of mankind,

Recognizing also the interests of the international community in the subject and the need to follow closely such developments,

Recognizing further that scientific and technological developments can have both civilian and military applications and that progress in science and technology for civilian applications needs to be maintained and encouraged,

Emphasizing that the proposal contained in resolution 43/77 A is without prejudice to research and development efforts being undertaken for peaceful purposes,

Having examined the report of the Secretary-General 1/ on this question,

1. Takes note of the preliminary work undertaken by the Secretary-General to follow future scientific and technological developments, especially those which have potential military applications, and to evaluate their impact on international security;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to conclude this work so that a report can be submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session;

3. Notes that the process of establishing national expert panels by Member States has already begun;

4. Encourages Member States to participate by communicating their views to the Secretary-General, and invites them to establish panels at the national level to monitor and evaluate developments;

5. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

B

Science and technology for disarmament

The General Assembly,

Considering that science and technology can profoundly contribute to solving the problems of mankind, especially to promoting its social and economic development,

Noting the interest of the international community in the peaceful uses of scientific and technological achievements,

Recognizing the vast possibilities that scientific and technological progress offers for supporting disarmament negotiations and implementing their results, inter alia, in the fields of verification of compliance with agreements on arms limitation and disarmament as well as conversion of military industry to civilian production,

1/ A/44/487 and Add.1 and 2.

Welcoming respective activities undertaken so far in this area by States and national and international scientific and technological institutions,

Taking into account that scientifically and technologically more advanced States bear a special responsibility for disseminating information on and promoting the application of science and technology in the field of disarmament,

Considering the need for an intensification and extension of such activities, as well as international co-operation, with a view to using scientific and technological achievements for disarmament-related purposes, inter alia, in the fields of verification of compliance with agreements on arms limitation and disarmament, application of technologies for improved means of verification and conversion of military industry to civilian production,

1. Takes note of national and international activities to use scientific and technological achievements for disarmament-related purposes;
2. Calls upon Member States and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to intensify and extend such activities, to develop international co-operation in this area and to keep the United Nations informed about progress in this field;
3. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session an item entitled "Science and technology for disarmament".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/44/119
19 January 1990

Forty-fourth session
Agenda item 66

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/44/788)]

- 44/119. Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

A

Comprehensive programme of disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, in which it declared the decade of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade and requested, inter alia, the then Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to work out "a comprehensive programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which would provide the Conference with a guideline to chart the course of its further work and its negotiations",

Recalling also its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, by which it adopted the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, which, inter alia, called for the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament with the utmost urgency,

Recalling further its resolution 43/78 K of 7 December 1988, in which it noted the agreement of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament of the Conference on Disarmament to "resume its work at the outset of the 1989 session of the Conference with the firm intention of completing the elaboration of the programme for its submission to the General Assembly, at the latest at its forty-fourth session",

Having examined the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament concerning its work during the 1989 session of the Conference on Disarmament, 1/ which is an integral part of the report of the Conference,

Recognizing the efforts of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and the substantial progress achieved thus far,

Conscious of the need to continue the work on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, building on the texts already agreed to, with a view to resolving the outstanding issues and thus concluding negotiations on it,

Recalling its resolution 43/78 L of 7 December 1988, in which it declared the decade of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade,

Considering that the conclusion of the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament would constitute an important contribution to the success of the Third Disarmament Decade and to the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament,

1. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to consider, at the beginning of its 1991 session, the resumption of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament with the aim of resolving the outstanding issues in order to conclude the elaboration of the programme;

2. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-sixth session the item entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

B

Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war

The General Assembly,

Recalling that, in accordance with paragraph 20 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 2/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority and that this commitment was reaffirmed by the Assembly at its twelfth special session, the second special session devoted to disarmament,

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/44/27), para. 100.

2/ Resolution S-10/2.

Recalling also that, in paragraph 58 of the Final Document, it is stated that all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider as soon as possible various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and related objectives, where possible through international agreement, and thereby ensure that the survival of mankind is not endangered,

Recalling further that at its fifteenth special session, the third special session devoted to disarmament, it was generally recognized that the prevention of nuclear war was of utmost concern and that specific efforts, bilateral, regional or multilateral, should be vigorously pursued and measures should be strengthened to reduce and ultimately eliminate the risk of nuclear war,

Reaffirming that the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and for undertaking measures aimed at preventing the outbreak of nuclear war, and that in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility,

Stressing that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,

Welcoming the entry into force and implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles ^{3/} as a first valuable step towards the reduction of nuclear weapons, as well as measures taken by the two States to reduce the risk of nuclear war, including the establishment and operation of nuclear risk reduction centres,

Expressing the hope that further measures will be undertaken to reduce and ultimately eliminate the risk of nuclear war,

Taking note of ideas directed to that end, including the suggestion to consider the establishment of a multilateral nuclear alert centre to reduce the risk of fatal misinterpretation of unintentional nuclear launchings,

Noting that the Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade from 4 to 7 September 1989, stressed the need for the conclusion of an international agreement prohibiting all use of nuclear weapons, ^{4/}

Welcoming recent progress in the field of disarmament, including the beginning at Vienna of new negotiations on conventional armed forces and on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe,

^{3/} The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 12: 1987 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.88.IX.2), appendix VII.

^{4/} See A/44/551-S/20870, annex, p. 22, para. 9.

Emphasizing that, for the sake of international peace and security, military concepts and doctrines must be of a strictly defensive character,

1. Considers that the solemn declarations by two nuclear-weapon States made or reiterated at the twelfth special session of the General Assembly, concerning their respective obligations not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, offer an important avenue to decrease the danger of nuclear war;

2. Expresses the hope that those nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so will consider making similar declarations with respect to not being the first to use nuclear weapons;

3. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on the item in its agenda concerning prevention of nuclear war and to consider, inter alia, the elaboration of an international instrument of a legally binding character laying down the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

C

Report of the Disarmament Commission

The General Assembly,

Having considered the annual report of the Disarmament Commission, 5/

Emphasizing again the importance of an effective follow-up to the relevant recommendations and decisions contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 2/ the first special session devoted to disarmament,

Taking into account the relevant sections of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly, 6/ the second special session devoted to disarmament,

Also taking into account widespread views expressed during the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly, the third special session devoted to disarmament,

5/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/44/42).

6/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Annexes, agenda items 9 to 13, document A/S-12/32.

Considering the role that the Disarmament Commission has been called upon to play and the contribution that it should make in examining and submitting recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and in the promotion of the implementation of the relevant decisions of the tenth special session,

Recalling its resolutions 33/71 H of 14 December 1978, 34/83 H of 11 December 1979, 35/152 F of 12 December 1980, 36/92 B of 9 December 1981, 37/78 H of 9 December 1982, 38/183 E of 20 December 1983, 39/148 R of 17 December 1984, 40/152 F of 16 December 1985, 41/86 E of 4 December 1986, 42/42 G of 30 November 1987 and 43/78 A of 7 December 1988,

1. Takes note of the annual report of the Disarmament Commission;
2. Notes that the Disarmament Commission has yet to conclude its consideration of some items on its agenda, but notes also with appreciation the progress achieved on some of these;
3. Recalls the role of the Disarmament Commission as the specialized, deliberative body within the United Nations multilateral disarmament machinery that allows for in-depth deliberations on specific disarmament issues, leading to the submission of concrete recommendations on those issues;
4. Stresses the importance for the Disarmament Commission to work on the basis of a relevant agenda of disarmament topics, thereby enabling the Commission to concentrate its efforts and thus optimize its progress on specific subjects in accordance with resolution 37/78 H;
5. Notes also that consultations have been held on the question of ways and means to enhance the functioning of the Disarmament Commission in the field of disarmament;
6. Takes note with satisfaction of the results of those consultations on ways and means to enhance the functioning of the Disarmament Commission, as annexed to the present resolution;
7. Requests the Disarmament Commission to continue its work in accordance with its mandate, as set forth in paragraph 118 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and with paragraph 3 of resolution 37/78 H, and to that end to make every effort to achieve specific recommendations, at its 1990 substantive session, on the outstanding items on its agenda, taking into account the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly as well as the results of its 1989 substantive session;
8. Also requests the Disarmament Commission to meet for a period not exceeding four weeks during 1990 and to submit a substantive report, containing specific recommendations on the items included in its agenda, to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session;

/...

9. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit to the Disarmament Commission the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament, 7/ together with all the official records of the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly relating to disarmament matters, and to render all assistance that the Commission may require for implementing the present resolution;

10. Also requests the Secretary-General to ensure full provision to the Commission and its subsidiary bodies of interpretation and translation facilities in the official languages and to assign, as a matter of priority, all the necessary resources and services to that end;

11. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

ANNEX

Ways and means to enhance the functioning of the Disarmament Commission

1. Mandate

The Disarmament Commission reaffirms its mandate contained in paragraph 118 (a) of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 2/ the first special session devoted to disarmament (hereinafter referred to as the "Final Document").

2. Decision-making method

The decision-making method described in paragraph 118 (b) of the Final Document should be maintained.

3. Agenda items

1. The Disarmament Commission could have a general agenda and a working agenda for each substantive session. The working agenda should be agreed at the Commission's organizational session.

2. For each session, the working agenda should be limited to a maximum of four substantive items for in-depth consideration.

7/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/44/27).

3. From 1991, no subject should, in principle, be maintained on the working agenda for more than three consecutive years. At each session, the Commission should review, for possible reconsideration, any subject that had been suspended.

4. If no agreement can be reached on a specific agenda item, the report of the Commission should contain a joint statement or a Chairman's summary of the proceedings to reflect views or positions of different delegations, particularly in the case of those agenda items to be suspended for a period of time.

5. At its 1990 session, the Commission should make every effort to conclude all its agenda items, except the new substantive items.

4. Subsidiary bodies

1. At each annual session, the Disarmament Commission should not establish more than four subsidiary bodies for its substantive agenda items. The allocation of the agenda items to the four subsidiary bodies and the appointment of chairmen for these subsidiary bodies should be decided at the organizational session of the Commission, taking into account the principle of equitable geographical distribution.

2. The chairmanship of subsidiary bodies should, in principle, be rotated each year; however, at its organizational session, the Commission may decide to extend the term of office of any chairman in the interest of effective work and the speedy conclusion of an item.

5. Duration of the substantive session

1. The Disarmament Commission should meet for a period not exceeding four weeks for in-depth deliberations on substantive items.

2. The duration of each substantive session, in accordance with the established practice, should be flexible and could be shortened. In order to utilize efficiently the conference-servicing resources available, the Commission should decide the duration of each substantive session at its organizational session.

6. Organization of work of the session

1. Each session may have a general debate on agenda items in the plenary meetings, not exceeding three days' duration.

2. Except in the case of new items, there should be no general exchange of views in the subsidiary bodies. The general exchange of views on new items should not exceed two meetings.

3. Subsidiary bodies could begin their work in parallel with the general exchange of views in the plenary meetings.

/...

4. No more than two official meetings should be held simultaneously. This restriction, however, would not apply to informal consultations.

5. The meetings of the Commission and its subsidiary bodies should be provided with full meeting services.

6. All the officers of the Commission should be elected at its organizational session.

7. Consultations

The Chairman of the Disarmament Commission should conduct consultations on matters relating to the work of the Commission, in particular on its working agenda, year round, especially during the meetings of the First Committee of the General Assembly.

D

Report of the Conference on Disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 34/83 B of 11 December 1979, 35/152 J of 12 December 1980, 36/92 F of 9 December 1981, 37/78 G of 9 December 1982, 38/183 I of 20 December 1983, 39/148 N of 17 December 1984, 40/152 M of 16 December 1985, 41/86 M of 4 December 1986, 42/42 L of 30 November 1987 and 43/78 M of 7 December 1988,

Having considered the report of the Conference on Disarmament, 7/

Convinced that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, should play the central role in substantive negotiations on priority questions of disarmament,

Expressing its regret that the Conference on Disarmament was not able in 1989 either to establish ad hoc committees or to commence negotiations on the nuclear issues on its agenda,

Expressing its expectation that the Conference on Disarmament, in view of the positive current processes in some important fields of disarmament, would be in a position to reach concrete agreements on disarmament issues to which the United Nations has assigned the greatest priority and urgency and which have been under consideration for a number of years,

Considering that it is more than ever imperative in the present circumstances to give an additional impetus to negotiations on disarmament at all levels and to achieve genuine progress in the immediate future,

/...

1. Reaffirms the role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community;
2. Notes with satisfaction that further progress has been made in the negotiations on the elaboration of a draft convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, and urges the Conference on Disarmament to intensify further its work with a view to completing negotiations on such a draft convention as soon as possible;
3. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its work, to further its mandate more earnestly through substantive negotiations, within the framework of ad hoc committees as the most appropriate mechanism, and to adopt concrete measures on the specific priority issues of disarmament on its agenda, in accordance with the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly; 2/
4. Urges the Conference on Disarmament to provide negotiating mandates to ad hoc committees on all agenda items, in keeping with the fundamental role of the Conference as identified in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session;
5. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report on its work to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session;
6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Report of the Conference on Disarmament".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

E

Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and
prevention of nuclear war

The General Assembly,

Believing that all nations have a vital interest in negotiations on nuclear disarmament because the existence of nuclear weapons jeopardizes the vital security interests of both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States alike,

Recalling its resolutions 43/78 E and F of 7 December 1988,

Recalling also that the international community, through the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 2/ has agreed that the nuclear-arms race, far from contributing to the strengthening of the security of all States, increases the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war,

/...

Welcoming the reaffirmation by the Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, 8/ held at Belgrade from 4 to 7 September 1989, that nuclear disarmament is a process in which all nations should participate, and its view that the ongoing process of disarmament could be accelerated and its coverage widened through the common endeavour of the entire international community,

Taking into account that all nuclear-weapon States, in particular those with the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility for the fulfilment of the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament,

Convinced that the prevention of nuclear war and the reduction of the risk of nuclear war are matters of the highest priority and of vital interest to all people of the world,

Encouraged by the continued recognition by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,

Aware of the fact that the prevention of nuclear war and the reduction of the risk of nuclear war are inextricably linked with the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, and that consequently they should be viewed in their interrelationship as essential elements of a process of general and complete disarmament,

Convinced that all avenues should be explored to ensure that progress is made in these two vital fields, and also convinced of the imperative need to take constructive multilateral action to complement and reinforce the bilateral process under way,

1. Reaffirms that multilateral and bilateral negotiations on nuclear questions should complement and facilitate each other;

2. Believes that efforts should be intensified in order to initiate multilateral negotiations in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

3. Reiterates that, in view of the importance of the matter, it is equally necessary to devise suitable steps to expedite effective action for the prevention of nuclear war;

4. Requests the Conference on Disarmament to establish ad hoc committees at the beginning of its 1990 session on both the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war with adequate mandates in order to allow a structured and practical analysis of how the Conference on Disarmament can best contribute to progress on these two urgent matters;

8/ See A/44/551-S/20870, annex, p. 21, para. 5.

5. Also requests the Conference on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session on its consideration of those subjects;

6. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the items entitled "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament" and "Prevention of nuclear war".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

F

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 3477 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, in which it endorsed the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific and invited the countries concerned to carry forward consultations about ways and means of realizing that objective,

Recalling also article VII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 9/ which acknowledges the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories,

Bearing in mind paragraph 60 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 2/ the first special session devoted to disarmament, which states that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure,

Noting the adoption on 6 August 1985 by the heads of Government of the independent or self-governing members of the South Pacific Forum, meeting at Rarotonga, of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty 10/ (also known as the Treaty of Rarotonga), and their adoption on 8 August 1986 of three Protocols to that Treaty,

Noting also that the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty entered into force upon the deposit of the eighth instrument of ratification, on 11 December 1986,

Recognizing that the Treaty of Rarotonga reflects the particular circumstances of the South Pacific region,

9/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 729, No. 10485.

10/ See The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, vol. 10: 1985 (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.86.IX.7), appendix VII.

1. Notes with satisfaction that eleven members of the South Pacific Forum have now ratified the Treaty and that China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have adhered to Protocols 2 and 3 of the Treaty;
2. Notes also that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America have stated that none of their practices and activities within the Treaty area are inconsistent with the Treaty or its Protocols;
3. Commends the Treaty and its Protocols for the consideration of all Member States.

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

G

Disarmament Week

The General Assembly,

Noting that there have been important developments of late in the areas of arms limitation and disarmament efforts which provide a sense of encouragement and hope for a more secure world,

Noting at the same time that, despite the positive developments, the arms race still poses a grave threat to world peace and security,

Stressing the vital importance of eliminating the threat of nuclear and conventional war, ending the nuclear and conventional arms race and bringing about disarmament,

Emphasizing anew the need for and the importance of world public opinion in support of halting and reversing the global arms race in all its aspects,

Taking into account the aspirations of the world public to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on Earth,

Noting with satisfaction the broad and active support by Governments and international and national organizations of the decision taken by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, the first special session devoted to disarmament, regarding the proclamation of the week starting 24 October, the day of the foundation of the United Nations, as a week devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament, 11/

Recalling the recommendations concerning the World Disarmament Campaign contained in annex V to the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of

11/ Resolution S-10/2, para. 102.

the General Assembly, the second special session devoted to disarmament, in particular the recommendation that Disarmament Week should continue to be widely observed, 12/

Noting the support for the further observance of Disarmament Week expressed by Member States at the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly, the third special session devoted to disarmament,

Recognizing the significance of the annual observance of Disarmament Week, including by the United Nations,

1. Takes note with satisfaction of the report of the Secretary-General 13/ on the follow-up measures undertaken by States, governmental and non-governmental organizations in holding Disarmament Week;

2. Commends all States, international and national governmental and non-governmental organizations for their active support for and participation in Disarmament Week;

3. Invites all States that so desire, in carrying out appropriate measures at the local level on the occasion of Disarmament Week, to take into account the elements of the model programme for Disarmament Week prepared by the Secretary-General; 14/

4. Invites Governments to continue, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 33/71 D of 14 December 1978, to inform the Secretary-General of activities undertaken to promote the objectives of Disarmament Week;

5. Invites international and national non-governmental organizations to continue to take an active part in Disarmament Week and to inform the Secretary-General of the activities undertaken;

6. Invites the Secretary-General to continue to use the United Nations information organs as widely as possible to promote better understanding among the world public of disarmament problems and the objectives of Disarmament Week;

7. Requests the Secretary-General, in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 33/71 D, to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session a report on the implementation of the present resolution.

81st plenary meeting

15 December 1989

12/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Special Session, Annexes, agenda items 9 to 13, document A/S-12/32, annex V, para. 12.

13/ A/44/446 and Add.1 and 2.

14/ A/34/436.

H

Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, in which it declared the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade,

Recalling also its resolution 34/75 of 11 December 1979, in which it directed the Disarmament Commission to prepare elements of a draft resolution entitled "Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade" for submission to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session for consideration and adoption,

Bearing in mind that the Second Disarmament Decade declared by its resolution 35/46 is coming to an end,

Recalling further its resolution 43/78 L of 7 December 1988, in which it decided to declare the decade of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade,

Reaffirming the responsibility of the United Nations in the attainment of disarmament,

Noting the progress in the disarmament talks between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America and its positive impact on the attainment of global peace and security,

Desirous of maintaining the current momentum in the disarmament process,

Convinced that a third disarmament decade will accelerate the disarmament process,

1. Takes note of the work of the Disarmament Commission at its 1989 session on the declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade; 15/
2. Directs the Disarmament Commission, at its 1990 substantive session, to finalize the preparation of elements of a draft resolution to be entitled "Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade" and to submit them to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session for consideration and adoption;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to render all necessary assistance to the Disarmament Commission in implementing the present resolution;
4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

15/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 42 (A/44/42), para. 49.



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/44/120
19 January 1990

Forty-fourth session
Agenda item 67

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/44/789)]

44/120. Implementation of the Declaration of the
Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

The General Assembly,

Recalling the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, contained in its resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 16 December 1971, and recalling also its resolutions 2992 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972, 3080 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, 3259 A (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3468 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/88 of 14 December 1976, 32/86 of 12 December 1977, S-10/2 of 30 June 1978, 33/68 of 14 December 1978, 34/80 A and B of 11 December 1979, 35/150 of 12 December 1980, 36/90 of 9 December 1981, 37/96 of 13 December 1982, 38/185 of 20 December 1983, 39/149 of 17 December 1984, 40/153 of 16 December 1985, 41/87 of 4 December 1986, 42/43 of 30 November 1987, 43/79 of 7 December 1988 and other relevant resolutions,

Reaffirming that the establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world under appropriate conditions, to be clearly defined and determined freely by the States concerned in the zone, taking into account the characteristics of the zone and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in conformity with international law, can contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole,

Recalling also the report of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, 1/

1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 45 and corrigendum (A/34/45 and Corr.1).

Noting that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean commemorated the tenth anniversary of the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, which took place on 13 July 1979, during its preparatory session in July 1989, 2/

Recalling further paragraph 22 of the document on international security and disarmament in the final documents of the Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade from 4 to 7 September 1989, 3/

Reaffirming its conviction that concrete action for the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace would be a substantial contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security, as well as to the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and peaceful development of the States of the region,

Convinced that agreement on such action should be facilitated by encouraging developments in international relations that could have beneficial effects on the region,

Also convinced that the continued military presence of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean area, conceived in the context of their confrontation, gives urgency to the need to take practical steps for the early achievement of the objectives of the Declaration,

Considering that the creation of a zone of peace requires co-operation and agreement among the States of the region to ensure conditions of peace and security within the area, as envisaged in the Declaration,

Noting with appreciation the offer made by the Government of Sri Lanka to host the Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo, from 2 to 13 July 1990,

Regretting that it is not possible to hold the Conference in 1990, as scheduled, in spite of the generous offer of the Government of Sri Lanka,

1. Takes note of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean; 4/
2. Reaffirms full support for the achievement of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace;
3. Reiterates and emphasizes its decision to convene the Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo, as a necessary step for the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, adopted in 1971;

2/ A/AC.159/SR.357; see also Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/44/29), chap. II, sect. C.

3/ See A/44/551-S/20870, annex, p. 24.

4/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 29 (A/44/29).

4. Renews the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee as defined in the relevant resolutions, and requests the Committee to intensify its work with regard to the implementation of its mandate;
5. Notes with satisfaction that, in the implementation of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, including the preparatory work for the convening of the Conference, as called for in the relevant resolutions recommended by the Committee and adopted by the General Assembly by consensus, considerable progress has been made by the Working Group of the Ad Hoc Committee in its meetings during the sessions of the Committee in 1989 and that the Chairman of the Working Group submitted his report to the Ad Hoc Committee;
6. Urges the Ad Hoc Committee to intensify its discussions on substantive issues and principles, including those identified by the Chairman of the Working Group in his report dated 12 July 1989, 5/ with the aim of elaborating elements that might be taken into consideration during the subsequent preparation of a draft final document of the Conference;
7. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to hold two preparatory sessions during the first half of 1990, the first with a duration of one week and the second with a duration of two weeks, for completion of the remaining preparatory work relating to the Conference on the Indian Ocean to enable the convening of the Conference at Colombo in 1991 in consultation with the host country;
8. Requests the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee to continue his consultations on the participation in the work of the Committee by States Members of the United Nations which are not members of the Committee, with the aim of resolving this matter at the earliest possible date;
9. Also requests the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee to consult the Secretary-General at the appropriate time on the establishment of a secretariat for the Conference;
10. Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session a full report on the implementation of the present resolution;
11. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to render all necessary assistance to the Ad Hoc Committee, including the provision of summary records, in recognition of its preparatory function.

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

5/ A/AC.159/L.93, annex.



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/44/121
19 January 1990

Forty-fourth session
Agenda item 68

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/44/790)]

44/121. Israeli nuclear armament

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind its previous resolutions on Israeli nuclear armament, the latest of which is resolution 43/80 of 7 December 1988,

Recalling its resolution 43/65 of 7 December 1988, in which, inter alia, it called for placing all nuclear facilities in the region under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East,

Recalling also Security Council resolution 487 (1981) of 19 June 1981, in which, inter alia, the Council called upon Israel urgently to place all its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,

Noting that only Israel has been specifically called upon by the Security Council to place its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,

Noting with grave concern Israel's persistent refusal to commit itself not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, despite repeated calls by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency,

Taking into consideration resolution GC (XXXIII)/RES/506 of 29 September 1989 adopted by the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in which the General Conference deprecated Israel's refusal to place all its nuclear installations under the Agency's safeguards and called upon Israel to comply with Security Council resolution 487 (1981),

Also taking into consideration the document of the Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade from 4 to 7 September 1989, entitled "International security and disarmament", 1/ in paragraph 12 of which Israel was condemned for continuing to develop its nuclear military programmes and weapons of mass destruction and for its refusal to implement the resolutions of the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency in this regard,

Deeply alarmed by the information with regard to the continuing production, development and acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel and its testing of their delivery systems in the Mediterranean, thus threatening the peace and security of the region,

Aware of the grave consequences that endanger international peace and security as a result of Israel's development and acquisition of nuclear weapons and Israel's collaboration with South Africa to develop nuclear weapons and their delivery systems,

Deeply concerned that the declared Israeli policy of attacking and destroying nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes is a part of its nuclear armament policy,

1. Reiterates its condemnation of Israel's refusal to renounce any possession of nuclear weapons;
2. Reiterates also its condemnation of the co-operation between Israel and South Africa;
3. Expresses its deep concern at Israel's continuing production, development and acquisition of nuclear weapons and testing of their delivery systems;
4. Requests once more the Security Council to take urgent and effective measures to ensure that Israel complies with Council resolution 487 (1981);
5. Demands once more that Israel place all its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;
6. Calls upon all States and organizations that have not yet done so to discontinue co-operating with and giving assistance to Israel in the nuclear field;
7. Reiterates its request to the International Atomic Energy Agency to suspend any co-operation with Israel that could contribute to its nuclear capabilities;
8. Requests also the International Atomic Energy Agency to inform the Secretary-General of any steps Israel may take to place its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards;

1/ A/44/551-S/20870, annex, pp. 20-25.

9. Requests the Secretary-General to follow closely Israeli nuclear activities and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session;

10. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Israeli nuclear armament".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/44/122
19 January 1990

Forty-fourth session
Agenda item 69

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/44/791)]

44/122. Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming its resolution 43/81 A of 7 December 1988,

Aware of the profound concern of all Member States for maintaining respect for rights and obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law,

Convinced that observance of the Charter of the United Nations, relevant treaties and other sources of international law is essential for the strengthening of international security,

Mindful, in particular, of the fundamental importance of full implementation and strict observance of agreements on arms limitation and disarmament so that individual nations and the international community can derive enhanced security from them,

Stressing that any violation of such agreements not only adversely affects the security of States parties but can also create security risks for other States relying on the constraints and commitments stipulated in those agreements,

Stressing also that any weakening of confidence in such agreements diminishes their contribution to global or regional stability and to further disarmament and arms limitation efforts and undermines the credibility and effectiveness of the international legal system,

Recognizing in this context, inter alia, the contribution that full compliance with existing agreements can make to progress in the negotiation of arms limitation and disarmament agreements,

Believing that compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements by States parties is, therefore, a matter of interest and concern to all members of the international community, and noting the role that the United Nations might play in this regard,

Convinced that resolution of non-compliance questions that have arisen with regard to agreements on arms limitation and disarmament would contribute to better relations among States and the strengthening of world peace and security,

Welcoming the universal recognition of the importance of the question of compliance in the context of arms limitation and disarmament agreements,

1. Urges all States parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to implement and comply with the entirety of the provisions of such agreements;

2. Calls upon all Member States to consider fully the adverse implications of non-compliance with those obligations for international security and stability, as well as for the prospects for further progress in the field of disarmament;

3. Also calls upon all Member States to support efforts aimed at the resolution of non-compliance questions, with a view to encouraging strict observance by all parties of the provisions of arms limitation and disarmament agreements and maintaining or restoring the integrity of such agreements;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to provide Member States with assistance that may be necessary in this regard;

5. Welcomes efforts by States parties to develop additional co-operative measures, as appropriate, aimed at increasing confidence in compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements and reducing any possibility of misinterpretation and misunderstanding;

6. Notes in this connection the contribution that verification experiments can make in confirming and perfecting verification procedures in arms limitation and disarmament agreements under negotiation, thereby providing an opportunity, from the time that such agreements enter into force, for enhanced confidence in the effectiveness of verification procedures as a basis for determining compliance;

7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-sixth session the item entitled "Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989



General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/RES/44/123
19 January 1990

Forty-fourth session
Agenda item 151

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/44/792)]

44/123. Education and information for disarmament

The General Assembly,

Firmly convinced that the United Nations was established for the purpose of laying the foundations of a new world order whose general lines are set out in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations,

Fully aware that a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of Governments would not be a peace that could secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the world, and that the peace must be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind,

Fully persuaded that, since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed,

Taking into account the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, 1/ in particular paragraph 106 thereof, in which the Assembly urged Governments and governmental and non-governmental international organizations to take steps to develop programmes of education for disarmament and peace studies at all levels,

Considering that paragraphs 99, 100 and 101 of the Final Document provide for the mechanisms of a programme to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament, including the dissemination of supplementary information and publicity as part of its educational work,

1/ Resolution S-10/2.

Also considering that the World Disarmament Campaign plays an important supplementary role in the educational efforts on behalf of disarmament carried out by Member States within their own educational and cultural development systems, but that it cannot achieve irreversible results until training programmes are carried out at all levels of formal education for the purpose of changing basic attitudes with respect to aggression, violence, armaments and war,

1. Invites Member States and international governmental and non-governmental organizations to inform the Secretary-General about all the efforts that they have made to respond to the call made in paragraph 106 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare a report, within available resources, on the current state of education for disarmament, taking into account the reports of Member States and international governmental and non-governmental organizations and based on information available from other kinds of sources;

3. Also requests the Secretary-General to submit the reports requested in paragraphs 1 and 2 above to the General Assembly at its forty-sixth session;

4. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Education and information for disarmament".

81st plenary meeting
15 December 1989

Decision 44/430. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects

At its 81st plenary meeting, on 15 December 1989, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the First Committee, 1/ recalling its resolution 43/67 of 7 December 1988 and taking note with satisfaction of the report of the Secretary-General, 2/ decided to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-fifth session the item entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects".

Decision 44/431. Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament

At its 81st plenary meeting, on 15 December 1989, the General Assembly took note of the report of the First Committee. 3/

Decision 44/432. International co-operation for disarmament

At its 81st plenary meeting, on 15 December 1989, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the First Committee, 4/ reaffirmed the importance of further strengthening international co-operation in the field of disarmament and, noting the recent important and encouraging developments in this area, decided to invite all States to be guided by principles of co-operation in furthering ways and means to facilitate both bilateral and multilateral solutions to disarmament and called upon all States to contribute to increasing the effectiveness of the United Nations in fulfilling its role and responsibility in the sphere of disarmament.

1/ A/44/777, para. 7.

2/ A/44/569.

3/ A/44/782.

4/ A/44/788, para. 28.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/960
CD/CW/WP.274
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FRANCE

SECOND NATIONAL TRIAL INSPECTION

I. INTRODUCTION

At the summer session in 1988, the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons proposed that States participating in the negotiations should conduct national trial inspections for the purpose of determining whether the verification provisions contained in the "rolling text" made it possible to ascertain that chemical industry facilities subject to declaration were not being used for prohibited purposes.

An initial trial inspection carried out in France in March 1989 was reported on in document CD/913 (CD/CW/WP.240), dated 11 April 1989, the conclusions whereof are reproduced below (see annex). A second inspection of the same kind was found necessary to confirm and refine those conclusions.

The present report describes the course of, and the lessons drawn from, that new exercise.

II. SUMMARY DESCRIPTION

1. Type of inspection

This second national trial inspection was carried out at a multi-purpose industrial site in accordance with the provisions of article VI of the current "rolling text" of the convention (CD/952, of 18 August 1989). Its purpose was to verify, by means of the routine systematic on-site inspection procedure, that the initial and annual declarations concerning a schedule [2] chemical corresponded to the output of the workshops concerned and that the chemical was not being used or diverted for prohibited purposes.

2. Type of facility

The inspection took place in a specific facility comprising two shops, one of which was multi-purpose. This facility comprises part of a medium-sized industrial site that engages in other chemical manufacturing operations using the same raw materials as the manufacturing activity inspected.

3. Type of chemical

The chemical in question belongs neither in schedule [1] nor in schedule [2]. It was chosen on the basis of the following three criteria:

Its manufacture involves widely used techniques similar to those used to make schedule [2] chemicals;

It undergoes partial processing at the facility. As the by-product so obtained has characteristics close to those of the chemical from which it derives, the decision was taken that it too should be subjected to inspection;

Several manufacturing processes are or have been employed: the situation at the time of the initial declaration was that the chemical and the by-product were made in the two specific shops concerned by the inspection, one of which operated continuously and the other in batch mode, and that one of the two substances was made in another shop, as a by-product of another manufacturing process that was not subject to declaration. That other manufacturing process had been definitively halted by the time of the annual declaration and the inspection.

It should be added that the manufacture of these two products requires the same raw materials stored on-site as other manufacturing activities, and that it consumes only a small proportion of them.

4. Composition of the inspection team

The inspection team was composed of three chemistry specialists, one of whom had already participated in the first trial national inspection:

A university-trained inspector of facilities classified for environmental protection purposes;

A chemical engineer, doctor of science and specialist in organic synthesis, belonging to a research centre;

An engineer from the chemical industry with long experience in research, development and production.

The same team carried out the initial visit.

An ad hoc national authority, observers from various ministries or civil service departments, a representative of the Union of Chemical Industries and representatives of the company owning the facility, participated in the whole of the exercise.

5. Implementation of the inspection procedure

The routine inspection procedure was implemented in accordance with the provisions of annex 2 to article VI of the current draft convention.

(a) Declarations

Pursuant to those provisions, the company's head office gave all the information that was to be included in the initial and annual declarations to the ad hoc national authority, which transmitted it to the inspection team.

The company declared that it was unable to answer with certainty the question whether the facility could be used to produce a schedule [1] chemical.

(b) Initial visit

This lasted four half-days spread over three days, from 10 to 12 October 1989.

(c) Notification of inspection

The ad hoc national authority gave the company 48 hours notice of the inspection.

(d) Inspection

The inspection was carried out on 8 and 9 November 1989 and lasted two half-days.

III. EVALUATION

1. Initial and annual declarations

Generally speaking, the relevant provisions of annex 2 to article VI proved well suited to the requirements of the inspection.

The company management supplied the information required to be given in the initial and annual declarations, making a distinction between:

Confidential information (for example, manufacturing and raw material storage capacities, output levels, details of employment and of sales by country for 1988, not including the names of customers and economic data);

Other information (for example, identification and physico-chemical characteristics of the products, general information on their uses, principles of the manufacturing processes employed, product specifications, marketing documents, safety instructions and documents for general distribution describing the industrial site).

The question arose of how precise the information contained in the initial and annual declarations should be in order to ensure that the initial visit and the inspection achieved their purpose and safeguard the principle of confidentiality.

For this reason, it seemed clear that the final drafting of the declarations should be the subject of close dialogue between the national authority and the industry before they were despatched to the international technical secretariat.

2. Initial visit

The initial visit lasted four half-days, divided up as follows:

Two half-days for familiarization with the site, during which the management provided information on the factory as a whole. The inspectors visited the facilities and collected information on the workshops and on the processes for manufacturing the products in question;

Two half-days for exchanges of view between the team of inspectors, the ad hoc national authority, the representatives of the manufacturer and the observers. These exchanges made it possible to spell out the main points of the specific facility agreement.

The initial visit constitutes a first contact of vital importance, for it enables the inspectors to familiarize themselves with the facilities subject to verification and thereby, in agreement with the national authority and the manufacturer, to determine the nature and the limits of the information needed for the performance of their task. For example, on the occasion of the visit to the factory's laboratory the inspectors were able to assess the types of analysis they would be able to carry out there.

In addition, a survey of the raw material stores showed that, in the absence of specific metering instruments which provided clear identification of the uses of raw materials for the manufacture of the products in question, as distinct from their other uses on the site, the inspectors would need access to certain accounting documents and materials records concerning products not subject to inspection.

Among the conclusions drawn on the occasion of the initial visit, mention should be made of the following:

The value of the international organization's drawing up terms of reference for the initial visit, based, perhaps, on pre-established guidelines, so as to define more clearly the rights and obligations of each of the parties;

The decisive role of the use of accounting documents both in the preparations for and in the conduct of the inspection. In this respect, the participants expressed doubts about the meaningfulness of a routine inspection conducted without access to accounting documents; in cases of double book-keeping; or where some or all of these documents are not presented.

They wondered whether it would be worth while including in the convention a provision whereby States parties would oblige companies manufacturing products subject to verification to adopt a standardized materials and utility management system.

(a) Duration

For one product and one by-product that are obtained by a relatively simple process, as was the case here, two days' work seems to be the minimum required for the compilation of a reference dossier and the drawing up of a specific facility agreement.

Should the chemical process be more complex, it would probably be necessary to provide for a longer initial visit.

(b) Specific facility agreement

The specific facility agreement was drafted after the initial visit on the basis of the facility attachment found in the "rolling text", which seemed to fit the case. A more detailed statement should, however, be made therein of the rights of the inspection team, especially as regards examination of the equipment in the facilities concerned.

Generally speaking, it is clear that the specific agreement will have to be very detailed and state unambiguously the services the inspectors will be entitled to expect and the constraints to which they will have to submit, particularly as regards:

Arrangements for travel within the site;

Opportunities for taking and analysing samples;

The rules of confidentiality (cf. paras. 2 (c) and 4).

(c) Confidentiality

In advance of this exercise the company requested all the participants who did not belong to its staff to sign a personal undertaking to respect the confidentiality of the information collected during the initial visit and the inspection.

This exercise reconfirms the need:

To limit the communication of information in strict accordance with the "need to know";

To define as precisely as possible the nature of the information that can be taken out of the facility without detriment to the interests of the enterprise.

3. Drawing up and content of the inspection mandate and the notification of inspection

The inspection mandate was drawn up on the basis of the relevant provisions of article VI of the draft convention. It contained the following information:

The address of the site containing the facility subject to verification;

The composition of the inspection team;

The purpose of the mission, defined as follows:

(a) Verification of:

The non-production by the designated facilities of products in schedule [1];

Consistency with the initial and annual declarations;

The non-diversion of the products in question for purposes prohibited by the convention;

(b) The drafting of a report indicating whether the relevant provisions of the convention are being observed;

A restatement of the modalities of the inspection in the light of the specific agreement relating to the facilities concerned;

A description of the role of the national authority in the process.

The notification of inspection was communicated, with two working days' advance notice, to:

The head office of the company operating the site;

The management of the site.

The period of notice was felt to be sufficient in the case in question.

The notification indicated the dates of arrival and departure and the composition of the inspection team.

These two documents were, intentionally, concisely worded. It was not felt necessary to mention in the notification the rights and duties of the inspectors or the characteristics of the inspection, since those matters had already been dealt with in the specific facility agreement and in the inspection mandate.

4. Inspection

(a) Opening conference

In view of the brevity of the interval between the initial visit and the inspection proper, it was not felt necessary to hold a very detailed opening conference, especially as the composition of the team of inspectors had not been changed.

The national authority, whose presence was deemed indispensable, reiterated the objective of the inspection, read out the specific facility agreement and stressed the need to respect the confidentiality of information that would be accessible.

The inspectors described their mandate, presented their air sampling equipment and described how the inspection would be carried out.

The management of the site handed over to the inspectors the reference dossier compiled on the occasion of the initial visit and indicated:

The safety and security rules in force on the site;

The areas that would be accessible in the context of the inspection;

The site staff who were authorized to communicate with the inspectors;

The rules the inspectors would have to observe when communicating with persons outside the site, and when taking notes.

(b) Escort and visit

In accordance with the specific facility agreement and the inspection mandate:

A designated representative of the company permanently accompanied the inspection team, which availed itself, as necessary, of the technical assistance provided by the management of the site;

The inspection team had access only to the facilities for manufacturing and storing the products concerned, and to certain buildings such as the conference room, the analytical laboratory and the sick-bay (see para. 4 (c));

The inspection team was unable to move about on the site outside a previously determined itinerary.

(c) Records: planned for, useful or necessary

The inspectors had at their disposal:

The accounting records and operating returns for the declared products only;

The sales records for the declared products;

The maintenance records for the facility;

The operating logs for the facility.

In view of the confidentiality of this information, the above documents could not be taken away from the site; that was also the case for the notebooks on the basis of which the inspectors drew up their report. The information that was not essential for the purposes of the inspection - for example, on customers, purchase prices of raw materials and sales prices of finished products - had been concealed in the accounting records.

However, in the absence of apparatus for measuring the consumption of the raw materials used both in the facility inspected and in other manufacturing shops on the site, the manufacturer furnished, on request, a number of

accounting vouchers concerning the various other uses of the raw materials. In the context of a normal routine inspection conducted on the basis of the current "rolling text", such information might not have been provided, especially as some of the other uses relate to a subsidiary in which the company owning the inspected site does not have a majority holding.

In the case studied, one of the raw materials being common to the manufacture of several other substances in larger amounts, the normal imprecision in the measurement of mass flows could have led to considerable uncertainty as to the quantity of that raw material actually used for the manufacturing operation inspected. In that event, the possibility of deliberately under-evaluated production could not have been ruled out. In fact, the uncertainty was dispelled by means of a check of the uses of the other raw materials employed in the process.

The question arises, therefore, whether such complementary or indirect checks will always be possible. On a more complex site, for example, where other raw materials too might have had multiple uses, the uncertainty could not have been dispelled, unless the inspectors had had access to documents that are normally unavailable for the inspection.

Another question that arose was whether, bearing in mind the principle of medical secrecy, the inspectors should be granted the right to visit the site sick-bay and consult the treatment records. Such a visit might also have enabled them to verify the existence of special medical equipment.

(d) Inspection of areas, equipment and operation procedures

The inspectors went into each of the manufacturing shops and into the storage areas connected with the facility. They were able to establish, thanks in particular to photographs taken with an instant camera during the initial visit and kept on the site, that no change had apparently been made to any part of the facility.

They did not judge the facility to be technically suited to the manufacture of products listed in schedule [1], for the following reasons:

The safety equipment is not adequate for that purpose;

Access to the shops is not controlled;

One of the shops is in the open air.

These remarks only apply, of course, to the facility described in the specific agreement.

At the request of the inspection team, the site officials took samples of products at the sampling points normally used for industrial monitoring. These samples were analysed in the presence of an inspector by the staff employed in the site laboratory and compared with a reference sample brought by the team of inspectors.

With a view to ascertaining that schedule [1] chemicals were not being made, the inspectors had provided themselves with a CW agent detection kit and air sampling equipment.

(e) Analysis of chemical samples and air samples

The requests made by the inspectors for analysis of the samples by the site laboratory could be fulfilled only subject to the following limitations:

Available gaps in the laboratory's schedule of work;

Use of the analytical methodology customarily used by the laboratory;

Use only of the equipment available on the spot, which is designed solely for regular and customary checks on production.

The CW agent detection kit, which as far as sensitivity is concerned is designed for battlefield conditions, proved unsuited to the needs of inspection in an industrial environment.

The site management gave its agreement for off-site analysis of the air samples, on condition that the results were communicated to it. The analysis carried out off-site did not reveal the presence in the facility of any product listed in schedule [1].

It would be helpful if a duplicate of each of the samples was kept under seal on the site so that a second evaluation could be undertaken if necessary.

(f) Inspectors' report

The detailed technical report drawn up by the inspectors was kept on the site in readiness for a possible subsequent inspection. The report intended for the international technical secretariat merely referred to consistency with the initial and annual declarations and compliance with the convention.

(g) Closing conference

A closing conference was held at the end of the inspection. The participants examined the detailed technical report and commented on the course of the exercise and on the conclusions to be drawn from it.

(h) Difficulties arising during the inspection

The inspection revealed no irregularities. It did, however, show that as verification procedures and monitoring techniques now stand, it was not always possible to gain an accurate idea of the limits of this type of inspection and so assess its effectiveness.

The reliability of the inspection depends to a large degree on:

The quality and credibility of the accounting documents supplied to the inspectors;

The suitability of the detection and identification equipment for an industrial environment;

The restrictions imposed on the inspectors' movements during the initial visit and during the inspection.

(i) Duration

Two half-days sufficed for the inspection because of the small size of the facility and the simplicity of the process used to manufacture the products in question.

As a general rule, it seems difficult to foresee the duration of inspections, particularly prior to the initial visit. The duration will depend above all on the complexity of the manufacturing process that is subject to verification. Account must also be taken of the constraints imposed by the manufacturer.

5. TECHNICAL FACILITIES FOR THE INSPECTION

(a) Preparation of a technical dossier on the chemicals involved

Ideally, scientific and technical documentation on the chemical or chemicals subject to verification will already have been made available to the inspection team. This documentation might be prepared by the technical secretariat following the initial declaration, drawing on appropriate data bases.

(b) Development of mobile analytical equipment

Using only the laboratory facilities available at the site may prove less than truly satisfactory, since it would mean restricting the inspection on the basis of the scientific equipment existing on the spot, which may be very limited in the case of small sites.

Bearing in mind the restrictions mentioned above (cf. II.4(e)) regarding the use of the analytical laboratory on the industrial site, it would appear desirable to investigate the idea of appropriate mobile equipment, standardized and acceptable to the chemical industry, designed to detect and identify chemicals on schedules [1] and [2], and complying with applicable security standards on the inspected sites.

6. IMPACT AND COSTS OF THE INSPECTION PROCESS

For the company the cost of the routine inspection was FF 100,000, based on the following company evaluation:

Two persons full-time (engineer-hours) for the duration of the initial visit and the inspection;

Analyses (two only in the present case);

Collating of various documents;

Travel for one person from company headquarters to the site on the occasion of the initial visit and the inspection.

For the ad hoc national authority, observers included, the cost is of the same order.

No production losses were observed during the inspection. The costs to be borne by the company would clearly be much greater if the inspection required a halt or a reduction in production, which was not the case during this inspection.

* * *

CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions drawn from this second trial inspection may be summarized as follows:

1. The régime of systematic routine on-site inspections is worth while only in so far as it allows checks of the accuracy of the declarations made by industry through the national authority. In this it contains a dissuasive element which should be invoked with care. However, it may be of limited effectiveness in practice, depending in particular on the reliability and the nature of the information or data supplied.
2. Preservation of confidentiality is vital - in particular the most confidential information collected during the initial visit and the inspection must be kept on the inspected site, and the information supplied must be strictly limited in accordance with the need to know.
3. The national authority is called upon to play a major role at all stages in the verification process (declarations, initial visit, inspection, etc.). Specifically, for the purposes of the initial declaration it must help the manufacturer to determine whether schedule [1] chemicals may be manufactured on the site.
4. A detailed initial visit to the facility is of decisive importance for the proper conduct of the inspection. As far as possible, the subsequent inspection should be carried out by the same team of inspectors.
5. Plants manufacturing schedule [2] chemicals should be placed under a clear obligation to use a standardized materials and utility management system.
6. There is a need to study and then develop detection, identification and measurement equipment which is reliable and specifically adapted for inspection in an industrial environment, in the form of mobile laboratories where appropriate.
7. The composition of the inspection team is of great importance. In particular, the availability of a wide range of expertise will be conducive to effective verification. Nevertheless, the team responsible for verification should be limited to a reasonable number of inspectors, if only for security reasons.

ANNEX

Extract from CD/913 - CD/CW/WP.240 of 11 April 1989

IV. CONCLUSIONS

1. It is essential to prepare a standard multilingual glossary, particularly for technical terms.
2. The specific agreement for the facility is vital for facilitating inspections. It is determined by the standard of the initial visit. It includes confidential elements to be kept within the plant.
3. Analytical accounting records of operations are an essential item of information in the inspection. Consequently, efforts should be made to ensure that all the facilities subject to inspection are in a position to provide such records.
4. In selecting and training the inspectors, account should be taken of the substantial differences which can exist in the structure of production systems from one country to another.
5. The very delicate question of parallel clandestine production on the same site, but in a separate location from the facility subject to monitoring, was not dealt with in this trial inspection, but should be given special in-depth consideration.

* * *

Finally, it seems clear that a single trial inspection is not sufficient to take stock of the many problems posed by the holding of a routine inspection, and a further national trial inspection is to be held.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/961
1 February 1990

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Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to the
Conference on Disarmament on its work during the period
16 January to 1 February 1990

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In accordance with the decision taken by the Conference on Disarmament at its 531st plenary meeting held on 31 August 1989, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons resumed its work on 16 January 1990 under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Pierre Morel (France). Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, Senior Political Affairs Officer of the Department for Disarmament Affairs, continued to serve as Secretary of the Committee, assisted by Mr. Michael Cassandra and Ms. Agnès Marcaillou, Political Affairs Officers of the Department for Disarmament Affairs.

2. The Ad Hoc Committee held four meetings from 16 January to 1 February 1990. In accordance with the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee, as contained in its Report to the Conference on Disarmament (CD/952), open-ended consultations of the Ad Hoc Committee were held between 28 November and 14 December 1989 in preparation for the resumed session.

3. The representatives of the following States not members of the Conference participated in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee: Austria, Bangladesh, Chile, Denmark, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ghana, Greece, Finland, Ireland, Iraq, Jordan, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Senegal, Spain, Syrian Arab Republic, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.

II. SUBSTANTIVE WORK DURING THE RESUMED SESSION

4. In accordance with its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee continued its work on the Convention. In particular, it considered the following issues in the framework of the five Working Groups established in 1989.

(a) Group 1 (Chairman: Mr. Rüdiger Lüdeking, Federal Republic of Germany)

- The Protocol on Inspection Procedures.

- (b) Group 2 (Chairman: Mr. Mohammed Gomaa, Egypt)
 - Final Clauses.
- (c) Group 3 (Chairman: Mr. Rakesh Sood, India)
 - The Scientific Advisory Board.
- (d) Group 4 (Chairman: Mr. Johan Molander, Sweden)
 - Guidelines for Schedule 1.
 - Annex 1 to Article VI.
 - Modalities for revision of schedules and guidelines.
- (e) Group 5 (Chairman: Dr. Walter Krutzsch, German Democratic Republic)
 - Undiminished security during the destruction period.

5. In addition, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee continued open-ended consultations on the issue of challenge inspection.

6. In its work, the Ad Hoc Committee utilized Appendices I and II of the Report on its work in 1989 (CD/952), proposals made by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, the Chairmen of the Working Groups as well as by delegations.

7. Furthermore, the Technical Group on Instrumentation, chaired by Dr. Marjatta Rautio of Finland, continued its work with a view to identifying all analytical tasks necessary for effective verification, determining the availability of instrumentation (on-site and off-site) and providing recommendations to the Ad Hoc Committee in this respect. Such tasks included analytical instrumentation, process monitoring, seals, surveillance, containment, sampling and transport of samples, and database development. The Report of the Group is contained in document CD/CW/WP.272.

III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8. The results of the work undertaken during the resumed session are reflected in the updated versions of the Appendices to CD/952, attached hereto. Appendix I to this Report represents the present stage of elaboration of the provisions of the Draft Convention. Appendix II contains papers reflecting the results of work undertaken so far on issues in the Convention. They are enclosed as a basis for future work.

9. The Ad Hoc Committee recommends to the Conference on Disarmament:

(a) that Appendix I to this Report be used for further negotiation and drafting of the Convention;

(b) that other documents reflecting the state of work of the Ad Hoc Committee, as contained in Appendix II to this Report, together with other relevant present and future documents of the Conference, also be utilized in the further negotiation and elaboration of the Convention.

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This Appendix contains papers reflecting results of work undertaken on issues under the Convention. They are enclosed to serve as a basis for future work.

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APPENDIX I

Preliminary structure of a Convention on chemical weapons

Preamble

- I. General provisions on scope
- II. Definitions and criteria
- III. Declarations
- IV. Chemical weapons
- V. Chemical weapons production facilities
- VI. Activities not prohibited by the Convention
- VII. National implementation measures
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- IX. Consultations, co-operation and fact finding
- X. Assistance and protection against chemical weapons
- XI. Economic and technological development
- XII. Relation to other international agreements
- XIII. Amendments
- XIV. Duration and withdrawal
- XV. Signature
- XVI. Ratification
- XVII. Accession
- XVIII. Depositary
- XIX. Entry into Force
- XX. Languages and authentic texts

Annexes and other documents

Preamble 1/

The States Parties to this Convention,

Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction,

Desiring to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Protocol for Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,

Recognizing that the Convention reaffirms principles and objectives of and obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction signed at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972,

Bearing in mind the objective contained in Article IX of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction,

Determined for the sake of all mankind, to completely exclude the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, through the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, thereby complementing the obligations assumed under the Geneva Protocol of June 1925,

Considering that the achievements in the field of chemistry should be used exclusively for the benefit of mankind,

Convinced that the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and their destruction, represents a necessary step towards the achievement of these common objectives.

Have agreed as follows:

1/ Some delegations consider that the texts contained in the Preamble require further consideration.

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS ON SCOPE 1/ 2/

1. Each State Party undertakes not to:

- develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone.

2. Each State Party undertakes not to:

- assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in activities prohibited to Parties under this Convention.

3. Each State Party undertakes not to use chemical weapons. 3/ 4/

4. [Each State Party undertakes not to [conduct other activities in preparation for use of chemical weapons] [engage in any military preparations for use of chemical weapons].]

5. Each State Party undertakes to destroy chemical weapons which are in its possession or under its [jurisdiction or] control. 5/

6. Each State Party undertakes to destroy chemical weapons production facilities which are in its possession or under its [jurisdiction or] control.

1/ One delegation pointed out, the preoccupying effects, in its view, on the security of States deriving from the very large disproportion, during the transitional period, between existing chemical weapons capabilities.

2/ Other delegations believed that the problem of disproportion between chemical weapons capabilities can be solved through their levelling out by a certain time after the entry into force of the Convention.

3/ It is understood that this provision is closely linked to the definition of chemical weapons in another part of the Convention, the final formulation of which is yet to be agreed upon. It is also understood that this provision does not apply to the use of toxic chemicals and their precursors for permitted purposes still to be defined and to be provided for in the Convention. This provision is also closely linked to a provision in the Convention to be agreed upon relating to reservations.

4/ The question of herbicides is subject to ongoing consultations. The 1986 Chairman of these open-ended consultations has suggested the following formulation for a provision on herbicides: "Each State Party undertakes not to use herbicides as a method of warfare; such a prohibition should not preclude any other use of herbicides".

5/ The view was expressed that the application of this provision to the destruction of discovered old chemical weapons needs to be further discussed. Another view was expressed that the application of this provision does not allow for any exceptions.

II. DEFINITIONS AND CRITERIA

For the purposes of this Convention:

1.1/ The term "chemical weapons" shall apply to the following, together or separately: 2/

- (i) toxic chemicals, including super-toxic lethal chemicals, other lethal chemicals, other harmful chemicals and their precursors, including key precursors [and key components of binary and/or multicomponent chemical systems for chemical weapons], 3/ except such chemicals intended for purposes not prohibited by the Convention as long as the types and quantities involved are consistent with such purposes;
- (ii) munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals, as referred to above, which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices;

1/ The definitions of chemical weapons are presented on the understanding that problems related to irritants used for law enforcement and riot control, and also to chemicals intended to enhance the effect of the use of chemical weapons if their inclusion in the Convention is agreed could be handled outside the definitions of chemical weapons if this will result in a more clear and understandable definition. Preliminary suggestions to solve these problems are given below and consultations on them will be continued.

2/ One delegation expressed its reservation on the present formulation of the definition of chemical weapons and on the terminology used in (i) that failed to reflect the general purpose criterion.

3/ Some delegations consider that further deliberation is required in order to clarify at a later stage of the negotiations the implications of this definition for other parts of the Convention. This applies to other relevant parts of the Appendix. Other delegations consider that key component of binary and/or multicomponent chemical system for chemical weapons means: a component which poses a special risk to the objectives of the Convention as it can be an integral part in a chemical weapons munition or device and can form toxic chemicals at the moment of their employment and possesses the following characteristics: (a) reacts (interacts) rapidly with other component(s) of binary and/or multicomponent chemical system during the munition's flight to the target and gives a high yield of final toxic chemical; (b) plays an important role in determining the toxic properties of the final product; (c) may not be used, or be used only in minimal quantities, for permitted purposes; (d) possesses the stability necessary for long-term storage.

(iii) any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of such munitions or devices.

- [The term "chemical weapons" shall not apply to those chemicals which are not super-toxic lethal, or other lethal chemicals and which are approved by the Conference of the States Parties for use by a Party for domestic law enforcement and domestic riot control purposes.]
- [States Parties agree not to [develop, produce, stockpile or] utilize for chemical weapons chemicals intended to enhance the effect of the use of such weapons.]

[2. "Toxic chemicals" means:

chemicals [however or wherever they are produced], [whether produced in plants, munitions or elsewhere] [regardless of the method and pattern of production] whose toxic properties can be utilized to cause death or temporary or permanent harm, to man or animals involving:]

[2. "Toxic chemicals" means:

any chemical, regardless of its origin or method of production which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm to man or animals]

[For the purpose of this Convention toxic chemicals are listed in Schedules contained in the Annex on Chemicals.] 1/

3. "Purposes not prohibited by the Convention" means:

(a) industrial, agricultural, research, medical or other peaceful purposes, domestic law enforcement purposes; and military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons.

(b) protective purposes, namely those purposes directly related to protection against chemical weapons; 2/

4. "Precursor" means:

a chemical reagent which takes part in the production of a toxic chemical.

[For the purpose of this Convention precursor chemicals are listed in Schedules contained in the Annex on Chemicals.] 1/

1/ The issue of a reference to the Annex on Chemicals in Article II should be further considered.

2/ The suggestion that such permitted protective purposes should relate only to "an adversary's use of" chemical weapons was removed pending a decision on whether in the Convention the question of prohibiting other military preparations for use of chemical weapons than those mentioned under scope should be dealt with.

5. The term "chemical weapons production facility": 1/

(a) means any equipment, as well as any building housing such equipment, that was designed, constructed or used since 1 January 1946:

(i) as part of the stage in the production of chemicals ("final technological stage") where the material flows would contain, when the equipment is in operation, any Schedule 1 chemical, or any other chemical that has no use for permitted purposes above ... kilograms per year but can be used for chemical weapons purposes; 2/ or

(ii) for filling chemical weapons. 3/

(b) does not include any facility with an annual capacity for synthesis of chemicals specified in subparagraph (a) (i) above that is less than [1,000-2,000] kilograms. 4/ 5/

(c) does not include the single small-scale facility provided under Annex 1 to Article VI of the Convention.

1/ A view was expressed that this definition may need to be reviewed to take into account further elaboration of Article VI.

2/ Any such chemical should be included in a relevant schedule of chemicals in the convention.

3/ The filling of chemical weapons includes, inter alia:

- the filling of Schedule 1 chemicals into munitions, devices, or bulk storage containers;
- the filling of chemicals into containers which form part of assembled binary munitions and devices and into chemical submunitions which form part of assembled unitary munitions and devices;
- the loading of the containers and chemical submunitions into the respective munitions and devices.

4/ The disposition of such facilities should be decided in the context of Articles III and VI of the Convention.

5/ This threshold should be decided once an agreed definition for the term "capacity" has been developed. Further work is needed on it, taking into account, inter alia, the report on how to define production capacity reproduced in Appendix II.

III. DECLARATIONS 1/

1. Each State Party shall submit to the Organization, not later than 30 days after the Convention enters into force for it, the following declarations:

(a) Chemical Weapons

- (i) whether it has any chemical weapons under its jurisdiction or control 2/ anywhere;
- (ii) whether it has on its territory any chemical weapons under the jurisdiction or control of others, including a State not Party to the Convention;
- (iii) whether it has transferred or received any chemical weapons and whether it has transferred to or received from anyone the control over such weapons since [1 January 1946] [26 March 1975].

(b) Chemical Weapons Production Facilities

- (i) whether it has any chemical weapons production facilities under its jurisdiction or control anywhere or has had such facilities at any time since [1.1.1946];
- (ii) whether it has any chemical weapons production facilities on its territory under the jurisdiction or control of others, including a State not Party to this Convention, or has had such facilities at any time since [1.1.1946];
- (iii) whether it has transferred or received any equipment for the production of chemical weapons [and documentation relevant to the production of chemical weapons] since [1.1.1946], and whether it has transferred to, or received from, anyone the control of such equipment [and documentation].

1/ The view was expressed that the Annex to this Article needs to be reviewed.

2/ It is agreed that the concept of "jurisdiction or control" requires additional discussion and elaboration. To facilitate work on the issue an informal discussion-paper dated 20 March 1987 was prepared, on the request of the Chairman of the Committee, by Dr. Bolewski (Federal Republic of Germany), Dr. Szénási (Hungary) and Mr. Effendi (Indonesia).

(c) Other declarations

The precise location, nature and general scope of activities of any facility and establishment 1/ on its territory or under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere 2/ designed, constructed or used since [1.1.1946] for development of chemical weapons, inter alia, laboratories and test and evaluation sites.

2. Each State Party making affirmative statements in regard to any of the provisions under subparagraphs 1a and 1b of this Article shall carry out all relevant measures envisaged in any or all of Articles IV and V.

1/ The scope of the phrase "any facility and establishment" is to be clarified and an appropriate formulation found.

2/ It is agreed that the concept of "on its territory or under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere" requires additional discussion and elaboration.

IV. CHEMICAL WEAPONS

1. The provisions of this article and its Annex shall apply to any and all chemical weapons under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, regardless of location, including those on the territory of another State.

2. Each State Party, within 30 days after the Convention enters into force for it, shall submit a declaration which:

(a) specifies the precise location, aggregate quantity and detailed inventory of any chemical weapons under its jurisdiction or control;

(b) reports any chemical weapons on its territory under the jurisdiction or control of others, including a State not Party to this Convention;

(c) specifies any transfer or receipt by the State Party of any chemical weapons since [1 January 1946] [26 March 1975] or any transfer of control by that State Party of such weapons; and

(d) provides its general plan for destruction of its chemical weapons.

3. Each State Party shall, immediately after the declaration under paragraph 2 of this Article has been submitted, provide access to its chemical weapons for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification of the declaration through on-site inspection. Thereafter, each State Party shall ensure, through access to its chemical weapons for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification and through on-site inspection and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments, that the chemical weapons are not removed except to a destruction facility.

4. Each State Party shall submit detailed plans for the destruction of chemical weapons not later than six months before each destruction period begins. The detailed plans shall encompass all stocks to be destroyed during the next coming period, and shall include the precise location and the detailed composition of the chemical weapons which are subject to destruction during that period.

5. Each State Party shall:

(a) destroy all chemical weapons pursuant to the Order specified in the Annex to Article IV, beginning not later than 12 months and finishing not later than 10 years after the Convention enters into force for it;

(b) provide information annually regarding the implementation of its plans for destruction of chemical weapons; and

(c) certify, not later than 30 days after the destruction process has been completed, that all chemical weapons have been destroyed.

6. Each State Party shall provide access to any chemical weapons destruction facilities and the facilities' storage for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification of destruction through the continuous presence of inspectors and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments, in accordance with the Annex to Article IV.

7. Any chemical weapons discovered by a State Party after the initial declaration of chemical weapons shall be reported, secured and destroyed, as provided in the Annex to Article IV. 1/ 2/

8. All locations where chemical weapons are stored or destroyed shall be subject to systematic international on-site verification, through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments in accordance with the Annex to Article IV.

9. Any State Party which has on its territory chemical weapons which are under the control of a State that is not a Party to this Convention shall ensure that such weapons are removed from its territory not later than [30 days] after the date on which the Convention entered into force for it.

10. The declaration, plans and information submitted by each State Party under this article shall be made in accordance with the Annex to Article III and the Annex to Article IV.

[11. Reminder: undiminished security during the destruction period.] 3/

1/ Consultations were carried out on this issue. The results are reflected in CD/CW/WP.177/Rev.1. Different views were expressed, inter alia on the question of the responsibility for the destruction of these weapons. Further work is needed.

2/ For some delegations, the question of the applicability of this Annex to obsolete chemical weapons (ordnances) retrieved from the combat zones of World War I will have to be resolved later.

3/ The question of the proper place in the text of the Convention for provisions concerning undiminished security during the destruction period is to be further discussed.

V. CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES

1. The provisions of this article shall apply to any and all chemical weapons production facilities under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, regardless of location. 1/

2. Each State Party with any chemical weapons production facility shall cease immediately all activity at each chemical weapons production facility except that required for closure.

3. No State Party shall construct any new facility or modify any existing facility for the purpose of chemical weapons production or for any other purpose prohibited by the Convention.

4. Each State Party, within 30 days after the Convention enters into force for it, shall submit a declaration which:

(a) specifies any chemical weapons production facilities under its jurisdiction or control, or on its territory under the control of others, including a State not party to this Convention, at any time since [1 January 1946] [at the time of entry into force of the Convention];

(b) specifies any transfer or any receipt by the State Party of any equipment for the production of chemical weapons [and documentation relevant to the production of chemical weapons] since [1.1.1946] or any transfer of control by that Party of such equipment [and documentation];

(c) specifies actions to be taken for closure of each chemical weapons production facility;

(d) outlines its general plan for destruction for each chemical weapons production facility, and

(e) outlines its general plan for any temporary conversion of any chemical weapons production facility into a facility for destruction of chemical weapons.

5. Each State Party shall, immediately after the declaration, under paragraph 4, has been submitted, provide access to each chemical weapons production facility for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification of the declaration through on-site inspection.

6. Each State Party shall:

(a) close within three months after the Convention enters into force for it, each chemical weapons production facility in a manner that will render each facility inoperable; and

1/ It is understood that the above provisions also apply to any facility on the territory of another State [regardless of ownership and form of contract, on the basis of which they have been set up and functioned for the purposes of production of chemical weapons].

(b) provide access to each chemical weapons production facility, subsequent to closure, for the purpose of systematic international on-site verification through periodic on-site inspection and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments in order to ensure that the facility remains closed and is subsequently destroyed.

7. Each State Party shall submit detailed plans for destruction of each facility not later than [3] [6] months before the destruction of the facility begins.

8. Each State Party shall:

(a) destroy all chemical weapons production facilities, and related facilities and equipment specified in Section II-C-3 of the Annex to Article V, in accordance with the provisions of that Annex, beginning not later than 12 months, and finishing not later than 10 years, after the Convention enters into force;

(b) provide information annually regarding the implementation of its plans for the destruction of its chemical weapons production facilities, and

(c) certify, not later than 30 days after the destruction process has been completed, that its chemical weapons production facilities have been destroyed.

9. A chemical weapons production facility may be temporarily converted for destruction of chemical weapons. Such a converted facility must be destroyed as soon as it is no longer in use for destruction of chemical weapons and, in any case, not later than 10 years after the Convention enters into force.

10. Each State Party shall submit all chemical weapons production facilities to systematic international on-site verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments in accordance with the Annex to Article V.

11. The declaration, plans and information submitted by each State Party under this article shall be made in accordance with the Annex to Article V.

[12. Reminder: undiminished security during the destruction period.] 1/

1/ The question of the proper place in the text of the Convention for provisions concerning undiminished security during the destruction period is to be further discussed.

VI. ACTIVITIES NOT PROHIBITED BY THE CONVENTION 1/ 2/ 3/

1. Each State Party:

(a) has the right, subject to the provisions of this Convention, to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, retain, transfer and use toxic chemicals and their precursors for purposes not prohibited by the Convention.

(b) shall ensure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are not developed, produced, otherwise acquired, retained, transferred, or used within its territory or anywhere under its jurisdiction or control for purposes prohibited by the Convention.

2. Toxic chemicals and their precursors listed in Schedules 1, 2A, 2B and 3 in the Annex on Chemicals which could be used for purposes prohibited by the Convention, as well as facilities which produce, process or consume these toxic chemicals or precursors, shall be subject to international monitoring as provided in Annexes 1, 2 and 3 to this Article.

The schedules of chemicals contained in the Annex on Chemicals may be revised according to part IV to that Annex.

3. Within 30 days of the entry into force of it, each State Party shall declare data on relevant chemicals and the facilities which produce them, in accordance with Annexes 1, 2 and 3 of this Article.

4. Each State Party shall make an annual declaration regarding the relevant chemicals in accordance with Annexes 1, 2 and 3 to this Article.

5. Each State Party undertakes to subject chemicals listed in Schedule 1 and facilities specified in Annex 1 to this Article to the measures contained in that Annex.

6. Each State Party undertakes to subject chemicals listed in Schedule 2, Parts A and B and facilities declared under Annex 2 to this Article to monitoring by data reporting and routine systematic international on-site verification, through on-site inspection and use of on-site instruments as long as production and processing are not impaired.

1/ This Article and its Annexes 2 and 3 need further consideration on the basis of CD/CW/WP.256.

2/ One delegation considers that the terminology used in this article and its annexes should be consistent with the final definition of chemical weapons to be agreed upon.

3/ One delegation expressed the view that the question of collection and forwarding of data and other information to verify non-production requires further consideration. This delegation made reference to the Working Paper CD/CW/WP.159 of 19 March 1987, which includes draft elements for inclusion in the rolling text.

7. Each State Party undertakes to subject chemicals listed in Schedule 3 and facilities declared under Annex 3 to this Article to monitoring by data reporting.

8. The provisions of this article shall be implemented in a manner designed in so far as possible to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of parties to the Convention and international co-operation in the field of peaceful chemical activities including the international exchange of scientific and technical information and chemicals and equipment for the production, processing or use of chemicals for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. 1/

9. In conducting verification activities, the Technical Secretariat shall avoid undue intrusion into the State Party's peaceful chemical activities.

10. For the purpose of on-site verification, each State Party shall grant to the International Inspectors access to facilities as required in the Annexes to this Article.

1/ The inclusion of this paragraph in this Article is to be considered further.

VII. NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES 1/

General undertakings

1. Each State Party to this Convention shall adopt the necessary measures in accordance with its constitutional processes to implement this Convention and, in particular, to prohibit and prevent anywhere under its jurisdiction or control any activity that a State Party to this Convention is prohibited from conducting by this Convention.

Relations between the State Party and the Organization

2. Each State Party shall inform the Organization of the legislative and administrative measures taken to implement the Convention.

3. States Parties shall treat as confidential and afford special handling to information which they receive in connection with the implementation of the Convention from the Organization. They shall treat such information exclusively in connection with their rights and obligations under the Convention and in accordance with the provisions set out in the Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information. 2/

4. In order to fulfil its obligations under the Convention, each State Party shall appoint a National Authority and inform the Organization of the designated National Authority at the time that the Convention enters into force for it. The National Authority shall serve as the national focal point for effective liaison with the Organization and other States Parties. 3/

5. Each State Party undertakes to co-operate with the Organization in the exercise of all its functions and in particular to provide assistance to the Technical Secretariat including data reporting, assistance for international on-site inspections, provided for in this Convention, and a response to all its requests for the provision of expertise, information and laboratory support.

1/ The view was expressed that the placement of Article VII needs to be discussed further.

2/ A view was expressed that further discussion on this subject is necessary.

3/ The view was expressed that the role of the National Authority might need to be further developed.

VIII. THE ORGANIZATION 1/

A. General Provisions

1. The States Parties to the Convention hereby establish the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, to achieve the objectives of the Convention, to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and co-operation among States Parties. 2/
2. All States Parties to the Convention shall be members of the Organization.
3. The seat of the headquarters of the Organization shall be ...
4. There are hereby established as the organs of the Organization the Conference of the States Parties, 3/ the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat.
5. The verification activities described in this Convention shall be conducted in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the timely and efficient accomplishment of their objectives. The Organization shall request only the information and data necessary to fulfil its responsibilities under the Convention. It shall take every precaution to protect the confidentiality of information on civil and military activities and facilities coming to its knowledge in the implementation of the Convention and, in particular, shall abide by the provisions set out in the Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information. 4/

1/ One delegation has expressed reservations with regard to the approach being given to the concept of an Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or any other similar solution for this purpose, and has expressed the view that before proceeding further in the examination of this question, there is a need to define the principles that will govern the financing of such an Organization.

2/ A view was expressed that the achievement of these objectives should be sought in close co-operation with the United Nations.

3/ A view was expressed that the designation of this highest organ, to which many references are made throughout the text, should be determined only after further consideration of other provisions of the Convention and that, in this connection, the possibility of using the designation "the General Conference" may also be considered.

4/ A view was expressed that further discussion on this subject is necessary.

B. Conference of the States Parties

(a) Composition, procedure and decision-making

1. The Conference of the States Parties shall be composed of all the States Parties to this Convention. Each State Party to the Convention shall have one representative in the Conference of the States Parties, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers.
2. The first session of the Conference of the States Parties shall be convened by the Depositary at (venue) not later than 30 days after the entry into force of the Convention.
3. The Conference of the States Parties shall meet in regular sessions which should be held annually unless it decides otherwise. Special sessions shall be convened:
 - when decided by the Conference of the States Parties;
 - when requested by the Executive Council; or
 - when requested by any State Party [and supported by [5-10] [one third of the] States Parties].

The special session shall be convened not later than [30-45] days after lodgement of the request with the Director-General unless specified otherwise in the request.

4. Sessions shall take place at the headquarters of the Organization unless the Conference of the States Parties decides otherwise.
5. The Conference of the States Parties shall adopt its rules of procedure. At the beginning of each regular session, it shall elect its Chairman and such other officers as may be required. They shall hold office until a new Chairman and other officers are elected at the next regular session.
6. A majority of the members of the Conference of the States Parties shall constitute a quorum.
7. Each member of the Conference of the States Parties shall have one vote.
8. The Conference of the States Parties shall take decisions on questions of procedure, including decisions to convene special sessions of the Conference, by a simple majority of the members present and voting. Decisions on matters of substance should be taken as far as possible by consensus. If consensus is not attainable when an issue comes up for decision, the Chairman shall defer any vote for 24 hours and during this period of deferment shall make every effort to facilitate achievement of consensus, and shall report to the Conference prior to the end of the period. If consensus is not possible at the end of 24 hours, the Conference shall take the decision by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting unless otherwise specified in the Convention. When the issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as one of substance unless otherwise decided by the Conference by the majority required for decisions on questions of substance.

(b) Powers and functions

1. The Conference of the States Parties shall be the principal organ of the Organization. It shall consider any questions, matters or issues within the scope of the Convention, including those relating to the powers and functions of the Executive Council and Technical Secretariat. It may make recommendations and take decisions 1/ on any questions, matters or issues related to the Convention raised by a State Party or brought to its attention by the Executive Council.

2. The Conference of the States Parties shall oversee the implementation of the Convention, and act in order to promote its objectives. It shall review compliance with it. It shall also oversee the activities of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat and may issue guidelines in accordance with the Convention to either of them in the exercise of their functions.

3. In addition, the powers and functions of the Conference of the States Parties shall be:

- (i) To consider and adopt at its regular sessions the report of the Organization, consider other reports and consider and adopt the programme and budget of the Organization, submitted by the Executive Council;
- (ii) to [encourage] [promote] international co-operation for peaceful purposes in the chemical field;
- (iii) to review scientific and technological developments which could affect the operation of the Convention and, in this context, direct the Director-General to establish a Scientific Advisory Board 2/ to enable him, in the performance of his functions, to render to the Conference of States Parties, the Executive Council or States Parties independent and specialized advice in areas of science and technology relevant to the Convention. 3/
- (iv) to decide on the scale of financial contributions to be paid by States Parties; 4/

1/ A view was expressed that the report of a fact-finding inquiry should not be put to a vote, nor should any decision be taken as to whether a Party is complying with the provisions of the Convention.

2/ A view was expressed that the subject needs further examination, including the relationship with other organs of the Organization and its financial implications.

3/ Terms of reference for the Scientific Advisory Board should be elaborated once the Chemical Weapons Convention has entered into force. Several delegations considered that this should be done before the appointment of the members of the Scientific Advisory Board.

4/ The entire problem of the costs of the Organization needs to be considered.

- (v) to elect the members of the Executive Council;
- (vi) to appoint the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat;
- (vii) to approve the rules of procedure of the Executive Council submitted by the latter;
- (viii) to establish such subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Convention. 1/
- (ix) ... 2/

4. The Conference of the States Parties shall, after the expiry of 5 and 10 years from the date of entry into force of this Convention and at such other times within that time period as may be agreed on, meet in special sessions to undertake reviews of the operation of this Convention. Such reviews shall take into account any relevant scientific and technological developments. At intervals of five years thereafter, unless otherwise agreed upon by a majority of the States Parties, further sessions of the Conference of the States Parties shall be convened with the same objective. 3/

[5. The Chairman of the Conference of the States Parties shall serve as non-voting Chairman of the Executive Council.]

C. The Executive Council

(a) Composition, procedure and decision-making 4/

(To be elaborated)

(b) Powers and functions

1. The Executive Council shall be the executive organ of the Conference of the States Parties, to which it shall be responsible. It shall carry out the powers and functions entrusted to it under the Convention and its Annexes, as well as such functions delegated to it by the Conference of the States Parties. In so doing, it shall act in conformity with the recommendations, decisions and guidelines of the Conference of the States Parties and assure their continuous and proper implementation.

1/ It has been proposed that a Fact-finding Panel be established as a subsidiary body.

2/ The question of functions relating to the implementation of Articles X and XI will be considered at a later stage. Other functions, e.g. the action to be taken in the event of non-compliance by a State Party, could be included as well.

3/ The placement and wording of this provision as well as the possible need for separate review conferences require further consideration.

4/ Consultations on this issue were carried out by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee for the 1989 session. The outcome of these consultations is contained in Appendix II.

2. In particular, the Executive Council shall:

(a) promote the effective implementation of, and compliance with, the Convention;

(b) supervise the activities of the Technical Secretariat;

(c) co-operate with the appropriate national authorities of States Parties and facilitate consultations and co-operation among States Parties at their request;

(d) consider any issue or matter within its competence, affecting the Convention and its implementation, including concerns regarding compliance, and cases of non-compliance, 1/ and, as appropriate, inform States Parties and bring the issue or matter to the attention of the Conference of the States Parties;

(e) consider and submit to the Conference of the States Parties the draft programme and budget of the Organization;

(f) consider and submit to the Conference of the States Parties the draft report of the Organization on the implementation of the Convention, the report on the performance of its own activities and such special reports as it deems necessary or which the Conference of the States Parties may request;

(g) conclude agreements with States and international organizations on behalf of the Organization, subject to approval by the Conference of the States Parties, and approve agreements relating to the implementation of verification activities, negotiated by the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat with States Parties;

(h) (i) meet for regular sessions. Between regular sessions, it shall meet as often as may be required for the fulfilment of its functions;

[(ii) elect its Chairman;]

(iii) elaborate and submit its rules of Procedure to the Conference of the States Parties for approval;

(iv) make arrangements for the sessions of the Conference of the States Parties including the preparation of a draft agenda.

3. The Executive Council may request the convening of a special session of the Conference of the States Parties. 2/

1/ A view was expressed that the report of a fact-finding inquiry should not be put to a vote, nor should any decision be taken as to whether a Party is complying with the provisions of the Convention.

2/ It has been proposed that the Executive Council should request the convening of a special session of the Conference of the States Parties whenever obligations set forth in Article I of the Convention are violated.

D. Technical Secretariat

1. A Technical Secretariat shall be established to assist the Conference of the States Parties and the Executive Council in the performance of their functions. The Technical Secretariat shall carry out the functions entrusted to it under the Convention and its Annexes, as well as such functions assigned to it by the Conference of the States Parties and the Executive Council.

2. In particular, the Technical Secretariat shall:

(a) address and receive communications on behalf of the Organization to and from States Parties on matters pertaining to the implementation of the Convention;

(b) negotiate the subsidiary agreements with States Parties relating to systematic international on-site verification for approval by the Executive Council;

(c) execute international verification measure provided for in the Convention; 1/

(d) inform the Executive Council of any problems which have arisen with regard to the execution of its functions, and of [doubts, ambiguities or uncertainties about compliance with the Convention] which have come to its notice in the performance of its verification activities and/or which it has been unable to resolve or clarify through its consultations with the State Party concerned;

(e) provide technical assistance and technical evaluation to States Parties [in accordance with] [in the implementation of the provisions of] the Convention, including evaluations of listed and unlisted chemicals. 2/

(f) prepare and submit to the Executive Council the draft programme and budget of the Organization;

(g) prepare and submit to the Executive Council the draft report of the Organization on the implementation of the Convention and such other reports as the Executive Council and/or the Conference of the States Parties may request;

(h) provide administrative and technical support 2/ to the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council and other subsidiary bodies.

1/ It has been suggested that the International Inspectorate may request inspections for some insufficiently clear situations in the context of their systematic verification activities.

2/ The phrasing of this paragraph needs to be considered further in the light of the elaboration of the relevant provision of the Convention. It has been suggested that the technical assistance or evaluation may relate, inter alia, to developing technical procedures, improving the effectiveness of verification methods.

3. The International Inspectorate shall be a unit of the Technical Secretariat and shall act under the supervision of the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat.

4. The Technical Secretariat shall comprise a Director-General, who shall be its head and chief administrative officer, and inspectors and such scientific, technical and other personnel as may be required.

5. The Director-General of the Technical Secretariat shall be appointed by the Conference of the States Parties [upon the recommendation of the Executive Council] 1/ for [4] [5] years [renewable for one further term, but not thereafter]. The Director-General shall be responsible to the Conference of the States Parties and the Executive Council for the appointment of the staff and the organization and functioning of the Technical Secretariat. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of services shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity. Only citizens of States Parties shall serve as international inspectors or as other members of the professional and clerical staff. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible. Recruitment shall be guided by the principle that the staff shall be kept to a minimum necessary for the proper execution of its responsibilities.

6. Consequent to paragraph 3 (iii) in Section B above, the Director-General is responsible for the organization and functioning of the Scientific Advisory Board. He shall, in consultation with States Parties, appoint members of the Scientific Advisory Board who shall serve in their individual capacity. The members of the Board shall be appointed on the basis of their expertise in the particular scientific fields relevant to the implementation of the Convention. The Director-General may also, as appropriate, in consultation with members of the Board, establish temporary working groups of scientific experts to provide recommendations on specific issues. In regard to the above, States Parties may submit lists of experts to the Director-General.

7. In the performance of their duties, the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat, the inspectors and other members of the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other source external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their positions as international officers responsible only to the Conference of the States Parties and the Executive Council.

8. Each State Party shall undertake to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat, the inspectors and the other members of the staff and not seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

1/ It has been proposed that the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat be appointed by the Conference of the States Parties upon the recommendation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

IX. CONSULTATIONS, CO-OPERATION AND FACT-FINDING 1/

1. States Parties shall consult and co-operate, directly among themselves, or through the Organization or other appropriate international procedures, including procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter, on any matter which may be raised relating to the objectives or the implementation of the provisions of this Convention.

2. States Parties to the Convention shall make every possible effort to clarify and resolve, through exchange of information and consultations among them, any matter which may cause doubt about compliance with this Convention, or which gives rise to concerns about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous. A Party which receives a request from another Party for clarification of any matter which the requesting Party believes causes such doubts or concerns shall provide the requesting Party, within ... days of the request, with information sufficient to answer the doubts or concerns raised along with an explanation on how the information provided resolves the matter. Nothing in this Convention affects the right of any two or more States Parties to this Convention to arrange by mutual consent for inspections or any other procedures among themselves to clarify and resolve any matter which may cause doubts about compliance or gives rise to concerns about a related matter which may be considered ambiguous. Such arrangements shall not affect the rights and obligations of any State Party under other provisions of this Convention.

Procedure for requesting clarification

3. A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council to assist in clarifying any situation which may be considered ambiguous or which gives rise to doubts about the compliance of another State Party with the Convention. The Executive Council shall provide appropriate information and data in its possession relevant to the situation which can dispel such doubts.

4. A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council to obtain clarification from another State Party on any situation which may be considered ambiguous or which gives rise to doubts about its compliance with the Convention. In such a case, the following shall apply:

(a) The Executive Council shall forward the request for clarification to the State Party concerned within 24 hours of its receipt.

(b) The requested State Party shall provide the clarification to the Executive Council within seven days of the receipt of the request.

1/ Some delegations expressed the view that the issue of verification of alleged use of chemical weapons and procedures for conducting such inspections had not yet been considered in-depth and should be discussed at a later stage on the basis of the proposed Annex to Article IX (documents CD/766 and CD/CW/WP.173).

(c) The Executive Council shall forward the clarification to the requesting State Party within 24 hours of its receipt.

(d) In the event that the requesting State Party deems the clarification to be inadequate, it may request the Executive Council to obtain from the requested State Party further clarification.

(e) For the purpose of obtaining further clarification requested under paragraph 2 (d), the Executive Council may set up a group of experts to examine all available information and data relevant to the situation causing the doubt. The group of experts shall submit a factual report to the Executive Council on its findings.

(f) Should the requesting State Party consider the clarification obtained under paragraphs 2 (d) and 2 (e) to be unsatisfactory, it may request a special meeting of the Executive Council in which States Parties involved not members of the Executive Council shall be entitled to take part. In such a special meeting, the Executive Council shall consider the matter and may recommend any measure it deems appropriate to cope with the situation.

5. A State Party shall also have the right to request the Executive Council to clarify any situation which has been considered ambiguous or has given rise to doubts about its compliance with the Convention. The Executive Council shall respond by providing such assistance as appropriate.

6. The Executive Council shall inform the States Parties to this Convention about any request for clarification provided in this Article.

7. If the doubts or concerns of a State Party about compliance have not been resolved within two months after the submission of the request for clarification to the Executive Council, or it believes its doubts warrant urgent consideration, without necessarily exercising its right to the challenge procedure, it may request a special session of the Conference of the States Parties in accordance with Article VIII. In such a special session, the Conference of the States Parties shall consider the matter and may recommend any measure it deems appropriate to cope with the situation.

Procedure for requesting a fact-finding mission

The further contents of Article IX remain to be elaborated. 1/

1/ Consultations on this issue were carried out by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee for the 1987 session and the Chairman of Group C for the 1988 session. The state of affairs, was contained in CD/952. The Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee for the 1989 session undertook consultations on Article IX, Part 2, the outcome of which is contained in Appendix II.

X. ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION AGAINST CHEMICAL WEAPONS 1/

XI. ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 1/

XII. RELATION TO OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 2/

Nothing in this Convention will be interpreted as in any way impairing the obligations assumed under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925 and in the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972.

XIII. AMENDMENTS 2/

XIV. DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL 3/

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party to this Convention shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Convention and the (United Nations Security Council) (Depositary) three months in advance. 4/ Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law, particularly the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925.

1/ Work on this Article continued. With the aim of facilitating further consideration of the issues involved, the text reflecting the current stage of discussion is included in Appendix II.

2/ During the 1989 session, work on this Article was continued. With the aim of facilitating further consideration of the issues involved, the text reflecting the current stage of discussion is included in Appendix II.

3/ A view was expressed that the withdrawal of any State Party shall not affect its obligations under Article I of this Convention.

4/ A view was expressed that the question of possibly setting different periods for the purpose of different circumstances relating to withdrawal, instead of a single period, requires further consideration.

XV. SIGNATURE

This Convention shall be open for signature for all States before its entry into force at (venue). 1/ 2/

XVI. RATIFICATION

This Convention shall be subject to ratification by States signatories according to their respective constitutional processes.

XVII. ACCESSION

Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force may accede to it at any time. 3/

XVIII. DEPOSITARY 4/

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention and shall:

1. promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices. The Depositary shall immediately upon receipt transmit any notices required by this Convention to every Party;
2. transmit duly certified copies of this Convention to the Governments of all signatory and acceding States;
3. register this Convention pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

1/ One delegation expressed the view that the Convention should be open for signature indefinitely.

2/ One delegation was of the view that this Article and the following Articles related to ratification, accession, deposit of instruments and entry into force should be contained under one Article.

3/ One delegation expressed a view that accession would not be necessary.

4/ It is to be discussed if other functions might be entrusted to the Depositary with regard to the special needs of the Convention.

XIX. ENTRY INTO FORCE

(a) This Convention shall enter into force (30) days after the date of the deposit of the (60th) instrument of ratification.

(b) For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry forces of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the (30th) day following the date of deposit of their instrument of ratification or accession. 1/

XX. LANGUAGES AND AUTHENTIC TEXTS

This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

1/ It is to be discussed further how to ensure that all "chemical weapons possessing" and "chemical weapons capable" States be among those States whose ratification would be required for the Convention to enter into force.

ANNEXES

ANNEX ON CHEMICALS

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ANNEX ON CHEMICALS

I. DEFINITIONS 1/

A. Definitions related to toxicity

(a) "super-toxic lethal chemicals", means chemicals which have a median lethal dose which is less than or equal to 0.5 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 2,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation) when measured by an agreed method 2/ set forth in ...

["Ultra-toxic chemicals" means super-toxic lethal chemicals which have a median lethal dose which is less than or equal to 0.1 mg/kg.]

[(b) "other lethal chemicals", means chemicals which have a median lethal dose which is greater than 0.5 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 2,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation) and less than or equal to 10 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 20,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation) when measured by an agreed method set forth in ...

[(c) "other harmful chemicals", means any [toxic] chemicals not covered by (a) or (b) above, [including toxic chemicals which normally cause temporary incapacitation rather than death] [at similar doses to those at which super-toxic lethal chemicals cause death].]

[and "other harmful chemicals", means chemicals which have a median lethal dose which is greater than 10 mg/kg (subcutaneous administration) or 20,000 mg-min/m³ (by inhalation).]]

B. Definitions related to precursor chemicals

(a) "Key Precursor" means:

a precursor which poses a significant risk to the objectives of the Convention by virtue of its importance in the production of a toxic chemical.

It may possess [possesses] the following characteristics:

- (i) It may play [plays] an important role in determining the toxic properties of a [toxic chemical prohibited by the Convention] [super-toxic lethal chemical].

1/ The final placement of these definitions within the Convention will be decided at a later stage.

2/ It was noted that after such measurements had actually been performed, the figures mentioned in this and the following section might be subject to slight changes in order to cover sulphur mustard gas under the first category.

(ii) It may be used in one of the chemical reactions at the final stage of formation of the [toxic chemicals prohibited by the Convention] [super-toxic lethal chemical].

[(iii) It may [is] not be used, or [is] used only in minimal quantities, for permitted purposes.] 1/

[(b) Key component of binary and/or multicomponent chemical systems for chemical weapons means:]

[a precursor which forms a toxic chemical in the binary or multicomponent weapons munition or device and which has the following additional characteristics (to be elaborated):]

1/ The position of this subparagraph should be decided in relation to how some chemicals, for instance, isopropylalcohol, are dealt with in the Convention.

II. SCHEDULES OF CHEMICALS

A. Schedule 1

1. O-Alkyl ($\leq C_{10}$, incl. cycloalkyl) alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphonofluoridates 1/

e.g. Sarin: O-isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate (107-44-8)
Soman: O-pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate (96-64-0)
2. O-Alkyl ($\leq C_{10}$, incl. cycloalkyl) N,N-dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphoramidocyanidates 1/

e.g. Tabun: O-ethyl N,N-dimethylphosphoramidocyanidate (77-81-6)
3. O-Alkyl (H or $\leq C_{10}$, incl. cycloalkyl) S-2-dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonothiolates and corresponding quaternary ammonium compounds 1/

e.g. VX: O-ethyl S-2-diisopropylaminoethyl methyl phosphonothiolate (50782-69-9)
4. Sulphur mustards [e.g.]:

Mustard gas (H): bis(2-chloroethyl)sulphide (505-60-2)
Sesquimustard (Q): 1,2-bis(2-chloroethylthio)ethane (3563-36-8)
O-Mustard (T): bis(2-chloroethylthioethyl)ether (63918-89-8)
bis(2-chloroethylthio)methane (63869-13-6)
1,3-bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-propane (63905-10-2)
1,4-bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-butane
2-Chloroethylchloromethylsulphide (2625-76-5)
5. Lewisites:

Lewisite 1: 2-chlorovinylchloroarsine (541-25-3)
Lewisite 2: bis(2-chlorovinyl)chloroarsine (40334-69-8)
Lewisite 3: tris(2-chlorovinyl)arsine (40334-70-1)
6. Nitrogen mustards:

HN1: bis(2-chloroethyl)ethylamine (538-07-8)
HN2: bis(2-chloroethyl)methylamine (51-75-2)
HN3: tris(2-chloroethyl)amine (555-77-1)
7. 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate (BZ) 2/ (6581-06-2)

1/ The precise delimitation of this group requires further discussion.

2/ The desirability of extending this item to include also related chemicals should be further discussed.

- [8. Saxitoxin 1/ (35523-89-8)]
- [9. Ricin 1/]
10. Alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonyldifluoride 2/
e.g. DF: methylphosphonyldifluoride (676-99-3)
11. O-Alkyl (H or $\leq C_{10}$, incl. cycloalkyl) O-2-dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-aminoethyl alkyl (Me, Et, N-Pr or i-Pr) phosphonites and corresponding quarternary ammonium compounds 2/
e.g. QL: O-ethyl O-2-diisopropylaminoethyl methylphosphonite (57856-11-8)
- [12. O-Alkyl ($\leq C_{10}$, incl. cycloalkyl) alkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphonochloridates 3/4/
e.g. Chloro Sarin: O-isopropyl methylphosphonochloridate (1445-76-7)
Chloro Soman: O-pinacolyl methylphosphonochloridate (7040-57-5)]
- [13. 3,3-Dimethylbutan-2-ol (pinacolyl alcohol) 5/ (464-07-3)]

1/ A view was expressed that, since toxins are covered by the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, they should not be covered by the Chemical Weapons Convention. Another view was expressed that since toxins are toxic chemicals, they would automatically be covered by the Chemical Weapons Convention. In addition, a view was expressed that relevant toxins should also be considered for inclusion in Schedule 2 part B. Another view was expressed that saxitoxin and ricin should only be considered examples of toxins that could be included in Schedule 1.

2/ The view was expressed that other members than DF and QL should be put on Schedule 2 part A, where however they are already covered by the first item.

3/ The precise delimitation of this group requires further discussion.

4/ A view was expressed that this group belongs to Schedule 2 part A, where it is already covered by the first item.

5/ A view was expressed that this chemical should be included in Schedule 2 part A.

B. Schedule 2 part A

1. Chemicals, containing a phosphorus atom to which is bonded one methyl, ethyl or propyl (normal or iso) group [radical] but not further carbon atoms, except for those chemicals listed under Schedule 1. 1/
2. N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) phosphoramidic dihalides
3. Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) N,N-dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr)-phosphoramidates
4. Arsenic trichloride (7784-34-1)
5. 2,2-Diphenyl-2-hydroxyacetic acid 2/ (76-93-7)
6. Quinuclidin-3-ol 2/ (1619-34-7)
7. N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethyl-2-chloride and corresponding quarternary ammonium compounds 3/4/

1/ The precise delimitation of this group requires further discussion.

2/ If item 7 on Schedule 1 is expanded into a group, a corresponding expansion should be considered for items 5 and 6 on Schedule 2 part A. Item 5 could, e.g., then include:

2-phenyl-2-(phenyl, cyclohexyl, cyclopentyl or cyclobutyl)-2-hydroxyacetic acids and their methyl, ethyl, n-propyl and iso-propyl esters,

and item 6 could, e.g., include:

3- or 4-hydroxypiperidine and their [derivatives] and [analogs].

3/ It was suggested that a limitation of the group to contain only the N,N-diisopropyl compounds should be considered in view of the scale of the commercial production of other group members. These other group members could then be included in Schedule 3. In this context, a view was also expressed that it could be sufficient to have only the N,N-diisopropyl compounds in Schedule 2 part A from the viewpoint that they are key precursors to VX. Furthermore a view was expressed that unless an appropriate limitation of the group can be provided, the placement of this group on this schedule should be reconsidered in light of existing commercial production of substances included in the group.

4/ A view was expressed that "and corresponding quarternary ammonium compounds" should be replaced by "and corresponding salts".

8. N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethane-2-ol and corresponding quaternary ammonium compounds 1/2/
9. N,N-Dialkyl (Me, Et, n-Pr or i-Pr) aminoethane-2-thiol and corresponding quaternary ammonium compounds 1/2/
10. Bis(2-hydroxyethyl)sulphide (thiodiglycol) 3/ (111-48-8)
- [11. 3,3-Dimethylbutan-2-ol (pinacolyl alcohol) 4/ (464-07-3)]

C. Schedule 2 part B 5/6/7/

Amiton: O,O-Diethyl S-[2-(diethylamino)ethyl]
phosphorothiolate (78-53-5)

1/ It was suggested that a limitation of the group to contain only the N,N-diisopropyl compounds should be considered in view of the scale of the commercial production of other group members. These other group members could then be included in Schedule 3. In this context, a view was also expressed that it could be sufficient to have only the N,N-diisopropyl compounds in Schedule 2 part A from the viewpoint that they are key precursors to VX. Furthermore a view was expressed that unless an appropriate limitation of the group can be provided, the placement of this group on this schedule should be reconsidered in light of existing commercial production of substances included in the group.

2/ A view was expressed that "and corresponding quaternary ammonium compounds" should be replaced by "and corresponding salts".

3/ A view was expressed that this chemical should be included in Schedule 3.

4/ A view was expressed that this chemical should be included in Schedule 1.

5/ A view was expressed that saxitoxin and ricin should be included in Schedule 2 part B.

6/ A view was expressed that CS and CR should be included in one of the Schedules.

7/ A view was expressed that 1,1,3,3,3-Pentafluoro-2-(trifluoromethyl)-1-propene (PFIB) CAS No. 382-21-8 be included in Schedule 2 B.

D. Schedule 3 1/

Phosgene	(75-44-5)
Cyanogen chloride	(506-77-4)
Hydrogen cyanide	(74-90-8)
Trichloronitromethane (chloropicrin)	(76-06-2)
Phosphorus oxychloride	(10025-87-3)
Phosphorus trichloride	(7719-12-2)
Di- and Trimethyl/Ethyl Esters of Phosphorus [P III] Acid <u>2/</u>	
[e.g.]: Trimethyl phosphite	(121-45-9)
Triethyl phosphite	(122-52-1)
Dimethyl phosphite	(868-85-9)
Diethyl phosphite	(762-04-9)
Sulphur monochloride	(10025-67-9)
Sulphur dichloride	(10545-99-0)
Thionyl chloride	(7719-09-7)
Phosphorus pentachloride	(10026-13-8)

1/ It was observed that no precursors for nitrogen mustards had been included and it was proposed that the three compounds triethanolamine, ethyldiethanolamine and methyldiethanolamine should be discussed in this context for possible inclusion in Schedule 3.

2/ Some felt that this heading might be superfluous and a possible source of misunderstandings, and therefore should be deleted.

III. GUIDELINES FOR SCHEDULES OF CHEMICALS

A. Guidelines for Schedule 1 1/

The following guidelines, singly or in combination, should be taken into account in considering whether a chemical should be included in Schedule 1:

1. Super-toxic lethal chemicals which had been stockpiled as chemical weapons.
2. Super-toxic lethal chemicals which pose a particular risk of potential use as chemical weapons.
3. Super-toxic lethal chemicals which have little or no use except as chemical weapons.
4. Super-toxic lethal chemicals which possess physical and chemical properties enabling them to be used as chemical weapons. 2/
5. Super-toxic lethal chemicals with chemical structure related/similar to those super-toxic lethal chemicals already listed in Schedule 1. 3/
6. Chemicals whose principal effect is to cause temporary incapacitation and which possess physical and chemical properties enabling them to be used as chemical weapons.
7. Any toxic chemical with a chemical structure related/similar to those chemicals already listed in Schedule 1. 3/
8. Other chemicals which have been stockpiled as chemical weapons.
9. Other chemicals which have little or no use except as chemical weapons.
10. Key precursors which participate in a one-stage process of producing toxic chemicals in munitions and devices. 4/
11. Key precursors which pose a high risk to the objectives of the Convention by virtue of their high potential for use to produce chemical weapons.

1/ These guidelines were developed in 1987. As no agreement has been reached on them, they are presently considered for revision partly on the basis of a new conceptual approach, contained in CD/CW/WP.258.

2/ A view was expressed that compounds listed in Schedule 1 should possess the properties of chemical warfare agents.

3/ The view was expressed that this by itself would not be sufficient to include a chemical in Schedule 1.

4/ One delegation believes that this provision is not necessary and that it is already covered under point 12.

12. Key precursors which may possess the following characteristics:

- (i) it may react with other chemicals to give, within a short time, a high yield of a toxic chemical defined as a chemical weapon;
- (ii) the reaction may be carried out in such a manner that the toxic product is readily available for military use; and
- (iii) key precursors which have little or no use except for chemical weapons purposes.

B. Guidelines for Schedule 2 part A 1/

The following criteria shall be taken into account in considering whether a precursor to a Schedule 1 chemical would be included in Schedule 2 part A:

- 1. It may be used in one of the chemical reactions at the final stage of formation of a chemical listed in Schedule 1.
- 2. It may pose a significant risk 2/ to the objectives of the Convention by virtue of its importance in the production of a chemical listed in Schedule 1.
- [3. It is not produced in large commercial quantities for purposes not prohibited by the Convention. 3/]

C. Guidelines for Schedule 2 part B 1/

Super-toxic lethal chemicals and other chemicals which are not included in Schedule 1 and are not precursor chemicals but which are deemed to pose a significant risk to the objectives of the Convention. 4/5/

1/ These guidelines are in the process of further consideration and development.

2/ The view was expressed that the degree of the risk of a chemical is determined on the basis of the contribution made by a precursor to the formation of the structure, or on the basis of the role it plays in determining the toxic properties of a Schedule 1 chemical.

3/ The question of the applicability of a quantitative criterion requires further discussion, taking into account, *inter alia*, the aim of the measures stipulated in Article VI, paragraph 6, as set forth in Annex 2 to Article VI, paragraph 4, the likelihood of meeting the various aspects of this aim by routine systematic on-site inspections and use of on-site instruments and the necessity of efficient implementation of verification.

4/ A view was expressed that, when assessing the risk to the objectives of the Convention, factors such as the lethal or incapacitating effects of a chemical, as well as its suitability as a chemical weapon in terms of physical and chemical properties should be taken into account.

5/ A view was expressed that chemicals included in Schedule 2 part B may have commercial use.

D. Guidelines for Schedule 3 1/

The following criteria shall be taken into account when considering whether a dual purpose chemical or a precursor chemical, not listed in other schedules, would be included in Schedule 3:

A. Dual purpose chemical

1. It is produced in large commercial quantities 2/ for purposes not prohibited by the Convention, and
2. it has been stockpiled as a chemical weapon, or
3. it may pose a risk to the objectives of the Convention by virtue of its physical, chemical and toxicological properties being similar to those of chemical weapons.

B. Precursor chemical

1. It is produced in large commercial quantities 2/ for purposes not prohibited by the Convention, and
2. it may pose a risk to the objectives of the Convention by virtue of its importance in the production of one or more chemicals listed in Schedule 1, or in the production of precursors to such chemicals 3/ [, and
3. it contributes one or more atoms other than hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen or oxygen to the final listed end-product 4/].

1/ These guidelines are in the process of further consideration and development.

2/ The question of a quantitative criterion, possibly including a numerical threshold, requires further discussion.

3/ A view was expressed that only precursors which may pose a risk to the objectives of the Convention by virtue of their importance in the production of one or more chemicals listed in Schedule 1 or 2 part A should be included.

4/ Whether this criterion is unduly restrictive should be further discussed.

IV. MODALITIES FOR REVISION OF SCHEDULES AND GUIDELINES 1/

A. General provisions

1. The revisions envisaged consist of additions to, deletions from, or shifts between the schedules and modifications of, additions to or deletions from the guidelines.
2. A revision shall be proposed by a State Party which may request the assistance of the Technical Secretariat in the preparation of its proposal. If the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat has [, or obtains from the Scientific Advisory Board,] any information which in his opinion may require a revision of the schedules of chemicals or one or more of the guidelines, he shall provide that information to the Executive Council and communicate it to all States Parties.
3. A proposal for revision shall be transmitted to the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat, substantiated with necessary information.
4. The Director-General of the Technical Secretariat shall inform the Executive Council and all States Parties about a proposal for a revision within [5] days of its receipt.
5. Any State Party and the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat may also provide relevant information for the evaluation of the proposal.

B. Decisions regarding revisions of schedules

1. When a proposal is made regarding a deletion of a chemical from a schedule or a shift between schedules the régime for that chemical shall be maintained while a decision on the proposed deletion or shift is being reached.
2. When an addition to a schedule of chemicals is proposed no régime shall be applied to that chemical until a decision has been taken to include it on one of the schedules.

1/ The view was expressed that there is no need to specify a role for the Scientific Advisory Board in these provisions as its functions will be determined by the Director-General in accordance with Article VIII. Another view was expressed that the Scientific Advisory Board should be able to submit to the Director-General or through him to the competent organs of the Organization any information available to it which in its opinion could lead to or contribute to a revision. These views apply to paras. A 2, B 4, C 1, C 3 of the present section.

[3. The proposal communicated under paragraph A.4 above shall be considered approved [if no State Party objects 1/ to it within [60] days after its receipt of the proposal.][upon the receipt within [60] days of formal acceptance by all States Parties.] 2/

4. [In the absence of such approval,] the Executive Council shall examine in light of all information available to it, [including any assessment by the Scientific Advisory Board,] the proposal for a revision. Within [90] days of the receipt of the proposal by the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat, the Executive Council shall provide its recommendation, together with appropriate background information, to all States Parties for consideration.

5. If the Executive Council recommends to all States Parties that the proposal be adopted, 3/ it shall be considered approved [[if no State Party objects][if no more than [5] States Parties object] 1/ to it within [30] days after its receipt of the recommendation.][upon the receipt within [30] days of formal acceptance by all States Parties.] 2/

6. Otherwise, a decision on the proposal shall be taken as a matter of substance by the Conference of the States Parties at its next regular session. For urgent consideration, a special session of the Conference of the States Parties may be convened according to article VIII, paragraph B.(a).3.

7. Any decision shall be notified to all States Parties. An approved revision shall enter into force [60] days after such a notification.

C. Decisions regarding revision of guidelines

1. The Executive Council shall examine in light of all information available to it[, including any assessment by the Scientific Advisory Board,] the proposal for a revision. Within [90] days of the receipt of the proposal by the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat, the Executive Council shall provide its recommendation, together with appropriate background information, to all States Parties for consideration.

1/ A view was expressed that an objection to a revision should be substantiated.

2/ Views were expressed that this latter bracketed phrase does not accord with the concept of tacit approval.

3/ A view was expressed that the same procedure should apply also in case of a recommendation for rejection.

2. The decision on a proposal shall be taken by the Conference of the States Parties in accordance with the procedures [laid down in Article XIII. 1/][to be specified in this Annex.]

3. Following a revision of guidelines, the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat shall, [with the assistance of the Scientific Advisory Board, immediately initiate a review of any schedule affected by the revision. This review shall be completed and the results communicated to all States Parties within [six] months.] 2/

1/ These procedures are presently under development.

2/ Further discussions are required as to whether a review would always be necessary and as to who would participate in the review process.

V. TOXICITY DETERMINATIONS

A. Procedures for toxicity determinations 1/2/

Recommended standardized operating procedures for
acute subcutaneous toxicity determinations

1. Introduction

Three categories of agents were defined on the basis of their toxicity:

- (i) super-toxic lethal chemicals;
- (ii) other lethal chemicals;
- (iii) other harmful chemicals.

Lethality limits in terms of LD₅₀ for subcutaneous administration were established to separate three toxic categories at 0.5 mg/kg and 10 mg/kg.

2. Principles of the test method

The test substance is administered to a group of animals in doses corresponding exactly to the category limits (0.5 or 10 mg/kg respectively). If in an actual test the death rate was greater than 50 per cent, then the material would fall into the higher toxicity category; if it was lower than 50 per cent the material would fall into the lower toxicity category.

3. Description of the test procedure

3.1 Experimental animal Healthy young adult male albino rats of Wistar strain weighing 200 ± 20 g should be used. The animals should be acclimatized to the laboratory conditions for at least five days prior to the test. The temperature of the animal room before and during the test should be $22 \pm 3^\circ$ C and the relative humidity should be 50-70 per cent. With artificial lighting, the sequence should be 12 hours light, 12 hours dark. Conventional laboratory diets may be used for feeding with an unlimited supply of drinking water. The animals should be group-caged but the number of animals per cage should not interfere with proper observation of each animal. Prior to the test, the animals are randomized and divided into groups; 20 animals in each group.

3.2 Test substance Each test substance should be appropriately identified (chemical composition, origin, batch number, purity, solubility, stability, etc.) and stored under conditions ensuring its stability. The stability of the substance under the test conditions should also be known. A solution of the test substance should be prepared just before the test. Solutions with concentrations of 0.5 mg/ml and 10 mg/ml should be prepared. The preferable solvent is 0.85 per cent saline. Where the solubility of the

1/ It was understood that these recommended standardized operating procedures (CD/CW/WP.30) for toxicity determinations might be supplemented or modified and/or, if necessary, reviewed.

2/ A view was expressed that appropriate methods for testing of non-lethal harmful chemicals need to be addressed at a later stage.

test substance is a problem, a minimum amount of an organic solvent such as ethanol, propylene glycol or polyethylene glycol may be used to achieve solution.

3.3 Test method Twenty animals receive in the back region 1 ml/kg of the solution containing 0.5 mg/ml of the test substance. The number of dead animals is determined within 48 hours and again after 7 days. If the death rate is lower than 10 animals, another group of 20 animals should be injected by the same way with 1 ml/kg of the solution containing 10 mg/ml of the test substance. The number of dead animals should be determined within 48 hours and again after 7 days. If the result is doubtful (e.g. death rate = 10), the test should be repeated.

3.4 Evaluation of the results If the death rate in the first group of animals (receiving a solution containing 0.5 mg/ml) is equal to or higher than 50 per cent, the test substance will fall into the "super-toxic lethal chemical" category. If the death rate in the second group (receiving a solution containing 10 mg/ml) is equal to or higher than 50 per cent, the test substance will fall into the "other lethal chemical" category; if lower than 50 per cent, the test substance will fall into the "other harmful chemical".

4. Data reporting

A test report should include the following information:

- (i) test conditions: date and hour of the test, air temperature and humidity;
- (ii) animal data: strain, weight and origin of the animals;
- (iii) test substance characterization: chemical composition, origin, batch number and purity (or impurities) of the substance; date of receipt, quantities received and used in the test; conditions of storage, solvent used in the test;
- (iv) results: the number of dead animals in each group, evaluation of results.

Recommended standardized operating procedures for acute inhalation toxicity criteria

1. In the assessment and evaluation of the toxic characteristics of chemicals in a vapour or aerosol state determination of acute inhalation toxicity is necessary. In every case, when it is possible, this test should be preceded by subcutaneous toxicity determination. Data from these studies constitute the initial steps in the establishing of a dosage regimen in subchronic and other studies and may provide additional information on the mode of toxic action of a substance.

Three categories of agents were defined on the basis of their toxicity:

- (i) super-toxic lethal chemicals;
- (ii) other lethal chemicals;
- (iii) other harmful chemicals.

Lethality limits in terms of LC_{50} for inhalatory application were established to separate three toxic categories at $2,000 \text{ mg min/m}^3$ and $20,000 \text{ mg min/m}^3$.

2. Principles of the test method

A group of animals is exposed for a defined period to the test substance in concentration corresponding exactly to the category limits ($2,000 \text{ mg min/m}^3$ or $20,000 \text{ mg min/m}^3$ respectively). If in an actual test the death rate was greater than 50 per cent, then the material would fall into the higher toxicity category; if it was lower than 50 per cent, the material would fall into the lower toxicity category.

3. Description of the test procedure

3.1 Experimental animal Healthy young adult male albino rats of Wistar strain weighing $200 \pm 20 \text{ g}$ should be used. The animals should be acclimatized to the laboratory conditions for at least five days prior to the test. The temperature of the animal room before and during the test should be $22 \pm 3^\circ \text{ C}$ and the relative humidity should be 50-70 per cent. With artificial lighting, the sequence should be 12 hours light, 12 hours dark. Conventional laboratory diets may be used for feeding with an unlimited supply of drinking water. The animals should be group-caged but the number of animals per cage should not interfere with proper observation of each animal. Prior to the test the animals are randomized and divided into two groups; 20 animals in each group.

3.2 Test substance Each test substance should be appropriately identified (chemical composition, origin, batch number, purity, solubility, stability, boiling point, flash point, vapour pressure, etc.) and stored under conditions ensuring its stability. The stability of the substance under the test conditions should also be known.

3.3. Equipment A constant vapour concentration may be produced by one of several methods:

- (i) by means of an automatic syringe which drops the material on to a suitable heating system (e.g. hot plate);
- (ii) by sending airsteam through a solution containing the material (e.g. bubbling chamber);
- (iii) by diffusion of the agent through a suitable material (e.g. diffusion chamber).

A dynamic inhalation system with a suitable analytical concentration control system should be used. The rate of air flow should be adjusted to ensure that conditions throughout the equipment are essentially the same. Both a whole body individual chamber exposure or head only exposure may be used.

3.4 Physical measurements Measurements or monitoring should be conducted of the following parameters:

- (i) the rate of air flow (preferably continuously);

- (ii) the actual concentration of the test substance during the exposed period;
- (iii) temperature and humidity.

3.5 Test method Twenty animals are exposed for 10 minutes to the concentration of 200 mg/m³ and then removed from the chamber. The number of dead animals is determined within 48 hours and again after 7 days. If the death rate is lower than 10 animals, another group of 20 animals should be exposed for 10 minutes to the concentration of 2,000 mg/m³. The number of dead animals should be determined within 48 hours and again after 7 days. If the result is doubtful (e.g. death rate = 10), the test should be repeated.

3.6 Evaluation of results If the death rate in the first group of animals (exposed to the concentration of 200 mg/m³) is equal to or higher than 50 per cent, the test substance will fall into the "super-toxic lethal chemical" category. If the death rate in the second group (exposed to the concentration of 2,000 mg/m³) is equal to or higher than 50 per cent, the test substance will fall into the "other lethal chemical" category; if it is lower than 50 per cent, the test substance will fall into the "other harmful chemical".

4. Data reporting

A test report should include the following information:

- (i) Test conditions: date and hour of the test, description of exposure chamber (type, dimensions, source of air, system for generating the test substance, method of conditioning air, treatment of exhaust air, etc.) and equipment for measuring temperature, humidity, air flow and concentration of the test substance;
- (ii) Exposure data: air flow rate, temperature and humidity of air, nominal concentration (total amount of test substance fed into the equipment divided by volume of air), actual concentration in test breathing zone;
- (iii) Animal data: strain, weight and origin of animals;
- (iv) Test substance characterization: chemical composition, origin, batch number and purity (or impurities) of the substance; boiling point, flash point, vapour pressure; date of receipt, quantities received and used in the test; condition of storage, solvent used in the test;
- (v) Results: number of dead animals in each group, evaluation of results.

B. Modalities for revision of toxicity determination procedures

(To be developed)

ANNEX ON THE PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 1/2/

A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE HANDLING OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

1. The obligation to protect confidential information shall pertain to the verification of both civil and military activities and facilities. As specified in Article VIII, the Organization shall:

(a) require only the minimum amount of information and data necessary for the timely and efficient carrying out of its responsibilities under the Convention;

(b) take measures necessary to ensure that inspectors and other staff members of the Technical Secretariat meet the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity;

(c) develop agreements and regulations to implement the provisions of the Convention and shall specify as precisely as possible the information to which the Organization shall be given access by a State Party.

2. The Director-General of the Organization shall have the primary responsibility for ensuring the protection of confidential information. He shall establish a stringent régime governing the handling of confidential information by the Technical Secretariat. [The Director-General shall be assisted by an Assistant Director-General for Information Security.] In doing so he shall observe the following guidelines:

(a) Information shall be considered confidential if

(i) it is so designated by the State Party from whom the information was obtained and to which the information refers;
or

(ii) in the judgement of the Director-General, its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the State Party to which it refers or to the mechanisms for implementation of the Convention.

(b) All data and documents obtained by the Technical Secretariat shall be evaluated by the appropriate unit of the Technical Secretariat in order to establish whether they contain confidential information. Data required by

1/ A view was expressed that further discussion on this subject is necessary.

2/ The view was expressed that the references to confidentiality in Article VII and Article VIII are adequate. The detailed guidelines on confidentiality should be part of rules and regulations to be developed by the International Organization.

States Parties to be assured of the continued compliance with the Convention by other States Parties shall be routinely provided to them. Such data shall encompass:

- (i) the initial and annual reports and declarations provided by States Parties under Articles III, IV, V and VI;
- (ii) general reports on the results and effectiveness of verification activities; and
- (iii) information to be supplied to all States Parties in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

(c) No information obtained by the Organization in connection with implementation of the Convention shall be published or otherwise released, except, as follows:

- (i) General information on the implementation of the Convention may be compiled and released publicly in accordance with the decisions of the Conference of States Parties or the Executive Council. [Prior to public release, all data and documents shall be evaluated by a specially designated unit of the Technical Secretariat to ensure that they do not contain confidential information.]
- (ii) Any information may be released with the express consent of the State Party to which the information refers.
- (iii) Information classified as confidential shall be released by the Organization only through agreed procedures which ensure that the release of information only occurs in strict conformity with the needs of the Convention.

(d) The level of sensitivity of confidential data or documents shall be established, based on criteria to be applied uniformly ^{1/} in order to ensure their appropriate handling and protection. For this purpose, a classification system shall be introduced, which by taking account of relevant work undertaken in the preparation of the Convention shall provide for clear criteria ensuring the inclusion of information into appropriate categories of confidentiality and the justified durability of the confidential nature of information. While providing for the necessary flexibility in its implementation the classification system shall protect the rights of States Parties providing confidential information.

(e) Confidential information shall be stored securely at the premises of the Organization. Some data or documents may also be stored with the national authority of a State Party. Sensitive information, inter alia, photographs,

^{1/} The view was expressed that such criteria should be developed by the Technical Secretariat.

plans and other documents required only for the inspection of a specific facility may be kept under lock and key at this facility in conformity with the agreement to be concluded on the basis of a relevant model.

(f) To the greatest extent consistent with the effective implementation of the verification provisions of the Convention, information shall be handled and stored by the Technical Secretariat in a form that precludes direct identification of the facility to which it pertains.

(g) The amount of confidential information removed from a facility shall be kept to the minimum necessary for the timely and effective implementation of the verification provisions of the Convention.

[(h) Each employee shall only have access to that kind of information necessary for fulfilment of the function deriving from the relevant position description.]

(i) Access to confidential information shall be regulated in accordance with its classification. The dissemination of confidential information within the Organization shall be on a strictly need-to-know basis.

(j) The Director-General shall report annually to the Conference of States Parties on the implementation of this régime.

3. States Parties shall treat information which they receive from the Organization in accordance with the level of confidentiality established for that information. [Upon request States Parties shall provide details on the handling of information provided to them by the Organization.]

B. EMPLOYMENT AND CONDUCT OF PERSONNEL IN THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT

1. Conditions of staff employment shall be such as to ensure that access to and handling of confidential information shall be in conformity with the procedures established by the Director-General in accordance with part A of this Annex.

2. [Each position in the Technical Secretariat shall be governed by a formal position description that specifies the scope of access to confidential information, if any, needed in that position.]

3. In keeping with the provisions of Article VIII D of this Convention, the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat, the inspectors and other members of the staff shall not disclose even after termination of their functions to any unauthorized persons any confidential information coming to their knowledge in the performance of their official duties. They shall not communicate to any State, organization or person outside the Technical Secretariat any information to which they have access in connection with their activities in a State Party.

4. In the discharge of their function inspectors shall only request the information and data which are necessary to fulfil their mandate. They shall not take any records on information collected incidentally not related to verification of compliance with the Convention.

5. The staff shall enter into individual secrecy agreements 1/ [with the Technical Secretariat] covering their period of employment and a period of five years after it is terminated.

6. In order to avoid improper disclosures, inspectors and staff members shall be appropriately advised and reminded about security considerations [and of the possible penalties that they would incur, including the likelihood of the Organization's waiving their immunity from private suit].

[7. Not less than 30 days before an employee is given clearance for access to confidential information that refers to activities under the [jurisdiction or control] of a State Party, the State Party concerned shall be notified of the proposed clearance. For inspectors the notification of a proposed designation shall fulfil this requirement.

8. In evaluating the performance of inspectors and other employees of the Technical Secretariat, specific attention should be given to the employee's record regarding protection of confidential information.]

C. MEASURES TO PROTECT SENSITIVE INSTALLATIONS AND
PREVENT DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL DATA IN THE
COURSE OF ON-SITE VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES 2/

1. States Parties may take such measures as they deem necessary to protect confidentiality, provided that they comply and demonstrate compliance with their obligations arising from the provisions of this Convention. Receiving an inspection they may indicate to the inspection team the equipment, documentation or areas that they consider sensitive and not related to the purpose of the inspection.

2. Teams shall be guided by the principle of conducting on-site inspections in the least intrusive manner possible, consistent with the effective and timely accomplishment of their mission. They shall, to the extent they deem them appropriate, take into consideration and adopt proposals which may be made by the State Party receiving the inspection, at whatever stage of the inspection, to ensure that sensitive equipment or information, not related to chemical weapons, is protected.

3. Inspection teams shall strictly abide by the provisions set out in the relevant Articles and Annexes of this Convention governing the conduct of inspections. They shall fully respect the procedures designed to protect sensitive installations and to prevent the disclosure of confidential data.

1/ This issue requires further consideration.

2/ The contents and placement of some provisions contained in this section need to be reviewed in the light of ongoing discussions on the Guidelines on the International Inspectorate.

4. In the elaboration of subsidiary arrangements/facility attachments due regard shall be paid to the requirement of protecting confidential information. Agreements on inspection procedures for individual facilities shall also include specific and detailed arrangements with regard to the determination of those areas of the facility to which inspectors are granted access, the storage of confidential information on-site, the scope of the inspection effort in agreed areas, the taking of samples and their analysis, the access to records and the use of instruments and continuous monitoring equipment.

5. The report to be prepared after each inspection shall only contain facts relevant to compliance with the Convention. The report shall be handled in accordance with the regulations established by the Organization governing the handling of confidential information. If necessary, the information contained in the report shall be processed into less sensitive forms before it is transmitted outside the Technical Secretariat and the inspected State Party.

D. PROCEDURES IN CASE OF BREACHES OR ALLEGED
BREACHES OF CONFIDENTIALITY 1/

1. The Director-General of the Technical Secretariat shall establish necessary procedures to be followed in case of breaches or alleged breaches of confidentiality, taking into account recommendations made by the Preparatory Commission.

2. The Director-General of the Technical Secretariat shall oversee the implementation of individual secrecy agreements and promptly initiate an investigation if there is any indication that obligations concerning the protection of confidential information have been violated and if he considers such an indication sufficient. He shall also promptly initiate an investigation if an allegation concerning a breach of confidentiality is made by a State Party.

3. [Members of the staff of the Technical Secretariat shall be held responsible for any breach of secrecy agreements they entered into.] The Director-General shall impose appropriate punitive and disciplinary measures on staff members who have violated their obligations to protect confidential information. 2/ In case of serious breaches the immunity from legal process may be waived by the Director-General.

1/ This section should be reviewed in the light of the results of considerations of other legal issues, in particular liability and the settlement of disputes.

2/ A view was expressed that the Director-General should be given clear guidelines on which punitive and disciplinary measures would be deemed appropriate.

4. States Parties shall, to the extent possible, co-operate and support the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat in investigating any breach or alleged breach of confidentiality and in taking appropriate action in case a breach has been established.

5. The Organization shall not be held liable for any breach of confidentiality committed by members of the Technical Secretariat.

6. For breaches involving both a State Party and the Organization [or specifically within the Technical Secretariat] a "Commission for the settlement of disputes related to confidentiality", set up as a subsidiary ad hoc body of the Conference of States Parties, shall consider the case. This Commission shall be appointed by the Conference of States Parties.

ANNEX TO ARTICLE III

I. DECLARATIONS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

A. Possession or non-possession

1. Possession of chemical weapons on own territory

Yes ...

No ...

2. Possession, jurisdiction or control over chemical weapons elsewhere

Yes ...

No ...

B. Existence on the territory of any chemical weapons under the jurisdiction or control of anyone else

Yes ...

No ...

C. Past transfers

Yes ...

No ...

II. DECLARATIONS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES

A. Possession or non-possession

1. Possession of chemical weapons production facilities on own territory

Yes ...

No ...

2. Possession, jurisdiction or control over chemical weapons production facilities elsewhere

Yes ...

No ...

B. Existence on the territory of any chemical weapons production facilities under the jurisdiction or control of anyone else

Yes ...

No ...

C. Past transfers of equipment [or technical documentation] ^{1/}

Yes ...

No ...

[III. OTHER DECLARATIONS]

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^{1/} The view was expressed that technical documentation should not be included.

ANNEX TO ARTICLE IV

I. DECLARATIONS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

A. The declaration by a State Party of the aggregate quantity, location, and detailed composition of chemical weapons under its jurisdiction or control shall include the following:

1. The aggregate quantity of each chemical declared.
2. The precise location of each declared storage site of chemical weapons, expressed by:
 - name;
 - geographical co-ordinates.
3. Detailed inventory for each storage facility:
 - (1) Chemicals defined as chemical weapons in accordance with Article II:
 - (a) Chemicals shall be declared within the schedules specified in the Annex on Chemicals.
 - (b) For a chemical not listed in the Schedules in the Annex on Chemicals the information required for possible assignment of the chemical to one of the proper schedules shall be provided, including the toxicity of the pure compound. For a precursor chemical, the toxicity and identity of the principal final reaction product(s) shall be provided.
 - (c) Chemicals shall be identified by chemical name in accordance with current IUPAC (International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry) nomenclature, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts Service registry number, if assigned. For a precursor chemical, the toxicity and identity of the principal final reaction product(s) shall be provided.
 - (d) In cases involving mixtures of two or more chemicals, all such components shall be identified and the percentage of each component shall be provided, and the mixture shall be declared under the category of the most toxic chemical.
 - (e) In cases involving multi-component munitions, devices, bulk containers, and other containers, the quantity of each chemical component shall be provided, as well as the projected quantity of the final principal reaction product obtained. Such items shall be declared under the category of the [key precursor] [key component].

(f) For each chemical the form of storage, i.e. munitions, sub-munitions, devices, equipment or bulk containers and other containers shall be declared. For each form of storage the following shall be listed:

- type
- size or calibre
- number of items
- weight of chemical fill per item.

In addition, for chemicals stored in bulk the percentage purity shall be declared.

(g) For each chemical the total weight present at the storage site shall be declared.

(2) Unfilled munitions and/or sub-munitions and/or devices and/or equipment, defined as chemical weapons. For each type the information shall include:

- (a) the number of items
- (b) the fill volume per item
- (c) the intended chemical fill, if known.

(3) Equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions, sub-munitions, devices or equipment under points (1) and (2).

(4) Chemicals specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions, sub-munitions, devices or equipment under points (1) and (2).

B. Detailed information on any chemical weapons on the territory of a State Party which are under the jurisdiction or control of others, including a State not Party to the convention (to be developed).

C. Past transfers and receipts.

A State Party that has transferred or received chemical weapons shall declare this (these) transfer(s) or receipt(s), [provided the amount transferred or received exceeded one metric tonne [of chemicals] [per chemical] per year in bulk and/or munition form]. This declaration shall be made according to the inventory format in paragraph 3 above. This declaration shall also indicate the supplier and recipient countries and, as precisely as possible, timing and current location of the transferred items.

II. INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION OF DECLARATIONS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS,
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMATIC MONITORING OF STORAGE FACILITIES, INTERNATIONAL
VERIFICATION OF REMOVAL OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS FOR DESTRUCTION

1. Storage facility description

(a) Each site or location where, pending their destruction chemical weapons, declared in accordance with Article IV, are stored on the territory of a State Party or under its jurisdiction or control elsewhere, shall hereafter be designated as "storage facility".

(b) At the time of the submission of its declaration of chemical weapons, in accordance with Article IV, a State Party shall provide the Technical Secretariat with the detailed description and location of its storage facility(ies) containing:

- boundary map;
- location of bunkers/storage areas, within the facility;
- the detailed inventory of the contents of each bunker/storage area;
- relevant details of the construction of bunkers/storage areas;
- recommendations for the emplacement by the Technical Secretariat of seals and monitoring instruments.

2. Measures to secure the storage facility and storage facility preparation

(a) Not later than when submitting its declaration of chemical weapons, a State Party shall take such measures as it considers appropriate to secure its storage facility(ies) and shall prevent any movement of its chemical weapons, except their removal for destruction.

(b) In order to prepare its storage facility(ies) for international verification, a State Party shall ensure that its chemical weapons at its storage facility(ies) are so configured that seals and monitoring devices may be effectively applied, and that such configuration allows ready access for such verification.

(c) While the storage facility remains closed for any movement of chemical weapons other than their removal for destruction activities necessary for maintenance and safety monitoring by national authorities may continue at the facility.

3. Agreements on subsidiary arrangements 1/

(a) Within [6] months after entry into force of the convention, States Parties shall conclude with the Organization agreements on subsidiary arrangements for verification of their storage facilities. Such agreements shall be based on a Model Agreement and shall specify for each storage facility the number, intensity, duration of inspections, detailed inspection procedures and the installation, operation and maintenance of the seals and monitoring devices by the Technical Secretariat. The Model Agreement shall include provisions to take into account future technological developments.

(b) States Parties shall ensure that the verification of declarations of chemical weapons and the initiation of the systematic monitoring of storage facilities can be accomplished by the Technical Secretariat at all storage facilities within the agreed time frames after the convention enters into force. 2/

4. International verification of declarations of chemical weapons

(a) International verification by on-site inspections

- (i) The purpose of the international verification of declarations of chemical weapons shall be to confirm through on-site inspections the accuracy of the declarations made in accordance with Article IV. 3/
- (ii) The International Inspectors shall conduct this verification promptly after a declaration is submitted. They shall, inter alia, verify the quantity and identity of chemicals, types and number of munitions, devices and other equipment.
- (iii) They shall employ, as appropriate, agreed seals, markers or other inventory control procedures to facilitate an accurate inventory of the chemical weapons at each storage facility.
- (iv) As the inventory progresses, International Inspectors shall install such agreed seals as may be necessary to clearly indicate if any stocks are removed, and to ensure the securing of the storage facility.

1/ The coverage of the subsidiary arrangements is to be discussed.

2/ Procedures to ensure the implementation of the verification scheme within designated time frames are to be developed.

3/ The applicability of Article IV, paragraph 2(b) is to be discussed.

(b) Co-ordination for international systematic monitoring of storage facilities

In conjunction with the on-site inspections of verification of declarations of chemical weapons, the International Inspectors shall undertake necessary co-ordination for measures of systematic monitoring of storage facilities.

5. International systematic monitoring of storage facilities

(a) The purpose of the international systematic monitoring of storage facilities shall be to ensure that no undetected removal of chemical weapons takes place.

(b) The international systematic monitoring shall be initiated as soon as possible after the declaration of chemical weapons is submitted and shall continue until all chemical weapons have been removed from the storage facility. It shall be ensured, in accordance with the agreement on subsidiary arrangements, through a combination of continuous monitoring with on-site instruments and systematic verification by international on-site inspections or, where the continuous monitoring with on-site instruments is not feasible, by the presence of International Inspectors.

(c) If the relevant agreement on subsidiary arrangements for the systematic monitoring of a chemical weapons storage facility is concluded, International Inspectors shall install for the purpose of this systematic monitoring a monitoring system as referred to below under (e). If no such agreement has been concluded, the International Inspectors will initiate the systematic monitoring by their continuous presence on-site until the agreement is concluded, and the monitoring system installed and activated.

(d) In the period before the activation of the continuous monitoring with on-site instruments and at other times when this continuous monitoring is not feasible, seals installed by International Inspectors may only be opened in the presence of an International Inspector. If an extraordinary event requires the opening of a seal when an Inspector is not present, a State Party shall immediately inform the Technical Secretariat and International Inspectors will return as soon as possible to validate the inventory and re-establish the seals.

(e) Monitoring with instruments.

(i) For the purpose of the systematic monitoring of a chemical weapons storage facility, International Inspectors will install, in the presence of host country personnel and in conformity with the relevant agreement on subsidiary arrangements, a monitoring system consisting of, inter alia, sensors, ancillary equipment and transmission systems. The agreed types of these instruments shall be specified in the Model Agreement. They shall incorporate, inter alia, seals and other tamper-indicating and tamper-resistant devices as well as data protection and data authentication features.

- (ii) The monitoring system shall have such abilities and be installed, adjusted or directed in such a way as to correspond strictly and efficiently to the sole purpose of detecting prohibited or unauthorized activities within the chemical weapons storage facility as referred to above under (a). The coverage of the monitoring system shall be limited accordingly. The monitoring system will signal the Technical Secretariat if any tampering with its components or interference with its functioning occurs. Redundancy shall be built into the monitoring system to ensure that failure of an individual component will not jeopardize the monitoring capability of the system.
 - (iii) When the monitoring system is activated, International Inspectors will verify the accuracy of the inventory of chemical weapons, as required.
 - (iv) Data will be transmitted from each storage facility to the Technical Secretariat by means (to be determined). The transmission system will incorporate frequent transmissions from the storage facility and a query and response system between the storage facility and the Technical Secretariat. International Inspectors shall periodically check the proper functioning of the monitoring system.
 - (v) In the event that the monitoring system indicated any irregularity, the International Inspectors would immediately determine whether this resulted from equipment malfunction or activities at the storage facility. If, after this examination the problem remained unresolved, the Technical Secretariat would immediately ascertain the actual situation, including through immediate on-site inspection or visit of the storage facility if necessary. The Technical Secretariat shall report any such problem immediately after its detection to the State Party who should assist in its resolution.
 - (vi) The State Party shall immediately notify the Technical Secretariat if an event at the storage facility occurs, or may occur, which may have an impact on the monitoring system. The State Party shall co-ordinate subsequent actions with the Technical Secretariat with a view to restoring the operation of the monitoring system, and establishing interim measures, if necessary, as soon as possible.
- (f) Systematic on-site inspections and visits.
- (i) Visits to service the monitoring system may be required in addition to systematic on-site inspections to perform any necessary maintenance, replacement of equipment or to adjust the coverage of the monitoring system, if required.

(ii) (The guidelines for determining the frequency of systematic on-site inspections are to be elaborated.) The particular storage facility to be inspected shall be chosen by the Technical Secretariat in such a way as to preclude the prediction of precisely when the facility is to be inspected. During each inspection, the International Inspectors will verify that the monitoring system is functioning correctly and verify the inventory in agreed percentage of bunkers and storage areas.

(g) When all chemical weapons have been removed from the storage facility, the Technical Secretariat shall certify the declaration of the National Authority to that effect. After this certification, the Technical Secretariat shall terminate the international systematic monitoring of the storage facility and will promptly remove all devices and monitoring equipment installed by the International Inspectors.

6. International verification of the removal of chemical weapons for destruction

(a) The State Party shall notify the Technical Secretariat [14] days in advance of the exact timing of removal of chemical weapons from the storage facility and of the planned arrival at the facility where they will be destroyed.

(b) The State Party shall provide the Inspectors with the detailed inventory of the chemical weapons to be moved. The International Inspectors shall be present when chemical weapons are removed from the storage facility and shall verify that the chemical weapons on the inventory are loaded on to the transport vehicles. Upon completion of the loading operations, the International Inspectors shall seal the cargo and/or means of transport, as appropriate.

(c) If only a portion of the chemical weapons is removed, the International Inspectors will verify the accuracy of the inventory of the remaining chemical weapons and make any appropriate adjustments in the monitoring system in accordance with the agreement on subsidiary arrangements.

(d) The International Inspectors shall verify the arrival of the chemical weapons at the destruction facility by checking the seals on the cargo and/or the means of transport and shall verify the accuracy of the inventory of the chemical weapons transported.

7. Inspections and visits

(a) The (Director-General of the) Technical Secretariat shall notify the State Party of its decision to inspect or visit the storage facility 48 hours prior to the planned arrival of the inspection team at the facility for systematic inspections or visits. In the event of inspections or visits to resolve urgent problems, this period may be shortened. The (Director-General of the) Technical Secretariat shall specify the purpose(s) of the inspection or visit.

(b) A State Party shall make any necessary preparations for the arrival of the Inspectors and shall ensure their expeditious transportation from their point of entry on the territory of the State Party to the storage facility. The agreement on subsidiary arrangements will specify administrative arrangements for Inspectors.

(c) International Inspectors shall, in accordance with agreements on subsidiary arrangements:

- have unimpeded access to all parts of the storage facilities including any munitions, devices, bulk containers, or other containers therein. While conducting their activity, Inspectors shall comply with the safety regulations at the facility. The items to be inspected will be chosen by the Inspectors;
- bring with them and use such agreed instruments as may be necessary for the completion of their tasks;
- receive samples taken at their request from any devices and bulk containers and other containers at the facility. Such samples will be taken by representatives of the State Party in the presence of the Inspectors;
- perform on-site analysis of samples;
- transfer, if necessary, samples for analysis off-site at a laboratory designated by the Organization, 1/ in accordance with agreed procedures;
- afford the opportunity to the host State Party to be present when samples are analysed;
- ensure, in accordance with agreed procedures that samples transported, stored and processed are not tampered with;
- communicate freely with the Technical Secretariat.

(d) The State Party receiving the inspection shall, in accordance with agreed procedures:

- have the right to accompany the International Inspectors at all times during the inspection and observe all their verification activities at the storage facility;
- have the right to retain duplicates of all samples taken and be present when samples are analysed;
- have the right to inspect any instrument used or installed by the International Inspectors and to have it tested in the presence of its personnel;

1/ The designation of the organ of the Organization that will be entrusted with this task will be considered further and specified in the text.

- provide assistance to the International Inspectors, upon their request, for the installation of the monitoring system and the analysis of samples on-site;
- receive copies of the reports on inspections of its storage facility(ies);
- receive copies, at its request, of the information and data gathered about its storage facility(ies) by the Technical Secretariat.

(e) The International Inspectors may request clarification of any ambiguities arising from the inspection. In the event that any ambiguities arise which cannot be resolved in the course of the inspection, the Inspectors shall inform the (Director-General of the) Technical Secretariat.

(f) After each inspection or visit to the storage facility, International Inspectors shall submit a report with their findings to the (Director-General of the) Technical Secretariat which will transmit a copy of this report to the State Party having received the inspection or visit.

III. PRINCIPLES, METHODS AND ORGANIZATION OF THE DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

1. Destruction of chemical weapons means a process by which chemicals are converted in an essentially irreversible way to a form unsuitable for production of chemical weapons, and which in an irreversible manner renders munitions and other devices unusable as such.

2. Each State Party possessing chemical weapons shall determine how it shall destroy them, except that the following processes may not be used: dumping in any body of water, land burial or open-pit burning. It shall destroy chemical weapons only at specifically designated and appropriately designed and equipped facility(ies).

3. The State Party shall ensure that its chemical weapons destruction facility(ies) are constructed and operated in a manner to ensure the destruction of the chemical weapons; and that the destruction process can be verified under the provisions of this convention.

IV. PRINCIPLES AND ORDER OF DESTRUCTION 1/

1. The elaboration of the Order of Destruction shall build on the undiminished security for all States during the entire destruction stage; confidence-building in the early part of the destruction stage; gradual acquisition of experience in the course of destroying chemical weapons stocks and applicability irrespective of the actual composition of the stockpiles and the methods chosen for the destruction of the chemical weapons.

1/ The further development of this entire section has been subject to consultations by the Chairman of Group B in 1988, the result of which is included in Appendix II.

2. The destruction of chemical weapons stocks shall start for all States Parties possessing chemical weapons simultaneously. The whole destruction stage shall be divided into nine annual periods.

3. Each State Party shall destroy not less than one ninth of its stockpile [in measure of stockpile equivalent and/or equivalent mustard weight] during each destruction period. 1/ 2/ However, a State Party is not precluded from destroying its stocks at a faster pace. Each State Party shall determine its detailed plans for each destruction period, as specified in part III of this Annex and shall report annually on the implementation of each destruction period. 3/

4. Order of Destruction (to be elaborated). 4/ 5/

1/ It is considered necessary to elaborate a method for comparing different categories of chemical weapons stocks. The comparison of lethal and harmful chemicals remains unresolved and is subject to further consideration.

2/ Some delegations expressed the view that the question of the regulation of the destruction of stockpiles needs further and full discussion.

3/ It has been recognized that the destruction of chemical weapons stocks and the elimination of relevant production facilities should be considered together.

4/ Some delegations feel that it would be appropriate to introduce the idea of security stockpile levels to meet the security concerns of countries with small stockpiles of chemical weapons.

5/ Some delegations drew attention to the proposal contained in CD/822 of 29 March 1988. This proposal is aimed at ensuring the undiminished security of all States during the destruction stage. To this end, it proceeds from the basic undertaking that all CW production shall cease immediately upon entry into force of the Convention and that all chemical weapons storage sites as well as production facilities will be subject from the outset to systematic international on-site verification.

Taking account of existing discrepancies in CW stocks it suggests a specific phased approach, according to which State Parties with large CW stocks are to proceed with the destruction of their stockpile until an agreed level is reached in the first phase. In their view, it is only after the end of this first phase, which would result at the end of the fifth year in the levelling out of the large CW stockpiles, that State Parties with smaller stockpiles would be required to start with the destruction of their stocks. The whole two phased destruction period would be subject to close monitoring.

V. INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION OF THE DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

1. The purpose of verification of destruction of chemical weapons shall be:

- to confirm the identity and quantity of the chemical weapons stocks to be destroyed, and
- to confirm that these stocks for all practical purposes have been destroyed.

2. General plans for destruction of chemical weapons

The general plan for destruction of chemical weapons, submitted pursuant to Article IV shall specify:

(a) a general schedule for destruction, giving types and quantities of chemical weapons planned to be destroyed in each period;

(b) the number of chemical weapons destruction facilities existing or planned, to be operated over the 10 years destruction period;

(c) for each existing or planned chemical weapons destruction facility:

- name and address;
- location;
- chemical weapons intended to be destroyed;
- method of destruction;
- capacity;
- expected period of operation;
- products of the destruction process.

3. Detailed plans for destruction of chemical weapons

The detailed plans submitted pursuant to Article IV, six months before each destruction period, shall specify:

(a) the aggregate quantity of each individual type of chemical weapons planned to be destroyed at each facility;

(b) the number of chemical weapons destruction facilities and a detailed schedule for the destruction of chemical weapons at each of these facilities;

(c) data about each destruction facility,

- name, postal address, geographical location;
- method of destruction;
- end-products;

- layout plan of the facility;
- technological scheme;
- operation manuals;
- the system of verification;
- safety measures in force at the facility;
- living and working conditions for the International Inspectors.

(d) data about any storage facility at the destruction facility planned to provide chemical weapons directly to it during the destruction period,

- layout plan of the facility;
- method and volume of storage estimated by types and quantities of chemical weapons;
- types and quantities of chemical weapons to be stored at the facility during the destruction period;
- safety measures in force at the facility.

(e) After the submission of the first detailed plans, subsequent annual plans should contain only changes and additions to required data elements submitted in the first detailed plans.

4. Review of detailed plans for the destruction of chemical weapons

(a) On the basis of the detailed plan for destruction and proposed measures for verification submitted by the State Party, and as the case may be, on experience from previous inspections and on the relevant agreement(s) on subsidiary arrangements, the Technical Secretariat shall prepare before each destruction period, a plan for verifying the destruction of chemical weapons, consulting closely with the State Party. Any differences between the Technical Secretariat and the State Party should be resolved through consultations. Any unresolved matters shall be forwarded to the Executive Council for appropriate action with a view to facilitating the full implementation of the Convention.

(b) The agreed combined detailed plans for destruction and verification plans, with an appropriate recommendation by the Technical Secretariat, will be forwarded to the members of the Executive Council for review. The members of the Executive Council shall review the plans with a view to approving them, consistent with verification objectives. This review is designed to determine that the destruction of chemical weapons, as planned, is consistent with the obligations under the Convention and the objective of destroying the chemical weapons. It should also confirm that verification schemes for destruction are consistent with verification objectives, and are efficient and workable. This review should be completed 60 days before the destruction period.

(c) Each member of the Executive Council may consult with the Technical Secretariat on any issues regarding the adequacy of the combined plan for destruction and verification. If there are no objections by any members of the Executive Council, the plan shall be put into action.

(d) If there are any difficulties, the Executive Council shall enter into consultations with the State Party to reconcile them. If any difficulties remain unresolved they should be referred to the Conference of the States Parties.

(e) After a review of the detailed plans of destruction of chemical weapons, the Technical Secretariat, if the need arises, will enter into consultation with the State Party concerned in order to ensure its chemical weapons destruction facility(ies) is (are) designed to assure destruction of chemical weapons, to allow advanced planning on how verification measures may be applied and to ensure that the application of verification measures is consistent with proper facility(ies) operation, and that the facility(ies) operation allows appropriate verification.

(f) Destruction and verification should proceed according to the agreed plan as referred to above. Such verification should not interfere with the destruction process.

5. Agreements on subsidiary arrangements

For each destruction facility, States Parties should conclude with the Organization detailed agreements on subsidiary arrangements for the systematic verification of destruction of chemical weapons. Such agreements shall be based on a Model Agreement and shall specify, for each destruction facility, the detailed on-site inspection procedures and arrangements for the removal of chemical weapons from the storage facility at the destruction facility, transport from this storage facility to their destruction and the monitoring by on-site instruments, taking into account the specific characteristics of the destruction facility and its mode of operation. The Model Agreement shall include provisions to take into account the need for maintenance and modifications.

6. International Inspectors will be granted access to each chemical weapons destruction facility [30 days] prior to commencement of active destruction phases for the purpose of carrying out an engineering review of the facility, including the facility's construction and layout, the equipment and instruments for measuring and controlling the destruction process, and the checking and testing of the accuracy of the verification equipment.

7. Systematic international on-site verification of destruction of chemical weapons

(a) The Inspectors will be granted access to conduct their activities at the chemical weapons destruction facilities and the chemical weapons storage facilities thereat during the entire active phase of destruction. They will conduct their activities in the presence and with the co-operation of representatives of the facility's management and the National Authority if they wish to be present.

(b) The Inspectors may monitor by either physical observation or devices:

- (i) the chemical weapons storage facility at the destruction facility and the chemical weapons present;
- (ii) the movement of chemical weapons from the storage facility to the destruction facility;
- (iii) the process of destruction (assuring that no chemical weapons are diverted);
- (iv) the material balance; and
- (v) the accuracy and calibration of the instruments.

(c) To the extent consistent with verification needs, verification procedures should make use of information from routine facility operations.

(d) After the completion of each period of destruction, the Technical Secretariat shall certify the declaration of the National Authority, reporting the completion of destruction of the designated quantity of chemical weapons.

(e) International Inspectors shall, in accordance with agreements on subsidiary arrangements:

- have unimpeded access to all parts of the destruction facilities, and the storage facilities thereat, any munitions, devices, bulk containers, or other containers, therein. While conducting their activity, Inspectors shall comply with the safety regulations at these facilities. The items to be inspected will be chosen by the Inspectors in accordance with the verification plan that has been agreed to by the State Party and approved by the Executive Council;
- bring with them and use such agreed instruments as may be necessary for the completion of their tasks;
- monitor the systematic on-site analysis of samples during the destruction process;
- receive, if necessary, samples taken at their request from any devices, bulk containers and other containers at the destruction facility or the storage facility thereat. Such samples will be taken and analysed by representatives of the State Party in the presence of the Inspectors;
- communicate freely with the Technical Secretariat;
- if necessary, transfer samples for analysis off-site at a laboratory designated by the Organization, 1/ in accordance with agreed procedures;

1/ The designation of the organ of the Organization that will be entrusted with this task will be considered further and specified in the text.

- ensure, in accordance with agreed procedures, that samples transported, stored and processed are not tampered with;
- afford the opportunity to the host State Party to be present when samples are analysed.

(f) The State Party receiving the inspection shall, in accordance with agreed procedures:

- have the right to accompany the International Inspectors at all times during the inspection and observe all their verification activities at the destruction facility, and the storage facility thereat;
- have the right to retain duplicates of all samples taken at the Inspectors' request and be present when samples are analysed;
- have the right to inspect any agreed standard instrument used or installed by the International Inspectors and to have it tested in the presence of its personnel;
- provide assistance to the International Inspectors, upon their request, for the installation of seals or monitoring devices and the analysis of samples on-site as appropriate to the monitoring of the destruction process;
- receive copies of the reports on inspections of its destruction facility(ies);
- receive copies, at its request, of the information and data gathered about its destruction facility(ies) by the Technical Secretariat.

(g) If Inspectors detect irregularities which may give rise to doubts they will report the irregularities to the representatives of the facility and the National Authority and request that the situation be resolved. Uncorrected irregularities will be reported to the Executive Council.

(h) After each inspection to the destruction facility, International Inspectors shall submit a report with their findings to the (Director-General of the) Technical Secretariat which will transmit a copy of this report to the State Party having received the inspection.

8. Chemical weapons storage facilities at chemical weapons destruction facilities

(a) International Inspectors shall verify any arrival of chemical weapons at a chemical weapons storage facility at a chemical weapons destruction facility, as referred to in paragraph 6 (d) of section II of this Annex, and the storing of these chemical weapons. They shall employ, as appropriate, agreed seals, markers or other inventory control procedures to facilitate an accurate inventory of the chemical weapons in this storage facility. They shall install such agreed seals as may be necessary to verify that stocks are removed only for destruction.

(b) As soon and as long as chemical weapons are stored at chemical weapons storage facilities at chemical weapons destruction facilities, these storage facilities shall be subject to international systematic monitoring, as referred to in relevant provisions of paragraph 5 of section II of the present Annex, in conformity with the relevant agreements on subsidiary arrangements or, if no such agreement has been concluded, with the agreed combined plan for destruction and verification.

(c) The International Inspectors will make any appropriate adjustments in the monitoring system in accordance with the relevant agreement on subsidiary arrangements whenever inventory changes occur.

(d) At the end of an active destruction phase, International Inspectors will make an inventory of the chemical weapons that have been removed from the storage facility to be destroyed. They shall verify the accuracy of the inventory of the chemical weapons remaining employing inventory control procedures as referred to above under (a). They shall install such agreed seals as may be necessary to ensure the securing of the storage facility.

(e) The international systematic monitoring of a chemical weapons storage facility at a chemical weapons destruction facility may be discontinued when the active destruction phase is completed, if no chemical weapons remain. If, in addition, no chemical weapons are planned to be stored at this facility, the international systematic monitoring shall be terminated in accordance with section II, paragraph 5 (g) of this Annex.

ANNEX TO ARTICLE V

I. DECLARATIONS AND REPORTS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES

A. Declarations of chemical weapons production facilities

The declaration should contain for each facility:

1. Name and exact location.
2. Ownership, operation, control, who ordered and procured the facility.
3. Designation of each facility:
 - (a) Facility for producing chemicals defined as chemical weapons.
 - (b) Facility for filling chemical weapons.
4. Products of each facility and dates that they were produced:
 - (a) Chemicals produced.
 - (b) Munitions or devices filled, identity of chemical fill.
5. Capacity of the facility, expressed in terms of:
 - (a) The quantity of end-product that the facility can produce in (period), assuming the facility operates (schedule).
 - (b) The quantity of chemical that the facility can fill into each type of munition or device in (period), assuming that the facility operates (schedule).
6. Detailed facility description:
 - (a) Layout of the facility.
 - (b) Process flow diagram.
 - (c) Detailed inventory of equipment, buildings and any spare or replacement parts on site.
 - (d) Quantities of any chemicals or munitions on site.

B. Declarations of former chemical weapons production facilities ^{1/}

The declaration should contain for each facility:

1. All information as in paragraph A, above, that pertains to the operation of the facility as a chemical weapons facility.

^{1/} All provisions dealing with "former" chemical weapons production facilities need to be reviewed once the definition of chemical weapons production facilities is agreed. In this connection, how to deal with chemical weapons production facilities that have previously been destroyed should also be discussed.

2. Date chemical weapons production ceased.
 3. Current status of special equipment that was used for chemical weapons production.
 4. Dates of conversion from CW use, date of beginning of non-CW use.
 5. Current ownership, operation and control.
 6. Current production, stating types and quantities of product(s).
 7. Current capacity of the facility, expressed in terms of the quantity of end-product that can be produced in (period), assuming the facility operates (schedule).
 8. Current detailed facility description:
 - (a) Layout of the facility.
 - (b) Process flow diagram.
 - (c) Location of any CW-specific equipment remaining on-site.
 - (d) Quantities of any chemical weapons remaining on-site.
- C. Declarations of chemical weapons production facilities under the control of others on the territory of the State Party
- Responsibility for declarations (to be discussed).
 - All elements contained in part IA of this Annex should be declared.
- D. Declarations of former chemical weapons production facilities under the control of others on the territory of the State Party ^{1/}
- Responsibility for declarations (to be discussed).
 - All elements contained in part IB of this Annex should be declared.
- E. Declarations of transfers
1. Chemical weapons production equipment means (to be developed).
 2. The declaration should specify:
 - (a) who received/transferred chemical weapons production equipment [and technical documentation];

^{1/} All provisions dealing with "former" chemical weapons production facilities need to be reviewed once the definition of chemical weapons production facilities is agreed. In this connection, how to deal with chemical weapons production facilities that have been previously destroyed should also be discussed.

(b) the identity of the equipment;

(c) date of transfer;

(d) whether the chemical weapons production equipment [and documentation] were eliminated, if known;

(e) current disposition, if known.

F. Declarations of measures to ensure closure of:

1. Facilities under the jurisdiction or control of the State Party (to be developed).
2. Facilities on the State Party's territory under the control of others (to be developed).

G. Annual Reports (to be developed)

H. Final Certification of Destruction (to be developed)

II. PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES

A. General

Each State Party shall decide on methods to be applied for the destruction 1/ of its chemical weapons production facilities, according to the principles laid down in Article V and in this Annex. 2/

B. Closure and methods for closing the facility

1. The purpose of the closure of a chemical weapons production facility is to render it inoperable as such.
2. Agreed measures for closure will be taken by the State Party with due regard to the specific characteristics of each facility. Such measures shall include, inter alia: 3/
 - prohibition of occupation of buildings except for agreed activities;
 - disconnection of equipment directly related to the production of chemical weapons to include, inter alia, process control equipment and utilities;

1/ Further discussion is needed of possible methods of destruction and of related definitions.

2/ The responsibility for carrying out measures when more than one State is involved needs to be discussed.

3/ The activities and items in these measures will need further elaboration and discussion in light of methods of destruction and characteristics of specific facilities.

- disabling of protective installations and equipment used exclusively for the safety of operations of the chemical weapons production facility;
- interruption of rail and other roads to the chemical weapons production facility except those required for agreed activities.

3. While the chemical weapons production facility remains closed, the State Party may continue safety activities at the facility.

C. Activities related to destruction

1. Destruction of equipment covered by the definition of a "chemical weapons production facility"

- All specialized and standard equipment shall be physically destroyed.
- "Specialized equipment" is:
 - . the main production train, including any reactor or equipment for product synthesis, separation or purification, any equipment used directly for heat transfer in the final technological stage (for example, in reactors or in product separation), as well as any other equipment which has been in contact with any Schedule 1 chemical, or any other chemical that has no use for permitted purposes above ... kilograms per year but can be used for chemical weapons purposes, or would be if the facility were operated.
 - . any chemical weapon filling machines.
 - . any other equipment specially designed, built or installed for the operation of the facility as a chemical weapons production facility, as distinct from a facility constructed according to prevailing commercial industry standards for facilities not producing super-toxic lethal or corrosive chemicals. (Examples include equipment made of high-nickel alloys or other special corrosion-resistant material; special equipment for waste control, waste treatment, air filtering, or solvent recovery; special containment enclosures and safety shields; non-standard laboratory equipment used to analyse toxic chemicals for chemical weapons purposes; custom-designed process control panels; dedicated spares for specialized equipment.)
- "Standard equipment" includes:
 - . production equipment which is generally used in the chemical industry and is not included in the types of "specialized equipment";
 - . other equipment commonly used in the chemical industry, such as fire-fighting equipment, guard and security/safety surveillance equipment, medical facilities, laboratory facilities, communications equipment.

2. Destruction of buildings covered by the definition of a "chemical weapons production facility"

- The word "building" shall include underground structures.
- All specialized and standard buildings shall be physically destroyed.
- "Specialized building" is:
 - . any building containing specialized equipment in a production or filling configuration;
 - . any building which has distinctive features which distinguish it from buildings normally used for chemical production or filling activities not banned by the convention.
- "Standard buildings" means buildings constructed to prevailing industry standards for facilities not producing super-toxic lethal or corrosive chemicals.

3. Facilities for producing unfilled chemical munitions and specialized equipment for chemical weapons employment

- Facilities used exclusively for production of: (a) non-chemical parts for chemical munitions or (b) specialized equipment for chemical weapons employment, shall be declared and eliminated. The elimination process and its verification should be conducted according to the provisions of Article V that govern destruction of chemical weapons production facilities.
- All equipment designed or used exclusively for producing non-chemical parts for chemical munitions shall be physically destroyed. Such equipment, which includes specially-designed moulds and metal-forming dies, may be brought to a special location for destruction. International Inspectors shall be present during the destruction process.
- All buildings and standard equipment used for such production activities shall be converted to permitted purposes, with confirmation as necessary through consultations or challenge inspection.
- Permitted activities may continue while destruction or conversion proceeds.

D. Activities related to temporary conversion to destruction facility
(to be developed)

E. Activities related to former chemical weapons production facilities 1/

1/ All provisions dealing with "former" chemical weapons production facilities need to be reviewed once the definition of chemical weapons production facilities is agreed. In this connection, how to deal with chemical weapons production facilities that have previously been destroyed should also be discussed.

III. ORDER OF DESTRUCTION (to be developed)

IV. PLANS

A. General Plans

1. For each facility the following information should be supplied:
 - (a) envisaged time-frame for measures to be taken;
 - (b) methods of destruction.
2. In relation to temporary conversion into chemical weapons destruction facility:
 - (i) envisaged time-frame for conversion into a destruction facility;
 - (ii) envisaged time for utilizing the facility as a destruction facility;
 - (iii) description of the new facility;
 - (iv) method of destruction of special equipment;
 - (v) time-frame for destruction of the converted facility after it has been utilized to destroy chemical weapons;
 - (vi) method of destruction of the converted facility.
3. In relation to former chemical weapons production facilities (to be elaborated). 1/

B. Detailed plans

1. The detailed plans for destruction of each facility should contain:
 - (a) detailed time schedule of destruction process;
 - (b) layout of the facility;
 - (c) process flow diagram;
 - (d) detailed inventory of equipment, buildings and other items to be destroyed;
 - (e) measures to be applied to each item on the inventory;
 - (f) proposed measures for verification;

1/ All provisions dealing with "former" chemical weapons production facilities need to be reviewed once the definition of chemical weapons production facilities is agreed. In this connection, how to deal with chemical weapons production facilities that have previously been destroyed should also be discussed.

(g) security/safety measures to be observed during the destruction of the facility;

(h) working and living conditions to be provided for International Inspectors.

2. In relation to the temporary conversion into a chemical weapons destruction facility.

In addition to the information contained in part IV.B.1 of this Annex the following information should be provided:

(i) method of conversion into a destruction facility;

(ii) data on the destruction facility, in accordance with the Annex to Article IV, part V.3.(c) and (d).

3. In relation to destruction of a facility that was temporarily converted for destruction of chemical weapons, information should be provided in accordance with part IV.B.1 of this Annex.

4. In relation to former chemical weapons production facilities. 1/

V. INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION OF DECLARATIONS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND THEIR CLOSURE, INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMATIC MONITORING, INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMATIC VERIFICATION OF DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITIES 2/

1. International verification of declarations of chemical weapons production facilities and of cessation of their activities

(a) International verification by initial on-site inspections

(i) The purpose of the international verification of declarations of chemical weapons production facilities shall be:

- to confirm that all activity has ceased except that required for closure;
- to confirm through on-site inspections the accuracy of the declarations made in accordance with Article V.

1/ All provisions dealing with "former" chemical weapons production facilities need to be reviewed once the definition of chemical weapons production facilities is agreed. In this connection, how to deal with chemical weapons production facilities that have previously been destroyed should also be discussed.

2/ This Section of this Annex will require further discussion and elaboration upon resolution of the definitions of chemical weapons, chemical weapons production facilities, and methods of destruction.

- (ii) The International Inspectors shall conduct this initial verification promptly, and in any event not later than [60] days after a declaration is submitted.
 - (iii) They shall employ, as appropriate, agreed seals, markers or other inventory control procedures to facilitate an accurate inventory of the declared items at each chemical weapons production facility.
 - (iv) International Inspectors shall install such agreed devices as may be necessary to indicate if any resumption of production of chemical weapons occurs or if any declared item is removed. They shall take the necessary precaution not to hinder closure activities by the State Party. International Inspectors may return to maintain and verify the integrity of the devices.
- (b) Co-ordination for international systematic monitoring of chemical weapons production facilities

In conjunction with the initial on-site inspections to verify declarations of chemical weapons production facilities, the International Inspectors shall undertake necessary co-ordination for measures of systematic monitoring of these facilities as provided for in paragraph 4, below.

2. Agreements on subsidiary arrangements 1/

(a) Within [6] months after entry into force of the Convention, States Parties shall conclude with the Organization detailed agreements on subsidiary arrangements for the systematic monitoring of their chemical weapons production facilities. Such agreements shall be based on a Model Agreement and shall specify for each production facility the detailed inspection procedures and arrangements for the installation, operation and maintenance of the seals and monitoring devices by the Technical Secretariat, taking into account the specific characteristics of each facility. The Model Agreement shall include provisions to take into account future technological developments.

(b) States Parties shall ensure that the verification of declarations of chemical weapons production facilities and the initiation of systematic monitoring can be accomplished by the Technical Secretariat at all such facilities within the agreed time-frames after the Convention enters into force. 2/

1/ The coverage of the subsidiary arrangements is to be discussed.

2/ Procedures to ensure the implementation of the verification scheme within designated time-frames are to be developed.

3. International verification of closure of chemical weapons production facilities

Subsequent to the on-site verification of declarations as referred to in paragraph 1, the International Inspectors shall conduct on-site inspections at each chemical weapons production facility for the purpose of verifying that measures referred to under (II.B.2) have been accomplished.

4. International systematic monitoring of chemical weapons production facilities

(a) The purpose of the international systematic monitoring of a chemical weapons production facility shall be to ensure that no resumption of production of chemical weapons nor removal of declared items would go undetected at this facility.

(b) The international systematic monitoring shall be initiated as soon as possible after the closure of the chemical weapons production facility and shall continue until this facility is destroyed. Systematic monitoring shall be ensured, in accordance with the agreements on subsidiary arrangements, through a combination of continuous monitoring with on-site instruments and systematic verification by international on-site inspections or, where the continuous monitoring with on-site instruments is not feasible, by the presence of International Inspectors.

(c) In conjunction with the on-site verification of the closure of chemical weapons production facilities referred to in paragraph 4 above and, if the relevant agreement on subsidiary arrangements for the systematic monitoring of a chemical weapons production facility has been concluded, International Inspectors shall install for the purpose of this systematic monitoring a monitoring system as referred to under (e) below. If no such agreement has been concluded, the International Inspectors will initiate the systematic monitoring by their continuous presence on-site until the agreement is concluded, and the monitoring system installed and activated.

(d) In the period before the activation of the monitoring system and at other times when the continuous monitoring with on-site instruments is not feasible, devices installed by International Inspectors, in accordance with paragraph 1 above, may only be removed in the presence of an International Inspector. If an extraordinary event results in, or requires, the removal of a device when an Inspector is not present, a State Party shall immediately inform the Technical Secretariat and International Inspectors will return as soon as possible to validate the inventory and re-establish the devices.

(e) Monitoring with instruments

(i) For the purpose of the systematic monitoring of a chemical weapons production facility, International Inspectors will install, in the presence of host country personnel and in conformity with the relevant agreement on subsidiary arrangements, a monitoring system consisting of, inter alia, sensors, ancillary equipment and transmission systems. The agreed types of these instruments shall be specified in the Model Agreement. They shall incorporate, inter alia, seals and other tamper-indicating and tamper-resistant devices as well as data protection and data authentication features.

- (ii) The monitoring system shall have such abilities and be installed, adjusted or directed in such a way as to correspond strictly and efficiently to the sole purpose of detecting prohibited or unauthorized activities within the chemical weapons production facility as referred to above under (a). The coverage of the monitoring system shall be limited accordingly. The monitoring system will signal the Technical Secretariat if any tampering with its components or interference with its functioning occurs. Redundancy shall be built into the monitoring system to ensure that failure of an individual component will not jeopardize the monitoring capability of the system.
- (iii) When the monitoring system is activated, International Inspectors will verify the accuracy of the inventory of declared items at each chemical weapons production facility as required.
- (iv) Data will be transmitted from each production facility to the Technical Secretariat by (means to be determined). The transmission system will incorporate frequent transmissions from the production facility and a query and response system between the production facility and the Technical Secretariat. International Inspectors shall periodically check the proper functioning of the monitoring system.
- (v) In the event that the monitoring system indicates any irregularity, the International Inspectors would immediately determine whether this resulted from equipment malfunction or activities at the production facility. If, after this examination the problem remained unresolved, the Technical Secretariat would immediately ascertain the actual situation, including through immediate on-site inspection or visit of the production facility if necessary. The Technical Secretariat shall report any such problem immediately after its detection to the State Party who should assist in its resolution.
- (vi) The State Party shall immediately notify the Technical Secretariat if an event at the production facility occurs, or may occur, which may have an impact on the monitoring system. The State Party shall co-ordinate subsequent actions with the Technical Secretariat with a view to restoring the operation of the monitoring system and establishing interim measures, if necessary, as soon as possible.
- (f) Systematic on-site inspections and visits
 - (i) During each inspection, the International Inspectors will verify that the monitoring system is functioning correctly and verify the declared inventory as required. In addition, visits to service the monitoring system will be required to perform any necessary maintenance or replacement of equipment, or to adjust the coverage of the monitoring system as required.
 - (ii) (The guidelines for determining the frequency of systematic on-site inspections are to be elaborated.) The particular production facility to be inspected shall be chosen by the Technical Secretariat in such a way as to preclude the prediction of precisely when the facility is to be inspected.

5. International verification of destruction of chemical weapons production facilities

(a) The purpose of international verification of destruction of chemical weapons production facilities shall be to confirm that the facility is destroyed as such in accordance with the obligations under the Convention and that each item on the declared inventory is destroyed in accordance with the agreed detailed plan for destruction.

(b) [3-6] months before destruction of a chemical weapons production facility, a State Party shall provide to the Technical Secretariat the detailed plans for destruction to include proposed measures for verification of destruction referred to in Section IV.B.1 (f) of the present Annex, with respect to, e.g.:

- timing of the presence of the Inspectors at the facility to be destroyed;
- procedures for verification of measures to be applied to each item on the declared inventory;
- measures for phasing out systematic monitoring or for adjustment of the coverage of the monitoring system.

(c) On the basis of the detailed plan for destruction and proposed measures for verification submitted by the State Party, and on experience from previous inspections, the Technical Secretariat shall prepare a plan for verifying the destruction of the facility, consulting closely with the State Party. Any differences between the Technical Secretariat and the State Party concerning appropriate measures should be resolved through consultations. Any unresolved matters shall be forwarded to the Executive Council 1/ for appropriate action with a view to facilitating the full implementation of the Convention.

(d) To ensure that the provisions of Article V and this Annex are fulfilled, the combined plans for destruction and verification shall be agreed upon between the Executive Council and the State Party. This agreement should be completed [60] days before the planned initiation of destruction.

(e) Each member of the Executive Council may consult with the Technical Secretariat on any issues regarding the adequacy of the combined plan for destruction and verification. If there are no objections by any members of the Executive Council, the plan shall be put into action.

(f) If there are any difficulties, the Executive Council should enter into consultations with the State Party to reconcile them. If any difficulties remain unresolved they should be referred to the Conference of the States Parties. The resolution of any differences over methods of destruction should not delay the execution of other parts of the destruction plan that are acceptable.

1/ The role of the Executive Council in the review process will need to be reviewed in the light of its composition and decision-making process.

(g) If agreement is not reached with the Executive Council on aspects of verification, or if the approved verification plan cannot be put into action, verification of destruction will proceed by the continuous on-site monitoring and presence of Inspectors.

(h) Destruction and verification should proceed according to the agreed plan. The verification should not unduly interfere with the destruction process and should be conducted through the presence of on-site Inspectors to witness the destruction. 1/

(i) If required verification or destruction actions are not taken as planned, all States Parties should be so informed. (Procedures to be developed.)

(j) For those items that may be diverted for permitted purposes. 2/

(k) When all items on the declared inventory have been destroyed, the Technical Secretariat shall certify, in writing, the declaration of the State Party to that effect. After this certification, the Technical Secretariat shall terminate the international systematic monitoring of the chemical weapons production facility and will promptly remove all devices and monitoring equipment installed by the International Inspectors.

(l) After this certification, the State Party will make the declaration that the facility has been destroyed.

6. International verification of temporary conversion of a chemical weapons production facility into a chemical weapons destruction facility

(to be elaborated)

7. Inspections and visits

(a) The (Director-General of the) Technical Secretariat shall notify the State Party of its decision to inspect or visit a chemical weapons production facility 48 hours prior to the planned arrival of the inspection team at the facility for systematic inspections or visits. In the event of inspections or visits to resolve urgent problems, this period may be shortened. The (Director-General of the) Technical Secretariat shall specify the purpose(s) of the inspection or visit.

(b) A State Party shall make any necessary preparations for the arrival of the Inspectors and shall ensure their expeditious transportation from their point of entry on the territory of the State Party to the chemical weapons production facility. The agreement on subsidiary arrangements will specify administrative arrangements for Inspectors.

1/ This verification measure may not necessarily be the only one and others, as appropriate, may need to be further elaborated.

2/ Specification of the items, permitted purposes and methods of verification of disposition will need to be elaborated.

(c) International Inspectors shall, in accordance with agreements on subsidiary arrangements:

- have unimpeded access to all parts of the chemical weapons production facilities. While conducting their activity, Inspectors shall comply with the safety regulations at the facility. The items on the declared inventory to be inspected will be chosen by the Inspectors;
- bring with them and use such agreed instruments as may be necessary for the completion of their tasks;
- communicate freely with the Technical Secretariat.

(d) The State Party receiving the inspection shall, in accordance with agreed procedures:

- have the right to accompany the International Inspectors at all times during the inspection and observe all their verification activities at the chemical weapons production facility;
- have the right to inspect any instrument used or installed by the International Inspectors and to have it tested in the presence of State Party personnel;
- provide assistance to the International Inspectors upon their request for the installation of the monitoring system;
- receive copies of the reports on inspections of its chemical weapons production facility(ies);
- receive copies, at its request, of the information and data gathered about its chemical weapons production facility(ies) by the Technical Secretariat.

(e) The International Inspectors 1/ may request clarification of any ambiguities arising from the inspection. In the event that any ambiguities arise which cannot be resolved in the course of the inspections, the Inspectors shall inform the (Director-General of the) Technical Secretariat immediately.

(f) After each inspection or visit to the chemical weapons production facility, International Inspectors shall submit a report with their findings to the (Director-General of the) Technical Secretariat which will transmit a copy of this report to the State Party having received the inspection or visit.

1/ The question of whether or not an individual Inspector shall have the rights set out in this and the following paragraph remains open.

ANNEX 1 TO ARTICLE VI

Régime for chemicals on Schedule 1

GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. A State Party shall not produce, acquire, retain, transfer or use chemicals in Schedule 1 unless:

- (i) the chemicals are applied to research, medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes, and
- (ii) the types and quantities of chemicals are strictly limited to those which can be justified for such purposes, and
- (iii) the aggregate amount of such chemicals at any given time for such purposes is equal to or less than one metric tonne, and
- (iv) the aggregate amount for such purposes acquired by a State Party in any calendar year through production, withdrawal from chemical weapons stocks and transfer is equal to or less than one metric tonne.

TRANSFERS

2. A State Party may transfer chemicals in Schedule 1 outside its territory only to another State Party and only for research, medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes in accordance with paragraph 1.

3. Chemicals transferred shall not be retransferred to a third State.

4. Thirty days prior to any transfer to another State Party both States Parties shall notify the Technical Secretariat.

5. Each State Party shall make a detailed annual declaration regarding transfers during the previous calendar year. The declaration shall be submitted within ... months after the end of that year and shall for each chemical in Schedule 1 include the following information:

- (i) the chemical name, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts Service Registry Number (if assigned);
- (ii) the quantity acquired from other States or transferred to other States Parties. For each transfer the quantity, recipient and purpose should be included.

PRODUCTION

1. Each State Party which produces chemicals in Schedule 1 for research, medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes shall carry out the production at a single small-scale facility approved by the State Party, the only exceptions being those set forth in paragraphs 2 and 3 below.

The production at a single small-scale facility shall be carried out in reaction vessels not designed for continuous operation with a volume not in excess of [10] [100] litres.

2. (a) Production of Schedule 1 chemicals in aggregate quantities not exceeding 10 kg per year may be carried out for protective purposes at one facility outside a single small-scale facility.

(b) Production of Schedule 1 chemicals in quantities of more than 100 g per year may be carried out for research, medical or pharmaceutical purposes outside a single small-scale facility in aggregate quantities not exceeding 10 kg per year per facility. 1/

Such facilities shall be approved by the State Party.

3. Synthesis of Schedule 1 chemicals for research, medical or pharmaceutical purposes, but not for protective purposes, may be carried out at laboratories 2/ [approved by the State Party] in aggregate quantities less than 100 g per year per facility. 3/

SINGLE SMALL-SCALE FACILITY

I. Declarations

A. Initial declarations

Each State Party which plans to operate such a facility shall provide the Technical Secretariat with the location and a detailed technical description of the facility, including an inventory of equipment and detailed diagrams. For existing facilities, this information shall be provided not later than 30 days after the Convention enters into force for the State Party. Information on new facilities shall be provided six months before operations are to begin.

1/ A view was expressed that ultratoxic substances (to be determined) shall not be allowed to be produced in excess of 10 g per year.

2/ A view was expressed that if so requested by the Technical Secretariat detailed information shall be submitted.

3/ The question whether transfer of Schedule 1 chemicals from a laboratory should be permitted or not needs further discussion.

B. Advance notifications

Each State Party shall give advance notification to the Technical Secretariat of planned changes related to the initial declaration. The notification shall be submitted not later than ... months before the changes are to take place.

C. Annual declarations

(a) Each State Party possessing a facility shall make a detailed annual declaration regarding the activities of the facility for the previous calendar year. The declaration shall be submitted within ... months after the end of that year and shall include:

1. Identification of the facility
2. For each chemical in Schedule 1 produced, acquired, consumed or stored at the facility, the following information:
 - (i) the chemical name, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts Service Registry Number (if assigned);
 - (ii) the methods employed and quantity produced;
 - (iii) the name and quantity of precursor chemicals listed in Schedules 1, 2, Part A or 3 used for production of chemicals in Schedule 1;
 - (iv) the quantity consumed at the facility and the purpose(s) of the consumption;
 - (v) the quantity received from or shipped to other facilities within the State Party. For each shipment the quantity, recipient and purpose should be included;
 - (vi) the maximum quantity stored at any time during the year;
 - (vii) the quantity stored at the end of the year.
3. Information on any changes at the facility during the year compared to previously submitted detailed technical descriptions of the facility including inventories of equipment and detailed diagrams.

(b) Each State Party possessing a facility shall make a detailed annual declaration regarding the projected activities and the anticipated production at the facility for the coming calendar year. The declaration shall be submitted not later than ... months before the beginning of that year and shall include:

1. Identification of the facility

2. For each chemical in Schedule 1 produced, consumed or stored at the facility, the following information:
 - (i) the chemical name, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts Service Registry Number (if assigned);
 - (ii) the quantity anticipated to be produced and the purpose of the production.
3. Information on any anticipated changes at the facility during the year compared to previously submitted detailed technical descriptions of the facility including inventories of equipment and detailed diagrams.

II. Verification

1. The aim of verification activities at the facility shall be to verify that the quantities of Schedule 1 chemicals produced are correctly declared and, in particular, that their aggregate amount does not exceed one metric tonne.
2. The single small-scale facility shall be subject to systematic international on-site verification, through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments.
3. The number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of inspections for a particular facility shall be based on the risk to the objectives of the Convention posed by the relevant chemicals, the characteristics of the facility and the nature of the activities carried out there. The guidelines to be used shall include: (to be developed).
4. Each facility shall receive an initial visit from international inspectors promptly after the facility is declared. The purpose of the initial visit shall be to verify information provided concerning the facility, including verification that the reaction vessels are not designed for continuous operation and that they do not have a volume in excess of [10] [100] litres. The purpose of the initial visit shall also be to obtain any additional information needed for planning future verification activities at the facility, including inspection visits and use of on-site instruments.

5. Within [3] [6] [12] 1/2/ months after the entry into force of the Convention each State Party possessing a facility shall conclude an agreement, 3/ based on a model for an agreement, with the Organization, covering detailed inspection procedures for the facility. 4/

Each State Party planning to establish such a facility after the entry into force of the Convention shall conclude an agreement with the Organization before the facility begins operation or is used.

Each agreement shall include: (to be developed).

1/ The view was expressed that the time periods for conclusion of arrangements for different types of facility subject to inspection under the Convention should be rationalized.

2/ A view was expressed that in light of the need for provisional inspection procedures, pending conclusion of the agreement, 12 months is an undue length of time.

3/ The view was expressed that negotiations on this agreement should commence immediately after the signing of the Convention.

4/ The view was expressed that pending conclusion of the agreement between a State Party and the Organization there would be a need for provisional inspection procedures to be formulated.

FACILITIES COVERED BY PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE SECTION ON PRODUCTION ABOVE

I. Declarations

A. Initial declarations

Each State Party shall provide the Technical Secretariat with the name, location and a detailed technical description of each facility or its relevant part(s) as requested by the Technical Secretariat. The facility producing Schedule 1 chemicals for protective purposes shall be specifically identified. For existing facilities, this information shall be provided not later than 30 days after the Convention enters into force for the State Party. Information on new facilities shall be provided not less than ... before operations are to begin.

B. Advance notifications

Each State Party shall give advance notification to the Technical Secretariat of planned changes related to the initial declaration. The notification shall be submitted not later than ... before the changes are to take place.

C. Annual declarations

(a) Each State Party shall, for each facility, make a detailed annual declaration regarding the activities of the facility for the previous calendar year. The declaration shall be submitted within ... months after the end of that year and shall include:

1. Identification of the facility
2. For each chemical in Schedule 1 the following information:
 - (i) the chemical name, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts Service Registry Number (if assigned);
 - (ii) the quantity produced;

and, in case of production for protective purposes, methods employed;
 - (iii) the name and quantity of precursor chemicals listed in Schedules 1, 2, Part A or 3 used for production of chemicals in Schedule 1;
 - (iv) the quantity consumed at the facility and the purpose of the consumption;
 - (v) the quantity transferred to other facilities within the State Party. For each transfer the quantity, recipient and purpose should be included;

(vi) the maximum quantity stored at any time during the year;

(vii) the quantity stored at the end of the year.

3. Information on any changes at the facility or its relevant part(s) during the year compared to previously submitted detailed technical description of the facility.

(b) Each State Party shall, for each facility, make a detailed annual declaration regarding the projected activities and the anticipated production at the facility for the coming calendar year. The declaration shall be submitted not later than ... before the beginning of that year and shall include:

1. Identification of the facility

2. For each chemical in Schedule 1 the following information:

(i) the chemical name, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts Service Registry Number (if assigned);

(ii) the quantity anticipated to be produced, the time period(s) when the production is anticipated to take place and the purposes of the production.

3. Information on any anticipated changes at the facility or its relevant part(s), during the year compared to previously submitted detailed technical descriptions of the facility.

II. Verification

1. The aim of verification activities at the facility shall be to verify that:

(i) the facility is not used to produce any chemical listed in Schedule 1, except for the declared chemical;

(ii) the quantities of the chemical listed in Schedule 1 produced, processed or consumed are correctly declared and consistent with needs for the declared purpose;

(iii) the chemical listed in Schedule 1 is not diverted or used for other purposes.

2. The facility shall be subject to systematic international on-site verification through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments.

3. The number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of inspections for a particular facility shall be based on the risk to the objectives of the Convention posed by the quantities of chemicals produced, the characteristics of the facility and the nature of the activities carried out there. The guidelines to be used shall include: (to be developed).

4. Each facility shall receive an initial visit from international inspectors promptly after the facility is declared. The purpose of the initial visit shall be to verify information provided concerning the facility, and to obtain any additional information needed for planning future verification activities at the facility, including inspection visits and use of on-site instruments.

5. Within [3] [6] [12] 1/2/ months after the entry into force of the Convention each State Party possessing such (a) facility (facilities) shall conclude (an) agreement(s), 3/ based on a model for an agreement, with the Organization, covering detailed inspection procedures for the facility (facilities). 4/

Each State Party planning to establish such a facility after the entry into force of the Convention shall conclude an agreement with the Organization before the facility begins operation or is used.

Each agreement shall include: (to be developed).

1/ The view was expressed that the time periods for conclusion of arrangements for different types of facility subject to inspection under the Convention should be rationalized.

2/ A view was expressed that in light of the need for provisional inspection procedures, pending conclusion of the agreement, 12 months is an undue length of time.

3/ The view was expressed that negotiations on this agreement should commence immediately after the signing of the Convention.

4/ The view was expressed that pending conclusion of the agreement between a State Party and the Organization there would be a need for provisional inspection procedures to be formulated.

ANNEX 2 TO ARTICLE VI

Régime 1/ for Chemicals on Schedule 2 Parts A and B

DECLARATIONS

The Initial and Annual Declarations to be provided by a State Party under paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article VI shall include:

1. Aggregate national data on the production, processing and consumption of each chemical listed in Schedule 2, and on the export and import of the chemicals in the previous calendar year with an indication of the countries involved.

2. The following information for each facility which, during the previous calendar year, produced, processed or consumed more than [] tonnes of the chemicals listed in Schedule 2 Part A or which produced 1/ at any time since ... a chemical in Schedule 2 for chemical weapons purposes: 2/

[The following information for each facility which, during the previous calendar year, produced, processed or consumed more than [10] [100] [1,000] kg of the chemicals listed in Schedule 2 part B.] 3/

Chemical(s)

- (i) The chemical name, common or trade name used by the facility, structural formula, and Chemical Abstracts Service Registry Number (if assigned).
- (ii) The total amount produced, consumed, imported and exported in the previous calendar year. 4/
- (iii) The purpose(s) for which the chemical(s) are produced, consumed or processed:
 - (a) conversion on-site (specify product type)
 - (b) sale or transfer to other domestic industry (specify final product type)

1/ A view was expressed that the question of quantitative thresholds would need to be discussed in this context.

2/ The placement in the Convention of the obligation to declare facilities which produced a chemical in Schedule 2 for chemical weapons purposes needs further consideration. A view was expressed that this obligation should be included in the Annex to Article V.

3/ The view was expressed that the same régime, including thresholds, should apply to both Schedule 2 A and 2 B. Some delegations also expressed the view that the thresholds should correspond to militarily significant quantities.

4/ Whether the total amount is to be expressed as an exact figure or within a range is to be discussed.

- (c) export (specify which country)
- (d) other.

Facility 1/ 2/

- (i) The name of the facility and of the owner, company, or enterprise operating the facility.
- (ii) The exact location of the facility (including the address, location of the complex, location of the facility within the complex including the specific building and structure number, if any).
- (iii) Whether the facility is dedicated to producing or processing the listed chemical or is multi-purpose.
- (iv) The main orientation (purpose) of the facility.
- (v) Whether the facility can readily be used to produce a Schedule 1 chemical or another Schedule 2 chemical. Relevant information should be provided, when applicable.
- (vi) The production capacity 3/ for the declared Schedule 2 chemical(s).
- (vii) Which of the following activities are performed with regard to the Schedule 2 chemicals:
 - (a) production
 - (b) processing with conversion into another chemical
 - (c) processing without chemical conversion
 - (d) other - specify.

1/ One delegation suggested that, in the case of a multi-purpose facility currently producing Schedule 2 chemicals, the following should be specified:

- general description of the products;
- detailed technological plan of the facility;
- list of special equipment included in the technological plan;
- type of waste treatment equipment;
- description of each final product (chemical name, chemical structure and register number);
- unit capacity for each product;
- use of each product.

2/ The view was expressed that a definition of a chemical production facility was needed and thus should be elaborated.

3/ How to define production capacity remains to be agreed upon. Some consultations with technical experts have taken place on this issue. A report on these consultations is enclosed in Appendix II to facilitate further work by delegations.

- (viii) Whether at any time during the previous calendar year declared chemicals were stored on-site in quantities greater than [] [tonnes].

Advance notifications

3. (a) Each State Party shall annually notify the Technical Secretariat of facilities which intend, during the coming calendar year, to produce, process or consume more than ... of any chemical listed in Schedule 2. The notification shall be submitted not later than ... months before the beginning of that year and shall for each facility include the following information:

- (i) The information specified under paragraph 2 above, except for quantitative information relating to the previous calendar year;
- (ii) For each chemical listed in Schedule 2 intended to be produced or processed, the total quantity intended to be produced or processed during the coming calendar year and the time period(s) when the production or processing is anticipated to take place.

(b) Each State Party shall notify the Technical Secretariat of any production, processing or consumption planned after the submission of the annual notification under paragraph 3 (a), not later than one month before the production or processing is anticipated to begin. The notification shall for each facility include the information specified under paragraph 3 (a).

Verification 1/

Aim

4. The aim of the measures stipulated in Article VI, paragraph 6 shall be to verify that:

- (i) Facilities declared under this Annex are not used to produce any chemical listed in Schedule 1. 2/
- (ii) The quantities of chemicals listed in Schedule 2 produced, processed or consumed are consistent with needs for purposes not prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention. 3/
- (iii) The chemicals listed in Schedule 2 are not diverted or used for purposes prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention.

1/ Some of the provisions contained in this section have general application throughout the Convention. It is understood that the retention of these will be reviewed at a later stage in the negotiations.

2/ It was suggested that "or for any other purposes prohibited by the Convention" should be added.

3/ Opinions were expressed on the need to consider the question of the existence in a facility of excessive capacity for the production of chemicals in Schedule 2.

Obligation and Frequency

5. (i) Each facility notified to the Technical Secretariat under this Annex shall be subject to systematic international on-site verification on a routine basis.
- (ii) The number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of inspections and monitoring with on-site instruments for a particular facility shall be based on the risk to the objectives of the Convention posed by the relevant chemical, the characteristics of the facility and the nature of the activities carried out there. 1/ 2/ The guidelines to be used shall include: (to be developed). 3/

Selection

6. The particular facility to be inspected shall be chosen by the Technical Secretariat in such a way to preclude the prediction of precisely when the facility is to be inspected.

Notification

7. A State Party shall be notified by the (Director-General of the) Technical Secretariat of the decision to inspect a facility referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 ... hours prior to the arrival of the inspection team.

Host State Party

8. The host State Party shall have the right to designate personnel to accompany an international inspection team. The exercise of this right shall not affect the right of Inspectors to obtain access to the facility, as provided by the Convention, nor shall it delay or otherwise impede the carrying out of the inspection.

1/ One delegation suggested that the number of such inspections could be from one to five per year.

2/ A number of possible factors that could influence the number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of inspections have been identified and discussed. The result of this work is enclosed in Appendix II to serve as a basis for future work.

3/ It was noted that a "weighted approach" might be taken in determining the inspection régime for specific chemicals. The importance of establishing a threshold(s) in this context was also noted. It was mentioned that a threshold(s) should relate to "militarily significant quantities" of the relevant chemical(s).

Initial Visit

9. Each facility notified to the Technical Secretariat under this Annex shall be liable to receive an initial visit from international Inspectors, promptly after the State becomes a Party to the Convention.

10. The purpose of the initial visit shall be to verify information provided concerning the facility to be inspected and to obtain any additional information needed for planning future verification activities at the facility, including inspection visits and use of on-site instruments.

Agreement on Inspection Procedures

11. Each State Party shall execute an agreement, based on a model agreement, with the Organization, within [6] months after the Convention enters into force for the State, governing the conduct of the inspections of the facilities declared by the State Party. The agreement shall provide for the detailed subsidiary arrangements which shall govern inspections at each facility. 1/

12. Such agreements shall be based on a Model Agreement and shall specify for each facility the number, intensity, duration of inspections, detailed inspection procedures and the installation, operation and maintenance of on-site instruments by the Technical Secretariat. The Model Agreement shall include provisions to take into account future technological developments.

States Parties shall ensure that the systematic international on-site verification can be accomplished by the Technical Secretariat at all facilities within the agreed time frames after the convention enters into force. 2/

Verification Inspections

13. The areas of a facility to be inspected under subsidiary arrangements may, inter alia, include: 3/

- (i) areas where feed chemicals (reactants) are delivered and/or stored;

1/ Several delegations considered that the model agreement should be elaborated as part of the negotiations on the Convention. A draft for such a model agreement is contained in Appendix II.

2/ Procedures to ensure the implementation of the verification scheme within designated time frames are to be developed.

3/ Opinions were expressed on the need to consider the question of the existence in a facility of excessive capacity for the production of chemicals on Schedule 2.

- (ii) areas where manipulative processes are performed upon the reactants prior to addition to the reaction vessel;
- (iii) feed lines as appropriate from subparagraph (i) and/or subparagraph (ii) to the reaction vessel, together with any associated valves, flow meters, etc.;
- (iv) the external aspect of the reaction vessel and its ancillary equipment;
- (v) lines from the reaction vessel leading to long- or short-term storage or for further processing of the designated chemical;
- (vi) control equipment associated with any of the items under subparagraphs (i) to (v);
- (vii) equipment and areas for waste and effluent handling;
- (viii) equipment and areas for disposition of off-specification chemicals.

14. (a) The (Director-General of the) Technical Secretariat shall notify the State Party of its decision to inspect or visit the facility [48] [12] hours prior to the planned arrival of the inspection team at the facility for systematic inspections or visits. In the event of inspections or visits to resolve urgent problems, this period may be shortened. The (Director-General of the) Technical Secretariat shall specify the purpose(s) of the inspection or visit.

(b) A State Party shall make any necessary preparations for the arrival of the Inspectors and shall ensure their expeditious transportation from their point of entry on the territory of the State Party to the facility. The agreement on subsidiary arrangements will specify administrative arrangements for Inspectors.

(c) International Inspectors shall, in accordance with agreements on subsidiary arrangements:

- have unimpeded access to all areas that have been agreed for inspection. While conducting their activity, Inspectors shall comply with the safety regulations at the facility. The items to be inspected will be chosen by the Inspectors;
- bring with them and use such agreed instruments as may be necessary for the completion of their tasks;
- receive samples taken at their request at the facility. Such samples will be taken by representatives of the State Party in the presence of the Inspectors;
- perform on-site analysis of samples;

- transfer, if necessary, samples for analysis off-site at a laboratory designated by the Organization 1/ in accordance with agreed procedures; 2/
- afford the opportunity to the host State Party to be present when samples are analysed; 2/
- ensure, in accordance with procedures (to be developed), that samples transported, stored and processed are not tampered with; 2/
- communicate freely with the Technical Secretariat.

(d) The State Party receiving the inspection shall, in accordance with agreed procedures:

- have the right to accompany the International Inspectors at all times during the inspection and observe all their verification activities at the facility;
- have the right to retain duplicates of all samples taken and be present when samples are analysed;
- have the right to inspect any instrument used or installed by the International Inspectors and to have it tested in the presence of its personnel;
- provide assistance to the International Inspectors, upon their request, for the installation of the monitoring system and the analysis of samples on-site;
- receive copies of the reports on inspections of its facility(ies);
- receive copies, at its request, of the information and data gathered about its facility(ies) by the Technical Secretariat.

15. The Technical Secretariat may retain at each site a sealed container for photographs, plans and other information that it may wish to refer to in the course of subsequent inspection.

Submission of Inspectors' Report

16. After each inspection or visit to the facility, International Inspectors shall submit a report with their findings to the (Director-General of the) Technical Secretariat which will transmit a copy of this report to the State Party having received the inspection or visit.

17. The International Inspectors may request clarification of any ambiguities arising from the inspection. In the event that any ambiguities arise which cannot be resolved in the course of the inspection, the Inspectors shall inform the (Director-General of the) Technical Secretariat immediately.

1/ The designation of the organ of the Organization that will be entrusted with this task will be considered further and specified in the text.

2/ The view was expressed that all questions related to analysis off-site required further discussion.

ANNEX 3 TO ARTICLE VI

Régime for Chemicals on Schedule 3

DECLARATIONS

1. The Initial and Annual Declarations to be provided by a State Party under paragraph 4 of Article VI shall include the following information for each of the chemicals listed in Schedule 3:

- (i) The chemicals name, common or trade name used by the facility, structural formula and Chemical Abstracts Service Registry Number.
- (ii) The total amount produced, consumed, imported and exported in the previous calendar year. 1/
- (iii) The final product or end use of the chemical in accordance with the following categories (to be developed).
- (iv) For each facility which during the previous calendar year produced, processed, consumed or transferred more than [30] tonnes of a chemical listed in Schedule 3 or which produced 2/ at any time since ... a chemical in Schedule 3 for chemical weapons purposes: 3/ 4/
 - (a) The name of the facility and of the owner, company, or enterprise operating the facility.
 - (b) The location of the facility.

1/ Whether the total amount is to be expressed as an exact figure or within a range is to be discussed.

2/ A view was expressed that the question of a quantitative threshold would need to be discussed in this context.

3/ The placement in the Convention of the obligation to declare facilities which produced a chemical in Schedule 3 for chemical weapons purposes needs further consideration. A view was expressed that this obligation should be included in the Annex to Article V.

4/ It was proposed that a threshold for the dual purpose agents (Phosgene, Cyanogen chloride, Hydrogen cyanide, Chloropicrin) could be established at [50 tonnes/year] [500 tonnes/year] and for precursors at [5 tonnes/year] [50 tonnes/year]. The proposal was presented in an informal discussion paper dated 30 March 1987, prepared on the request of the Chairman of the Committee, by Dr. Peroni (Brazil), Lt. Col. Bretfeld (German Democratic Republic) and Dr. Ooms (Netherlands).

- (c) The capacity (to be defined) 1/ of the facility.
- (d) The approximate amount of production and consumption of the chemical in the previous year (ranges to be specified).

2. A State Party shall notify the Technical Secretariat of the name and location of any facility which intends, in the year following submission of the Annual Declaration, to produce, process or consume any of the chemicals listed in Schedule 3 (on an industrial scale - to be defined).

VERIFICATION

The verification régime for chemicals listed in Schedule 3 will comprise both the provision of data by a State Party to the Technical Secretariat and the monitoring of that data by the Technical Secretariat. 2/

1/ Some consultations with technical experts have taken place on this issue. A report on these consultations is enclosed in Appendix II to facilitate further work by delegations.

2/ Some delegations consider that provision should be made for resort to an on-site "spot-check" inspection, if required, to verify information supplied by a State Party. Other delegations believe that the provisions of Articles VII, VIII and IX of the Convention are sufficient in this respect.

OTHER DOCUMENTS

Preparatory Commission 1/

1. For the purpose of carrying out the necessary preparations for the effective operation of the provisions of the Convention and for preparing for the first session of the Conference of the States Parties, the Depositary of the Convention shall convene a Preparatory Commission not later than [30] days after the Convention has been signed by (to be determined) States.
2. The Preparatory Commission shall be composed of all States which sign the Convention before its entry into force. Each signatory State shall have one representative in the Preparatory Commission, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers.
3. The Commission shall be convened at [...] and remain in existence until the first session of the Conference of the States Parties has convened.
4. The expenses of the Commission shall be met by the States signatories to the Convention, participating in the Commission, [in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment, adjusted to take into account differences between the United Nations membership and the participation of States signatories in the Commission].
5. All decisions of the Preparatory Commission should be taken by consensus. If notwithstanding the efforts of representatives to achieve consensus, an issue comes up for voting, the Chairman of the Preparatory Commission shall defer the vote for 24 hours and during this period of deferment shall make every effort to facilitate achievement of consensus, and shall report to the Commission prior to the end of the period. If consensus is not possible at the end of 24 hours, the Commission shall take decisions on questions of procedure by a simple majority of the members present and voting. Decisions on questions of substance shall be taken by two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. When the issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or not, that question shall be treated as one of substance unless otherwise decided by the Preparatory Commission by the majority required for decisions on questions of substance. 2/
6. The Commission shall:
 - (a) elect its own officers, adopt its own rules of procedures, determine its place of meeting, meet as often as necessary and establish such committees as it deems useful;
 - (b) appoint an executive secretary and staff to exercise such functions as the Commission may determine with a view to establishing a provisional

1/ Provisions on the Commission could be contained in a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly commending the Convention or in an appropriate document associated with the Convention.

2/ It has also been proposed that decisions should be taken by consensus only.

Technical Secretariat with units in charge of preparatory work concerning the main activities to be carried out by the Technical Secretariat to be established by the Convention;

(c) make arrangements for the first session of the Conference of the States Parties, including the preparation of a draft agenda and draft rules of procedure;

(d) undertake, inter alia, the following tasks on subjects requiring immediate attention after the entry into force of the Convention:

- (i) the detailed staffing pattern of the Technical Secretariat, including decision-making flow charts;
- (ii) assessments of personnel requirements;
- (iii) staff rules for recruitment and service conditions;
- (iv) recruitment and training of technical personnel;
- (v) standardization and purchase of equipment;
- (vi) organization of office and administrative services;
- (vii) recruitment and training of support staff;
- (viii) establishment of the scale of financial contribution for the Organization; 1/
- (ix) establishment of administrative and financial regulations;
- (x) preparation of host country agreement;
- (xi) preparation of guidelines for initial visits and facility attachments;
- (xii) preparation of programme of work and budget of the first year of activities of the Organization;
- (xiii) preparation of such studies, reports and recommendations as it deems necessary.

7. The Commission shall prepare a final report on all matters within its mandate for the first session of the Conference of States Parties and the first meeting of the Executive Council.

8. At the first session of the Conference of States Parties, the property and records of the Preparatory Commission shall be transferred to the Organization.

1/ The view was expressed that the entire problem of the costs of the Organization needs to be considered.

ADDENDUM TO APPENDIX I
PROTOCOL ON INSPECTION PROCEDURES 1/

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1/ The texts contained in this document require further consideration and elaboration including the level of detail required in this Protocol as well as the overlap between detail in the Annexes and in this Protocol. Some delegations held that many of the details should not be included in the Protocol and that they should rather be the subject of an Inspectors' manual to be issued by the Technical Secretariat. Also the status of this Protocol and the question of amendment procedures to be applied to the provisions contained in the Protocol require further discussion.

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PART I: GENERAL

I. Definitions

"Inspector" means an individual designated by the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat according to the procedures as set forth in part I, Section II of this Protocol to carry out an inspection in accordance with the Convention, its annexes, and facility agreements between States Parties and the Organization of the Convention.

"Inspection assistant" means an individual designated by the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat according to the procedures as set forth in part I, Section II of this Protocol to assist inspectors in an inspection (e.g. medical, security, administration, interpreters).

"Inspection Team" means the group of inspectors and inspection assistants assigned by the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat to conduct a particular inspection.

"Inspected State Party" means the State Party to the Convention on whose territory an inspection pursuant to the Convention, its annexes and facility agreements between Parties and the Organization of the Convention takes place, or the State Party to the Convention whose facility on the territory of a host State is subject to such an inspection.

"Inspection Site" means any area or facility at which the inspection is carried out and which is specifically defined in the respective facility agreement or inspection mandate or request.

"Period of Inspection" means the period of time from arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site until its departure from the inspection site, exclusive of time spent on briefings before and after the verification activities.

"Point of Entry" means the location(s) designated for the in-country arrival of inspection teams for inspections pursuant to the Convention and for their departure after completion of their mission.

"In-Country Period" means the period from the arrival of the inspection team at a point of entry until its departure from the State at a point of entry.

"Host State" means that State on whose territory lie States Parties' facilities subject to inspection under the Convention.

"In-Country Escort" means individuals specified by the inspected State Party and, if appropriate, by the Host State, if they so wish to accompany and assist the inspection team during the in-country period.

"Routine Inspections" means the systematic, on-site inspection [, subsequent to initial inspections,] of facilities declared pursuant to Articles IV, V, VI and the Annexes to those Articles.

"Initial inspection" means the first on-site inspection of facilities to verify data declared pursuant to Articles IV, V, VI and the Annexes to those Articles.

"Challenge Inspection" means the inspection of a State Party requested by another State Party pursuant to Article IX, part II.

"Requesting State Party" means a State Party which has requested a challenge inspection pursuant to Article IX.

"Observer" means a representative of a requesting State Party designated by that State Party to observe a challenge inspection.

"Approved Equipment" means the devices and/or instruments necessary for the performance of the inspection team's duties that have been certified by the Technical Secretariat in accordance with agreed procedures. Such equipment may also refer to the administrative supplies or recording materials that would be used by the inspection team.

"Facility Agreement" means an agreement between a State Party and the Organization relating to a specific facility subject to routine inspection.

"Inspection Mandate" means the instructions issued by the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat to the inspection team for the conduct of a particular inspection.

II. Designation of inspectors and inspection assistants

1. Not later than ... days after entry into force of the Convention the Technical Secretariat shall communicate, in writing, to all States Parties the names, nationality and ranks of the Inspectors and inspection assistants proposed for designation. 1/ Furthermore, it shall furnish a description of their qualifications and professional experience.

2. Each State Party shall immediately acknowledge receipt of the list of Inspectors and inspection assistants, proposed for designation communicated to it. Any Inspector and inspection assistant included in this list shall be regarded as designated unless a State Party, within [30] days 2/ after acknowledgement of receipt of the list declares its non-acceptance.

In the case of non-acceptance, the proposed Inspector or inspection assistant shall not undertake or participate in verification activities within the State Party which has declared his non-acceptance. The Director-General shall, as necessary, submit further proposals in addition to the original list.

1/ It has been suggested that, in order to facilitate early implementation of the verification activities, States might, upon signature or thereafter before the entry into force, make declarations concerning the number and types of facilities which shall be subject to verification. The Preparatory Commission, on the basis of these declarations, might initiate the designation and clearance process.

2/ The time period should not be longer than 30 days. Otherwise the obligation to make declarations within 30 days after entry into force and immediately thereafter provide access for inspection cannot be met.

3. Verification activities under the Convention shall only be performed by designated Inspectors and inspection assistants.

4. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 below a State Party has the right at any time, to object to an Inspector or inspection assistant who may have been already designated in accordance with the procedures in paragraph 3 above.

It shall notify the Technical Secretariat of its objections [and include the reason for the objection.] Such objections shall come into effect 30 days after receipt by the Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat shall immediately inform the State concerned of the withdrawal of the designation of the Inspector or inspection assistant.

5. A State Party that has been notified of an inspection shall not seek to have removed from the inspection team for that inspection any of the designated inspectors or inspection assistants named in the inspection team list. 1/

6. The number of Inspectors and inspection assistants accepted by and designated to a State Party must be sufficient to allow for availability and rotation of appropriate numbers of Inspectors and inspection assistants.

7. If, in the opinion of the Director-General the non-acceptance of proposed Inspectors or inspection assistants impedes the designation of a sufficient number of Inspectors or inspection assistants or otherwise hampers the effective fulfilment of the task of the International Inspectorate, the Director-General shall refer the issue to the Executive Council.

8. Whenever amendments to the above-mentioned lists of Inspectors and inspection assistants are necessary or requested, replacement Inspectors and inspection assistants shall be designated in the same manner as set forth with respect of the initial list.

9. The members of the inspection team carrying out an inspection of a facility of a State Party located in the territory of another State Party shall be designated in accordance with the procedures set out in this Protocol both to the inspected State Party and the host State.

1/ A view was expressed that new information on the bona fides of designated inspectors could be a reason for objecting to their being included in the inspection team.

III. Privileges and immunities 1/

1. Each State party shall, within [30] days 2/ after acknowledgement of receipt of the list of Inspectors and inspection assistants or of changes thereto and for the purpose of carrying out inspection activities, provide for multiple entry/exit and/or transit visas and other such documents which each Inspector or inspection assistant may need to enter and to remain on the territory of that State Party. These documents shall be valid for at least 24 months from the date of their provision to the Technical Secretariat.

2. To exercise their functions effectively, Inspectors and inspection assistants shall be accorded privileges and immunities as set forth in paragraph (i) through (ix). Privileges and immunities shall be granted to members of the inspection team for the sake of the Convention and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves. Privileges and immunities shall be accorded for the period of transit through non-inspected States Parties, for the entire in-country period, and thereafter with respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of official functions as Inspector or inspection assistant. 3/

- (i) The members of the inspection team shall be accorded the inviolability enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961.
- (ii) The living quarters and office premises occupied by the inspection team carrying out inspection activities pursuant to the Convention shall be accorded the inviolability and protection accorded the premises of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
- (iii) The records of the inspection team shall enjoy the inviolability accorded to all papers and correspondence of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The inspection team shall have the right to use codes for their communications with the Technical Secretariat.

1/ Some delegations expressed the view that this section required further consideration. A view was expressed that Article VI ("Experts on mission for the United Nations") of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations should be taken into account in this later consideration.

2/ The time period should not be longer than 30 days. Otherwise the obligation to make declarations within 30 days after entry into force and immediately thereafter provide access for inspection cannot be met.

3/ The rights and privileges of the Inspectors and inspection assistants during transportation over and through non-States Parties needs further consideration.

- (iv) Samples and approved equipment carried by members of the inspection team shall be inviolable subject to provisions contained in the Convention and exempt from all customs duties. Hazardous samples shall be transported in accordance with relevant transport regulations.
 - (v) The members of the inspection team shall be accorded the immunities accorded diplomatic agents pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
 - (vi) The members of the inspection team carrying out their prescribed activities pursuant to the Convention shall be accorded the exemption from dues and taxes accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
 - (vii) The members of the inspection team shall be permitted to bring into the territory of the inspected State Party or host State, without payment of any customs duties or related charges, articles for personal use, with the exception of articles the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations.
 - (viii) The members of the inspection team shall be accorded the same currency and exchange facilities as are accorded to representatives of foreign Governments on temporary official missions.
 - (ix) The members of the inspection team shall not engage in any professional or commercial activity for personal profit on the territory of the inspected State Party or that of the host State.
3. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities the members of the inspection team shall be obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the inspected State Party or host State and, to the extent that is consistent with the inspection mandate, shall be obliged not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State.

If the inspected party or host State Party considers that there has been an abuse of privileges and immunities specified in this Protocol, consultations shall be held between the Party and the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat to determine whether such an abuse has occurred and, if so determined, to prevent a repetition of such an abuse.

The immunity from jurisdiction of members of the inspection team may be waived by the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat in those cases when it is of the opinion that immunity would impede the course of justice and that it can be waived without prejudice to the implementation of the provisions of the Convention. Waiver must always be express.

[4. If at any time, a member of the inspection team is on the territory of the inspected State Party or host State and is suspected or accused of violating a law or regulation, consultations shall be held between the State concerned and the inspection team chief to determine whether such an abuse has occurred, and if so determined, to prevent a repetition of such an abuse. If requested by the inspected State Party or host State, the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat shall remove that individual from the country. If the inspection team chief is the individual suspected or accused, the

inspected State Party shall have the right to communicate with the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat and request their removal and replacement. The deputy team chief shall assume the duty of team chief until the Technical Secretariat has acted on the inspected State Party's request.]

[5. If the inspected State Party so decides, Inspectors and inspection assistants monitoring destruction of chemical weapons during the active phase of destruction pursuant to article IV and its annex shall only be allowed to travel 1/ up to (...) kilometres from the inspection site with the permission of the in-country escort, and as considered necessary by the inspected State Party shall be accompanied by the in-country escort. Such travel shall be taken solely as leisure activity. 2/]

IV. Standing arrangements

A. Points of entry

1. Each State Party shall designate the points of entry and shall supply the required information to the Technical Secretariat not later than 30 days after the Convention enters into force. 3/ These points of entry shall be such that the inspection team can reach any inspection site from at least one point of entry within [12] hours. Locations of points of entry shall be provided to all States Parties by the Technical Secretariat.

2. Each State Party may change the points of entry by giving notice of such change to the Technical Secretariat. Changes shall become effective ... days after the Technical Secretariat receives such notification to allow appropriate notification to all States Parties.

3. If the Technical Secretariat considers that there are insufficient points of entry for the timely conduct of inspections or that changes to the points of entry proposed by a State Party would hamper such timely conduct of inspections, it shall enter into consultations with the State Party concerned to resolve the problem.

4. In cases where facilities of an inspected State Party are located in the territory of another State Party or where the access from the point of entry to the facilities subject to inspection requires transit through the territory of another State, inspections shall be carried out in accordance with this Protocol.

1/ It is understood that "travel" does not imply the right of access to areas restricted for security reasons or to private property.

2/ Further study on the rights of members of an inspection team to communicate with the embassy of their respective nationality is necessary.

3/ In order to ensure that the process of designation of Inspectors and inspection assistants, as well as of points of entry (and departure) function smoothly as from the date of entry into force of the Convention, the idea of the signatories indicating advance acceptance on the basis of a preliminary list drawn up by the Preparatory Commission should be considered.

States Parties on whose territory facilities of other States Parties subject to inspection are located shall facilitate the inspection of those facilities and shall provide for the necessary support to enable the inspection team to carry out its tasks in a timely and effective manner.

5. In cases where facilities of an inspected State Party are located in the territory of a non-State Party the State Party subject to inspection shall ensure that inspections of those facilities can be carried out in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol. A State Party that has one or more facilities on the territory of a non-State Party shall ensure acceptance by the host State of inspectors and inspection assistants designated to that State Party.

B. Arrangements for use of unscheduled aircraft

1. For inspections pursuant to Article IX and for other inspections where timely travel is not feasible using scheduled commercial transport, an inspection team may need to utilize aircraft owned or chartered by the Technical Secretariat. Within 30 days after entry into force of the Convention, each State Party shall inform the Technical Secretariat of the standing diplomatic clearance number for non-scheduled aircraft transporting inspection teams and equipment necessary for inspection into and out of the territory in which an inspection site is located. Aircraft routings to and from the designated point of entry shall be along established international airways that are agreed upon between the States Parties and the Technical Secretariat as the basis for such diplomatic clearance.

2. When a non-scheduled aircraft is used, the Technical Secretariat shall provide the inspected State Party with a flight plan, through the National Authority, for the aircraft's flight from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the State in which the inspection site is located to the point of entry, no less than [6] hours before the scheduled departure time from that airfield. Such a plan shall be filed in accordance with the procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organization applicable to civil aircraft. For its owned or chartered flights, the Technical Secretariat shall include in the remarks section of each flight plan the standing diplomatic clearance number and the notation: "Inspection aircraft. Priority clearance processing required."

3. No less than [3] hours prior to the scheduled departure of the inspection team from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the country in which the inspection is to take place, the inspected State Party [or host State Party] shall ensure that the flight plan filed in accordance with paragraph B of this section is approved so that the inspection team may arrive at the point of entry by the estimated arrival time.

4. The inspected State Party shall provide parking, security protection, servicing and fuel as required for the aircraft of the inspection team at the point of entry when such aircraft is owned or under charter to the Technical Secretariat. Such aircraft shall not be liable for landing fees, departure tax, and similar charges. The Technical Secretariat shall bear the cost of such fuel, [security] and servicing. 1/

1/ The Technical Secretariat will need to negotiate arrangements for costs of such services.

C. Administrative arrangements

The inspected State Party shall provide or arrange for the amenities necessary for the inspection team such as communication means, interpretation services to the extent necessary for the performance of interviewing and other tasks, transportation, working space, lodging, meals and medical care of the inspection team. In this regard, the inspected State Party shall be reimbursed by the Organization for such costs incurred by the inspection team (details to be developed).

D. Approved equipment

1. Subject to paragraph 3 of this section there shall be no restriction by the inspected State party on the inspection team bringing on to the inspection site such approved equipment which the Technical Secretariat [and the States parties] [has] [have] determined to be necessary to fulfil the inspection requirements. 1/

[This includes, inter alia, equipment for discovering and preserving evidence related to the compliance with the Convention, temporary and permanent monitoring equipment and seals for emplacement, equipment for discovering and preserving information, equipment for recording and documenting the inspection, as well as for communication 2/ with the Technical Secretariat and for determining that the inspection team has been brought to the site for which the inspection has been requested.] The Technical Secretariat shall to the extent possible prepare and, as appropriate, update a list of approved equipment, which may be needed for the purposes described above, and regulations governing such equipment which shall be in accordance with this Protocol. In establishing the list of approved equipment and these regulations, the Technical Secretariat should ensure that safety considerations for all the types of facilities at which such equipment is likely to be used, are taken fully into account. 3/ 4/

2. The equipment shall be in the custody of the Technical Secretariat and be designated, calibrated and approved by the Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat shall, to the extent possible, select that equipment which is specifically designed for the specific kind of inspection required.

1/ A view was expressed that further consideration should be given to the conclusion of bilateral agreements between the Technical Secretariat and the States Parties on the instruments and devices to be used in the inspections in order to guarantee that they are reliable and applicable.

2/ The issue of communications requires further consideration.

3/ Further consideration needs to be given to when and how such equipment will be agreed and to what extent it will need to be specified in the Convention.

4/ The relationship between equipment for routine inspections and challenge inspections and provisions for their respective uses will need to be considered.

Designated and approved equipment shall be specifically protected against unauthorized alteration. [The Technical Secretariat shall certify that the equipment meets agreed standards.]

3. The inspected State Party shall have the right, without prejudice to the prescribed time-frames to inspect the equipment in the presence of inspection team members at the point of entry, i.e., to check the identity of the equipment brought in or removed from the territory of the inspected State Party or host State. To facilitate such identification, the Technical Secretariat shall attach documents and devices to authenticate its designation and approval of the equipment. The inspection of the equipment shall also ascertain to the satisfaction of the inspected State Party that the equipment meets the description of the approved equipment for the particular type of inspection. The inspected State Party may exclude equipment not meeting that description or equipment without the above-mentioned authentication documents and devices. [Excluded equipment shall be kept at the point of entry until the inspection team leaves the respective State. Storage of the inspection team's equipment and supplies at the point of entry shall be in tamper-indicating containers provided by the inspection team within a secure facility provided by the inspected State Party. Access to each secure facility shall be controlled by a "dual key" system requiring the presence of both the inspected party and representative of the inspection team to gain access to the equipment and supplies. The Technical Secretariat may allow a State Party to maintain equipment storage as described here in lieu of bringing it in for each inspection in accordance with the agreement between the State Party concerned and the Technical Secretariat.]

4. In cases where the inspection team finds it necessary to use equipment available on site not belonging to the Technical Secretariat and requests the inspected State Party to enable the team to use such equipment, the inspected State Party shall comply with the request to the extent it can. 1/

V. PRE-INSPECTION ACTIVITIES

A. Notification

1. The Director-General of the Technical Secretariat shall notify the State Party prior to the planned arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry and within the prescribed timeframes where specified of its intention to carry out an inspection.

2. Notifications made by the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat shall include the following information:

- the type of inspection;
- the point of entry; 2/

1/ A view was expressed that the possibility of agreed procedures should be considered in this regard.

2/ A view was expressed that for routine inspections it could be agreed in the facility agreement that notification of the point of entry would not be needed.

- the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry;
- the means of arrival at the point of entry;
- [the site to be inspected];
- the names of Inspectors and inspection assistants;
- if appropriate, aircraft clearance of special flights;
- the names of the observer[s] of the requesting State Party in the case of a challenge inspection.

[The inspection site shall be specified by the chief of the inspection team at the point of entry not later than 24 hours after the arrival of the inspection team.]

3. The inspected State Party shall within [one] hour acknowledge the receipt of a notification by the Technical Secretariat of an intention to conduct an inspection.

4. In the case of an inspection of a facility of a State Party located in the territory of another State Party both State Parties shall be simultaneously notified in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2, 3 of this section.

B. Entry into the territory of the inspected State Party or host State and transfer to the inspection site

1. The State Party [or host State Party] which has been notified of the arrival of an inspection team, shall ensure its immediate entry into the territory and shall through an in-country escort [if such an escort is requested] do everything in its power to ensure the safe conduct of the inspection team and its equipment and supplies, from its point of entry to the inspection site(s) and to its point of exit.

2. In accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5 of Section IV A. above, the inspected State Party [or host State Party] shall ensure that the inspection team is able to reach the inspection site within [12] 1/ hours from the arrival at the point of entry or, if appropriate, from the time the inspection site is specified at the point of entry. 2/

1/ Further study is required on whether a longer or shorter time period is feasible.

2/ The view was expressed that because the specific point of entry utilized as well as the time of arrival would be selected by the Technical Secretariat and to avoid prematurely revealing the site during some types of inspections the closest point of entry may not be chosen, the inspected State Party could not be held responsible for ensuring that the inspection team reaches the site within a specified time frame, although it should undertake to avoid the use of delaying tactics.

C. Pre-inspection briefing

Upon arrival at the inspection site and prior to the commencement of the inspection, the inspection team shall be briefed, with the aid of maps and other documentation as appropriate, by facility representatives on the facility, the activities carried out there, safety measures and administrative and logistic arrangements necessary for the inspection. The time spent for the briefing shall be limited to the minimum necessary and in any event not exceeding three hours.

VI. CONDUCT OF INSPECTIONS

A. General rules

1. The members of the inspection team shall discharge their functions in accordance with the articles and annexes of the Convention, this Protocol as well as rules established by the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat and facility agreements between States Parties and the Organization. 1/ 2/
2. The inspection team dispatched shall strictly observe the inspection mandate issued by the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat. 3/ It shall refrain from activities going beyond this mandate. 4/ 5/
3. The activities of the inspection team shall be so arranged as to ensure on the one hand the timely and effective discharge of the inspector's functions and, on the other, the least possible inconvenience to the State concerned and disturbance to the facility or other location inspected. The inspection team shall avoid unnecessarily hampering or delaying the operation of a facility and avoid affecting its safety. In particular, the inspection team shall not operate any facility.

1/ A detailed manual of technical procedures should be prepared for the guidance of teams conducting challenge inspections and for the inspected State Party to know what the rights, obligations and constraints of the inspectors, escorts and inspected State Party are. A view was expressed that the manual should, inter alia, give guidance to the inspection team on the specific types of information a team should seek to establish the facts in particular situations.

2/ A view was expressed that an Inspector or inspection assistant shall be considered to have assumed his inspection duties on departure from his primary work location, on Technical Secretariat arranged transportation, and shall be considered to have ceased performing those duties when he has returned to his primary work location and on termination of Technical Secretariat provided transportation.

3/ The use of the terms "Technical Secretariat" and "Director-General of the Technical Secretariat" needs to be reviewed throughout the Convention.

4/ A view was expressed that for challenge inspections the inspection mandate would have to be flexible enough for the inspection team to tailor the inspection to the conditions they meet on the site.

5/ The question of what actions shall be taken in case an inspector or an inspection assistant goes beyond the mandate should be further considered.

If inspectors consider that, to fulfil their mandate, particular operations should be carried out in a facility, they shall request the designated representative of the management of the facility to have them performed. The representative shall carry out the request to the extent possible.

4. In the performance of their duties on the territory of an inspected State Party, the members of the inspection team shall, if the inspected State Party so requests, be accompanied by representatives of his State, but the inspection team must not thereby be delayed or otherwise hindered in the exercise of its functions. 1/

5. [At least two Inspectors on each team must speak the language of the Convention which the inspected Party has agreed to work in. 2/ 3/ Each inspection team shall operate under the direction of a team leader and deputy team leader designated by the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat.] Upon arrival at the inspection site, the inspection team may divide itself into subgroups consisting of no fewer than two Inspectors each.

B. Safety

In carrying out their activities, Inspectors and inspection assistants shall observe safety regulations established at the inspection site, 4/ including those for the protection of controlled environments within a facility and for personal safety. Individual protective clothing and approved equipment, duly certified, shall normally be provided by the Technical Secretariat. 5/ 6/

1/ The right of host State representatives need to be further considered.

2/ Consideration should be given to include provision in the Convention for the selection by States Parties of what language of the Convention they will operate in for the conduct of inspections and submission of reports to the Technical Secretariat.

3/ The Technical Secretariat should also make arrangements for interpreters for national languages of States Parties, to the extent possible, to facilitate inspections.

4/ Consideration will need to be given with regard to those areas which for safety reasons preclude or limit the entrance of personnel (e.g. unexploded munitions, hazardous areas of destruction facilities).

5/ Agreements between the Technical Secretariat and States Parties should specify that all protective clothing and equipment meet pre-agreed safety standards or a State Party may require the team to use the clothing and equipment of the Party.

6/ For safety reasons, the inspected State Party should have the right to provide appropriate alternative equipment and protective clothing of its own for the inspection team, provided this does not hinder the conduct of the inspection.

C. Communications

Inspectors shall have the right throughout the in-country period to communications with the Headquarters of the Technical Secretariat. For this purpose they [may use their own, duly certified, approved equipment and/or] may request that the inspected State Party or host State Party provide them with access to other telecommunications. 1/ The inspection team shall have the right to use its own 2/ two-way system of radio communications between personnel patrolling the perimeter and other members of the inspection team. [Communication systems should conform to power and frequency instructions established by the Technical Secretariat.]

D. Inspection team and inspected State Party rights

1. The inspection team shall, in accordance with the relevant articles and annexes of this Convention as well as with facility agreements, have the right to unimpeded access to the inspection site. The items to be inspected will be chosen by the inspectors.
2. Inspectors shall have the right to interview any facility personnel in the presence of representatives of the inspected State Party with the purpose of establishing relevant facts. Inspectors shall only request information and data which are necessary to the conduct of the inspection, and the inspected State Party shall furnish such information upon request. The inspected State Party shall have the right to object to questions posed to the facility personnel if those questions are deemed not relevant to the inspection. If the inspection team chief objects and states their relevance, the questions shall be provided in writing to the Inspected Party for reply. The inspection team may note any refusal to permit interviews or to allow questions to be answered and any explanations given, in that part of the Inspection Report that deals with the co-operation of the Inspected State Party.
3. Inspectors shall have the right to inspect documentation and records they deem relevant to the conduct of their mission.
4. Inspectors shall have the right to have photographs taken at their request by representatives of the inspected State Party. The capability to take instant development photographic prints shall be available.

[If requested by the inspection team, such photographs should show the size of an object by placing a measuring scale, provided by the inspection team, alongside that object during the photographing.] The inspection team should determine whether photographs conform to those requested, and if not, repeat photographs should be taken. The inspection team and the inspected State Party should each retain one copy of every photograph.

1/ The issue of communications requires further consideration.

2/ For safety reasons, the inspected State Party should have the right to provide appropriate alternative equipment and protective clothing of its own for the inspection team, provided this does not hinder the conduct of the inspection.

5. The inspected State Party shall have the right to accompany the inspection team at all times during the inspection and observe all their verification activities.

6. The inspected State Party shall receive copies, at its request, of the information and data gathered about its facility(ies) by the Technical Secretariat.

7. Inspectors shall have the right to request clarifications in connection with ambiguities that arise during an inspection. Such requests shall be made promptly through the representative of the inspected State Party. The representative of the inspected State Party shall provide the inspection team, during the inspection, with such clarifications as may be necessary to remove the ambiguity. In the event questions relating to an object or a building located within the inspection site are not resolved, the object or building shall be photographed for the purpose of clarifying its nature and function. If the ambiguity cannot be removed during the inspection, the Inspectors shall notify the Technical Secretariat immediately. The Inspectors shall include any such unresolved question, relevant clarifications and a copy of any photographs taken in the inspection report.

E. Collection, handling and analysis of samples

1. Except as provided for in parts III and IV of this Protocol representatives of the inspected State Party or of the inspected facility shall take samples at the request of the inspection team in the presence of inspectors. If so agreed in advance with the representatives of the inspected State Party or of the inspected facility the inspection team may take samples themselves.

2. Where possible, the analysis of samples shall be performed on-site. The inspection team shall have the right to perform on-site analysis of sample using approved equipment brought by them. Alternatively they may request that appropriate analysis on-site be performed in their presence.

3. The inspected State Party has the right to retain portions of all samples taken or take duplicate samples and be present when samples are analysed on-site.

4. The inspection team shall, if they deem it necessary, transfer samples for analysis off-site at laboratories designated by the Organization. 1/ 2/ 3/

1/ The designation of the organ of the Organization that will be entrusted with this task will be considered further and specified in the text.

2/ In cases of off-site analysis, the question should be further discussed of documentation that should be provided by the Technical Secretariat to the inspected facilities (inspected State Party) concerning the acknowledgement of receipt of the samples at the designated laboratories, possible transfer as well as final destination (retention, return or destruction) of the unused samples or portions thereof.

3/ Transportation of toxic samples and existing international transportation regulations will need to be addressed.

5. The Director-General of the Technical Secretariat shall have the primary responsibility for the security, integrity and preservation of samples and for ensuring that the confidentiality of samples transferred for analysis off-site is protected. He shall

- (i) establish a stringent régime governing the collection, handling, transport and analysis of samples;
- (ii) certify the laboratories designated to perform different types of analysis;
- (iii) oversee the standardization of equipment and procedures at these designated laboratories and mobile analytical equipment and procedures, and monitor quality control and overall standards in relation to the certification of these laboratories and mobile equipment/procedures; and
- (iv) select from among the designated laboratories those which shall perform analytical or other functions in relation to specific investigations.

6. When off-site analysis is to be performed samples shall be analysed in at least two designated laboratories. The Technical Secretariat shall ensure the expeditious processing of the analysis. The samples shall be accounted for by the Technical Secretariat and any unused samples 1/ or portions thereof shall be returned to the Technical Secretariat.

7. The Technical Secretariat shall compile the results of the laboratory analysis of samples and include them in the final inspection report. The Technical Secretariat shall include in the report detailed information concerning the equipment and methodology employed by the designated laboratories.

F. Extension of inspection duration

[Periods of inspection may be extended by agreement with the in-country escort, by no more than (xx hours).] 2/

1/ Consideration should be given to the retention of unused samples taken during challenge inspection for which the findings were inconclusive.

2/ The view was expressed that, as no fixed period was foreseen for routine inspections, this paragraph might be superfluous. The view was also expressed that for some kinds of routine inspections there cannot be any time-limit without changing the substance of agreed provisions of articles IV and V and their annexes.

G. Debriefing

1. Upon completion of an inspection the inspection team shall meet with representatives of the inspected State Party and the personnel responsible for the inspection site to review the preliminary findings of the inspection team and to clarify any ambiguities. The inspection team shall provide to the representatives of the inspected State Party its preliminary findings in written form according to a standardized format together with a list of any samples and copies of written information and data gathered and other material to be taken off site. 1/ The document shall be signed by the head of the inspection team. In order to indicate that he has taken notice of the contents of the document the representative of the inspected State Party shall countersign the document. This meeting shall be completed within [4] [24] hours of the completion of the inspection.

VII. DEPARTURE

[In the case of inspections conducted pursuant to articles IV, V, VI and IX, upon completion of the post-inspection procedures, the inspection team shall return promptly to the point of entry at which it entered the inspected State and it shall then leave, within 24 hours, the territory of that State.] 2/

VIII. REPORTS

1. Within [10] days after the inspection, Inspectors shall prepare a final report 3/ on the activities conducted by them and on their findings. The report shall be factual in nature. It shall only contain facts relevant to compliance with the Convention, as provided for under the inspection mandate. The report shall also provide information as to the manner in which the State Party inspected co-operated with the inspection team. Differing observations 4/ held by Inspectors may be attached to the report. The report shall be kept confidential.

2. The final report shall immediately be submitted to the inspected State Party. Any written comments, which the inspected State Party may immediately make on its findings shall be annexed to it. The final report together with

1/ A view was expressed that for routine inspection the question of off-site transfer of "copies of written information and data gathered and other material" needs further examination, in particular as regards the confidentiality aspect.

2/ The view was expressed that this paragraph could not apply to routine inspections.

3/ Further consideration needs to be given on when and how the receiving State/facility will be able to comment on the contents of the report.

4/ It is understood that it is not up to the inspection team to draw conclusions with regard to compliance of a State Party from the facts established during an inspection.

annexed comments made by the inspected State Party shall be submitted to the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat not later than [30] days after the inspection.

3. Should the report contain uncertainties, or should co-operation between the National Authority and the Inspectors not measure up to the standards required, the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat shall approach the State Party for clarification.

4. If the uncertainties cannot be removed or the facts established are of a nature to suggest that obligations undertaken under the Convention have not been met, the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat shall inform the Executive Council without delay.

PART II: ROUTINE INSPECTIONS PURSUANT TO ARTICLES IV, V AND VI

I. INITIAL INSPECTIONS AND FACILITY AGREEMENTS

1. Each facility declared and subject to on-site inspection pursuant to Articles IV, V and the Annexes 1 and 2 of Article VI shall be liable to receive an initial inspection from the international inspectors promptly after the facility is declared. The purpose of the initial inspection of the facility shall be to verify information provided and to obtain any additional information needed for planning future verification activities at the facilities, including on-site inspections and the use of continuous on-site instruments and to work on the facility agreements. 1/2/3/

2. Each State Party shall conclude a facility agreement with the Organization for each facility declared and subject to on-site inspection pursuant to Articles IV, V and the Annexes 1 and 2 of Article VI. These agreements shall be completed within ... months after the Convention enters into force for the State or after the facility has been declared for the first time. They shall be based on models for such agreements and provide for detailed arrangements which shall govern inspections at each facility. 4/5/

II. SIZE OF THE INSPECTION TEAM

[An inspection team conducting routine inspections pursuant to Articles IV, V and VI shall include no more than (xx) Inspectors and (xx) inspection assistants.] 6/

1/ The consistency of this provision with all verification provisions in the Convention needs further consideration.

2/ A view was expressed that initial inspections should be carried out in accordance with the guidelines for such inspections.

3/ A view was expressed that the rules governing the conduct of inspectors in performing the initial inspection need to be discussed and further elaborated.

4/ A view was expressed that the areas to which inspectors have access at the inspected facility shall be clearly defined in the facility agreement.

5/ It was suggested that with respect to Article VI verification a step-by-step approach should be introduced where appropriate.

6/ The view was expressed that routine inspection effort expressed in inspection man-days should be agreed between the inspected State Party and the Technical Secretariat and not be provided for in the Convention.

III. STANDING ARRANGEMENTS

A. Continuous Monitoring by Instruments

1. Where applicable, the Technical Secretariat shall have the right to install and use continuous monitoring instruments and systems and seals in conformity with the relevant provisions in the Convention and the facility agreements between State Parties and the Technical Secretariat.
2. Continuous monitoring systems consisting of, inter alia, sensors, ancillary equipment and transmission systems shall be specified in the facility agreements. They shall incorporate, inter alia, tamper-indicating and tamper-resistant devices as well as data protection and data authentication features.
3. The Technical Secretariat shall have the right to carry out necessary engineering surveys, construction, emplacement, maintenance, repair, replacement and removal of continuous monitoring instruments and systems and seals.
4. The inspected State Party shall provide the necessary preparation and support for the establishment of continuous monitoring instruments and systems and, to this end, shall, at the request of and at the expense of the Technical Secretariat provide:
 - (i) All necessary utilities for the construction and operation of the monitoring instruments and systems, such as electrical power and heating;
 - (ii) Basic construction materials;
 - (iii) Any site preparation necessary to accommodate the installation of continuously operating systems for monitoring;
 - (iv) Transportation for necessary installation tools, materials and equipment from the point of entry to the inspection site.
5. Every continuous monitoring system shall have such abilities and be installed, adjusted or directed in such a way as to correspond strictly and efficiently to [the sole purpose of detecting prohibited or unauthorized activities] [the purpose of detecting prohibited or confirming permitted activities]. The coverage of the system shall be limited accordingly. The monitoring system shall signal the technical Secretariat if any tampering with its components or interference with its functioning occurs. Redundancy shall be built into the monitoring system to ensure that failure of an individual component will not jeopardize the monitoring capability of the system.
6. Data to be transmitted from a facility to the Technical Secretariat shall be transmitted by means to be determined. Where necessary, the transmission system will incorporate frequent transmissions from the facility and a query and response system between the facility and the Technical Secretariat. International Inspectors shall periodically check the proper functioning of the monitoring system.

7. Seals placed by inspectors and monitoring devices shall only be removed in the presence of inspectors. If an extraordinary event requires the opening of a seal, or the removal of a monitoring device when an inspector is not present, the State Party shall immediately notify the Technical Secretariat. Inspectors shall as soon as possible check that no prohibited or unauthorized activities have occurred at the facilities and replace the seal or monitoring device.

8. The State Party shall immediately notify the Technical Secretariat if an event at a facility subject to systematic international monitoring occurs, or may occur, which may have an impact on the monitoring system. The State Party shall co-ordinate subsequent actions with the Technical Secretariat with a view to restoring the operation of the monitoring system and establishing interim measures, if necessary, as soon as possible.

B. Inspection activities relating to continuous monitoring by instruments

1. The inspection team shall verify during each inspection that the monitoring system functions correctly and that emplaced seals have not been tampered with. In addition, visits to service the monitoring system may be required to perform any necessary maintenance or replacement of equipment, or to adjust the coverage of the monitoring system as required.

2. In the event that the monitoring system indicated any anomaly, the Technical Secretariat shall immediately take action to determine whether this resulted from equipment malfunction or activities at the facility. If, after this examination the problem remained unresolved, the Technical Secretariat shall immediately ascertain the actual situation, including through immediate on-site inspection of the facility if necessary. The Technical Secretariat shall report any such problem immediately after its detection to the State Party who shall assist in its resolution. 1/

IV. PRE-INSPECTION ACTIVITIES

1. Routine inspections shall be notified [12] [24] [36] [48] 2/ hours in advance of the planned arrival of the inspection team [at the point of entry] [at the inspection site].

2. Initial inspections shall be notified no less than 72 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry. Such notifications shall in addition to the information specified in part I, section VI A, paragraph 2 also include the specification of the inspection site.

1/ The issue of anomalies irregularities requires further discussion with regard to the consistent usage of terms throughout the Convention and, on a more general level, to the way the underlying concept is to be treated in the Convention.

2/ Consideration needs to be given to balance the time required for logistical purposes and the amount of advance warning given to a Party of a pending inspection.

V. DEPARTURE

[In the case of routine inspections pursuant to Articles IV, V and VI, if the inspectors intend to conduct another inspection within the same inspected State Party or host State the inspection team shall return to the point of entry which it used to enter the State and await notification by the Technical Secretariat to the inspected State Party of the next inspection.]

PART III: CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO ARTICLE IX 1/ 2/

I. DESIGNATION AND SELECTION OF INSPECTORS AND INSPECTION ASSISTANTS

1. Inspections under Article IX shall only be performed by Inspectors and inspection assistants especially designated for this function. In order to designate Inspectors and inspection assistants for inspections under Article IX, the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat shall, by selecting Inspectors and inspection assistants from among the full-time Inspectors and inspection assistants for routine inspection activities, establish a list of proposed Inspectors and inspection assistants. It shall comprise a sufficiently large number of Inspectors and inspection assistants having the necessary qualification, experience, skill and training, to allow for [rotation] [random selection] and availability of Inspectors. The designation of Inspectors and inspection assistants shall follow the procedures provided for under Section II of this Protocol.

2. The Director-General shall select the members of an inspection team also taking into account the circumstances of a particular request. Each inspection team shall consist of not less than [5] inspectors and shall be [kept to a minimum necessary for the proper execution of its task] [not more than ... members 3/]. No national of the requesting State Party, or the inspected State Party shall be a member of the inspection team.

II. PRE-INSPECTION ACTIVITIES

A. Notification

1. The request for a challenge inspection to be submitted to the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat shall contain at least the following information: 4/

1/ The view was expressed that some main elements contained in this part are subject to further consideration and elaboration of the principles of on-site inspection on challenge, which also need further examination.

2/ The provisions in Part III may need to be amended in the light of experience gained in practice challenge inspections.

3/ It has been suggested that the size of the inspection team should be subject to agreed limits. Further study is needed before trying to specify what the limits should be. It would be useful to explore the relationship among the size of the area to be inspected, the duration of the inspection and the size of the inspection team.

4/ One delegation held the view that pending a decision on the Status of this Protocol and of the corresponding text for part 2 of Article IX the same formulation concerning the content of the request should be used as in paragraph 2 of page 197 of CD/952 in the same line the term "observer" in this text should be replaced by "representative" as mentioned in paragraph 3 on page 198 of CD/952.

- the State Party to be inspected and, if applicable, the host State
- the point of entry to be used
- [- the precise location of the inspection site and the type of site to be inspected]
- the size of the inspection site
- the type of violation suspected including a specification of the relevant provisions of the Convention about which doubts about compliance have arisen and of the nature and circumstances of the suspected non-compliance
- the names of the observer[s] of the requesting State Party

The requesting State Party may submit any additional information it deems necessary.

2. The inspection site shall be delimited by geographic co-ordinates specified to the nearest second. The area subject to inspection shall be deemed to be the maximum area within the precision of the co-ordinates. [Where specification to the nearest second is not possible owing to the absence of sufficiently detailed maps, or where it would be helpful, geographic co-ordinates shall be supplemented by written descriptions.] If possible, the requesting State Party shall also provide a map with a general indication of the inspection site and a diagram specifying precisely the boundaries of the site to be inspected.

3. The Director-General of the Technical Secretariat shall within [one] hour[s] acknowledge to the requesting State Party receipt of its request. 1/

4. The Director-General of the Technical Secretariat shall notify the inspected State Party not less than [12] hours prior to the planned arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry. Simultaneously the members of the Executive Council shall be informed about the request.

[5. Unless already included in the request for a challenge inspection the requesting State Party shall within 24 hours after the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry simultaneously inform the inspection team and the inspected State Party of the inspection site. At the same time the inspected State Party shall also be informed by the inspection team about the type of violation suspected as specified in the request in accordance with paragraph 2 of this section.] 2/

1/ It has been suggested that the transmission of the request needs further discussion in light of unresolved issues under Article IX.

2/ A view was expressed that the inspected State Party be fully informed on the inspection request and the violation it is suspected of at the latest after the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry.

B. Entry into the territory of the inspected State Party or host State

The Director-General of the Technical Secretariat shall dispatch an inspection team as soon as possible after a request is received by the Technical Secretariat. The inspection team shall arrive at the point of entry specified in the request [not later than [24] hours after the receipt of a request] [in the minimum time possible]. 1/ 2/

C. Securing the site

1. To help establish that the site to which the inspection team has been transported corresponds to the site specified by the requesting State Party the inspection team shall have the right to use location-finding equipment and have such equipment and other approved equipment installed according to its directions. [The inspection team may also visit local landmarks identified from maps available to them in order to verify their location.]

2. In securing the inspection site, immediately upon arrival and up to the completion of the inspection, the inspection team shall be permitted to patrol the perimeter of the site, station personnel at the exits and inspect any means of transport [of the inspected State Party] [of any State Party temporarily or permanently based at the site or] leaving or entering the site, in order to ensure that there is no removal or destruction of relevant material. If the inspection team so decides, no such transport may leave the inspection site during the course of the inspection until permitted by the inspection team. The inspection team shall also be permitted to use approved equipment to monitor the perimeter of the site.

D. Pre-inspection briefing

1. A pre-inspection briefing shall be held in accordance with part I, section VI. C. In the course of the pre-inspection briefing, the inspected State Party may indicate to the inspection team the equipment, documentation or areas it considers sensitive and not related to the purpose of the inspection, the Inspectors shall [consider] [take] into account the proposals made to the extent they deem them appropriate for the conduct of their mission. Additionally, personnel responsible for the site will brief the team on the physical layout and other relevant characteristics of the site, the team shall be provided with a map or sketch drawn to scale showing all the structures and significant geographic features at the site. The team shall also be briefed on availability of facility personnel and records.

1/ It has been suggested that while the inspected State Party should co-operate with the Technical Secretariat to ensure rapid arrival of the team at a point of entry, the obligation to co-operate should be a more general one, and that this might best be dealt with in the text of the basic challenge inspection provision.

2/ The view was expressed that overall timeframes from the first announcement of a challenge inspection in a given State Party to the arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site are also important. The timeframes should be such as to enable the inspected State Party to co-operate fully with the inspection while not undermining the value of short-notice inspections.

2. After the pre-inspection briefing the inspection team shall prepare, on the basis of the information available to it, an inspection plan which specifies the activities to be carried out by the inspection team, including the specific areas of the site to be visited, and the sequences in which the planned activities will occur. The plan shall also specify whether the inspection team will be divided into subgroups. The plan shall be made available to the representatives of the inspected State Party and the inspection site. The representatives of the inspected State Party and of the inspection site may suggest modifications to the plan. The inspection team shall have full discretion whether or not to accept any suggestion and shall have the right to modify its inspection plan at any time. The inspection briefing as well as the establishment and discussion of the inspection plan shall not exceed the general time-limit provided for in part I of section VI. C.

III. CONDUCT OF INSPECTIONS

A. General rules

1. Subject to the provisions under section B. and this section the inspection team shall have the access at the site they deem necessary for the conduct of their mission.

2. In carrying out the inspection in accordance with the request, the inspection team shall use only those methods necessary to provide sufficient relevant facts to clarify doubts about compliance with the provisions of the Convention, and shall refrain from activities not relevant thereto. It shall collect and document such evidence as is related to the compliance with the Convention by the inspected State party but shall neither seek nor document information which is clearly not related thereto, unless the inspected State Party expressly requests it to do so. Any material collected and subsequently found not to be relevant shall not be retained.

3. The inspection team shall be guided by the principle of conducting the inspection in the least intrusive manner possible, consistent with the effective and timely accomplishment of its mission. ^{1/} Wherever possible, it shall begin with the least intrusive procedures it deems acceptable and proceed to more intrusive procedures only as it deems necessary.

B. Managed access

1. The inspection team shall, to the extent it deems them appropriate, take into consideration and adopt suggested modifications of the inspection plan and proposals which may be made by the inspected State Party, at whatever stage of the inspection including the pre-inspection briefing, to ensure that sensitive equipment, information or areas, not related to chemical weapons, are protected.

^{1/} Possible standardization of procedures to facilitate the implementation, inter alia, of this principle may be considered in the context of a manual for Inspectors to be elaborated by the Technical Secretariat.

2. In conformity with the relevant provisions in the Annex on the protection of confidential information the inspected State Party shall have the right to take measures to protect sensitive installations and prevent disclosure of confidential data not related to chemical weapons. Such measures, which shall not interfere with the inspection, may include:

- removal of sensitive papers from office spaces and securing them in safes
- shrouding of sensitive displays that cannot be secured in safes
- shrouding of sensitive pieces of equipment, such as computer or electronic systems
- logging off of computer systems and turning off of data indicating devices

Subject to procedures in this Protocol (to be specified) inspectors shall have the right to inspect the entire inspection site, including shrouded or environmentally protected objects and the interiors of structures, containers, and vehicles.

3. It shall be the obligation of the inspected State Party to satisfy the inspection team that any object protected by measures in accordance with paragraph 19 above or any other area, structure, container or vehicle excluded from inspection has not been designed, constructed or used for the suspected activity stipulated in the inspection request.

[This may be accomplished by partial removal of a shroud or environmental protection cover, at the discretion of the inspected party, or by other methods. If the inspected party demonstrates to the satisfaction of the inspection team that the object has not been designed, constructed, or used for the stipulated suspect activity, then there shall be no further inspection of that object.

Furthermore, it shall be the responsibility of the inspected party to satisfy the inspectors that a hazardous area, structure, container, or vehicle has not been designed, constructed, or used for the suspected activity stipulated in the inspection request. If the inspected party demonstrates to the satisfaction of the inspection team by means of a visual inspection of the interior of an enclosed space from its entrance that the enclosed space does not contain any items designed, constructed, or used for the stipulated suspect activity, then such an enclosed space shall not be subject to further inspection 1/.]

1/ It was suggested that further study is needed regarding what should be done if the obligation to satisfy the inspectors has not been fulfilled.

C. Observer[s]

1. The requesting State Party shall have the right to observe the conduct of a challenge inspection. 1/ It shall liaise with the Technical Secretariat to co-ordinate the arrival of its observer[s] at the same point of entry as the inspection team within a reasonable period of the inspection team's arrival. 2/
2. The observer[s] of the requesting State Party shall have the right throughout the period of inspection to be in communication with the embassy of the requesting State located in the host State or, in the case of absence of an embassy, with the requesting State itself. He shall use the telephone communications provided by the requested State Party.
3. The observer[s] shall have [the right to arrive at the site] [access to the inspection site as granted by the inspected State Party to him/them] [the same access to the inspection site as that granted to the inspection team]. [Throughout the inspection the inspection team shall keep the observer(s) fully informed about the conduct of the inspection and the findings.] 3/
4. Throughout the in-country period, the inspected State Party shall provide or arrange for the amenities necessary for the observer[s] such as communication means, interpretation services, transportation, working space, lodging, meals and medical care. All the costs in connection with the stay of the observer[s] on the territory of the inspected State Party or the host State shall be borne by the requesting State Party.

D. Sampling

The inspection team shall itself have the right to take any air, soil, wipe or effluent samples from the inspection site [,] at the perimeter of the inspection site [,] immediately upon arrival at the inspection site and throughout the period of inspection. 4/

1/ A view was expressed that this sentence contained a basic obligation which should be included in the main body of the Convention.

2/ The procedures for the timely entry of the observer of the requesting State Party into the territory of the inspected State Party/host State require further consideration.

3/ The rights of the observer(s) need to be discussed and further elaborated. If agreement is reached that more than one observer shall be permitted, it might be necessary to specify the maximum number of observers.

4/ It has been suggested that whether inspection team members or escort personnel should take these samples would require further discussion. It was also suggested that procedures for sample analysis require further discussion.

E. Extension of inspection site 1/

If the inspection team considers it necessary, for the purpose of the inspection, to visit any other contiguous location outside the boundaries of the inspection site as originally specified by the requesting State Party, the inspection team leader shall formally submit a written request to the inspected State Party [through the in-country escort]. Within two hours of the submission of the request the inspected State Party shall formally respond in writing to the request [through the in-country escort]. The requesting State Party or the observer[s] of the requesting State Party shall promptly be informed by the inspection team of the request of the inspection team leader and the response to it by the inspected State Party. If the response is negative, the requesting State Party may [through its observer] modify its original request to include the additional contiguous location. Once such a modified request has been formally submitted to [the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat] [the in-country escort], the additional contiguous location shall be subject to inspection by the team within ... hours. A request to visit an additional contiguous location shall not extend the overall period of inspection unless agreed in accordance with section IV. F. below of this section. 2/

F. Duration of an inspection

[The period of inspection shall not exceed ... hours. It may be extended by agreement with the inspected State Party by no more than ... hours. 3/]

IV. DEPARTURE

[1. At the inspected State Party's request, the clothing and equipment shall be left at the site. The inspected State Party shall reimburse the Technical Secretariat for the cost of any clothing and equipment left by the inspection team.]

2. Upon completion of the post-inspection procedures at the inspection site, the inspection team and the observer of the requesting State Party shall return promptly to the point of entry at which it entered the inspected State Party or host State and it shall then leave the territory of that State [within 24 hours] [as soon as possible].

1/ A view was expressed that the inspection should be conducted strictly within the site as originally specified by the Organization, and there should be no such extension.

2/ A view was expressed that it might not be necessary to formally resort back to the requesting State Party which is already involved in the whole process of the inspection through its observer as currently foreseen in the latter part of paragraph 3, section "Observers".

3/ It has been suggested that before limits of an inspection are specified, it would be useful to explore the relationship between the size of the area to be inspected, the duration of the inspection and the size of the inspection team.

V. REPORTS

A. Contents

The inspection report shall summarize in a general way the activities conducted by the inspection team and the factual findings of the inspection team, particularly with regard to the ambiguities or suspected non-compliance cited in the request for the challenge inspection. Detailed information relating to the ambiguity or suspected non-compliance cited in the request for the challenge inspection shall be submitted as an Appendix to the final report and be retained within the Technical Secretariat under appropriate safeguards to protect sensitive information.

B. Procedures

The Inspectors shall within 72 hours of their return to their primary work location 1/ submit a preliminary inspection report to the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat. The Director-General shall promptly transmit the preliminary report to the requesting State Party, the inspected State Party and to the Executive Council. A draft final report shall be made available to the inspected State Party within [20] days of the completion of the inspection for identification of any non-CW-related information it considers should due to its confidentiality not be circulated outside the Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat shall consider proposals for changes to their draft final report made by the inspected State Party and using its own discretion, wherever possible, adopt them. The final report shall be submitted within [30] days of the completion of the inspection and be circulated to State Parties. 2/

1/ The implication of the as yet undefined term "primary work location" requires further consideration.

2/ A view was expressed that the requesting State Party should also have the right to access to the report at any early stage.

PART IV: PROCEDURES IN CASES OF ALLEGED USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS 1/

I. GENERAL

1. On-site inspections, initiated pursuant to Articles IX [and/or X] 2/ of the Convention, to investigate an alleged use of chemical weapons shall be conducted in accordance with this Protocol and detailed procedures to be established by the Director General of the Technical Secretariat. Wherever appropriate, the provisions relating to challenge inspections shall apply.
2. In establishing detailed procedures for the investigation of alleged uses of chemical weapons, the Director General of the Technical Secretariat shall take into account relevant procedures established within the framework of the United Nations.

II. ACCESS

In addition to the access 3/ to the site[s] specified in its mandate the inspection team shall also have the right to access to hospitals, refugee camps and other locations it deems relevant to the effective investigation of the alleged use of chemical weapons. 4/

III. SAMPLES

The inspection team has the right to collect samples, of types and in quantities it considers necessary. Upon request the inspected State Party shall assist in the collection of samples. The inspected State Party shall also permit and co-operate in the collection of appropriate control samples from areas neighbouring the site of the alleged use and from other areas as requested by the inspection team.

1/ This part will need further discussion and elaboration. Whether procedures developed for the Secretary-General of the United Nations under UNGA Res 42/37 C might be adopted might require further consideration. In addition work done by Canada and Norway on the issue might help to elaborate this section further.

2/ The applicability of these provisions to investigations initiated by the Director General of the Technical Secretariat under Article X needs further consideration.

3/ A view was expressed that consideration should be given to the special situation that might exist at locations such as battlefields where the challenged State may not control access and where peacetime constraints cannot realistically be expected to be met.

4/ A view was expressed that such locations should be further discussed.

IV. INTERVIEWS

The inspection team shall have the right to interview and examine persons who may have been affected by the alleged use of chemical weapons. It shall also have the right to interview eyewitnesses of the alleged use of chemical weapons and medical personnel and/or other persons who have treated or have come into contact with the people who may have been affected by the alleged use of chemical weapons. The inspection team shall have access to medical histories, if available, and be permitted to participate in autopsies as appropriate of the persons who may have been affected by the alleged use of chemical weapons.

V. EXTENSION OF INSPECTION DURATION

If the inspection team deems that safe access to the specified site is not possible, the requesting State Party shall be informed immediately. 1/ If necessary the period of inspection shall be extended until safe access can be provided and the inspection team will have concluded its mission. 2/

VI. STATES NOT PARTY

In the case of alleged use of chemical weapons involving a non-State Party or on territory not controlled by a State Party the Organization shall closely co-operate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 3/

1/ A view was expressed that a provision to the effect that State Parties shall undertake not to take action which may endanger the safety of the inspection team is needed.

2/ The concept of extension of the period of inspection in such cases needs further consideration.

3/ The view was expressed that further consideration is needed on the relationship between the United Nations and the Organization with regard to investigations involving non-State Parties.

APPENDIX II

PRINCIPLES AND ORDER OF DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS 1/

1. The elaboration of the Order of Destruction shall build on the undiminished security for all States during the entire destruction stage, confidence-building in the early part of the destruction stage, gradual acquisition of experience in the course of destroying chemical weapons stocks and applicability irrespective of the actual composition or size of the stockpiles and the methods chosen for the destruction of the chemical weapons.

2. Each State Party possessing chemical weapons shall begin destruction not later than one year after it becomes a Party to the Convention, and all stockpiles must have been destroyed by the end of the tenth year after the entry into force of the Convention. 2/

3. The entire destruction period is divided into annual periods.

4. For the purpose of destruction, chemical weapons declared by each State Party are divided into three categories:

Category 1: Chemical weapons on the basis of Schedule 1 chemicals;

Category 2: Chemical weapons on the basis of all other chemicals;

Category 3: Unfilled munitions and devices, and equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with employment of chemical weapons.

5. The Order of Destruction shall be based on the principle of levelling out the stockpiles of chemical weapons of State Parties, while observing the principle of undiminished security. (The level of such stockpiles shall be agreed upon).

6. Each State Party possessing chemical weapons

- shall start the destruction of Category 1 chemical weapons not later than one year after it becomes a Party to the Convention, and shall complete it not later than 10 years after the entry into force of the Convention; the comparison factor for such weapons shall be agent tons, i.e. the aggregate weight of the chemicals within such Category,

1/ Some delegations drew attention to another proposal which suggests a specific phased approach, including a special phase for advance destruction by the largest chemical weapons owners until midway of the destruction period. This proposal is contained in CD/822 of 29 March 1988.

2/ The view was expressed that possible additional provisions applicable to States possessing chemical weapons but which ratify the Convention at a later stage would need to be discussed. The view was also expressed that the Convention should include from the beginning all States possessing chemical weapons. Another view was expressed that the final version of this paragraph depends on what is agreed in Article IV.

- shall start the destruction of Category 2 chemical weapons not later than one year after it becomes a Party to the Convention and shall complete it not later than five years after the entry into force of the Convention; the comparison factor for such weapons shall be agent tons, i.e. the aggregate weight of the chemicals within such Category,
- shall start the destruction of Category 3 chemical weapons not later than one year after it becomes a Party to the Convention, and shall complete it not later than five years after the entry into force of the Convention; the comparison factor(s) for unfilled munitions and devices shall be expressed in fill volume (m3) and for equipment in number of items.

7. Within each Category a State Party shall carry out the destruction in such a way that not more than what is specified in the table below remains at the end of each annual period. A State Party is not precluded from destroying its stocks at a faster pace.

TABLE

<u>Year</u>	<u>Category 1</u>	<u>Category 2</u>	<u>Category 3</u>
2			
3			
4			
5		(TO BE DEVELOPED)	
6			
7			
8			
9			
10			

8. Within each category a State Party shall determine its detailed plans for each annual period in such a way that not more than what is specified in the Convention will remain by the end of each such period.

These plans shall be submitted to and approved by the Executive Council, in accordance with the relevant provisions in Section V of the Annex to Article IV.

9. Each State Party shall report annually to the Organization on the implementation of the destruction in each annual period.

POSSIBLE FACTORS IDENTIFIED TO DETERMINE THE NUMBER, INTENSITY,
DURATION, TIMING AND MODE OF INSPECTIONS OF FACILITIES HANDLING
SCHEDULE 2 CHEMICALS 1/ 2/

1. Factors related to the listed chemical
 - (a) Toxicity of the end-product.
2. Factors related to the facility
 - (a) Multipurpose or dedicated facility.
 - (b) Capability and convertibility for initiating production of highly toxic chemicals.
 - (c) Production capacity.
 - (d) On-site storage of listed key precursors in quantities exceeding ... tonnes.
 - (e) Location of the facility and infrastructure for transportation.
3. Factors related to the activities carried out at the facility
 - (a) Production e.g. continuous, batch, types of equipment.
 - (b) Processing with conversion into another chemical.
 - (c) Processing without chemical conversion.
 - (d) Other types of activities, e.g. consumption, import, export, transfer.
 - (e) Volume produced, processed, consumed, transferred.
 - (f) Relationship between maximum and utilized capacity for a scheduled chemical.
 - multipurpose facility
 - dedicated facility
4. Other factors
 - (a) International monitoring by on-site instruments.
 - (b) Remote monitoring.

1/ The terminology of this material might have to be revised on the basis of the present stage of negotiations.

2/ The order in which these factors are listed does not indicate any priority.

REPORT ON HOW TO DEFINE "PRODUCTION CAPACITY" 1/

During the 1987 session, consultations were held with Lt. Col. Bretfeld (German Democratic Republic), Dr. Cooper (United Kingdom), Prof. Kuzmin (USSR), Dr. Mikulak (United States), Dr. Ooms (Netherlands) and Prof. Pfirschke (Federal Republic of Germany), as well as with Col. Koutepov (USSR) and Col. Lovelace (United States). This report summarized the results of the consultations, as seen by the rapporteur, Dr. Santesson (Sweden).

Although it was generally felt that it would be desirable to have one definition of "production capacity" applicable all through the Convention, it was also concluded that this might not be possible.

A definition could consist of a verbal part and a mathematical formula to be used for the calculation of the numerical value of the production capacity. Such a single definition, as exemplified below, could be utilized in the Annex to Article V, paragraphs I.A.5 (a) and I.B.7 (cf. in this context CD/CW/WP.148), in Annex 2 to Article VI, paragraph 2 in Annex 3 to Article VI, paragraph 1 (iv), and in the case of "Possible factors identified to determine ... Schedule 2 chemicals", contained in Appendix II.

On the basis of CD/CW/WP.171 and proposals presented during the consultations, the following suggestion was worked out.

Verbal part:

- Alt. 1 The production capacity is the annual quantitative potential for manufacturing a specific substance on the basis of the technological process used at a facility where the substance in question is actually produced.
- Alt. 2 The production capacity is the annual quantitative potential for manufacturing a specific substance on the basis of the technological process actually used or planned to be used at a facility.

Mathematical formulae:

Production capacity per year =

= $\frac{\text{quantity produced}}{\text{hours of production}} \times \text{constant} \times \text{no. of units}$

or in the case of dedicated units not yet in operation

= $\frac{\text{nameplate or design capacity}}{\text{hours of planned operation}} \times \text{constant} \times \text{no. of units}$

1/ As this material was developed prior to the elaboration of the Annex on Chemicals and the current text of Annex 1 to Article VI terminology and concepts therein do not fully reflect the present stage of negotiations.

The constant is the number of hours of availability per year. In both formulae, the constant will have different values for continuous and batch operations. Furthermore, different values may have to be assigned for "dedicated batch processes" and "multipurpose batch processes". The values of the constant remain to be determined.

It was noted that the formulae relate to the production step in which the product is actually formed. They might not necessarily be applicable e.g. to subsequent purification steps in the process.

It was also noted that in the case of multipurpose facilities producing more than one declared chemical, the production capacity of the facility for each of the chemicals should be calculated independently of the other chemicals being produced.

In the case of the Annex to Article VI [...], 1/ it appears that for limited production, the above mathematical formulae might possibly give rise to an overestimate of the actual production capacity. It was suggested that the formulae could be used if the annual production was more than five tonnes.

In the case of Annex 1 to Article VI it was felt that the above type of definition would be unsuitable and that other ways of delimiting the "production capacity" of the single small-scale production facility should be explored. 2/

Further refinement of the definition of production capacity is required. Also, methods for verification of the declared production capacity will have to be discussed. In this context opinions were expressed on the use of production log books and to which extent inspectors would need access to technical information on the production process.

As a continuation of the consultations reported in CD/795, further consultations were held with Dr. Boter (Netherlands), Lt. Col. Bretfeld (German Democratic Republic), Dr. Cooper (United Kingdom) Prof. Kuzmin (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), Prof. Pfirschke (Federal Republic of Germany) and Dr. Schröder (Federal Republic of Germany). This report summarizes the results of the continued consultations, as seen by the rapporteur, Dr. Santesson (Sweden).

In the view of the technical experts, "production capacity" could be defined thus:

1/ Work during the 1989 session led to the deletion of Schedule [...] and the creation of Schedule 2 part B.

2/ The current delimitation of "production capacity" of the single small-scale facility is expressed in terms of mode of operation and volume of reaction vessels in Annex 1 to Article VI.

The production capacity is the annual quantitative potential for manufacturing a specific substance on the basis of the technological process actually used or, in case of processes not yet operational, planned to be used at the facility, as specified in the subsidiary agreements.

For the purpose of the declaration, an approximate production capacity shall be calculated using the formula:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Production capacity (tons/year)} &= \\ &= \frac{\text{des. cap.}}{\text{pl. op. hours}} \times \text{op. factor} \times \text{no. of units} \end{aligned}$$

where:

des. cap. = nameplate or design capacity of one unit (tons/year)
pl. op. hours = hours of planned operation to achieve the design capacity
op. factor = operational factor (hours)

The operational factor should take into account the various facility-specific and process-specific factors which would affect the actual practical production capacity, and could e.g. be determined during the initial visit. A need might exist for a provisional value of the operational factor to be applied before the initial visit has taken place.

MODELS FOR AGREEMENTS

A. MODEL FOR AN AGREEMENT RELATING TO FACILITIES PRODUCING,
PROCESSING OR CONSUMING CHEMICALS LISTED IN SCHEDULE 2

1. Information on the facility producing, processing, or consuming chemicals listed in Schedule 2

(a) Identification of the site and the facility

- (i) Site identification code
- (ii) Name of the complex/site
- (iii) Owner(s) of the complex/site on which the facility is located
- (iv) Name of the company/enterprise operating the facility
- (v) Exact location of the facility
 - (1) Address and location (geographic co-ordinates) of the head-quarter building(s) of the site/complex
 - (2) Location (including the geographic co-ordinates, specific building and structure number) of the plant/reactor within the site/complex
 - (3) Location(s) of the relevant building(s)/structure(s) comprising the facility within the site/complex.

These might include:

- (a) Headquarters and other offices
 - (b) Operation Process Unit
 - (c) Storage/handling areas for feedstock and product
 - (d) Purification equipment
 - (e) Effluent/waste handling/treatment area
 - (f) All associated and interconnecting pipework
 - (g) Control/analytical laboratory
 - (h) Warehouse storage
 - (i) Records associated with the movement of the declared chemical and its feedstock or product chemicals formed from it, as appropriate, into, around and from the site
 - (j) Medical centre
- (vi) Other areas to which Inspectors have access.

(b) Detailed technical information

Design information to be obtained during the initial visit should, as relevant, include:

- (i) Data on the production process (type of process: e.g. continuous or batch; type of equipment; the technology employed; process engineering particulars)
- (ii) Data on processing with conversion into another chemical (description of the conversion process, process engineering particulars and end-product)
- (iii) Data on processing without chemical conversion (process engineering particulars, description of the process and the end-product, concentration of processed chemical in the end-product)
- (iv) Data on feedstocks used in the production of processing of declared chemicals (type and capacity of storage)
- (v) Data on product storage (type and capacity of storage)
- (vi) Data on waste/effluent treatment (disposal and/or storage; waste/effluent treatment technology; recycling)
- (vii) Data on clean-up procedures and general maintenance and overhauls
- (viii) Plan of the complex/site showing the location of the facility as defined in paragraph 1 (a) (v) and other areas as specified in paragraph 1 (a) (vi), including, with functions specified, for example, all buildings, structures, pipework, roads, fences, mains electricity, water and gas points
- (ix) Diagram indicating the relevant material flow and sampling points at the facility.

(c) Data on safety and health measures on-site

(d) Identification of the required degree of confidentiality for information provided during the elaboration of the agreement.

2. Specific facility health and safety rules and regulations to be observed by Inspectors

3. Inspections

On-site inspection activities may include, but shall not necessarily be restricted to, the following:

- (i) Observation of any and all activities at the facility including safety measures

- (ii) Identification and examination of any and all equipment at the facility
- (iii) Identification, verification and registration of any technological or other changes in comparison with the detailed technical information ascertained when the facility agreement was worked out
- (iv) Identification and examination of documentation and records
- (v) Installation, review, servicing, maintenance and removal of monitoring equipment and seals
- (vi) Identification and validation of measuring and other analytical equipment (examination and calibration using, as appropriate, independent standards)
- (vii) Taking of analytical samples and their analysis
- (viii) Investigation of indications of irregularities.

4. Monitoring with instruments on-site

- (a) Specification of items and their locations
 - (i) Instruments supplied by the Technical Secretariat
 - (ii) Instruments at/supplied by the facility
- (b) Installation of the instruments and seals, as appropriate
 - (i) Time schedule
 - (ii) Advance preparations
 - (iii) assistance provided by the facility during installation
- (c) Activation, initial testing and certification
- (d) Operation
 - (i) Operating mode
 - (ii) Routine testing provisions
 - (iii) Service and maintenance
 - (iv) Measures in case of malfunctions
 - (v) Replacement, modernization and removal
- (e) Responsibilities of the State Party

5. Instruments and other equipment to be used during the inspections

- (a) Instruments and other equipment brought in by the Inspectors
 - (i) Description
 - (ii) Examination, as appropriate, by the facility
 - (iii) Use
- (b) Instruments and other equipment provided by the State Party
 - (i) Description
 - (ii) Testing, calibration and examination by the Inspectors
 - (iii) Use and maintenance

6. Sample-taking, on-site analysis of samples

- (a) Identification of routine sampling points from
 - production or process unit
 - stocks, including warehouse, feedstock, storage
- (b) Other sample-taking (including wipe samples, environmental and waste/effluent samples)
- (c) Sample-taking/handling procedures
- (d) On-site analyses (e.g. provisions concerning on-site/in-house analyses, analytical methods, sensitivity and accuracy of analyses)

7. Removal of samples from the facility

- (a) in-house analysis off-site
- (b) other

8. Records and other documentation

- (1) Records
 - (a) Accounting records e.g., quantities of all relevant chemicals moved on to and off site
 - (b) Operating records e.g., quantities of chemicals moved through the process unit
 - (c) Calibration records as appropriate.

- (2) Other documentation
- (3) Location of records/documentation
- (4) Access to records/documentation
- (5) Language of records/documentation

9. Confidentiality

Identification of the required degree of confidentiality for information obtained during the inspection;

10. Services to be provided

Such services may include, but shall not necessarily be restricted to the following:

- (a) Medical and health services
- (b) Office space for Inspectors
- (c) Laboratory space for Inspectors
- (d) Technical assistance
- (e) Communications
- (f) Power and cooling water supplies for instruments
- (g) Interpretation services

For each type of services, the following information shall be included:

- (a) The extent to which that service shall be provided
- (b) Points of contact at the facility for the service

11. Updating, changes and revisions of the agreement

12. Other matters

Explanatory note

During the review of the Model for an Agreement relating to facilities producing, processing or consuming chemicals listed in Schedule 2 the words facility, plant, operating process unit, site and complex have been understood as follows:

1. Site. An area, whether or not within a retaining boundary, which is under the operational control of the HQ defined in para. 1 (a) V (1). A site may contain one or more plants.
2. Complex. A large area comprising a number of autonomous sites which are not necessarily under the same operational control. There is doubt about the validity of this concept for this model for agreement.
3. Plant. A relatively self-contained area/structure located on a site in which the production, processing or consumption of a particular type of chemical occurs (e.g., an organophosphorus plant, a packaging plant), or where particular types of operating units are grouped e.g., a multi-purpose plant. A plant may contain one or more operating process units.
4. Operating Process Unit. The central array of equipment in a particular plant wherein the declared chemical is produced, processed or consumed. This might include reactor vessel, distillation and condenser units.
5. Facility. All structures and buildings (referred to in para. 1 above) associated with the production, consumption and processing of the declared chemical.

These might include:

- (a) Headquarters and other offices
- (b) Operation Process Unit
- (c) Storage/handling areas for feedstock and product
- (d) Purification equipment
- (e) Effluent/waste handling/treatment area
- (f) All associated and interconnecting pipework
- (g) Control/Analytic laboratory
- (h) Warehouse storage
- (i) Records associated with the movement of the declared chemical and its feedstock or product chemicals formed from it, as appropriate, into, around and leaving the site
- (j) Medical centre

B. MODEL FOR AN AGREEMENT RELATING TO
SINGLE SMALL-SCALE FACILITIES 1/

Proposal by the Co-ordinator of Cluster IV for the 1987 session

1. Information on the single small-scale facility

(a) Identification

- (i) Facility identification code
- (ii) Name of the facility
- (iii) Exact location of the facility

If the facility is located within a complex, then also

- . Location of the complex
- . Location of the facility within the complex, including the specific building and structure number, if any
- . Location of relevant support facilities within the complex, e.g. research and technical services, laboratories, medical centres, waste treatment plants
- . Determination of the area(s) and place(s)/site(s) to which Inspectors shall have access

(b) Detailed technical information

- (i) Maps and plans of the facility, including site maps showing, with functions indicated, for example, all buildings, pipework, roads, fences, mains electricity, water and gas points, diagrams indicating the relevant material flow at the designated facility and data on infrastructure for transportation
- (ii) Data on each production process (type of process, type of equipment, technology employed, production capacity, process engineering particulars)
- (iii) Data on the feedstocks used (type of feedstock, storage capacity)
- (iv) Data on the storage of the chemicals produced (type and capacity of storage)
- (v) Data on waste treatment (disposal and/or storage, waste treatment technology, recycling)

1/ Prepared by Lt. Col. Bretfeld, German Democratic Republic; Dr. Cooper, United Kingdom; Dr. Lau, Sweden; and Dr. Santesson, Sweden.

(c) Specific facility health and safety procedures to be observed by Inspectors

(d) Dates

(i) Date when the initial visit took place

(ii) Date(s) when additional information was provided

(e) Storage of information

Identification of which information, provided about the facility under paragraph 1, shall be kept by the Technical Secretariat under lock and key at the facility.

2. Number and modalities of inspections

The number and modalities of inspections shall be decided by the Technical Secretariat on the basis of guidelines.

3. Inspections

On-site inspection activities may include, but shall not necessarily be restricted to, the following:

(i) Observation of any and all activities at the facility

(ii) Examination of any and all equipment at the facility

(iii) Identification of technological changes in the production process

(iv) Comparison of process parameters with those ascertained during the initial visit

(v) Verification of chemical inventory records

(vi) Verification of equipment inventory records

(vii) Review, servicing and maintenance of monitoring equipment

(viii) Identification and validation of measuring equipment (examination and calibration of measuring equipment, verification of measuring systems using, as appropriate, independent standards)

(ix) Application, examination, removal and renewal of seals

(x) Investigation of indicated irregularities

4. Monitoring system

(a) Description of items and their location

(i) Sensors and other instruments

- (ii) Data transmission system
- (iii) Ancillary equipment
- (iv) ...
- (b) Installation of the system
 - (i) Time schedule
 - (ii) Advance preparations
 - (iii) Assistance to be provided by the State Party during installation
- (c) Activation, initial testing and certification
- (d) Operation
 - (i) Regular operation
 - (ii) Routine tests
 - (iii) Service and maintenance
 - (iv) Measures in case of malfunctions
 - (v) Responsibilities of the State Party
- (e) Replacement, modernization

5. Temporary closure

- (a) Notification procedure
- (b) Description of the types of seals to be used
- (c) Description of how and where seals shall be fixed
- (d) Provisions for surveillance and monitoring

6. Instruments and other equipment to be used during inspections

- (a) Instruments and other equipment installed or brought in by Inspectors
 - (i) Description
 - (ii) Testing, calibration and examination by the State Party
 - (iii) Use
- (b) Instruments and other equipment to be provided by the State Party
 - (i) Description

(ii) Testing, calibration and examination by Inspectors

(iii) Use and maintenance

7. Sample-taking, on-site analyses of samples and on-site analysis equipment

(a) Sample-taking from production

(b) Sample-taking from stocks

(c) Other sample-taking

(d) Duplicates and additional samples

(e) On-site analyses (e.g. provisions concerning on-site/in-house analyses, analytical methods, equipment, precision and accuracy of analyses)

8. Records. The records to be examined shall be determined after the initial visit and shall include the following:

(a) Accounting records

(b) Operating records

(c) Calibration records

The following shall be determined on the basis of the initial visit:

(a) Location and language of records

(b) Access to records

(c) Retention period of records

9. Administrative arrangements

(a) Preparations for the arrival and departure of Inspectors

(b) Transport of Inspectors

(c) Accommodation for Inspectors

(d) ...

10. Services to be provided ^{1/}

Such services may include, but shall not necessarily be restricted to, the following:

(a) Medical and health services

^{1/} The question of charges for the services needs to be discussed.

- (b) Office space for Inspectors
- (c) Laboratory space for Inspectors
- (d) Technical assistance
- (e) Telephone and telex
- (f) Power and cooling water supplies for instruments
- (g) Interpretation services

For each type of service, the following information shall be included:

- (a) The extent to which that service shall be provided
- (b) Points of contact at the facility for the service

11. Other matters

12. Revisions of the agreement

C. MODEL FOR AN AGREEMENT RELATING TO CHEMICAL
WEAPONS STORAGE FACILITIES 1/

Proposal by the Co-ordinator of Cluster IV for the 1987 session

1. Information on the storage facility

(a) Identification:

- (i) Storage facility identification code;
- (ii) Name of the storage facility;
- (iii) Exact location of the storage facility.

(b) Dates:

- (i) Date of the initial verification of the Declaration of the facility;
- (ii) Date(s) additional information provided

(c) Layout:

- (i) Maps and plans of the facility, including
 - boundary map to show entrances, exits, nature of boundary (e.g. fence);
 - site maps to include locations of all buildings and other structures, bunkers/storage areas, fences with access points indicated, mains electricity and water points, and infrastructure for transports including loading areas;
- (ii) Details of the construction of bunkers/storage areas which might be of relevance for verification measures;
- (iii) ...

(d) Detailed inventory of the contents of each bunker/storage area;

(e) Specific facility health and safety procedures to be observed by Inspectors.

2. Information relating to the transport of chemical weapons from the facility

(a) Detailed description of loading area(s);

(b) Detailed description of loading procedures;

1/ Prepared by Lt. Col. Bretfeld, German Democratic Republic; Dr. Cooper, United Kingdom; Dr. Lau, Sweden; and Dr. Santesson, Sweden.

- (c) Type of transport to be used, including construction details relevant to verification activities, e.g. where to place seals;
- (d) ...

3. Number and modalities of systematic inspections, etc.

The number and modalities of systematic inspections will be decided by the Technical Secretariat on the basis of guidelines.

4. Inspections

(a) Systematic on-site inspections

Systematic on-site inspection activities may include, but are not necessarily restricted to, the following:

- (i) Application, examination, removal and renewal of seals;
- (ii) Review, servicing and maintenance of monitoring equipment;
- (iii) Verification of the inventory of randomly selected sealed bunkers/storage areas.
 - Percentage of bunkers/storage areas to be verified during each systematic on-site inspection.

(b) On-site inspections of transports from the facility

On-site inspections of transports of chemical weapons from the storage facility may include, but are not necessarily restricted to, the following:

- (i) Application, examination, removal and renewal of any seals relevant to the transportation of chemical weapons;
- (ii) Verification of the inventory of bunkers/storage areas from which chemical weapons are to be transported;
- (iii) Observation of the loading procedure and verification of items loaded;
- (iv) Adjustment/realignment of the coverage of the monitoring system.

(c) Inspections to resolve indicated irregularities (ad hoc inspections)

Ad hoc inspection activities may include, but are not necessarily restricted to, the following:

- (i) Investigation of indicated irregularities;
- (ii) Examination, removal and renewal of seals;
- (iii) Verification as required of the inventory of bunkers/storage areas.

(d) Continuous presence of Inspectors

The activities of continuously present Inspectors may include, but are not necessarily restricted to, the following:

- (i) Application, examination, removal and renewal of seals;
- (ii) Verification of the inventory of any selected sealed bunkers/storage areas;
- (iii) Observation of any and all activities at the storage facility, including any handling of stored chemical weapons for the purpose of transport from the storage facility.

5. Seals and markers

- (a) Description of types of seals and markers
- (b) How and where seals are to be fixed

6. Monitoring system

- (a) Description of items and their locations:
 - (i) Sensors and other instruments;
 - (ii) Data transmission system;
 - (iii) Ancillary equipment;
 - (iv) ...
- (b) Installation:
 - (i) Time schedule;
 - (ii) Advance preparations at the storage facility;
 - (iii) Assistance to be provided by the State Party during installation.
- (c) Activation, initial testing and certification
- (d) Operation:
 - (i) Regular operation;
 - (ii) Routine tests;
 - (iii) Service and maintenance;
 - (iv) Measures in case of malfunctions;
 - (v) Responsibilities of the State Party.

(e) Replacements, modernizations

(f) Dismantling and removal

7. Provisions governing instruments and other equipment to be used during inspections

(a) Instruments and other equipment brought in by Inspectors:

(i) Description;

(ii) Testing, calibration and examination by the State Party;

(iii) Routine use.

(b) Instruments and other equipment to be provided by the State Party:

(i) Description;

(ii) Testing, calibration and examination by Inspectors;

(iii) Routine use and maintenance.

8. Provisions governing sample-taking, on-site analyses of samples and on-site analysis equipment

(a) Sample-taking from munitions, notably the standardization of methods for each different type of munition present at the facility

(b) Sample-taking from bulk stocks

(c) Other sample-taking

(d) Duplicates and additional samples

(e) On-site analyses (e.g. provisions concerning on-site/in-house analyses, analytical methods, equipment, precision and accuracy of analyses)

9. Administrative arrangements

(a) Preparations for arrival of Inspectors

(b) Transport for Inspectors

(c) Accommodation for Inspectors

(d) ...

10. Services to be provided ^{1/}

Such services should include, but are not necessarily restricted to, the following:

- medical and health services;
- office space for Inspectors;
- laboratory space for Inspectors;
- technical assistance;
- telephone and telex;
- power and cooling water supplies for instruments;
- interpretation services.

For each type of service, the following information should be included:

- the extent to which that service is to be provided;
- point of contact at the facility for the service.

11. Amendments and revisions of the agreement

(e.g. changes in loading procedures, types of transport, analytical methods)

12. Other matters

^{1/} The question of charges for the services needs to be discussed.

OUTCOME OF THE OPEN-ENDED CONSULTATIONS ON THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

Working basis on composition and decision-making process

During the 1989 session, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee carried out private and open-ended consultations on the composition and decision-making process of the Executive Council.

This paper contains the preliminary outcome of these consultations. It is presented with the aim of facilitating the further consideration of this issue. It should be stressed that delegations involved in the consultations accepted, as a working basis only, a hypothetical Executive Council of 25 members, then proceeded to examine issues associated with the Executive Council on that basis. Neither the basic hypothesis nor the options discussed about size, composition, allocation of seats and decision-making process, nor any of the positions formulated during the consultations constitute agreement; they do not necessarily represent any delegation's national position.

A. Size 1/

1. The Executive Council shall be composed of (25?) 2/ States Parties to the Convention, (with ... members?) elected for a (3?)-year term.
2. (8/9?) members shall be elected every (?) years(s). 3/
3. Monthly rotating chairmanship / or Chairman elected for (1?) year by the Executive Council/or the Conference of the States Parties; / or the Chairman of the Conference of the States Parties shall serve as a non-voting Chairman of the Executive Council.

B. Composition

Taking into account the eligibility of each State Party to serve on the Executive Council and the need to ensure an equitable balance in membership, its composition:

1. shall be based on the representation of the five regional groups of the United Nations;
2. and on / the national capacity in the relevant 4/ chemical industry / and on / the political factor/

1/ The possibility of a specific decision on change in size of the Executive Council to be provided for in advance has been discussed.

2/ Proposals made range from 15 to 35.

3/ The subjects of re-election and of non-elected members have been discussed.

4/ The view was expressed that the word "relevant" should be further discussed.

C. Allocation of seats

1. The allocation of seats could be made on the following basis:
 - Each of the five regional groups will be allotted (3?) seats; these will be filled by members elected by the Conference of the States Parties on the proposals by the regional groups.
 - The remaining seats (10?) will be filled (on proposal by the Executive Council,) in accordance with paragraph B.2 (by members elected by the Conference of the States Parties).
2. A number of concrete formulae could be derived from A., B. and C.1 1/

1/ The following concrete formulae have been discussed:

- (a) Allocation of 5 seats per regional group of the United Nations, taking into account the industrial and political considerations within each region.
- (b) Allocation of seats to the 5 permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, with the remaining seats apportioned equally among the 5 regional groups.
- (c) Allocation of 3 seats per regional group and 10 seats on the basis of industrial criterion to be determined.
- (d) Allocation of 5 seats to the 5 most industrially advanced States Parties in the world; allocation of one seat each to the industrially most advanced States Parties in the regions not covered by the first category; and allocation of the remaining seats to the 5 regional groups, with 4 seats for the 2 groups not covered by the second category.
- (e) Allocation of 3 seats per regional group and 10 seats on the basis of the political factor to be determined.
- (f) Allocation of 3 seats per regional group; and 10 seats on the basis of industrial criteria to be determined, with at least 3 of the latter being allotted to Latin America/Africa/Asia.
- (g) Allocation of 3 seats per regional group; allocation of 5 seats to the industrially most advanced States Parties; allocation of 5 seats taking into account the political factor following a 2-1-1-1 pattern.
- (h) (10?) seats on proposal by the Executive Council "amongst States Members whose presence in the Executive Council would be beneficial for the good functioning of the Convention"; allocation of 4 seats per regional group of which 2 seats to the industrially most advanced States Parties of each group not included in the former category.
- (i) Allocation of seats on the basis of the requirement of regional spread and the weight to be allotted to a country in relation to its industrial importance.

D. Decision-making process

1. Each member of the Executive Council has one vote.
2. The decision-making process of the Executive Council could be based on: simple majority for matters of procedure; consensus for matters of substance; and after ... hours a majority of (...).
3. Voting requirements other than a two-thirds majority could be developed in order to prevent any preponderance. */

*/ A view was expressed that, in order to prevent preponderance, the decision-making process should be such that no one regional group could impose a decision on others and, in turn, could not be imposed upon with a decision it does not agree with.

CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION 1/

During the verification activities under the Chemical Weapons Convention the proper balance should be observed between the degree of intrusiveness and the need to protect confidential information. Only when necessary data reporting and verification should rely on confidential information. Its handling shall not be in conflict with the existing international legal norms, namely with regard to the protection of intellectual property. In drawing the rules for handling and protection of confidential information the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat shall use the following classification, establishing the level of confidentiality of information:

(a) Information, which could be released for public use through the official reports of the Organization to the United Nations or other institutions or upon request to States Non-Parties to the CWC, various organizations or individuals. The Executive Council shall determine the general parameters covering the release of information for public use, within which the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat shall consider and decide upon individual requests. Requests going beyond these parameters shall be referred to the Executive Council for decision. However, information from other classifications related to specified States Parties shall not be made public without the consent of the State Party concerned. The Director-General may disseminate any other information in accordance with a request by a State Party to which the information refers. This category shall cover, i.a., general information on the course of the implementation of the Convention.

(b) Information with distribution limited to States Parties to the Convention. The main source of such information will be the Initial and Annual Declarations on the aggregate quantities of chemicals produced and number of facilities operating in individual States Parties. Data of such nature might be included in the reports to various bodies of the Organization. States Parties shall have easy access to such information and shall treat it as confidential (e.g. not to be offered to press). A routine distribution of this information shall be made to the Executive Council members and to the Technical Secretariat. Data, not contained in the regular reports, might be requested by States Parties. The Director-General shall respond positively to such requests, unless they contravene the agreed rules for the classification of confidential information.

(c) Information limited to the Technical Secretariat, to be used primarily for the planning, preparation and carrying out of verification activities. This category shall comprise mainly detailed, facility-related information, obtained from the relevant declarations, facility attachments and conclusions from on-site inspections. The Director-General shall regulate the access to such information by the Technical Secretariat personnel on the "need-to-know" basis. Respect by the International Inspectorate and other Technical Secretariat personnel for confidential nature of information

1/ This material shall be transferred to the Preparatory Commission/ Director-General of the Technical Secretariat for consideration in the elaboration of relevant regulations.

obtained will be ensured through contracts or appropriate recruitment and employment procedures as well as agreed measures applied against the Technical Secretariat staff in case of breach of rules for the protection of confidential information. Most sensitive information might be stored under code numbers rather than names of countries and facilities. Information, achieved through generalization of the facility-related data, could be, in accordance with the agreed procedure, released for use by States Parties.

(d) Most sensitive kind of confidential information, containing data required only for the actual performance of an inspection like, e.g. blueprints, specific data related to technological processes, types of records. Such information shall be limited to justified needs for protection of technological know-how and shall only be available to inspectors on the site. It shall not be taken from the premises.

* * *

The rules for classifying and handling of confidential information should contain sufficiently clear criteria ensuring:

- inclusion of information into appropriate category of confidentiality;
- establishing justified durability of confidential nature of information;
- rights of States Parties providing confidential information;
- procedures allowing, if necessary, to move a kind of information from one confidentiality category to another;
- modifications, when necessary, of procedures for handling individual categories of information.

OUTCOME OF THE OPEN-ENDED CONSULTATIONS ON ARTICLE IX, PART 2:
ON-SITE INSPECTION ON CHALLENGE

During the 1989 session, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee carried out private and open-ended consultations on Article IX, Part 2 (on-site inspection on challenge). 1/ These consultations were based on the text elaborated by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee for the 1987 session, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden and by the Chairman of Working Group C for the 1988 session, as contained in CD/952, Appendix II, pages 193-195.

This paper contains the outcome of these consultations but does not address all the issues covered in the former text. The paper is not presented as a draft Article IX, Part 2, but with the aim of furthering the process of elaboration of Article IX. Although the text of this paper is unbracketed, it does not necessarily constitute agreement.

1. Each State Party has the right to request an on-site inspection in any other State Party in order to clarify (and resolve) any matter which causes doubts about compliance with the provisions of the Convention, or any concern about a matter pertaining to the implementation of the Convention and which is considered ambiguous, and to have this inspection conducted anywhere, at any time and without delay by a team of inspectors designated by the Technical Secretariat. The inspection shall be mandatory, with no right of refusal. A requesting State is under the obligation to keep the request within the scope of the Convention. Throughout the inspection, the requested State has the right and is under the obligation to demonstrate its compliance with the Convention.

2. The request shall be submitted by the requesting State to the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat, 2/ 3/ who shall immediately notify the State to be inspected and inform the members of the Executive Council (as well as all other States Parties). The requesting State Party shall, as precisely as possible, specify the site to be inspected 4/ and the matters on which reassurance is required, including the nature of the suspected non-compliance, as well as indicate the relevant provisions of the Convention about which doubts of compliance have arisen.

1/ A view was expressed that these consultations are preliminary, exploratory in nature and inexhaustive. Some major elements contained in this document require further consideration, and there are some other elements to be examined.

2/ A view was expressed that the request should be channelled through a Fact-finding Panel.

3/ It has been pointed out that there is a need to discuss ways and means to prevent misuse of such requests.

4/ Possible specification of the site in two steps to be further discussed.

3. The mandate of the team of inspectors for the conduct of the inspection is the request put into operational terms, and must conform with the request. The team shall conduct the requested on-site inspection with the purpose of establishing relevant facts. The inspection team shall have the access to the site it deems necessary for the conduct of the inspection. It shall conduct the inspection in the least intrusive manner consistent with the effective and timely accomplishment of their task. The time-frame within which the team shall arrive at the site, secure it the way it deems necessary, have access to it and perform and conclude the inspection, and the relevant procedures, as well as the relationship of the representative of the requesting State to the inspection team and to the requested State are specified in (the Annex to this Article and in) the Protocol on Inspection Procedures.

4. The requested State shall be under the obligation to admit the inspection team and the representative of the requesting State into the country, to assist the team throughout the inspection and to facilitate the task of the inspection team. In keeping with its right and obligation, the requested State may propose to the inspection team ways and means for the actual conduct of the inspection and also the protection of sensitive equipment or information not related to the Convention. The inspection team shall consider the proposals made to the extent it deems them adequate for the conduct of its mission. 1/

5. In the exceptional case that the requested State proposes arrangements to demonstrate compliance, alternative to a full and comprehensive access, it shall inform the inspection team and make every effort, through consultations with the requesting State / and the inspection team 2/ / to reach agreement on the modalities for establishing the facts and thereby clarify the doubts. If no agreement is reached within 24 hours,

- the inspection shall be carried out in accordance with the request,
- or the inspection team shall carry out the inspection in accordance with the inspection mandate as it deems necessary;
- or the inspection team shall take the decision;
- or the inspection team shall carry out the inspection in accordance with the guidelines set by the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat. 1/

6. The Director-General of the Technical Secretariat shall promptly transmit the report of the inspection team, which shall be factual (and contain, if necessary, individual observations of inspectors), to the requesting State, to

1/ The concepts of alternative measures and managed access need further clarification.

2/ Further consideration is necessary on whether it is the requesting State Party or the inspection team or both which would agree on alternatives to access.

the requested State, to the Executive Council and to all other States Parties. 1/ He shall further transmit promptly to the Executive Council the assessment 2/ of the requesting State, the views of the requested State and the views of other States Parties which may be conveyed to him for that purpose, and then provide them to all States Parties. 3/ When requested by any State Party, 4/ the Executive Council shall meet within 48 hours to review the situation and consider any appropriate further action necessary 5/ to redress the situation and ensure that the Convention is being complied with, including specific proposals to the Conference of the States Parties. 6/ The Executive Council shall inform the States Parties of the outcome of its meeting. 7/

1/ Further consideration is needed as to the nature of the report and as to how much of its contents is to be provided to all States Parties in view of the sensitivity of information possibly contained therein.

2/ A view was expressed that the term "assessment" is too vague.

3/ Further discussion is needed with regard to the decision-making process and actions of States Parties and organizational bodies following a challenge inspection.

4/ A view was expressed that the meeting of the Executive Council should be automatic.

5/ A view was expressed that, with regard to follow-on actions of the Executive Council, it should not take a vote on the inspection report nor on whether a party is complying with the Convention. In this regard, the question of what further action the Executive Council might recommend, including possible sanctions after any on-site inspection, needs further consideration and discussion.

6/ A view was expressed that in view of Article VIII procedures, this sentence is not necessary nor appropriate here. Placing it here seems to limit the many possible courses of action available to States Parties, the Executive Council and Conference of States Parties after a challenge inspection.

7/ The view was expressed that further consideration is needed as to the extent to which the process after the submission of the inspection report should be spelt out in Article IX.

Article X: Assistance and Protection against Chemical Weapons

1. For the purposes of this Article, protection against chemical weapons, which contributes to the undiminished security of States Parties, covers inter alia, the following areas: detection equipment and alarm systems, protective equipment, decontamination equipment and decontaminants, medical antidotes and treatments and advice on any of these protective measures. [Assistance means the co-ordination and delivery of such protection to States Parties.]

2. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as impeding the right of any State Party to the Convention to conduct research into, develop, produce, acquire, transfer or use means of protection against chemical weapons, for purposes not prohibited by the Convention.

3. [All States Parties to the Convention undertake to facilitate, and shall have the right to participate in, the fullest possible] [Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as impeding the right of States Parties to] exchange [of] equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning means of protection against chemical weapons.

4. The Technical Secretariat shall establish and maintain, for the use of any requesting State Party, a data bank containing freely available information concerning various means of protection against chemical weapons as well as such information as may be provided by States Parties.

The Technical Secretariat shall also, within the resources available to it, and at the request of a State Party, provide experts for advice and assist it in identifying how its programmes for the development and improvement of a protective capacity against chemical weapons could be implemented.

5. [Each State Party has the right to request and shall receive assistance and protection against use or threat of use of chemical weapons, (hereinafter referred to as "assistance") from the Organization and States Parties] [Each State Party has the right to request from other States Parties protection against chemical weapons, and from the Organization, assistance in this regard] if it considers that

- (i) chemical weapons have been used against it;
- (ii) it faces actions or activities by any State which are prohibited for States Parties to this Convention. 1/

1/ It is understood that if a State Party considers that it faces actions or activities by another State Party which might be otherwise incompatible with the purposes and objectives of the Convention, it has the right to request clarification in accordance with paragraphs 3-7 of Article IX.

6. [Each State Party undertakes to provide or support assistance] [as it may deem appropriate]. [For this purpose it may elect:

- (i) to contribute to the voluntary fund for assistance;
- (ii) to conclude, if possible within six months after the entry into force of the Convention, agreements with the Organization concerning the procurement, upon demand, of medical aid, medical treatment, protection equipment, services and technical advice;
- (iii) to declare within six months after the entry into force of the Convention the kind of assistance and protection it might provide in response to an appeal by the Organization.

The Organization shall [be empowered to] establish a voluntary fund, conclude agreements and receive declarations to implement the provisions set forth in this paragraph.]

7. The Organization shall [provide] [process a request for] assistance in accordance with the following provisions:

(a) the request shall be addressed to the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat and shall be accompanied by relevant [reliable and] specific information [on the nature of the circumstances];

(b) the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat shall:

- (i) immediately inform the Executive Council, all States Parties [and the United Nations Security Council] about the request;
- (ii) initiate within [24] hours an investigation 1/2/3/ in order to provide the foundation for [any] action by [the Organization] [or States Parties]. The investigation shall, as appropriate and in conformity with the request and the information accompanying it, establish facts related to the request as well as to the types and scope of assistance [and protection] necessary.

1/ The relationship between this investigation and any concurrent Article IX investigation by the Organization need further consideration and discussion.

2/ A view was expressed that the relationship with, and co-ordination between, this investigation and investigative activities of other international organizations, e.g. United Nations and The Red Cross, need further consideration and discussion.

3/ The ability of the Organization to investigate actions involving a non-State Party needs further consideration.

The investigation shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures ... (to be developed). 1/2/

(c) In case the information available from the ongoing investigation and other reliable sources would give sufficient proof that there are victims of use of chemical weapons and immediate action is indispensable, the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat shall provide such information to the Executive Council and all States Parties and [initiate] [initiate contacts and co-ordinate] emergency measures of assistance [in close consultation with the Executive Council] [with the prior consent of the Executive Council]. 3/

(d) After submission of the investigation report [and if requested by a State Party], the Executive Council shall meet within [24] hours to consider it [and shall take action not later than eight hours following the start of the consideration]. [On the basis of the report] [Following this consideration], the Executive Council shall [decide on the provision of assistance in conformity with paragraph 6] [decide on the utilization of resources available in conformity with paragraph 6] [and] [make recommendations to States Parties on the provision of assistance].

[The decision of the Executive Council shall be taken by a simple majority]. The report of the investigation and [the decision taken by] [any recommendation of] the Executive Council shall be communicated to all States Parties.

(e) The Director-General of the Technical Secretariat shall [implement the decision of the Executive Council] in close co-operation with the requesting State Party, other States Parties and relevant international agencies [and] [co-ordinate the collection and distribution of assistance].

1/ In elaborating the procedures, appropriate elements of the inspection procedures under Article IX, including the time frames set forth therein, as well as the experience gained through investigations by the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the possible use of chemical weapons, shall be taken into account.

2/ The need for quick and timely reporting, including interim reporting if necessary, as well as for speedy conclusion of the investigation has to be further elaborated.

3/ In order to make emergency measures more effective, it has been proposed that sets of material be prepared and put as first-aid kit at the disposal of the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat.

Article XI: Economic and technological development 1/

1. The provisions of this Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed, in so far as possible, to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of Parties to the Convention and international co-operation in the field of peaceful chemical activities including the international exchange of scientific and technical information and chemicals and equipment for the production, processing or use of chemicals for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

2. The States Parties to this Convention, subject to its provisions, shall:

(a) have the right, individually or collectively, to conduct research with, to develop, produce, acquire, retain, transfer and use chemicals;

(b) undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of chemicals, equipment and scientific and technical information relating to the development and application of chemistry for purposes not prohibited by this Convention;

(c) not impose any restrictions [on a discriminatory basis] which would impede development and promotion of scientific and technological knowledge in the field of chemistry.

This provision shall be without prejudice to the generally recognized principles and applicable rules of international law concerning peaceful chemical activities [including those concerning any proprietary rights and environmental or health protection].

1/ Some delegations expressed the view that this Article required further consideration. In particular, in their view, there exists no common understanding as to the definition of key terms in the wording proposed for this Article, and therefore no clear picture of the extent of the obligations to be undertaken by States Parties.

Article XII: Relation to other international agreements 1/

1. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the [obligations] [rights and obligations] assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, and under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, signed at London, Moscow and Washington on 10 April 1972.

Each Party to this Convention that is also Party to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925, affirms that the obligation set forth in paragraph 3 of Article I supplements its obligations under the Protocol.

or/and

2. This Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations of States Parties which arise from other agreements compatible with this Convention.

- or alternatively -

None of the provisions of this Convention shall suspend or modify the commitments undertaken by States Parties pursuant to other international instruments related to this Convention.

1/ Several delegations expressed the view that this article was not needed.

Article XIII: Amendments

1. Any State Party may, in accordance with the agreed procedures, propose amendments to any provision of this Convention.

2. [No amendments may be made to [any provision] [Provisions ...] during the 10-year destruction period provided for under Articles IV and V. However, if deemed necessary during this period, a Conference of the States Parties may unanimously adopt amendments to these Articles. These amendments shall enter into force only after ratification instruments of all States Parties present and voting at the Conference of the States Parties have been deposited.]

3. Any amendment to the present Convention shall be adopted by a majority of [3/4] [4/5] [9/10] of States Parties [present and voting], without prejudice to paragraph 2, enter into force [for all States Parties] [for States ratifying or acceding to them] upon the deposit of the instruments of ratification by the same majority [including all original States Parties to the Convention].

[Amendments shall enter into force for Parties ratifying or acceding to them on the thirtieth day following the deposit of instruments of ratification or accession by a majority of the Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining Party on the thirtieth day following the deposit of its instrument of ratification or accession.]

4. (a) The text of any proposed amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary not less than 60 days prior to a session of the Conference of the States Parties and shall be promptly communicated by him to all States Parties. [The State Party proposing an amendment may also communicate it simultaneously to the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat and the Executive Council.]

(b) Proposed amendments shall be taken up at the next session of the Conference of the States Parties. However, if deemed necessary, the Conference of the States Parties may, by a majority of two-thirds of States Parties present and voting, convene a special session to discuss and take a decision on proposed amendments. 1/

5. The provisions of this Article shall be without prejudice to the special modification procedures provided for in Annexes 2/

1/ A view was expressed that it is to be discussed whether sessions of the Conference of the States Parties or Review Conferences are appropriate forums in which to consider amendments to the Convention.

2/ A view was expressed that a differentiated amendment mechanism is required to meet the special needs of various provisions of the Convention. It is understood that this Article might be limited to general amendment procedures which would be applied unless otherwise provided in relevant parts of the Convention. It is to be further discussed which provisions should be subject to strict amendment procedure and which might be amended in a simplified way.

Settlement of disputes

The question of the settlement of disputes was further discussed in Working Group 2 in 1989.

Reservations */

1. No reservations or exceptions, however phrased or named, [including interpretative statements or declarations], may be made to this Convention [unless expressly permitted by other provisions of the Convention].
2. The provision in paragraph 1 above does not preclude a State when signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, from making statements or declarations, however phrased or named, provided that such statements or declarations do not purport to exclude or to modify the legal effect of the provisions of this Convention in their application to that State.

- or alternatively -

This Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

Status of Annexes

The subject needs further discussion.

*/ The view was expressed that the concerns of a State Party should be dealt with during the negotiations of the Convention so that reservations will not be necessary. Thus, the reservations issue should be dealt with at a further stage in the negotiations.

SANCTIONS

The question of sanctions was considered by the Working Group on Legal and Political Questions during four meetings. Document CW/Group 2/16 was presented to the Working Group on 7 July 1989. On the basis of that document, some 40 interventions were made during the discussion on sanctions, from which the following emerged:

- A number of delegations were of the view that the Chemical Weapons Convention should contain a provision on sanctions. It was also understood that the Organization, through one of its organs, should take action in order to redress and repair any situation which would be in contradiction with the provisions of the Convention. 1/
- It was argued by several delegations that not all violations would fall into the same category. They suggested that there might be a distinction between serious violations and minor or technical ones. 2/
- In connection with this classification, some delegations were of the view that automatic measures may be laid down in the Convention to cover cases of minor violations.
- It was also agreed by all delegations that the existence of a provision on sanctions within the Convention or the failure to implement it should not affect the rights of States Parties to carry out unilateral actions amounting to sanctions as long as they are kept within the bounds of International Law.
- It was suggested by some delegations that sanctions may imply the withdrawal or restriction of rights and privileges from States Parties. In this respect, certain rights and privileges were mentioned such as: the right to membership in organs of the Organization; the right to Challenge Inspections, the right to have nationals as inspectors. However, it was understood by delegations that in no way should the withdrawal of rights and privileges amount to the withdrawal of the right of membership in the Organization.
- The question of what type of sanctions in addition to withdrawal or restriction of rights and privileges may be suggested has yet to be considered.

1/ The view was expressed that divergent views remain on the feasibility of sanctions and the effectiveness of their deterrence of non-compliance.

2/ A view was expressed that the nature of a violation depends upon the context of the situation and, depending on the context, a technical violation may be a serious one.

- Some delegations held that the nature of sanctions (mandatory or voluntary) should depend on the nature of each specific case. It was suggested that a differentiation between violations of technical matters and the violation of other provisions may be useful, where, according to many delegations, mandatory sanctions should be carried out with regard to the latter category.
- There was a degree of uncertainty concerning the modalities by which to establish the occurrence of a breach or violation. One view supported the idea that the Organization should establish the existence of a violation on the basis of information arising from the verification activities which it conducts. A second view was that it is very difficult to entrust the Organization with the role of a Tribunal in establishing breaches or violations; however there could be a distinction between violations of technical matters, where establishing the facts will be automatic and self-evident, and the violations of other provisions. A third view was that sanctions should not depend on the formal establishment of a breach or violation; they should rather be used to enforce demands of the Organization vis-à-vis States Parties to bring their activities in line with their obligations under the Convention.
- The view was expressed that the Organization itself, through the Conference of States Parties or the Executive Council, should decide on sanctions according to a machinery which is yet to be considered.
- There is a common understanding that the efforts to incorporate into the Convention a provision on sanctions should not in any way aim at creating a mechanism parallel to that of the Security Council, nor should they undermine its prerogative to address any major breach of the Convention which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security or to constitute a threat to or breach of the peace and to impose appropriate sanctions under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. However, a view was expressed that in many cases the Security Council was unable to perform its duties, and that, in the case of the Organization of Chemical Weapons Convention, such a situation would be fatal.
- Although the issue of how a provision on sanctions may be incorporated in the Convention has not yet been settled, a preference was expressed for a separate article, while some delegations find it more appropriate to combine it with other articles.
- There was no agreement on whether to impose sanctions on non-parties or not. A view was expressed that the universality of the Convention does not only mean membership of a great number of States Parties to the Convention but also erga omnes adherence to the principle objectives of the Convention due to its sui generis nature. Hence, there has to be a mechanism to control and sanction any such activities by non-parties which may endanger the system established by

the Convention. Another view was that non-parties should not be sanctioned for non-compliance with obligations they have not undertaken. The question of rights and duties of third parties with regard to the Convention has yet to be discussed in detail.

- It was argued that should the Organization fail to impose sanctions collectively, the Convention would suffer great damage.
- The discussion of the question of sanctions has clearly shown the highly delicate political nature of the problem, which needs to be further addressed in order to clarify more the issues involved and try to find appropriate solutions to them.

Material on the Preparation Period

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I. OBJECTIVE OF WORK

1. The general objective of the work connected with the preparation period is to ensure:

(a) the entering into force of the Convention without undue delay, and to create the conditions necessary for its implementation from the very beginning;

(b) the promotion of a universal adherence to the Convention. 1/

II. MEASURES CONNECTED WITH THE NEGOTIATIONS

1. The provision of relevant data will be instrumental for the elaboration of procedures, the identification of thresholds and the assessment of costs.

States should be encouraged to participate in the exchange of such information. Further discussion to increase the compatibility of such information might be necessary. The outline for the provision of data to the Preparatory Commission, as contained in attachment 2, could be used as starting point for such a discussion.

2. The transmission of material not being part of the text of the Convention to the Preparatory Commission has to be arranged for in advance.

A register should be established by the Secretariat of the Ad hoc Committee, which will include documents relevant to the further preparation of the implementation of the Convention. An example for the possible structure of such a register is comprised in attachment 3.

III. INFORMATION AND CO-OPERATION REQUIREMENTS FOR SIGNATORIES PRIOR TO THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION

The work to be accomplished by the Preparatory Commission will be complex and manifold. The correct functioning of the implementation mechanism of the Convention will depend to a large extent on the results which this body will achieve in the course of its activities. The contributions of signatories to the Convention will be instrumental to this end. 2/

1/ Further consideration of specific activities on this subject will be necessary.

2/ See the attachment 1 on preparation activities.

The following requirements will have to be met:

1. Information on the progress of the ratification process
2. Information on
 - CW stockpile facilities
 - CW production facilities
 - CW destruction facilities
 - Production of chemicals included in Schedules 1, 2, 3 1/
 - National Authorities
3. Co-operation in the following fields:
 - acquisition and testing of instruments and devices for monitoring and inspection activities;
 - designation of instruments for routine and challenge inspection;
 - designation and installation of off-site laboratories and elaboration of respective procedures;
 - preparation for the designation of inspectors;
 - training of inspectors for verification activities (routine and challenge inspection);
 - prenegotiation of facility agreements related to facilities to be inspected under Articles IV, V and VI;
 - preparation for designation of points of entry.
4. In order to ensure that these requirements will be met in the appropriate time-frames, concrete arrangements might be necessary. 2/

1/ An outline for the provision of such data is attached to this paper.

2/ The legal status of the Preparatory Commission and the obligations of States Signatories thereto needs further consideration.

ATTACHMENT 1

Overview of some activities of the Organization to be carried out after entry into force of the Convention, the ensuing preparatory work to be accomplished prior to this date and the information and co-operation requirements arising for signatories

Provision	Activity of the Organization	Time to start after entry into force	Preparatory work	Information and co-operation requirements
III, IV, V	Declarations to receive, compile and distribute to States Parties <i>i.e.</i> general and detailed declarations on CW stocks, CW production facilities, general and detailed plans for CW destruction and destruction/conversion of production facilities	30 days 6 months or 9 months	Establishment of administrative framework for declaration and data as well as preparation for the study, compilation of and dissemination of data and declaration to States Parties and other units of the Secretariat	Information on the progress in the process of ratification to enable planning for the date when the Convention enters into force
VI	Declarations on activities not prohibited by the Convention (relevant chemicals and facilities which produce, process or consume them)	30 days resp. annually		
IV (3)	Verification of declaration on CW at the location of each stockpile	Immediately after 30 days	Recruitment and training of (...) inspectors & supporting staff	Information on CW stocks, their size and number of locations
IV (3)	Verification of non-removal of CW-stockpiles (continuous presence of inspectors and monitoring with instruments)	30 days/ continuously	Development and procurement of monitoring instruments and devices for the inventory control procedure	Acquiring and testing of monitoring instruments and devices

ATTACHMENT 1 (continued)

IV (6)	Verification of destruction (continuous presence of inspectors and monitoring with instruments during active destruction phase)	After 1 year or earlier until the end of destruction	Recruitment and training of (...) inspectors & supporting staff, development and procurement of instruments	Number of destruction facilities. Approximate time of operation, operation schedules, acquiring and testing of instruments and devices
V (5)	Verification of declarations of CW production facilities	Immediately after 30 days	Recruitment and training of (...) inspectors & supporting staff	Information on CW production facilities, their number and location
V (6)	Inspection and continuous monitoring of closure of CW production facilities (periodic & on-site instruments)	3 months until destruction	See above & development and procurement of instruments	See above & acquiring and testing of instruments
V (8)	International verification of destruction of CW production facilities	Not later than 12 months until the end of destruction	Recruitment and training of (...) inspectors & supporting staff	Support in training activities
V (9)	International verification of temporary conversion of a CW production facility into a CW destruction facility	See above	See above	Information about intention of conversion
VI Annex VI (1) II, 4	Initial visits to SSPFs and "other facilities" Systematic on-site verification of SSPFs and "other facilities" through on-site inspection and monitoring with instruments	Immediately after 30 days Immediately after 30 days	Recruitment and training of (...) inspectors & supporting staff See above & development and procurement of instruments	Information on SSPFs and "other facilities" in operation upon entry into force See above & acquiring and testing of instruments

ATTACHMENT I (continued)

<p>VI Annex VI (2), 9</p>	<p>Initial visits</p>	<p>Immediately after 30 days</p>	<p>Recruitment & training of (...) inspectors & supporting staff development and procurement of instruments</p>	<p>Information on facilities producing, processing or consuming chemicals listed in Schedule (2), acquiring and testing of instruments</p>
<p>Annex VI (2), 5</p>	<p>Systematic on-site verification on routine basis</p>			
<p>IV Annex IV, II, 3</p>	<p>Conclude agreements concerning storage facilities</p>	<p>Within (6) months</p>	<p>Establishment of administrative frame- work for agreements and negotiations, and further refinement of models for agreements, prenegotiation of such agreements with States Parties which will be needed during the first year</p>	<p>Prenegotiation of agreements on facilities under Articles IV, V, VI respectively with the Preparatory Commission</p>
<p>IV Annex IV, V, 5</p>	<p>Conclude agreements concerning on-site verification of CW destruction facilities resp. combined plans for destruction and verification</p>	<p>Earlier than 12 months</p>		
<p>V Annex V, V, 2</p>	<p>Conclude agreements concerning on-site verification of declarations and systematic monitoring of closure and verification of destruction of CW production facilities</p>	<p>Within (6) months</p>	<p>See above</p>	<p>See above</p>
<p>VI Annex VI (1), II, 5</p>	<p>Conclude agreements concerning on-site verification of SSPFs and "other facilities"</p>	<p>Immediately after 30 days</p>	<p>Further elaboration of the model for an agreement, prenegotiation of agree- ments with signatories</p>	<p>Prenegotiation of agreements with the Preparatory Commission</p>

ATTACHMENT 1 (continued)

VI Annex VI (2), 11	Conclude agreements concerning on-site verification of facilities producing etc. chemicals listed in Schedule (2)	(6) months	Prerenegotiation of agreements with signatories	Prerenegotiation of agreements with the Preparatory Commission
IV Annex IV, II, 7 and V, 7 VI (2) 14	Samples analysis in off-site laboratories designated by the Organization	Immediately after 30 days	Setting up a scheme of standardized equipment for off-site laboratories, designation of off-site laboratories and procedures for transport and handling of samples	Co-operation in the designation of off-site laboratories, installation of such laboratories pursuant to the schemes of the Preparatory Commission
Guidelines on the International Inspectorate (routine and challenge)	Designation of inspectors and inspection personnel	Immediately	Indication to signatories which inspectors are chosen for designation	Indication to the Preparatory Commission whether the inspectors might be acceptable
IX, 2	Agreement on points of entry	Immediately	Preliminary agreement	Preliminary agreement
	Carrying out of challenge inspections	Immediately	Training of inspectors for challenge inspections	Support in training activities
IX, 2	Designation of instruments for purposes of challenge inspection	Immediately	Development, procurement, testing, preliminary designation	Acquiring and testing of instruments
VII	Communicate with National Authorities	Immediately	Preparation of a list of names, addresses, communication lines	Providing data on National Authorities

ATTACHMENT 2

Nature of data to be submitted

Such data would include, inter alia:

1. Information on CW stockpile facilities
 - number of facilities
 - size of each facility (agent tons, square km)
 - aggregate amount (agent tons)
2. Information on CW production facilities
 - number of facilities
 - preliminary plans for their destruction
3. Information on CW destruction facilities
 - number of facilities
 - preliminary plans for the destruction of CWs
 - (time-frames for the first active destruction phase)
4. Production of Schedule-1-chemicals
 - 4.1 Information on SSF
 - location of the facility
 - 4.2 Information on "other facilities" producing above 100 g
 - number of facilities
 - location of the facilities
5. Production etc. of Schedule-2-chemicals
 - number of facilities
 - location of the facilities
 - names of chemicals produced etc. at each facility
 - production etc. amount per annum at each facility (in ranges) 1/
6. Production etc. of Schedule-3-chemicals
 - number of facilities
 - location of the facilities
 - names of chemicals produced etc. at each facility
 - production etc. amount per annum at each facility (in ranges) 1/
7. Others

1/ Dependent on the thresholds finally agreed upon in the text of the Convention.

ATTACHMENT 3

Possible structure of a register for material of relevance for the further preparation and eventual implementation of the Convention

- (A) Documents tentatively agreed upon, but not forming part of the draft (possible example: model for agreements on facilities).
 - (B) Recorded understandings related to the work of the Preparatory Commission and/or the Organization.
 - (C) Problems on which further work is required after the negotiations have been terminated.
 - (D) Information on intentions of Governments concerning voluntary contributions for the Preparatory Commission, the Organization and States to assist in the preparation of the implementation of the Convention.
 - (E) Studies, data-base, technical expertise related to the activities of the Organization in the implementation process (example: experience on trial inspections, data provided).
 - (F) Other documents.
-