

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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Appendix II/Volume I  
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## REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

### APPENDIX II

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- Verbatim Records of the 1991 session

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26. Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects
27. Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques
28. Disarmament database
29. Role of non-governmental organizations

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
0. <u>Organizational Matters</u>			
1. <u>Organization of work and Procedures</u>			
577	Sri Lanka (the President)	Australia	582
	<u>The Secretary-General of the</u> <u>Conference on behalf of the</u> <u>Secretary-General of the</u> <u>United Nations</u>	Canada	597
		Egypt	595
			601
			603
580	Sri Lanka (the President)		
		Hungary	583
581	Sri Lanka (the President)		586
			603
582	Australia		
	Cameroon (non-member State)	Indonesia	603
	Sri Lanka (the President)		
		Japan	588
583	Sweden (the President)		594
	Hungary		
		Morocco	596
585	Chile (non-member State)		601
	The Secretary-General of the Conference	Myanmar	596
586	Yugoslavia	Nigeria	588
	Hungary		
	Peru	Pakistan	586
	Pakistan		
	Sweden (the President)	Pakistan (Chairman, Informal Consultations on the Improved and Effective Functioning of the Conference)	603
	USSR		
587	Sweden (the President)		
588	USSR (the President)	Peru	586
	Nigeria		592
	Japan		
590	Zaire	Sri Lanka (the President)	577
			580
591	USSR (the President)		581
			582
		Sweden (the President)	583
			586
			587



Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
0. <u>Organizational Matters</u>			
1. <u>Organization of work and Procedures</u>			
592	Peru USSR (the President)	USSR	586
593	United Kingdom (the President) Senegal (non-member State)	USSR (the President)	588 591 592
594	Japan United Kingdom (the President)	United Kingdom (the President)	593 594 595 596
595	New Zealand (non-member State) Egypt United Kingdom (the President)	United States	602
596	Morocco Myanmar United Kingdom (the President)	United States (the President)	597 599 600 601
597	United States (the President) Spain (non-member State) Canada	Venezuela (the President)	602 603 604 605
599	United States (the President)		
600	United States (the President)	Yugoslavia	586
601	Egypt Morocco United States (the President)	Zaire	590
602	Venezuela (the President) United States	<u>Non-member States</u>	
		Cameroon	582
		Chile	585 605
		New Zealand	595

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<b>0. <u>Organizational Matters</u></b>		
	<b>1. <u>Organization of work and Procedures</u></b>		
603	Hungary Pakistan (Chairman, Informal Consultation on the Improved and Effective Functioning of the Conference) Indonesia Egypt Venezuela (the President)	Senegal  Spain  <u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	593  597  577
604	Venezuela (the President)	<u>The Secretary-General of the Conference</u>	585
605	Chile (non-member State) Venezuela (the President)		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
0. <u>Organizational Matters</u>			
2. <u>Participation of Non-Member States</u>			
580	Sri Lanka (the President)	Canada	597
585	Sweden (the President)	Indonesia	603
	USSR	Japan	588
587	Austria (non-member State)	Myanmar	596
588	Japan	Sri Lanka (the President)	580
593	United Kingdom (the President)	Sweden (the President)	585
595	United Kingdom (the President)	USSR	585
596	Myanmar	United Kingdom (the President)	583
597	Spain (non-member State)		595
	Canada	United States (the President)	599
598	Republic of Korea (non-member State)	Venezuela (the President)	603
599	United States (the President)		605
603	Indonesia	<u>Non-member States</u>	
	Venezuela (the President)	Austria	587
604	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (non-member State)	Chile	605
		Democratic People's Republic of Korea	604
605	Chile (non-member State)	Republic of Korea	598
	Venezuela (the President)	Spain	597

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
0. <u>Organizational Matters</u>			
3. <u>Membership of the CD</u>			
577	Sri Lanka (the President)	Canada	597
582	Cameroon (non-member State)	Mongolia	605
583	Sweden (the President)	Sri Lanka (the President)	577
585	Chile (non-member State)	Sweden	591
587	Sweden (the President)	Sweden (the President)	583 587
588	USSR (the President)	USSR (the President)	588 592
590	Zaire		
591	Sweden	United Kingdom (the President)	596
592	USSR (the President)	United States (the President)	597 601
594	Norway (non-member State)	Venezuela (the President)	602 605
595	New Zealand (non-member State)		
596	United Kingdom (the President)	Zaire	590
597	United States (the President) Spain (non-member State) Canada	<u>Non-member States</u> Cameroon	582
598	Republic of Korea (non-member State)	Chile	585 605
601	United States (the President)	New Zealand	595
602	Venezuela (the President)	Norway	594
605	Chile (non-member State) Mongolia Venezuela (the President)	Republic of Korea Spain	598 597

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PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
I. <u>Nuclear Test Ban</u>			
577	<u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	Argentina	585
		Argentina Brazil jointly	602
		Australia	582
581	Mexico Sri Lanka (the President)	Brazil	605
582	Australia Cameroon (non-member State) Indonesia Peru Sri Lanka (the President) Brazil (on behalf of the Group of 21) India (Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban) India (on behalf of the Group of 21) China	Brazil (on behalf of the Group of 21)  Bulgaria  Canada  China  Germany  India	582  588  597 599  582  600  599
583	Sweden (the President)	India (on behalf of Group of 21)	582
584	Uruguay (non-member State)	India (Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban)	582 604
585	Chile (non-member State) United States Sweden (Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts) Argentina Sweden (the President)	Indonesia	582 598 603
586	Yugoslavia Peru Sweden (the President)	Japan	588 594
587	Austria (non-member State)	Mexico	581
588	USSR (the President) Bulgaria Nigeria Japan Venezuela	Mongolia  Morocco  Myanmar	596  596 601 596

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
I. <u>Nuclear Test Ban</u>			
590	Zaire	Netherlands	592
591	Finland (non-member State)	Nigeria	588
592	Netherlands USSR (the President)	Peru	603 582 586
593	Senegal (non-member State)	Romania	599
594	United Kingdom Norway (non-member State) Japan	Sri Lanka (the President)	581 582
595	New Zealand (non-member State)	Sweden	599
596	Morocco Myanmar Mongolia	Sweden (the President)	583 585 586
597	Canada	Sweden (Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts)	585 602
598	Republic of Korea (non-member State) Indonesia	USSR (the President)	588 592
599	Sweden Romania Canada India United States (the President)	United Kingdom United Kingdom (on behalf of the Western Group)	594 602
600	Germany United States (the President)	United States United States (the President)	585 599 600 601
601	Morocco United States (the President)	Venezuela	588
602	Argentina Brazil jointly United Kingdom (on behalf of a Group of Western States) Sweden (Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts) Venezuela (the President)	Venezuela (the President)	602 603 605

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
I. <u>Nuclear Test Ban</u>			
603	Nigeria Indonesia Venezuela (the President)	Yugoslavia	586
		Zaire	590
604	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (non-member State) India (Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban)	<u>Non-member States</u>	
		Austria	587
		Cameroon	582
605	Brazil Chile (non-member State) Venezuela (the President)	Chile	585 605
		Democratic People's Republic of Korea	604
		Finland	591
		New Zealand	595
		Norway	594
		Republic of Korea	598
		Senegal	593
		Uruguay	584
		<u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	577

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<p align="center"><u>II. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament</u></p>			
577	<u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u> Sweden	Argentina-Brazil jointly	602
		Australia	586
		Brazil	605
581	Sri Lanka (the President)	Brazil-Argentina jointly	584
582	Islamic Republic of Iran	Bulgaria	588
	Czech and Slovak Federal Republic		595
	Cameroon (non-member State)	Canada	597
	Indonesia		
	Peru	Cuba	603
	Sri Lanka (the President)		
	India (on behalf of Group of 21)	Czech and Slovak Federal Republic	582
	Kenya (on behalf of Group of 21)		
	USSR	Egypt	601 603
583	Sweden (the President)	France	588 594
584	Uruguay (non-member State)		600
	Brazil-Argentina jointly		603
585	Chile (non-member State)	Germany	591
586	Yugoslavia	Hungary	603
	Australia		
587	Sweden (the President)	India	599
588	USSR (the President)	India (on behalf of Group of 21)	582
	Bulgaria		
	Nigeria	Indonesia	582 603
	Japan		
	Venezuela	Islamic Republic of Iran	582
	France		
591	Germany	Italy	604
	Finland (non-member State)		
593	Senegal (non-member State)	Japan	588 594



Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
II. <u>Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament</u>			
594	United Kingdom Norway (non-member State) Sweden France Japan	Kenya (on behalf of Group of 21)  Mongolia  Morocco	582  596  596 601
595	New Zealand (non-member State) Austria (non-member State) Bulgaria	Myanmar  Nigeria	596  588 603
596	Morocco Myanmar Mongolia	Pakistan	598
597	United States (the President) Spain (non-member State) Canada	Peru  Poland	582 599  601
598	Republic of Korea (non-member State) Pakistan Democratic People's Republic of Korea (non-member State)	Romania  Sri Lanka (the President)	599 601  581 582
599	Peru Sweden Romania India	Sweden	577 594 599
600	France United States USSR United States (the President)	Sweden (the President)  USSR	583 587  582 600
601	Poland Egypt Romania Morocco United States (the President)	USSR (the President)  United Kingdom	588  594
602	Venezuela (the President) Argentina-Brazil jointly	United States	600

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	II. <u>Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament</u>		
603	Cuba	United States (The President)	597
	Nigeria		600
	Hungary		601
	Indonesia		
	France	Venezuela	588
	Egypt		
	Venezuela (the President)	Venezuela (the President)	602
			603
			605
604	Italy		
	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (non-member State)	Yugoslavia	586
605	Brazil	<u>Non-member States</u>	
	Venezuela (the President)		
		Austria	595
		Cameroon	582
		Chile	585
		Democratic People's Republic of Korea	598
			604
		Finland	591
		New Zealand	595
		Norway	594
		Republic of Korea	598
		Senegal	593
		Spain	597
		Uruguay	584
		<u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	577

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<b>III. <u>Prevention of nuclear war,</u></b> <b><u>including all related matters</u></b>		
581	Sri Lanka (the President)	Australia	582
582	Australia	Egypt	595
	Sri Lanka (the President)	France	594
	India (on behalf of Group of 21)	India (on behalf of Group of 21)	582
	Kenya (on behalf of Group of 21)		
583	Sweden (the President)	Italy	604
587	Sweden (the President)	Kenya (on behalf of Group of 21)	582
588	Nigeria	Myanmar	596
591	Finland (non-member State)	Nigeria	588
593	Senegal (non-member State)	Sri Lanka (the President)	581 582
594	Sweden	Sweden	594
	France		
595	New Zealand (non-member State)	Sweden (the President)	583 587
	Egypt		
596	Myanmar	United Kingdom (on behalf of Group of Western States)	602
597	United States (the President)	United States (the President)	597 599
599	United States (the President)	Venezuela (the President)	602 603
602	Venezuela (the President)		
	United Kingdom (on behalf of a Group of Western States)	<u>Non-member States</u>	
603	Venezuela (the President)	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	604
604	Italy	Finland	591
	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (non-member State)	New Zealand	595
		Senegal	593

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
IV. <u>Chemical Weapons</u>			
577	<u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	Argentina	596 601
		Australia	582 586
580	Sweden (Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons)	Brazil	605
	Netherlands	Bulgaria	588
	Canada		595
	Sri Lanka (the President)		
581	Sri Lanka (the President)	Canada	580
	Peru (on behalf of Group of 21)		597
	Germany (on behalf of Group of Western States)	China	582
	United States	Cuba	603
582	Islamic Republic of Iran	Czech and Slovak Federal Republic	582
	Sweden		
	Czech and Slovak Federal Republic	Egypt	595
	Australia		601
	Germany		603
	United Kingdom		
	Cameroon (non-member State)	France	594
	Indonesia		603
	Sri Lanka (the President)		
	Peru (on behalf of Group of 21)	Germany	582
	USSR		591
	China		603
		Germany (on behalf of Group of Western States)	581
583	Sweden (the President)		605
	Hungary		
		Hungary	583
584	Uruguay (non-member State)		603
	New Zealand (non-member State)		
		India	595
585	Chile (non-member State)		599
	USSR		
		Indonesia	582
586	Yugoslavia		598
	Australia		603
	Peru		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
IV. <u>Chemical Weapons</u>			
587	Austria (non-member State)	Islamic Republic of Iran	582
588	USSR (the President)	Italy	604
	Bulgaria	Japan	588
	Nigeria		594
	Japan	Mongolia	596
	Venezuela	Morocco	596
590	Zaire		601
	USSR (Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons)	Myanmar	596
591	Germany	Netherlands	580
	Finland (non-member State)		592
	United States	Nigeria	588
592	Netherlands		603
	Peru	Pakistan	600
	USSR		
	USSR (the President)	Peru	586
593	United Kingdom (the President)		592
	Senegal (non-member State)		596
594	United Kingdom		599
	Norway (non-member State)	Peru (on behalf of Group of 21)	581
	Sweden		582
	France	Poland	598
	Japan		601
	United Kingdom (the President)	Romania	599
	<u>The Secretary-General of the</u> <u>Conference on behalf of the</u> <u>Prime Minister of Australia</u>	Sri Lanka	598
595	New Zealand (non-member State)	Sri Lanka (the President)	580
	Egypt		581
	Austria (non-member State)		582
	Bulgaria	Sweden	582
	USSR (Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons)		594
	India		603
	United Kingdom (the President)		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
IV. <u>Chemical Weapons</u>			
596	Morocco Myanmar Mongolia Argentina United Kingdom (the President) Peru	Sweden (Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons)  Sweden (the President)	580    583
597	United States (the President) Spain (non-member State) Canada	USSR	582 585 592 601
598	Poland Republic of Korea (non-member State) Sri Lanka Indonesia	USSR (Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons)  USSR (the President)	590 595 605  588 592
599	Peru Finland (non-member State) Romania India	United Kingdom   United Kingdom (the President)	582 594  593
600	Pakistan		594 595 596
601	Poland USSR Egypt Argentina Morocco United States (the President)	United States    United States (the President)	581 591 602  597 601
602	Venezuela (the President) United States	Venezuela	588
603	Cuba Nigeria Hungary Germany Sweden Indonesia France Egypt	Venezuela (the President)    Yugoslavia  Zaire	602 605  586  590

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
IV. <u>Chemical Weapons</u>			
604	Italy Democratic People's Republic of Korea (non-member State)	<u>Non-member States</u> Austria	587 595
605	Brazil Chile (non-member State) USSR (Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons) Germany (on behalf of Group of Western States) Venezuela (the President)	Cameroon Chile  Democratic People's Republic of Korea  Finland  New Zealand  Norway Republic of Korea Senegal Spain Uruguay  <u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>  <u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Prime Minister of Australia</u>	582 585 605 604  591 599  584 595  594 598 593 597 584 577  594

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
V. <u>Prevention of an arms race in outer space</u>			
581	Sri Lanka (the President)	Argentina	582
582	Australia Cameroon (non-member State) Sri Lanka (the President) Sweden (on behalf of Group of 21) France (on behalf of a Group of Western States) Argentina China	Argentina (Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space)  Australia  Bulgaria  Canada	604  582 588 587 597
583	Sweden (the President)		
584	Uruguay (non-member State)	China	582
585	Chile (non-member State)	Egypt	603
586	Yugoslavia	France	594 600
587	Canada		
588	USSR (the President) Bulgaria Nigeria Venezuela	France (on behalf of a Group of Western States)  Morocco	582  596 601
594	United Kingdom France	Myanmar	596
596	Morocco Myanmar	Nigeria	588
597	Canada	Romania	599
		Sri Lanka (the President)	581 582
599	Romania	Sweden (on behalf of Group of 21)	582
600	France	Sweden (the President)	583
601	Morocco	USSR (the President)	588
603	Egypt	United Kingdom	594



Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
V. <u>Prevention of an arms race in outer space</u>			
604	Argentina (Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space)	Venezuela	588
		Venezuela (the President)	605
		Yugoslavia	586
605	Venezuela (the President)	<u>Non-member States</u>	
		Cameroon	582
		Chile	585
		Uruguay	584

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<p>VI. <u>Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons</u></p>			
577	<u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	Bulgaria	588
578	Sri Lanka (the President)	Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances)	603
581	Sri Lanka (the President)	Egypt	595
582	Sri Lanka (the President)	Myanmar	596
583	Sweden (the President)	Sri Lanka (the President)	578
588	Bulgaria		581
594	United Kingdom	Sweden (the President)	582
595	Egypt	United Kingdom	583
596	Myanmar	United Kingdom (the President)	594
	United Kingdom (the President)	Venezuela (the President)	596
603	Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances)	<u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	604
604	Venezuela (the President)		577

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<b>VII. <u>New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: radiological weapons</u></b>		
578	Sri Lanka (the President)	Bulgaria	588
579	Canada	Canada	579 597
582	Cameroon (non-member State) Sri Lanka (the President)	Canada (Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons)	602
583	Sweden (the President)		
588	Bulgaria	Egypt	595
592	Netherlands	Myanmar	596
594	United Kingdom	Netherlands	592
595	Egypt	Romania	599
596	Myanmar	Sri Lanka (the President)	578 582
597	Canada	Sweden (the President)	583
599	Romania	United Kingdom	594
602	Canada (Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons)	Venezuela (the Chairman)	603
		<u>Non-member States</u>	
603	Venezuela (the President)	Cameroon	582

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<b>VIII. <u>Comprehensive programme of disarmament</u></b>			
582	Cameroon (non-member State) Sri Lanka (the President)	Australia (on behalf of a Group of Western States)	593
583	Sweden (the President)	Cuba (on behalf of Group of 21)	593 603
584	Sweden (the President)	Mexico	603
587	Sweden (the President)	Myanmar	596
588	Nigeria USSR (the President)	Nigeria	588
593	United Kingdom (the President) Cuba (on behalf of Group of 21) Australia (on behalf of a Group of Western States)	Sri Lanka (the President) Sweden (the President)	582 583 584 587
596	Myanmar United Kingdom (the President)	USSR (the President)	588
603	Mexico Cuba (on behalf of Group of 21)	United Kingdom (the President)	593 596
		<u>Non-member States</u>	
		Cameroon	582

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>1. <u>Special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament</u></p>		
592	India	Egypt	595
595	Egypt	India	592
597	Spain (non-member State)	Indonesia	598
598	Indonesia	<u>Non-member States</u>	
		Spain	597

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>2. <u>Verification</u></p>			
588	Bulgaria	Brazil	605
592	Peru	Bulgaria	588
599	Sweden	Peru	592
605	Brazil	Sweden	599

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>3. <u>Nuclear-weapon-free zones</u></p>			
595	Egypt	Egypt	595
598	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (non-member State)	<u>Non-member States</u>	
604	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (non-member State)	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	598
	Republic of Korea (non-member State)	Republic of Korea	604

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>4. <u>Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons</u></p>			
577	<u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	Australia	582
		Brazil-Argentina jointly	584
		Bulgaria	595
582	Islamic Republic of Iran	Canada	597
	Australia	Egypt	595
	Cameroon (non-member State)		601
	Indonesia		
	Peru		
583	Hungary	France	594
			603
584	Uruguay (non-member State)	Germany	591
	Brazil-Argentina jointly		
586	Peru	Hungary	583
			603
588	Japan		
	Venezuela	India	599
591	Germany	Indonesia	582
594	United Kingdom	Islamic Republic of Iran	577
	Norway (non-member State)	Japan	588
	Sweden		594
	France		
	Japan	Mongolia	596
595	New Zealand (non-member State)	Morocco	601
	Egypt		
	Austria (non-member State)	Nigeria	603
	Bulgaria		
596	Mongolia	Pakistan	598
597	Spain (non-member State)	Peru	582
	Canada		586



Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>4. <u>Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons</u></p>		
598	Poland	Poland	598
	Republic of Korea (non-member State)	Romania	599
	Pakistan	Sweden	594
	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (non-member State)		599
599	Sweden	USSR	600
	Romania	United Kingdom	594
	India	United Kingdom (on behalf of a Group of Western States)	602
600	USSR		
601	Egypt	Venezuela	588
	Morocco	Venezuela (the President)	605
602	United Kingdom (on behalf of a Group of Western States)	<u>Non-member States</u>	
603	Nigeria	Austria	595
	Hungary	Cameroon	582
	France	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	598
604	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (non-member State)		604
	Republic of Korea (non-member State)	New Zealand	595
605	Venezuela (the President)	Norway	594
		Republic of Korea	598
			604
		Spain	597
		Uruguay	584
		<u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	577

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u>			
5. <u>Bacteriological (Biological) weapons</u>			
583	Hungary	Brazil	605
584	Uruguay (non-member State)	Bulgaria	595
586	Peru	Canada	597
587	Austria (non-member State)	Egypt	595 601
588	Japan	France	594
591	Germany	Germany	591
594	United Kingdom Sweden France Japan	Hungary	583 603
595	Egypt Austria (non-member State) Bulgaria	Japan	588 594
597	Canada	Peru	586
598	Republic of Korea (non-member State)	Romania	599
599	Romania	Sweden	594
601	Egypt	United Kingdom	594
603	Hungary	<u>Non-member States</u>	
605	Brazil Chile (non-member State)	Austria	587 595
		Chile	605
		Republic of Korea	598
		Uruguay	584

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<p style="text-align: center;"><u>IX. Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>6. Conventional Disarmament and Reduction of Armed Forces</u></p>			
577	<u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u> Sweden	Bulgaria	588
		Canada	580 597
		France	594 603
580	Netherlands Canada	Germany	591
583	Hungary	Hungary	583 586
584	Uruguay (non-member State)		
585	Chile (non-member State)	India	599
586	Hungary	Japan	588 594
587	Austria (non-member State)		
588	Bulgaria Nigeria Japan	Mongolia	596
		Myanmar	596
		Netherlands	580 592
591	Germany Finland (non-member State)		
592	Netherlands	Nigeria	588
593	Senegal (non-member State)	Pakistan	598
594	United Kingdom Norway (non-member State) Sweden France Japan	Peru	599
		Romania	599
		Sweden	577 594 599
595	New Zealand (non-member State) Austria (non-member State)	United Kingdom	594

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u>			
6. <u>Conventional Disarmament and Reduction of Armed Forces</u>			
596	Myanmar Mongolia	<u>Non-member States</u>	
		Austria	587
597	Canada		595
598	Republic of Korea (non-member State) Pakistan	Chile	585
		Democratic People's Republic of Korea	604
599	Peru Sweden Romania India	Finland	591
		New Zealand	595
603	France	Norway	594
604	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (non-member State)	Republic of Korea	598
		Senegal	593
		Uruguay	584
		<u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	577

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u>			
7. <u>Regional disarmament</u>			
582	Islamic Republic of Iran Australia Indonesia	Australia	582
		Canada	597
583	Hungary	Egypt	595
588	Nigeria Japan	France	594
		Germany	591
591	Germany Finland (non-member State)	Hungary	583
592	Netherlands	Indonesia	582 603
594	France Japan	Islamic Republic of Iran	582
595	New Zealand (non-member State) Egypt	Japan	588 594
596	Myanmar Mongolia	Mongolia	596
		Myanmar	596
597	Spain (non-member State) Canada	Netherlands	592
598	Republic of Korea (non-member State)	Nigeria	588
		Pakistan	598
598	Pakistan	Romania	599
599	Sweden Romania	Sweden	599
603	Indonesia		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>7. <u>Regional disarmament</u></p>		
604	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (non-member State)	<u>Non-member States</u>	
		Chile	605
605	Chile (non-member State)	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	604
		Finland	591
		New Zealand	595
		Republic of Korea	598
		Spain	597

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>8. <u>Zones of peace</u></p>		
598	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (non-member State)	<p><u>Non-member States</u></p> <p>Democratic People's Republic of Korea</p>	598

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>9. <u>Reduction of military budgets</u></p>			
583	Hungary	Hungary	583
587	Austria (non-member State)	<u>Non-member States</u>	
		Austria	587



Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>10. <u>Confidence-building measures</u></p>		
577	<u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	Bulgaria	588
		France	594
		Germany	591
583	Hungary	Hungary	583
587	Austria (non-member State)	Japan	588
588	Bulgaria		594
	Japan	Myanmar	596
591	Germany	Pakistan	598
	Finland (non-member State)	Peru	599
594	United Kingdom	Romania	599
	Norway (non-member State)	Sweden	599
	France	United Kingdom	594
	Japan	United Kingdom (on behalf of a Group of Western States)	602
595	New Zealand (non-member State)	<u>Non-member States</u>	
	Austria (non-member State)	Austria	587
596	Myanmar		595
597	Spain (non-member State)	Chile	605
598	Republic of Korea (non-member State)	Finland	591
	Pakistan	New Zealand	595
599	Peru	Norway	594
	Sweden		
	Romania		
602	United Kingdom (on behalf of a Group of Western States)		
605	Chile (non-member State)		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>10. <u>Confidence-building measures</u></p>		
		Republic of Korea	598
		Spain	597
		<u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	577

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>11. <u>Disarmament and international security</u></p>		
577	<p><u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u></p> <p>Sweden</p>	<p>Argentina/Brazil jointly</p> <p>Australia</p> <p>Brazil</p>	<p>602</p> <p>582</p> <p>605</p>
582	<p>Australia</p> <p>Indonesia</p>	<p>Bulgaria</p>	<p>588</p> <p>595</p>
583	<p>Hungary</p>	<p>Canada</p>	<p>597</p>
584	<p>Uruguay (non-member State)</p>	<p>Cuba</p>	<p>603</p>
586	<p>Yugoslavia</p>	<p>Egypt</p>	<p>595</p> <p>601</p>
587	<p>Austria (non-member State)</p>	<p>Germany</p>	<p>591</p>
588	<p>USSR (the President)</p> <p>Bulgaria</p> <p>Nigeria</p> <p>Venezuela</p>	<p>Hungary</p>	<p>583</p> <p>603</p>
591	<p>Germany</p>	<p>Indonesia</p>	<p>582</p>
593	<p>Senegal (non-member State)</p>	<p>Mongolia</p>	<p>596</p>
595	<p>New Zealand (non-member State)</p> <p>Egypt</p> <p>Bulgaria</p>	<p>Morocco</p> <p>Nigeria</p>	<p>596</p> <p>588</p>
596	<p>Morocco</p> <p>Mongolia</p>	<p>Pakistan</p>	<p>598</p>
597	<p>Canada</p>	<p>Peru</p>	<p>599</p>
598	<p>Pakistan</p>	<p>Romania</p> <p>Sweden</p> <p>USSR (the President)</p>	<p>599</p> <p>577</p> <p>588</p>

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>11. <u>Disarmament and international security</u></p>		
599	Peru Romania	United Kingdom (on behalf of a Group of Western States)	602
601	Egypt	Venezuela	588
602	Argentina/Brazil jointly United Kingdom (on behalf of a Group of Western States)	Venezuela (the President)	605
		Yugoslavia	586
603	Cuba Hungary	<u>Non-member States</u>	
		Austria	587
605	Brazil Venezuela (the President)	New Zealand	595
		Senegal	593
		Uruguay	584
		<u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	577

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>12. <u>Naval arms race</u></p>			
582	Sri Lanka (the President)	Sri Lanka (the President)	582

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>13. <u>Scientific and Technological Development</u></p>		
577	<u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	Argentina Brazil jointly	602
		Brazil	605
		Cuba	603
586	Yugoslavia	Yugoslavia	586
595	Austria (non-member State)	<u>Non-member States</u>	
602	Argentina Brazil jointly	Austria	595
603	Cuba	<u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	577
605	Brazil		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
586	Peru	Peru	586
<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>14. <u>Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof</u></p>			

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u>		
	15. <u>Unilateral Disarmament Measures</u>		
591	Finland (non-member State)	<u>Non-member States</u>  Finland	591



Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p><u>IX. Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p><u>16. International Arms Trade</u></p>		
582	Australia	Australia	582
583	Hungary	Bulgaria	595
586	Yugoslavia	Canada	597
	Hungary	China	603
588	Nigeria	France	594
	Japan		603
591	Germany.	Germany	591
	Finland (non-member State)		
594	United Kingdom	Hungary	583
	Norway (non-member State)		586
	Sweden		
	France	Japan	588
	Japan		594
595	New Zealand (non-member State)	Mongolia	596
	Bulgaria		
596	Mongolia	Nigeria	588
597	Canada	Pakistan	598
598	Poland	Peru	599
	Republic of Korea (non-member State)	Poland	598
	Pakistan	Romania	599
599	Peru	Sweden	594
	Romania		
603	France	United Kingdom	594
	China	Yugoslavia	586

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>16. <u>International Arms Trade</u></p>		
		<u>Non-member States</u>	
		Finland	591
		New Zealand	595
		Norway	594
		Republic of Korea	598

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u>		
	17. <u>Radioactive Waste</u>		
595	Egypt	Egypt	595

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>18. <u>The Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament</u></p>			
577	Sri Lanka (the President)	Egypt	595
583	Hungary	France	594
594	France	Hungary	583
595	New Zealand (non-member State)	Sri Lanka (the President)	577
	Egypt	<u>Non-member States</u>	
		New Zealand	595

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u>		
	19. <u>South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)</u>		
584	Uruguay (non-member State)	<u>Non-member States</u>	
595	New Zealand (non-member State)	New Zealand	595
		Uruguay	584

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>20. <u>Zone exempt of all Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East</u></p>		
594	France	Canada	597
595	Egypt	China	603
596	Morocco	Egypt	595
	Mongolia		601
			603
597	Canada	France	594
598	Republic of Korea (non-member State)		603
		Mongolia	596
599	Romania	Morocco	596
601	Egypt	Romania	599
603	France	<u>Non-member States</u>	
	Egypt		
	China	Republic of Korea	598

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>21. <u>General and complete disarmament</u></p>		
582	Cameroon (non-member State) Indonesia	Cuba	582
584	Uruguay (non-member State)	Indonesia	582
598	Pakistan	Morocco	601
601	Morocco	Pakistan	598
602	United Kingdom (on behalf of a group of Western States)	United Kingdom (on behalf of a group of Western States)	602
603	Cuba	<u>Non-member States</u>	
604	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (non-member State)	Cameroon	582
		Democratic People's Republic of Korea	604
		Uruguay	584

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>22. <u>Arms and the Environment</u></p>		
586	Australia	Australia	586
588	Venezuela	Japan	594
591	Finland (non-member State)	Venezuela	588
593	Senegal (non-member State)	<u>Non-member States</u>	
594	Japan	Finland	591
		Senegal	593



Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>23. <u>Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water</u></p>		
577	<u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	Indonesia	582 598 603
581	Mexico	Japan	588
582	Cameroon (non-member State) Indonesia	Mexico	581
585	Chile (non-member State)	Myanmar	596
587	Austria (non-member State)	Nigeria	588
588	Nigeria Japan Venezuela	Sweden	599
591	Finland (non-member State)	United Kingdom	594
594	United Kingdom	Venezuela	588
596	Myanmar	<u>Non-member States</u>	
598	Republic of Korea (non-member State) Indonesia	Austria	587
599	Sweden	Cameroon	582
603	Indonesia	Chile	585
		Finland	591
		Republic of Korea	598
		<u>The Secretary-General of the Conference on behalf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations</u>	577

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>24. <u>Missile Technology</u></p>		
594	United Kingdom	Bulgaria	595
	Sweden		
	France	Canada	597
	Japan	France	594
595	New Zealand (non-member State)		603
	Bulgaria	Japan	594
597	Canada	Romania	599
599	Romania	Sweden	594
602	United Kingdom (on behalf of a group of Western States)	United Kingdom	594
603	France	United Kingdom (on behalf of a group of Western States)	602
		<u>Non-member States</u>	
		New Zealand	595

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>25. <u>Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)</u></p>		
584	Uruguay (non-member State) Brazil-Argentina jointly	Argentina-Brazil jointly	602
		Brazil-Argentina jointly	584
588	Venezuela	Venezuela	588
602	Argentina-Brazil jointly	<u>Non-member States</u>	
		Uruguay	584

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
584	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>26. <u>Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects</u></p>		584
	Uruguay (non-member State)	<p><u>Non-member States</u></p> <p>Uruguay</p>	

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>27. <u>Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques</u></p>		
584	Uruguay (non-member State)	Peru	586
586	Peru	<u>Non-member States</u>	
591	Finland (non-member State)	Finland	591
		Uruguay	584

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u>		
	28. <u>Disarmament Database</u>		
594	Japan	Japan	594

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>IX. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant matters</u></p> <p>29. <u>Role of Non-Governmental Organizations</u></p>		
586	Sweden (the President) <u>Secretary-General of the Conference</u> France (on behalf of a group of Western States) Argentina (on behalf of Group of 21) China Czech & Slovak Federal Republic Hungary Australia Peru	Argentina (on behalf of Group of 21)  Australia  China  Czech & Slovak Federal Republic  France (on behalf of a group of Western States)  Hungary  Peru  Sweden  Sweden (the President)  <u>Secretary-General of the Conference</u>	586  586  586  586  586  586  586  586  586  586  586
594	Sweden		





# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.577  
22 January 1991

ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 22 January 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. W. Rasaputram (Sri Lanka)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 577th plenary meeting and the 1991 session of the Conference on Disarmament.

Distinguished delegates, as we begin our 1991 session, the prevailing uncertainties and sombre reflections will not prevent me from conveying to you my sincere wishes for a happy and, above all, a peaceful New Year. We are facing a critical threshold. Times of stress and conflict are indeed occasions to redouble our collective efforts towards realizing the objectives of shared peace and security, and respect for the rule of law. They should encourage rather than discourage us to persevere in our endeavours towards peace. Our Conference has no direct mandate in the realm of conflict resolution. We do nevertheless have a great responsibility in contributing to conflict prevention, as our mandate constitutes an integral part of international action in codifying State behaviour in the domain of security and disarmament. Conflicts and breaches of the peace arise when State behaviour deviates, in one way or another, from the ideals and the principles of the code of conduct enshrined in the United Nations Charter and when justice is denied. We hope and pray that peace will prevail. It is in this context that I have the honour to convey to you the following message addressed to our Conference by the President of my country, His Excellency Ranasinghe Premadasa:

"I have great pleasure in addressing this message to the Conference on Disarmament to coincide with Sri Lanka taking over the presidency of this prestigious body. Sri Lanka has consistently supported the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament. We believe that in a period of change, dynamic multilateral co-operation would greatly enhance the prospect of a stable, just and peaceful world.

"The session you begin today is the first one in the last decade of the twentieth century. The build-up to this threshold has been marked by momentous developments. There have been unprecedented changes of a far-reaching nature. Over two months ago in Paris, 34 nations signed away 43 years of confrontation and hostility and committed themselves to progressively rely less on military means for security. The Paris Charter has vindicated the Charter of the United Nations, which is an edifice of peace and security based on the ethic of non-violence in State behaviour. The emerging new international order calls for a deep commitment to peace and security on the basis of shared responsibility.

"The United Nations has been enabled to realize its peace-making and peace-keeping potential more than ever before. Seemingly intractable regional disputes have been resolved through the revitalized role of the United Nations. Indeed, the United Nations has been the constant factor that has provided the stability for the international community to collectively deal with emerging crisis. We should resolve to act with determination to strengthen our joint endeavours to attain lasting peace, security and sustainable development.

"Despite the positive changes and the determined responses of the Conference on Disarmament, the future agenda remains heavy. While we are rightly concerned about the well-being of emerging democracies, we should not neglect existing democracies which are striving for self-preservation

(The President)

against internal and external threats. It would also be opportune to address the socio-economic dimensions of security which weigh heavy on the majority of developing countries. Reduction of weapons in one area should not give rise to the emergence and proliferation of weaponry in other areas.

"The Conference on Disarmament has an important role to play in strengthening the United Nations' ability to deal with the multifaceted challenges we will face as we move into the twenty-first century. Your agenda remains relevant and rich in potential. I am optimistic that your collective wisdom and the momentum generated by recent positive developments in the world at large will enable the Conference to produce genuine and viable agreements. There is a wealth of experience and expertise that can be put to use. The successful conclusion of your negotiations aimed at a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons would be a particularly notable achievement. We in Sri Lanka eagerly await the realization of such a convention.

"Your Conference has to work by consensus. The democratization of human relations, be it within or between States, is by definition a process of consensus-building. It is also a process where all parties - big and small, strong and weak - are actively involved and to which they all contribute.

"My Government was voted in at the elections held in 1988 on an election manifesto advocating consultation, compromise and consensus as a means of overcoming the socio-economic and political questions that we face. This remains the political credo of my Government. My Government's instructions to the Sri Lanka delegation at the Conference on Disarmament will also remain the same - to constructively participate in and to contribute positively and actively to the consensus-building process in this truly representative multilateral body.

"I wish you success in your difficult and indispensable tasks."

In taking up the presidency of the Conference at the opening of its 1991 session, I should like to commit myself and my own delegation to co-operating closely with all members of the Conference in discharging that heavy responsibility. I am sure that I can count on your assistance in conducting the work of the Conference, and I shall remain available to discuss any matter relating to our work in the coming weeks.

On behalf of the Conference, I should like to thank Mr. Chirila of Romania for his untiring efforts as President of the Conference during the month of August, when he faced the task of conducting our work during the preparation of the annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

After the 1990 session, the outgoing President as well as the representatives of Algeria, Poland and Yugoslavia left the Conference. I wish them all happiness and success in their personal lives and professional activities. I wish also to welcome the new representatives who have been accredited to the Conference: Ambassadors Abdelhamid Semichi of Algeria, Paul O'Sullivan of Australia, Todor Ditchchev of Bulgaria, Tibor Tóth of Hungary,

(The President)

Damdiny Erendo Baljinnyam of Mongolia and Naste Calovski of Yugoslavia. I convey to them our greetings and assure them of our co-operation in the performance of their important assignments.

I should like to note the presence among us at this opening plenary meeting of the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, Mr. Jan Martenson, who I also welcome in this Conference. At the same time, I wish to thank him for the effective co-operation provided by his office in servicing this Conference.

May I now proceed with our regular business? As you know, for the last few weeks I have conducted consultations on those organizational matters on which we need to achieve consensus, so that the Conference might soon begin its work on substantive questions. During the consultations, I have discussed with members the adoption of the agenda and programme of work in the light of the agreements reached last year on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, as well as the establishment of subsidiary bodies on various items of the agenda. The consultations are well advanced and I hope that we can agree at our next plenary meeting on a number of those subjects, so that no time will be lost in proceeding with our agenda for the year.

The Conference has already received 27 requests from non-members to participate in its work during the 1991 session. These requests have already been circulated to the members of the Conference. I am informed that other requests will be received in the coming days. They will be circulated by the secretariat upon receipt, so that members might consider them. In this connection, I should like to recall that, as I indicated at the informal consultations held on this subject, in conformity with the procedure agreed upon by the Conference during its 1990 session, all requests received from non-members to participate in its work are to be put before the Conference attached to a note from the President which will be the subject of a single decision. It should be noted that in 1990, in connection with the decision taken on requests from non-members, the President of the Conference made a statement (CD/PV.534, pp. 14-15) which was referred to after each decision adopted later on participation of non-members. I shall recall that statement at the time of the adoption of the relevant decision. I trust that those other non-members which have signified their interest in participating in the work of the Conference will transmit their requests as soon as possible.

I should also like to draw your attention to the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference, which has been under consideration for a long time. I believe that it is high time that the Conference redoubled its efforts, so that an agreement might emerge on this subject without further delay.

We should also consider the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, as agreed in our annual report to the forty-fifth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Last year, thanks to the able leadership of Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan, who chaired the informal consultations devoted to the subject, we were able to agree on several questions after consensus had eluded us for years. I believe that we will approach this matter with the same constructive spirit as shown last year.

(The President)

I now invite the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ambassador Komatina, to take the floor to read out a message addressed to us by Mr. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar.

Mr. KOMATINA (Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): The following is a message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations:

"This Conference begins its 1991 session under the shadow of war. The Persian Gulf crisis poignantly reminds us of the truth that peace and stability in international relations rests on full respect for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. That is the indispensable condition for a stable international security order within which progress in the field of arms limitation and disarmament must proceed hand in hand.

"It is ironic in the extreme that the current situation with its grave portents should confront us when a phenomenal positive change has taken place at a global level. Indeed, great strides, unthinkable only a few years ago, have been made in some crucial areas of international relations which, if pursued on a world-wide basis, offer real possibilities for innovative approaches and responses to all security challenges facing the international community. The ending of the cold war has provided a unique opportunity to work out a coherent strategy of peace based on new forms of co-operation.

"In the field of arms limitation and disarmament the agreements that have been reached encourage hope that much more can be achieved. The 1987 INF Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union will, we trust, soon be supplemented by the START agreement which is expected to cut their strategic nuclear forces significantly. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe concluded in Paris last November and the new set of confidence-building and security-building measures adopted in the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe have genuinely established a new basis for growing co-operation. These positive measures, if fully and faithfully implemented by all parties, will definitely have a lasting impact on international peace and security.

"These developments have created conditions for an enlarged and enhanced role for the United Nations in evolving new concepts of international security. The role of the world Organization in the field of arms limitation and disarmament should be commensurate with its increased responsibilities in the peace-making and peace-keeping fields. Furthermore, positive shifts in political relations should accelerate progress towards disarmament; the endeavour needs to be pursued at a faster pace and in a more global and comprehensive way as part of a reliable and consistent system of undiminished security for all. Quantitative reduction in arms and armed forces will not yield its full benefit if a qualitative arms race is allowed to continue. There is a need to address the whole problem of the military application as well as the peaceful uses of science and technology. Unimpeded access to

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Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of  
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technology is essential for economic development, but the direction of technology to the refinement of weapons of destruction is a looming threat to global peace and justice.

"In the present evolving situation, the role of the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating body, becomes even greater, and the successful discharge of its responsibilities is needed more than before. I believe the opportunity is at hand.

"Nuclear disarmament remains, as it must, a priority issue. Here, the Conference on Disarmament should be able fully to play its role. While the vital importance of progress in the United States-USSR bilateral negotiations is unquestionable, these negotiations by themselves cannot replace the multilateral efforts of the Conference on Disarmament.

"One of the issues in the nuclear field which has constantly attracted a great deal of attention is that of the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. The deliberations at the PTBT Amendment Conference, which ended its work last week, have shown that, despite the differences in approach to the whole issue, there is overwhelming support on the part of member States for a significant role by the Conference on Disarmament in dealing with the various aspects of such a ban. There is also a growing realization that the reduction of the numbers and yields of tests can only be understood as a means of achieving the goal of ending all nuclear tests for all time. The setting up of an Ad Hoc Committee on this question was a step in the right direction. It strengthens the role of the Conference on Disarmament in arriving at a global solution.

"Regarding another important issue - the question of security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States - I hope that the Conference will be able to make decisive progress and thus strengthen the incentive for universal adherence of member States to the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The risk of proliferation - horizontal and vertical - remains a steady concern of the international community. I therefore wholeheartedly welcome recent declarations and specific actions by several member States reiterating their renunciation of the nuclear option.

"Another priority is the completion of negotiations on a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. The urgency of finalizing this work was emphasized once again by the international community at the last session of the General Assembly, and has been underlined further by events in the Gulf region. Universal adherence to an effective ban could best be ensured through a global, comprehensive and non-discriminatory convention. I strongly believe that all necessary conditions have been met to achieve a balanced compromise. There is incalculable danger in allowing the existing political momentum to lapse through tardy action. Every effort must be made to step up negotiations and constructively address the fundamental political issues which stand in the way of

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success. The time has come, in my opinion, to give a decisive impetus to the Conference's work on the convention through a meeting at the ministerial level with a view to settling all the remaining points of concern.

"Success in the endeavours of the Conference on Disarmament means fruitful multilateral approaches to, and negotiations on, disarmament. What is required is a strengthened political will that can generate a credible response to the new political environment. This entails a review of the Conference's method and organization of work, so as to enhance its negotiating character. The debate on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference is a positive step in this regard.

"The progress achieved so far does not yet fully reflect the potentialities of political evolution in the world. Existing positive trends need to be consolidated and widened. Tangible results in the work of the Conference can go far in promoting that end.

"I wish you success in your work."

Here ends the Secretary-General's message.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for reading out the message addressed to us by Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar. I should be grateful if he could transmit to the Secretary-General our thanks for the contents of that message.

I wish to inform you that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has also sent to me a letter transmitting the resolutions and decisions on disarmament which were adopted at the forty-fifth session of the General Assembly. That letter and its attachments will be circulated in all official languages at our next plenary meeting, as document CD/1045.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Sweden, Mexico and Peru. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Theorin, whom I welcome once more in our midst, on this occasion also in her capacity as Dean of the representatives accredited to the Conference on Disarmament.

Mrs. THEORIN (Sweden): Thank you for your kind words, Mr. President. Allow me to congratulate you, Ambassador Rasaputram. I am confident that you will guide us effectively and wish to assure you of my delegation's full support.

Some colleagues have left Geneva for new, important assignments. I am referring to the Ambassadors of Algeria, Australia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and Yugoslavia. I wish to thank them for the excellent co-operation which my delegation has had with them. At the same time, I extend a warm word of welcome to newly arrived ambassadors from those countries. War, Mr. President, does not solve problems. War creates problems.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

The address I am about to deliver is not the one I had intended to make on behalf of my Government at the opening of the Conference on Disarmament. My expectation was to be able to recall with satisfaction the progress in disarmament that has been made since the latest session.

The cold war - over at last. The most comprehensive conventional disarmament agreement ever - formally signed. The most comprehensive nuclear disarmament agreement ever - agreed in principle. In both conventional and nuclear disarmament - patient work paying off at last. Disarmament - finally picking up speed. A new security order - being born in Europe. An order based not on deterrence and military threat. An order based on common security. A Europe characterized by democracy, peace and unity. A Europe progressively more imbued with respect for human rights.

I was considering making reference to a long talk which the former Soviet Foreign Minister had with me and some colleagues in Moscow last month, when he made a number of constructive and optimistic remarks about the need for continued nuclear arms reductions, a ban on nuclear testing, a commitment to step up Soviet efforts to achieve a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, and a proposal for United Nations supervision of the international arms trade - in line with his whole-hearted support for Soviet glasnost and perestroika. Two weeks later he resigned, sounding a dramatic warning of the risk of dictatorship - a warning that may have appeared exaggerated at the time, but which now seems increasingly more justified by the day.

At one blow, the world has been hit by two serious crises. The war in the Gulf and the violence in the Baltic republics. The dramas of the past few days force us to think and to rethink, to examine and to re-examine, to consider and to reconsider.

War is always a failure for the immediate victims. For international law. For the world community. The war in the Gulf is a human tragedy. It may lead to ecological disaster. It may lead to a political catastrophe.

Let there be no misunderstanding: the war in the Gulf is the result of Iraq's brutal annexation of its small neighbour Kuwait. This was a case of unprovoked aggression, a flagrant violation of national sovereignty and breach of international law. The United Nations rightly became the centre for political efforts to find a peaceful solution to this crisis.

The Security Council displayed great resolve, firmly agreeing on mandatory sanctions against Iraq. Sanctions which, by all accounts, gradually undercut the Iraqi economy rather severely. The Security Council has urged Iraq to withdraw unconditionally. As a last resort, and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council mandated the use of all necessary means, including force, if Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January. Iraq has chosen to defy the Security Council and has rejected all the attempts made by the United Nations to reach a peaceful settlement. It is therefore Iraq that carries the responsibility for the outbreak of war.



(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

From the very beginning of the crisis, Sweden's position has been unequivocal: the invasion, and the subsequent annexation of Kuwait, is a serious crime against the fundamental principles of international law that conflicts between States must be resolved by peaceful means, and that the acquisition of territory by force must not be condoned under any circumstances.

While not militarily involved, Sweden is not neutral in this conflict. As a loyal member of the United Nations, Sweden supports the resolutions adopted by the Security Council. My Government's support for the United Nations is based on the principle that the ultimate objective of the world organization is to ensure international peace and security. Ever since the conflict started, my Government has worked for a peaceful solution. And right up to the last minute, Sweden has tried to actively contribute to such a solution through intensive diplomatic activities. Sweden will continue to seek a solution based on the United Nations resolutions.

A solution has to start with complete and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal in accordance with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. After such a withdrawal, a proper regional security arrangement has to be established. United Nations observers or peace-keeping forces might be necessary before such a regional arrangement is agreed upon. An international peace conference on the Middle East should in our view also be convened after Iraq has complied with the United Nations resolutions.

There is a great danger that war will mean continued instability in the region. The Palestinian question is still waiting for a solution, 43 years after the decision to create two States, Israel and a Palestinian State. This is the most protracted and fundamentally important conflict in the Middle East. Unless a solution is found to this question, and the legitimate right of the Palestinian people to self-determination is respected as well as Israel's right to secure and recognized borders, the Middle East will continue to be characterized by instability for a long time after the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait has been settled.

In this critical hour, it is of utmost importance that peace efforts continue. Every political and diplomatic effort to bring the war to an end must be made.

It is an irony of history that weapons in Iraq's arsenal are now turned against their suppliers. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, four fifths of these weapons have been supplied by three of the permanent members of the Security Council - China, France and the Soviet Union. But many other countries, too, have contributed.

A lesson to be learned from the military build-up in the region is that the international arms trade has to be limited. International control of all arms trade is urgently called for. All States, both arms exporters and importers, must comply with such control. Another lesson to be learned from the acute menace of chemical warfare is that chemical weapons must be destroyed once and for all and that a total ban on chemical weapons must be concluded urgently. Considerable progress has been made in the past year. However, the political breakthrough continues to elude us. It must come now. The world cannot wait any longer.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

Ten days ago, tanks emerged in the streets of Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania. The democratically elected Parliament was threatened. People were killed. People who had believed in democracy, glasnost and freedom of expression. People who had struggled peacefully for their independence.

Two days ago, naked force was exercised in Riga, the capital of Latvia.

Sweden, a neighbour, views the current developments in the Baltic republics with sorrow and dismay. The measures the central Soviet leadership has taken fill us with anger. Sweden cannot accept the brutal intervention of Soviet troops, as in Lithuania and Latvia, or their violent attempt to intervene in the political process in the Baltic republics. My Government considers what has taken place to be in violation of the principle of the national right to self-determination as expressed in the Helsinki Document.

The escalation of the conflict between the central authorities and the Baltic republics can lead to developments which cannot be controlled. Neither side will gain from a continued escalation of violence. The resort to force contravenes the commitments which the Soviet Union and the other European States have agreed shall be the guiding principles of a future Europe. The use of force or the threat of the use of force cannot be accepted. Further violence would have far-reaching consequences for the Soviet Union and for future developments in Europe. A solution of the conflict between Moscow and the Baltic republics must be achieved by political means and through agreements.

When military violence is excused, when freedom of speech is circumscribed, when freedom of the press is questioned, the world is entitled to ask where the Soviet Union is heading. Away from glasnost and perestroika? Away from human rights? Away from international good will? Away from a Europe characterized by democracy, peace and unity? Back to the closed, isolated society of the past? Back to the cold war?

War and violence do not solve problems. They only create problems.

War, the Charter of the United Nations says, has brought untold sorrow to mankind. The war now going on in the Gulf brings new sorrow to mankind. The United Nations was founded in order to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. The war now going on in the Gulf is a failure in this respect. This war must be a brief parenthesis in recent positive international trends. We, the peoples of the United Nations, must now do our utmost to save the present generation from the scourge of war. We must renew our commitment in the Charter of the United Nations to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sweden for her statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marín Bosch.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, we are pleased to see you guiding the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Sri Lanka and Mexico pursue common objectives in disarmament matters, and both form part of the group of initiators of the conference held recently to discuss the amendment of the partial test-ban Treaty. You may count on the full co-operation of my delegation in the discharge of your important task.

Allow me to place on record our gratitude to Mr. Gheorghe Chirila of Romania, who served as President in August and co-ordinated our consultations during the inter-sessional period. Our greetings go to Ambassador Miljan Komatina, our Secretary-General, and our Deputy Secretary-General Ambassador Vicente Berasategui.

Since August several changes have occurred in the composition of the delegations. We extend a most cordial welcome to the new representatives of Algeria, Australia, Bulgaria, Poland and Yugoslavia. We wish them every success. We also express our gratitude for the contributions made by their predecessors, Ambassadors Ait Chaalal, Reese, Kostov, Sujka and Kosin. Allow me also to say how much we appreciate the work and friendship of Ambassador Peter Dietze.

Today we begin the thirteenth year of work of the CD and the twenty-ninth since the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC), the forerunner of this single multilateral negotiating organ on the subject, met in March 1962. In 1991 the CD's calendar will be a little different, since it has been agreed to divide the 24-week annual session into three rather than two periods. That agreement was perhaps the only tangible result of the informal consultations that the CD held last year on its improved and effective functioning. Let us hope that this year the Conference will be able to pursue those consultations with a view to reaching agreement on more substantial aspects of our work.

During last year the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban was examined in detail by the international community. Here, it was at last possible to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on this priority item and in the General Assembly there were extensive consultations aimed at merging the two texts that have been adopted year after year. Moreover, at the fourth NPT review conference the item was the subject of intense discussions and over the past two weeks the Moscow Treaty Amendment Conference examined in detail several aspects of the question, including that of the verification of a comprehensive test ban. On the other hand, in 1990 it was not possible to advance substantially towards the conclusion of a convention on the elimination of chemical weapons, notwithstanding continual meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on the matter and the persevering efforts of its Chairman, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden.

Over the coming weeks the Mexican delegation will take up these and other agenda items. In its statement today, my delegation would like to address a question which, whether we like it or not, will affect our work directly in the immediate future. I refer to the expansion of the membership of the CD and the need for us to think about the viability of our present arrangements.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

In 1991, for the eighth consecutive year, the CD will have to examine the question of its expansion. This question originated in 1978 in the General Assembly, during its first special session devoted to disarmament, when its President carried out consultations on the membership of the recently created Conference. Given the need to limit the size of this negotiating body, many countries were not able to join the CD and it was agreed that its membership would be reviewed at regular intervals. As a result of that review, the CD decided in 1984 "that its membership might be increased by not more than four States" and agreed that two should be nominated by the members of the Group of 21, one by those from Eastern Europe and other States and one by the Western States, "so as to maintain balance in the membership of the Conference". That is the key phrase - "so as to maintain balance in the membership of the Conference". As a result of the recent profound changes in Europe, perhaps we will have to give a little more thought to that "balance in the membership of the Conference". The balance, which was first reflected in the membership of the ENDC, was a product of the cold war and was not easy to achieve.

All of us know that the Conference on Disarmament is the successor to a series of United Nations multilateral negotiating organs that were created from 1946 onwards: the Atomic Energy Commission, and in 1947 the Commission for Conventional Armaments. Both were composed of the then 11 members of the Security Council and Canada (if it was not a member of the Council): the five permanent members - which by a quirk of history would also become the five nuclear-weapon States - and six non-permanent members (one from Western Europe and another from Eastern Europe, one from the Commonwealth, one from the Middle East and two from Latin America), plus Canada.

With the advent of the cold war and the emergence of the military blocs in Europe (NATO and the Warsaw Pact), the membership of the United Nations disarmament commissions was no longer very balanced. That imbalance would perhaps have been partly corrected in 1949 if the United Nations had recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China. But over two decades were to elapse before that would occur. Consequently, during those first years of the United Nations, the negotiation of disarmament agreements took place in multilateral forums whose membership favoured the Western Powers. In 1952, the General Assembly dissolved the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments and established a single Disarmament Commission. And to choose its members it again had recourse to the formula "the Security Council members plus Canada".

In 1955 the number of United Nations Member States, which had grown from 51 to 60 in 10 years, increased considerably with the entry of 16 countries, including several from Eastern Europe. As a result the Disarmament Commission was enlarged to 25 countries in 1957, and a year later it was opened to all United Nations Member States. At that moment it ceased to be a negotiating body and became a deliberating forum for the General Assembly.

Also in 1958, the Assembly established the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee, whose membership, on the prompting of the Soviet Union, was evenly divided between the two principal military blocs - five from NATO and five

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from the Warsaw Pact. In spite of that symmetry the Committee did not meet for over a year and was unable to bridge the differences between the two military blocs, meeting only from March to June 1960.

In 1961, a year after the dissolution of the Ten-Nation Committee, there was an unexpected development: a joint statement by the United States and the Soviet Union on agreed principles for disarmament negotiations. In November of that year the General Assembly urged those two countries to reach agreement on the composition of a new disarmament body, and a month later it endorsed the following membership of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC): the members of the Ten-Nation Committee plus eight non-aligned or neutral countries that would serve as a bridge between the two military alliances, facilitating agreement between them. It was co-chaired by the United States and the Soviet Union, and the General Assembly urged it to undertake negotiations based on the joint statement of principles they had signed.

The ENDC began its work in Geneva in March 1962. From the beginning France did not participate because of its opposition to the unusual institution of the co-chairmanship. The ENDC met uninterruptedly from 1962 to 1978. Its name changed to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) when it was enlarged to 26 members in 1969 and 31 in 1975, with the balance between the military blocs and the non-aligned countries maintained. In his opening statement on 15 March 1962, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union said that the Committee was "a sort of cross-section of the present-day world. All three main groups of States are represented here: the socialist countries, the States belonging to the military blocs of the Western Powers, and the neutralist countries. The Committee also incorporates the interests of the various geographical regions of the world". And he added:

"Never before has there been a negotiating body for disarmament that was so fitted for the solution of the problem confronting it. The Committee is broad enough to be representative in the full sense of the word. At the same time it is narrow enough to act efficiently without getting stuck in the quagmire of endless discussions in which the vital cause of disarmament would be bogged down" (ENDC/PV.2).

That same day the Secretary of State of the United States said:

"All of us will agree, I am sure, that this Conference faces one of the most perplexing and urgent tasks on the agenda of man. In this endeavour we welcome our association with representatives from countries which have not previously been intimately involved with earlier negotiations on disarmament. The dreary history of such negotiations shows that we need their help and fresh points of view. The presence of these delegations reminds us too that arms races are not the exclusive concern of the great Powers. Countries situated in every region of the world are confronted with their own conflicts and tensions, and some are engaged in arms competition. We are not here dealing solely with a single struggle in which a few large States are engaged, with the rest of the world as spectators. Every State has a contribution to make in establishing the conditions for general disarmament in its own way" (ENDC/PV.2).

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

At first, the discussions in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, which were led by the United States and the Soviet Union in their capacity as co-chairmen, were basically between the two military alliances. Little by little the Group of Eight began to function, first as a "moderating force" between the alliances but later acquiring greater cohesiveness and its own momentum.

It is true that a good part of the negotiations were carried out bilaterally (United States and Soviet Union) or trilaterally with the United Kingdom. This is what happened with the Moscow Treaty in 1963. But it is also true that other members of the Committee, including the Group of Eight, participated directly in the drafting of treaties, such as the NPT in 1967 and 1968. In fact it could be said that the role of the non-aligned States and that of the non-nuclear-weapon States in general grew in the ENDC. This was evident in the enlargements of 1969 and 1975. By then, however, continued symmetrical growth was no longer possible because of a very simple fact: with the entry of Hungary in 1969, all of the members of the Warsaw Pact were already in the Committee.

The expansions of 1969 and 1975 reflected the need to include certain militarily and/or economically important countries. They were also a response to growing pressure from other United Nations members. This is why a more or less equitable geographical distribution was sought.

In 1978 this Conference on Disarmament was established, composed of 40 States: the 31 that had come to be members of the ENDC and the CCD, plus 9 new ones. By then, however, the United States and the Soviet Union had been negotiating bilaterally for several years not only outside the CCD but outside the United Nations as well. That tendency persists, but seems to have been changing in the last two years with the renewed interest of both countries in the United Nations and the machinery provided by its Charter for maintaining international peace and security.

Until recently the CD had been working in a predictable way since its 40 members were divided into more or less homogeneous groups in accordance with the model derived from the cold war: the group of 10 countries from Western Europe and others (8 from NATO plus Australia and Japan); the group of 8 countries from Eastern Europe and others (7 members of the Warsaw Pact plus Mongolia); China; and the Group of 21 non-aligned or neutral countries, including countries from Africa, Asia and Latin America as well as two European States (Sweden and Yugoslavia).

The Conference on Disarmament's work continues to be of great interest to many other countries. Sixteen Governments have already applied for admission, and in 1990, 24 non-member States of the CD attended as observers.

The question of enlarging the CD was analysed in 1990 against the background of the profound changes in Eastern Europe. For practical purposes the Warsaw Pact has ceased to exist, and its disappearance poses some questions regarding NATO's raison d'être. As the debates in the CSCE summit held in Paris in November 1990 showed, European countries are now exploring new security arrangements, both military and economic, within a pan-European approach. Moreover, the consolidation of the European Economic Community and

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

its growing appeal to the other countries in the region will also have an impact on the groupings in the entire United Nations system, including of course the CD.

The end of military confrontation in Europe is blurring the differences between the positions of the member countries of NATO, on the one hand, and the ex-members of the Warsaw Pact and other European neutral countries on the other. And what are we to say about the non-aligned countries? Non-aligned vis-à-vis whom? All over the world there is a re-ordering of priorities, emphasis is placed on economic development based on access to markets, and with important exceptions preparations are being made for conversion from a war economy to a peace economy. These readjustments (not to say realignments) became apparent during 1990 in the debates in the CD, and, in the recent General Assembly, found concrete expression in surprising changes in position on many questions, especially in the field of nuclear disarmament. In fact, one could say that one of the most interesting aspects of the past General Assembly was perhaps the voting pattern of certain Eastern European countries. That trend was confirmed last Friday at the PTBT Amendment Conference in New York in the voting on a decision on its future work.

It is clear that the "balance" in the Conference, a balance based on the geopolitical and military realities that were consolidated in the 1950s and lasted until the 1980s, has disappeared. In 1958, the insistence on the symmetrical presence of the two principle military alliances resulted in the 5 + 5 formula in the Ten-Nation Committee. However, as it proved impossible to enter into a constructive dialogue, eight non-aligned or neutral countries were invited in 1962 to "contribute to the search for solutions to the disarmament problem". Hence the 5 + 5 + 8 formula in the ENDC. In the CCD it was increased to 7 + 7 + 12 and later to 8 + 8 + 15. In the CD we have 10 + 8 + 21 plus China.

The post-cold-war world is no longer made up of opposing military blocs, nor of countries politically non-aligned. But, except in Europe, the world has yet to regroup into well-defined economic zones. Work in UNCTAD and the Uruguay Round negotiations in GATT make this clear. Thus, a number of CD members are finding themselves in an increasingly uncomfortable position. Just as German unification came about with surprising speed and in the most unexpected way, the CD is faced with a state of affairs whose principle feature is the ever-increasing political rapprochement among almost all European countries and the consequences of this trend for the other members of the CD. There are countries without a group and groups that no longer reflect the positions of all their members.

For the developing countries the problem derives from a basic historical fact: the definition of their raison d'être vis-à-vis a Europe which is militarily divided and a North which is economically different. With the disappearance of those divisions and differences, the non-aligned countries have lost their role as a "bridge" between the two military alliances. Nor are they any longer a homogeneous entity in multilateral economic negotiations. The problem not only affects developing countries but also has repercussions for other non-European nations in the CD. And while the Europeans, whether or not they are members of military alliances, appear to be gravitating towards certain already identified goals, the rest of the countries have yet to define their own.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

The transition from a bipolar to a multipolar world will surely be slow. To move from two military blocs to several economic blocs will not be easy. For some time we shall be faced with a unipolar world, whose existence was demonstrated in the recent decisions taken by the Security Council with regard to the Persian Gulf conflict. All this constitutes the background to the debates on the enlargement of the CD. Moreover, the unification of Germany created a vacancy which some countries wished to fill immediately; some Governments hastened to submit their candidatures.

In 1991 the Conference will once again have before it the question of its expansion. With 40 members the CD has already reached the limits of its size as a negotiating body. If it continues to grow it could suffer the fate of the Disarmament Commission. For this reason we feel that an exercise in self-criticism would be advisable in order to consider and perhaps revise the way in which we work, our internal organization. But it will not be easy. How will the situation in the Soviet Union evolve? Will the already very westernized trend in the countries of eastern or central Europe become consolidated? What will happen to the other member of that group? Will the Western group become a purely European grouping? How will the non-aligned and neutral countries "realign themselves", and what role could they play in the future?

When examining the expansion of the CD we should also consider problems of a different nature. Are all the countries that should participate in this single multilateral negotiating forum represented here? It should be noted that in 1978, when the General Assembly considered the membership of the future CD, a number of factors were borne in mind: the countries' military importance, the special responsibilities that some bear under the Charter of the United Nations, the role they play in the disarmament sphere, geographical balance, and political and ideological balance. That was the point of departure, together with the conviction that "all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations", in the words of the final document of the first General Assembly devoted to disarmament. But there were complaints and disagreements. This gave rise to the idea of examining the membership of the CD at "regular intervals". Some suggested that such an examination should be carried out every three years, while others were of the view that the membership of the CD should rotate every two years. That is what happens with the 10 non-permanent seats in the Security Council. Would it be advisable to institute a similar system in the CD? As the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention show, there are questions that are or should be of universal interest. How can this be reconciled with the need to keep a limited size precisely in order to be able to negotiate agreements?

It is quite obvious that the CD will continue to be an indispensable forum for the negotiation of multilateral agreements on disarmament questions of a global character and hence of universal interest. The question today is: What balance should it have to be truly representative of the international community? This kind of analysis could lead us to the discussion of somewhat delicate matters for we would have to begin by asking ourselves if all of those present here really should be here. For all of these reasons we believe that it would be appropriate to examine these questions initially in an informal way.



(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

The Third United Nations Disarmament Decade is beginning. Its conclusion will coincide with the end of the century and the start of a new millenium. We are convinced that the profound changes which have occurred in the last few years have brought us closer to a new, perhaps more promising era in international relations. However, the tragic war in the Gulf serves to remind us how fragile the process of détente is and how difficult it is to consolidate international peace and security. It also serves to demonstrate to us that regional problems for which a timely solution is not found can become even more complicated, and that the so-called strategic and economic interests of some countries can give rise to unexpected actions.

Let us hope that this Conference will at last make the contribution which everyone expects from it. It is not a matter of finding a way to "get through another year", or seeing whether or not we can conclude the convention on the elimination of chemical weapons this year, while we pass the time discussing other items knowing full well that in August we shall not have achieved much. Let us re-establish the ad hoc committees on all our agenda items at once, avoiding an unnecessary waste of time. And let us give clear proof of political will by giving them negotiating mandates. That is why this body was created and that is why we are here.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, Ambassador de Rivero.

Mr. de RIVERO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, allow me first of all to convey satisfaction at seeing you presiding over the Conference for this first month in our session, which is notable for the delicate effort of co-ordination that must be made for the organization of our work. We are sure that your tact and great experience will have a decisive influence on the successful conclusion of this phase, and I offer you all the support that may be necessary on the part of my delegation. I would also like to place on record great appreciation and friendship for Ambassadors Messaoud Ait Chaalal of Algeria, David Reese of Australia, Bogumil Sujka of Poland, Peter Dietze of the German Democratic Republic and Marko Kosin of Yugoslavia. We regret their departure from Geneva and from the Conference and offer them our best wishes for personal and professional happiness. This is also an appropriate occasion to extend a very cordial welcome on behalf of my delegation to the Ambassador of Mongolia, Ms. Baljinnyam, Ambassadors Semichi of Algeria and Sullivan of Australia. We wish all of them a happy stay in Geneva and every success in discharging their responsibilities.

Since 17 January, despite the ending of the cold war, the world has once again been shaken by an unfortunate regional armed conflict with international dimensions. As a consequence of the refusal of the Government of Iraq to comply with the Security Council resolutions calling for its unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, Peru has condemned this flagrant violation of international law and, along with 12 Latin American countries making up the Rio group, has made an appeal for diplomatic efforts to be intensified in order to find a just and stable solution to this dangerous situation. It is not without paradox that, as the bulding of a new international order begins following the ending of the cold war, it should once again be weapons that must solve disputes between States and curb wild ambitions. And it is ironic, to

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

say the least, that while Europe is finally getting ready to live in peace and democracy after so many wars and tensions, another region of the world should have to confront the unforeseeable threats of situations of destruction and loss of human life. Without doubt the unprecedented response of the Security Council to the invasion of Kuwait is the most encouraging sign of the new times in which we are living. We saw the five permanent members of the Security Council, as never before, setting aside their ideological and strategic differences in order to react jointly and immediately to aggression. With this major step the situation of "international anarchy" referred to by the Secretary-General of the United Nations was overcome, and the full application of collective security as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations is being pursued. In other words, we now have a new political situation and the legal potential of the United Nations is available to us in order to build a new order, a new concept of collective security, collective security based on respect for international law and human rights, based on the practice of democracy, based on the struggle against critical poverty, on the fight against the degradation of the environment, and based above all on the simultaneous quest for confidence-building measures, arms control and disarmament.

Nevertheless, the worst that could happen is that this ambitious and promising era proclaimed in the Paris Charter for a New Europe should be affected by the shifting of the international conflict towards other regions characterized by instability as a result of traditional rivalries in many regions in the developing world compounded by explosive factors such as critical poverty, external indebtedness, degradation of the environment, the population explosion and the proliferation of arms and violence. A new order therefore cannot merely take the form of security and co-operation between East and West. If it is to be stable, a new order must be aimed at the building of a common home for the whole of mankind. There must, as we have said, be a political evolution of the concept of security. We must convince one another that there can be no national security without regional security, and that there can be no regional security if we do not achieve global security that embraces all States. Nowadays all States are interdependent, and no country or region can attain security if it is not shared on a joint and world-wide basis.

A major obstacle to the attainment of this new concept of security is the uncontrollable international trade in arms. The Gulf war has clearly shown that to sell weapons to volatile regions of conflict exacerbates the lack of security because of international interdependence. This is a hard lesson for arms-exporting countries and the entire international community. Another lesson of the Gulf war is that in the future we should set aside geopolitical concepts of security which are intended to establish a balance of power between countries in a given region, arming some against others or setting one of them up as a hegemon in order to keep the peace. This concept of regional security is extremely dangerous, volatile and precarious. Moreover, we hope that the free publicity that the media are providing for current weapons systems and their fantastic performance in the Gulf war will not promote trade in these weapons or bring war down to the level of just one more show on the television. In conclusion, the topic of the international trade in weapons should be taken up by the Conference on Disarmament in order to give it a practical role in the future and ensure that it is in touch with international realities.

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

It is not possible to visualize a new international order with policies aimed at the continuous development of highly competitive export-oriented new weapons systems. This zeal for money-making sidesteps basic ethical principles. Worse, we have reached the extreme of designing and selling weapons that are in conflict with the Geneva Protocols of 1977. More than ever we believe in the urgent need for the international community to adopt a code of ethics that will govern arms production and trade in order to curb the military applications of new technology once and for all and subject the arms trade to democratic control, with full respect for human rights and under the supervision of the United Nations. A specific example of the serious risks that could occur if this Conference and the international community failed to act may be found in laser weapons, which are currently being perfected and tested. According to experts a side-effect of the use of these weapons would be irreversible blindness in their victims. Laser weapons, which at one time we thought belonged to science fiction, may be operational in five years' time, with the additional difficulty that new, increasingly sophisticated generations of these weapons will appear at the turn of the century. The International Committee of the Red Cross is aware of this threat, and has convened as many as three expert meetings since October 1989 in order to look into its implications for international humanitarian law, in particular from the point of view of unnecessary suffering. This concern of the Red Cross is not unjustified, because strategists may already be presumed to have identified the impact of such weapons in tactical war scenarios. It is sufficient to cite as an example the agreement signed by the United States and the Soviet Union on 12 June 1989 on the prevention of dangerous military activities, (CD/943), which prohibits uses of lasers that could be harmful to personnel. It would not be surprising in the future to see efforts to promote the production and sale of portable laser weapons for use by the civilian population, subjecting us to another insane dimension of so-called technological progress.

The fundamental changes in relations between East and West reflected in the Paris Charter for a New Europe and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe have had the virtue, *inter alia*, of revealing that the Conference on Disarmament is seriously out of step in apparently feeling more inclined to turn itself into a deliberating body than to negotiate concrete multilateral disarmament measures. In principle, the regional approach to disarmament should not be incompatible with this Conference's global approach. However, when concerted multilateral action is abandoned through neglect, or the negotiations are delayed and regional agreements preferred, then it is a sure sign that something is wrong, unless there is a desire that the Conference on Disarmament should not move in the same direction as history.

First of all, it is easy to perceive the growing lack of correspondence between the items on its agenda and certain regional priorities. It is not that the agenda has become obsolete, but there has clearly been a weakening in the original political will that inspired its members to negotiate disarmament measures under the eight main items. This accounts for the recurrent paralysis of the Conference in dealing with most of its items, as well as the unforeseeable complication of negotiating on such an urgent issue as the total banning and destruction of chemical weapons.

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

Another problem that has made the Conference out of step with the real world pertains to its membership, which basically has its origins in the Manichean models of the cold war and the artificial division of Europe that was introduced by ideology to separate peoples with ethnic and cultural ties. This situation, which now lies in the past, can no longer be used as a yardstick for the geographical distribution of the seats in the Conference, unless we wish to live in a fairy-story world.

Europe has always been the best-represented region in the Conference on Disarmament. Last year 16 delegations from that region were accredited, to which we have to add four more countries of the developed world which are regarded as their partenaires. Yet on the other hand, along with China and Mongolia, there were representatives from only 18 countries in the developing world that covers Latin America, Africa, Asia and Oceania, the most heavily populated and extensive areas of the globe. It is necessary to ask how right it is, politically speaking, to sideline significant sectors of the international community which suffer violence daily and could be potential regions of conflict. That is why my delegation thinks that perhaps the time has come to refocus the Conference on Disarmament and bring its membership into line with today's realities, so that it can become the best vehicle to curb the arms race and, without neglecting global disarmament, become involved in regional or bilateral disarmament processes and the international arms trade.

The recent summit of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe offers an example of the great regional potentialities of disarmament and the strengthening of security, in which the Conference on Disarmament could play the role of an intermediary if it were to assume the responsibility of promoting regional disarmament. As we all know, the fourth conference to review the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ended in deadlock because of the convergence of two extremes, although the vast majority of the participating States were in favour of adopting a final declaration. Although it should be acknowledged that there was progress in very important areas, particularly in verification, the disagreement on the application of article VI will now oblige the States parties to approach the 1995 Conference in a constructive spirit of conciliation, putting aside intransigent positions or preconditions which are not in keeping with the spirit and the letter of the Treaty.

The foreseeable results of the PTBT Amendment Conference constitute another factor that should prompt us to moderation. And negotiation and co-ordination between States call for a will and an effort that go beyond mere good intentions. New political conditions must be created that will make it possible for a treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear tests once and for all to be negotiated as rapidly as possible. But this should be viewed as a process to be pursued in parallel with and not in conflict with the question of the extension of the NPT, bearing in mind that the fate of the NPT beyond 1995 will depend on how all its provisions have been respected. It is this constructive spirit and quest for consensus that should inspire the Conference on Disarmament to include in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons the prohibition of use of all forms of these weapons of mass destruction. From the time that the prohibition of the use of force was enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, there has been no place in

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

international law for the right to reprisals. The only exception to this principle is self-defence, which is provided for in Article 51 of the Charter, on the terms that are stated therein. It is to be hoped that this year the scope of the future convention will be defined on the basis of the norms laid down in the Charter of the United Nations.

It is my hope that this year the Conference on Disarmament can provide the international community with specific results from its negotiations. The Gulf war places us under an obligation to achieve the virtual finalization of the convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons. In this context I wish Ambassador Batsanov, who is to assume the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee, every success, and I offer him the full co-operation of my delegation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Peru for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor?

I should now like to give the floor to the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ambassador Komatina, who will make a statement in connection with the services available to the Conference.

Mr. KOMATINA (Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations): In the context of existing financial constraints, we are mandated by the General Assembly to report to the Conference on the services to be assigned to it. As in previous sessions, the Conference will be allocated 10 meetings per week with full servicing, 15 meetings per week with full services during the sessions of the Seismic Group. In other words, we should be able to hold two daily meetings with full servicing throughout the whole of the 1991 session, plus one additional daily meeting when the Seismic Group is in session.

As the work of the Conference proceeds, it may be necessary to hold meetings of subsidiary bodies consecutively with other committees or working groups. This practice has in the past prevented the waste of allocated resources in cases where the full three hours allocated for each meeting have not been fully utilized. In this respect, punctuality in starting meetings of the Conference is also important. I wish to inform you that we are not using all the services assigned to us. In 1990 the Conference and its subsidiary bodies lost a total of 358 hours of full services.

It is also understood that meetings with such services cannot be held in the evening or during weekends.

I also wish to recall that measures accepted by the Conference at the informal meeting held on 22 April 1986 concerning documentation continue to be valid. In order to implement these decisions and bring about savings in the cost of documentation, all papers need to be presented well in advance.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for his statement. You will recall that, during our consultations, members agreed to the arrangements described by Ambassador Komatina. The Conference will therefore proceed accordingly.

Before I adjourn the meeting, I should like to invite members to renew their consultations on those organizational questions still pending, so that at our next plenary meeting we may achieve consensus on at least some of those issues.

I have no other business for today, and I shall now adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 24 January, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.578  
24 January 1991

ENGLISH

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 24 January 1991, at 10 a.m.

President:

Mr. W. Rasaputram

(Sri Lanka)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 578th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I have no speakers listed as wishing to take the floor today. Before we proceed with some organizational matters, I should like to ask whether any member wishes to address the Conference at this plenary meeting.

Since there is none, I should now like to turn to our business for today. My consultations on the agenda and programme of work for the 1991 session are concluded. I should therefore like to convene an informal meeting of the Conference to report to you on the results of the consultations, as well as on the question of the re-establishment of some subsidiary bodies and other matters. If there is no objection, I shall now suspend the plenary meeting, and we shall resume our work at an informal meeting in five minutes' time.

The meeting was suspended at 10.15 a.m. and resumed at 10.25 a.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 578th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

We shall now proceed to formalize the agreements reached at the informal meeting held today.

I put before the Conference for adoption document CD/WP.397, containing a proposed agenda and programme of work for the 1991 session of the Conference. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts these proposals.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I now turn to document CD/WP.398, containing a draft decision on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: We shall now take up document CD/WP.399, containing a draft decision on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. May I take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision? I see no objection.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: In connection with the re-establishment of this Ad Hoc Committee, I now invite the Conference to appoint Mr. Angus Robertson of Canada as its Chairman.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I should like to convey to Mr. Robertson the congratulations of the Conference on his appointment as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, and wish him success in discharging his responsibilities.



(The President)

In connection with agenda item 7, entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons", as indicated at the informal meeting, I wish to suggest that we keep in mind that, whenever it is appropriate for the Conference to deal with this agenda item and in the light of its existing priorities, it should keep under review, with expert assistance, as appropriate, the prohibition of the development and manufacture of those weapons and systems with a view to making, when necessary, recommendations on undertaking specific negotiations on the identified types of such weapons.

I have no other business for consideration at this plenary meeting, and I intend therefore to adjourn it. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 29 January, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.30 a.m.



# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.579  
29 January 1991

ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 29 January 1991, at 10 a.m.

President:

Mr. W. Rasaputram

(Sri Lanka)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 579th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

There are no speakers on the list for this plenary meeting. I should therefore like to ask whether any member wishes to address the Conference at this stage. I recognize the distinguished representative of Canada, and I give the floor to Mr. Robertson.

Mr. ROBERTSON (Canada): I thought it would be appropriate, since this is the first plenary I have been able to attend at this new session of ours, to say a few words, not of substance, about the election of Canada, in my person, to act as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, an honour, I might add, for me and for my delegation. I would like to apologize for not having been here earlier; I have been in Malta for a CSCE meeting on the somewhat ironic subject of the peaceful settlement of disputes and returned less than 48 hours ago, so that is why I haven't been here sooner.

I wanted to take this opportunity to give to the Conference my assurances that I will certainly use all my best endeavours to advance our work on the RW agenda, and I think we are very fortunate that we will have on the secretariat side the help of Mr. Cassandra and Ms. Cummins. I understand that the negotiations and discussions on the composition of the Bureau and the possible chairmanships of the two traditional tracks are still going on, and obviously the help of the Bureau that is eventually selected will be equally important in advancing our work, but of course it is going to be the role of the member States of the CD who participate in that work that will determine whether we get any further this year than we have in the past, as I have to admit that progress has not been particularly rapid. To an outsider it might seem that since it was possible for the CD to reach early agreement both on the mandate and the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc RW Committee the prospects for progress are good, but we all know that this is really not the case. The subjects we are working on are difficult, in some cases contentious, and it is not likely to be any easier this time around than earlier. That being said, it seems to me, however, and I just wanted to flag this for later discussions, informally with you, that there are already some possibilities for improving our chances. One difficulty in 1990 was when we used to meet early on Monday mornings. That not only conflicted with the informal weekly consultations on chemical weapons of one of our groups, and thereby perhaps deprived the RW deliberations of some inputs from smaller delegations which could have been useful, but in any event it seems to me that Monday morning is not necessarily the time when we are all at our best and ready to work as productively as we might and one of my objectives, therefore, is to consult with the group co-ordinators and the secretariat to see whether we cannot reach agreement in a mutually satisfactory way on a better time slot for work on RW. Another possibility I will mention before I close these remarks is that last year, because of various circumstances, we did not have as many meetings as we might have had; there were some 19 in all, 4 Ad Hoc Committees, 8 of track A, 7 of track B. Under our new format for 1991, with a three-session division of our labour, we have at least the possibility of holding as many as 25 meetings and therefore, although we may not reach that target, that also argues that we may be able to do somewhat more this time around.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Canada, and I would like to ask whether any other member wishes to address the Conference. I see none.

I now wish to turn to our business for today. I should like to inform you that the report of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, covering its inter-sessional work, will be available as document CD/1046 for our next plenary meeting on Thursday. On that occasion, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, will introduce it. At the following plenary meeting of the Conference, to be held on 7 February, I shall invite the Conference to adopt the report contained in document CD/1046. In connection with the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee, which was recommended to us as a priority matter in its report on the 1990 session, I am continuing my consultations on its future mandate. I do hope that it will be possible for us to agree soon on the re-establishment of this subsidiary body, so that negotiations on the "rolling text" can proceed without delay.

In addition to my consultations on the mandate for the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, I am also proceeding with the co-ordinators to review the situation concerning the re-establishment of other subsidiary bodies. I shall report to you as soon as these consultations are concluded.

Before I adjourn this plenary meeting, I wish to inform you that we have already received 34 requests from non-members to participate in the work of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies. The latest requests received were circulated last Thursday for the information of members. Accordingly, we should be in a position to decide on those requests at our next plenary meeting on Thursday. You will recall that I have already explained the procedure to be followed on that occasion, which is identical to the practice followed last year. Before I put before the Conference for action the note by the President with all the requests attached to it, we shall hold an informal meeting for the consideration of that note. We shall thereafter resume the plenary meeting and take appropriate action.

I have no other business for today, and I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 31 January, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.25 a.m.



# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.580  
31 January 1991

ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND EIGHTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 31 January 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. W. Rasaputram (Sri Lanka)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 580th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I have on my list of speakers today the representative of Sweden, who will speak in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, to introduce the report of that Committee on its work during the inter-sessional period, as well as the representatives of the Netherlands and Canada. Once we reach the end of the list of speakers, I shall suspend the plenary meeting and convene an informal meeting of the Conference to consider requests for participation in our work which have been received from States that are not members. We shall later resume the plenary meeting to continue our examination of that subject.

I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, who will introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, contained in document CD/1046.

Mr. HYLTIENIUS (Sweden): I have the honour today to introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons (CD/1046).

As you will recall, the Conference decided at the last meeting of the summer part of its session that the Ad Hoc Committee should hold open-ended consultations from 26 November to 21 December 1990, followed by a session of limited duration during the period 8 to 18 January 1991. As a result of this inter-sessional work the earlier report submitted to the Conference in August last year (contained in document CD/1033) has been considerably amended. Several new documents have been drafted, and parts of the earlier text have been moved from appendix II to appendix I and thus now form part of the so-called "rolling text". Moreover, the part of the "rolling text" containing the articles of the convention has been edited to make it more consistent and readable.

In 1990 the political issues involved in the drafting of the future convention were addressed to a much greater extent than before. This was done in a number of ways. The most comprehensive effort took place in the open-ended consultations on undiminished security and universal adherence. A convention of this magnitude cannot be dealt with only on a piecemeal basis. It is necessary also to have an overview of the political context and the component parts in their interrelationship. It became clear from the consultations that the convention must be effective and non-discriminatory in order to be sufficiently attractive. It must be considered an advantage to become a party to the convention. Correspondingly, it must be unattractive to stay outside. I believe that the open-ended consultations on these matters have increased understanding of the issues involved and thereby prepared the ground for final agreement on them. It has also opened a discussion on what can be done at this stage to promote widest possible adherence to the convention by means of declarations of intent, regional initiatives, etc.

My summary of the open-ended consultations on undiminished security and universal adherence is contained in appendix II to the Committee's report. In this context I note with particular satisfaction the increased number of



(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

non-members of the Conference on Disarmament which are participating in the negotiations. This bodes well for the prospects of future adherence to the convention. The regional initiatives undertaken and planned are other examples of constructive contributions to these endeavours.

In this past year we have also worked very actively on verification issues. Apart from the active consideration of these issues in one of the Working Groups, which led to some important concrete results and to which I shall revert in a minute, a determined effort was made to come to grips with the problem of challenge verification, or - as I would prefer to name it - inspection on request. I presented a draft article IX, which was welcomed by a large number of delegations and extensively and intensively discussed. It did not prove possible, however, to agree on the article. It would, of course, have been a great achievement to settle this long-standing political problem relating to a cornerstone of the convention, but in my view there is no reason to be too discouraged by this situation. The remaining problems are now better known and understood by all delegations. This is a stage we must go through in order to achieve the convention.

In this connection it is interesting to note the efforts made in trial inspections on request to illustrate the problems encountered and find solutions to them. The Committee will in fact be in a better position than before to resolve this issue when it comes under renewed consideration.

The open-ended consultations on the Executive Council seemed by and large to confirm the viability of the existing provisions in appendix I, whereas it appeared that the issues of the composition and decision-making procedures of the Council were not yet ripe for solution.

Besides the complete treatment of major political hard-core issues that I have just outlined, considerable progress has been made on various issues which are now reflected in the new "rolling text". The disappointment over the lack of agreement on a few key issues must not obscure the considerable and concrete achievements made in the three Working Groups and by the Friends of the Chair.

From Working Group A we have received a new and final text on investigations of alleged use of chemical weapons, which is harmonized with the procedures available to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and is now included in the protocol on inspection procedures. In addition, painstaking work has been done in Working Group A, which has resulted in readable and, most importantly, implementable verification provisions in the annexes to articles IV and V. These provisions and similar provisions in the annexes to article VI have, furthermore, been harmonized with provisions in the protocol on inspection procedures. I wish to thank Mr. Sahbaz for his contributions to these important results.

Working Group B has been able to incorporate into the "rolling text" a complete order of destruction for chemical weapons as well as for chemical weapons production facilities. I would like to recall that before the 1990 session this was considered by representatives from all groups as one of the

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

main outstanding hurdles. It has now been overcome, and I especially thank Mr. Meerburg for his inventiveness and a good job done. Working Group B has also been able to elaborate further the schedules in the annex on chemicals, and to finalize the modalities for revision of schedules and guidelines. Moreover, considerable progress has been made on the issue of thresholds. Extremely useful material on low concentrations and on the "captive use" of listed chemicals has also been incorporated into appendix II.

Working Group C has made much headway on issues that were considered by most of us as major outstanding problems. We are particularly indebted to Dr. Krutzsch for his perseverance and enthusiasm. While the solutions to the issues of amendments, settlement of disputes and measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions now incorporated into appendix I have not been finally elaborated, each of them constitutes a breakthrough not only technically but also politically. Finally, the material on "Financial aspects of the Organization" now in appendix II constitutes a valuable new basis for further work on an issue that is of major concern.

The open-ended consultations on article X (Assistance and protection against chemical weapons) continued during the inter-sessional period. Further progress was made, and it is my opinion that agreement is within reach on this important article. A Chairman's paper (CD/CW/WP.324) was issued as a basis for continued work. I am very grateful indeed to Ambassador García Moritán of Argentina and his deputy, Mr. Parini, for the very constructive and promising work undertaken on this issue.

Article XI is in my opinion another important part of the convention. I have conducted private consultations on this article during the whole year, and during the inter-sessional period I also held open-ended consultations on the matter. There is still no agreement on this, but the number of delegations which have reservations about including the draft text on the article in appendix I have diminished considerably.

The problem of old chemical weapons is now better analysed than before, but its solution still eludes us. I have the impression that further contacts on a bilateral basis between some of the countries particularly concerned will be necessary before it is possible to find an appropriate and generally acceptable solution in the multilateral context. I am most grateful to Ambassador Morel for his efforts and contributions as a Friend of the Chair in this difficult field. The outcome of the work on this matter is reflected in appendix II.

I am pleased to report that the problem of jurisdiction and control has been brought much closer to solution this year. A new text on "General undertakings" in article VII has been included in appendix I. A few references to this concept remain in the "rolling text", but I am convinced that they can be addressed without too much difficulty now that the general undertakings have been agreed. This is due to the energetic work done by Ambassador Reese and Mr. Morris of Australia, who conducted consultations on this issue on my behalf. I wish to express my warm thanks for their successful endeavours.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

Although great emphasis has been put on the efforts this year to address the political issues, this does not mean that the technical questions have been neglected. I have already reported on the work and the important results achieved in Working Group B. In addition, several technical problems have been dealt with in the Technical Group on Instrumentation under the able Chairmanship of Dr. Rautio, and I should like to take this opportunity to thank her once more for her important contributions to this year's work.

The draft convention has been meticulously elaborated over several years by different negotiators and experts. It has gradually become rather difficult to read because of inconsistencies in nomenclature, numbering, punctuation etc. It was therefore felt that the present text had to be edited. An open-ended group led by Dr. Santesson of my delegation embarked upon that work during the inter-sessional period, and the part of the "rolling text" containing the articles of the convention has now been edited. In addition, guidelines for future editing as well as a list of some outstanding editing issues have been circulated in a working paper (CD/CW/WP.323).

As the implementation of the future convention will also depend on co-operation with chemical industry, contacts with industry representatives are of particular importance. The Ad Hoc Committee's meetings with industry representatives provided the framework for in-depth discussions of some topical verification and technical issues. Diplomats and industrialists seem to have gained a better understanding of each other's perceptions and concerns than was the case in earlier years.

It is not possible to conduct a negotiation of this complex nature without the support of a very competent and efficient secretariat. The Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is fortunate enough to have such support. I am particularly indebted to Mr. Bensmail, the long-standing Secretary of the Committee, whose contributions to our work in the last year and over a number of previous years can hardly be overestimated. He has been very ably assisted by Ms. Marcaillou, Ms. Darby and Mrs. Roux, and I wish to extend my warm thanks also to them. Other members of the secretariat too have contributed in an important manner. I am thinking especially of the interpreters and the translators. I am very grateful to all of them for their work and their understanding and co-operation in our common endeavour.

My own delegation has worked very hard indeed to contribute to the efforts which go into a chairmanship of this kind. I have many competent collaborators who have prepared the basis for much of the material which I have presented in the Committee - Mr. Molander, Dr. Santesson, Dr. Lau, Mr. Gierow, Dr. Runn and Mr. Grenstad. My gratitude also goes to the secretaries in my mission, who have borne much of the burden of producing the material.

I referred at the outset to the political framework of this negotiation. Let me conclude by reverting to this aspect. We can do much within this Conference to take political aspects into account in drafting the convention in such a manner that it becomes attractive enough to achieve wide, perhaps even universal, adherence. But in searching for ideal and well-elaborated

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

solutions let us not lose track of current events. The war in the Gulf reminds us that the problem of chemical warfare is an awesome possibility, and that every effort must now be made to bring our work to an early conclusion. It is more important and urgent than ever.

I wish the incoming Chairman, Ambassador Serguei Batsanov, every success. He had the competence, vision and determination required for the responsible task of guiding these negotiations.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for his presentation, as well as for the kind words addressed to the Chair. On behalf of the Conference, I thank Ambassador Hyltenius for the very effective and skilful way in which he performed his duties as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee.

As I explained at our last plenary meeting, the Conference will adopt the report contained in document CD/1046 at its next plenary meeting on Thursday, 7 February.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Wagenmakers.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): Allow me, Mr. President, to congratulate you on behalf of my delegation on taking up the high office of President of the Conference on Disarmament. We are sure that under your competent and dynamic leadership the CD's activities for this year will get under way smoothly and efficiently. Let me assure you that the Netherlands delegation will make every effort to assist you in making your present stewardship effective and stimulating.

Most of our thoughts are directed nowadays towards the war in the Gulf, and rightly so. The Netherlands is taking an active share in the task of ensuring compliance with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. As we are all aware, a dramatic dimension is looming over this war. I refer to the implicit and explicit threats which we have heard to use chemical weapons in that conflict. Needless to say, such threats cannot but compel us to achieve the most important objective on our agenda: an effective convention banning all chemical weapons once and for all. A convention worthy of our confidence to ensure that the scourge of chemical warfare is effectively removed from every region in the world. A convention of which we can be sure that it will be faithfully implemented and complied with everywhere, and which will not be considered by some as just another scrap of paper to be ignored. One of the tools which should give rise to confidence in complete implementation of the convention is a régime to trigger international inspections on request any time, anywhere, based on effective procedures to identify serious violations. Only such a régime will deter potential violators. We have already worked out some procedures for such inspections. We must test them in practice. And we must improve and complete them.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

In this connection, I take pleasure in introducing today on behalf of both Canada and the Netherlands a report on a joint Canada/Netherlands chemical weapons trial challenge inspection of a military facility. This report is being circulated as document CD/1052, and also bears the number CD/CW/WP.327.

The inspection, which took place from 26 to 28 November 1990 at an operational military airfield containing garrisoned land forces, was the first bilateral trial inspection in the chemical weapons field for both participating countries. I may remark that the Netherlands has also been involved in a number of bilateral trial inspections in the field of conventional arms control. Last year, two joint inspection exercises took place with Poland to provide practical experience for the negotiations on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, signed in Paris on 19 November 1990. As a further training effort for the implementation of this Treaty, a joint Canada/Netherlands trial inspection was held this week in the Netherlands. Observers from our partners in the Western European Union were invited to take part on that occasion.

I come back now to our Joint Canada/Netherlands chemical weapons trial inspection. Building on the experience of earlier national trial inspections, the aims of the inspection were firstly, to further test the inspection procedures laid down in the "rolling text"; secondly, to ascertain that compliance with a chemical weapons convention could be demonstrated without sensitive information being divulged; and, finally, to continue the training of the participants in organizing, carrying out and escorting such an inspection.

The inspection, carried out by Netherlands as well as Canadian inspectors, demonstrated the utility of conducting multinational exercises. It also demonstrated that reliable conclusions could be drawn under circumstances of managed access at an operational military facility. Furthermore, the exercise yielded a number of useful conclusions on problems still under discussion in the CD and pointed to some areas that still need to be addressed in our negotiations, and, perhaps, in the protocol on inspection procedures in the draft convention. These conclusions and recommendations are laid out in the report. Allow me, Mr. President, to dwell on a few of them.

With regard to the notification of the inspection site and the arrival of the inspection team, Canada and the Netherlands opted for the procedure whereby the site is notified by the requesting State after arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry, rather than simultaneously with the notification of the inspection request to the inspected State. In real life this would have enhanced the element of surprise. It was concluded, however, that the "rolling text" leaves many ambiguities as to the precise procedures that should be followed up to the actual beginning of the inspection. The exact time of the start of the inspection, for instance, about which the "rolling text" says little, leaves considerable opportunity for dispute. At the same time, the Technical Secretariat would encounter quite a number of problems in forming an inspection team if it was unaware, at that time, of the type and size of the site to be inspected.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

During the exercise, the observer from the requesting State was given a considerable amount of leeway in observing the pre-inspection briefing, the debriefing and the activities of the inspection team and its subteams. It was felt afterwards that the observer would have been in a very good position to advise his national authorities on the efficacy of the conduct of the inspection and on its findings, without interfering with the inspection or obtaining sensitive information.

On the whole, the exercise showed that under circumstances of managed access, sensitive information could be adequately protected at this military site, while at the same time the inspection team was provided with enough information to draw reliable conclusions with regard to the presence of CW. One related problem was the inability of the inspection team to inspect medical records owing to Canadian laws that protect the privacy of the patient. It was felt that this issue should be carefully considered in the CD.

Canada and the Netherlands agreed that all samples would be analysed off-site at the TNO laboratories in the Netherlands. Although analysis at a fully equipped modern laboratory had the advantage of producing very reliable test results and, at the same time, reducing the size of the inspection team and the quantity of its equipment, off-site inspection posed the problem of maintaining the chain of custody during storage, transportation and analysis of the samples. As our experts are already aware, further consideration will need to be given to this matter.

On the whole the joint Canada/Netherlands trial challenge inspection amounted to a rather satisfactory and useful experience. It showed once more that the procedures laid down in the "rolling text" so far, although not yet perfect, do in principle provide an excellent framework for the carrying out of such inspections. It contains the instruments required to ascertain that the provisions of the future chemical weapons convention are complied with. I might therefore encourage all potential States parties to the future convention to participate in trial challenge inspections, in order to help us further fine-tune this aspect of the CW verification régime.

Some of the issues we have identified in our report on the trial challenge inspection could possibly be addressed in the Ad Hoc Committee and its subgroups, while other issues might not need to be addressed until a later stage. This is a matter for discussion by our technical and legal experts.

I should not let this opportunity go by without thanking the Canadian authorities, both military and civilian, for their splendid co-operation. As the inspection took place in Germany, our appreciation also goes, of course, to the German authorities.

Finally, we look forward to and count on the completion of our negotiations this year. We believe therefore that the new Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons should be set up without delay. The new "rolling text" just introduced by the former Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons provides an excellent basis for continuing, if not redoubling, our efforts.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

My delegation wishes to avail itself of this opportunity to express our appreciation and respect to Ambassador Hyltenius and his team for the invaluable services they have rendered to the CWC negotiating process. We are confident that Ambassador Batsanov will push on in the same vein.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Netherlands for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Shannon.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada): May I, at the outset, Mr. President, offer you my congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of this Conference and wish you every success, and may I also welcome our new ambassadorial colleagues among our ranks?

The report we are presenting today on the joint Canada/Netherlands trial CW challenge inspection comes at a time of great international crisis. World attention is focused on the conflict in the Persian Gulf and on the danger that chemical weapons might yet again be used, in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The spectre of possible chemical weapons use in the Gulf highlights the importance of our work, as we seek to rid the world of these weapons of senseless mass destruction. We must respond to this challenge with redoubled effort.

Last year Canada welcomed the Netherlands proposal to conduct a joint inspection and, in fact, to create a binational inspection team. We felt that this would exemplify many of the characteristics of an international team dispatched by the Director-General of the Proposed Technical Secretariat. Our first collaboration with the Netherlands in a CW trial inspection capacity took place in June 1990, and was reported in CD/1030/Rev.1. In this first endeavour, Canadian officials conducted a practice "routine" inspection at a Canadian pharmaceutical facility. An observer from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs attended. However, the full integration of officials from both countries in carrying out the joint Canada/Netherlands trial challenge inspection at Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Lahr in Germany went further, in a multinational sense, than our earlier national practice inspection. And, as the trial inspection took place on German territory, we had an additional multinational feature: the presence of German observers throughout the inspection.

I would like to draw attention to another aspect of this inspection and its procedures. The Canadian in-country escort team had been trained to receive inspections in relation to quite a different set of treaty obligations, namely, those of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. We found that the escort team's operating procedures, as well as those of the personnel of the inspected site, could be modified without great difficulty to meet many of the needs of the CW challenge inspection. In a similar vein, I would like to suggest that certain of the considerations taken into account and finding expression in the Protocol on Inspection of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe might be of interest to our experts as we refine and conclude the protocol on inspection procedures in the "rolling text" of the CW convention. What I am referring to is a cross-fertilization of ideas as we try to devise a set of procedures that will work in practice, not just look good on paper.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

My Netherlands colleague has already touched on the "managed access" element of the joint trial challenge inspection of CFB Lahr. I would like to add a point of reinforcement from the perspective of the inspected State. Even though normal security sensitivities applied to CFB Lahr as an operational military airfield and a garrison for land forces, the "managed access" approach to particular facilities and equipment was able both to meet the needs of the inspection team and to satisfy the security concerns of the inspected State.

As an aside, I want to express here to my Netherlands colleague our deep pleasure and appreciation for the opportunity afforded us to work so closely with our Dutch colleagues and to remark upon the professionalism which both the Netherlands Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Defence displayed throughout this exercise.

Mr. President, my delegation offers to you, at the beginning of substantive work of this CD session, our full support as we strive to conclude, as soon as possible, a CW convention that will result in the complete destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles and remove for ever the fear that such horrible weapons might again be used. This year has seen the threat of CW use raised again; our task is to ensure the year does not end with the question of the control of CW still unresolved.

I take this opportunity to add that, as in previous years, my delegation will be distributing, through the secretariat, copies of the latest compendiums of CW-related documents and statements delivered during the 1990 session.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none.

As announced at the opening of this plenary meeting, I shall now suspend it and convene an informal meeting to consider requests from non-members to participate in the work of the Conference.

The meeting was suspended at 10.50 a.m. and resumed at 10.55 a.m.

The PRESIDENT: The 580th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

As a result of the informal meeting that we have just held, I propose that we take a decision on 34 requests from non-member States to participate in our work, on the basis of the note by the President which the secretariat has circulated today as document CD/WP.400. Since no objections were raised at the informal meeting, I suggest that we now adopt this decision.

It was so decided.



The PRESIDENT: In connection with the decision just taken, I wish to state the following:

As is well known, the Conference on Disarmament is a specialist body. It is the unique global multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. There is a tradition among CD members of concentrating in their discussions very much on the disarmament issues at hand. This has been the general practice as well for the non-members invited to participate. Many non-members have made contributions of outstanding practical value to our disarmament work. I trust - and am confident - that those non-members whom we have just invited will make a constructive contribution to the negotiations and, as the case might be, pre-negotiations on the disarmament issues they have chosen. It is understood that, in accordance with the rules of procedure and the practice of the Conference, invitations extended to non-members are for the 1991 session. It goes without saying that any action from which our negotiations would not benefit would be most inappropriate. In fact, the participation of States non-members of the Conference should contribute to the universality of disarmament agreements.

Our negotiations on a convention banning chemical weapons have shown encouraging progress. This is all the more timely since we have witnessed in the recent past how much suffering chemical weapons may cause. May I therefore remind all delegations, those of member States as well as those of States wishing to accede to the status of participating non-members, that all States participating in the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons made the following call in its Final Declaration: "In addition, in order to achieve as soon as possible the indispensable universal character of the convention, they call upon all States to become parties thereto as soon as it is concluded." In this context I wish to note that all 34 States non-members that have addressed communications to us have indicated their wish to be invited to participate in our negotiations on the banning of chemical weapons.

There is no other business, and I shall therefore adjourn this plenary meeting. I wish to recall that, as agreed by the Conference at its 575th plenary meeting on 21 August 1990, and as indicated in our programme of work for this session, as from the coming week we shall hold one plenary meeting every week, preferably on Thursdays. This being the case, the next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 7 February, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11 a.m.



# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.581  
7 February 1991

ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 7 February 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. W. Rasaputram (Sri Lanka)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 581st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

As announced at our last plenary meeting, I will put before the Conference today for adoption the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, contained in document CD/1046. We shall first listen to the statements scheduled for today and then proceed immediately afterwards to take that action.

I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of Peru and Mexico. I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, Mr. Calderón, who will speak in his capacity as co-ordinator of the Group of 21 for agenda item 4.

Mr. CALDERON (Peru) (translated from Spanish): This morning, I wish to read out a statement on behalf of the Group of 21 concerning the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

(continued in English)

As in previous years, the Group of 21 would like to emphasize once again that the goal of the negotiations under way in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is to conclude a comprehensive and non-discriminatory multilateral convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

On 4 December 1990, the forty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 45/57 A, which refers, inter alia, to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. In this resolution the General Assembly stressed once again its conviction of the "necessity that every effort be exerted for the successful conclusion of negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction". The General Assembly also expressed "its regret and concern that a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction has not yet been concluded". Furthermore, it strongly urged the Conference on Disarmament, "as a matter of highest priority, to intensify during its 1991 session its efforts to resolve outstanding issues, and to conclude its negotiations on a convention, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and to re-establish its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for that purpose".

This year the urgency of concluding a chemical weapons convention is reinforced by the present circumstances in the international arena, which are detrimental to peace and security. The Group of 21 continues to believe that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons should include a reference to the total prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in order to be consistent with the General Assembly resolutions successively adopted in previous years since, in its view, this undertaking is already provided for in article I, paragraph 3 of the draft Convention. This element is of paramount importance to the Group as well as to the vast majority of all members of the Conference.

(Mr. Calderón, Peru)

As stated repeatedly by the Group of 21, the goal of concluding a comprehensive convention compels the Conference on Disarmament to seek a total ban on the use of chemical weapons so as to free the world from the scourge of these weapons of mass destruction. The Group would like to emphasize the importance it attaches to all aspects of the mandate, and expresses its willingness to ensure the prompt resumption of the important work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): The comprehensive nuclear test ban has been at the top of the list of priority items in this Conference since its establishment in 1962. It could even be said that the then Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) was set up specifically to bring about a comprehensive test ban.

"Such an agreement will be an important first step in bringing the arms race under control. It will be the foundation for the establishment of the necessary confidence, which must be built upon in order to ensure that other more far-reaching disarmament measures will be concluded and faithfully carried out. Such a treaty can serve to restrict and inhibit other countries from producing their own nuclear weapons. Finally, it will prevent further increases in the radioactive fall-out from nuclear tests."

This assessment, which was voiced by the representative of the United States in this very room on 27 August 1962 (ENDC/PV.75), summarizes the position of the overwhelming majority of the international community on this item.

A year later, in August 1963, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water was opened for signature. The two sole substantive provisions of the Treaty are the partial test ban (without provision for a verification system) and the possibility (contained in article II) of amending it. In the preamble to the Treaty, the original parties - the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union - undertook to seek "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end, and desiring to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances".

More than a quarter of a century and hundreds of underground nuclear tests later, the international community still has no CTB. In this Conference, where we are supposed to be negotiating such a treaty, it has not even been possible to secure agreement on establishing a subsidiary negotiating body. This is the reason for the growing impatience of many Member States of the United Nations, impatience which, year after year, has taken shape in numerous General Assembly resolutions and urgent appeals from political leaders, parliaments and governmental and non-governmental organizations. In view of the deadlock in this Conference, a group of countries decided in 1988 - the silver anniversary of the partial test-ban Treaty - to submit for the consideration of the parties an amendment to this Treaty. The proposal made by Indonesia, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Mexico was distributed in this very Conference on 5 August 1988 (CD/852). The purpose of the amendment is to convert the Treaty into a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. It is composed of three parts.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

Firstly, the addition of an article VI, stating that "Protocols annexed to this Treaty constitute an integral part of the Treaty". Secondly, the text of protocol I broadening the test ban to cover tests underground or in any other place not described in article I of the Treaty itself. Thirdly, protocol II on the verification of the comprehensive ban.

In pursuance of article II of the Treaty and of the request of the majority of the States parties and of the General Assembly of the United Nations (in resolutions 41/46 B, 42/26 B and 44/106), an Amendment Conference was convened whose first organizational phase took place at United Nations Headquarters from 29 May to 8 June 1990. There the provisional agenda for the Amendment Conference was agreed on, its rules of procedure were adopted and the States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, were requested to present to the Conference their views on the verification of a CTB.

On 30 November 1990, the six States which had initiated the amendment conference proposal distributed a draft protocol II on verification of a comprehensive test ban (PTBT/CONF/6). However, in view of the attitude adopted by two of the original signatories - to whom the Treaty gives the right to veto any amendment - it was obvious that the amendment could not be adopted in the second phase of the Conference, which was held, also in New York, from 7 to 18 January 1991. Fully aware of the foregoing, the General Assembly, in resolution 45/50 of 4 December 1990, recommended that "arrangements be made to ensure that intensive efforts continue, under the auspices of the Amendment Conference, until a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is achieved". But the breadth of the general debate in the plenary and the discussion of the protocol on verification in the Committee of the Whole, as well as the active participation of non-governmental organizations, highlighted the broad international support built up by the six-nation initiative. Hence the vast majority of the parties managed to reach an agreement on a follow-up mechanism which would enable the Conference to continue its work after 18 January.

The six sponsors, along with the Philippines, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania, submitted a draft decision reading as follows:

"Acknowledging the complex nature of certain aspects of a comprehensive test ban, especially those with regard to verification of compliance and possible sanctions against non-compliance, the States parties were of the view that further work needed to be undertaken. Accordingly, they agreed to reconvene the Conference no later than September 1993 and to establish an inter-sessional working group, composed of 15 to 20 countries, in order to continue the consideration of verification of compliance with a complete test-ban treaty. The working group will submit a report to the Conference at its reconvened session."

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

Subsequently, guided by a spirit of compromise, the six countries modified their proposal in the following way. The first part remained exactly as I have just read out, while the second read:

"Accordingly, they agreed to mandate the President of the Conference to conduct consultations with a view to achieving progress on those issues and resuming the work of the Conference at an appropriate time."

This was the decision that the Conference adopted at the conclusion of its second phase on 18 January. Its President, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas of Indonesia, will now have the task of continuing his skilful conduct of the work of the Conference. And in order to fulfil his mandate and ensure the success of the Conference, he will need the co-operation of all the parties to the Treaty.

When protocol II was discussed in the Amendment Conference, it was suggested, inter alia, that this Geneva Conference should also look at this document (CD/1054), which I now have the honour to present on behalf of the delegations of Indonesia, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Mexico. Likewise we have asked for it to be made available to the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, whose mandate, I would like to say in passing, could perhaps benefit from a few adjustments.

Draft protocol II consists of a preamble, eight articles, three annexes and an appendix. The first three articles describe the "treaty institutions" - the organization and its main bodies. One would be the assembly and its technical committee, in which all States parties would be represented. The other would be the secretariat, headed by a secretary-general, which among other functions would give technical support to the committee. Articles IV and V cover operating procedures, that is to say monitoring techniques and reports to be prepared by the secretariat. The next two articles indicate the "obligations of the parties" with regard to co-operative measures and additional monitoring procedures. The final article refers to the fact that the annexes and appendices would be integral parts of the protocol. Annex 1 describes the permanent global monitoring network, including monitoring stations, station operation and site selection. A preliminary list of the initial stations is given in appendix 1. Annex 2 deals with the way in which the secretariat could carry out temporary localized monitoring, and with station equipment and operations. Annex 3 refers to procedures for on-site inspection.

There is nothing esoteric about the content of draft protocol II. It is based on the already very long list of proposals designed to bring about proper verification of a CTB. One of the first was contained in the "draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments" (ENDC/58) submitted to the Conference by the United States and the United Kingdom in August 1962. This proposal sought the establishment of a scientific commission, an international staff and a verification system with a network of stations and on-site inspection.

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

The six delegations - I am about to conclude, Mr. President - hope that our draft protocol II to the 1963 Treaty will be given careful consideration by this Conference and its subsidiary bodies. We are prepared to improve it and consider it along with other proposals that have already been tabled.

Mr. von WAGNER (Germany): As this is the first time that I take the floor under your presidency, Sir, I am very glad to be able to congratulate you on your assumption of your high and very responsible task. We are sure that you will discharge it in the most able manner, as we have experienced already.

We have listened very carefully to the declaration just read out by the representative of Peru on behalf of the Group of 21. As co-ordinator for chemical weapons of the Western Group, on behalf of Western delegations, may I express the opinion of Western delegations that we agree completely with the declaration of the Group of 21 as far as it pronounces the need for the early establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee for Chemical Weapons? We have, at an early date of the new round of negotiations of the Conference on Disarmament, pointed to the fact that Western delegations are prepared to re-establish that Committee without any delay, and in order to be able to do so, we have said that the best way to do it is on the basis of the mandate which we had last year. That this mandate is sufficient is proven by the "rolling text" which has been elaborated during the past years on this and similar mandates, and which now contains more than 200 pages, most of them consensus language. So, as it was sufficient to establish that kind of consensus and that text, there is no reason to believe that it would not be sufficient to continue this very valuable task during the coming year. On that ground, we urge the Conference on Disarmament to agree as early as possible on the establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Germany for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I recognize the representative of the United States, Ambassador Stephen Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): I would like to mention that we have with us today, as a guest of my delegation, Congressman Wayne Owens, a member of the United States House of Representatives, from the State of Utah. Congressman Owens is one of four Congressmen appointed by the Speaker of the House, Mr. Thomas Foley, as a special observer for the chemical weapons negotiations. He is in Geneva to familiarize himself with the CW negotiations.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for introducing in the Conference Congressman Wayne Owens, who holds the important responsibility of Special Observer of the House of Representatives for the chemical weapons negotiations. I welcome him and wish him success in discharging that task, which is closely related to one of the priority items on our agenda.

Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none.



(The President)

We shall now take action on the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons on its intersessional work, as contained in document CD/1046. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the report of the Ad Hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I should like now to refer briefly to those organizational questions still pending. As you know, I have been engaged since the opening of the annual session in consultations with the co-ordinators in connection with the most appropriate organizational arrangements to deal with some agenda items. I am happy to report to you today that agreement has emerged on the organizational framework to deal with agenda items 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", and 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". We shall apply the same procedure as followed during the last annual session, i.e., the Conference will hold a series of informal meetings on the substance of these agenda items, and views expressed on them at both plenary and informal meetings will be reflected in the annual report of the Conference. I shall make a statement, under my own responsibility, listing topics for the purpose of facilitating a structured discussion at the informal meetings. That statement will not be binding on any delegation. I intend therefore at our next plenary meeting to formalize this agreement and, for that purpose, I shall follow a procedure identical to that used at the 547th plenary meeting of the Conference on 29 March 1990.

As you know, I have also conducted consultations on the question of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, pursuant to paragraph 18 of our last annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. As a result of those consultations, I have decided to appoint Ambassador Ahmad Kamal of Pakistan to conduct consultations bilaterally with members of the Conference, to determine whether there would be common ground for addressing certain issues relating to that question. Ambassador Kamal has very kindly agreed to this appointment, and I should like to express my appreciation to him for undertaking this new and heavy responsibility.

I am also conducting consultations in connection with the re-establishment of the subsidiary bodies under agenda items 1, 4 and 5, so that we can implement the agreement already obtained in connection with those items. No agreement seems in sight in connection with the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee under agenda item 8. We also need to appoint the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances, and I do hope that during the coming days I shall have a recommendation to proceed to substantive work in that subsidiary body.

As we start the last week of my presidency, I intend to intensify my consultations, including, if necessary, additional meetings with the co-ordinators, so that we might start substantive work on a number of other subjects before the Conference. If agreement is not possible during the coming week on all pending questions relating to subsidiary bodies, I shall proceed to comply with the provision contained in paragraph 5 (d) of the decision adopted by the Conference at its 575th plenary meeting on 21 August 1990, concerning its improved and effective functioning. In

accordance with that provision, in the absence of consensus on the establishment of any particular subsidiary body or its mandate, the incumbent President shall, in the two weeks following the principal debate at the opening of the annual session, try to identify a Special Co-ordinator to assist in carrying out informal consultations with a view to reaching consensus. In other words, my mandate is to try to identify, by the end of next week, special co-ordinators if we are unable by that time to agree on organizational arrangements for certain agenda items.

I have no other business for this plenary meeting and I therefore intend to adjourn it. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 14 February, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.45 a.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.582  
14 February 1991

ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Thursday, 14 February 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. W. Rasaputram (Sri Lanka)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 582nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the very beginning, I wish to extend a warm welcome in the Conference to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, His Excellency Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati, who will address this plenary meeting. The Minister has been following our work very closely, as shown by his visits to the Conference, where he has presented on many occasions the views of his Government on disarmament matters, in particular one of the high-priority subjects on our agenda, the banning of chemical weapons. I wish to thank His Excellency Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati for his interest in the work of the Conference and for his presence among us today.

I am happy to report to you that my consultations on organizational arrangements for a number of agenda items have made substantial progress during the last week; we should now be in a position to take decisions on many of those questions which have been pending. Once the list of speakers is exhausted, we shall proceed to take up those questions requiring a decision by the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers today His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the representatives of Sweden, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Australia, Germany, the United Kingdom, Cameroon, Indonesia and Peru. I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, His Excellency Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati.

Mr. VELAYATI (Islamic Republic of Iran): The first month of the work in the Conference on Disarmament is always the most challenging and difficult part of the year. Your able and wise leadership during this period, Mr. President, is well recognized and appreciated. Finding myself once again in your midst gives me mixed feelings: the pleasure of talking and exchanging views with you, and the discomfort of having to share with you yet another tragic and sad experience in our region.

It is the paradox of history that the weapons provided to Iraq have now turned against their own suppliers. The Persian Gulf has now become the scene of the test of the most destructive weapons of our time. Cruise missiles are being battle-tested for the first time. Satellite-guided Slams, ultra-high-speed Patriots and ALARMS (air-launched anti-radar missiles) have come to the challenge of Scuds and Frogs. The destruction is frightening and the loss of life incalculable.

It is clear that this war will not solve problems, but rather exacerbate existing inequalities and injustices, leading to an escalated arms race. I am not going to argue here whether the arms race breeds tension or tension accelerates the arms race. It is, however, clear that they are mutually reinforcing. Proliferation, limitation, restriction or prohibition as well as arms control and disarmament are all properly security concerns, whether national, regional or international. The problem of the arms race is inextricably linked to regional security issues. Efforts to limit the arms race are linked to the process of eliminating existing hotbeds of tension,

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

removing sources of inequalities and injustices, properly addressing the security concerns of all, and following an impartial and principled approach to existing problems.

The situation in the Persian Gulf is getting out of hand. The crisis which was initiated by Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and exacerbated by the unprecedented and massive foreign military build-up in the region - with objectives that go beyond the liberation of Kuwait - has now entered the fifth week of an all-out war with no apparent end in sight. The destruction and instability brought to the region in the space of the last seven months, which is clearly the result of irresponsible policies of the past, is beyond reason.

The massive loss of human life, in particular the not so collateral civilian casualties, was certainly not what was envisaged or proclaimed at the adoption of Security Council resolution 678. The destruction of Iraq and Kuwait as well as the economic resources of the region is hardly compatible with the maintenance of regional and international peace and security. Furthermore, insistence, seemingly by both sides, on a military solution as well as statements concerning the post-war situation paint an uncertain and indeed dangerous picture for the future of the Persian Gulf.

Under these circumstances, it is of vital necessity to work out a political solution based on Iraq's unconditional and complete withdrawal from Kuwait, the withdrawal of foreign forces from the region, the inviolability of international boundaries in the Persian Gulf and respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all States in that area.

The imperative need for the creation of a "security and co-operation arrangement in the Persian Gulf area" is now more than ever evident. In 1986, the Islamic Republic of Iran presented the idea of the establishment of such a system, and Security Council resolution 598 provides the necessary institutional framework. The long-term security and stability of the region and the undeniable necessity of preventing further occurrences of aggression demand the creation of such an arrangement through the initiative of the countries of the Persian Gulf region with the co-operation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which would provide the necessary assurances and ensure its compatibility with United Nations principles and objectives.

The "security and co-operation arrangement in the Persian Gulf area" must include all countries of the region, as any exclusion would be the seed of future tension and instability. It is equally necessary that such a system should be free from foreign presence, intervention and interference, as these practices are historically and inherently destabilizing.

On the basis of these principles, the Islamic Republic of Iran took every step to prevent a war, and at this stage is actively seeking a responsible political solution to bring an end to the war with its disastrous consequences. We have maintained our channels of communication with the leadership of Iraq as well as those of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region. We believe that every effort should be directed towards fostering political will on both sides for the attainment of these principles, which would pave the way for the formulation of a comprehensive

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

proposal to end the hostilities. With this in view, our President presented an "idea for peace" to the President of Iraq during the recent visit by Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister. The contacts and dialogue are continuing, and it is our understanding that there is room for the continuation of diplomatic activities, and thus we will continue our efforts individually and within the framework of the Non-Aligned Movement on the basis of the decision taken two days ago in Belgrade.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region and the indiscriminate use of chemical weapons in the past decade are now coupled with the spectre of their possible use in the Persian Gulf war. Any such use will undoubtedly bring about unpredictable consequences whose implications could be catastrophic for all. Even talk here and there by officials of the warring parties is dangerous.

It is even more alarming that not only threats exist of the possible use of chemical weapons, but there is even reference to a possible resort to nuclear arms. Aside from an immediate need to prevent such a disastrous situation in this conflict, one is now more inclined to insist, for the long term, that any commitment regarding weapons of mass destruction ought to be comprehensive and include chemical weapons and nuclear weapons as well as sophisticated conventional weaponry. With regard to nuclear weapons, one could now conclude that accession to the non-proliferation Treaty by all States seems a necessary requirement.

The draft convention on chemical weapons should also be freed of any discriminatory provisions. It should enhance the security of all nations. Ideas such as the retention of chemical weapon stocks, whatever the pretext, will give the impression of the military utility of such weapons and will be detrimental to our common cause.

Furthermore, universality is the keyword for our work in this regard. The incentives for joining the convention and disincentives for those who remain outside will play a determining role in this respect. Since underdevelopment poses a threat to the security of developing countries, any provision which may harm the legitimate development of civil chemical industry should be prevented.

But still, the most significant task to be tackled in order to ensure universality and prepare suitable ground whereby States would find it safe and secure to join the convention is to maintain a balance at the global, and more importantly at the regional level for the security of States. The fact that the chemical weapons convention would generally enhance the security of States remains valid, but this cannot be sufficient when one comes to the actual point of making a decision to join this convention. For each country, national security reigns supreme. Every State will wish to have enough assurances that its security will not be diminished through joining the convention. I must add that this is particularly relevant in regions which are hotbeds of tension and where chemical weapons have already been used.

(Mr. Velayati, Islamic Republic of Iran)

Let me conclude by reiterating that the effects of the current crisis in the Persian Gulf will go beyond the region, although its consequences for future stability and security in the region itself will be immense and long-lasting. In reality, this crisis will determine whether political or military solutions will prevail in international affairs. One way or another, both parties have chosen the military option, which in fact will only be a lost game. Our individual and joint efforts should all be directed at reversing this trend and generating the necessary political will to prevent the catastrophe from gaining further momentum. My country will spare no effort in this regard.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his important statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius.

Mr. HYLTEINIUS (Sweden): I have listened with great interest to the important statement just made by His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. I am sure that it will be read with great interest in many capitals, including my own.

My delegation today wishes to introduce document CD/1053 on "Verification of the chemical industry within the general pattern of verification of a chemical weapons convention".

The proposal contained in CD/1053 is already well known to all delegations. A first version was circulated for consultations to all groups and China in November. My delegation made a special presentation in the Group of 21, and was gratified also to be invited to the Group of Western States for a detailed discussion. Delegations from all groups and several observer delegations approached us during the inter-sessional period to obtain clarifications and share their preliminary views. By and large my delegation has been encouraged to proceed and to develop the ideas contained in the consultation paper.

In elaborating the new document, which is now before you, we have thus been able to draw on a considerable amount of comments from a large number of delegations. I would like to take this opportunity to thank those delegations that have spent time studying our proposal and conveying their views and questions to us. The amendments and additions that have been made to the paper are mainly aimed at clarifying a number of points, but a few substantive additions have also been made. The fact that the basic approach of the paper has not been questioned by any delegation that has studied it in detail gives us good hope that the paper will be given serious consideration in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

Against this background any further introduction may be superfluous. Still, I would like to make some general comments. First, I would like to state what this paper is not. It is not a tactical proposal for the purpose of unlocking the apparent stalemate in discussions on verification in the chemical industry. My delegation has for a long time had doubts regarding the cost-effectiveness of schedule 2 verification as provided for in the draft convention. These doubts have matured over the years. The intense

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

involvement of my delegation in the evaluation of the many national trial inspections has given us ample opportunity to take a close look at the provisions of annex II to article VI.

The NTI exercise taught us a limited lesson, namely that the inspections envisaged in annex II to article VI in the draft convention could technically be implemented. The Committee chose to stop at that conclusion. The national trial inspections as designed, however, could not serve to demonstrate that such inspections were effective in terms of an overall verification objective. Only a few delegations commented openly on the apparent futility of "crawling around one single reactor or production line" for a day when a number of similar reactors on the premises were undeclared and not even available for any kind of verification except on challenge. The doubts, which everyone that carried out an NTI must have felt, were however expressed by some through proposals for additions to the system in the shape of ad hoc inspections.

While discussing these proposals my delegation gradually came to the conclusion that an imperfect system would hardly get any better by adding to it. Instead, we started to look for ways and means to amend the present system in such a way that a comprehensive and unified approach could be taken to the chemical industry in its entirety. In doing so we had to depart from an imperfect material-balance verification of a narrow segment of the relevant industry to follow a verification concept that creates transparency in the entire industry concerned, combined with selective on-site verification efforts, either directed or at random. The outline given in CD/1053 is thus a proposal in its own right, which should be discussed and judged on its own merits and not in the light of provisions in the "rolling text" or other proposals under discussion.

The second thing this proposal is not is an unravelling of the "rolling text", an undoing of work done. This new approach is, rather, a redirection within a given framework. It builds on what has been already achieved or discussed, including experience from national trial inspections. Furthermore, the proposal in CD/1053 can contribute to solving some difficult outstanding issues. Thus the present schedule 2 verification in the "rolling text" cannot be said to be really agreed until the issues of modalities for determining the frequency of inspections and the actual contents of schedule 2 have been resolved. And those are major and difficult tasks. The approach in CD/1053 would resolve the issue of frequency and would permit a quick and easy compromise on the contents of the schedules. Finally, in the view of my delegation, the incorporation of CD/1053 into the "rolling text" would not require any major effort.

Far from re-opening a closed chapter, the outline in CD/1053 would permit the Conference to conclude one of the most difficult unresolved parts of the chemical weapons negotiations, namely how to create a sufficient degree of confidence that capabilities in the chemical industry are not misused for purposes prohibited by the convention, without undue intrusiveness and interference in perfectly legitimate industrial activities, and without causing unacceptable costs to the States parties.



(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

As I have stated, CD/1053 is in the first place an outline in which the details are to be developed. Discussion of it should therefore first focus on its basic concepts. Among its basic concepts I would like to underline the obligation to declare all CW-capable plant sites, whether or not they actually produce listed chemicals, and thereby the undertaking to accept short-notice on-site inspections at any of these. Such inspections should be streamlined and aimed primarily at verifying declarations on planned activities and the absence of activities that should have been declared. It is of particular importance to note that such inspections, according to the proposal, would focus on ongoing activities instead of trying to verify past activities. This helps to avoid unnecessary anomalies and ambiguities.

Hence we have on the one hand, broader openness and transparency than hitherto contemplated, and on the other hand less intrusiveness and interference in those cases where an actual inspection is carried out. My delegation proposes to identify CW-capable facilities through the use of certain chemical conversion processes. It might not be possible to use this classification absolutely unambiguously for each and every plant site. It is the view of my delegation, however, that a list of chemical conversion processes would be sufficiently clear to implement obligations under the convention. The responsibility to define exactly how the obligation to declare should be implemented in each State party could be entrusted to national legislation. Certainly, guidelines could be recommended through consultative multilateral work in the preparatory commission.

The negative verification approach, coupled with the absence of facility agreements in CD/1053, goes a long way towards streamlining the actual inspections and responding to legitimate concerns regarding confidentiality in industry. In fact, Sweden has carried out a national trial inspection on the basis of the approach taken in CD/1053. The result was encouraging. The inspectors were satisfied with the verification result - the absence of any production of listed chemicals - and the facility was particularly satisfied at the absence of a facility agreement, the elaboration of which would have required the facility to provide sensitive process information in written form.

Many delegations have asked questions regarding the selection of facilities for inspection. In the view of my delegation this problem is not of major importance. The overall approach, including the declaration régime, the concentration on production, the definition of CW-capable industry and the similar treatment of schedules 2 and 3, should be discussed first. Were those elements to be accepted, the selection principles could certainly be negotiated without too much difficulty.

It has been natural for my delegation to build on the present annex II in providing for obligatory inspections in those facilities that actually produce schedule 2 and schedule 3 chemicals. In addition, it is proposed that inspections should take place in these as well as in other CW-capable facilities through a system which blends directed efforts with random selection. We think all of these elements may be necessary. How actually to combine them - a higher or lesser degree of random selection - can certainly be discussed. But again, in the view of my delegation, this is a practical detail rather than a matter of principle in our proposal.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

CD/1053 is largely self-explanatory. I have therefore only tried briefly to comment further on some of the salient points and to dissipate any possible misunderstanding of the paper, its contents and objectives. It is now in the hands of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We look forward to more formal discussion of it.

Mr. KRALIK (Czechoslovakia): First of all, Mr. President, we would like to extend to you our warm congratulations on taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament, and thank you for discharging your important responsibilities during the starting phase of our work. I also take this opportunity to express our gratitude to your predecessor, Mr. Chirila, who fulfilled the duties of President in August and during the inter-sessional period. My delegation sincerely welcomes the presence of the distinguished Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who addressed the Conference at the beginning of this plenary meeting.

Since the last session of the Conference the very skilful Ambassadors Ait Chaalal, Reese, Kostov, Varga, Sujka and Kosin have left Geneva. We extend a most cordial welcome to the new representatives of Algeria, Australia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia. We wish them every success.

Mr. President, you have invited us to avoid topics not belonging to this forum. It is a justified appeal, justified because it gives us the chance to devote more attention to the subjects really pertaining to disarmament. No doubt, the Conference cannot remain indifferent to the fact that there are growing apprehensions of the use of chemical and other non-conventional weapons. And this, above all, in those countries where the renowned nuclear mushroom has not appeared yet, but where an equally terrifying ecological bomb with boundless consequences for the flora and fauna of a region compared at one time to the biblical Eden has already exploded.

The assurance of some experts that the potential aggressor is not sufficiently technically prepared to use chemical weapons is, doubtless, a very meagre consolation. History teaches us the very opposite, and that is why I would like to mention in this connection the far-sighted message of Winston Churchill. With prophetic words this great statesman addressed humanity soon after Hitler's ruthless annexation of Austria and his brutal violation of Czechoslovakia, and before his preparations to attack Poland.

"Is he going to try to blow up the world or not? The world is a very heavy thing to blow up! An extraordinary man at a pinnacle of power may create a great explosion, and yet the civilized world may remain unshaken. The enormous fragments and splinters may clatter down upon his own head and destroy him ... but the world will go on".

And the world went on. But at what a price! We recall it bitterly - in Europe as well as in the other continents. That is the reason why the new blows of destruction are not only a matter of apprehension for the Middle East nations. The best remedy against fear is positive behaviour. Therefore, I believe that this Conference should also take a positive step. Following the example of the group of 11 Latin American countries, and developing the ideas of President Mitterrand and other statesmen, we could, for example, renew the

(Mr. Kralik Czechoslovakia)

initiative we were talking about last year. As an example, the Conference could possibly initiate a joint declaration by the member States of the Conference on Disarmament and those having observer status, undertaking not to be the first to use chemical weapons during the period of negotiations on the CWC.

I would like to devote my statement today to questions concerning the prohibition of chemical weapons (CW) and the finalization of the chemical weapons convention (CWC). In recent years, the Ad Hoc Committee on CW has moved toward completion of the CWC. However, there are certain open questions to be solved, some of them of a technical nature and some of a political character. In respect of both - political and technical - different working papers have been distributed dealing with various aspects of the future CWC. In the interests of openness and - if possible - obtaining more information from the States parties to the future CWC, the majority of delegations, including Czechoslovakia (in document CD/949) have presented working papers about their chemical potential. However, with a view to the future development of the "rolling text", a more detailed assessment of the needs of inspectors and financial aspects, and clarification of some technical questions, in my last statement in August 1990 our delegation announced a new document. The document contains very detailed data on Czechoslovakia's chemical potential, including not only qualitative but also quantitative data on the production, processing, consumption, export and import of chemicals falling under the scope of the future CWC. This document, numbered CD/1048, has just been distributed.

Let me say a few words about the philosophy of our approach. As stated in the past, and I can repeat it once again, Czechoslovakia has no CW. Our country also intends, and this is well known, to be an original party to the CWC. That is why we approach the CWC very seriously. Today I wish to inform you that we synthesize compounds on schedule 1, as you can see from the document distributed, of course in much smaller quantities than those permitted by the proposals contained in the present "rolling text".

In a spirit of good will and on a voluntary basis, we also declare and specify the facilities, including their owners and locations. We believe that after this declaration there will be a clearer picture of the verification requirements of the future CWC in one country. We hope for similar openness from other States because these data, taken together, are connected with personnel, equipment and other needs for implementation of the CWC. Let me inform distinguished delegations that these data can also be verified in a very simple way. Last year, bilateral talks were held between the United States Embassy in Prague and our Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, and on 17 December 1990 - on the basis of an agreement - United States specialists visited a Czechoslovak military facility in Slovakia used for synthesis of super-toxic lethal chemicals. As a result of this visit it was confirmed that the schedule 1 chemicals produced cannot be considered to be CW. For the same purpose, the commander of the facility authorized the use of a computerized data base to review the production of chemicals in a year selected at random from a 10-year period. The professionalism of the facility and its workers were appreciated. This high level of professionalism of Czechoslovak scientists can be documented now on the basis of the activities of a small but qualified group of military specialists in the Gulf.

(Mr. Králík, Czechoslovakia)

All these data serve as evidence of Czechoslovakia's interest in finalizing the CWC as soon as possible. More evidence of our real concern for chemical disarmament is provided by the withdrawal of our reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, announced by Foreign Minister Dienstbier of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic at the forty-fifth United Nations General Assembly.

To illustrate further our efforts in preparation for the CWC, I also wish to inform you of the establishment of a working group for preparatory work on a national committee for the future CWC. We are now in the process of forming this committee, and following its initial activities we shall inform the CD of the practical results.

As far as practical verification is concerned, I would also like to point out that we are willing to invite interested delegations, on a bilateral basis, to visit the facility presented in document CD/1048, and we are able to extend the spectrum of facilities which can be visited at other Czechoslovak establishments dealing with CW-related topics.

My delegation looks forward to and counts on the completion of our CW negotiations as soon as possible, probably this year. The revised "rolling text" provides a unique basis for redoubling our common efforts. The regrettable consequences of the events taking place in the Gulf are pushing us towards the early conclusion of the chemical weapons convention. I would like to assure the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Serguei Batsanov, the new Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, of my delegation's full support and co-operation in its further deliberations and in his very important task. At the same time I would like to express appreciation and respect to Ambassador Hyltenius and his colleagues on the Swedish delegation for the excellent work they have done during the last year. In full awareness of the importance of the words of Albert Camus - "La vraie générosité envers l'avenir, consiste à tout donner au présent" - I wish the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons much success in its future activities.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador O'Sullivan.

Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Australia): Mr. President, I am pleased to take the floor for the first time at this Conference under your presidency, in particular because of the friendly ties that have existed for so long between our two countries.

This is a sombre period in which to be assuming duties as Ambassador for Disarmament. But it is also a time when the opportunities and the necessity for disarmament and restraints on arms transfers are more apparent than ever. The war in the Gulf is a tragic reminder that the enormous improvement in the international environment which emerged in 1989 does not necessarily or inevitably lead to greater peace and stability in every region. On the contrary, one of the ironic effects of the ending of the cold war is that in regions outside Europe the security environment may well have become more complex and more difficult to calculate. The emerging world, one commentator

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

has said, "is likely to lack the clarity and stability of the cold war, and to be a more jungle-like world of multiple dangers, hidden traps, unpleasant surprises and moral ambiguities". This will be particularly so if pressures from regional arms races result in the further proliferation of conventional, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the spread of missile technology. With the experience of recent weeks, the international community will expect these questions to be addressed with renewed vigour.

Under these circumstances, the relevance and salience of the work of this Conference has increased. The threat of the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf war makes the achievement of a complete ban of chemical weapons for all times and in all environments even more urgently required. I will therefore address chemical weapons issues principally in this statement today.

The Australian Government is fully committed to a ban which would make chemical weapons illegal and which would prohibit their use. We believe our security and that of our neighbours would be enhanced by a binding multilateral commitment which assured us all that we would not face the threat of these horrible weapons. We believe that the international political conditions exist to bring such a ban into effect by concluding these negotiations. We hope in this final stage of the convention negotiations that we will recapture in 1991 the spirit that was evident two years ago at the Paris Conference and 18 months ago at the Canberra Conference, when Governments and the chemical industry committed themselves to that same objective.

We recognize however that there is a limit what officials here in Geneva may be able to achieve through the processes of negotiation and that higher-level involvement may be necessary to provide the political direction to break through the remaining problems. We therefore support calls for a meeting at ministerial level.

As we see it, the purpose of such a meeting would be to overcome political impasses in the negotiations and to give final instructions to permit the conclusion of a balanced treaty package. This requires careful preparation of the elements of such a package. It could be that we will need to prepare options so that ministers would be able to assess which proposals are both feasible in their impact on industry and credible in their contribution to collective security. A second reason for suggesting and supporting a ministerial-level meeting would be to help promote universal adherence to it. As a newcomer to this Conference I observe that there is a considerable part of the world which is not represented here. Even amongst Governments which are here represented there are different constituencies in different countries which will need to be educated about the treaty. This means there is a significant "selling job" ahead of us to have a treaty supported as widely as possible amongst Governments and as broadly as possible within Governments.

Of course participation in the deliberations of this Conference is not limited to its 39 member States. We were pleased to see the Conference approve, on 31 January, the application for observer status of 34 nations. We would have been even happier if that number had been larger, particularly as we approach the final phase, of the negotiations of a multilateral chemical weapons convention.

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

Clearly one of the most efficient and productive ways to understand the objectives and the political, legal and practical implications of a future CWC is through active participation in the negotiations themselves. In practice, this opportunity has been realized by a number of observer delegations, and especially in our CWC negotiations. Observer States can and do participate both through the submission of working papers and orally in the proceedings of the CWC Ad Hoc Committee and its working groups. During the course of the negotiations in 1991 we would encourage non-member States to make known their views on specific aspects of the "rolling text" of concern to them so that they can be considered fully.

Another approach to promoting universality that has made sense to Australia has been to engage in a serious dialogue with our neighbours in the Asia/Pacific areas about this treaty and what it would imply for them. I had the privilege of being present in Brisbane in November 1990 at the second regional seminar against chemical weapons hosted by the Australian Government. There were 23 regional States present of whom only three are colleagues here in the CD; that is Indonesia, Burma and ourselves. It was apparent that there is a big gap in understanding this far-reaching and complex treaty between those of us who sit in this room and who are familiar in detail with its concepts and its specific provisions, and those busy government officials in other countries who are not here but who nevertheless will be required to undertake the considerable administrative and commercial requirements that the convention will impose.

In asking Governments to accept those requirements we need to be clear that we are delivering tangible security benefits in return. This means to our minds that the concepts and working arrangements that are embodied in the treaty particularly in the area of verification must not be designed to be so elaborate or to be required to cover such highly theoretical possibilities that they put at risk those benefits. Ultimately the treaty like all treaties can only bind with ropes of paper. If there is not the political willingness to abide by its provisions then its internal mechanisms cannot force proper behaviour on States. But on the other hand, a well-balanced, sensible, clear treaty can establish norms and give confidence to all its adherents that its benefits of enhanced security and equal commercial impact will be realized.

In order to achieve that equal commercial impact, the Australian Government has actively sought collaboration with the international chemical industry not as a partner with us here in the negotiations but as an interested and knowledgeable resource on whom much of the impact of this convention will fall. A recent example of productive Government-industry exchanges was the meeting in January 1991 in Bangkok of the ASEAN Chemical Industries Club at which a colleague from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade was able to give a presentation on the state of our negotiations here. It is also pleasing that this Conference has had further involvement with industry over the past year. And may I say that we welcome very much the ideas put forward by Sweden this morning in document CD/1053? We will examine them sympathetically and closely.

For our part, the Australian Government and the Australian chemical industry will continue to look for opportunities to continue this dialogue with our regional neighbours so that all States in our region will be well

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

prepared to become adherents to the completed convention. In this context, the Australian Government intends to host a workshop for regional chemists in Melbourne in the middle of this year with the aim of providing the necessary background and training to those technical advisers to Governments who will be required to complete declarations and assemble technical data. We are indebted to our Finnish colleagues for the model they have established and without shame we have adapted their work for our own region. May I add here that we admire the work that Dr. Rautio and her experts continue to produce? Associated with the workshop in Melbourne for regional chemists we plan to hold a multilateral trial inspection of a chemical plant there. We welcome the intention of the Governments of Venezuela and Nigeria to engage in similar exercises aimed at raising consciousness of the benefits and the requirements of the convention, and would encourage other members of this Conference to undertake similar exercises in their regions as tangible ways of soliciting support and promoting universal adherence to the concluded convention.

Australia has also been putting into place the administrative structure that will be needed once the convention comes into effect. We have found this to be no simple matter with a federal constitution and varying State and local government regulations. In the hope that our experiences may be of use to other nations, I have asked the secretariat to distribute today as a Conference document CD/1055, a strategy paper outlining how we have approached the establishment of our national chemical weapons convention secretariat, and we will look forward to the document that our Czechoslovak colleague has foreshadowed earlier this morning giving us details of Czechoslovakia's experiences in the same area.

During 1990 under the able leadership of Ambassador Hyltenius, good progress was made in cleaning up the "rolling text" in a way which makes it internally more consistent, concise and readable. One major impediment to the cleaning-up process and to substantive progress in the negotiations has been a large number of unattributed footnotes, in many cases their authorship now unknown and *raison d'être* forgotten as the years of negotiating have rolled on. In the past the CD tradition, as I understand it, was not to attribute footnotes. The state of the negotiations is now, I believe, such that it would be useful to be able to identify the originators of footnotes in order to facilitate their removal if there is no reason for them to remain, or to help us understand more fully the authors' thinking in order to find a solution as these negotiations conclude. In brief, we propose that all delegations use the first session of this year's work in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to identify footnotes they have inserted in the "rolling text" and to transmit these to the secretariat for compilation and distribution to all the participants. The secretariat could also assist if it is able to identify old footnotes to the extent that its records permit it do so. Any footnotes not so "claimed" should simply be deleted. Once this process has been completed, we would be in a much better position to tackle in a more purposeful way the substance of the remaining attributed footnotes.

Another matter which is of great concern to the Australian Government is that the provisions of the treaty relating to the destruction of existing chemical weapons should ensure there is a clear commitment to environmentally safe procedures. Our view is that the provisions of the convention should be developed on this point. This is a particular concern to Australia and to

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

nations of the Pacific because of the operation of the CW destruction facility at Johnston Atoll. Australia supports that facility's operations on the basis that its scope is limited to the destruction of the stockpiles currently there and that its operation continues in a manner which is fully compatible with environmental safety. This is a matter on which the Australian Prime Minister has taken a direct interest and to which he is personally deeply committed.

Stepping back from the actual provisions of the "rolling text" and ways to bring these negotiations to an early conclusion Australia believes the threat posed by the spread of chemical weapons is regrettably growing and not just in the Middle East. This concern underlines the urgency of the task before us and gives particular point to our security concerns which can only be met by a multilateral, verifiable, broadly supported convention. I am pleased to advise today that Australia will be an original signatory to such a convention.

Turning briefly to other items on our agenda the Australian Government looks forward to the early re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. There is useful work to be done under its existing mandate. We wish that a comprehensive test ban be achieved at an early date and that nuclear testing become a relic of the past. We have noted that the Soviet Union and the United States and to a lesser extent France have reduced nuclear weapons tests in recent years. We consider these to be moves in the right direction. We hope the number and yields of nuclear tests continue to decline.

The cessation of nuclear testing is one of the items on the CD's agenda relevant to the broader objective of nuclear non-proliferation. We are concerned that the NPT treaty embodying the norms of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons could not be reviewed last September in a way that led to an agreed final document. We nevertheless welcome the thorough review that took place and wish to see the recommendations agreed on addressed in the International Atomic Energy Agency and elsewhere. We consider that the NPT has made a major contribution to international peace and security. It has served the security interests of its adherents. We wish to work with others to improve its functioning in the period leading up to its extension conference in 1995. We consider it vital that all members of the Treaty demonstrate through their actions and their statements that they are living up to their obligations under the Treaty and that the Treaty be extended on an assured basis. We hope that the next five years will see a greater commitment by all States to a world free of nuclear proliferation and in this regard we warmly welcome the recent statements by the Presidents of Argentina and Brazil.

We look forward to the early re-establishment of the Committee on outer space and we will continue to work fully and co-operatively with that Committee to consider how outer space can be spared an arms race. I will be dealing with this and other matters of the CD's agenda in a subsequent intervention. Finally, I take this occasion to observe that in the years since 1978 when it was established the Conference on Disarmament has grappled with its difficult mandate as the sole multilateral negotiating body set up to produce credible and workable arms control and disarmament agreements. Australia hopes that the Conference on Disarmament will be able to make a significant contribution to an enhanced world order based on the rule of law



(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

and the principles of the United Nations Charter. Although much will depend on the outcome of the Gulf war, we believe this year we have the opportunity to do so through the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Germany, Ambassador Ritter von Wagner.

Mr. von WAGNER (Germany): A number of countries have reported to the Conference on Disarmament the outcome of national chemical weapons practice challenge inspections, including the Netherlands, Canada, the United Kingdom and Germany. All these exercises were intended to test the procedures that we have already worked out in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, in order to draw lessons from practical experience and thus contribute to the completion of an effective challenge inspection régime by providing a better understanding of the problems involved. Most recently Canada and the Netherlands introduced in CD/1052 the report on their joint trial challenge inspection at a military base in Germany. Today I would like to introduce, on behalf of both the United Kingdom and Germany, a report on two joint CW practice challenge inspections carried out in military facilities. The detailed report on the outcome of these exercises is tabled as document CD/1056 - working paper CD/CW/WP.330.

In view of the extensive experience both countries had already gained in the course of their previous national practice challenge inspections (PCIs), the two joint exercises, one in each country, were intended to give added realism to the PCI concept, to re-examine once more the conclusions they had reached so far, and to see what further lessons could be learned. The first exercise was held in the Federal Republic of Germany from 21 to 23 May 1990 at an air force base. The exercise was conducted under joint Anglo-German control, with the United Kingdom providing the inspection team and challenging State observer, and the Federal Republic the home team. The second exercise was held in the United Kingdom from 18 to 21 June 1990 at an ammunition storage facility. This exercise was also held under joint control, but with the roles reversed. Both countries concluded that the exercises had been conducted in a very positive and co-operative spirit, and that a number of lessons had been learned, both in confirming the conclusions that had been reached in their respective national PCIs, and in providing new insights and perspectives on the issue of challenge inspection.

Of the multitude of lessons learned, which include further practical experience in sample-taking and the use of instrumentation, like X-ray and mobile analytical equipment, and which are reported and discussed in detail in the report, let me highlight here only two of the principal conclusions drawn. Firstly, the two joint exercises have confirmed for both countries the key importance of the concept of challenge inspections, based on short notice as well as access to any challenged site, as an effective means for deterring circumvention of, as well as ensuring compliance with, the chemical weapons convention. Secondly, the joint exercises have demonstrated once more that, using managed access techniques in an intelligent and inventive way, inspectors are able to obtain the relevant information they seek, while sensitive information unrelated to chemical weapons remains protected. This has proved to be particularly true in applying the random selective access proposals elaborated in the United Kingdom paper, CD/1012.

(Mr. von Wagner, Germany)

The series of national PCIs in Germany will soon be continued in a chemical plant site, from which we expect to gain a better understanding of the problems related to the application of challenge inspections in chemical industry.

Finally, let me use this opportunity to express my gratitude to all military and civilian authorities of the United Kingdom involved in the two joint practice challenge inspections for their outstanding co-operation and support in the preparation and conduct of these exercises.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): As this is the first time I take the floor under your presidency, may I begin by congratulating you on your accession to the Chair of our Conference? We are all benefiting from the wise leadership you are giving us.

The distinguished Ambassador of Germany has just introduced a report on two joint chemical weapons trial challenge inspections held by Germany and the United Kingdom (CD/1056). Ambassador von Wagner has already described this collaborative work in some detail. I would only make two comments.

First I would emphasize the excellent co-operation between the officials, German and British, who carried out the two joint trials. We for our part found working together with our German colleagues gave a most valuable additional dimension to both trials.

You may recall that prior to these two joint trials, the United Kingdom had undertaken six national trial challenge inspections, and we reported on these in CD/1012. My authorities found that the experience gained in the joint German/United Kingdom trials confirmed the earlier conclusions from our own national trials as regards both the high value of challenge inspection as part of the verification process and the efficacy of managed access techniques. Ambassador von Wagner has rightly emphasized this aspect, and I endorse what he has said. Our experience in this respect seems to have been similar both to that of our German partners and to that described in the report on the joint trial challenge inspection held by Canada and the Netherlands which was tabled by the distinguished Ambassadors of those two countries on 31 January.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for her statement and for the kind words she addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Cameroon, Ambassador Ngoubeyou.

Mr. NGOUBEYOU (Cameroon) (translated from French): First of all Mr. President, I would like to congratulate you on taking up the presidency of the Conference for the period from 22 January to 17 February 1991, and to thank you for giving me this opportunity to take the floor in this august assembly.

As a result of the remarkable improvement in relations between Washington and Moscow, the sudden acceleration of history in Central and Eastern Europe, the glimmers of hope in Asia and elsewhere, despite the Gulf conflict, and the revival of multilateralism, the Conference is being held this year in an exceptional international climate. This improvement in the international

(Mr. Ngoubeyou, Cameroon)

climate, which is founded on the political will of all States and the taking into account of the legitimate interests of each group of States, should enable the international community, and in particular the Conference on Disarmament, to undertake a thorough examination of the various aspects of the issue of disarmament, at a time when the goals, purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations call our attention to our duty to save future generations from the scourge of war.

Cameroon, which welcomes the positive and encouraging course of the negotiations between the two super-Powers, as well as the important agreements recently concluded in Paris to guarantee security, peace and co-operation in Europe, remains dedicated to the purposes and principles proclaimed in the Charter and attaches special importance to disarmament and the maintenance of peace. In this connection the recent measures taken by the Conference on Disarmament to improve its functioning, involving the amendment of rules 7, 9 and 28 of the rules of procedure, should be noted with satisfaction. We are also gratified by the fact that at its first plenary in 1991 the Conference decided, in response to the wishes of the overwhelming majority of States, to continue consideration of the item concerning its improved and effective functioning and to report on the matter to the General Assembly of the United Nations at its forty-sixth session. It is important for the Conference on Disarmament, which remains the international community's sole multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations, to acquire the means to implement its mandate effectively, intensify its work and adopt concrete measures on specific priority disarmament issues which have been on its agenda for years, in accordance with the Programme of Action set out in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly. The Conference should also reflect the present composition of the international community so that all the elements in it are able to make their contribution to the cause of peace. In accordance with paragraphs 14 and 15 of its report (CD/1039), the Conference will be intensifying its consultations with a view to taking a positive decision at this session on the expansion of the membership of the Conference by not more than four States, taking into account the need to keep a balance in its membership, and will inform the General Assembly of the United Nations of its decision at its forty-sixth session. Cameroon strongly supports the determination of the members of the Conference to settle this question of the admission of new States quickly and fairly. Likewise, we hope that participation by and contributions from non-member States in the work of the Conference will continue to be encouraged.

The question of a nuclear test ban has been on the Conference's agenda virtually since its inception. This complex issue lies at the core of the efforts being made by the international community, bearing in mind that a comprehensive test ban would put an end to the qualitative improvement of existing arsenals and help decisively to curb the nuclear arms race. Despite intensive and painstaking negotiations during the fourth NPT review conference and the PTBT Amendment Conference, no agreement was reached on a legal instrument banning all nuclear testing in all environments for all time. In view of the importance of this question in the disarmament process, its links with the question of the extension of the NPT and its relationship with the problem of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, it is important that the Conference on Disarmament, in accordance with General Assembly

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resolutions 45/49 and 45/51, should be able to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban during this session to carry forward the work begun in the Conference in 1990, focusing on substantive work on specific and interrelated test-ban issues, including the structure and scope of the future test-ban treaty as well as verification and compliance with obligations freely entered into.

Turning to chemical weapons, I should point out that the report presented by Ambassador Hyltenius, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, shows the substantial progress that has been achieved in the elaboration of the draft convention on chemical weapons. Here we would like to congratulate Ambassador Hyltenius for his tremendous contribution. The importance of such a legal instrument in formalizing the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, particularly in the light of events in the Gulf, needs no further demonstration. That is why we hope that under the enlightened guidance of Ambassador Batsanov, the Ad Hoc Committee will make every effort to settle the highly complex political and technical questions that have still to be resolved and reach agreement on the substance of this international convention which we have awaited with such impatience. The Cameroonian delegation, which will again be participating in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee this year, will make its modest contribution to the search for compromise solutions.

Here it is appropriate to stress the value of CW trial inspections such as those carried out jointly at the Canadian military base at Lahr in Germany by the Netherlands and Canada. Such trials make it possible to verify the applicability of the provisions of the protocol on inspection procedures, to initiate participants into techniques for implementing the future convention and to promote understanding among States. We hope that the Conference will be in a position to achieve concrete progress in finalizing the text of the convention on chemical weapons. Likewise, since there is no fundamental objection in the Conference to the idea of an international convention aimed at providing non-nuclear-weapon States with assurances against the use or threat of use of such weapons, even if the difficulties involved in developing a common approach are still great, Cameroon hopes that the members of the Conference will redouble their efforts to study further the different approaches that have been envisaged in order to overcome the difficulties, reach an agreement as soon as possible and conclude effective international arrangements relating to the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

Other important questions are on the Conference's agenda for the 1991 session. They relate in particular to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, radiological weapons and the comprehensive programme of disarmament. On all these substantive issues, to which the international community is quite rightly giving attention in the quest for general and complete disarmament under effective international control and in the promotion of peace, security and development, my delegation will be making its contribution in due course, either in the form of statements in plenary or during consultations in the ad hoc committees.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Cameroon for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Loeis.

Mr. LOEIS (Indonesia): At the outset, let me join the previous speakers in paying tribute to the very important statement made by the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mr. Ali Akbar Velayati. I am sure that his presence and his message will give more impetus to our deliberations in the Conference.

Sir, I would like to express our pleasure at seeing you, the representative of a country with which Indonesia has always had excellent relations, presiding over the Conference. I am confident that under your stewardship we shall achieve substantive progress in our work. I would like to take this opportunity to commend your distinguished predecessor, Dr. Gheorghe Chirila of Romania, for the very competent manner in which he guided us during the last part of our session last year.

I wish every success to those colleagues who have left us since I last addressed the Conference - Ambassador Ait Chaalal of Algeria, Ambassador Reese of Australia, Ambassador Kostov of Bulgaria, Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, Ambassador Kosin of Yugoslavia and, finally, Ambassador Peter Dietze, who was the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic before unification. I extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues, the Ambassadors of Yugoslavia, Algeria, Australia, Bulgaria and Poland. We look forward to working in close co-operation with them in the future.

While the dramatic and unprecedented international changes which overshadowed the sessions of the Conference of last year and 1989 have been widely discussed, I venture to say that this session of the Conference is taking place during the most disturbing international event of the era since the Second World War. Never during its existence has the session of the Conference been confronted with such a human tragedy as the war in the Gulf, from which we are already hearing stories of devastation, fear and suffering. In this connection, allow me to touch upon matters which are pertinent to our deliberations at this given time, and to refer to the circumstances from the point of view of a member of the Conference from a region which has had much experience of the evils of conflicts and power rivalries. First and foremost, I believe that the Conference has been provided with a convincing indication as to the importance of the role that the Conference should play in contributing to the international endeavours towards the achievement of international peace and security, based on the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. It should not lose sight of its task, which is that of negotiating measures to halt and reverse the arms race in a multilateral sense, towards general and complete disarmament. The evidence of the devastating effects of the use of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons in the past, already great enough, is being compounded by further evidence from the present armed conflict.

I could not agree more with the Secretary-General of the United Nations that, as he said in his message a few days ago, the endeavour towards disarmament needs to be pursued at a faster pace, in a more global and

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comprehensive way, as part of a reliable and consistent system of undiminished security for all. A great number of resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly on matters related to disarmament have reflected the common quest of all Members of the United Nations for lasting international peace and security through practical measures of disarmament. Indeed, the dark cloud resulting from the smoke of munitions a long way from this room should be giving us a strong signal to speed up our deliberations.

Resolution 45/49 of the United Nations General Assembly appeals to all member States of the Conference on Disarmament to "promote" the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, at the beginning of its 1991 session, with the objective of carrying out multilateral negotiations for a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear test explosions. The General Assembly recommends that the Ad Hoc Committee should comprise two working groups dealing with the following interrelated questions: firstly the contents and scope of the treaty, and secondly compliance and verification. United Nations General Assembly resolution 45/51 also urges the Conference, inter alia, in addition to re-establishing the Ad Hoc Committee on an NTB, to take into account the progress achieved by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, including work on the routine exchange and use of wave-form data, and other relevant initiatives or experiments carried out by individual States and groups of States.

Over the years, the General Assembly has adopted numerous resolutions calling for a comprehensive test ban so as to achieve the goal of a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test-ban treaty. At the risk of being repetitive, let me restate that the preambles to the partial test-ban Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, two treaties which my country strictly adheres to, stipulate that the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons by all States in all environments for all time is a fundamental goal to be realized. The recently concluded PTBT Amendment Conference revealed certain elements which might be beneficial for the work of the Conference in pursuing the goal mentioned earlier. Considering these recent developments, the Conference is at the moment gaining momentum in its endeavours toward the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

At the PTBT Amendment Conference, it was widely held that the Amendment Conference produced a stronger international commitment to a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Some constructive ideas were also outlined - among other things, a suggestion that the verification proposals presented to the Amendment Conference, including the draft protocol proposed by the co-sponsors of the Amendment Conference, should be transmitted to the Conference on Disarmament for further consideration. For the benefit of our deliberations at this forum this suggestion should be given adequate consideration.

Confidence in the technical aspects of verification as a determining factor which can motivate the cessation of nuclear weapon testing by nuclear-weapon States is of great significance, as was pointed out by a number of delegations during the Amendment Conference. There were also many convincing arguments to the effect that the available techniques of verification, both national and international, are sufficient to sustain a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It was pointed out at the Amendment Conference

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that scientific evidence proves sufficient for a nuclear test ban verification system, taking advantage of currently available technological and scientific means.

A large number of delegations at the Amendment Conference suggested that seismic monitoring has a vital role to play in the verification system of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. There was, however, widespread recognition that seismic monitoring may not be adequate to instil confidence in a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In this regard, some delegations welcomed the various proposals made in the Amendment Conference concerning the monitoring of airborne radiation, satellite surveillance and on-site inspection, which all merit further consideration. The importance of the work being undertaken by the Group of Scientific Experts on seismic events was also emphasized during the Amendment Conference.

As for the institutional aspect of the envisaged comprehensive nuclear test-ban régime, some suggested at the Amendment Conference that the proposal concerning verification should be presented to the Conference on Disarmament so that it might be further elaborated. From the perspective of the work of the Conference on Disarmament, such a proposal is encouraging. It provides evidence that the Conference on Disarmament, and especially its Group of Scientific Experts, is considered by States parties to the Treaty as worthy to deal with the question of verification of the nuclear test ban. It is only natural therefore that the Conference on Disarmament should resume and increase the substantive work it initiated last year in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban with renewed determination and vigour. Since the question of a nuclear test ban is of paramount importance for the Conference to deal with, my delegation would wish the Conference to have an opportunity to assess the work undertaken at the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban by the end of the Conference's session.

In touching upon the elaboration of the comprehensive nuclear test-ban régime, I wish to underline one of the most crucial points made by the Group of 21 during last year's session of the Conference. It was stressed that such a comprehensive nuclear test-ban régime should be non-discriminatory and comprehensive in character so as to attract universal adherence. It should include a verification system that is universal in its application and non-discriminatory in its nature, and guarantees equal access to all States. My delegation is of the belief that a test-ban régime which confers exclusive rights on any States to continue to carry out nuclear testing would inevitably be met with suspicion and mistrust by others which are not accorded equal rights.

Referring to item 4 of our agenda, let me begin by saying that my delegation's basic position was well reflected in the statement of the distinguished delegate of Peru on behalf of the Group of 21 a few days ago. The future convention, while safeguarding civilian chemical industry and promoting international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses of chemicals, must in the first place be designed to achieve the total destruction of existing arsenals and outlaw the use of these abhorrent weapons. Given the long-standing loathing of these weapons by the world community, which is now increased by the threat of the possible use of these

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weapons on the battlefield during the present war, the Conference now faces the critical historic task of bringing about a treaty banning the use, possession, production and development of these weapons.

There are some issues left to be solved in order to conclude the convention. The main task at the current session of the Conference, as far as chemical weapons are concerned, is that of finding solutions in principle to those few issues where there is as yet no agreement, mainly the question of universal adherence. For this purpose the future convention must provide for systematic and total destruction of all chemical weapons within a specific period. The legitimate concern for the security of non-possessor States should be addressed in a way which ensures that the implementation of the convention will not create any new imbalance which might undermine their security concerns. Those States which do not possess or intend to possess chemical weapons for their military and defence purposes, which I believe comprises the majority of States in the globe, should not be in the position of being caught off guard and finding that, at the end of the destruction period, certain States parties are allowed to retain their chemical weapons stocks. My delegation will find it difficult to support a draft convention which permits the existence of these weapons. The political cost of protesting at a later stage will be too high for a country like mine, which has so far scrupulously observed its obligations under any treaty relating to disarmament.

Indonesia has consistently supported the role played by the United Nations in the maintenance of peace and security at regional as well as global levels. For that reason, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia hosted the United Nations Regional Disarmament Workshop for Asia and the Pacific in Bandung from 28 January to 1 February 1991. The convening of the workshop, in co-operation with the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, took place under the mandate of United Nations General Assembly resolution 40/151 H. The programme for this workshop covered a wide range of issues which are of deep concern to the entire world. These include peace and security in Asia and the Pacific, global disarmament to strengthen the régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, the chemical weapons convention, regional disarmament efforts and a proposal to strengthen the non-proliferation régime and conflict resolution in the Asia-Pacific region. I am hopeful that the results of these deliberations will contribute substantially to the region's comprehension of these issues, and more specifically that it will also contribute to the implementation of United Nations General Assembly resolution 40/151 H concerning the promotion of regional disarmament training and advisory services.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, Ambassador de Rivero.

Mr. de RIVERO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): My delegation has asked to take the floor this morning in order to refer to agenda item 1, Nuclear test ban. According to the final declaration of the first session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament, this item is of the highest priority, and that has been my country's view for many years. This Conference on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating forum on



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disarmament, has the mandate from the international community to carry out concrete and substantive negotiations. On many occasions in this very body Peru has restated the urgent need to initiate negotiations with a view to bringing about, in the shortest possible time, a complete nuclear test ban valid for all environments and all forms. The fact that to date the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to satisfy this just demand, which is a response to the democratic outcry of the overwhelming majority of the countries of the world and the man in the street, indisputably calls into question the binding nature of this sole multilateral negotiating forum which in 1978 received by consensus a clear and emphatic mandate from the United Nations General Assembly to negotiate agreements in the area of disarmament on matters of particular importance for the cessation of the nuclear arms race.

There is no valid reason to justify the indefinite postponement of the start of negotiations. Nor are member States of the Conference on Disarmament in a position to sacrifice deep-seated positions of principle, based on democratic sentiments of their peoples, while awaiting the bon vouloir of one or two delegations. Starting negotiations on a CTBT does not necessarily oblige member States of the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a treaty in six months or a year. As in the area of chemical weapons, where nobody doubts the good faith of the States that are represented here, negotiations on a CTBT could very well take a few years to reconcile positions that are still divergent as regards the structure and scope of the future CTBT. Nevertheless, my delegation is concerned that a degree of intolerance and inflexibility persists with regard to a matter that would in no way tie the hands of member States, but does definitely jeopardize the realization of an aspiration that is based on international law and the demands of the peoples of other countries and the obligations incumbent on members of the Conference on Disarmament.

In 1990, Peru joined the last-minute consensus that allowed the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 1, Nuclear test ban, to be established. On that occasion my delegation, along with the distinguished delegations of the Group of 21, was practically forced to make a major concession: it left in abeyance its position contained in document CD/829, which was the result of a mature and responsible decision by the group on the comprehensive nuclear test ban. This made it possible for a preliminary exchange of views to take place under the chairmanship of the distinguished Ambassador Donowaki, which had the virtue of bringing the discussions up to date. At the same time consultations on the work programme were carried out as the best way to facilitate matters for this year. At the end of the exercise my delegation was amongst those that were surprised at the reluctance of one group to include in the final report of the Ad Hoc Committee an unequivocal reference to its re-establishment at the beginning of the 1991 session. So we had to agree to a report that in the end subordinated the fate of the Ad Hoc Committee to the outcome of the fourth NPT review conference and the PTBT Amendment Conference. Yet again the Group of 21 was presented with a fait accompli and faced, in addition to the immediate negotiation of a CTBT, the problem of the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee.

(Mr. de Rivero, Peru)

During the fourth NPT review conference an offer was made for the immediate re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee as a way of avoiding a commitment to begin immediate negotiations on a CTBT. And the review conference was unable to adopt a final declaration precisely for that reason. A similar situation was seen in the PTBT Amendment Conference, which was unable to find a formula which would enable us to respond to the justified expectations of the non-nuclear-weapon States. So matters continue, and we find ourselves in this Conference virtually obliged not to negotiate, lacking any alternative but to repeat the exercise of 1982 and 1983, with the difference that in 1995 - that is to say, very soon - the States parties to the NPT will have to take a decision on the number of years that the Treaty should continue in force. This year we will have to decide at the forthcoming General Assembly on the date when the work of the Preparatory Committee for the NPT extension conference should start. And it is precisely because of these time constraints that the Conference on Disarmament must make an exceptional effort to enable immediate negotiations to take place.

As I have already said, negotiating does not mean concluding a treaty immediately. Negotiating - a negotiating mandate - is first and foremost a political gesture to reaffirm good faith in complying with commitments entered into. When, in article I, paragraph 3, of the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, the United States and the Soviet Union undertook to continue their negotiations with a view toward achieving a solution to the problem of the cessation of all underground nuclear weapon tests, it is clear that they did not rule out negotiations in the multilateral arena, and it is the unwillingness to start such negotiations that is now untenable, even though the cessation of nuclear tests is still considered a longer-term objective.

This morning my delegation cannot but place on record its dissatisfaction at the serious setbacks facing the Conference on Disarmament in carrying out the mandate with regard to agenda item 1. In view of the important deadlines that we have ahead of us in the next few years, my delegation is prepared for this year, and for this year alone, to join the consensus regarding the mandate adopted last year. However, my delegation believes that this situation involving deliberations but no negotiations on an item of the highest priority cannot be perpetuated in the future. It will be necessary to provide for a start to negotiations on a CTBT at the very latest by next year, in 1992, if this Conference wishes to form part of a new international order and to keep its status as the sole multilateral negotiating forum.

In this life everything has an end and nothing, absolutely nothing, can remain unchangeable indefinitely.

The PRESIDENT: That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor?

As I announced at the opening of this plenary meeting, I shall now put before the Conference for action a number of decisions relating to organizational arrangements under agenda items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. We shall proceed in the order in which the items appear on our agenda. Accordingly, we shall begin with agenda item 1, entitled "Nuclear test ban". In that connection, the secretariat has circulated today a draft decision on the

(The President)

re-establishment of an ad hoc Committee to deal with that item. The draft decision appears in document CD/WP.403. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I now wish to invite the Conference to appoint the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. I am informed that there is consensus on the appointment of Ambassador Indrajit Singh Chadha of India as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Shall I take it that the Conference so decides?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I extend to Ambassador Chadha, on behalf of the Conference, our congratulations on his appointment to the important post of Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee and wish him every success in discharging his heavy responsibilities.

In connection with the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on item 1, I wish to recall that Ambassador Donowaki of Japan very kindly made himself available to help in the process of informal consultations on the programme of work of the Committee. I am grateful for the assistance provided by Ambassador Donowaki in that respect and I am sure that the work he performed on that subject will be very helpful to the incoming Chairman.

I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil, who will speak as Co-ordinator of the Group of 21 on this item.

Mr. RICUPERO (Brazil): The conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is the most urgent item on the agenda of this Conference and is long overdue. This Conference, as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, has the primary role in negotiations to achieve that objective. The need for a nuclear test-ban treaty has been repeatedly emphasized in numerous documents adopted unanimously by the United Nations, including the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. As a significant contribution to the aim of halting and reversing the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the Group of 21 has consistently advocated and has continued to attach the highest priority to a nuclear test ban.

In a spirit of compromise and flexibility, and in order to facilitate the setting up of an ad hoc committee on item 1 in the Conference on Disarmament, the Group of 21 did not object to document CD/863 being taken as the basis for the mandate of the Committee when it was established late in the 1990 session of the CD. This acceptance was without prejudice to its continuing preference for the mandate contained in document CD/829.

We accept that the Ad Hoc Committee will now be able to resume its work. Its mandate, however, continues to be much below the expectations of the Group of 21. The Group exceptionally accepts the present mandate, and such acceptance does not imply that the Ad Hoc Committee should be allowed to work indefinitely on the same basis. The Group believes that a clear negotiating

(Mr. Ricupero, Brazil)

mandate is necessary to ensure the conclusion of a nuclear test-ban treaty which will play a fundamental role in contributing to the cause of disarmament.

It should be recalled that the achievement of a nuclear test-ban treaty was envisaged in the preamble to the partial test-ban treaty of 1963, which embodied the objective of continuing negotiations "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time".

The Group of 21 would like to put on record that it accepts the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban on the basis of last year's mandate only for this year, in order to allow it to begin its work as soon as possible. It does so on the understanding that the results of the Committee's work and its mandate will be reviewed at the end of our session.

In recognizing the efforts of Ambassador Donowaki of Japan, we should like to congratulate Ambassador Chadha of India on his election to chair the Ad Hoc Committee this year.

Mr. CHADHA (India): Mr. President, I would like to begin by extending to you, on behalf of my delegation, our warmest felicitations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament during a crucial phase of its work, and our best wishes for success in the task that lies ahead. I would also like to join earlier speakers in thanking His Excellency the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the thought-provoking address which we were privileged to hear this morning.

I am indeed greatly honoured by the trust and confidence which has been reposed in me by electing me as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban". It will be my endeavour to carry forward the task so ably initiated by Ambassador Donowaki last year, to the best of my ability; and I am confident that in doing so I can count on the support and co-operation of the members of the CD as well as of the secretariat. I would like to take this opportunity to pay a warm tribute to Ambassador Donowaki for the outstanding leadership he provided during the formative stages of the work of the Committee upon its re-establishment last year.

The task which has been assigned to this Committee is of great importance and, at the same time, of enormous complexity with far-reaching political implications. This is abundantly clear from the fact that it took us so long to agree upon the new mandate of the Committee, which was able to resume its work after a long gap of seven years. That we were eventually able to resolve our differences bears testimony not only to the importance which the members of the CD attach at the present juncture of international relations to the resumption of work in this area, but also to their willingness to accommodate the points of view of one another. It is my earnest hope that the same spirit of compromise, co-operation and flexibility which characterized the negotiations on the mandate will continue to prevail in the future and will facilitate the accomplishment of our task.

In reviving this Committee last year, we reaffirmed our commitment to the goal of a comprehensive test ban. The attainment of this goal will call for dedicated work and renewed determination to overcome the obstacles which still

(Mr. Chadha, India)

remain. Our deliberations will be followed with considerable interest by all those who are dedicated to the cause of disarmament and peace; and I hope that we shall not disappoint them.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. Does any other member wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none.

We shall now proceed to consider agenda items 2 and 3. As I informed you at our last plenary meeting, consensus has been reached on an organizational arrangement to deal with these agenda items. I shall now follow a procedure identical to that used last year to formalize the consensus. I therefore put before the Conference for decision the following text:

"The Conference on Disarmament decides that informal meetings be held during its 1991 session on the substance of agenda items 2, 'Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament', and 3, 'Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters', and that the discussions at those informal meetings be duly reflected in the annual report of the Conference to the General Assembly of the United Nations."

If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the text that I have just read out.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I should like now to turn to another subject relating to the forthcoming informal meetings. Under the rules of procedure, the President of the Conference has the responsibility, in accordance with the normal duties of any presiding officer, to ensure that discussions at plenary or informal meetings are conducted in an orderly way. Accordingly, I wish to inform you that I have myself taken the initiative of preparing a list of topics for the purpose of facilitating a structured discussion at informal meetings on the substance of agenda items 2 and 3. That list is my own and therefore does not bind any delegation. Furthermore, it is understood that members wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the agenda items, as is the normal practice of the Conference. I shall now read out that list of topics:

Firstly, for agenda item 2:

Implementation of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of SSOD-I in the light of the trends in international relations

Evaluation of the dynamics of the nuclear arms race in the light of recent international developments

The nuclear arms race in all its qualitative aspects, and related matters

Existing international instruments concerning the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament

(The President)

The interrelation between bilateral and multilateral consideration of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; participation in negotiations for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prerequisites for the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in nuclear disarmament; role of the Conference on Disarmament

Security concepts relating to nuclear weapons in view of recent developments and in the light of the global consequences of existing and envisaged disarmament and arms limitation agreements

The role of nuclear deterrence in keeping the peace for 40 years: the need to proceed carefully and gradually in reducing reliance on nuclear deterrence

Principles governing nuclear disarmament

Proposals on stages and measures of nuclear disarmament

Cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, and measures against the reuse for weapons purposes of fissionable material released by disarmament steps

Naval nuclear armaments and disarmament

Collateral measures with the aim of consolidating and continuing the ongoing process of nuclear disarmament:

Non-proliferation of missiles and other means of delivery of nuclear weapons, as well as their technology

Confidence-building measures promoting nuclear disarmament

Verification in relation to the purposes, scope and nature of agreements

Existing proposals.

Secondly, for agenda item 3:

The impossibility of separating the problems of preventing nuclear war and preventing any war

Measures to exclude the use of nuclear weapons, inter alia:

Paragraph 58 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly (code of peaceful conduct that would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons)

International convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances (text annexed to General Assembly resolution 43/76 E of 7 December 1988)

Prohibition in a legally binding form of the use of nuclear weapons

(The President)

Measures for confidence-building and crisis prevention:

Measures to enhance confidence and increase openness with regard to military activities, including a multilateral agreement on the prevention of incidents on the high seas

Measures to prevent accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and to avoid and manage crisis situations, including the establishment of multilateral nuclear alert and crisis control centres

Measures to facilitate the international verification of compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements

Criteria and parameters for defensive military postures; military strategies and doctrines; prevention of surprise attacks

New trends in weapons technology and their impact on security and disarmament efforts.

This is the list of topics that I have prepared on my own responsibility.

I now give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Chadha, as Co-ordinator of the Group of 21 on item 2.

Mr. CHADHA (India): The significance which the Group of 21 attaches to agenda item 2 - Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament - is well known, and its views are already reflected in documents CD/64, CD/116, CD/180, CD/526 and CD/819. In keeping with its consistent position, the Group of 21 presented the draft mandate contained in CD/819/Rev.1 on 27 July 1989. It is a mandate that reflects the two crucial aspects of this issue - the urgency that the issue demands and the need to deal with it in the multilateral negotiating framework of the Conference on Disarmament.

Resolution 45/62 C adopted at the forty-fifth United Nations General Assembly session requests the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee at the beginning of its 1991 session on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament with an adequate mandate in order to allow a structured and practical analysis of how the Conference can best contribute to progress on this urgent matter. Resolution 45/59 D, also adopted at the forty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly, calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to agree, through a joint declaration, to a comprehensive nuclear arms freeze, which would embrace, besides a comprehensive test ban on nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, the complete cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes under appropriate and effective measures and procedures for verification. The General Assembly, through these widely supported resolutions, has requested the Conference on Disarmament to submit a report to its forty-sixth session on the implementation of these resolutions. The Group of 21 regrets that despite the preliminary work carried out on the subject during previous years, it has still not been found possible to set up an ad hoc committee on this item.

(Mr. Chadha, India)

In keeping with the discussions that took place on this item in previous years, and as reflected in the report of the CD contained in document CD/1039, the Group of 21 is convinced that the need for urgent multilateral action on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, leading to the adoption of concrete measures, has been amply demonstrated. In its opinion, multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament have long been overdue. It takes note of the progress achieved in the bilateral negotiations in the nuclear field and looks forward to further reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals in the context of the START process. However, bilateral negotiations can never replace or nullify the genuine multilateral search for universally applicable nuclear disarmament measures. All nations have a vital interest in negotiations on nuclear disarmament. The existence of nuclear weapons and their quantitative and qualitative development directly and fundamentally jeopardize the vital security interests of both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. It is an accepted fact that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and the survival of civilization.

The present international situation and the easing of tensions between East and West lends further credence to the long-standing demand of an overwhelming majority of the world community to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects, and to adopt urgent measures for nuclear disarmament through a time-bound programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

The accumulation of nuclear weaponry constitutes a threat to the very security that it seeks to protect. In the nuclear age, the only valid doctrine is the achievement of collective security through nuclear disarmament. As long as doctrines of nuclear deterrence are persisted with, a nuclear arms race which leads to greater insecurity and instability in international relations cannot be halted and reversed. Moreover, such doctrines, which in the ultimate analysis are predicated upon a willingness to use nuclear weapons, cannot be the basis for preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war, a war which would affect participants and innocent bystanders alike. The Group wishes to reiterate the validity of General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI) of 1961, which declared, inter alia, that the use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the laws of humanity and a crime against civilization.

In the task of achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament, the nuclear-weapon States bear a special responsibility. In keeping with respect for the security concerns of non-nuclear States, all nuclear-weapon States must accept the obligation to take positive and practical steps towards the adoption and implementation of concrete measures towards nuclear disarmament.

The realization that a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought is a significant step forward, which must be translated into practical steps. Paragraph 50 of the Final Document of SSOD-I sets out guidelines for the CD to provide an effective and complementary process in the multilateral framework. The Group of 21 remains firmly committed to the implementation of the provisions of this paragraph and believes that the establishment of an ad hoc committee in the CD provides the best means to achieve this objective. The Group of 21 stresses that its willingness to accept the format of the informal plenary to discuss this agenda item this year in no way prejudices



(Mr. Chadha, India)

its principled stand reflected in CD/64, CD/116, CD/180, CD/526, CD/819 and CD/819/Rev.1. The Group expects substantial movement on the issue of setting up an ad hoc committee on this agenda item next year, in keeping with the importance of the subject within the global disarmament agenda.

The PRESIDENT: I now give the floor to the representative of Kenya, Ambassador Ogada, as Co-ordinator for the Group of 21 on item 3.

Mr. OGADA (Kenya): Mr. President, as this is the first time I have taken the floor during your presidency, may I congratulate you for the very effective and efficient manner in which you have guided the work of the Conference since the commencement of its 1991 session? As the same time, my delegation would also like to thank His Excellency Dr. Velayati, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, for his illuminating statement on the Gulf crisis.

I have asked for the floor today to make a statement on behalf of the Group of 21 with regard to agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

The Group of 21 wishes to express its regret at the inability of the Conference on Disarmament to set up an ad hoc committee on agenda item 3. The Group has shown itself ready to exchange views on this subject, here or in the General Assembly. But some delegations have not agreed with this, as their priorities seem to be different.

I do not need to emphasize the importance that the Group of 21 attaches to this item. The Group believes that the greatest peril facing the world is the threat of destruction from a nuclear war, and that consequently the removal of this threat is most acute and urgent. Nuclear-weapon States possess the primary responsibility for avoiding nuclear war, but all nations have a vital interest in the negotiation of measures for prevention of nuclear war, in view of the catastrophic consequences that such a war would have for mankind. As far back as 1961, General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI) declared that the use of nuclear weapons, besides being a violation of the Charter of the United Nations, would be against the laws of humanity and a crime against civilization. Keeping this in view the Belgrade Declaration, adopted in September 1989 at the Ninth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, emphasized the extreme urgency of achieving nuclear disarmament through the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and "stressed the need for the conclusion of an international agreement prohibiting all use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances".

It is matter of concern for all delegations present here that no progress has been possible on this item since its introduction as a separate item on the CD's agenda in accordance with General Assembly resolution 38/183 G. During these years the arms race has accelerated, leading to the expansion of nuclear weapon stockpiles and the introduction of still more lethal warheads into them.

The United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly requested the Conference on Disarmament to undertake, as a matter of the highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical

(Mr. Ogada, Kenya)

measures for the prevention of nuclear war and to establish for that purpose an ad hoc committee on this subject. During the 1990 session of the General Assembly there were two resolutions on this subject which were adopted by overwhelming majorities. One of these resolutions, 45/59 B on a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, reiterated the call to the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations, as a matter of priority, in order to reach agreement on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances, taking as a basis for its work the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons annexed to the resolution.

In view of the irreversible consequences of a nuclear war, it is clear that conventional wars cannot under any circumstances be equated with nuclear war, since nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction. In this context, invoking the Charter to justify the use of nuclear weapons in the exercise of the right to self-defence is completely unjustifiable. The Group of 21 remains convinced that the shortest way to remove the danger of nuclear war lies in the elimination of nuclear weapons, and that pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited. It has welcomed the declaration by then President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in November 1985 that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought", as also its reconfirmation in the joint statements issued subsequently. Now is the time to translate this will into a binding commitment.

The Group of 21 remains committed to the position expressed in CD/515/Rev.5 of 27 July 1989 for the establishment of an ad hoc committee that will permit thorough consideration of all aspects - legal, political, technical and military - of all the proposals before the Conference. It believes that such consideration will not only contribute to better understanding of the subject but also pave the way for negotiations for an agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. Such an objective cannot be achieved only through discussions in the plenary or informal meetings. The Group is disappointed, therefore, that despite the urgency accorded to this subject and the flexibility it has displayed, the Conference on Disarmament is not able to discharge its own mandate, which is reflected in paragraph 120 of the Final Document of SSOD-I. However, the Group of 21 is prepared to start consideration of this item in informal plenary meetings in the hope that the importance of the matter will lead to a rethinking on the part of those who have expressed reservations on the mandate proposed by the Group of 21.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Kenya for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. Are there any further comments in connection with items 2 and 3? It seems not.

I wish to inform you that the informal meetings referred to will be devoted alternately to agenda item 2 and agenda item 3. We shall hold the first informal meeting on Thursday, 21 February, immediately after the plenary meeting on that date. As a rule, we shall deal with one agenda item per week, on the understanding that if for any reason we have no time to listen to all speakers listed for a particular day, we shall continue at the end of the following plenary meeting. Members wishing to place their names on the list in advance may do so, but this is not necessary.

(The President)

I should like now to turn to agenda item 4. The secretariat has also circulated today a draft decision which is contained in document CD/WP.401, concerning the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I now put document CD/WP.401 before the Conference for decision. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I now turn to the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee. I understand that there is consensus on the appointment of Minister Serguei Batsanov of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. I invite you to formalize that decision.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I wish to extend congratulations to Minister Batsanov on behalf of the Conference on his appointment to the chairmanship of that subsidiary body. I further wish him a successful tenure of office in the negotiations on one of the priority items on our agenda.

I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, as Co-ordinator for the Group of 21 on item 4.

Mr. CALDERON (Peru) (translated from Spanish): On behalf of the Group of 21, I would like to make the following statement with regard to the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. With your permission, Mr. President, I shall read out the statement in English.

(continued in English)

"On 7 February 1991 the Group of 21 made a statement with regard to the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. It set forth its position in relation to the necessity of including the question of the total prohibition of use of chemical weapons in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons that we have just re-established. The Group of 21 has joined the consensus this morning on the draft mandate proposed in order to ensure the prompt resumption of the important work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. However, we deeply regret that the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons does not include specific reference to the prohibition of use of chemical weapons. The Group of 21 continues to believe that, as the draft convention covers the issue of the prohibition of use, this should also be clearly reflected in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee."

Mr. ANTYUKHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, since the delegation of the USSR is taking the floor for the first time at today's session of the Conference on Disarmament, we would like at the outset to welcome you most sincerely to your present responsible post. The delegation of the USSR has been acquainted with you for a long time now as we have worked together in the field of multilateral disarmament, and in the time that has elapsed since the opening of the present session, we have had the opportunity to see for ourselves once again the skilful, purposeful and tactful way you have been steering the work of the

(Mr. Antyukhin, USSR)

Conference. I would like to assure you that the Soviet delegation will fully support you in your work. At the same time, we would like to welcome the new heads of delegation - Ambassadors A. Semichi, P. O'Sullivan, T. Ditchev, T. Tóth, D.E. Baljinnyam and N. Calovski. We wish them every success in performing their responsible tasks. We would also ask the delegations of Algeria, Australia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, France and Yugoslavia to convey our very best wishes to Ambassadors M.A. Chaalal, D. Reese, I. Varga, L. Bayart, B. Sujka, G. Chirila, P. Morel and M. Kosin, who have returned home.

In connection with the decision just adopted by the Conference, to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and appoint the head of the Soviet delegation, S.B. Batsanov, as Chairman of the Committee for the coming year, the Soviet delegation would like to express its deepest gratitude to all delegations for the great confidence that they have placed in us.

S.B. Batsanov has asked me to convey to you that he regards this appointment first and foremost as a recognition of the role which the Soviet Union is playing both in the talks aimed at the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and in the efforts being made by the international community in other fields of arms limitation and disarmament. He has asked me to assure all the distinguished representatives that he will make every effort to ensure that 1991 is a year of substantial progress towards a decision on what we view as one of the most urgent items on the agenda of the Conference - saving mankind from the threat of chemical warfare. The urgency of this task is confirmed by the dramatic events which are now occurring in the Persian Gulf region. The delegation of the USSR listened carefully to the substantive statement made by the distinguished Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Dr. Ali Akbar Velayati. It contains a number of points which all of us should give serious thought to. Furthermore, the war in the Gulf, as we see it, clearly demonstrates that we are seriously behind schedule in drafting a comprehensive convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. In these circumstances it is obvious that all of us should once again take a critical look at our fundamental attitude to the convention and take the necessary political decisions to ensure full and unreserved support for the future convention on the part of all participants in the negotiations. This is the guarantee of success.

Unfortunately, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, S.B. Batsanov, will be away from Geneva until Monday for previously planned consultations. He asked me to say on his behalf that in order to perform effectively the functions of Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, he intends to co-operate extensively with all interested delegations participating in the talks both as members of the Conference and as non-members. The goal of such co-operation, as he sees it, is to try to lay the foundations which on the one hand will contribute to the achievement of a generally acceptable compromise on outstanding issues connected with the draft convention, reflecting a balance between the interests of the different parties in the negotiations, and on the other hand will guarantee the effectiveness and universality of the future convention.

(Mr. Antyukhin, USSR)

We feel bound to point out that the circumstances which helped to bring the negotiations to the very significant stage they have now reached did not come about by accident. A considerable personal contribution was made here by the distinguished representatives of States who have served as previous chairmen of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. In this connection, I would like to refer in particular to the last Chairman, the Ambassador of Sweden, Ambassador C.-M. Hyltenius, whose pragmatism, openness, intuition and, when necessary, stubbornness, played a substantial role during the 1990 session of the Ad Hoc Committee in the achievement of important results on the basis of which we now have to make the last breakthrough to the signing of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

I would also like to inform you that the representative of the USSR to the Conference on Disarmament has received instructions from his Government to the effect that, if elected Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, he should actively promote negotiations, devoting special attention to finding solutions on key political issues leading to the completion of work on the multilateral convention.

In conclusion, S.B. Batsanov has asked me to inform the distinguished delegates that with the agreement of the secretariat of the Conference, the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will be held next Tuesday, 19 February at 3 p.m. in room V.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. Does any other member wish to speak on the decision just adopted? I see none.

We shall now deal with agenda item 5. The secretariat has distributed document CD/WP.402, containing a draft mandate for a re-established Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. I now intend to put the proposed draft mandate before the Conference for action. If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Conference decides to adopt the draft mandate.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I now turn to the appointment of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. I am informed that consensus exists on the appointment of Ambassador García Moritán of Argentina as Chairman of that Committee. May I therefore proceed to register that decision?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: On behalf of the Conference, I congratulate Ambassador García Moritán on his appointment as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee under agenda item 5. I extend to him our best wishes for success in discharging the important responsibilities for which he has now been appointed.

I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius, as Co-ordinator for the Group of 21 on item 5.

Mr. HYLTEINIUS (Sweden): I should like to make the following statement on behalf of the Group of 21 in connection with the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

On 4 December 1990, the United Nations General Assembly, by an overwhelming majority and only one dissenting vote, adopted resolution 45/55 A on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The resolution reiterates that the Conference on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. It requests the Conference on Disarmament to consider this question as a matter of priority. It also requests the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its consideration of the question of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, building upon areas of convergence and taking into account relevant proposals and initiatives.

The Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space has, over the years, accorded extensive consideration to several issues that have been before it. It has already examined and identified the need to reinforce the legal régime applicable to outer space, as well as the need for strict compliance with existing agreements. It has also considered further measures and the need to hold appropriate international negotiations in accordance with the spirit of the outer space Treaty. In this context the Group of 21 wishes to recall the large number of proposals from all groups introduced in the Conference on Disarmament since the inception of the work of its Ad Hoc Committee in 1985, as demonstrated in documents CD/908/Rev.1 and CD/OS/WP.28/Rev.1. In particular, several of them are, in the view of the Group of 21, ready for in-depth and more structured treatment as they have gathered a substantial degree of support among the majority of the members of the Committee.

The Group of 21 has therefore proposed that this year the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space should have a negotiating mandate. The Committee should thus, in the view of the Group, focus on concrete proposals to prevent an arms race in outer space, and continue to build upon areas of convergence with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. To the regret of the Group of 21, however, it has not been possible to improve adequately the mandate of previous years, due to the reluctance of some delegations to accept such a change.

In order to facilitate the speedy resumption of work, the Group of 21 has decided to go along with the same mandate as before. This is a renewed demonstration of the flexibility and goodwill of the Group. It is our hope that other delegations will respond constructively to this attitude and agree to a more focused approach to relevant issues, so that we can move forward in areas where there are prospects for agreement. The Group holds that any delay of the work of the Committee should be avoided, given the urgent need to address this important agenda item. The Group of 21 is of the opinion that the Ad Hoc Committee should therefore start work immediately in order to achieve progress and attain positive results, and expects substantial movement on the mandate issue in the near future.

(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

Before concluding, I should like to take this opportunity to congratulate Ambassador García Moritán of Argentina on his appointment as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. His experience and diplomatic skills guarantee that the Committee will be in very competent hands, and I am convinced that it will make substantive progress under his guidance.

The PRESIDENT: I now give the floor to the representative of France as Co-ordinator of the Western Group on this item.

Mr. BESANCENOT (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, this is the first time that I have had the honour of taking the floor in this forum, and therefore I would like at the outset to congratulate you on my delegation's behalf on the manner in which you have acted as President of our Conference during these first important four weeks of the annual session.

On behalf of the Group of Western Countries I would like to express our satisfaction at the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, and the Conference's adoption of the same mandate for the Committee as in the past. A reading of the Ad Hoc Committee's report is sufficient to persuade one that the Committee must continue in-depth analysis of all questions relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, in order to reconcile positions on basic concepts, which is essential in order to envisage negotiations on measures in this area. Experience has shown that the present mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee was sufficiently broad and flexible to enable all interested delegations to make their contribution to this common quest, including the consideration of new proposals. We would like to thank the other groups and other members of the Conference for their efforts which led to the adoption of this decision. We hope that this sense of realism will enable the Committee to embark on its substantive work without further delay. Lastly, I would like to congratulate His Excellency Mr. García Moritán, the representative of Argentina, on his election as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Both his diplomatic skills and his country's well-known interest in this agenda item make us confident in the prospects for this session.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Moritán.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): In this last stage of your presidency, I would like to express my delegation's appreciation to you for the important task that you have performed at the start of the 1991 session of the Conference on Disarmament. The decisions adopted this morning offer a clear demonstration of your diplomatic skills and the effort made to get our work off to a good start. In that context I wish to express appreciation for the confidence placed in my delegation through the appointment to lead the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, and also to thank those who congratulated me. I would like to take this opportunity to thank Ambassador Shannon of Canada for the work done in 1990 as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, and the important support received from the secretariat during his term of office.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. Does any other member wish to refer to the decision that we have just taken? I now give the floor to the representative of China, Ambassador Hou Zhitong.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese): I wish to say a few words after having listened to many interesting statements today. I shall be very brief.

I am very happy to speak for the first time this year at the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament. First of all, please allow me on behalf of the Chinese delegation to extend our congratulations to you, as the distinguished representative of friendly Sri Lanka, on being the first President of the session, and on the excellent way you have accomplished the important task of starting the session. I would also like to take this opportunity to pay our tribute to Ambassador Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, and Ambassador Berasategui, Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference.

We listened with great interest to the statement by His Excellency Mr. Ali Akbar Velayati, Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Since last August the heads of a number of delegations have changed. I take this opportunity to warmly welcome among us the new ambassadors, Ambassador Semichi of Algeria, Ambassador O'Sullivan of Australia, Ambassador Ditchiev of Bulgaria, Ambassador Tóth of Hungary, Ambassador Baljinnyam of Mongolia and Ambassador Calovski of Yugoslavia. I wish these new colleagues every success in their work and look forward to friendly co-operation with them. At the same time I would like to say to those ambassadors who have left - Ambassador Chaalal, Ambassador Dietze, Ambassador Kosin, Ambassador Reese, Ambassador Sujka and Ambassador Morel - how much we miss them and wish them every success.

Under your able guidance, Mr. President, steady new progress has been made in the work of the Conference. In addition to other ad hoc committees, the ad hoc committees on an NTB, chemical weapons and outer space have been re-established today. New decisions have been taken on important agenda items such as nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war. In this connection, I wish to extend our congratulations to you as well as to the Conference. Our felicitations also go to Ambassador Chadha of India, Mr. Batsanov, head of the Soviet delegation, and Ambassador Moritán of Argentina on their appointment as chairmen of the three committees. We are convinced that with their outstanding skills and rich experience, they will guide the committees to new achievements. Here I would like to offer them as well as the officers of the Conference the close co-operation of the Chinese delegation. At the same time I would like to express once again our thanks to Ambassador Donowaki, Ambassador Hyltenius and Ambassador Shannon, the chairmen of the three ad hoc committees in 1990, and their officers, for their outstanding work and contributions.

The principled stands of the Chinese delegation on the nuclear test ban, the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the prevention of nuclear war, chemical weapons and outer space, including our position on the mandate of



(Mr. Hou, China)

those ad hoc committees, are consistent and well known to everyone, and therefore I will not elaborate. I would like to emphasize here that it has been the common objective cherished and pursued by people all over the world to free the world from chemical weapons. The conclusion of the negotiations on a convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons is an important task entrusted to the Conference on Disarmament by the international community. The current developments in the international situation have further proved the importance and urgency of accomplishing this historic task at an early date. The Chinese delegation would like to reiterate that the key to the success of our negotiations on a chemical weapons convention lies in firm adherence to the fundamental objective, namely the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons. It is a matter of course that an unconditional ban on the use of chemical weapons and the thorough destruction of all chemical weapons should be included. This is the common ground for the whole negotiation process. We are convinced that so long as all parties to the negotiations adhere to this commitment by conducting earnest and pragmatic negotiations and fully demonstrate their political will, we will surely attain our goal.

It is the set objective of China to work actively for the early conclusion of such a convention. The Chinese delegation will, as always, continue to co-operate with other delegations in a constructive and earnest manner in our joint efforts to achieve the early conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of China for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

Since there are no other speakers on this subject, I propose now that we again take up agenda item 6. You will recall that at our 578th plenary meeting, the Conference decided to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons. Consultations have been proceeding on the appointment of a Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, and I am happy to inform you that there now seems to be a consensus on the nomination of Ambassador Juraj Králík of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic for that position. I now invite the Conference to take action in that connection by appointing Mr. Králík Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I extend to Ambassador Králík the congratulations of the Conference on his appointment as Chairman of the subsidiary body re-established under agenda item 6 and, as in the case of other colleagues appointed for similar responsibilities, I wish him success in the performance of his duties as presiding officer of the Ad Hoc Committee.

With the actions taken today on organizational matters, we have agreed on arrangements for most items on our agenda, with the exception of agenda item 8, entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament". As you know, there is no consensus at present on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee. At our last plenary meeting I informed you that if there was no agreement on a particular agenda item, in accordance with the provision contained in

(The President)

paragraph 5 (d) of document CD/1036, I would try to identify a special co-ordinator who would be responsible for reaching consensus on an appropriate organizational arrangement for that agenda item. Unfortunately, my consultations have produced no results yet, and it will therefore be up to my successor to continue my efforts in that respect.

With the decisions taken today, we are now in a position to start substantive work in the subsidiary bodies of the Conference. I am informed by the secretariat that it is the intention of the incoming President to convene a meeting of chairmen of subsidiary bodies to review the weekly timetable and the timing requirements of each ad hoc committee, so that we might use the resources allocated to us in the most effective way. On that basis, a weekly timetable will be circulated for the information of members in the delegation's pigeon-holes.

I should like to inform you that I have been approached by the representative of Hungary in connection with the possibility of holding an additional plenary meeting on Wednesday, 20 February. He has also raised the issue with the group co-ordinators. The reason for this request is a visit to Geneva by His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary, who wishes to address the Conference on that date. I have consulted the co-ordinators and, on the basis of the views expressed by them, I have informed the representative of Hungary that the Conference would be happy to listen to the statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. After discussing the matter with him, it was clear that the additional plenary meeting could not be held on Tuesday, 19 February, because of the Minister's previous engagements. This being the case, we agreed that the additional plenary meeting would be held on Wednesday, 20 February, at 10 a.m. Of course, it is understood that this recommendation that I submit to the plenary does not set a precedent for holding meetings on days other than Thursdays or Tuesdays. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Conference accepts the proposed arrangement.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I have no other business for consideration by the Conference today. Allow me therefore to make a concluding statement in my capacity as its President.

We began our 1991 session under unprecedented conditions obtaining in the international scene. Ironically, some of these were grave portents while others promised a great positive potential. The essence of the message from the President of my country, which I had the honour to convey to you at our first plenary meeting, was that we have to maximize the positive aspects while minimizing and reversing the dangerous trends. This will only be possible through a genuine process of multilateral consensus-building. Despite the sombre reflections and uncertainties engendered by the ongoing conflict, the seriousness and the spirit of compromise that have been evident during the past four weeks to finalize the start-up work of our 1991 session are indeed a source of encouragement.

As regards the organizational questions, I am certain that all my distinguished colleagues share my satisfaction that five ad hoc committees have been re-established.

(The President)

(On the important question of a nuclear test ban, I hope that the Ad Hoc Committee will be able to start substantive work soon under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Chadha of India on the basis of the decision we have taken a little while ago. The very fact that it was possible to re-establish this Ad Hoc Committee despite strong views held by the delegations concerning the terms of reference of this Committee signifies the great importance attached to this question. I have no doubt that the same spirit of compromise and understanding will prevail in carrying out the substantive work of the Committee in a way that will contribute to the achievement of a nuclear test ban, which is one of the highest-priority items on our agenda. I would like to express my deep appreciation to Ambassador Donowaki of Japan, who conducted painstaking and skilful consultations last year and during the inter-sessional period. His efforts have contributed in no small measure to facilitating substantive work on this item.)

We have also been able to reach early agreement on an appropriate organizational framework to deal with agenda items 2 and 3. I hope that this framework will facilitate a productive exchange on substantive issues involved, as it did last year, enabling us to reflect our perceptions in that regard in a more focused way in our report to the General Assembly this year.

The decision we have just taken on agenda item 4 once again signifies the spirit of compromise displayed by all groups and delegations. I do hope that, as the President of Sri Lanka stated in his message to the Conference, the demonstrated willingness to get on with the work of conclusively negotiating a treaty on this subject will augur well for the early realization of the convention. The meticulous care and skill with which the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Batsanov, has embarked upon his onerous duties make us confident that the Committee will make decisive progress this year.

Another priority item on our agenda, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, will be dealt with under the dynamic leadership of Ambassador Moritán of Argentina. I am pleased that it was possible to reach agreement on this important question, since the cumulative work done by the CD during past years has indicated interesting and productive avenues to explore on this subject.

The early agreement reached to re-establish ad hoc committees on radiological weapons and negative security assurances will have given sufficient time for all delegations to prepare for constructive work of substance on these important items. I am aware that the chairmen, Ambassador Králik of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and Mr. Robertson of Canada, are conducting consultations with a view to organizing the work of the committees.

It was also possible to reach an understanding with regard to the first part of agenda item 7, entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons". We will accordingly keep this matter under review and deal with it whenever necessary with a view to treating this subject in a way commensurate with the importance attached to it.

(The President)

After lengthy consultations and much skilful diplomacy displayed by Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan, several decisions were taken last year concerning the improved and effective functioning of the Conference. Due to the co-operation extended by all delegations and groups it was possible to reach an understanding with regard to the manner in which we should deal with this important subject in the Conference this year. Ambassador Kamal was accordingly appointed to conduct consultations bilaterally with members of the Conference to determine whether there would be common ground for addressing certain issues relating to this question. I am certain that Ambassador Kamal with his usual vigour and skill will continue his consultations with a view to building upon the area of agreement reached last year.

The Conference was also able, at an early stage, to take appropriate decisions facilitating the participation of non-members in the Conference. I take satisfaction - a sentiment which I am certain my distinguished colleagues share - at the fact that the trend of increasing participation by non-members continues. This is indicative of the growing awareness of and interest in substantive work being done at the Conference. It also augurs well for enhancing the multilateral character of our collective work.

Among the pending issues is the comprehensive programme on disarmament; agreement has yet to be reached on an appropriate organizational arrangement for dealing with this agenda item. Consultations will continue on this question.

In conclusion I would like to express my deep appreciation to the group co-ordinators and to all delegations who have always extended to me their fullest co-operation and understanding. The expeditious decisions on organizational matters were largely due to the co-operation extended to the President by all. A special word of gratitude should go to Ambassador Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, and Ambassador Berasetagui, the Deputy Secretary-General, who have always provided valuable advice with professionalism and skill. I also thank the other members of the secretariat who have helped me and my delegation in carrying out our responsibilities during the past four weeks. I would also like to convey my thanks to the interpreters for the efficient job they always do, and particularly for their patience and goodwill today during the extended session. Finally, I would like to convey my best wishes to the incoming President, Ambassador Carl-Magnus Hyltenius of Sweden. We are already familiar with his competence and diplomatic skills and are confident of a most successful stewardship of the Conference under his presidency.

That concludes my statement. I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Wednesday, 20 February, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.583  
20 February 1991

ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Wednesday, 20 February 1991, at 10 a.m.

President:

Mr. Carl-Magnus Hyltenius

(Sweden)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 583rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset I wish to give a warm welcome, on behalf of the Conference, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary, His Excellency Dr. Géza Jeszenszky, who on the occasion of his visit to Geneva expressed the wish to address us. As is known, the Minister assumed his high office after devoting his professional activities to the academic field, where he played an outstanding role in his country. I am sure that members will follow his statement with particular interest, and I wish to thank him for joining us today.

As this is the first plenary meeting of the Swedish presidency of the Conference, I should now like to make an opening statement.

It is an honour for Sweden to assume the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference has a great responsibility and a vital function, not least today when recent developments have underlined the need to find global solutions to a number of pressing political issues. Some of these are on our agenda, and it is our responsibility to deal with them in an effective manner. The history of disarmament negotiations is full of disappointments, but it also shows that important agreements can be negotiated in this framework. In fact, the global multilateral disarmament machinery has produced some important treaties, and at least one major new convention is now within reach.

It is encouraging that many States participate in our work even if they are not members of the Conference on Disarmament. In today's world, global and multilaterally negotiated solutions are become even more necessary than before.

There are reasons to believe that this Conference will gradually move towards a greater degree of mutual understanding between delegations and groups of delegations. Such a trend is already noticeable in the context of the United Nations General Assembly. For example, the proportion of resolutions adopted without a vote in the First Committee has been rising the last few years. It has also been possible for the United Nations Disarmament Commission to conclude some of its long-standing issues with consensus reports. It is to be hoped that the vanishing effects of earlier East-West confrontation will not be replaced by a North-South axis of tension that might be equally paralysing for work in the field of disarmament. We can all contribute to avoiding that danger, but it requires an effort by all parties to take the legitimate interests of others into account. We are indeed faced with an opportunity that must not be missed.

It is with great satisfaction that I recall that despite certain difficulties, it has already been possible to re-establish no less than five ad hoc committees, which can now start working. I should like to pay tribute to my predecessor as President of the Conference,

(The President)

Ambassador Rasaputram of Sri Lanka, for his achievement and for his authoritative and skilled stewardship. I shall certainly spare no effort to discharge my responsibilities in the best possible manner, but whether substantive progress will be made or not is, of course, dependent on all participants in this important endeavour.

The greatest threat that faces mankind is the danger of nuclear war. It is therefore proper that the nuclear issues are at the top of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. It is a source of satisfaction that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban was re-established last year. It has now been established again, and it is my hope that it will very soon get down to substantive work. Statements made in this Conference testify to the importance that many delegations attach to this issue.

As in previous years, it was not possible to reach agreement on the establishment of ad hoc committees on agenda items 2 and 3. However, arrangements have been made for a thorough discussion of these items, as demonstrated by the very comprehensive list of topics read out by the President at our last plenary meeting. I hope that all interested delegations will participate actively in the discussions, so as to prepare the ground for future solutions to the vital issues involved.

It is my view that the conclusion of the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention is within reach. The Ad Hoc Committee will resume its work today. The current conflict in the Middle East has once again illustrated the importance and urgency of these negotiations.

An increasing number of States will become active in the peaceful uses of outer space. Some of them may also contemplate military uses which may be considered threatening to other States. The CD has an opportunity of making a decisive contribution to the efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space before it becomes an established fact. There are several examples of similar agreements in the past, preventing undesirable developments, agreements which have proved to be extremely useful. The re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee provides this opportunity.

Negative security assurances have been the subject of consideration in the CD for many years. The Ad Hoc Committee just established can register a new development, since the United Nations General Assembly last autumn managed to agree on one single resolution on this issue. Radiological weapons will continue to be dealt with in an ad hoc committee. Hopefully the work of the Committee will make substantive progress this year in the two Contact Groups on tracks A and B. There is no agreement to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. I therefore plan to appoint a Special Co-ordinator on this issue. The consideration of the question of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference will continue. Last year's consultations led to some concrete results, and I hope that further progress will be made.

(The President)

The problem of the expansion of the membership of the Conference, and the more recent issue of whether the number of members should be allowed to decrease, require in my view active consideration. It has been pending for a very long time. It is the first time in the history of this Conference and its predecessors that the question of expansion has been considered for such a long time without any decision being taken. As you recall, it was agreed as early as 1979 that the membership would be reviewed at regular intervals, and in 1982 a decision in principle was taken on the question of expansion. However, no progress has been noted, which has been reflected in the repeated unchanged wording of the relevant passage in the report to the General Assembly. Non-members have been waiting for many years for a decision. It is high time that the Conference moved from words to deeds in this matter, and I therefore intend to pursue it actively during my presidency.

That concludes my statement. I now have pleasure in giving the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary, His Excellency Dr. Géza Jeszenszky.

Mr. JESZENSZKY (Hungary): It is a great pleasure for me to address the Conference on Disarmament as the Foreign Minister of the first Hungarian Government since 1947 responsible to a freely and democratically elected Parliament. First of all, let me congratulate you, Sir, on your accession to the important post of President, and wish you every success in your highly responsible work. Let me also express my gratitude to the representatives of the States members of the Conference, and in particular Ambassador Rasaputram of Sri Lanka, the previous President, for their understanding and co-operation in making this special plenary meeting possible.

The Conference on Disarmament, this prestigious body, is an important forum for conducting negotiations on issues that are primordial for international peace and security. During the decades of existence of the Conference and its predecessors this manifold task has been met with great expertise, intensive work and valuable results.

The present modalities of the work of the Conference were elaborated more than a decade ago and have remained practically unchanged. The topics on the agenda are questions of real significance. During the 1980s, however, new challenges have also emerged, many of them having a direct bearing on international peace and security.

This session of the Conference on Disarmament is taking place when the international community is making grave efforts to restore the sovereignty of Kuwait, which has fallen victim to an inadmissible act of aggression. We firmly believe that the numerous Security Council resolutions calling for the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait reflect the principle of collective security enshrined in the United Nations Charter.

It is obvious that the Gulf conflict will have a major impact on the realities of global politics, and the unfolding new situation will differ in many ways from what it used to be before 2 August 1990. At the same time there are other factors that have already exerted their influence on the status of world affairs.



(Mr. Jeszenszky, Hungary)

In the wake of the revolutionary democratic changes in Europe, confrontation between East and West is falling into oblivion. This process was marked most recently by the adoption of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe and the signing of a treaty of historic importance, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

Hungary has always attached special importance to the ongoing arms control negotiations in Vienna. These negotiations faithfully reflected all the positive trends that have characterized our continent during the last two years. It was an encouraging phenomenon that apart from the biggest military Powers, which bear primary responsibility in maintaining security and stability in Europe, smaller States could also actively play a part in creating the final consensus.

I think it is needless to stress again that my country has a special interest in building a new co-operative security structure in Europe that would extinguish the division of the continent once and for all. We are of the firm belief that the tranquillity and stability of the "European house" is closely intertwined with the successful continuation of the CFE negotiations.

Last November, the Paris summit created the overall impression that the foundation of a new European security structure was established and a historic breakthrough had been achieved. In fact, the CFE Treaty is not just an ordinary agreement but the first multilateral treaty ever to stipulate significant reductions in conventional armed forces. We continue to believe that this treaty indeed holds the full potential for serving as a solid and accurately drafted basis for the realization of the principal objectives of conventional arms control in Europe. The key for the success of this endeavour lies in the full-scale implementation of its correlative provisions.

We consider it a basic test for the whole CSCE process that all States - without exception - should recognize their special responsibilities and spare no efforts in order to forestall any negative impacts on the realization of our shared original objectives. Let us hope that the very near future will prove that each and every State party to the CFE Treaty is ready to heed the appeals of others and, accordingly, is able to work in the same constructive spirit as that which we experienced at the very same forum previously.

There is another factor of change in world affairs, namely, the growing importance of multilateralism. The revitalization of the United Nations has been felt in recent years. The united stand of the international community in facing the events since last August has proved that the role of the world organization will be upgraded even more in the future. Thus, it is solely up to us to make full use of the existing vast possibilities.

In parallel with these positive trends, a regrettable phenomenon is gaining ground in multilateral affairs. There is a growing difference in approaches between North and South, a danger inherent in many of the issues of international security. While seeking solutions to pending problems care must be taken to avoid the emergence of new rifts and tensions, especially along the North-South axis, since this might undermine the very objective of those constructive efforts.

(Mr. Jeszenszky, Hungary)

Besides promising tendencies, signs of growing disharmony are showing between the performance of the Conference on Disarmament and the direction as well as the pace of events having a direct impact on international security. Even at this juncture, where the further course of developments remains unclear, it seems to be appropriate to launch an informal process of assessing the challenges and possible solutions in the context of multilateral disarmament.

The Conference was rightly designated more than a decade ago the multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament. This role itself, however, proved to a reason for heated, sometimes "theological" debates, when the expression "negotiating body" had to be filled with substance. We are convinced that it is of the utmost importance to preserve the primary function of the Conference of working out disarmament agreements through concrete and direct negotiations. Nevertheless, it must be realized that a strict and narrow interpretation of the negotiating function is illusory. It does not always reflect the political realities, and might only yield fruitless political wrangling.

With remarkable intensity the Conference on Disarmament is performing its task of elaborating a multilateral convention on the comprehensive and total prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles. The problem of chemical weapons is, of course, only one of several items on the agenda of the Conference. There are other items, many of them highly important, on which subsidiary bodies are now functioning but where no major breakthrough has been achieved over a prolonged period of time. On some other items, even getting down to substantial work has for years been impossible.

The "Decalogue" of the Conference was created to be a wide and flexible framework, covering practically all aspects of disarmament. The present agenda, built on the basis of this Decalogue, concentrates the efforts of the Conference on weapons of mass destruction. Given the enormous destructive power of such weaponry, no reasoning is needed to justify that special attention. Nevertheless, we cannot forget that the nuclear and chemical threats are not the only dangers facing mankind. The Decalogue provides us with a very useful umbrella, and it might be opportune to start thinking whether the present agenda could be developed through a gradual and realistic adjustment in order to face the realities of the world.

The Conference on Disarmament offers another rare opportunity through the fact that it is a forum where countries are represented both politically and geographically in a balanced manner. This unique balance provides a sound framework for dealing with global security and disarmament issues and can contribute to the reconciliation of differing approaches.

Speaking about the need to adapt to the requirements of a changing international environment, let me address some of the challenges we consider as being of overriding significance from the point of view of security and stability. For years nuclear issues dominated the disarmament agenda, often practically precluding the possibility of considering the issue of conventional weapons. Without denying the importance of nuclear disarmament, this approach, in my view, turned out to be misleading. It has often been argued that States with the largest arsenals have a special responsibility in

(Mr. Jeszenszky, Hungary)

pursuing the process of conventional disarmament. The first CFE agreement, when implemented, will have produced conventional force levels in Europe that will enhance stability by eliminating former imbalances and fundamentally reducing capabilities for launching a surprise attack or a large-scale offensive.

Attempts to bring about further reductions in conventional forces in Europe might be affected by the size of armed forces in the neighbouring regions. The Gulf crisis has shown dramatically that an excessive level of conventional armed forces cannot be considered as an internal problem of a given region. We are, of course, aware of the differences in security requirements that exist geographically. Yet it is also true that no region can be isolated from the overall security situation. We do not see why conventional disarmament could not be initiated in regions where massive arms accumulation no longer serves the sole purpose of legitimate self-defence but rather aggressive intent, as evidenced by the tragic invasion of Kuwait last summer.

Regional initiatives are the most promising in the field of conventional disarmament. Experience gained from the implementation of conventional disarmament and confidence-building measures, as well as measures of military openness in certain regions, might also be relevant in a wider context. Sharing information on conventional force levels and measures aimed at reducing them could well help promote the cause of conventional disarmament in different parts of the world. I believe that the Conference on Disarmament could provide a framework for such a wider exchange of relevant information.

In 1990, Hungary provided the participants of the Conference on Disarmament with detailed information on the structure and primary indicators of our military forces, and the significant reductions that have taken place in the Hungarian army, and we also presented a report on our military expenditure. We considered this step an example of our readiness to strengthen the transparency of military affairs and to take voluntary confidence-building measures. It is also evident that arms transfers can have serious implications for conventional disarmament in addition to the effects on stability. The lack of a mechanism to keep track of even legal transactions might provide ideal terrain for an aggressive arms build-up, contributing to the aggravation of the situation. Restraint on the side of suppliers and recipients alike can do a lot to alleviate the problem.

In fact, it was only recently that a seemingly routine arms deal carried out by a Hungarian foreign trading company had an unfortunate impact on bilateral relations with a neighbouring State. The unwelcome outcome of the transaction led to the realization that amidst circumstances of creating a free-market economy and liberalizing trade it is a special responsibility of the Government to step up control over the arms trade, however minor the share it might account for in our economic activities. We are convinced that greater openness and transparency in international conventional arms transfers would have a major role in confidence-building. Adequate national supervision of arms transactions also has a contribution to make. Hungary for its part is ready to co-operate on a bilateral, regional or multilateral level to seek ways and means to tackle the problem.

(Mr. Jeszenszky, Hungary)

Most of the security challenges the world has to face today have manifested themselves strikingly in the Gulf war. These include the menace resulting from nuclear and missile proliferation, the possible use of chemical and biological weapons and the introduction of the ecological weapon.

The issue of ballistic missile capabilities is gaining special relevance today and has implications that go beyond any given region. The deplorable endeavour to escalate the Gulf conflict clearly demonstrated that possession of such military hardware and technology coupled with irresponsible political behaviour could represent a major threat to international security and stability. Important measures have been taken to thwart missile proliferation. The Missile Technology Control Régime or relevant Soviet-American co-operation could be cited as examples. Yet the effectiveness of these steps is somewhat curtailed since they are far from comprehensive. It could be useful to study the possibility of introducing confidence-building measures in addition to the existing régime and taking further steps of openness in order to increase mutual trust and security. This is also a field where the global multilateral approach could contribute to the solution of problems.

The Gulf conflict has brought the problem of nuclear non-proliferation to the centre of attention again. The fourth NPT review conference in 1990 proved that the majority of the international community attached great significance to this issue. However, the fact that the existing régime lacks the adherence of certain States of crucial importance, and that the course of related events is accelerating, suggest that there is a need to establish a framework of contacts with these States. It might be advisable to take this into account when preparing for the next NPT review conference, which will be a milestone in the history of non-proliferation efforts.

I am convinced that the persistent threat of chemical weapons represents one of the major dangers with respect to human suffering. I suppose that many of us here were shocked by the pictures showing the frightening skills children acquired in using gas masks. Surely, none of us would like to create a future where such abilities are a prerequisite of human existence and where mankind has to learn to live under the perilous shadow of chemical weapons.

After more than 20 years of negotiations we need no additional arguments in favour of the early conclusion of the chemical weapons convention. We need action now, decisive and urgent action. This item of the agenda will have to be solved in the near future, despite the obvious fact that answers to major political and technical questions have yet to be found.

For any multilateral disarmament agreement to be viable the widest possible adherence is of crucial importance. In the case of the chemical weapons convention this means the involvement of all States that have declared the possession of chemical weapons and all States that have the technological capability of producing such weapons. In order to achieve the aim of universality the future convention must be attractive in the broadest sense and in no way discriminatory for potential States parties.

(Mr. Jeszenszky, Hungary)

The future multilateral legal instrument should be equitable in terms of rights and obligations of States parties. In the context of the convention, this entails an unconditional rejection of the use of chemical weapons connected to the obligation to destroy existing chemical weapon stockpiles totally.

I would like at this forum to reiterate once again our commitment to the total prohibition of chemical weapons. Hungary is among the States that have declared their intention to become original parties to the chemical weapons convention. My country declared in 1989 its intention to be in full conformity with the main provisions of the convention still being negotiated. In February 1990, as a measure of openness, we provided detailed data on the activities of our chemical industry as required by the draft provisions of the convention. I am pleased to announce that in document CD/1061 we are repeating this declaration and putting forward all the information required under the future convention. We are convinced that this step will contribute to the cause of negotiations, and we would welcome similar confidence-building measures on the part of other negotiating parties as well.

In my understanding current negotiating efforts are aimed at preparing possible solutions for a number of outstanding political issues related to the future chemical weapons convention. This set of solutions in turn could be formalized by the foreign ministers of States represented in the Conference on Disarmament, with the aim of giving a final push towards the successful conclusion of negotiations. I personally would be pleased to come back to the Conference for a ministerial meeting and share the common satisfaction of contributing to the efforts aimed at finalizing the draft convention.

In considering ways and means to preserve the vitality of the Conference on Disarmament, we could perhaps ponder what other issues are to be taken up after the successful termination of negotiations on chemical weapons. It might be deemed timely to initiate informal contacts amongst members of the Conference to probe different ideas. These informal contacts could and should, in due time, lead to wide agreement on relevant and politically feasible measures, however partial they might initially be.

The ideas presented in my statement are not an endeavour to pre-empt too precipitately such a process, but an effort to promote its timely launching. These ideas are not in the least intended to undermine the very important substantive work currently being conducted in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament. Rather, they are meant to highlight the need to preserve the authority of this body by enabling it to face new challenges and helping it to enter into a new phase of its existence. Nature has provided numerous examples proving that inability to adapt to the changing environment is not an advantage in the race for survival, called evolution.

The PRESIDENT: I thank His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary for his important statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I have no other speaker on my list for this plenary meeting. Does any other member wish to take the floor? It seems not.

(The President)

I now turn to another matter. The secretariat has circulated today, at my request, a timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies between today and the end of next week. This timetable is the result of the consultations I held yesterday with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. As usual, it is merely indicative and subject to change, if the need arises. I have agreed with the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies that we should maintain close contact to ensure that the programme of meetings is fulfilled expeditiously. On this understanding, I propose that we now adopt the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Before I adjourn this plenary meeting, I wish to recall that, as announced by my predecessor at the last plenary meeting and as indicated in the timetable, the Conference will hold, tomorrow, Thursday, immediately after the plenary meeting, an informal meeting devoted to the substance of agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

I note that, tomorrow, we shall have a visit from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Uruguay, who is listed as first speaker. I hope therefore that we can start our plenary meeting punctually.

I have no other business for today. I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held tomorrow, Thursday, 21 February, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 10.50 a.m.

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.584  
21 February 1991

ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 21 February 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Carl-Magnus Hyltenius (Sweden)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 584th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

Firstly, I wish to warmly welcome, on behalf of the Conference, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Uruguay, His Excellency Dr. Héctor Gros-Espiell, who will be our first speaker today. The Minister is well known to the Conference, as he has held the position of Secretary-General of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. He has also been active in activities relating to the United Nations, in particular in the field of human rights, and has been Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. He has also held diplomatic positions, having already been Permanent Representative at the United Nations Office at Geneva. And last but not least, he is an outstanding jurist who has an important background as a professor of public international law. I am convinced that his statement will represent a useful contribution to our work.

I have on my list of speakers for today His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Uruguay and the representatives of Brazil and New Zealand. I take pleasure now in giving the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Uruguay, His Excellency Dr. Héctor Gros-Espiell.

Mr. GROS-ESPIELL (Uruguay) (translated from Spanish): Many thanks, Mr. President, for your very kind words and many thanks to the Conference on Disarmament which is receiving me today and is granting me the signal honour of addressing this meeting on behalf of the Government of my motherland. My feelings of appreciation and happiness at being amongst you today are enhanced by the fact that I am speaking in this chamber named after Francisco de Vitoria, surrounded by the magnificent frescoes painted by the great Spanish artist José María Sert, a chamber whose bronze doors are engraved with unforgettable quotations and ideas from the great Spanish jurists and theologians who in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, along with Grotius, embarked on the very difficult task of building international law based on the idea of an international community.

This is the first time that a Minister for Foreign Affairs of Uruguay has spoken at the Conference on Disarmament. I think that the participation of a small country that is not a member of the Conference and is only an observer in the Group of 21 - small, I say, peaceful and law-abiding, whose own security is based on the very notion of collective security, with armed forces in which there is obviously no problem of an arms build-up, and which are limited to the minimum necessary in order to carry out their specific functions - is of special significance. Through it this Conference can hear the voice of a country that is devoted only to law and principles, and this I think is of very special significance, particularly at the present time in the face of current problems. It is clear that there is a very close and intimate relationship between disarmament, arms limitation and control and the concepts of peace and security. But I think that this relationship, which is beyond question and well known to everyone, should be highlighted at the present time, in the situation we are living through, because we have been given the best possible demonstration of the fact that without a process of arms limitation and control genuine peace is impossible.



(Mr. Gros-Espiell, Uruguay)

In the statement I delivered to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 4 October 1990 entitled "The vulnerability of peace without disarmament", I said one or two words that with your permission I would like to repeat again:

"The events in the Persian Gulf remind us of the vulnerability of peace when it is not based on a system of international arms limitation and control, with the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament. Dividing walls may be torn down; ideological confrontations may be mitigated; borders may be opened to communication and trade, the wings of democracy may fly over and destroy anachronistic authoritarian schemes, but no stable security or lasting peace will be attained as long as gigantic arsenals exist all over the world, ready to be used by any arbitrary and aggressive government.

"An armed world, one in which the great and the small furnish themselves with powerful and inhuman instruments of destruction and death, does not provide the proper framework for peace. The events of the Gulf were possible because the States involved thought they were ensuring the effectiveness of their reckless acts through the support of excessive military power, resulting from an uncontrolled arms race.

"The international community must avoid the occurrence of similar dangerous situations in the future. That will be possible only if we accelerate the disarmament process. Uruguay understands that the immediate task is to concentrate on further advancing the regulation and limitation of armaments, whether conventional, nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, radiological or space weapons."

In my brief statement today, it is clear that I cannot, nor should I, seek to deal with all the items, even to say a few words on each of those that are on the agenda of the Conference. I need only refer to one or two of them because of their current significance and the importance my country attaches to them, either because of their general implications or because of their regional aspects.

First of all, therefore, allow me to say a few words on the question of chemical weapons, as it stands today in the view of my Government. We know that from the legal standpoint the present situation on the chemical weapons issue is determined by the existence and applicability of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, a protocol that was supplemented many years later, because this Protocol had emerged from the work of the League of Nations, by the 1972 Convention, drafted within the United Nations and devoted to the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and their destruction. But it is clear that these two international instruments, which are manifestly important and necessarily applicable, do not by any means exhaust the international agenda on the subject of chemical weapons. For that reason the Paris Conference of 1989 on the prohibition of chemical weapons analysed the problem in the light of the present situation, and concluded that it was necessary to expedite this process in order to complete the legal framework of the total ban on all the aspects of the chemical weapons issue.

(Mr. Gros-Espiell, Uruguay)

In this context, the work of the Conference on Disarmament is obviously of great importance, and today is of a topicality and urgency that cannot be ignored by anyone. The Paris Conference, in the year 1989, on the one hand, recognized the importance and continuing validity of the 1925 Protocol, and at it the States parties to that Protocol solemnly reaffirmed the prohibition as established in it and called upon States that have not yet acceded to it to do so, but underscored, and this is what is important, what I wish to emphasize today, the necessity of concluding, at an early date a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction. This is the major challenge we face as far as chemical weapons are concerned at the present time, one that in the light of the current situation it is necessary to expedite with renewed efforts and with sure hopes of arriving as soon as possible at an acceptable solution for the entire international community which will be implemented immediately without fail. In this regard, I wish to refer to the statement by the Group of 21 which was made very recently on 7 February 1991 in the form of an exposé by Peru on behalf of the Group. On this basis, on this awareness of the urgency, the importance, the topicality and this Conference's inescapable commitment to the international community with regard to the chemical weapons issue, my Government hopes that in a short time it will be possible to present this convention that is being so eagerly awaited.

The other item I wished to refer to is the item relating to the arms race in space. The mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and the statement made by Sweden on behalf of the Group of 21 on 14 February last are major steps to permit progress on this topic. Thus both with regard to chemical weapons and on the arms race in outer space, two ad hoc committees are in operation and we hope that in both cases this Conference will be in a position to set an example of swiftness, calm, thorough and practical analysis, in solving these problems.

With regard to the item on nuclear weapons, an item which obviously could not be ignored in the statement I am making in this Conference, I would like to recall the words I spoke on behalf of the Uruguayan Government on 21 August 1990 at the conference to review the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). After analysing what the NPT means with regard to the process that would counter the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and recalling that my country is a party to the non-proliferation Treaty and has always strictly fulfilled its obligations thereunder, I added the following, which I believe must always be borne in mind:

"Is the NPT perhaps the only possible form, the only way to combat and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons? Uruguay considers that the NPT is the most important route or avenue, but that it would be a doubtful claim to assert that it is the sole and exclusive road towards the objective of non-proliferation. Non-proliferation is not limited to the NPT. It also has its basis in the treaties under which nuclear-weapon-free zones have been established in inhabited regions of the globe. I am referring to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga. But although non-proliferation is the common aim of these treaties and those which may be concluded in the future to establish new nuclear-weapon-free zones and the NPT, it cannot be denied that those

(Mr. Gros-Espiell, Uruguay)

agreements do not have - that is to say, the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga - the premonitory element that some States find in the NPT, as they draw no distinction between States parties in relation to the prohibition on supplying, producing, importing or using nuclear weapons."

Two zones free of nuclear weapons exist in the world today, fully in force and of relative applicability: the zone created by the Treaty of Tlatelolco in Latin America and the zone created by the Treaty of Rarotonga in the South Pacific. Their importance is obvious. With regard to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, my country has always been concerned, with a concern that still applies fully, to help to achieve the full and total application of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, so that it covers the entire geographical area described in article 4 of the Treaty. Consequently, in the statement I delivered at the NPT review conference and to which I have already referred, I said in that regard:

"Uruguay, which is a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, is making every effort to promote texts relating to this Treaty that will enable Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Cuba to become parties to it, and secure their adoption in due course. As is well known, Argentina has signed but not ratified, Brazil and Chile have ratified, but without the waiver provided for under article 28, paragraph 2, and Cuba has not yet signed. Uruguay, which nurtures the wish that the whole of Latin America will be free of nuclear weapons, which will not be achieved until these four States, which are not parties to the NPT, enter into the Tlatelolco system, is preparing on the basis of consultations a number of texts that will enable these four sister countries to join the regional non-proliferation régime."

Subsequently to that month of August 1990, major events took place which it is necessary to mention. The Declaration of Foz do Iguaçu drafted on 28 November 1990 by Presidents Menem and Collor of Argentina and Brazil respectively marked an extremely important step forward towards the possibility that these two sister countries will become full parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Immediately after the Declaration of Foz do Iguaçu, Uruguay contacted the Governments of Argentina and Brazil to express its satisfaction and its whole-hearted readiness to co-operate with them in order to attain the objectives set forth in that Declaration and in this connection I would also like to recall that in the weeks following that Declaration of November 1990 Chile officially expressed its wish to participate in a process that would make it possible to arrive at the moment to present the waiver in question. As for Cuba, Uruguay has been carrying out sustained diplomatic efforts, through direct contacts between the Foreign Ministries of Cuba and Uruguay, in an endeavour to co-operate to the utmost with a view to the desirable ultimate objective that Cuba too will become a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. We hope that this open process, an important part of which will unfold in the coming weeks in Vienna with regard to the contacts that are being made by Argentina and Brazil in this regard, will be successful and that we will have very good news soon.

Another subject I would like to mention is the relationship which cannot be denied, and I think that present events point to this ever more clearly, the close and necessary relationship between the problems of arms limitation

(Mr. Gros-Espiell, Uruguay)

and control and international humanitarian law. In our view it is necessary to prevent disarmament negotiations from being a closed preserve, a dialogue between political specialists on disarmament without any contacts with public opinion or with the progress and development of the remainder of international law. In this connection I think that the Convention of 10 April 1981 on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects is an example. Although this Convention was drawn up in a special United Nations conference on prohibitions or restrictions of use of weapons and not within this Conference, it is an example of the relationship, the parallelism, between the problems of arms limitation and international humanitarian law. The Convention to which I have just referred is not strictly speaking a disarmament convention, but it is one lato sensu, as is indicated by its inclusion in the United Nations book on the status of multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements.

I also wish to say a very few words on the relationship between the processes of arms limitation and regulation in the light of disarmament and the protection of the environment, the basic issue of the present day. The relationship between these two concepts is clear, and if we do not develop an appropriate and rational process of limitation and regulation of arms build-ups, if we do not properly tackle the question of nuclear tests and nuclear explosions, then we will be contributing to the dreadful problem of the deterioration of the environment. The Convention of 10 April 1972 on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques is an example, a first step towards using treaties to handle this relationship between two issues of vital importance for the future of mankind. But this is a convention that deals with only one aspect of the problem, having been drawn up in 1972. Since then 18 years have passed, and today the problem of environmental protection has acquired a seriousness and urgency and a pressing need for solutions which goes beyond what could have been imagined at that time. This means, in my view and in the view of the Government of Uruguay, that we must tackle this problem head-on, and that the issue must be dealt with in a frank and thorough manner at the Conference on Environment and Development which is to be held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.

Finally, I wish to point to the importance my country attaches to the participation of the Latin American countries as observers in the Conference on Disarmament - Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica and Uruguay - and reiterate once again their full support for the views that were set forth in the document of 15 February 1991. These countries wish to co-operate in the work of the Group of 21, and I think that the importance of this participation is obvious. There is a projection and necessary understanding on the part of these observer countries that wish to attend the proceedings of the Conference on Disarmament as a means of contributing, although they are not members of the Conference, to progress and forward movement on this issue which is essential for the survival of mankind itself at this very critical time for the entire world.

My thanks once again, and I would like to reiterate not only the great personal honour for me to be able to address you, but also Uruguay's whole-hearted calling to contribute to the success of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. RICUPERO (Brazil) (translated from Spanish): The privilege of speaking immediately after Minister Gros-Espiell enables me to emphasize the significance and inspiration of the views we have just heard, enriched not only by the moral authority of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of a country with such an impeccable tradition where peace, security and international co-operation are concerned, but also by a lifetime of study, labour and personal dedication to the cause of disarmament.

(continued in English)

Mr. President, it is an honour and a pleasure for me to be among the first to address to you our congratulations on the presidency that we are sure will greatly benefit from the same quality of competence, balance and search for compromise that have so outstandingly distinguished your recent chairmanship of the Committee on Chemical Weapons. Our words of appreciation and praise go also to Ambassador Rasaputram, whose tireless energy and thoughtful diplomatic efforts have created the necessary conditions for the programme of work for the present session of the Conference. Finally, let me add my voice to those who expressed feelings of sadness for the departure of so many remarkable colleagues in recent months, as well as my welcome greetings and best wishes to the new representatives who have joined our common endeavour.

In continuation and confirmation of a practice recently established, it gives me special satisfaction to take the floor on behalf not only of the Government of Brazil, but also of the Government of Argentina, to provide this session with information on recent developments in our nuclear co-operation. One of the approaches being developed by both countries to support the bilateral process of integration is the strengthening of confidence-building mechanisms by means of stable and broadened co-operation. This effort has led to a number of concrete achievements.

Less than three months ago Presidents Fernando Collor and Carlos Menem signed a Declaration on Common Nuclear Policy in the border town of Foz do Iguaçu. Ambassador García Moritán and I have been instructed to request that it be distributed as a document of this Conference.

Dr. Hans Blix, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and Dr. Antonio Stempel Paris, Secretary-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, attended the Foz do Iguaçu ceremony as special guests. On that occasion, a time frame for the implementation of important objectives of our nuclear policies was established by the two Presidents, aiming at the adoption of a common nuclear material accounting and control system, to be applied to all nuclear activities in both countries; the negotiation with the International Atomic Energy Agency of a joint safeguards agreement, on the basis of the common accounting and control system; and the adoption of initiatives to facilitate at a later stage the entry into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the political objectives of which are fully shared by our two countries.

The decisions for short-term implementation then taken have already been substantively carried out, including the exchange of descriptive lists of nuclear facilities; the exchange of declarations on the initial inventories of nuclear materials; and the first reciprocal inspections of the centralized register systems.

(Mr. Ricupero, Brazil)

The next step, to take place shortly, is the presentation of the International Atomic Energy Agency of the register and reporting system which is part of the common accounting and control system. As the name suggests, it consists of common procedures for accounting, registering, reporting and inspection, which will guarantee each party systematic access to all the nuclear facilities of the other party and keep track of all nuclear materials in both countries. Having established the procedures for accounting, registering and reporting, experts from both countries are now developing the inspection mechanisms.

Under previous declarations Brazil and Argentina had already set up the structure within which technical and industrial co-operation would take place between the two countries. A protocol was concluded allowing for increased industrial complementarity in the construction of the Atucha II and Angra II nuclear power plants. The Permanent Committee on Common Nuclear Policy has been meeting for about two years now and will continue to meet alternately in Argentina and Brazil to assess technical co-operation and set guidelines and co-ordinate positions to be followed in international forums dedicated to nuclear energy and nuclear disarmament.

Openness and transparency are key elements of the nuclear co-operation between Brazil and Argentina. Confidence-building in the nuclear field can be more easily achieved by means of close technical and political co-operation. Thus, the common mechanisms and procedures which are being followed by our Governments are a natural outcome of broad, stable and intimate co-operation encompassing all fields. They constitute a logical corollary of that co-operation.

In the case of Argentina and Brazil the "trust and verify" principle has acquired a more wholesome and gratifying expression. Our experience in the field of nuclear co-operation has taught us that "trust and verify" should not be systematically inverted to "verify and trust". Undoubtedly, inspections are crucial and indispensable, but in the absence of the desirable political conditions they may not be enough to reduce or eliminate mistrust and suspicion.

The joint safeguards agreement to be concluded by Brazil and Argentina with the International Atomic Energy Agency will be based on the common accounting and control system and will provide all the information needed to secure the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in both countries, while respecting Argentina's and Brazil's right to develop nuclear technology without undue restrictions, and protecting the confidential information of a technological and industrial nature acquired in the process. The agreement will also have to be compatible with the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

The third step approved in the Declaration of Foz do Iguaçu relates to the updating and improvement of the text of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, particularly those articles detailing verification and compliance procedures. The adjustments concern the need to harmonize the provisions aimed at defining the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with the need to preserve confidential information of a technological and industrial nature.

(Mr. Ricupero, Brazil)

The Governments of Argentina and Brazil believe that the Treaty of Tlatelolco thus updated needs to be accorded due recognition, and that it should come into force as soon as possible for all Latin American countries and for all the States referred to in Protocols I and II. We continue to consider the Treaty of Tlatelolco the appropriate instrument to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Latin America, a goal which it has in fact achieved since its conclusion in 1967.

We hope our nuclear co-operation will encourage others to intensify their negotiations aimed at substantially reducing their existing nuclear arsenals, thus opening the way for further negotiations with the constructive participation of all nuclear-weapon States.

In concluding my remarks, I wish to state that the Governments of Brazil and Argentina share the perception that they have already achieved an important objective: the consolidation of a constructive approach towards nuclear security through nuclear co-operation. An approach which tends to be at the same time more amenable and more effective. Nevertheless, we expect more of our initiative. We hope this positive approach can serve as an example for the encouragement and reinforcement of regional and global security.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Brazil for his statement and for the very kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of New Zealand, Ambassador Hannah.

Mr. HANNAH (New Zealand): Let me begin by congratulating you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the Conference on Disarmament presidency for the next four weeks. Sweden and New Zealand have many shared views on disarmament and international security issues. You can be assured of our support during your presidency. We, for our part, are confident that the momentum of the Conference will be strengthened by your personal contribution in the position.

I should also like to pay my respects to my neighbour on the non-members' bench today, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Uruguay, His Excellency Dr. Héctor Gros-Espiell. I followed his thought-provoking statement with great interest. So, too, the statement of the distinguished Ambassador of Brazil, speaking on behalf of his own country and Argentina.

My statement this morning is devoted entirely to the subject of chemical weapons. Specifically, I wish to place before the CD the report of New Zealand's national trial inspection, contained in document CD/1057. Before doing so, however, I would like to make a few general comments on the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention - at this moment the prime focus of the work of this Conference.

New Zealand does not have, and has never had chemical weapons. We do not allow chemical weapons to be stationed on our territory. We are party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and in 1989 we withdrew our reservation to that Protocol which permitted the use of chemical weapons under certain circumstances. We took that step because the New Zealand Government does not now see any circumstances where the use of chemical weapons would be tolerable.

(Mr. Hannah, New Zealand)

The possibility that chemical weapons might be used in the Gulf war is of immediate concern. That threat confirms our belief in the need for a convention going far beyond the Geneva Protocol, one which effectively prohibits the development, production, stockpiling as well as the use of chemical weapons. That threat should strengthen the resolve of all of us to conclude such a convention as soon as possible.

It is against such a background that New Zealand's support for a chemical weapons convention should be seen. New Zealand is not a key participant in the negotiations. We have only a fledgling chemical industry and are unable to muster the technical expertise shared by so many here in this room. But we are following the negotiations closely. Our aim is that, once the chemical weapons convention is concluded, New Zealand will have the necessary legislation in place to become an original party. Others have already expressed a similar aim, and we hope many more will do likewise as the negotiations enter their concluding phase.

New Zealand is under no illusions that there still remain crucial political obstacles to be overcome before a chemical weapons convention becomes a reality. We accept that some of those may be beyond the scope of this body. That is why we support the idea of a ministerial conference, later this year, where the necessary political decisions might be taken. It goes without saying that such a conference should be open to all - CD members and non-members alike - who share our common interest in a chemical weapons convention. It is only through universal adherence that the chemical weapons convention will achieve its objective of ensuring that such weapons will never again be used anywhere on this Earth.

My Government's support for the conclusion of a comprehensive, effective, and verifiable chemical weapons convention is shared by the New Zealand chemical industry. As a measure of this support, Government and industry worked together to undertake a national trial inspection in November 1990.

As I have noted, New Zealand has only a small chemical industry, and limited technical resources at its disposal. We are not alone in that. Through discussion at regional meetings we are aware of the burden other small countries believe they will face in implementing the chemical weapons convention. One objective of our trial inspection was therefore to determine how the lessons learned from earlier inspections were applicable to those with more modest chemical industries. Bearing in mind our limited technical resources, a second objective was to examine the auditing aspect of an inspection, both as an independent measure of verification, and in its relationship to scientific monitoring.

The inspection we undertook was conducted at a multi-purpose complex of an agricultural chemical company that produces mainly herbicides. It is the largest of only a few chemical manufacturers in New Zealand. It does not produce any chemicals currently listed under schedule 2 of the "rolling text". For the purposes of the inspection, therefore, para-chloro-ortho-cresol (PCOC) was treated as a schedule 2 chemical. The declared activity at the plant during the inspection was the production of the herbicide sodium 4-chloro-2-methyl phenoxybutyrate (MCPB).



(Mr. Hannah, New Zealand)

The report of the trial inspection is contained in CD/1057. I will restrict my comments today to the two specific objectives mentioned earlier. The inspection demonstrated that commercial practices in today's chemical industry give rise to a myriad of overlapping records that can be audited as a means of verifying legitimate chemical production. The trial inspection clearly showed the effectiveness as a verification tool of a detailed financial and production records audit.

An audit of financial records was undertaken in addition to a production records audit to verify declared activities over an extended period of time (which a site inspection may not be certain to identify). The financial records audit also provided a thorough cross-check of production records in the event of a fraudulent dual accounting system (which we thought would most likely occur in the production domain). The independence of both recording systems provides extensive opportunity for the detection of undeclared activity, and should not be underplayed.

Although relatively straightforward, the records and production audit proved to be the most time-consuming aspect of the trial inspection. In undertaking the audit, a five-point strategy was adopted: (i) preliminary evaluation; (ii) production analysis and evaluation; (iii) financial substantive testing evaluation; (iv) internal control (compliance testing) evaluation; and (v) analytical review evaluation. This strategy, together with a list of documentation required for a production and financial records audit, is detailed in the annex to the report.

It was found that to undertake a records audit an inspector needed experience in both commercial auditing and management/cost accounting from a manufacturing background. A minimum of six to nine working days (depending on the complexities of the operation and number of independent processes) was necessary to complete an audit.

Looking more generally at the resource implications, the trial inspection reinforced for us the lesson that even for a modest chemical industrial facility subject to routine inspection procedures, a high degree of technical instrumentation and a wide variety of skills are needed to properly verify legitimate chemical industry activity. Physical inspection, financial and production records audit, and sample analysis are all essential ingredients of an effective inspection régime.

In undertaking such an exercise New Zealand used the full extent of its technical and scientific capability. It is our view that the resources required to attain such a capability are beyond the scope of many countries and that, accordingly, such countries are likely to face difficulties in meeting chemical weapons convention obligations. Granted the burden of routine and challenge inspections will fall not upon individual Governments, but upon the technical secretariat. But even so, the requirement to establish national authorities with the kind of capabilities I have just listed will not be easy for many.

In its conclusion, the New Zealand report identifies two possible ways to help overcome such difficulties. Firstly, countries need to review the technical/legal/scientific resources their regions possess, and the potential for regional co-operation in implementing the convention. Secondly,

(Mr. Hannah, New Zealand)

development at an early stage of a flexible but standardized methodology of key audit and inspection approaches would be desirable. This would ensure compatibility of inspection treatments, streamlined and effective techniques, and prior determination and preparation of the human resources and equipment required.

Since our inspection report was prepared, we have had the opportunity to study your own delegation's paper, CD/1053, which proposes ways of streamlining schedule 2 inspections. When you introduced that paper at last week's meeting, you expressed some doubts about the cost-effectiveness of schedule 2 verification in the draft convention. We share those concerns and, on the basis of our own experience, are particularly aware of the potential for a verification régime to overburden the national authorities of smaller would-be States parties. We look forward to the proposals in CD/1053 being closely examined by the Ad Hoc Committee.

Unless individual States are confident of their own ability to implement relevant aspects of the chemical weapons convention, there cannot be the necessary international confidence in the convention as a whole. The New Zealand experience is that, for many countries, there will be practical constraints quite different in nature from those facing the major players in the negotiations. We all need to keep these constraints in mind as we begin what all hope will be the year in which a chemical weapons convention is concluded.

I thank the members of the Conference and yourself, Mr. President, for hearing out a rather technical intervention, and I hope it is of assistance to the deliberations on the chemical weapons convention.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of New Zealand for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other representative wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none.

May I now turn to another subject? You will recall that, at our plenary meeting yesterday, I informed you of my intention to identify a Special Co-ordinator who would be charged with seeking consensus on an appropriate organizational arrangement for agenda item 8, entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament". I am pleased to report to you that my consultations have now been concluded and that I am appointing Ambassador Marín Bosch of Mexico as Special Co-ordinator for this agenda item. I am grateful to Ambassador Marín Bosch for having accepted this responsibility, and I am sure that he will discharge it with his usual diplomatic competence.

As indicated in our timetable of meetings, immediately after this plenary meeting the Conference will hold an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 2, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

I have no further business today and I shall now proceed to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 28 February at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.05 a.m.

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