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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND NINETY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 25 June 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Stephen J. Ledogar (United States of America)

GE.91-61467/3310B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 597th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the beginning of the presidency of the United States of America, I should like to make a brief opening statement.

Though my accession to this office is due only to accidents of timing and alphabet, it is nevertheless a high honour for me, as head of the United States delegation, to assume the presidency of this Conference. I am well aware of the importance of the job, and of its difficulties. I shall spare neither time nor effort in carrying out the tasks of this office, and I'll do my level best to keep these efforts clearly separate from my national responsibilities.

Before proceeding further, I take this opportunity to pay tribute to all of the distinguished persons who have served as President before me this year. Each has provided diligent and effective direction to the work of this body. As thee place of the United Kingdom delegation again starts its six-year circuit around this quadrangle, I would like especially to offer the congratulations and thanks of my delegation to my colleague, Ambassador Solesby of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, for her outstanding work as President of the Conference during the past four weeks. We have all appreciated the intelligent and impartial manner in which she discharged her duties, as well as her strenuous efforts to advance our work - efforts which she has modestly characterized as minor adjustments to the auto-pilot controls. For all of her achievements we are profoundly grateful.

It has been pointed out to me that I come to this job at an easy time in the cycle. The committees of the Conference are in place and operating as smoothly as possible. Informal discussions on agenda items 2 and 3 are also being held on a regular basis, and yet report-writing doesn't begin until after I turn over the gavel to Ambassador Arteaga on 11 August. But, perhaps a few things can be accomplished while I'm here. On the subject of expansion of membership, I have asked Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan, and he has kindly agreed, to work with me in conducting private consultations with individual members and groups within the framework of the CD President's consultations, where all are represented. We will place special emphasis on trying to find a formula for expansion within the structural framework identified for us by previous CD Presidents this year.

I'm not partial to long introductory statements by new CD Presidents. I will allow myself just a few personal words on this occasion. The Conference on Disarmament is comprised of a group of States from all over the world whose representatives come together to consider issues and to negotiate agreements. It is the only negotiating forum where, on the basis of equality in voice, such a group of States, regardless of their military potential, their economic prowess, or their geographical size meet to come to grips with urgent security problems of our times. Each and every State can make a significant contribution to the efforts to achieve arms control and disarmament. We seek to serve the objectives of international peace and security. We do so in a world which, thankfully, has been spared the agony of a global conflict for nearly a half-century. Yet out world has, sadly enough, witnessed a

(The President)

continuation of suffering, destruction and death in numerous violent regional and internal conflicts during this period. It is a matter of great importance, therefore, that this Conference address the urgent issues on its agenda. As numerous speakers before me have already recalled, of utmost urgency is a total ban on chemical weapons.

As you know, at the beginning of this session the United States set forth some new elements in the approach it wishes to take in pursuit of a chemical weapons ban. In the process we reversed two major, long-held United States positions which most of you had identified as obstacles to progress. We didn't bargain for their removal; President Bush swept them away unconditionally. His purpose was to strengthen the prospects for a successful and speedy conclusion of a chemical weapons convention. In the weeks that followed I've sensed a new spirit of optimism and challenge in this body. We do have a very large task ahead of us, but with the will to succeed we will succeed. The chemical weapons convention will be concluded in 1992 and we will proceed to destroy these terrible weapons which threaten all mankind.

I believe we can help make our world a better place. Let us, then, continue our work in a new spirit, with a willingness to listen to, and to learn from, each other, and with a commitment to nothing less than success.

Finally, I would like to express my greetings to the Secretary-General of the Conference and Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ambassador Miljan Komatina, to Ambassador Vicente Berasategui, the Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, and to members of the President's bureau. And I thank them in advance for the invaluable assistance I know we will receive from them.

That concludes my statement. I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of Spain and Canada. I would now like to give the floor to the representative of Spain, Ambassador Pérez-Villanueva.

Mr. PEREZ-VILLANUEVA (Spain) (translated from Spanish): It is a real honour and a pleasure for me to meet Ambassador Ledogar once again as President of this Conference after having had an opportunity personally to witness his professional skill and negotiating ability in Vienna some time ago when he and I participated in the conventional disarmament talks that were then just beginning and would later, as you all know, become crystallized in the agreement on conventional forces in Europe. Allow me therefore, as I begin my statement, to congratulate you and offer you my delegation's best wishes at the beginning of your term in the very important post it falls to you to occupy at a particularly interesting and intensely active time in the life of the Conference on Disarmament. I am sure that during your term as President, benefiting from your drive and guidance, pursuing the path taken by your immediate and illustrious predecessors, Ambassador Solesby and Ambassador Batsanov, this forum will make definite progress on the many outstanding questions in each of the committees, and especially the committee dealing with chemical weapons. I followed with great attention your very interesting statements on the inauguration of your presidency, and I think

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that your remarks on beginning your term are highly appropriate for tackling the problem of expanding the membership of the Conference. I will refer to them later. Thank you, therefore, to you and Ambassador Kamal.

We were talking about a particularly interesting period in the Conference on Disarmament and in the international context in which we are operating. There are events, and changes, taking place in the international scene today that for most part give us hope and in any event are of great interest. On 29 May of this year, the President of the United States announced a series of proposals for controlling the spread of nuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons in the Middle East, proposals that you yourself, Mr. President, presented in this room. The initiative seeks to curb the proliferation of missiles and the destabilizing conventional arms race in that region of the world. Spain welcomes this United States initiative, through which an attempt might be made to bring military arsenals into line with the real defensive requirements of States in a particularly sensitive region. More recently, the President of France also proposed a global arms control plan while announcing his country's decision of principle to accede to the NPT. Spain applauds this decision, which will most certainly help to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and will undoubtedly set an example for other countries that have yet to join. The measures proposed by France and presented to this Conference recently by Ambassador Errera are very much in line with the Spanish position, especially in so far as their underlying philosophy is concerned (the need to promote regional and global stability through arms control and non-proliferation) as well as the instruments it suggests (universalization of the NPT and the MTCR, speeding up of the CW negotiations in Geneva, etc.). Spain believes, Mr. President, that your country's initiative as well as that of France are particularly timely as the Gulf crisis has dramatically highlighted the consequences of excessive arms accumulation in an especially unstable region. Specifically with regard to the expectations surrounding the Conference on Disarmament, we welcome with special satisfaction the initiative you recently presented on behalf of President Bush substantially modifying the United States position on certain outstanding obstacles in the chemical weapons Committee. This change in your country's negotiating position is most gratifying and will undoubtedly give a substantial stimulus to the negotiating process towards a convention.

The situation in the Conference on Disarmament in the short and medium term gives urgency to the task of reflecting on its immediate future - a task that has already been tackled by some delegations in this plenary, and one in which my delegation would now like to join, thus playing a part in harnessing the momentum given to this forum by the expected conclusion within the next 12 months of a convention eliminating an entire category of weapons. That success, which will certainly be achieved, should pave the way towards a greater and better use of the resources of this Conference and the institution in itself as the international community's sole forum for disarmament negotiations.

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We are not lacking in subjects that could be used to update our agenda, and specifically it might be useful for this assembly to benefit from the experience that some of the countries participating in it as full members or simple observers have acquired in, for example, security-building and confidence-building measures, or regional disarmament. In spite of recent fierce war crises, the future gives grounds for hope, and we think that the necessary conditions exist for the international community to take the right path towards better coexistence and the replacement of confrontation by cooperation. In this favourable climate I am certain that together we will be able to forge a future using our Conference on Disarmament in a way that will enable everyone to benefit fully. Mr. President, you may count on the support and cooperation of my delegation at all times and as far as we are able.

For several years now the participating countries, be they full members or observers in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, have been staging trials applying the rules that the chemical weapons convention will soon lay down for the different types of inspection it is likely to establish. The carrying out of trial inspections has become a praiseworthy and particularly intensive tradition in the last few years. These national trial inspections have several aims, generally seeking to check the feasibility of the inspection provisions in the draft text of the convention, and at the same time to determine the degree of preparedness and awareness of governments as well as private chemical industry and the armed forces with regard to the forthcoming application of the convention on the total prohibition of the production, development, use and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

Spain, wishing, in keeping with government policy in this area, to contribute actively to the attainment of an effective and verifiable convention, has carried out a national trial inspection, in the form of a routine inspection, the results of which appear in the report that I am pleased to present today to this Conference (CD/1082). The carrying out of the national trial inspection had a dual purpose: the immediate purpose of making a direct contribution on the part of my country to the negotiations being held in Geneva, and indirectly but no less importantly, to set in motion a mechanism for raising awareness in the public and private sector in Spain about the implications for either side that will undoubtedly stem from the entry into force of the convention.

Systematic contacts were held among the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Federation of Spanish Chemical Industries and some companies of special importance in the Spanish chemical industry before the trial inspection was carried out. The task in the first stage was to up-date information on the Spanish chemical sector and at the same time lay the foundations of what will shortly become the national authority under the convention. These initial contacts proved very useful, firstly in identifying the general features of the company to be chosen for the trial inspections, and secondly in establishing smoother relations between the authorities and the private sector in this field. In subsequent meetings the specific programme of activities was prepared and tasks were allotted to all the agencies and experts directly or indirectly involved in the operation.

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My country obtained important information as a direct result of the inspection, particularly with regard to its limits and the benefits of the inspection system. First of all, on-site inspection is an essential element for verification of a chemical weapons convention. Moreover, in this instance inspection is feasible, for as our experience has shown, it is possible to find a way to respect the company's confidentiality concerns without diminishing the effectiveness of the inspectors' task. Cooperation between the company and the inspection team is also extremely important. And lastly, it is very useful to schedule the "field" inspection in the industrial plant itself simultaneously with the inspection of the administrative and commercial machinery, which, as has been shown by experience in many other countries, in addition to Spanish experience, will be longer and more complex than the former, in most cases. Through this exercise Spain reaffirmed its belief that inspection in its different forms, as a right and as a duty, is the only element which can fully guarantee the security of the countries that are parties to the future convention. In this instance, Spain tested the system established for routine inspection of a large industrial chemical plant. My Government also plans to stage a trial inspection on request, if time allows, jointly with another country participating in this Conference. And this is my Government's intention because, considering the experience acquired through the trial routine inspection, the importance of including inspection on request or challenge inspection in our future convention with no restrictions other than purely technical ones has become even more evident. An inspection of this kind, for which there is no substitute in terms of political value, should be accepted without preconceived restrictions, conditions or limitations on the understanding that it is possible to strike a balance between the company's legitimate concerns, the unrenounceable right to secrecy in defence matters and the aim of the inspection itself, whose benefits are well worth a major effort.

I am pleased to be able to announce to you today that, as regards chemical weapons, and more specifically the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphixiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, my Government is undertaking a detailed study on the possibility of the early withdrawal of the reservations made by my country to the text of the Protocol, to which it acceded in the summer of 1929. Spain would thus renounce the use of chemical weapons erga omnes and therefore also the right of reprisals in kind. I hope to make an official statement on this matter very soon.

On 3 April 1990 the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs in his first statement to this Conference on Disarmament in its entire history, referred, inter alia, to an aspect that is of particular concern to Spain, all the more so at this time when security arrangements in the world are changing and are being restructured. I am referring to the expansion of the membership of the Conference, on which Mr. Fernández Ordóñez said that there was no doubt that in the current international situation, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva had acquired essential importance and responsibility as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating organ in the United Nations system. In that context, he fully supported the efforts of the Conference and for that reason, and since Spain had been actively participating for years as an observer, he

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trusted that Spain would be able to become a full member as soon as possible so that it could contribute to its work more and in a more effective way. In the preceding years, the process of expansion of the number of full members of the Conference had been blocked. That had prevented the entry of countries which, like Spain, had on numerous occasions shown, as they continued to show day by day, their interest in contributing constructively and effectively to the disarmament process.

As far back as 1979 the principle that the Conference should periodically review its membership was adopted, following which the decision was taken in 1982 to actually expand the Conference in a limited fashion. The system for allocating the four seats that were approved in 1983 for expanding the membership of the Conference was established in 1986, and from then up to the present, partly because of difficulties encountered in the nomination of candidates, and partly for political reasons that are perhaps less clear, the Conference has not only retained its numerus clausus but has even lost one of its members, though admittedly for very unusual reasons. This sequence of events is well known and in recent months has frequently been referred to in this very room as the expression of growing concern over a situation that has already lasted too long.

Allow me to make a few remarks on this subject. The assumptions on the basis of which the Conference on Disarmament was established, including its different forms and titles, have radically changed. This organ is no longer called upon to promote, in an almost exclusively bilateral manner, disarmament agreements between two militarily and ideologically irreconcilable blocs with the help of a group of States not officially belonging to either of those two groups. In 1978 it was laid down in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly that what was then known as the Committee on Disarmament was to become a multilateral negotiating body, and this is the universally acknowledged status of the Conference on Disarmament, its successor since 1984. Paragraph 28 of that same document lays down that all States have the duty to contribute to and the right to participate in disarmament efforts, and, as a logical consequence, paragraph 120 enshrines the principle of regular increases in the membership of the Committee. Hence even at that time the organ of which our Conference is a direct descendant came into being with aspirations to universality, which for the moment are being frustrated by the passage of time, with no solutions being found to the expansion problem. If the situation is no longer what it was then, when the purposes and rules of procedure for this negotiating organ were established at its inception, and if the plans for expansion set forth by the General Assembly at that time have not been carried out, we must conclude that the Conference on Disarmament's mode of representation today is neither the most appropriate nor does it accurately correspond to a political scene that differs substantially from that which prevailed at the end of the 1970s. In a word, we think that all those that are here should be here, but that not all that should be here in the Conference on Disarmament are here.

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In these circumstances, and in a well-intentioned effort to overcome the difficulties caused by the deadlock on the expansion of the Conference on Disarmament for so long for those States that aspire to become full members, we have applied for all these years the formula already set out in articles 32 to 36 in section IX of the Committee's rules of procedure and in paragraphs 120 (g) and (h) of the Final Document itself. I am referring of course to participation in the negotiations by non-member States at their request. In our judgement this formula is a palliative which, though obviously useful for observer States - and Spain has been making use of it all this time thanks to the generosity of the member States - clearly is not a complete substitute for full membership status. Naturally it is very useful because it allows for inputs of points of view, experience and suggestions, as well as all kinds of observations, from outside the Conference, so to speak, on the subjects under discussion within it. But the formula is inadequate because two important factors operate in the way the Conference on Disarmament works: views relating to the actual security of States, a subject that the work in the Committee relates to almost exclusively, and the rule of decision-making by consensus, which derives from the sovereign equality of the participants. Thus, the Conference on Disarmament deals with subjects that are particularly deeply rooted in the concept of national sovereignty, on which any deal reached is complex and must be reflected upon and weighed carefully, in full knowledge of the responsibility being assumed. It is therefore only natural that decisions should be taken by consensus, implying the right of veto, which is the very right that observers lack. And in my opinion this is the feature that defines observer status. This aside, there is very little difference in the modus operandi of observers and members in everyday practice, thanks to the generous disposition of the member countries of the Conference on Disarmament. But fundamentally, because of this lack of a right of veto, because of this different and important legal status of the observer, his contributions to the Conference can only be considered secondary, strictly speaking, since it will be up to the full members to decide whether or not they will be taken into account. Thus, given that the observer cannot assert his views during the negotiations, at the time of acceding to the result of those negotiations, his national concerns, his own views, which are legitimate and worthy of respect, can only be expressed in the form of reservations to the text being signed, which - still purely within a theoretical framework - has negative repercussions for the country in question and for the entire international community. This state of affairs ultimately leads to the conclusion, in our view, that the status of what is known as an observer country is not sufficient, especially bearing in mind that the aim of negotiations is as important as ours is here and now, in this Conference and in the present historical circumstances.

The need to ensure effectiveness in the negotiations by keeping the number of full members limited is sometimes advanced as an argument in favour of maintaining the status quo and the present membership of the Conference on Disarmament at least for the time being. A conference open to everyone, giving full access to all the elements of the international community, would soon become a forum for theoretical rather than practical debate, in which the almost infinite diversity of views would cripple the consensus on concrete documents dealing with specific topics - this has often been said. In our

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opinion, the equation deliberative forum = large assembly, negotiating forum = body with limited membership is not automatically true. In fact, we think that the argument in favour of effectiveness in the negotiations through limited participation, which is generally valid, in this instance comes up against two nuances, one theoretical, the other practical. The former has to do with the reality, which I have already mentioned, of the necessary and confirmed universal character of the Conference on Disarmament. The latter has to do with a simple observation that for the moment not all the member countries of the United Nations have applied for membership in the Conference on Disarmament, even as participating non-members (though there is one well-known applicant that is still not a Member of the United Nations). The figures are truly significant. Perhaps, therefore, the difficulty the expansion would pose might not really be so great in diminishing the negotiating efficiency of an assembly that already has 39 members.

In his statement to this assembly last year, the Foreign Minister also said he was convinced that a step towards the expansion of the Conference would give a vital boost to the disarmament negotiations and help to ensure universal endorsement of any disarmament agreements that might be adopted within the Conference, that being a problem which would sooner or later have to be faced by a Conference on Disarmament restricted, as currently, to a limited number of members. As can be inferred from these words, the longed-for universal accession to these legal instruments that are taking shape in this field is a thought-provoking subject in relation to the membership of the Conference and access to it. According to all indications, and as evidenced by the wishes expressed by many delegations in this very plenary and by the progress in the negotiations, we are on the verge of reaping the fruit of a long and difficult task in concluding a chemical weapons convention, thus taking a truly historic step in the recent arms control and disarmament processes.

One of the basic components of a convention of this kind is of course accession by the widest possible number of parties, which will satisfactorily guarantee the security of all and compensate for the sacrifices made by the signatories. Therefore, it seems somewhat contradictory to wish for the widest accession to the chemical weapons convention, as is indeed logical, while at the same time limiting access to the forum in which it is negotiated. Spain has repeatedly declared its firm resolve to sign the chemical weapons convention as soon as it is open for signature, but on the other hand somewhat regrets that this is the only course fully consistent with its status as a sovereign country that my country can follow in the immediate foreseeable future since, as has been stated, its participation in the negotiating process is limited. The fact that Spain is not yet a member of the Conference on Disarmament, despite its reiterated interest over the years, does not alter the basic political decision on the chemical weapons convention or any other that may be negotiated in this field and is in keeping with Spain's security interests and those of its friends and allies. There remains, however, the possibility that this contradiction to which we referred earlier may become a deep rift in the normative system which the Conference on Disarmament intends to present to the international community, and this rift, which will never be

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exploited by Spain, will certainly be exploited by those that are already looking for its weaknesses and the means to evade the objectives of a future chemical weapons convention.

It goes without saying that if the Conference's aim is to negotiate legal instruments for the international community, neither will benefit in any way from restricted access to the institution for some members of that community, and even less so for an apparently indefinite period of time. Spain is a country, though of course not the only one, whose continued presence in the ranks of mere observers in this room and in this Conference cannot but cause a certain surprise. As a part, and a very active and staunch part, in a solid framework, of all kinds of mutual interests with like-minded countries in its geographical region and outside it, on the basis of government institutions irrevocably rooted in the democratic beliefs of an entire people, my country ought to become a full member of the Conference on Disarmament within a reasonable period of time. Spain is not a great Power either as far as defence is concerned or in industrial or economic terms. It is, however, a great European country whose position links it especially through history and geographical proximity to Africa and the Arab world in particular and through its historical and deep cultural relationship to the Americas. Hence, it does not seem easy to explain to public opinion in such a country that its political, social, economic and historical profile today is not sufficient to earn it a place among the countries that play a leading role in the United Nations' sole negotiating forum in the field of disarmament.

My delegation is aware of the difficulties that have crippled decision-making on the Conference's expansion over the years. It is also aware that the situation of profound changes and modifications in the world today, and particularly the changes in the traditional grouping of countries in terms of political affinities, constitutes indirectly an additional difficulty for my country's membership of this Conference. For that reason I would like to make a cordial and hopeful appeal to the 39 present members of this Conference to find a formula soon which can meet Spain's aspirations. In that regard, as I said at the beginning of my statement, your opening remarks, Sir, are particularly welcome.

I would also like to remind the Conference that on 1 July 1978, through the different countries' permanent missions to the United Nations in New York, my country presented its candidature for the then Committee on Disarmament. This candidature was officially restated during the general debate in the Assembly on 23 July 1982, in relation to the future Conference on Disarmament. Much more recently Spain's wish was repeated formally and explicitly by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in this very room on the aforementioned occasion and date. A few weeks ago the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius, put forward to this plenary a proposal to guide the possible solution of the perennially postponed problem of the expansion of the Conference on Disarmament. I should like to thank Ambassador Hyltenius for his interest and efforts, and I am pleased to agree with the basic outline of his analysis. It does not seem possible to maintain the formula of an increase limited to four members, if only because of the disappearance of the German Democratic Republic, which will oblige us to fill a fifth seat; nor to

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maintain the present situation until the political groups in the Conference finish restructuring themselves. It is very likely that in the near future the General Assembly will have to take a very firm stand to clarify this entire subject and the modus operandi in this matter. But in any event, for the reasons already given, it will prove difficult to maintain the agreement in principle reached in 1983, and another figure will probably have to be set taking into account, inter alia, the fact that no expansion has been possible for such a long time.

Filling the vacancy that has arisen in the Conference on Disarmament is, we might say, inevitable. Expanding the Conference on Disarmament today by only four members, to our mind, would amount to upholding an approach decided upon eight long years ago as though nothing had changed on the international scene. It would thus be logical and practical, as well as realistic, for this assembly to begin considering soon an expansion substantially greater than the one envisaged almost a decade ago. That is the interest of my delegation and its proposal, which I commend today to the attention of this Conference on Disarmament, trusting that they will be favourably considered.

I cannot resist the temptation to refer to a curious fact, that from the observers' seats I am speaking to you in a room that was dedicated to Francisco de Vitoria, and decorated by a Spanish artist named José María Sert, with bronze doors on your right and left, Mr. President, bearing the names of Vásquez Menchaca and Suárez respectively. It seems surprising that there should not soon be a place around the table of this Conference for a country such as Spain. Thank you for your interest and your patience.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Spain for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Ambassador Shannon.

Mr. SHANNON (Canada): Mr. President, I welcome your opening statement both for its brevity and for its clarity of purpose. It reinforces my confidence that under your firm leadership, both for the remainder of this part of our session, during the subsequent break, and for the beginning of the third and final phase of our work this year, we shall find the necessary will that you referred to, as well as the flexibility and courage, to advance our work, particularly on chemical weapons. There are, of course, other important subjects with which we have to deal, as well as such issues as our programme of work in the period after 4 September; the matter of the enlargement of the CD membership; and the possibility of further improving the effectiveness of our procedures.

I will speak to certain of those subjects later in this statement but I would like to begin by offering you my delegation's full support and by expressing our thanks to your predecessors as President this year, Ambassadors Solesby, Batsanov, Hyltenius and Rasaputram, for their leadership while in office. I would also like to join in welcoming those new heads of delegation who have come to the CD since last I spoke in plenary. And I would like to take this opportunity to say a special word of both congratulations

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and farewell to our colleague Nabil El Araby. I am certain that my colleagues at our Permanent Mission in New York will enjoy and benefit from working with him as much as we have here in Geneva.

I will in due course speak to a number of subjects that relate directly to our work here at the CD. But before doing so there are some more general remarks that I wish to make, relating in particular to Canada's heightened interest in non-proliferation issues. The area of arms control is one where the lessons of the recent war in the Persian Gulf are most relevant. The aggression perpetrated against Kuwait by Iraq clearly demonstrated to all of us the dangers to the maintenance of international peace and security posed by excessive accumulations of conventional weapons. Moreover, Iraq's threats to resort to the use of chemical weapons highlighted the urgent need for the international community to mobilize political will to address the proliferation both of weapons of mass destruction and of their delivery systems.

In response to these problems, Prime Minister Mulroney, in February, launched an initiative designed to foster progress on some of the most pressing security issues of our time. This initiative stressed the need for political impetus to achieve early progress in the various arms control disarmament negotiations and other efforts that were then already under way to address proliferation issues. The Prime Minister also outlined specific measures that Canada itself would pursue, in the appropriate forums, to stengthen international non-proliferation régimes. At the political level, Canada is now therefore taking action to ensure that arms control and proliferation are given consideration at all appropriate high-level meetings in which we participate.

The first of these meetings was the recent General Assembly of the Organization of American States, at which Canada introduced a resolution entitled "Cooperation for security in the hemisphere. Curbing the proliferation of instruments of war and weapons of mass destruction". This resolution, which was co-sponsored by 22 States, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru, was adopted by consensus. The resolution expressed strong support for international efforts to eliminate all forms of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and urged all members of the international community to exercise sensitivity in the transfer of arms and related technologies. It also requested the Permanent Council of OAS to study problems posed to international security by the proliferation of instruments of war and to examine the possibility of exchanging information on national policies governing the transfer and procurement of arms, including the establishment of a mechanism for consultations about situations where excessive arms build-ups would appear to be developing.

Earlier this month, Canada, at the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, jointly with its NATO allies, reiterated its commitment to the earliest possible achievement of advances in the various forums dealing with proliferation issues. Canada was also active in pursuit of this objective at last week's CSCE meeting of foreign ministers in Berlin. The results are reflected in the following paragraph summarizing the conclusions of the meeting: "In the light of the recent experience in the

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Gulf region the ministers see a need to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction and for restraint and transparency in the transfer of conventional weapons and weapons technologies, particularly to regions of tension. This should be a priority of CSCE Governments, and ministers agreed to maintain a dialogue on these issues among CSCE countries." Canada also looks forward to exchanging views with its G-7 partners on proliferation issues at the upcoming London summit.

My Government is pleased to note the widespread interest and constructive proposals to respond to the challenges of concluding and implementing effective arms control measures that have recently been enunciated by several other Governments. We support President Bush's proposal that the five permanent members of the Security Council, who are the principal arms exporters to the Middle East, enter into discussions to establish guidelines on the restraint of conventional and other arms transfers to that region. While President Bush's proposal deals with a specific region of chronic tension and high levels of armament, Canada believes that his initiative has the potential to provide useful experience that should be of relevance in a broader context.

The plan announced earlier this month by President Mitterrand of France is also very constructive and closely parallels Canadian thinking in the area of arms control and weapons proliferation.

The programme of action that Canada is now pursuing seeks to consolidate and strengthen instruments that are already in place or which are currently under negotiation. The scope of our programme encompasses the full range of weapons of mass destruction as well as conventional arms.

Nuclear proliferation, despite the great success of the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), remains of great concern to Canada. We regard the NPT as the best instrument currently at the international community's disposal to effectively prevent horizontal proliferation and thereby to ensure a stable international environment that, in turn, is conducive to continued nuclear disarmament on the part of the nuclear-weapon States. Thus, Canada favours universal adherence to this Treaty. We are also very pleased that the number of States party to the NPT continues to grow and we particularly welcome the recent accessions of Zambia and Tanzania, and as well the announcement by France that it too has taken the decision in principle to accede. In keeping with the great importance that Canada attaches to the NPT, we strongly support the Treaty's indefinite extension in 1995.

It is our conviction that our ongoing efforts to ensure against the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons must be accompanied by continued efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals. Canada looks forward to the conclusion of a START agreement in the very near future and we urge the United States and the Soviet Union to follow up that treaty with further negotiations aimed at additional deep cuts in their nuclear arsenals and I would here also like to express to you, Sir, and to Ambassador Batsanov, our great appreciation for the regular debriefings on progress in the START process which you have arranged to provide to us, most recently those by Ambassadors Nazarkin and Brooks last week.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

The early conclusion of a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable chemical weapons convention is another very high-priority Canadian arms control and disarmament objective. We believe that this objective is possible and realistic, and that some time not too late in 1992 we can together achieve it. We will spare no effort to meet that goal.

In the related area of biological and toxin weapons, a Convention is already in place that has been developed over the years to include confidence-building measures and improved consultation procedures. Canada looks forward to the third review conference of the biological and toxin weapons Convention later this year because it gives us the opportunity to build upon existing measures. In particular, we favour the review conference establishing a clear mandate and time frame for the detailed examination of a compliance regime, including fact-finding provisions, so as to strengthen further the effectiveness of this Convention.

Closely related to the issue of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is that of capability to deliver such weapons. As a founding partner of the Missile Technology Control Régime, Canada favours the enhancement of measures to ensure against the proliferation of missile technology and encourages non-partners to the MTCR to adhere to its guidelines. The area of conventional weapons, specifically the excessive accumulation of such arms, is one that has not received adequate attention in the past. Indeed, despite increasing acknowledgement of the great importance of this matter, as evidenced in a number of earlier plenary statements this session, no forum currently exists to consider the transfer of conventional arms and the possible negative consequences that might result from such transfers. In Canada's view, transparency, consultation and restraint could provide an appropriate framework to effectively address the threat of excessive conventional arms accumulations. In order to enhance confidence among States through transparency, we favour the early establishment of a voluntary information exchange system regarding arms transfers, under United Nations auspices.

For its part, Canada released this year our first "Annual report on the export of military goods from Canada". Consultation among States on apparent excessive arms build-ups can take place in a range of multilateral forums and can encourage participants to demonstrate greater sensitivity in the transfer of conventional arms. Finally, transparency and consultation should also encourage States to exercise restraint in their arms exports or acquisition and to take other appropriate measures when it is evident that excessive accumulations are occurring.

To conclude this portion of my remarks, I would like to stress that Canada believes the months ahead offer opportunities for decisive action in addressing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and excessive build-ups of conventional weapons. Canada looks forward to working closely with you and with all States to ensure that these opportunities are exploited to the fullest.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

Now let me turn briefly to some of the subjects on the current CD agenda. I have already referred briefly to the ongoing negotiations on chemical weapons. Although the task of assessing the results of this second part of the 1991 session on chemical weapons is one that must await the reports of the Ad Hoc Committee Chairman and his colleagues, it is already apparent that our work has benefited enormously from the important policy statement by President Bush last month. Canada both welcomed and applauded that statement - not only did it demonstrate a welcomed flexibility on two of the major issues before us, but, through its commitment to resolve the remaining outstanding issues and complete the convention within the next year, it provided a much-needed impetus to our negotiations.

As a direct result of that statement, major progress has been achieved in Working Group A, under Mr. Mashhadi's able guidance, in resolving uncertainties over the question of CW use. The text emerging from that Group's discussions on article I - the article that sets forth the fundamental principles of this convention - now more clearly bans the use of CW by States parties in any circumstances whatsoever, including retaliatory use, use against a non-State party, or use against any persons or places anywhere. This is a major achievement, one that we hope will serve to encourage universal adherence to the convention. In light of this, I should like to reaffirm the undertaking made by a predecessor of mine several years ago that Canada will re-examine its reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol with a view to withdrawing these reservations once the CW convention has come into effect. We call upon all other States that have not yet done so to make a similar commitment, and I welcome in that respect the important statement made this morning by the Ambassador of Spain.

Mr. President, your Government's reaffirmed commitment to the total destruction of its CW stockpile under the convention, has, we think, successfully laid to rest concerns felt by many here about the implications of the proposals contained in CD/CW/WP.303. As such, we consider that the clear and unequivocal commitment of States parties to destroy their CW stockpiles will serve as a powerful incentive for those of us who do not possess CW to adhere to the convention.

These of course are not the only areas of our work in which there have been important developments. Rather than catalogue these, however, I should like to focus on the area that we consider most vital for ensuring an effective convention, and that is the question of verification. We and others have long argued that effective verification is essential to persuading States - both CW-possessors and non-possessors - that their security concerns regarding CW can best be addressed through this convention. And in the course of these negotiations, we have been persuaded that effective verification requires two fundamental elements: a comprehensive routine system that allows on-site inspection of any facility that might have direct relevance to the convention, backed up by a strong and meaningful challenge inspection - or "inspection on request" - procedure that ensures that any doubts that one State party might harbour about the compliance of another State party can be ultimately resolved. The two are not mutually exclusive but they are mutually reinforcing. And both will be most effective if both are developed to their optimum potential.

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

We therefore find it very encouraging that the discussions this session on a comprehensive, integrated verification system under article VI have been so constructive. In large measure, this has been due to the sensitive leadership shown by Mr. Gizowski, but all participants in the Working Group deserve credit for their willingness to explore seriously the best means of achieving an effective régime for article VI. We have every confidence that if we continue this approach we will ultimately succeed in devising a system that is of maximum effectiveness at optimum cost-effectiveness. Similarly, we hope that our future discussions on article XI verification will be equally constructive and positive.

I said that I did not want to catalogue the achievements of this second part of the 1991 session and I shall not. But I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the achievements being made in Working Group C, under the leadership of Mr. Perugini, ably assisted by his amicus curiae, Professor Ronzitti, on a number of difficult legal and institutional issues. Canada particularly appreciates the progress achieved to date in resolving an issue of considerable importance to us, and that is "jurisdiction and control". If this issue can ultimately be settled along the lines of the present discussions, then Canada will have markedly greater confidence in its ability to honour fully all of its obligations under the convention.

Some observers not participating in our negotiations might wonder why we are paying such close attention to issues such as "jurisdiction and control", but we here are all aware that the details can be devilishly difficult. None more so, perhaps, than those confronting our two "Friends of the Chair" on technical issues, Messrs. Meerburg and Canonne. May I thus take this opportunity to thank them both for their patient efforts to lead us through the technical thickets of the schedules and guidelines and the problem of how to define "capability"?

I need not remind you that a further major element in President Bush's statement last month was the call to engage in continuous negotiations here until the outstanding issues have been resolved. Canada supports this call, we welcome the CD's decision to radically reduce the July break, and we are prepared to endorse further radical adjustments in our schedule in the forthcoming months to realize our goal. We have some tough decisions still ahead of us on verification but an effective CW convention now is within our grasp. With a relatively modest additional sacrifice of our time and energy, we should be able to complete our negotiations in the next few months.

Last year, I had the honour to be appointed Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on outer space. It was a difficult task. We are very pleased that this year, under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Roberto García Moritán of Argentina, the Ad Hoc Committee has begun to focus in greater detail on questions of terminology and definition. It has always been Canada's view that we can only achieve progress on this item if we have first been able to agree on the meaning of certain of the basic concepts involved. Two of my predecessors as Canadian Ambassador here had earlier addressed this issue in this forum and I am delighted now to be able to report to them that,

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

however informally, the Committee is tackling the question of terminology and definitions through a friend of the Chair, Mr. Monkton of the United Kingdom delegation.

Canada is one among those countries which, without wanting to confuse the two distinct mandates of this Conference and of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, believe that there may be areas of complementarity in which each can learn from the other. The question of establishing an agreed terminology and definitions is one such area, as has been pointed out by the friend of the Chair who is coordinating this particular subject, and I wish him well. I am also pleased that another friend of the Chair will be exploring the feasibility of ensuring increased transparency in the use of space, as a first step toward confidence-building measures. I want to take this opportunity to welcome the Soviet working paper, tabled as document CD/OS/WP.45, which we consider to be a useful compendium of existing confidence-building proposals and which we hope may help us to focus on the most promising avenues which should be followed in this area. Canada's interest in the peaceful use of space remains very high. Many of you will be aware that in October 1991 we will host a meeting of the International Astronomical Federation in Montreal and that, immediately before the IAF meeting, there will be a workshop for developing countries on space, co-sponsored by Canada, the United Nations and IAF.

On another subject, this year, Canada, in the person of my colleague Ron Robertson, has been honoured with the responsibility of chairing the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. Together with the two coordinators of tracks A and B, Mr. Omene and Mr. Dimitrov, he is actively working further to refine the draft texts in order to advance progress on both tracks. I believe that this process is going quite well, particularly with respect to track A where one of the only really major issues still to be resolved is that of scope and definition of a radiological weapon. The older alternative language texts on these points have been extensively analysed and reviewed and interesting new proposals designed to resolve the issue have been put forward. If the members of the Ad Hoc Committee can agree on some form of language which will successfully exclude from the purview of the draft treaty nuclear weapons as such, then a major hurdle will have been overcome. Work on track "B" is also progressing but the subject under consideration, a prohibition or restriction of attacks on nuclear facilities, is both more complex and more contentious.

Before I conclude, let me say a few words about a nuclear test-ban treaty. Canada is a strong supporter of the objective of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and we have been active in advancing this goal here and at the United Nations General Assembly, in the First Committee. We recognize that conditions are not yet ripe for the conclusion of a CTBT. None the less, we believe that much valuable work can be done in this forum that will contribute to the eventual realization of this goal. Furthermore, we believe that bilateral negotiations on nuclear testing between the United States and the USSR can conclude additional significant interim steps on the road to a CTBT that could include limitations on the yield and number of tests. We urge the United States and the USSR to pursue the negotiation and implementation of

(Mr. Shannon, Canada)

such interim measures. Important as the CTBT goal is, Canada is convinced that it is not in the interest of international security to link progress toward this specific objective with the extension of the NPT, as was suggested by some at the fourth review conference of that Treaty, last year.

Finally, a word about improved and effective functioning, where our colleague Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan continues to lead our discussions with great distinction. It is matter of the CD's agenda, particularly in a post-chemical-weapons-convention-negotiations phase, that we believe should be the focus of our attention. We would favour dropping or the merger of some items on which little progress has been made over many years; and we would welcome additional issues being brought in for consideration. It is clear, however, that not all CD members share this view and that at least for now we may have to settle for less substantive, more procedural changes. In that respect we welcome the recent French proposals for dealing more efficiently with applications from non-member States wishing to participate in our work and recommend that we adopt them.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I have no other delegation listed to address the plenary. Does any other member wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none.

May I recall that, immediately after this plenary meeting, there will be an informal open-ended consultation on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, in this conference room with full services?

I have no other business for today and intend now to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held two days from now, on Thursday, 27 June, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.15 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.598
27 June 1991

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND NINETY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 27 June 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Stephen J. Ledogar (United States of America)

GE.91-61525/3314B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 598th meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of Poland, the Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Pakistan. I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, Mr. Gizowski.

Mr. GIZOWSKI (Poland): Mr. President, it is a great honour for me to address the Conference on Disarmament during your presidency. I should like to congratulate you on the assumption of this responsible post, fully confident that you will steer our deliberations with your well-known efficiency and skill. I also wish to thank Ambassador Solesby for her excellent work as your immediate predecessor in the Chair. I also extend our sincere words of welcome to the newly arrived heads of delegations and pledge to them our full cooperation.

As we approach the end of the second part of the 1991 session of the Conference, I should like to devote my statement today almost exclusively to the question of chemical weapons. This not only reflects the very high priority attached by my country to the earliest possible conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, but also stems from a qualitatively new situation which has emerged in this regard in the last few weeks.

Year after year the delegations, including my own, repeated in their plenary statements that the CW convention was within our reach. At that time it proved to be more an expression of hope than of a reality. Today we are facing the possibility of a genuine breakthrough in our prolonged negotiations. This is due, first of all, to the initiative undertaken by the President of the United States, which was introduced by you, Mr. President, at this forum on 16 May. My Government wholeheartedly welcomes President Bush's announcement forswearing the use of chemical weapons for any reason, including retaliation, against any State. Together with the commitment of the United States to destroy unconditionally all their stocks of chemical weapons within 10 years of the entry into force of the convention, it opens new promising possibilities of solving outstanding issues expeditiously and accelerating further negotiations on the convention. We highly appreciate the offer of technical assistance on safe and environmentally sound destruction of chemical weapons, which could greatly facilitate the smooth implementation of the convention. Altogether it provides fresh momentum towards the attainment of our ultimate goal of a world free of chemical weapons.

The positive reaction of other delegations to this initiative enabled us to reach a consensus on the necessity to accelerate the work with a view of completing the chemical weapons convention by 1992. We believe that it is the responsibility of the whole Conference on Disarmament, and not only the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, to ensure that the elaboration of the convention receives the highest priority, particularly in cases when due to limited resources in terms of availability of time or conference services there might be a need to make the necessary adjustment in consideration of various issues.

(Mr. Gizowski, Poland)

This does not mean of course that my delegation seeks to belittle the significance of other items on the agenda of the Conference. Some of those items are indeed of vital importance and should certainly stay also in the future as priority topics for negotiations in this forum. Some others, no less important from the substantive point of view, but not yet ripe as subjects for negotiating international conventions or agreements, are perhaps better suited for future discussions in other forums, such as the United Nations Disarmament Commission. But in any case, as far as the present moment is concerned, I am convinced that it is in the deepest interest of the Governments represented in this hall and the whole international community to concentrate efforts on elaborating the chemical weapons convention. Prompt, successful conclusion of the convention would add immensely to the credibility of this Conference as the unique multilateral body in the field of disarmament. And what is even more important, the conclusion of the convention, after the INF and CFE agreements and hopefully also after a START agreement, would become a step of enormous significance in building a safer world, in constructing a new infrastructure of security based not on military might but on cooperation among States.

I shall come back to the question of the chemical weapons convention later in my statement today. Now I wish to emphasize that we did notice and consider of great importance other initiatives, proposals and ideas which have been put forward in the last few months in this forum or which are directly connected with the work of the Conference on Disarmament. I have in mind first and foremost the plan for arms control and disarmament submitted by the President of France on 3 June this year. We welcome, in particular, the decision of France in principle to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty and we remain convinced that it will give a strong stimulus to the process of further universalization of the Treaty.

The Conference has been addressed this year by eminent personalities from a number of countries. The statements by our distinguished guests, as well as numerous interventions by heads of delegations, have given the Conference abundant material for thinking and analysing. Several ideas have been put forward with regard to the future activities of the Conference, after the conclusion of the chemical weapons convention. Particular emphasis has been placed on the question of limitation of international arms transfers. All those ideas merit careful consideration. The Polish delegation has taken note of them and will present its position in due course. As of now we can say that we regard some of the suggestions as extremely interesting and worthy of full support.

Reverting to the question of the chemical weapons convention, I cannot but fully agree with what you, Mr. President, in your capacity as the head of the United States delegation, stated when introducing President Bush's message to the Conference, namely that we cannot afford to continue with "business as usual" in our negotiations. My delegation is gratified at the fact that recently the Conference adopted several decisions conducive to the intensification and speedy conclusion of the negotiations on a chemical weapons ban, including the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee and allocation of

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additional time for negotiations. We are prepared to go along with any further suggestions in terms of time and effort needed to accelerate negotiations.

We believe, however, that the question of intensification is not only a problem of time but also, and perhaps in the first place, a problem of will to compromise on the part of all the participants and the necessity to give a fresh look to those issues which are blocking us from achieving the final agreement. It is our firm belief that with a real will to work intensely and to "give and take", we should be able to resolve all key outstanding issues before the end of this year.

One of these issues is undoubtedly verification. The discussion conducted on this issue so far has confirmed once again that the future verification regime should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and assurance that the convention is being observed by all parties. An effective verification system will promote the implementation of the convention by building confidence and deterring any possible violations. We all agree at least on one point - that a 100 per cent infallible verification system is just not feasible. But this does not mean that a reasonable level of assurance to the States parties that the convention is being complied with is not achievable. In principle, the basic outlines of such a system have already been written into the present "rolling text". Verification provisions dealing with chemical weapons stocks and production facilities are well elaborated and, with some refinement, they could serve properly for the effective implementation of chemical disarmament. The same is true about verifying schedule 1 facilities. There are still two major outstanding issues in the area of verification on which a solution should be found, namely the remaining part of article VI on activities not prohibited under the convention and article IX, in particular the question of inspection on request.

There is a substantial distinction between the two types of inspection. At the same time, however, both of them embody two concepts: confidence and deterrence, although the proportion among these two factors is different. While in inspection on request the deterrence factor prevails, in the case of verification activities under article VI confidence plays a leading role. This proportion is, in our opinion, quite natural. Any verification system conceived under article VI should be based on declared activities and should serve mainly as a confidence-building measure. Still, a certain degree of deterrence should be preserved. From this point of view we welcome the broadening of the scope of verification under this article. We share the opinion that it will be quite difficult to sift relevant facilities from irrelevant ones. That is why we prefer a broader approach, even risking sometimes the inclusion into the scope of declarations of facilities which are not posing a particular risk to the objectives of the convention. One might question whether any State would choose to use a declared facility for illicit weapons manufacture in the first place. The very fact that on-site inspections can take place is a significant deterrent. When making this assumption in combination with a broad scope of facilities which could be included into the declarations we are already increasing confidence substantially. Here we come

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to grips with the question of how to provide adequate resources to verify treaty compliance effectively. We should be careful not to overburden the future technical secretariat with the enormous task of verifying the obvious cases and spending on this a huge amount of the Organization's budget. We were quite concerned about constantly increasing tasks of the future Organization, especially in the verification area, without being confident that this was adding to the efficiency of the implementation process. Taking this into account, certain elements in the Swedish proposal for an "integrated approach" are quite attractive to us. The crux of the matter is in the selection process. To be effective, it should combine, in our opinion, the involvement of the States parties as well as that of the technical secretariat. Our experience with the implementation of confidence-building measures in the context of the Stockholm agreement - although I am aware of differences between these two concepts - shows that when the request is treated as something normal and routine the confrontational character can be easily avoided.

The key issue in the overall verification system under the chemical weapons convention remains, however, inspection on request. We know that in spite of the fact that it is not now directly on the table this issue is not dormant. We do hope that in the rather near future it will reappear on the negotiating table. We consider inspection on request as a prerequisite for confidence that the convention is being complied with. This was one of the reasons why we undertook a trial inspection on request of Soviet military facilities located on Polish territory, a report on which will soon be presented to the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Poland for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I note the presence in this plenary meeting this morning of the new representative of Romania, Ambassador Romulus Neagu, to whom I extend the warm welcome of the Conference. I apologize, Sir, that I did not note your presence before the first speaker. I now give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea, Ambassador Park.

Mr. PARK (Republic of Korea): Mr. President, as this is the first time I have taken the floor in this forum, on behalf of my delegation and myself I wish to extend to you our warm congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and to wish you every success in discharging your important responsibility. The determination that you demonstrated in your opening statement the day before yesterday to conclude the chemical-weapons-ban treaty by 1992 is a good indication of the firm leadership with which you are going to lead us to productive results of our debate on disarmament. I would also like to express our sincere appreciation to the preceding Presidents, Ambassador Rasaputram of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Hyltenius of Sweden, Ambassador Batsanov of the USSR and Ambassador Solesby of the United Kingdom, for the excellent manner in which they presided over the Conference. I also would like to take this opportunity to extend my high regards to Ambassador Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, and his staff for their invaluable assistance in making the necessary arrangements and preparations for this Conference.

(Mr. Park, Republic of Korea)

The months of the second part of the Conference on Disarmament have been characterized by a series of events and disarmament initiatives. The European security system underwent major reforms and changes to ensure that European security keeps pace with the newly emerging international order. With its dissolution in April, the Warsaw Treaty Organization no longer exists. And the NATO Defence Ministers' meeting followed by a Foreign Ministers' meeting, convened in early June, attempted to reorient the only remaining military alliance body in Europe to better serve the peace and stability of an enlarged Europe.

The overhaul, we think, will have far-reaching implications for the future of both Europe and the world.

The CFE Treaty negotiations cleared the remaining hurdle when the Foreign Ministers of the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to resolve their key differences during their meeting in Lisbon on 1 June. The breakthrough along with the progress in the START negotiations will pave the way for the summit for the finalization of the conventional and strategic arms treaties. When the CFE Treaty is ratified, it will be another major disarmament achievement in the area of conventional weapons, and will certainly brighten prospects for the commencement of the CFE-II negotiations.

It is ironic that the world witnessed the eruption of war in the Gulf just as the warming international climate was thawing the icy remnants of cold war tensions. Was it an isolated incident or was it indicative of the uncertainty caused by multi-polarity in world politics? Whichever the case, the event revealed the volatile nature of regional conflicts and provoked serious thought on regional security and stability. If any lesson can be drawn from the experience of the Gulf war, it would be the renewed awareness of the importance of the United Nations role in these obviously uncertain times. The world body has proved itself as a focal point in bringing parties together for dialogue and collective action. New light has been shed on the potential of the United Nations Security Council in safeguarding regional peace and security and enforcing arms control.

The perils of the transfer of arms are another lesson of the Gulf war and pose additional complications for the problem of regional security. Arms transfer has been a long-standing agenda item in United Nations disarmament forums, but few workable formulas have been produced to tackle the problem, particularly with respect to tension-ridden regions. In view of the changing international political environment and the growing importance of regional security, it is necessary to take a fresh look at the ramifications of arms transfers in the regional and global arena.

In this regard, the Middle East arms control initiative proposed by President Bush of the United States on 29 May is timely and appropriate, as it envisions guidelines for halting the proliferation of conventional as well as non-conventional weapons. As the Government of the Republic of Korea has consistently supported international efforts to curb arms proliferation, we welcome the initiative and wish to express our hope that it will help to consolidate the region's peace and security with the cooperation of the

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countries involved. An equally important arms control initiative in a much broader context is the arms control and disarmament plan put forward by President Mitterrand of France on 3 June. The French initiative, among other things, underlines the role and responsibility of the United Nations as an important factor in combating the problem of arms proliferation. As elaborated by the proposal, the reduction of tensions and the removal of sources of conflict are of primary importance. Such efforts combined with enhancement of transparency and confidence-building are essential in the arms control process. In our view, the two proposals of the United States and France are mutually supportive and complementary, and, therefore, a good starting-point in the pursuit of a generally applicable formula.

Thanks to the exhaustive review that has been made of the effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament, more time has been allocated to negotiation - the substantive part of the CD's functioning - with the change in the schedule of the annual session and the reduction in the overall number of plenary meetings. Pertinent to this line of innovative restructuring is the issue of the extension of CD membership. In spite of the collapse of the cold war that has done away with the East-West dichotomy, disarmament continues to be one of the utmost challenges confronting the world. The increasing number of aspirants to full CD membership is a clear reflection of concerns on disarmament. In this regard, equitable geographical distribution as well as military significance are, inter alia, the factors to be taken into account. In keeping with the changing international realities, careful consideration should continue to be given to keeping the CD's organization and work up to date.

The draft convention on the chemical weapons ban is one of the most crucial and promising items on the Conference's agenda and has raised hopes and expectations for the early conclusion of the convention. In our view, the key to the success of the convention on chemical weapons lies in assuring universal adherence to the convention. We share the view of other delegations that universal adherence could best be ensured by making the convention effective, non-discriminatory and verifiable. To this end, we wish to underline the importance of ironing out the remaining differences for the establishment of an effective verification regime. Such a regime would enhance confidence in the convention by assuring each State party that other States parties remain in full compliance.

President Bush of the United States made an announcement on 13 May on the United States unconditional commitment to the destruction of all of its stocks of chemical weapons within 10 years of the convention coming into force. President Bush's new arms control initiative is most welcome and represents a positive and far-sighted step toward achieving universal adherence to the chemical weapons convention.

The outbreak of chemical warfare was an ominous possibility during the Gulf war, and the world was alerted to its potentially catastrophic consequences. Despite progress made in disarmament negotiations between the two super Powers and in Europe, and the recent conclusion of the Gulf war, the danger of chemical weapons use has not completely disappeared. The time is

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ripe to take advantage of every possible opportunity to broaden support for the early and successful conclusion of the convention, in the same way that momentum was created by the Paris Ministerial Conference and the Canberra Government-Industry Conference in 1989.

The convention on banning chemical weapons and the Convention prohibiting biological weapons are twin branches of the same tree. The third review conference of the biological weapons Convention will be held in September in Geneva. The Republic of Korea has always supported international efforts to eradicate weapons of mass destruction. My country, as a party to the Convention since 1987, will be represented at the review conference and will make an active contribution to making the Convention effective and lasting.

The fourth review conference of the NPT, held in Geneva in August-September last year, and the amendment conference of the partial test-ban Treaty, convened in New York in early January this year, were the two major events highlighting the serious differences among the States parties over the issue of a complete test ban. The linkage approach to a CTB at the fourth review conference of the NPT yielded no concrete results, left the future of the NPT after 1995 uncertain and made the other important agreements superfluous. We are hopeful, however, that this does not represent a total setback, but a temporary one before a leap forward towards a universal NPT. We welcome France's decision announced on 3 June to join the NPT. France's accession to the NPT will strengthen the authority of the Treaty and reinforce worldwide pressure to bring those countries outside of the Treaty into the non-proliferation regime.

The unsafeguarded nuclear facilities of the States parties to the NPT, particularly North Korea, reportedly possessing significant nuclear facilities, have been the subject of international concern. In international forums such as the IAEA and NPT conferences, a great number of States parties, both individually and collectively, have called for the early and speedy conclusion by such countries of safeguards agreements with IAEA.

The Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, hosted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in Pyongyan in April-May, neither alleviated nor diminished worldwide apprehension over the unsafeguarded nuclear programmes of the States parties. IPU attempted to remedy the situation by adopting a resolution urging these States parties to subject their nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection. Very recently, it was revealed that IAEA has been informed by North Korea of the latter's intention to resume negotiations on a safeguards agreement with IAEA in July, with a view to submitting the agreement to the IAEA Board of Governors for approval at its September session. If the Democratic People's Republic of Korea indeed proves its intention through concrete action, as laid down in article 3 of the NPT and other relevant regulations of IAEA, and with no conditions attached, it will be the first major step for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in easing the worldwide suspicion hanging over its reportedly significant nuclear facilities.

(Mr. Park, Republic of Korea)

The signing of a safeguards agreement with IAEA is an unqualified, mandatory obligation of the States parties to the NPT. The conditions attached by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to submission to IAEA inspection cannot be justified by any means. As the unsafeguarded nuclear programmes of States parties represent a serious threat to regional and international peace and security, efforts should be intensified for the realization of their full-fledged commitment to an IAEA safeguards agreement at the earliest date.

In his address at the forty-third session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1988, President Roh Tae Woo of the Republic of Korea proposed a consultative conference for peace in north-east Asia in order to lay a solid foundation for durable peace and prosperity in the region. The proposal was made in an effort to create a favourable international environment more conducive to peace and reunification of the Korean peninsula within the framework of regional security in north-east Asia. It is particularly to be noted that the necessity of convening such forums has also been felt by other countries with their subsequent proposals in a similar vein.

These days the Korean peninsula has often been described as the last remaining arena of cold war confrontation. Fortunately, it now appears inevitable that North-South relations will thaw under the continuing warmth of the international political climate. By virtue of our efforts to improve relations with those countries whose ideologies and political systems acted as hindrances in the past, the political climate surrounding the Korean peninsula has steadily improved and has become increasingly conducive to stability and peace in the area. On 28 May, North Korea announced its decision to apply for United Nations membership, which we wholeheartedly welcomed. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's acceptance of two separate United Nations memberships for North and South Korea opens the way for peaceful co-existence between the two parts of Korea and for normalization of inter-Korean relations pending the reunification of the country. The admission of both South and North Korea to the United Nations will help lay to rest the long-standing confrontation and enmity between the two sides and to promote dialogue and exchanges as responsible and peace-loving members of the international community.

The Prime Ministers of South and North Korea last year held three rounds of talks alternately in Seoul and Pyongyang, until they were suspended in January this year. Because of the deep-rooted mistrust and suspicion between the two parts of Korea born out of a long-drawn-out military confrontation, mutual opening, exchanges and cooperation are essential as a confidence-building process before any meaningful dialogue on matters of disarmament and arms control can commence. We have learned from Europe's experience that mutual openness and transparency are the basis for any disarmament talks.

There have been limited inter-Korean exchanges in the areas of performing arts and sports, giving rise to high expectations for future exchanges and confidence-building exercises in other areas. It is encouraging that some of our CBM proposals are also referred to in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's recent proposal on arms control on the Korean peninsular - namely,

(Mr. Park, Republic of Korea)

peaceful use of the Demilitarized Zone, installation of direct hot lines between the military authorities and advance notification of military exercises. With regard to the peaceful use of the Demilitarized Zone, in particular, I would like to recall that President Roh Tae Woo of the Republic of Korea in his address at the forty-third United Nations General Assembly proposed an idea of building a "city of peace" in the DMZ, where separated families could freely reunite, and broad trade and other kinds of exchanges could be facilitated.

We are more hopeful than before that, given the forthcoming United Nations membership of both North and South Korea, the suspended South-North Prime Ministers' talks will be resumed soon so that we can re-open dialogue on these vital confidence-building measures and other arms control issues and contribute to the disarmament process at the regional and global level.

As a responsible member of the international community, the Republic of Korea will spare no effort to help facilitate the implementation of the noble task of this Conference. Finally, in concluding, allow me to express the fervent wish of the Korean Government that the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, will make a positive contribution to the promotion of world peace and security by successfully concluding the chemical weapons convention as early as possible, and that a breakthrough on other major issues of the CD, such as the nuclear test ban, will be made in the near future.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Republic of Korea for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Rasaputram.

Mr. RASAPUTRAM (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, let me at the very outset congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency. I am particularly pleased to do so as you represent a country with which Sri Lanka has traditionally close and friendly relations. Your diplomatic skills and initiative are well known and we are confident of a most successful conduct of the CD's business under your able guidance. I would also like to express my delegation's gratitude to your predecessor Ambassador Tessa Solesby of the United Kingdom who guided our work most efficiently and with great acceptance. May I also take this opportunity to join in extending a warm welcome to the newly arrived heads of delegations? We will greatly miss the company and contributions of Ambassador Nabil Elaraby of Egypt but would like to congratulate him for his new appointment and wish him well.

My statement today will focus on our negotiations on the chemical weapons convention. My delegation will revert to other priority items on our agenda and the question of the improved and effective functioning of the CD at a later stage. On the important question of the improved and effective functioning, my delegation hopes that the very useful exchange of views will continue under the able guidance of Ambassador Kamal.

(Mr. Rasaputram, Sri Lanka)

In our statement at the last session of the CD we expressed optimism that a comprehensive and global ban on chemical weapons was within reach. Recent developments have enhanced this optimism. We indeed believe that the CW negotiations have now entered a decisive, and hopefully, the terminal phase. We also stated then that the bulk of the "technical infrastructure" of the convention was in place and that remaining issues should be addressed in a political perspective with a view to taking decisions through compromises. We now feel that the negotiations are poised to move in that direction.

We welcome in this context the initiative by the President of the United States in announcing a most constructive change of position facilitating a consensus on the main prohibition of the convention covering the entire chemical weapons cycle including the unconditional destruction of CW stocks within the specified time-frame. We take satisfaction at the fact that this development has already led to the emergence of a consensus on article I of the Convention. The comprehensive character of the main prohibition that we now have, which is applicable in any circumstances whatsoever, will augur well for achieving the desired objective of universality. We hope that somewhat related issue of article XII will be resolved expeditiously. As my delegation sees it, the remaining issue relating to article XII involves both legal and political questions. Given the comprehensive and multilateral nature of the convention that we all hope for, it is important that we adopt innovative solutions to such problems. In this regard, the interesting idea put forward by the distinguished Ambassador of Austria is worthy of serious consideration by countries which have entered reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The possibility of a collective withdrawal of reservations would be an expression of greater political support for the kind of comprehensive regime envisaged under the convention. It would also amount to an important confidence-building measure, commensurate with the unconditional prohibition which we have already secured collectively.

A consensus having been reached in the Conference for an intensified work programme, for which we would like to thank Ambassador Batsanov, it is now important for the Committee to maintain the momentum of its work. We therefore hope that new substantive proposals aiming at developing a consensus acceptable to all delegations will be forthcoming on remaining major issues such as inspection on request. My delegation shares the view that the procedure for inspections on request is an important part of the verification regime to maintain the confidence of all countries, large and small, developed and developing. We also believe that in order to achieve this desired objective, the concept itself should retain its multilateral character and be depoliticized. Its intrusiveness and use should be managed in a way consistent with the objectives and the scope of the Convention. The new inputs expected, we hope, will address these aspects and lead to consensus.

In our statement to the CD on 22 March last year, my delegation referred to two aspects of a possible framework to facilitate solutions to remaining political questions. One was the desirability of a time-frame to conclude our negotiations and the other was the question whether we should look at a package format to handle remaining issues in the terminal phase of our negotiations. My delegation stated then:

(Mr. Rasaputram, Sri Lanka)

"We are inclined to believe that a time-frame for the conclusion of the convention could now be considered as a via media for seeking solutions to remaining issues. The questions relating to scope, the composition and decision-making of the Executive Council, challenge inspection, assistance, the order of destruction, economic and technological development and the Convention's relationship to the 1925 Geneva Protocol are issues which require political decisions in a spirit of compromise, bearing in mind the realities of desired universality. One could argue that these issues are politically interrelated in a manner that perhaps requires solutions in a package form during the terminal phase of negotiations."

We therefore take satisfaction at the fact that a consensus was achieved to infuse a sense of timing into the mandate of the Committee. In order to use the other aspect of a package framework we encourage the Chairman of the Committee to pursue his own consultations.

All are agreed that universality is the desired objective with regard to the implementation of the Convention. As has been pointed out by the Group of 21, a key to achieve this objective would be the internal consistency of the convention in maintaining the non-discriminatory and multilateral character of the treaty which now embodies a comprehensive and unconditional ban on the entire chemical weapons cycle. Consistency of these two principles should be equally applicable to the composition and decision-making process of the Executive Council.

Long-drawn-out efforts, both bilateral and multilateral, have contributed to developing the "rolling text" as it stands today. The authority of the consensus flowing from the Paris Conference and recent developments facilitating a consensus on the main prohibition augur well for the Committee to come to grips with other political issues, while parallel technical work should continue in working groups. Sri Lanka remains committed to the conclusion of the convention at the earliest possible date. I have been instructed by my Government to state that it is actively considering becoming an original signatory to the convention, when it is ready for signature upon conclusion.

The chemical weapons convention will be a unique instrument in terms of both its intrusiveness and its coverage of civilian industrial activity. It could also be the first international instrument which envisages, in one way or another, the concept of universality even before the conclusion of negotiations. While extra-convention means will always be available to promote universality, the most effective way of ensuring the widest possible participation would be to promote universality from within the text of the convention. The majority of the potential States parties will be countries which have never had chemical weapons and have no intention of acquiring them. It is therefore important that the convention does not entail undue and disproportionate institutional and financial burdens on such countries under the verification regime envisaged. As was pointed out by the distinguished Minister of New Zealand, it will be essential that the verification burdens of the convention should not discourage smaller countries from acceding. One

(Mr. Rasaputram, Sri Lanka)

cannot argue that the accession of militarily insignificant countries, which would in any case not pose a threat to the convention, is of less significance than a "capable" country remaining outside the convention.

It is in this context that my delegation would like to commend for serious consideration the pertinent observations of the delegation of Argentina concerning the need for the verification regime to remain commercially neutral and the importance of avoiding a dual regime for civil chemical trade once the convention enters into force. Developing countries which seek to develop their, as yet, elementary civilian chemical industry will have to weigh the security benefits of the convention against the costs and burdens not only of national implementation measures and international verification measures but also of the economic implications of possible dual regimes. The justified motives of devising an adequately comprehensive verification regime should not take us to the extreme of legislating for every eventuality. This would overburden the convention with an expensive verification regime that could go beyond the scope of the convention. Financing of such a regime can entail considerable financial obligations for developing countries. It will therefore be of importance to agree on a viable balance of verification burdens, bearing in mind that letter-perfect verification is neither feasible nor needed.

We feel that the opportunity now exists for the CD to strive towards firming up what could be the Conference's first conclusive output, since its inception over a decade ago. The consensus that was recently achieved on article I was the culmination of a long process. It also demonstrated the dynamism of multilateral negotiations and the fact that debilitating attributes sometimes conferred upon multilateral bodies are not justified. In fact the consensus on article I proved the contrary. The initial draft text of a CW convention submitted to the CD some years ago was enriched and developed in a dynamic way by multilateral participation. The very basis of the new consensus, namely, the idea of including the use of CW in the main prohibition, did not figure in the initial proposal but was conceived and developed by this multilateral body. The CD has therefore proved that it can negotiate, even on issues concerning weapons of mass destruction, if and when it is enabled to do so. Among the many tragedies and ironies of the Gulf war, some would perceive a realization that the threat of mass destruction deriving from chemical weapons neither deterred war nor influenced the outcome of that war. If this is to be one among many lessons to be drawn from that tragic event, it is perhaps time for the CD to pay more focused attention to other priority items on our agenda dealing with a host of disarmament questions including the priority nuclear issues which have remained in a state of paralysis due to similar doctrinal considerations. Irrespective of the moral of the Gulf conflict experience, if it has presented us with an opportunity to eliminate an entire class of weapons of mass destruction, the CD has to seize that opportunity.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Rahardjo.

Mr. RAHARDJO (Indonesia): As I am speaking for the first time in the plenary session of this august body, allow me to warmly congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference. My delegation is confident that with your wisdom and customary aplomb doubled with long and vast experience, you will be able to discharge your task effectively and efficiently. Allow me also to extend my felicitations, through you, to Ambassador Solesby of the United Kingdom, who preceded you in the Chair, for the efficient and tactful manner in which she presided over our deliberations. On behalf of Ambassador Loeis of Indonesia, who had to leave the Conference very suddenly last April, I wish to extend his sincere thanks to all colleagues and friends at the Conference, as well as the members of the secretariat, for the cooperation rendered to him during his term as head of the Indonesian delegation to the Conference on Disarmament. He also requested me, on this occasion, to wish every success to all of the distinguished personalities taking part in this gathering, the delegates of both the members and the observer States, and all members of the secretariat. Through you, Mr. President, I also wish to extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues and ambassadors who have joined us since the start of this second session of the Conference.

My association with the Conference on Disarmament is at a time when the echo of the ongoing dynamic and fundamental changes in the global political climate seems to be having an effect on its work. The observations made on the progress of the negotiations on item 4 have made it clear to us all that tangible results could be realized in the near future, due to the conciliatory positions of the major parties, which will eventually pave the way for the speedy conclusion of the draft convention.

It is my delegation's view that a decision made by the major possessors of chemical weapons to abandon these weapons options and to totally eliminate them from their military arsenals would encourage others to do the same. Recent events in the Gulf have clearly demonstrated that the military value of these weapons is limited when in contest with other systems of sophisticated weaponry owned by a handful of the collective military Powers. The political costs of maintaining these abhorrent weapons for defence and military purposes in the future will be too high for any country to afford.

The change of position of the Government of the United States on the question of the use of chemical weapons has provided new impetus to the course of negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The new approach of the Governments of the United States and the USSR to the question of universal adherence has brought about a fresh resolve and has resulted in the emergence of a common will to achieve a final agreement as soon as possible on the establishment of a treaty on the total prohibition of these abhorrent weapons. My delegation welcomes this development and hopes that the future convention on chemical weapons will be a faithful reflection of the legitimate interests of the international community as a whole.

For a country like Indonesia, which has never possessed or developed such abhorrent weapons, the total prohibition of their use has always been regarded as a crucial element in the convention. We believe that the real danger of

(Mr. Rahardjo, Indonesia)

chemical weapons lies in the possible use or threat of use of these weapons, rather than the development or stockpiling of these weapons. In this context, the importance of provisions regulating assistance and protection in case of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons could well be emphasized in order to create a deterrent and thus lessen the chance of countries choosing chemical weapons for aggressive military purposes. My delegation also attaches particular importance to the provision governing the future possibility of the use or threat of use of such weapons by States which are not party to the convention. A provision which assures prompt assistance and protection to a State party which might be threatened or attacked by any State using chemical weapons may attract States to become party to the convention.

In the course of the negotiations of the last few years, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has not been able to reach agreement on the above question, which is due among other reasons to the thorny question of the threat of use of chemical weapons. Moreover, the question of the function of the future technical secretariat in providing assistance to States parties in need of assistance in case of the threat of use or use of chemical weapons has remained unresolved. If these pending questions are to be resolved, a new approach has to be developed. Any State or States parties to the convention which renounce chemical weapons options for their defence purposes and become parties to the convention should be entitled to receive assistance or protection against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons, with a view to preventing the real use of such weapons against this particular State or States parties. My delegation hopes that those which are in a position to do so will make a contribution either in cash, or in kind, through the assistance mechanism to be created under the auspices of the technical secretariat. At the same time efforts should also be pursued to make the technical secretariat function effectively so as to enable it to give prompt assistance to countries in need.

With regard to the interrelationship between the future chemical weapons convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol, my delegation would like to emphasize that the provision governing such a relationship should be carefully and properly drafted so as to fully reflect the concerns and aspirations of the States parties to the convention. The future chemical weapons convention should avoid any possible confusion or loopholes which may lead to abuse by any State which is party to both the future convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

While it is encouraging to note the wealth of ideas which have been put forward during the course of the negotiations on the convention on chemical weapons, my delegation considers it necessary to mention a number of points which are of relevance to us. With reference to the verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the chemical industry, we are all aware that a new concept based on an integrated approach has been introduced. This has altered the perceived concept of verification as envisaged in the "rolling text" of the last session of the Conference on Disarmament; among others the range of the target to be verified has been widened. The concept of "capable" facilities allows on-site inspection not only in those facilities which produce but also those which are able to produce or process scheduled

(Mr. Rahardjo, Indonesia)

chemicals. In this connection we would like to underline that the question of verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the chemical industry should be approached cautiously with a view to avoiding an unnecessary burden upon the developing countries which are still in the process of developing their chemical industry.

With reference to the effective functioning of the verification system of the convention, the Indonesian delegation welcomes the conduct of the meeting of the Technical Group on Instrumentation. Based on the experience gained from our participation in the meeting, it was learnt that the existing laboratories and research institutes in Indonesia are operating the same instrumentation as conceived to be used in the future verification system. As for the need to furnish inspectors for the future implementation of the verification system of the convention, I wish to express the appreciation of the Indonesian Government to the Government of Finland for granting the opportunity for Indonesian officials to participate in the training course for such inspectors. We earnestly hope that this initiative will be followed by other countries which are in a position to do so, with a view to improving the technical skills of the personnel for the smooth implementation of the convention.

While recognizing the importance of the total elimination of weapons of mass destruction, in particular chemical weapons, we should not lose sight of the need to pursue the efforts towards a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, which is long overdue. It has been noted that the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban has resumed its work. We recognize that the progress of the work in the Committee in stemming further qualitative improvements of nuclear weaponry falls far short of expectations. There is still a tremendous amount of work ahead of us in order to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test-ban regime which will be universally adhered to. The resumption of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee is expected to be a good beginning. We hope that its endeavours will be instrumental in the overall effort to establish a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

During the PTBT Treaty Amendment Conference some constructive ideas were outlined. It was suggested inter alia by some that the verification proposals, namely the draft protocol presented to the Amendment Conference by the co-sponsor of the Conference, should be transmitted to the Conference on Disarmament for further consideration. My delegation is pleased to learn that the draft protocol regarding the verification of a nuclear test-ban treaty submitted by the co-sponsor of the PTBT Amendment Conference has been taken up by the Ad Hoc Committee. We hope that its result will contribute to the overall endeavours directed toward the establishment of a CTBT. As exemplified by a large number of United Nations General Assembly resolutions on a CTBT, and a clear mandate to the Conference as stipulated in the Final Document of SSOD-I, my delegation shares the view that a mandate to negotiate should be given to the Ad Hoc Committee in order to make the Committee work more effectively.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I would be grateful if he could transmit our appreciation to Ambassador Loeis for his message to us. My predecessor has already expressed best wishes to him on his departure, and I should like now to join her in wishing the Ambassador best wishes in his new assignment. I now give the floor to our next speaker, the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Kamal.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): Mr. President, let me begin by expressing our happiness at seeing you in the Chair, the representative of a country with which Pakistan has always enjoyed a close relationship. We are confident that under your direction the work of the CD will be conducted efficiently and skilfully. On my part, I would like to assure you that you will receive the full cooperation of my delegation in the fulfilment of your task. A number of colleagues have left since I last took the floor. I would like to take this opportunity to wish them every success in their future endeavours. I would also like to extend a very warm welcome to new colleagues who have joined us recently.

Our annual session last year began on a positive note. Speaker after speaker highlighted the political changes that were taking place in Europe, and welcomed the growing spirit of dialogue and understanding that was marking the relationship between the super-Powers. There was well-founded optimism that worldwide disarmament had become an achievable objective. But all these hopes and expectations crumbled with the developments in the Persian Gulf. We were confronted with the stark reality of an end to the cold war that may have led to a more cooperative relationship between the super-Powers, but which did not imply the beginning of universal peace, nor signal a new international stability. We still appear to be a long way off from our goal of general and complete disarmament under effective internatioanl control. While the cold war infected almost all other conflicts on the globe, most of these conflicts clearly existed in their own right, and would continue to rage until each found its own solution. Many of these conflicts had the potential to involve States outside their respective regions, as was demonstrated by the Gulf war itself. We therefore believe that a regional approach to disarmament, which leads to the elimination of conflicts and the removal of tensions from various regions of the world, would reinforce the structure of world peace and security to which we are all committed.

It is gratifying to note that this regional approach to disarmament is steadily gaining ground. The importance of this concept was clearly demonstrated with the inclusion of the item "Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security" in this year's agenda of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. We have actively participated in the discussions on this agenda item, and hope that the promise evident in the discussions of this year will be translated into concrete proposals by the time the report is finalized at the 1993 session of UNDC. We also hope that these developments will be duly reflected in our own agenda in the Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

On a more concrete level, there is a growing recognition also that the security problems and preoccupations of States can be accorded fuller consideration in a regional context, where remedial measures can be designed which are suitable to specific situations. The success of the CSCE process in Europe bears testimony to the idea that regional consultations offer an important and relevant answer to the problems of security and arms control. If disarmament on a regional scale can succeed in a Europe which is the cradle of the cold war, then there is no reason why it cannot be pursued in other parts of the world with the same degree of success. This does not mean that the successful application of certain measures in one region can merely be transplanted into another region. It is evident that each region has distinct characteristics, but it is possible to learn from the experience of other regions, and to translate and imbibe the principles of their success with appropriate modifications.

In our own region, South Asia, we have, for many years, been promoting regional and bilateral efforts aimed at ensuring the equal and undiminished security of all States. These efforts have been supplemented by our strong belief in the utility and importance of confidence-building measures for the maintenance of regional peace and security, and for developing mutually beneficial and friendly relations among States. Even though confidence-building measures alone cannot provide a guarantee of progress towards the resolution of major disputes, they must be pursued earnestly, in order to avoid at least those crises that can result from misperceptions or lack of transparency, particularly in the military sphere. In this context, I would like to draw attention to the recent agreements concluded between Pakistan and India on advance notice of military exercises, manoeuvres and troop movements, prevention of air space violations and permitting overflights and landings of military aircraft. An agreement between Pakistan and India on the prohibition of attacks on each other's nuclear facilities, ratified earlier this year, also constitutes a significant confidence-building measure between the two countries.

Important as these measures are, they are far from being the only initiatives in our troubled region. At a time when renewed attention is being focused on the dangers of nuclear proliferation, allow me to list yet again some of the proposals initiated by Pakistan over the past two decades. In 1974, when India exploded a nuclear device, we proposed the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, a proposal which has been repeatedly endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly ever since. In 1978, we proposed that, as a first step, India and Pakistan should issue a joint declaration renouncing the acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons. In 1979, we proposed an agreement with India on a system of bilateral inspection of all nuclear facilities on a reciprocal basis. In 1979 again, we proposed simultaneous acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards by India and Pakistan on all nuclear facilities. The same year we also expressed our readiness to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty, simultaneously with India. In 1987, we proposed the conclusion of a bilateral or regional nuclear test-ban treaty. The same year again, we also proposed the convening of an

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

international conference on nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia, under the auspices of the United Nations, with the participation of regional and other States.

Now, on 6 June 1991, the Prime Minister of Pakistan has specifically proposed that the United States, the Soviet Union and China consult and meet with India and Pakistan to discuss and resolve the issue of nuclear proliferation in South Asia, on the basis of proposals already made, or any new ideas that may emerge. A regional non-proliferation regime, containing guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States, and agreed to by all the regional countries, would help resolve the problem in all its dimensions, and usher in a climate of mutual trust, peace and security in South Asia, enabling the States of the region to concentrate their energies and efforts on accelerating economic development, and on the promotion of the well-being of their peoples.

Of late, increasing references have been made to the creation of a new world order, a concept which recognizes that arms proliferation was one of the major underlying causes of regional instability, and which has made it one of its central concerns. It proposes substantial arms control measures, and stresses the need for responsible behaviour by both arms recipients and suppliers in an effort to prevent dangerous regional imbalances from emerging. We have no philosophical dispute with this concept and would be glad to see it succeed. We hope, however, that the measures that have been suggested will be applied across the board, without discrimination, and that they will not legitimize or perpetuate existing regional imbalances. Many small and medium-sized States, lacking indigenous defence production capabilities, have no choice but to rely upon arms purchases from abroad to meet their essential security needs. Unless the basic causes of insecurity are eliminated from inter-State relations, nations will not be persuaded to stop acquiring arms. Arms control thus has to be pursued as a political process aimed at ensuring equal and undiminished security for all regional States at the lowest levels of armaments. We must, therefore, guard against any attempt to isolate and highlight only one element of conventional arms control, while ignoring its other important aspects.

To sum up, regional disarmament is an area which deserves much greater attention than it has received so far. We remain convinced that the successful application of this concept would contribute immensely to international peace and security. The world is, after all, composed of the sum of its parts, and if we can achieve disarmament on a regional level, then we can transform this mosaic of insecure regions into a planet of global prosperity and universal peace.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. That concludes my prescribed list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I recognize the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Mr. HAN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): My delegation is pleased to see that the second session of the Conference on Disarmament is concluding with a new atmosphere which all of us like very much.

The Peace and Anti-nuclear Committee of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea two days ago made a detailed public statement on the deployment of nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula, and the Committee made it clear about the threat of those nuclear weapons. I think all of us are well aware of what I mean. Nuclear weapons have been deployed on the Korean peninsula since 1957. Since then, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been under threat from nuclear weapons for nearly 30 years. Under this menace the Democratic People's Republic of Korea decided to be protected by international law, namely the NPT, so we joined the NPT in 1985. We expected an improvement in the situation on the Korean peninsula, but we witnessed only the increase of nuclear arsenals in South Korea and the continued, ceaseless, military manoeuvres. These manoeuvres comprised 200,000 military forces from the United States in South Korea. These exercises inform the world that these are exercises for nuclear war. Therefore, the Korean people strongly demanded the withdrawal of these nuclear weapons from South Korea and appeal to the world to join us in achieving these efforts. We had hoped that the South Korean authorities would join us to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-weapon-free zone which we proposed to discuss, but they opposed it. Now, they did not utter about these nuclear weapons and the nuclear war threat caused by the southern part of the Korean peninsula. I want to ask them: Didn't they know about these realities? Didn't they see the danger of these nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea? More than 1,000 nuclear weapons of all kinds. Didn't they know that voices are sounded by the South Korean people as well as among the American people to withdraw? It is time to withdraw from the last point of the cold war. But now, I hear no sign from the South Korean side to make the Korean peninsula a peaceful and nuclear-free-zone. They talk nonsense. This is not only a threat to the Korean people; it threatens the security and peace of Asia as a whole. No one can imagine what will happen if these kinds of weapon explode in the region. It could easily be spread to other regions. So, if the South Korean authorities really want peace and security and harmony among Koreans, they should join us to withdraw the foreign nuclear weapons from our own soil. Of course, my delegation plans to make a statement in the future. We have a schedule, therefore I don't want to make other comments on Korean questions and bilateral problems and relations between North and South. We must speak about this when we have a chance to speak. today, I reserve my right to speak about all those questions.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for his statement. Is there any other representative who wishes to take the floor at this time? I see none and would therefore turn to other matters. The secretariat has circulated today, at my request, the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the first week of the third part of the 1991 annual session, covering the period 23 to 26 July. In that connection, I wish to inform you that the timetable for inter-sessional work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, from 8 to 19 July, will be adopted by the CW Committee itself, as the plenary

(The President)

will not then be in session. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and can be changed if the need arises. It seems good practice, however, to advance our work by indicating what we will be doing at the opening of the next part of the annual session. Therefore, I would like to invite you to adopt the timetable which you have there if, of course, there is no objection.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the timetable for this week, the Conference will hold an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", immediately after this plenary meeting. I have no other business for today. I shall now adjourn the 598th plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held four weeks from today, on Thursday, 25 July, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.599
25 July 1991

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND NINETY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 25 July 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Stephen J. Ledogar (United States of America)

GE.91-62077/3480B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 599th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I would note the departure, during the recent recess, of the representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Baljinnyam, to whom I wish, on behalf of all of us, all the best in her future activities.

I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of Peru, Sweden, Finland, Romania and Canada. I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, Ambassador de Rivero.

Mr. de RIVERO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): It is a pleasure for me to see you, Ambassador Ledogar, an outstanding representative of the United States of America, presiding over the work of the Conference on Disarmament. The United States and Peru have always cultivated lasting links of friendship and cooperation, which have now been reinforced by a common effort to strengthen democracy in the Americas, to fight drug trafficking and the spread of weapons. What a happy coincidence that this very morning under your presidency it should fall to me to take the floor to inform this unique multilateral negotiating body that the Government of Peru has invited the Latin American countries in the Rio Group to attend a special meeting of their Foreign Ministers in Lima next November, in order to agree for the first time in our region on measures of arms limitation, strengthening of security and transparency among Latin American democracies. This Peruvian initiative falls within the context of the historical breakthrough which has occurred recently in the world and which has led to the end of the cold war and the establishment of a promising international climate founded on stability and international cooperation.

In the area of security and arms limitation this process of mutual trust and understanding led first to the Washington Treaty, whereby two categories of intermediate and short-range nuclear missiles were limited, and later to the United States-Soviet agreement on the non-production and destruction of the bulk of their respective chemical-weapon arsenals; the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe; and the imminent signature of the first START agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning cuts in a substantial number of strategic weapons. In addition, a few weeks ago President Bush proposed a peace plan for the Middle East which was followed by the arms control and disarmament plan proposed by President Mitterrand and the endorsement by the Group of Seven of Prime Minister Major's initiative, supported by Japan, for the establishment of a register of arms transfers under the auspices of the United Nations.

In short, the impressive changes which have occurred in East-West relations have been accompanied by a series of important steps in the area of security and arms limitation. In this context Latin America could not be an exception, nor could it stand aside. That is why, at the summit of heads of State and government of the Ibero-American countries held in Guadalajara, Mexico, the President of Peru, Alberto Fujimori, proposed Latin American

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disarmament with the objective of using the resources thus released to promote economic and social development in the region. This initiative forms part of a new concept of national defence designed to maintain the stability of democratic and legitimately constituted Governments in the face of the internal threats of underdevelopment, drug trafficking and terrorism, external debt and critical poverty in Latin America.

Consequently, I am pleased to inform the Conference on Disarmament that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru has communicated to the ambassadors in Lima of the member countries of the Rio Group - Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela - a proposal for the holding in Lima next November, on dates to be decided, of a special meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Rio Group, firstly, to agree expressly on a joint renunciation of all types of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and secondly, to reach agreement on banning the acquisition, production or transfer in the future of short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles for warlike purposes in Latin America, as well as the new generations of advanced systems of conventional weapons - I refer principally to fuel-air bombs with a massive explosive and destructive effect, laser-guided bombs and munitions, long-range extremely destructive multistage rocket systems, anti-radar and "stealth" technology. Also a ban on the introduction of nuclear propulsion in the attack submarines of Latin American countries. The third objective of the Lima meeting would be to devote itself to measures to build security, confidence and transparency among the democracies of the Rio Group, such as intensification of contacts between military high commands, cuts in troops and offensive weapons in border areas, mutual notification of military manoeuvres, invitations to attend them, visits to military facilities and the creation of a centre to register the transfer and production of weapons in our countries.

The Lima meeting will undoubtedly help to strengthen security, development and democracy in Latin America and will, I believe, mark a new era of solidarity and cooperation in the region. The democracies of Latin America, which are the faithful reflection of the hopes of their peoples, cannot stand aside from the process of peace and security which is under way in the world today. The Latin American democracies must base their relations on mutual trust and transparency in their national defence systems. Equally, the Latin American democracies cannot further burden future generations with external debts caused by the acquisition or manufacture of new and costly arms. The democracies in Latin America have first of all to secure the welfare of their peoples and work for constitutional stability and wholehearted respect for international treaties. The Latin American democracies must once and for all say no to arms trafficking, no to wars of aggression, no to suspicion and lack of transparency. Yes to a new order based on the full application of international law. Yes to human rights. In conclusion, yes to life, prosperity and solidarity.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Peru for his most important statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Theorin.

Mrs. THEORIN (Sweden): Let me first congratulate you, Ambassador Ledogar, on assuming the important function of President of the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation is confident that our work will continue to be effectively guided through your well-known diplomatic skills. I should also like to thank Ambassador Solesby of the United Kingdom for her distinguished contribution as the preceding President of the Conference.

World politics have undergone dramatic changes in recent years. As part of this process, there has been a significant evolution in perceptions of nuclear weapons. In January 1985, the Soviet Union and the United States undertook to start negotiations on nuclear and space arms which they had agreed "should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere". In December 1987, they agreed to eliminate all their land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles, to completely abolish one entire category of nuclear missiles. This was not only the first agreement on nuclear arms reductions in history. It also marked a breakthrough for intrusive verification provisions in international disarmament. The destruction of intermediate-range land-based nuclear missiles has now reportedly been completed. Moreover, there is now every indication that we will experience the next breakthrough in nuclear arms reductions. Both Moscow and Washington have publicly declared that they are on the verge of finalizing the START agreement on major cuts in strategic nuclear weapons. This constitutes a diplomatic achievement we have every reason to praise. It is a great victory for disarmament efforts. By all accounts, it will be a militarily much more significant arms reduction agreement than the INF Treaty. However, it must be kept in mind that these reductions will only bring their strategic arsenals back to about the same level as when the negotiations started nine years ago. Let us, nevertheless, make sure that this agreement becomes an injection of vitality in our negotiations here at the Conference on Disarmament.

There have been other essential developments in the recent improvement in the international climate. One significant development concerns the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. A number of States - including several countries in southern Africa, among them South Africa - have recently joined the non-proliferation Treaty. France, one of the nuclear-weapon Powers that has not acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty, announced its decision in principle to do so. The most fundamental and far-reaching change has centred on Europe, the most heavily armed continent, where the two major military alliances confronted each other for several decades.

A totally new Europe is emerging. A Europe that has left entrenched rivalries behind, that has moved beyond the cold war. One element in the political transformation of Europe has been agreements on comprehensive military confidence-building measures and major reductions of conventional armed forces involving highly intrusive verification provisions. I would like to make reference here also to the declining trend in the total numbers of nuclear-weapon tests. In the Soviet Union, in particular, there has been a

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marked decline in nuclear-weapon tests, in part due to popular opposition for health and environmental reasons to such tests. Also the Nordic countries have to the Government of the Soviet Union expressed their serious concern.

The decline in testing must not, however, obscure the fact that tens of thousands of nuclear weapons remain in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States. We must not overlook the fact that, in spite of the incipient quantitative reductions, the qualitative development of nuclear weapons continues. The real purpose of testing is, no doubt, to develop more effective nuclear weapons. Nor must we forget that, in spite of the improved political climate, the testing of nuclear weapons continues. Furthermore, an end to nuclear testing would be a clear manifestation of a genuine will to pursue nuclear disarmament. It would also be a proof of our commitment to save and protect the environment. An end to testing would clearly demonstrate that we share and respect the worries expressed by millions of people as regards the environmental effects of nuclear testing.

The importance of a comprehensive nuclear test ban has long been widely acknowledged by the international community. For more than 30 years, the total prohibition of testing of nuclear weapons has been considered crucial to halting the nuclear arms race and a way of curbing horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation. Year after year, the General Assembly of the United Nations has underscored the urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The momentous changes in world politics, the end of the cold war, the actual reductions of nuclear weapons, and the prospects for further significant cuts in the nuclear-weapon arsenals, the breakthrough for intrusive disarmament verification methods, progress in the efforts to halt nuclear-weapon proliferation and the declining trend in nuclear-weapon testing are developments which suggest that the time has come to start negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is against this background that Sweden is today introducing to this Conference a draft comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The partial test-ban Treaty, which bans nuclear-weapon test explosions, and any other nuclear explosions, in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, has, for obvious reasons, reduced radioactive contamination of the atmosphere. As a disarmament measure, however, it has been of marginal importance since the Treaty does not contain provisions prohibiting underground nuclear explosions.

The Swedish position as to the need for urgent negotiations on a comprehensive test ban has not changed in the last decades. Together with a vast majority of other States, Sweden has consistently worked for a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

The partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 expresses the commitment to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. This commitment is reaffirmed in the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

After close to almost three decades, still no negotiations are being conducted on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. On the contrary, it is even being stated that such a treaty is only a long-term goal.

Fundamentally, the case for ending nuclear testing rests on the need to put an end to a mad security system built on nuclear deterrence. However, there are also widespread concerns about the collateral effects of nuclear testing.

The United Nations study on nuclear weapons, which I had the privilege of chairing, provides an account of medical and environmental effects of nuclear-weapon production and testing. In my judgement, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the nuclear-weapon Powers to justify continued nuclear testing. To the vast majority of States it is not acceptable that year after year goes by without serious efforts to achieve a test ban - indeed, without even starting negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The re-initiation of negotiations on this matter has been urgent for many years. To refuse to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty defies the will of the overwhelming majority of States.

The draft comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty that Sweden is introducing today is a revised and considerably extended version of the draft treaty submitted by Sweden in 1983 (CD/381 of 14 June 1983). The major changes have been undertaken with regard to the protocols of the draft treaty, dealing with a verification system and organizational matters.

In this new draft, we have tried to take into consideration developments during the last few years, above all in the United Nations, in the Conference on Disarmament and at the PTBT Amendment Conference, including protocol II of the proposals for amendment of the partial test-ban Treaty. We have of course also considered new working papers, proposals and contributions from individual countries. We have also taken into account the rapid scientific and technical developments.

Specifically, we recognize and have made an effort to build upon achievements in the realm of disarmament verification in recent years. We have, therefore, redrafted our proposals with regard to the organization which will oversee the overall function of the treaty and its verification arrangements. As envisaged in the new Swedish draft, the principal organ of the organization to oversee compliance with the treaty is the conference of the States parties. The other organs to be established are the executive council and the technical secretariat. In this context, we have not only made use of the terminology in the draft chemical weapons convention. We have also to a certain degree built on the conceptual approach in the negotiations on that forthcoming convention. In this context, we have built furthermore on the verification provisions of the threshold test-ban Treaty.

With regard to verification we have, of course, taken special account of the progress made in the Group of Scientific Experts of the Conference on Disarmament. The technical achievements in the field of verification are such that effective international verification of a CTBT is now possible.

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The question of verification is no longer a technical one, but of a political nature. Given political preparedness to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the effectiveness of the verification regime is largely a question of the amount of resources which are allocated for this purpose.

An adequate verification system is a most important element in a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The legitimate right and duty of all States to participate in the verification of international treaties to which they are parties must be recognized. This political recognition must be supported by international technical arrangements that make it possible for all parties to gain access to the results obtained through the verification machinery. International cooperative measures are a cornerstone of the verification arrangements of this draft treaty. Sweden is committed to the work of establishing such international verification arrangements.

In a world where the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons is obvious, a comprehensive test-ban treaty must be designed so as to encourage the widest possible adherence. It must, therefore, be non-discriminatory. The rules should be the same for all.

The draft treaty and its three protocols, containing measures such as seismic monitoring, surveillance of airborne radioactivity, satellite observation and on-site inspection, are altogether aimed at establishing a basis for an effective verification system. All in all, I hope that the new draft treaty submitted by Sweden will provide a political and technical basis for intensified work on the CTBT issue in the Conference on Disarmament.

Nuclear testing demonstrates that nuclear-weapon States insist on retaining the option of further developing these weapons of Armageddon. The continuation of nuclear-weapon testing is not in harmony with current trends in world politics. Neither is testing compatible with a concern for the environment and our common future. The ending of nuclear tests would be a major step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. The prohibition of nuclear test explosions will also be instrumental in preventing the proliferation of such weapons.

The Conference on Disarmament is the proper forum to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Indeed, it is the very first item on its agenda. We can afford no more procrastination. The recent dramatic improvement in world politics shows every nation that the time has come to negotiate such a treaty. Let us start now.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Sweden for her most interesting statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Finland, Dr. Rautio.

Mrs. RAUTIO (Finland): I have asked for the floor to introduce the latest "blue book", which has been circulated as a CD document (CD/1090). Like last year's report, the 1991 "blue book" is a joint report of countries which participated in the second round-robin test. A brief description of the

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test has also been circulated as a working paper (CD/CW/WP.350) by Australia, Canada, China, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Finland, France, Germany, India, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. That working paper was introduced in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons yesterday. In my presentation today, I will mainly deal with the conclusions of the test that are of more general interest than the analytical details as such.

In order that the exercise should follow a likely CWC scenario it was agreed that the samples for the second round-robin test should simulate an inspection of the chemical industry by including appropriate background chemicals. The laboratory that volunteered to prepare the samples chose to use charcoal, Tenax, XAD-2 and cotton buds as sample matrices in addition to aqueous samples. Some of the samples were spiked with octyl methylphosphonofluoridate, which, although a schedule 1 chemical, is not (within public knowledge) a CW agent. This meant that many laboratories did not have the necessary reference material (authentic reference substance or database information) to make a positive identification of the principal spiking substance. In the absence of a readily identifiable CW agent upon which to focus, the participating laboratories applied varying degrees of effort in identifying as many compounds as possible to allow judgement whether they were scheduled compounds.

Accordingly, to maximize the value of this second round-robin test, the objective of the test was changed from analysis of samples for CW agents and their degradation products to their content of any scheduled chemicals.

In the event the laboratories reported 17 scheduled chemicals, 31 other phosphorus-containing chemicals and 89 non-phosphorus chemicals. All laboratories identified the chemicals used as starting materials in the synthesis of the planned end-product, the pesticide dichlorvos. Only two laboratories reported chemicals belonging to schedule 1, the mixture of isomeric octyl methylphosphonofluoridates. All laboratories except one identified dimethyl methylphosphonate, which is a schedule 2 compound and appeared as an impurity of feedstock material. Six laboratories identified the mixture of isomeric dioctyl methylphosphonates which are also schedule 2 compounds and primary degradation products of the principal spiking compound. Three laboratories identified the mixture of methyl octyl methylphosphonates. Two laboratories reported detection of alkyl alkyl methylphosphonates but were not able to identify the actual alkyl groups. In addition to the octyl derivatives, four additional methyl phosphonates and methylphosphonic acid were reported.

All the participating laboratories considered the second round-robin test very useful, even though the original plan of the test did not materialize. The results obtained from the analysis of samples according to the revised objective probably raised many more questions than the original plan would have done.

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The need for background information on samples was discussed by the scientists of the participating laboratories. They considered it desirable to know whether the samples had been collected in an area of alleged use or in an industrial site. The participants also considered the analysis request, be it confirmation of preliminary identifications, identifying scheduled chemicals or structure elucidation of unknown chemicals, to be more important for the off-site laboratories than to know whether the inspection had been a routine or challenge inspection.

In the present test the laboratories were informed that the samples did not contain CW agents. This information caused some confusion, however, because not all laboratories were aware of the difference between a CW agent and a schedule 1 chemical and, accordingly, some did not look for members of the nerve agent families.

Information on the particular sampling points in the facility helped in understanding the production process. However, such information might be considered highly confidential by the facility, the kind of information that should not be revealed to a laboratory capable of doing in-depth analysis of all chemicals in the samples. This type of information is, naturally, available to the inspectors on-site, but there confidential information can be protected by the use of "blinded" instruments, i.e. those having only scheduled and related chemicals in their databases.

As shown by the test, a large number of chemicals can be tentatively identified with a gas chromatograph/mass spectrometer (GC/MS), the instrumentation planned for on-site analysis, if reference spectra are available in the computer of the instrument.

The second round-robin test showed that if the analytical request is to identify any scheduled chemicals, the methods should be such as to allow detection of all individual compounds on the schedules. As long as the databases remain incomplete, samples should be monitored by techniques allowing detection of family members. Easily volatile chemicals such as phosgene and hydrogen cyanide require slightly different procedures than those optimized for nerve agents and mustards.

The scientists discussed the criteria and need to report chemicals other than scheduled ones to the future technical secretariat. This question was felt important since the number of chemicals that can be identified in off-site laboratories is greater than during on-site analysis. In this test the laboratories reported non-scheduled feedstock chemicals and the product of ongoing synthesis, plus their impurities and a large number of unrelated chemicals. It was pointed out that the identification of non-scheduled chemicals could be used to identify industrial processes and could corroborate the stated purpose of the process and be used as evidence of compliance. However, this would not necessarily be an indication of compliance all of the time. In the present test, toluene and trichloracetaldehyde confirmed that during the inspection the facility was producing dichlorvos.

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Some laboratories identified and reported sodium fluoride and octyl alcohols, which do not belong to the schedules either, but which could indicate earlier production of octyl methylphosphonofluoridates.

The need to identify and report non-scheduled chemicals is determined by the goal of the verification, whether it is to confirm the absence of non-declared scheduled chemicals or also to confirm that the current production of the facility is in line with the declaration. If the goal is to confirm the absence of non-declared scheduled compounds, the goal can be achieved on-site with "blinded" instruments. In this case, chemicals such as sodium fluoride and octyl alcohols would remain undetected unless they were included in the database as additional chemicals.

If the goal is to confirm a declaration, on-site analysis would require that the databases for the instruments contain data on the chemical products and their feedstock chemicals instead of data on scheduled chemicals. In this case, in addition to undeclared non-restricted production, undeclared scheduled chemicals would go undetected.

If both current production and the absence of scheduled chemicals are to be verified, the number of chemicals in the databases increases substantially. At present negative assurance seems to be the preferred objective. For the future tests, the group agreed that only scheduled chemicals should be reported.

The present test strongly emphasized the need for identification criteria in verification analyses. Some laboratories did not list any chemicals for which no reference material was available, and the identification of which would have had to be based on structure elucidation only. Some laboratories listed chemicals solely on the basis of electron ionization spectra after comparison of the recorded spectra with those in commercial libraries.

The scientists discussed the degree of certainty required before a scheduled chemical is reported to the technical secretariat as present in the samples collected during an inspection of a chemical facility. The results of on-site and off-site analyses have to be considered separately.

The goal of on-site analysis is to support the verification of compliance with the treaty, i.e. to find out if there are any samples that need to be sent to two off-site laboratories for confirmatory analysis. Unambiguous identification is not required on-site, just an indication that scheduled chemicals might be present. On the other hand, the goal of off-site analysis is to obtain unambiguous confirmation of the analytical results obtained on-site. The scientists discussed whether unambiguous results are the only ones that should be reported by laboratories to the technical secretariat or whether tentative assignments, clearly marked as tentative, should also be released, to allow the secretariat to make the final identification. The group considered it imperative that the laboratories do the final identification themselves and report only those chemicals for which they have an unambiguous identification, i.e. a simple yes/no answer. In cases when the results from the two laboratories differ, the technical secretariat should

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send the samples for final evaluation to a third laboratory together with the analytical data from the two laboratories. The experts from the three laboratories together could then resolve the discrepancies.

The criteria for unambiguous identification were discussed at some length. There was consensus that two independent spectrometric techniques giving identical results are required. If the concentration of the sample is high enough, two different techniques such as mass spectrometry and infrared spectrometry or mass spectrometry and nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometry are to be preferred over two similar techniques, such as two kinds of mass spectrometry.

In all the spectrometric methods, unambiguous identification requires that the analytical results be compared with reference data in a database or with data recorded from an authentic compound using the same individual instrument. The latter procedure involving authentic compounds was considered more reliable because the recorded and database spectra are likely to have been recorded under different conditions.

The present test highlighted the difficulties in identifying chemicals for which there are no earlier data or authentic compounds available. Preliminary identification has to be based on the interpretation of different types of spectra and final confirmation is obtained only after synthesis of the proposed chemical and recording of the identification data for purposes of comparison. In future, such a requirement for synthesis might delay the reporting of analytical results to the technical secretariat and, accordingly, underlines the need for as complete a database as possible at the earliest date after the convention has entered into force.

Unambiguous identification requires that the arrangement of atoms in the molecule be exactly known. The large number of isomeric chemicals in the octyl families made it impossible to determine the exact configuration of the octyl side chain. For purposes of verification, the scientists considered it sufficient to be able to report that octyl methylphosphonofluoridates were identified, without the need to report each of the fluoridates separately. Scientifically speaking this means that identifications were not unambiguous but that they were sufficient for the purpose, especially as the draft convention requires identification of alkyl methylphosphonofluoridates, not the exact structure of the alkyl moiety.

The results of the present test need to be evaluated in terms of success in identifying those samples that would have warranted transport to verification laboratories for more detailed analysis. The most important samples were those containing schedule 1 compounds and those containing methylphosphonates, especially the octyl derivatives. The only schedule 1 chemicals, the mixture of isomeric octyl methylphosphonofluoridates, were reported by only two laboratories, despite the availability of sophisticated in-house equipment. This was partly due to the degradation of the fluoridates during transport of the samples and partly due to the lack of reference data for these compounds. The degradation would of course have been avoided if the analysis had been performed on-site. Both the fluoridates and the

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methylphosphonates have specific ions in their mass spectra, most probably common to almost all members of the respective families, so they too would have been detected on-site.

The scientists considered the recommended operating procedures important for both on-site and off-site analyses and accordingly compiled procedures for the new sample matrices and analytical techniques. The need continuously to improve procedures, to meet the challenges of new developments in the analytical field, raised the idea of a "rolling text" for the recommended operating procedures.

The second round-robin test demonstrated the need to solve the problems associated with the transportation of samples. At present, the laboratory responsible for the preparation of samples is the only one that can give information on the toxicity of the samples with a view to finding the appropriate means of transportation. Rules acceptable for every Government should, therefore, be found for the transportation of test samples in order to facilitate the work of the future convention.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Finland for a very interesting report on the second round-robin test, which has so many implications for the work of our CW Committee. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Ambassador Neagu.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania): It gives me particular pleasure that, for the first time, as representative of the new, democratic Romania, I address this august and unique United Nations body entrusted with the difficult but important task of negotiating agreements on disarmament.

My privilege is twofold. First, that I'm bringing here the irreversible options of Romania for democracy and market economy at home, for full openness, cooperation based on partnership and transparency in international affairs. Secondly, I'm joining you, distinguished and noted specialists, in your noble efforts for halting the arms race at a time when, due to the radical changes in human experience with respect to the fundamental importance of human rights and freedoms for the whole development of mankind, including security systems, important progress is also being achieved in the field of disarmament. I shall cooperate with you open-mindedly, free of any inhibition, either political or ideological, ready to share with you our concerns and perceptions.

Indeed, we witness profound mutations in the security situation in the world. Let's take only the recent disappearance of the Warsaw Treaty with all its consequences, political and military, and the legitimate concerns of Eastern European countries with respect to their security in the existing vacuum. In a period when we work intensively for building up an all-European cultural area, establishing a common human dimension and expanding economic integration, the necessity also arises to create a common Euro-Atlantic security system. We appreciate very much the opinion expressed by

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Mr. Manfred Wörner, Secretary-General of NATO, during his recent official visit to Bucharest, that Romania's security concerns, like the security concerns of other Eastern European countries, must be taken into consideration in any new arrangements in Europe.

Meantime, we consider that measures should be taken in order to avoid any exacerbation of the tension in some areas of Eastern Europe, including abstention from interference in the internal affairs of other countries. It will be of greatest importance to avoid especially the creation of opposing alliances. This is why Romania, pointing out the profound defensive and stabilizing character of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, strongly advocates the undertaking of the obligation by all East European and other countries in Europe to refrain from concluding alliances directed against other countries on the continent.

These evolutions and changes also have a bearing on the methods of work and systems of consultations within our Conference, and we are called upon to address this matter too.

It is undeniable that important progress has been achieved in efforts to halt the arms race, reduce armaments and control the armaments drive, and that new and important agreements can be concluded in the field of disarmament. We highly praise in this respect the contributions of your great country, Mr. President, the United States of America, which open new vistas for our endeavours. With you chairing this Conference, we stand confident that we can succeed in attaining further progress in our work, first of all in putting the final touch on the chemical weapons convention.

The recent initiative of your country, presented personally by President George Bush, is unanimously appreciated as a real breakthrough for the solution of the remaining problems. This has already led to the emergence of a consensus on article I of the "rolling text", providing a more comprehensive character of the prohibition, which is applicable in any circumstances whatsoever.

Among the major remaining issues to be solved, verification is, of course, the most important. We share fully the view that verification is vital for assuring the efficiency of the convention. In such a way, States will be more assured that their security concerns are covered. Romania is ready to submit herself to any verification that meets with the agreement of the other States. Meantime, we understand the tremendous objective difficulties lying before us, and first of all before the experts who deal directly with this problem. Among other things, as has rightly been stressed during the debates, it is necessary to find an equilibrium between the necessity to prevent any violations of the undertaken obligations and the legitimate preoccupation to protect certain installations from improper intrusions that do not have any relation with the objective of the convention. We ourselves have such problems and are interested in balanced and efficient control.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

My country, which is unequivocally committed to the achievement of a total and comprehensive banning of chemical weapons, repeatedly declared in the last year and a half that it possessed no chemical weapons or had the means of producing them, nor the intention to acquire them. The Romanian Government wants to become an original party to the chemical weapons convention.

I am pleased to announce here today that as far as chemical weapons are concerned, and more specifically the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, the Romanian Parliament adopted last month a law on the withdrawal of the reservations made to the text of the Protocol a long time ago. This month, Romania officially notified France, as the depositary country, about the withdrawal of these reservations.

We support the proposal made by our Austrian colleague that countries which still have such reservations should withdraw them collectively and, in order to come to such an arrangement, a special meeting of the concerned countries be convened. We also share the view that this could be done during the envisaged ministerial meeting on chemical weapons.

One cannot appreciate more the efforts deployed by the United States and Soviet Union in order to conclude the INF Treaty permitting for the first time in history a destruction of arms, and these are nuclear delivery vehicles, one of the most destabilizing arms. The whole world and first of all European nations received with great satisfaction the news about the destruction of the last United States and Soviet land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles. In the same sense mention should be made about the commitments undertaken by the Soviet Union and United States to unilaterally withdraw significant numbers of tactical nuclear warheads from the European region. Also, the ratification of the threshold test-ban and peaceful nuclear explosions treaties gave hope that progress will also be obtained in the negotiations on the prohibition of all nuclear tests.

We welcome the imminent signature of the START treaty, which, as Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh appreciated, "is the most striking document ever elaborated in history, not to mention its size. It is a fantastically complex penetration into the heart of strategic balances and technologies".

The negotiated reductions and unilateral measures aimed at gradual elimination of nuclear weapons from Europe made possible significant progress in conventional disarmament on the continent as well. The CFE Treaty signed last year establishes a new military balance at a substantially lower level of armaments. In our view there are good conditions to continue this process and carry out, correctly and completely, the Paris Charter provisions on weapon reduction. A weapon-free Europe is still a utopian dream but a continent with less weapons represents an attainable objective. At the same time, openness and transparency, confidence-building measures in general are proven pace-setters for disarmament measures, as stipulated in the 1990 Vienna Document of the negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures and the Paris Charter. Such measures could be envisaged not only in the

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frame of a multilateral document, but on a bilateral basis too. We have in mind the possibility of two neighbour countries to conclude agreements conceived as instruments aimed at increasing confidence and strengthening good-neighbourliness. The agreement between the Government of Romania and the Government of the Republic of Hungary on the establishment of an "open skies" regime, signed on 11 May 1991 in Bucharest, stands for an application of this orientation. This agreement sets up an aerial surveillance regime under which unarmed aircraft of both parties are authorized to conduct observation flights above the territory of each other.

The Gulf crisis served to remind us of what consequences can ensue from the uncontrolled flow of weapons into unstable regions where tensions run high. The chief point of the problem of the massive accumulation of conventional weapons is not only their production, but their transfer between countries as well. Therefore we agree with the views expressed here that new ways should be developed to provide transparency in arms trade and restraint among suppliers and recipients. Lately, we noted widespread interest to conclude and implement effective arms control measures in this field. We support the proposal that the five permanent members of the Security Council, who are the principal arms exporters in the world, enter into discussions to establish guidelines on the restraint of conventional and other arms transfers.

The war in the Gulf has also demonstrated the dangers of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, the spread of nuclear weapons and of ballistic missiles, the related question of arms transfers and the arms trade. Constraining the supply and availability of weapons of mass destruction, and of the materials needed for their manufacture, should be a priority task. Such constraints would undoubtedly reduce the risks posed by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the ballistic missile systems that can deliver them. It is our belief that the renunciation of weapons of mass destruction and the commitment to their non-proliferation should also include missile technology.

Romania has been actively participating since the beginning of last year in the current multilateral efforts to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime. To this end, my Government expressed its readiness to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group and, as a result, last spring Romania was invited to take part in the work of this forum as a full member. In the same spirit my country decided to accept the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and to accede to this Group next autumn. We have close relations with the members of the Australia Group, working to increase the effectiveness of its control on chemical and biological materials.

In accordance with this new orientation of Romanian foreign policy, we support the latest United States Middle East arms control initiative and France's plan for global arms control and disarmament.

Romania welcomes the resumption of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and the active participation in its debates. Much work is still ahead of us in order to conclude a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban regime which could be universally adhered to.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

Committed as it is to the aim of a complete test-ban treaty, Romania accepts the principle of reaching this objective gradually, in stages, on a step-by-step basis. The Romanian Government will welcome any agreement on further limitation of underground nuclear tests and any new step in this direction.

We noted with interest the considerable progress that has been made in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. Romanian experts actively participate in the experiments that are presently taking place in this field. Now we received a new updated Swedish draft comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty so ably introduced by Ambassador Theorin. This text will have all the attention of my delegation.

We support all measures that have been agreed upon bilaterally or multilaterally to prevent the introduction of weapons and weapons systems in outer space. We appreciate the fact that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space has resumed its activity with a more targeted orientation. In the same spirit we commend the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons.

I conclude these few general remarks with the pledge that I shall do my best in order to make my share of contribution to the progress of the negotiations at the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Romania for his statement and for the kind words addressed to all the colleagues and specialists of the Conference, as well as those addressed to me and my country. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Mr. Robertson.

Mr. ROBERTSON (Canada): I would like to take the opportunity provided by this plenary to inform the representatives of both CD member States and participating non-members of a presentation that Canada will be making on Monday afternoon, 5 August, in connection with the work of the Group of Scientific Experts.

Dr. Kin Yip Chun of the University of Toronto Geophysics Division has been conducting seismic research on behalf of our verification research programme. On the afternoon of Monday, 5 August, probably in room VII, he will present a layman's briefing, designed for non-experts, on certain aspects of his work, which will focus on further developments of seismic monitoring methodologies. That briefing will be immediately followed by a more detailed technical briefing for interested experts in the field of seismology who are here for the meeting of the GSE. We will also ask the secretariat to circulate a written invitation to delegations concerning Dr. Chun's presentation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for this information and we will look forward to the briefing, our attention to which he has called. With that statement we have concluded the list of those members inscribed for this morning.

(The President)

I would now take the initiative to call attention to the presence among us of the representative of India, Ambassador Chadha, who, as you know, will be leaving the Conference at the end of this month. As this is the last plenary that he will attend, I wish to convey to him on behalf of the Conference and myself our very best wishes for his future career and our most sincere appreciation for his contributions to the work of the Conference. In addition to having represented his country with distinction, Ambassador Chadha served this Conference as an elected leader and, given his well-known diplomatic skills and deep experience in multilateral organizations, it was not surprising that he discharged those responsibilities with distinction. His leadership and competence as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban are highly appreciated by all of us. Ambassador Chadha has expressed the wish to make a statement now and I therefore give him the floor.

Mr. CHADHA (India): Mr. President, may I begin by felicitating you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference and by conveying to you my best wishes for a successful and fruitful term? We are confident that with your vast experience and diplomatic skills, you will be eminently successful in guiding our deliberations.

I wish to express my deep appreciation for the kind words that you have just addressed to me. It was indeed an enriching experience for me to be present during the work of the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva at a time when new opportunities have been created in the field of disarmament by the far-reaching changes in East-West relations, the signature of the CFE Treaty in Europe and the announcement that the START Treaty between the United States and the USSR will be signed in the near future. We also saw a new momentum in the chemical weapons negotiations at Geneva, which may indeed lead to the completion of these negotiations in the near future.

As I approach the end of my tour of duty at Geneva, I would like to say a few words regarding my impressions of the work relating to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, which, as you have just recalled, Mr. President, I had the honour to chair this year. The Ad Hoc Committee, as we are all aware, was set up after a gap of seven years for a brief period last year and was re-established this year with a non-negotiating mandate. This was made possible by the spirit of compromise shown by all. The underlying expectation was that the deliberations in the Committee would prepare the ground for the eventual conclusion of a nuclear-test-ban treaty. We proceeded with our task by identifying four major topics for discussion this year. These were taken up in two clusters, viz., (i) structure and scope, and (ii) verification and compliance. In the course of the next couple of weeks, the Committee will be further enriched by interaction with representatives of the Group of Scientific Experts. The quality of the debate was extremely high; which was indicative of the interest of delegations in the issue of a nuclear test ban. Personally, I received full cooperation from the bureau members and other delegations in the conduct of these deliberations, for which I am most grateful. It would be remiss of me not to mention the extremely competent work put in by the secretariat; and the interpreters, who had to deal with some complex terminologies.

(Mr. Chadha, India)

The exchange of views in the Committee brought out the universal recognition of the importance of the multilateral consideration of the question. The need for the Committee to be provided with a negotiating mandate continues to be underlined by most delegations. The view has also been expressed that all nuclear-weapon States must participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. While there was general acceptance of the final goal of a nuclear test ban, differences still remain on its timing and modalities. It was recognized that the achievement of a comprehensive test ban is only a partial measure in the overall goal of complete nuclear disarmament and that its importance cannot be belittled in this context. There is no doubt that a global nuclear-test-ban treaty would stem proliferation both vertically and horizontally and this would be a genuine non-proliferation measure. It was pointed out during the discussions that while a comprehensive test ban was desirable, even a one-kiloton ceiling on tests could seriously curtail the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons. This lends credence to the view that a nuclear-test-ban treaty has to be achieved quickly, lest the problems of verification become intractable. As far as verification is concerned, though there has been a widely held view that seismic methods would be adequate to detect and identify major underground nuclear explosions, it has been pointed out that an acceptable level of certainty and compliance could be achieved by looking at other methods as well; such as measurement of radiation, satellite monitoring, acoustic methods, on-site inspections and other relevant measures. The work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has been widely commended. It has been stated that the overall technical work of the Group should be seen in the political context and the guidance of the Ad Hoc Committee is essential in this respect. In this context, many delegations held the view that the GSE should be given clear and precise future tasks as quickly as possible.

The Committee also benefited from a number of concrete proposals on verification as well as on the structure of the future nuclear-test-ban treaty. The contribution of Sweden, which was made today, will further enrich the Committee's work. A nuclear test ban is more easily verifiable than most other disarmament measures. However, a decision whether or not to go ahead with the treaty would not be based only on this consideration. It would be essentially a political decision based on governmental calculations of national security and international stability. It is important that such a decision, which would help save resources needed for peaceful purposes, diminish the dangers to the environment and improve the international political climate, leading further to other disarmament measures, is taken at the earliest possible time. It is my hope that the report of the Ad Hoc Committee this year will identify specific issues for future work. It is important that delegations concentrate on a list of priorities in order to sustain an interest in this item next year and beyond. It is my experience that delegations have already shown flexibility in this regard and this should not pose insurmountable problems. I intend to hold further consultations in the course of today on this important question.

The present international situation offers adequate opportunities for the Conference on Disarmament to live up to its reputation as the single multilateral negotiating forum. The conclusion of a chemical weapons

(Mr. Chadha, India)

convention in the near future would certainly be a shot in the arm for this body. Although I have some regrets that I will not be here when this convention is finalized, I can assure you that the Indian delegation will continue to cooperate fully with other delegations at the CD in order to fulfil our important task. I wish to thank all delegations once again for their cooperation. I am also grateful to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, and his able deputy, Ambassador Berasategui, with whom I have had a long association, the other members of the secretariat for their support and encouragement, and finally wish the Conference on Disarmament well in the accomplishment of its tasks.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for his statement, and for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

If there is no other delegation wishing to take the floor, I shall proceed to other business. I see none.

The Conference has before it working paper CD/WP.408, relating to a request from Malta to participate in the work of the Conference at plenary meetings and in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I gained the impression at presidential consultations yesterday that there was no objection to that request. This being the case, I would think there is no need to hold an informal meeting to consider it, on the understanding that this does not set a precedent for the consideration of other requests. Shall I take it that the Conference agrees to the draft decision?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The Permanent Mission of Malta will be informed accordingly.

The secretariat has circulated today the timetable for meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies next week. You will notice that the Seismic Group will begin its thirty-second session on Monday, at 11 a.m., in conference room VII. As we are approaching the last month of work of the Conference, I appeal to all members to be available to start our meetings on time, so that we can fully utilize the resources available to us. This applies in particular to those meetings being held consecutively, and thus the utmost punctuality is required. Of course, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. On this understanding, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the informal paper.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: I have no other business for today, but before adjourning this plenary meeting, I wish to remind you all that the Conference will hold an informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", immediately following this. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 1 August, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.600
1 August 1991

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDREDTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 1 August 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Stephen J. Ledogar (United States of America)

GE.91-62125/3497B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 600th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset I wish to convey to the representative of Switzerland, on behalf of the Conference on Disarmament and myself as President, our warmest congratulations on the 700th anniversary of the Swiss Confederation. I hardly need stress the important role that Switzerland has played and continues to play in international affairs. Its reputation as the centre for sensitive negotiations on major issues facing the international community is well known, not only to us diplomats but to international public opinion at large. This important role has been further strengthened by a tradition which has rendered great contributions in the field of international humanitarian law and by the involvement of Swiss institutions in relief work for those suffering in regions devastated by the ravages of war and natural catastrophes. It is certainly not by chance that Switzerland is the host to a number of organizations in the United Nations system, and also to this Conference, to which it has been contributing effectively. May I ask the representative of Switzerland to transmit to his Government our best wishes on this historic commemorative day?

I should now like to extend a warm welcome on behalf of the Conference to the new representative of Indonesia, Soemadi Brotodiningrat, who is attending this plenary meeting. In doing so, I wish to pledge to him the continuing cooperation of my delegation with his own in the activities of the Conference. I am sure that we shall have in him a colleague who will carry on the good work done by his predecessor.

I also note today the presence of the participants in the 1991 United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme, who will be following our work as part of their activities. We all wish them success in their endeavours.

I have on my list of speakers today the representatives of France and Pakistan. At the end of that list I shall also make a short statement as representative of the United States of America, as will the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I now give the floor to the representative of France, Ambassador Errera.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): First of all, Mr. President, I should like to address to you my warmest congratulations on taking up the office of President of our Conference. We can all gauge the authority, the high ideals and the effectiveness with which you have been conducting our work. I am also pleased to be speaking following the signing between the United States and the Soviet Union of a disarmament agreement which my Government, like many others, has hailed as a historic event, and on which my delegation will have occasion to make its views known in the near future. I also wish to address my heartiest congratulations to the representative of Switzerland upon the national holiday of his country, which this year marks the 700th anniversary of the Confederation. Lastly, I also wish to greet and extend a welcome to our new colleague from Indonesia.

(Mr. Errera, France)

I have asked for the floor today in order to introduce a working paper (distributed under number CD/1092) relating to the prevention of an arms race in space. In its recent arms control and disarmament plan which I had occasion to present here on 6 June last, France proposed the development of a regime of confidence-building measures in space, in particular in the form of a "code of conduct in space" applicable to civilian and military satellites. The subject of course is not a new one. It has already been discussed within the Conference, and in particular in its Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, where numerous proposals have been put forward since 1985, in particular by the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, Australia, Poland, the Soviet Union and Argentina. This work demonstrated that this subject was the focus of growing interest and support. Each of us is aware of the difficulties involved in a total prohibition of the deployment of arms in space. How does one define these arms, for example, and above all how does one verify such a prohibition?

On the other hand, by means of confidence-building measures - the development of registration and rules of behaviour - the purpose is to enhance the security of space activities by preventing any aggressive use of space. Experience acquired on Earth does indeed demonstrate that the implementation of confidence-building and security-building measures can constitute a fundamental stage leading subsequently to disarmament. This action, in our view, would not only be in keeping with the interests of all space Powers, but would contribute to ensuring international stability and help to permit development in space cooperation for civilian and scientific purposes, in the interests of all States, in conformity with the spirit of the 1967 outer space Treaty. That is why, among all the topics under discussion in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, France is convinced that it is confidence-building measures which offer the best prospects for the near future.

France also proposed, in its disarmament plan of 3 June, the creation of regional agencies responsible for transparency, which would benefit from access to satellite images in the context of regional agreements on confidence and security. The usefulness of data derived from space observation in the monitoring of disarmament agreements or crisis management needs no further demonstration. Moreover, the international community increasingly recognizes the need for a regional approach to security and disarmament. France is therefore ready, for its part, to make a contribution to the establishment of such agencies, in particular through the training of specialists in photo-interpretation, the definition of reception facilities which could be made available to such agencies, and cooperation with other producers of space images to supply the agencies with the data needed for their operations.

The working paper submitted by my delegation provides further details of these various proposals. It will also be the subject of a more elaborate presentation by an expert from the National Centre for Space Studies, Mr. Pierre-Henri Pisani, at the next meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space on 6 August next. I hope that this contribution will make it possible for the Committee to move forward in its work.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Kamal.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): In my statement today I propose to address some aspects of the future chemical weapons convention, an important subject to which the Conference on Disarmament continues to devote by far the greatest amount of its time.

Allow me to reiterate, at the very outset, our perception of what the chemical weapons convention should encompass. We support a comprehensive, effective and equitable treaty which prohibits the development, stockpiling, acquisition, transfer and use of chemical weapons, and which provides for the total destruction of existing stockpiles, production facilities and delivery systems of chemical weapons. A convention which contains anything less than these fundamental provisions would not enjoy universal support, and this would undermine the basic concept of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. Let me also state once again for the record that Pakistan neither possesses chemical weapons nor desires to acquire them, and that it will continue to actively and positively contribute towards the early conclusion of a chemical weapons convention.

The impetus that has been provided to our negotiations by the recent change in the United States position is timely, and we welcome it. In fact, it has made it possible for us to refine article I, which for the first time now clearly spells out the prohibition of use in a straight-forward manner. If we continue our work in the same spirit in the coming months, and show due regard for the views of all negotiating partners, there is no reason why a convention cannot be concluded by the end of 1992 as has already been resolved by us.

Confidence in compliance with the future chemical weapons convention lies at the heart of our negotiations. It would be too simplistic to build a vitally important disarmament convention only on the premise that States parties would adhere to it in good faith, and with the intention of abiding by its provisions. Provisions relating to verification and compliance will consequently have to establish a system which ensures that treaty obligations are being strictly observed. While 100 per cent effective compliance machinery does not appear within the realm of the possible, our endeavour is to create an equitable and efficacious verification system which maximizes confidence in the treaty provisions. It is obvious that the type and intrusiveness of verification to which an activity would be subjected should be determined by the element of risk which that particular activity poses for the convention.

The verification regime which we have been developing for the convention consists of two main elements, namely routine inspection under article VI and challenge inspection under article IX. I shall address these articles separately.

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

The importance of verification under article VI is undeniable. Unlike the provisions in the convention concerning destruction, which will apply only to chemical-weapon States, and which will hopefully become obsolete after the 10-year destruction period during which stocks and production facilities would be eliminated, the monitoring regime for activities not prohibited under the convention will be of unlimited duration and of direct interest to a considerably larger number of States. In this context we have addressed the question of clandestine production in facilities which are normally devoted to peaceful purposes but which could be converted to the production of chemicals posing a risk to the objectives of the convention. In developing a regime to address these concerns we must ensure that it is as non-intrusive as possible, while at the same time being as cost-effective as possible. We are not in favour of a system which places unnecessary hindrances on the civilian chemical industry, and in which certain elements of the challenge inspection procedure are sought to be injected. Continued insistence on the inclusion of such concepts are liable to result in the unnecessary politicization of an activity which is intrinsically routine in nature.

The provisions of article IX on challenge inspection will have a central place in the proposed convention, both as a means of providing confidence in its implementation and in order to deter potential violations. To be effective these procedures will have to be expeditious, non-discriminatory and mandatory. Although these principles now seem to be generally accepted, the task of translating them into agreed procedures has not been easy. Numerous proposals have been put forward, but success has eluded us so far. The working paper introduced by four delegations recently is a brave and positive attempt to break the deadlock on this issue, and we have noted that in its effort to accommodate many of the concerns that have been expressed in the Ad hoc Committee by various delegations, it has departed from some concepts which until now had been considered as sacrosanct and non-negotiable.

On this subject of challenge inspection, I would like to state once again some of the ideas which my delegation has expressed in the past, and continues to favour. Critically important among these is the imperative need for including clear conditions which prevent abuse of challenge inspection procedures, and which ensure the legitimate right of States, and particularly smaller States, to protect and safeguard sensitive information and installations which are not relevant to the convention. Additionally, once a challenge inspection is launched, it becomes a subject of concern to the States parties, and can no longer be treated as a bilateral affair between the challenging State and the challenged State: the primary responsibility of carrying out the inspection is that of the technical secretariat. The role of the observer still needs to be clearly defined, taking care not to make him into an "inspector of inspectors". And finally, irrespective of the subjective assessments of the parties concerned, once an inspection is completed, a clear determination on compliance or otherwise should be arrived at by the executive council. Failure to include such a provision in the convention would perpetuate a climate of distrust, and undermine confidence in the verification procedures.

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

Articles X and XI of the convention are of special importance for the developing countries. My delegation has taken a particular interest in the development of the provisions for these articles, and we are happy to see that agreement has finally been reached in the Ad Hoc Committee to enhance their status by placing them in appendix I. This is indeed an important and overdue breakthrough, though some additional work is required yet to further refine their provisions. The viability and universality of the convention will depend, to a great extent, on the final shape these articles acquire before negotiations are concluded.

Even though the text of article X is fairly well developed, our perception of what it should encompass bears repetition. Firstly, an article which does not assure mandatory assistance and protection against the use or threat of use of chemical weapons will lead to an unbalanced convention. Secondly, the system that is established under this article for the provision of assistance should have an automaticity and predictability about it, of the type of automaticity and predictability that is being sought for the verification mechanisms, for the two directly complement each other. Thirdly and finally, a system of assistance and protection will have no meaning without the actual availability of adequate resources with the Director General, which enable him to provide assistance and protection in case of need, and most particularly in cases requiring emergency assistance.

The language of article XI was developed some years ago and will have to be refined to reflect existing realities. In our view, the provisions of this article should incorporate the obligation of States parties not to impede international cooperation in the peaceful uses of chemical science and technology, and an undertaking that existing discriminatory mechanisms will be dismantled once the convention comes into force. As in the case of the suggestion that has been repeatedly heard in this forum, calling on all States to declare their intention to adhere to a future convention even while its text is still under negotiation, perhaps member States who, individually or collectively, apply export controls and restrictions on the transfer of certain chemicals may consider declaring their intention to dismantle these measures for the States who signed the future chemical weapons convention. Simultaneously, as suggested by Austria and supported by other States, member States who have entered reservations to the Geneva Protocol might also consider announcing their intention to withdraw their reservations once the convention comes into force. Such gestures would promote confidence in the convention, and contribute to the objective of its universality, to which we are all committed.

The composition, powers and functions of the executive council are outstanding and thorny issues, and we hope that they will be addressed in an appropriate setting during the current session of the Ad Hoc Committee. Our past discussions have helped us to identify most of the issues and options already. What is now required is the will to strike a compromise which should be realistic and equitable.

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

We share the view expressed by a majority of delegations that the executive council should consist of between about 25 and 30 members. At the same time we also believe that the convention should contain provision for the expansion of the executive council in the future, if the situation so warrants.

While choosing a system for the allocation of seats, a balance has to be struck between the undeniable interests of those States which have substantial chemical industries many of which will either be directly concerned by the convention or whose cooperation will be essential, the equally undeniable interests of those States which are situated in particularly sensitive regions or who have specific threat perceptions, and the overall and overriding need for a democratic and regionally representative membership. However, some flexibility will be necessary so that no one of these three legitimacies overwhelms the other two, and so that the membership of this vital organ does not take on a colour that prejudges its decisions. We think a formula can be found, provided there is general agreement on the need for compromise and adjustment between these three types of interest.

We are now in a stage of intense and intensified work, when many factors lead us to believe that meaningful results can be achieved in negotiating and drafting a convention which will be comprehensive and fair, and which will then draw the type of universal adherence which we all seek. Let none of us be found wanting in far-sighted statesmanship now when the glimmer of success is in sight, and when we all see the positive and early possibility of outlawing an entire type of abhorrent weapon from our global community.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement. As I now have no other previously inscribed speakers on my list, I shall now proceed with my own statement. I see now and recognize the representative of Germany, Ambassador von Wagner.

Mr. von WAGNER (Germany): Mr. President, forgive me for asking for the floor without being inscribed on your list. I take the floor to announce the following.

The German delegation has pleasure in informing you about a technical presentation on "Lessons learnt from GSETT-2: A proposal for an open seismic stations concept" by the German representatives to the GSE, Prof. Dr. Harjes and Mr. Henger. In this presentation, an alternative to the currently used concept of national and international data centres for the verification of a future NTB will be suggested. The open seismic station concept would result in significant advantages, such as immediate and unhindered access to seismic wave-form data by all participants at any time; retrieval of data on a need-to-know basis, thus reducing the requirements for communications; and, finally, costs for data transmission will be lowered considerably.

The presentation will take place at 3 p.m. on 7 August 1991 in room XVI on the fifth floor of the Palais des Nations, and it will be followed by a reception in the Delegates' Restaurant on the eighth floor of the same Palais. The German delegation would be highly honoured if delegations could find time to attend the presentation and to take part in the reception in the Delegates' Restaurant.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Germany for his statement, and we will take due note of the information he has kindly provided.

I would now proceed with the brief statements by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

As was already noted by the representative of France, yesterday a historic agreement, the Treaty on strategic arms reductions or the START Treaty, was signed in Moscow by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev. That signing ceremony culminated nine years of hard work here in Geneva, and represented a major achievement in securing a more stable, predictable balance at lower levels of strategic nuclear forces.

Once ratified, the START Treaty will reduce, over seven years, each side's strategic nuclear weapons from their current levels of between 10,000 and 11,000 weapons to between 8,000 and 9,000 weapons. The agreement includes a major reduction in the most destabilizing and dangerous weapons - namely, land-based ballistic missiles and their warheads - and it places restrictions on specific types of strategic weapons. The Treaty embodies the concepts of equality, stability, predictability, deep reductions, and transparency.

Perhaps the most important aspect of this Treaty is its contribution to increasing predictability and transparency. A protocol containing over 80 different types of notifications will help both sides understand the strategic military activities of the other side. Twelve different forms of inspections and the permanent monitoring of certain ballistic missile production in each country will provide firm assurances that Treaty obligations are being met. The Treaty will have a duration of 15 years, unless superseded beforehand by a subsequent agreement.

At a future date, we would plan to introduce the basic text of the START Treaty into this body as a CD document.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Batsanov.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): First of all, I should now like to convey greetings to the representative of Switzerland, Ambassador von Arx, and the members of his delegation, on the occasion of the 700th anniversary of the Swiss Confederation. This is an important landmark in the history of a country which is playing a very positive role in the European and world processes. We value not only the traditional Swiss hospitality, which ensures excellent conditions in particular for the work of a whole range of the most important international organizations, including the Conference on Disarmament, but also the specific constructive contribution made by the Swiss Government to the settlement of problems facing the world community. On behalf of the Soviet delegation and personally, I should like on this day to wish our Swiss colleagues every success, health and happiness, and I would request them to transmit our sincere congratulations and best wishes to the Swiss Government.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

I would also wish to offer greetings to our distinguished President, Ambassador Ledogar, who is conducting the proceedings of the Conference in a highly worthy manner, and also to express confidence that during his tenure as President we will achieve concrete results in the solution of tasks facing the Conference.

Today, as the representative of a State - one of the two States - participating in the bilateral Soviet-American negotiations, which culminated yesterday in the signing of the historic Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, I wish to say a few words in connection with that event, without repeating what has just been stated by Ambassador Ledogar. The Treaty signed by our Presidents is the result of many years of efforts, a great deal of work and patience, will-power and boldness, demanded of statesmen, diplomats and the military, as well as the overcoming of stereotyped ideas concerning each other which on occasion appeared to be tougher than gun-metal. The Treaty symbolizes the continuation of the voluntary reduction of the nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the United States of America, which is unprecedented in scale and purpose and offers unequivocal proof of the resolve of both sides to discharge their obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Together with the Treaty on the elimination of Soviet and American intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, it imparts to the dismantling of the infrastructure of nuclear confrontation which was built up during the years of the "cold war" a momentum which it will be difficult to halt. It is important that now there is growing understanding of the absurdity of an overarmed world, especially when mankind has moved towards an era of economic interdependence. To be sure the Treaty is not ideal, and we cannot exclude the possibility that certain provisions contained in it will be criticized. Many, perhaps, may say that the reductions provided for are not sufficient. However, we are convinced that the parties have done everything that is possible at this stage and at the same time necessary for further movement forward. It is important that we have built a basis for further stabilizing reductions in strategic offensive armaments, and the resolve of the parties to move forward in this direction has been placed on record, inter alia in the Soviet-American statement of 1 June 1990.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I would now ask whether any other representative wishes to address the plenary today. I see that the representative of Switzerland wishes to take the floor. You have the floor, Ambassador von Arx.

Mr. von ARX (Switzerland) (translated from French): As this is the first time that I am taking the floor in this plenary, Mr. President, I wish to extend my warm congratulations to you on your task that is so full of responsibilities and dignity. The delegation of Switzerland is convinced that under your guidance, and that of your predecessors, we will make significant steps towards our common goal, and we are indebted to you and all those who preceded you for all your endeavours. I would like to assure you of the constructive cooperation of the delegation of Switzerland. On this occasion also I wish to welcome our new colleague from Indonesia.

(Mr. von ARX, Switzerland)

You, Mr. President, as well as the representatives of France and the Soviet Union, were kind enough this morning, on our national day, to convey dignified and friendly words of congratulation to my delegation and my country on the occasion of its 700th anniversary. We are very grateful to you and I must say how moved we were at your words. I shall without fail convey this to my authorities. Seven hundred years of existence of a small State in the midst of Europe which is often so turbulent - are there any lessons to be drawn from this, any experience to be gained that might perhaps be helpful to us too in our work which is so important here in the Conference on Disarmament?

Perhaps one first point. Our Confoederatio Helvetica did not drop out of the sky, and it is never quite complete. It was created 700 years ago by the firm political will of three small mountain States in the centre of our country, and that political will to expand that State, even by entities with different cultures, different languages or religions, was necessary throughout the 700 years and will be necessary too in the future. Let us recall the fact that the most recent canton in our country, the canton of Jura, was established not quite 20 years ago, when the canton of Jura separated from the canton of Berne in keeping with the wishes of its population and acceptance by the people of Berne and all of Switzerland. Our country is and remains based on that political will which must be elaborated on, maintained, developed, day by day, year by year. What ideas can we draw from this to assist us in our work? That we too must continue our political work day after day without giving up courage and confidence, and that, even if we have attained intermediate goals, however extraordinarily important, our work will not be finished.

A further point. Only roughly 150 years ago, my country was one of the poorest countries in Europe. Karl Marx, when he made an extended trip to Switzerland, ended by drawing conclusions concerning what he had seen and studied. His verdict was that, given the geographical circumstances - just rocks, a few pastures and a few cows, and the absence of raw materials - Switzerland would forever remain a poor State. If you compare that with the development of my country since then, we can perhaps draw two conclusions. First of all, that even great minds can make mistakes, and secondly that even things that appear to be impossible can be realized. That too can guide us in our work and give us courage.

With these few thoughts I would like to conclude, thanking you all once again for your warm congratulations. The Swiss delegation is pleased to invite you all this evening to our 700th anniversary at the Domaine de Penthes.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Switzerland, and also for the kind words addressed to the Chair, and we look forward to his hospitality this evening. I see that the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Brotodiningrat, wishes to take the floor.

Mr. BROTODININGRAT (Indonesia): May I first congratulate you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament? I would also like to felicitate the delegation of Switzerland, which today celebrates the 700th anniversary of its beautiful country.

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

May I take the opportunity just to express my most sincere thanks and appreciation for your kind words of welcome you have just addressed to me? Being just a beginner, it would be pretentious for me to promise you a substantial contribution to the work of the Conference on Disarmament, but it would certainly be most appropriate for my delegation to pledge to you its full cooperation in the discharge of your demanding task. Let me at this point just reiterate the utmost importance that my Government attaches to disarmament in general and to the work of the CD in particular. Once again, Mr. President, thank you very much for the welcome.

The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Sir, and I hope that your tour here will be long enough that you can make it around to this seat before you leave.

May I now turn to other business? First of all, the secretariat has circulated today the timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies to be held next week. As usual, the timetable is only indicative and may be changed if necessary. On this understanding, I suggest that we adopt it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Next, I would like to recall that, in the context of the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, there will be a number of activities. I have asked the secretariat to circulate the text of a communication addressed to me by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, Dr. Ola Dahlman, concerning a technical demonstration of Inmarsat's satellite transmission capability. That letter will also be circulated this afternoon in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, for its information. The technical demonstration will be held on 8 August at 3 p.m. in the Salon de Genève, Delegates' Restaurant, on the eighth floor. We were also informed by the representative of Canada, at our last plenary meeting, that on Monday 5 August, Dr. Kin Yip Chun will present a layman's briefing on certain aspects of his work, which will focus on further developments of seismic monitoring methodologies. That briefing will take place in room VII at 3 p.m. As announced today by the representative of Germany, his delegation is inviting all members and non-members to a technical demonstration of an "open seismic CD station", to take place on Wednesday 7 August, at 3 p.m. in room XVI.

I have no other business for today. Before I adjourn, I should like to recall that, immediately following this plenary meeting, the Conference will hold its last informal meeting on the substance of agenda item 2. As announced on several occasions, with that meeting the Conference shall conclude its series of informal meetings on agenda items 2 and 3. Of course, in accordance with the rules of procedure, members wishing to do so may continue to address these agenda items at plenary meetings of the Conference.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held one week from today, on Thursday 8 August, at 10. a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.05 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.601
8 August 1991

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 8 August 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Stephen J. Ledogar (United States of America)

GE.91-62194/3569B

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 601st plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the outset, I would like to bid farewell, on behalf of the Conference and myself, to two distinguished friends and colleagues who are today attending the plenary for the last time before they assume new functions assigned to them by their Governments. I take particular pleasure in doing so, as they are both being appointed to serve in different capacities in my own country. During his brief but able tenure as representative of Brazil to this Conference, Ambassador Ricupero has confirmed once more his reputation in Geneva as a skilful and competent diplomat. He has now been entrusted with the responsibility of representing his country before my own Government in Washington. Relations between Brazil and the United States have always been excellent, and I cannot think of a more appropriate interlocutor to further strengthen those relations. Ambassador Elaraby of Egypt is a very experienced diplomat in the field of disarmament, having also served with distinction in the predecessor of this body, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. A gifted professional, during his four years with this Conference everyone has come to value his talent for persuasion and his knowledge of the complexities of multilateral diplomacy. This will, I am sure, serve him well in his new functions. Although he will not be dealing with bilateral relations, while in New York he will be a welcome and appreciated guest of the United States. On behalf of all of us I wish our two colleagues every success in their new postings.

The representative of Brazil, Ambassador Ricupero, has asked to say a few words at this point and, if there is no objection from the listed speakers, I would give him the floor at this time. Ambassador, you have the floor.

Mr. RICUPERO (Brazil): Mr. President, with your permission and the permission of the other speakers, I would like to have the privilege of taking the floor right away because unfortunately I have to leave shortly, so to my great regret I cannot stay until the end of the proceedings. I was deeply moved by your words, Mr. President, and it gives me particular satisfaction to hear them from you, the representative of the United States of America, a country where in a few weeks I will have the honour of representing my own country, Brazil, going back to the post where I served about 15 or 18 years ago. I would also like to express my feelings of deep gratitude to yourself and to all our colleagues for the numerous signs of friendship, of sympathy, of cooperation, extended to me during my work here in the Conference. I have greatly benefited from your wisdom, from your experience, and I am sorry to leave the Conference at this moment, at this turning-point in international affairs when things are moving everywhere, where I am sure that the Conference on Disarmament will have its share of historical progress - I am sure you will make good use of the opportunity that is opening before us. I would like once again to thank you all, to wish you all well in your endeavours.

The PRESIDENT: I have on my list of speakers today, the representatives of Poland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Egypt, Argentina, Romania and Morocco. I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, Mr. Przygodzki.

Mr. PRZYGODZKI (Poland): My delegation has already had a chance to congratulate you, Mr. President, on the assumption of your responsible duties. Today, as the term of your presidency is going to be completed soon, I should like to express our deep appreciation for the exemplary way you have guided the deliberations of this body and for your personal input to the work of the Conference.

I wish to join you, Mr. President, in saying words of farewell to the distinguished Ambassador of Brazil and to the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt. The Polish delegation highly appreciated the cooperation with them and the important contribution they made to the work of this Conference. We wish them well in their future careers and personal lives.

I wish to express the deep satisfaction of my Government with the signing last week by President George Bush and President Mikhail Gorbachev of the strategic arms reduction Treaty. I should like to convey to you, Mr. President, as the representative of the United States, as well as to the representative of the USSR, our warmest congratulations on this historic event. We highly appreciate the efforts which have been made both by your country, Mr. President, and by the Soviet Union in overcoming all the difficulties and obstacles on the road to concluding the START Treaty. This is indeed good news for the whole of mankind, and also for this body, which has the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament high on its agenda. The START Treaty, being the first commitment of both States to cut significantly the arsenals of long-range nuclear weapons, including, in particular, the most destabilizing systems of such weapons, will undoubtedly stand as a milestone on the way towards a more secure world. I do hope that in a near future we negotiators in Geneva will be able to make our own contribution to disarmament efforts by successfully completing negotiations on the chemical weapons convention.

In our last statement at the Conference on Disarmament my delegation promised to present a report on a trial inspection on request conducted at some Soviet military facilities on Polish territory. Poland initiated preparations for such an inspection at the beginning of this year. However, at that time our initiative did not materialize. Today I would like to introduce a joint report on behalf of the Republic of Poland and the USSR on the trial inspection on request conducted by Poland at two Soviet military facilities located on the territory of my country on 17 and 18 April 1991. The detailed report on the conduct of this inspection and its results is tabled as document CD/1093 (working paper CD/CW/WP.354).

The principal aims of this inspection were, first, to confirm, in so far as Poland's territory is concerned, the USSR declaration on non-possession of chemical weapons outside its territory; and second, to test relevant procedures of the "rolling text" in practice and to train inspectors in carrying out such inspections. In view of the twofold character of this inspection certain procedural elements were properly adjusted without

(Mr. Przygodzki, Poland)

prejudice to relevant provisions under the convention. At the same time activities of inspectors were carried out pursuant to a bilateral protocol agreed between Poland and the USSR based on the preceding version of the "rolling text" (CD/1033).

The facilities inspected during this inspection on request were selected by the Polish side. The first was a central artillery depot of the Soviet troops, the second a central chemical depot, both located on the territory of Poland. The different nature of each of these facilities required different approaches to the conduct of the inspection. In the latter case the inspection team inspected the entire depot, while at the first facility it was possible to limit the inspection to just a part of it. In both cases conclusions were identical: no chemical weapons or their traces were discovered.

I would like to note with appreciation the full cooperation of the Soviet authorities and the management of the inspected facilities at all stages of the inspection. The inspection team had full access to all places selected by it, as well as to all documentation. This played an important role as a confidence-building measure at a time when relations between Poland and the USSR are being developed on a qualitatively new basis.

The experience gained during the exercise confirmed that inspection on request constitutes an indispensable element of the effective verification of compliance with the convention. The extent of cooperation by the inspected State with the inspection team will play a great role in dispelling concern about treaty compliance and terminating an inspection at an earlier stage when sufficient evidence is obtained that doubts or suspicion giving rise to the request were unwarranted. A request for inspection should, to the extent possible, clearly identify the nature of suspicion. This would considerably facilitate the task of the technical secretariat to select inspectors with appropriate qualifications and suitable equipment to fulfil the aims of the inspection.

In view of the importance of inspections on request in the verification system of the future chemical weapons convention, my delegation welcomes all efforts to find a final solution to this very important issue in our negotiations. Working paper CD/CW/WP.352 constitutes, in our view, a good basis for further work on article IX. We do believe that an agreement on the final shape of inspection on request will enable us to make progress on all other outstanding issues, thus contributing to the attainment of our common goal - completing negotiations on the chemical weapons convention by 1992. My delegation is ready to contribute its share in this endeavour.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Poland for his statement and for the joint report he introduced, and I also thank him for the kind words addressed to the Chair and to the arms control and disarmament efforts of my Government. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Iossifov.

Mr. IOSSIFOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): On behalf of the Soviet delegation I too wish to express our appreciation and gratitude to the distinguished Ambassadors of Brazil and Egypt for their contribution to the work of the Conference on Disarmament and for their cooperation with the Soviet delegation. We wish them success in their future endeavours.

Today the Soviet delegation jointly with the delegation of the Republic of Poland is introducing for consideration by the participants in the negotiations a document entitled "Joint report on a trial inspection on request", which is being circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament numbered CD/1093 and dated 6 August 1991, and at the same time as a working paper of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons under number CD/CW/WP.354. In terms of timing the introduction of this document has coincided with the stepping up of the discussion on inspections on request in the negotiations, and we hope that the submitted material will facilitate the search for a mutually acceptable solution to this problem.

As the participants in the negotiations are aware, the Soviet Union has officially declared that it has no chemical weapons on the territory of other States (CD/CW/WP.264). The Republic of Poland, which has also submitted data related to chemical weapons to the Conference on Disarmament, has declared, inter alia, that it does not possess chemical weapons (CD/985). With a view to strengthening mutual understanding and trust between the two sides, the Soviet Union and Poland agreed to carry out a trial inspection on request. The trial inspection had the following aims: to confirm, in so far as Poland's territory is concerned, the USSR declaration on non-possession of chemical weapons outside its territory; to test in practice the relevant procedures of the protocol on inspection procedures contained in the draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons to be used in checking the suspected storage of chemical weapons; to determine the necessary scope of activities which should be carried out by the inspection team during an inspection on request at military facilities; and lastly to train inspectors in carrying out such inspections.

The trial inspection was carried out during the period from 17 to 18 April 1991 at two Soviet military facilities located on Polish territory. The facilities to be inspected were selected by the Polish side. The inspection was carried out at the central artillery depot, where different types of artillery munitions are stored, and at the central chemical depot, where gear for protection against weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, are stored. On the basis of the results of the inspection it was concluded that no chemical weapons or traces of such weapons are present at the inspected facilities. Overall the experiment demonstrated that it is important and essential to include a concept of inspections on request in the verification mechanism under the future convention as a basic element for ensuring compliance with the provisions of the convention and dispelling possible concerns on the part of the future States parties with regard to such compliance.

(Mr. Iossifov, USSR)

Allow me now to dwell in a little more detail on certain aspects of the trial inspection which are of direct relevance to the issues in the context of inspections on request currently under discussion in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. First, it should be noted, in our view, that the inspection team was granted access to any place within the inspected facilities. During the inspection there were no cases of refusal to grant any requests for access. Another aspect is related to the time elapsing between the submission of the request for the inspection and the granting of access to the facilities indicated in the request. The request was submitted 16 hours prior to the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry. Access to the first facility was provided within two hours after arrival at the point of entry. The notification of the second facility to be inspected was presented 15 hours prior to the arrival of the inspection team at the facility. During the inspection agreed equipment was used.

Naturally, the results of this inspection on request do not claim to be regarded as universal, but we hope that their joint presentation by the Soviet and Polish delegations will help the participants in the negotiations to finalize their approach to this form of verification.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement, which also spoke of the joint report addressed by the representative of Poland. I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Elaraby.

Mr. ELARABY (Egypt): It is a source of great pleasure for me to take the floor under the presidency of Ambassador Stephen Ledogar, the distinguished representative of the United States. Your wide and highly recognized diplomatic experience, Mr. President, is well known to all the members of the Conference on Disarmament. Your contributions in the field of disarmament, both bilateral and multilateral, are well recognized. I am confident that under your very able leadership meaningful progress in our work will be attained. Mr. President, I was personally touched by the gracious sentiments you expressed regarding my departure from Geneva and the assumption of my new post in New York, and I am grateful for that.

I shall at the outset address the chemical weapons convention. I begin by paying tribute to the efforts of Ambassador Serguei Batsanov of the Soviet Union, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and the three chairmen of the working groups entrusted with the preparation of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, as well as the Friends of the Chair. My delegation's gratitude also goes to Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail and his able assistants for their meticulous work.

The spectre of the production and use of chemical weapons has caused universal concern. There is no doubt that a comprehensive treaty banning chemical weapons is the appropriate framework to deal with the question. The work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons established by the Conference on Disarmament is closely followed now by the international community as a whole. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is at present

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

undertaking consultations on an extensive programme of work for the remainder of 1991 and the beginning of 1992. Whatever the outcome of his consultations, I wish to state that my delegation is prepared to work on a full-scale schedule should the Conference on Disarmament so decide.

Last year the President of the United States made an important and timely initiative on chemical weapons. My delegation is grateful that it took two stumbling-blocks out of our way. But what is more significant is that it reaffirmed the commitment on the highest level in the United States to the conclusion of a convention on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, and that there is no place on board for non-proliferation; a position that Egypt has always maintained.

Egypt is of the view that universal adherence to the chemical weapons convention is imperative. To attain univeral adherence all the Members of the United Nations should be involved, as appropriate, in the actual preparation of the convention. An open-ended preparatory commission to precede or follow a ministerial conference, or, as the Foreign Minister of Japan suggested when he addressed us on 6 June 1991, that "we should consider convening a meeting in Geneva at the level of high officials", could positively contribute towards the universality that we aspire to attain and could serve as a useful tool in our quest to encourage universal adherence. For this reason we appreciate the constructive step that the Conference on Disarmament took when it considered sending letters to States which are neither members of nor observers at our Conference, bringing to their attention the most recent report of the Ad Hoc Committee so that they could benefit from following the work in this important phase. By doing this, I believe that we would achieve two objectives. The first is to have more participation in our work by observers in the Conference, and the second is to embark on the open-ended preparatory phase we have been considering for a long time now.

In this connection, I would like to refer to the proposal to convene a ministerial meeting as one method of finalizing our work and ensuring universality. Since the proposed ministerial meeting is directly related to the package approach, the decision to convene it is anchored on what we will be able to accomplish in elaborating the package. The more concise the package is, the more easy it becomes to invite the ministers to accelerate the conclusion of the CW convention. On the other hand, if the package is not based on a comprehensive approach the preparation of the ministerial meeting becomes insufficient, and would have negative effects because we will only be left with incoherent positions at the highest level of decision-making, which could backfire.

It is good news that the members of the Conference have agreed to add a reference to the prohibition of use to the mandate. This, however, just brings the wording of the mandate into line with the unambiguous absolute prohibition against the use of chemical weapons that already exists in article I of the draft convention. Our aim is to conclude a convention which will be universally adhered to. But universal adherence in itself is subject

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

to the question of undiminished security - an issue which imposes itself in almost every aspect and provision of our draft convention. A legal question which is very relevant to the issue of undiminished security is the relation of the chemical weapons convention to other relevant international agreements. This provision is the cover under which unilaterally declared "rights" under the 1925 Geneva Protocol are to be transferred to and thereby eternalized in the chemical weapons convention. Some maintain the position that retaliatory use of chemical weapons in conformity with the reservations attached to the 1925 Protocol must remain permissible as long as chemical weapons exist. Any such attempts aiming at creating a situation of legal uncertainty about the scope of the prohibition and the implementation of the convention should be resisted, for it would undermine the integrity of the whole edifice of the convention. The convention should be the sole international contractual legal instrument that governs chemical weapons; otherwise we will be creating a dual legal regime. Furthermore, the legal uncertainty concerning the scope of the prohibition and the implementation of the convention will continue to plague the international community. The comprehensive undertaking not to use chemical weapons, which is already provided for in article I, paragraph 3 of the draft convention, is incompatible with any claim that a reservation to the 1925 Protocol can be carried through in the future. The chemical weapons convention should, therefore, provide that all States with retaliatory rights under the 1925 Protocol should renounce their reservations at the time they sign the convention.

Another important issue that falls directly under the broad concept of undiminished security is that of sanctions. In the absence of effective international control, comprising credible assurances as well as viable monitoring arrangements, the threat to both national and international security persists. This is why the international community should not limit itself to negative assurances in the manner followed with respect to the non-proliferation Treaty. What is needed is positive and credible assurances which would be applied through a mechanism elaborated by the convention and in conformity with the rules of international law. Sanctions, in my view, are guarantees to ensure ultimate compliance. In order to sustain the credibility of these sanctions, they will have to be monitored by the executive council acting under the appropriate supervision of the Security Council. In some cases non-compliance with the convention may constitute a threat to international peace and security. This is why I suggest that a clear relation be established between the functions and competence of the executive council and the Charter-prescribed responsibilities of the Security Council. The executive council should consider the questions of non-compliance and convey its conclusions and recommendations to the Security Council. My delegation welcomes the decision taken by the Ad Hoc Committee to incorporate a new article under the title "Measures to redress a situation and ensure compliance, including sanctions". My delegation has been advocating the inclusion of such an article since 1989. We do, however, realize that further work on this article and related provisions in other parts of the draft convention is still required.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

Another pending issue is that of settlement of disputes. There is no provision in the "rolling text" at present on this subject. Certain references, however, exist, though scattered among some articles which specify one method, namely negotiations. What happens, for example, if a solution is not reached through negotiation? All such measures and methods of dispute settlement should be incorporated in the text. Provisions dealing with settlement of disputes should be assembled under a single article, and it should be expected that certain disputes may arise out of the application or the interpretation of the convention. We must, therefore, provide adequate means for the resolution of such disputes. It is reassuring that the Ad Hoc Committee has embarked on the consideration of this subject. A new and comprehensive article on this subject in the "rolling text" will no doubt be a stimulus for further work.

The chemical weapons convention is a functional agreement. Thus the organizational aspects of the convention acquire great relevance. The executive council will be the principal political organ of the organization to be established for the purpose of implementing the convention. The composition of the executive council and its decision-making mechanism should be determined on the basis of the functional requirements - that is to say rapidity in convening meetings and the ability to take timely decisions. A flexible non-discriminatory appointment regime should be adopted to safeguard the right of every State to serve on the council without any special rights or discrimination. The functions of the executive council are just as important. The council should be expected to supervise all the activities emanating from the convention. It should consider the questions of non-compliance and convey its conclusions and recommendations to the Security Council, as I have already stated.

I now turn to the question of verification. The credibility of the verification regime to be established by the convention will be one of the major factors governing its life course. A watertight verification regime is imperative in order to allow the convention to pursue its objectives. The draft convention envisages a number of verification measures. What is revolutionary about this convention is the idea that States parties to the convention are asked to accept, beforehand, the fact that the organization, through its appropriate organs, could at any time inspect any site on their respective territories. This innovation is a bold challenge to the concept of sovereignty. If such provisions are to be enshrined in the chemical weapons convention, as we all hope, they will open a new phase in international relations built on total transparency in all disarmament agreements.

The Ad Hoc Committee has been active on the issue of challenge inspections during the past few weeks. There are several proposals on this question, the most recent of which is the proposal presented by four States and contained in document CD/CW/WP.352. The purpose of any provision on challenge inspection should be to clarify and resolve questions of compliance with the convention. Requests for inspections must only be within the scope of the convention, which is the total prohibition of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

The executive council should be informed of any request immediately, and should be able to convene right away to follow the course of the investigation so that timely decisions may be taken in order to facilitate the task of the inspectors and to control the situation. Although such inspections should be effective and timely, they should be executed in the least intrusive manner. The challenged State should have the right to protect its national security and industrial secrets. However, in order to ensure compliance by the challenged State, the chemical weapons convention should provide clear-cut procedures in order to strike a balance between these legitimate rights of States and the success of this regime. The report of the inspection operation has to be passed to the parties as well as to the executive council. This report should contain a statement of the factual findings of the inspectors, as well as a conclusion which would help the executive council in deciding whether the challenged party was in compliance with the convention or violating it. Furthermore, the executive council should be able to convene immediately to consider ways and means to remedy the situation and to ensure compliance. This would involve bringing the matter to the attention of the Security Council. A provision to ensure that the right to request challenge inspections will not be abused also has to be included in the text.

The convention should provide a protective umbrella for the States parties, in the form of assistance provided by the other States parties to limit the effect of the use or threat of use of chemical weapons. This system should cover a whole range of measures from prevention to treatment. In addition to the question of automaticity required in implementing this provision, the convention must trigger a mechanism in a well-defined time-frame. It is a major achievement that the Ad Hoc Committee was able to move article X from appendix II to appendix I. However, transferring it to appendix I does not mean that article X cannot be improved. The work undertaken in Working Group A aims at attaining such improvement.

Another major step that the Ad Hoc Committee was able to achieve during the inter-sessional period was that of taking article XI off the shelf, where it has been for several years, and putting it in its proper place in appendix I. Article XI is a key provision for universal adherence to the convention. To a large extent, adherence to it will depend, inter alia, on the nature and scope of the provisions that will provide for international cooperation to develop the peaceful uses of chemical industries; a convention that does not, however, impede peaceful chemical activities. I wish to emphasize the interest of all States in ensuring that the economic and technological development of their chemical industry are not hampered. In this context, a technical assistance programme to help parties in organizing a system for monitoring their chemical industry should be devised. It is also imperative that the flow of chemicals, instruments and data be maintained. These concepts should be scrutinized so as to clearly reflect the rights and obligations within the context of a well-justified balance.

The Ad Hoc Committee is divided on the question of environment. We believe it is important to introduce provisions on environment in relation with the destruction of CW and any other activity prohibited by the convention.

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

I now wish to address the issue of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Egypt has consistently striven to spare this region fraught with tension from the scourge of a possible recourse to any type of weapon of mass destruction. The accumulation of such weapons in the Middle East creates a destabilizing environment that endangers international peace and security.

Egypt has, since 1974, annually presented to the United Nations General Assembly a resolution calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Since 1980 that resolution has been adopted by the General Assembly by consensus. Last year a group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General submitted a study. It is relevant to recall the conclusion contained in paragraph 110 of that study that "an effective zone would be a great improvement over the present situation. The problem is how to create the conditions in which a zone becomes a realistic development."

On 8 April 1990, President Hosni Mubarak proposed the establishment of a "zone free from weapons of mass destruction" in the Middle East. The three components of President Mubarak's proposal are the following: First, that all weapons of mass destruction without exception should be prohibited in the Middle East, nuclear, chemical or biological; second, that all States of the region without exception make an equal and reciprocal commitment in this regard; third, that verification measures and modalities be established to ascertain full compliance by all States in the region with the full scope of that prohibition without exception.

This initiative provides the appropriate framework for engaging States in the region in a process that would ultimately facilitate the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East, and ensure regional collective accession through the encouragement of all States in the region to adhere to the international legal instruments that comprise the juridical regimes regulating weapons of mass destruction. These legal instruments are the non-proliferation Treaty, the biological weapons Convention of 1972 and the chemical weapons convention which is under preparation now at the CD. The successful employment of confidence-building measures in the Middle East will undoubtedly be augmented through the adherence of all parties in the region to these three important legal instruments.

Proposals on chemical and biological weapons relating to the region should be considered by these States within this framework. Egypt would like to reaffirm that disarmament measures relating to the different weapons of mass destruction cannot be taken in isolation, and that all the States of the region should be legally bound by the same obligations without any exception.

At this juncture, I am pleased to invite the attention of the CD to a letter dated 21 July 1991 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, concerning the recent proposals on arms limitation and disarmament in the Middle East. This letter was reproduced on 30 July 1991 as an official document of the General Assembly (A/46/329) and the Security Council (S/22855). May I request the circulation of this document as an official document of the CD?

(Mr. Elaraby, Egypt)

With your permission, Mr. President, I would like to conclude on a personal note. I had the honour to serve in the Egyptian delegation to the CCD in the mid-1970s, as you rightly pointed out. I was away from Geneva for 11 years. When I came back, four years ago, a glance at the Conference on Disarmament files and proceedings was sufficient to reveal that no progress whatsoever had been achieved in a whole decade. No doubt, all the members of the CD realized this fact, and there was an atmosphere of general disappointment. I am happy to state that today, when I am in the process of relinquishing my post in Geneva, I leave with feelings of hope and great expectations for the work of the Conference on Disarmament and for the efforts exerted to achieve disarmament in general. Several important developments have transformed our contemporary world in recent years. Suffice it to mention the general relaxation between the super-Powers and the oft referred-to attempts to revise the Charter of the United Nations and to make a genuine attempt to resuscitate its provisions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. Moreover, several important agreements in the nuclear field have been concluded, and when it comes to the chemical weapons convention, there is a general agreement that the light at the end of the tunnel is now glowing brighter. Here I must confess that I envy you, distinguished members of the Conference on Disarmament, for you will soon witness the fruition of these long and arduous negotiations. I take leave of you, Mr. President, and look forward to seeing all of you next October in New York and to cooperating once more with you, in our joint endeavours to create a better world for future generations.

Finally, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my old friends Ambassador Miljan Komatina, Secretary-General of the CD and Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and Ambassador Vicente Berasategui, Deputy Secretary-General of the CD. Their advice and guidance has always been highly appreciated.

(continued in Arabic)

In conclusion, I would like to pay tribute to the interpreters, especially those in the Arabic booth, and to thank them particularly for their efforts.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Egypt for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. The letter dated 21 July 1991 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to which you referred, Ambassador, will be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador García Moritán.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): As you end your term of office as President, I would like to express the special appreciation of my delegation for the way in which you have conducted our work during this unique phase that the negotiating body is currently passing through. Your distinguished personal qualities and your professionalism have earned the respect of my delegation.

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

On behalf of the Conference on Disarmament you have bidden farewell to two distinguished colleagues who have made a significant contribution to this Conference and to the multilateral effort being made in security and international cooperation. I believe that all of us, and in particular the Argentine delegation, will greatly miss the personal and professional qualities of the distinguished Ambassadors of Brazil, Rubens Ricupero, and Egypt, Nabil Elaraby. Just a few days ago another friend, the distinguished Ambassador Chadha of India, left us. The Conference will certainly not be the same without them.

As the formal session for 1991 draws to a close, the negotiations in the chemical weapons Committee are becoming more concrete in keeping with the time-frames and objectives we have set, in particular as the change in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, following the new impetus given to the negotiations as a result of President Bush's initiative, stipulated that next year we should conclude our already excessively prolonged work. Deadlines are approaching, and inevitably we have to tackle the most difficult questions, those which in the final analysis reflect our interest in the instrument designed to ban chemical weapons for ever. Now that the problem of the destruction of existing stockpiles has been resolved, and the issue of a ban on use has been directly and unequivocally included in the text of the convention, some questions of major importance still remain to be solved. This morning I will refer to some of them.

Allow me briefly to recall that in a previous statement, my delegation had occasion to express one or two ideas concerning the verification system for the chemical industry under article VI. At that time we tried to draw attention to the need for negotiating efforts to be directed towards a simpler formulation of the verification mechanism which at the same time would provide a credible guarantee that the provisions of the convention with respect to non-military activities in the chemical field would be duly complied with. We believe that the exercise that has been going on both in Group B as well as in the consultations led by France as a Friend of the Chair have to a large extent followed this thrust. But we think that further efforts could certainly be made to simplify the verification system under article VI, which should be focused on actual production of chemicals and production capacity, and not on the material flow or balance of chemicals, which, as much experience - including not a few national trial inspections - has shown, is not sufficiently accurate to support the conclusion that the convention is not being breached through the transfer of chemicals.

This brief initial digression serves to remind you of what, in the view of my delegation, should be the dominant guiding principle regarding inspections under article VI. On this same issue of verification of the chemical industry I think it is important to point out that the recent meeting at which representatives of the world chemical industry exchanged views with the members of the Committee confirmed the impression shared by many delegations involved in the negotiations that the verification system must be open and simple and must take account in a very special way of the principle

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

that the normal operations of the chemical industry must not be affected. In view of a recurrent tendency that has been observed in the negotiations in the Committee to insist on complex and indeed costly formulations, I will not hesitate to repeat today that this article deals with activities not prohibited by the convention, in other words, perfectly legitimate activities.

Advocates of these sophisticated verification systems have argued that the risk that certain facilities could pose for the convention should not be side-stepped. Risk, as everyone knows, is a category that pertains to the realm of perception. There is nothing less uniform in the field of disarmament than the security perceptions of the negotiating States. Hence what some might consider of paramount importance as a risk assessment parameter - production capacity, multi-purpose capability of a facility - could be perceived by others as less important than, for instance, its location. In other words, the fact that a plant might be located in an isolated place or might possess power sources indicating a high level of activity or one that would be difficult to justify under normal circumstances. Above all there is the political assessment of those involved, both that of the party assessing the risk and that of the potential transgressor. I sincerely believe that at this stage of our negotiations any risk assessment exercise which aspired to unanimity would be doomed to failure. This is why, as far as the Argentine Republic is concerned, an appropriate verification regime within the framework of article VI must be open, but at the same time realistic and circumscribed by parameters which are attainable and manageable both from the political and from the financial point of view.

The chemical weapons convention, as has been repeatedly stated, is a security treaty. This is its logical nerve-centre and the indisputable focal point of its content must be the provisions designed to secure the elimination and prevent the reappearance of chemical weapons. Therefore, for Argentina the chemical weapons convention must be equipped with a verification system which is sound and coherent from the viewpoint of security, and able to play effectively the deterrent role that any verification mechanism must play in order to discourage, or attach a very high political cost to, any breach of its provisions. That is why in our opinion the verification system under article IX is par excellence the most important element within the treaty's verification system if the treaty is to become a really successful agreement with universal adherence. I would therefore like to raise one or two ideas relating to the negotiations on article IX, and in particular challenge inspections, which we are concentrating on at the moment. Our thinking draws on consideration at the national level of what would be the implications and the scope of the system of challenge inspections, measured against the objectives of the convention and the legitimate security concerns that all the future States parties have to different degrees in this process.

At the same time, in voicing these ideas we have borne in mind the experience gained thanks to the positive and timely initiative of the delegation of Germany that enabled us to participate in the multilateral trial challenge inspection exercise held in an air base in the Frankfurt-Cologne

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

area between 22 and 24 May this year. This was a very positive experience, and in that context our gratitude and appreciation go to the German authorities, through Ambassador von Wagner and his delegation, for the excellent arrangements and the highly professional way in which they conducted this complex joint exercise.

In our view, the inspection, details of which will undoubtedly be presented with greater authority by the organizing delegation, succeeded in demonstrating that a challenge inspection is a highly intrusive exercise, but that it can nevertheless be made compatible with the necessary confidentiality that must protect certain military facilities or others with a high commercial or scientific value. The concept of managed access, duly developed on an ad hoc basis - that is, taking into account the characteristics of the site to be inspected - should allow physical access by the organization's inspectors to any site located in a State party whenever a properly justified request is made for challenge inspection.

The exercise at Pferdersfeld made it clear that there are areas - the role of observers, the relationship between the inspection team and the receiving State, the closure (securing) of the site, the availability of reliable means of communication for the inspection team, the need to draw up a fully agreed glossary of important terms for the convention in the five official languages of the United Nations, all issues on which considerable work still has to be done with a view to improvement. The conclusion, however, is encouraging in indicating that it is possible to aim for a strong system of challenge inspections without unduly affecting the security of the receiving State.

Very recently the Ad Hoc Committee received with keen interest a new proposal on challenge inspections put forward by your delegation, Mr. President, along with the delegations of Australia, Japan and the United Kingdom. It joins the existing proposals and will undoubtedly constitute a major contribution to our deliberations. We believe that a number of the elements we identified when referring to the inspection carried out in Germany in May have been taken into account by the authors of this initiative, and we welcome this fact as an encouraging element. At the same time, we think it useful to point out a few basic points that the final blueprint of verification under the convention should in our view include in its final form.

First of all, any system of challenge inspections agreed upon should guarantee the inspection team rapid, not to say immediate, access to the agreed site. Otherwise the challenge would turn into a phased warning, which we do not think would be in anyone's interest, not to mention the fact that any delay, be it at the moment of initiation or later on, would in our view contradict the very principle and the definition of challenge inspections. Secondly, access for the inspectors should be understood primarily as physical access, with the appropriate limitations arising out of the concept of managed access, carried out on an ad hoc basis in the light of the necessarily differing importance of the requested site from the viewpoint of practical

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

factors (geographical, access, and so on), as well as its significance from the point of view of the various aspects of confidentiality, whether scientific, commercial or military. The use of alternative forms and/or concepts of access should be elaborated in detail in order to avoid any counter-productive effect. We hope that the current negotiations will lead to progress on this point.

Without seeking to carry the analogy with the activities carried out by the special United Nations commission appointed to monitor compliance with Security Council resolution 687 further than prudence dictates in these cases, we believe that there are important lessons which must be drawn from this continuing exercise, in particular with regard to physical access for inspectors and securing of inspected sites. We believe that if all these considerations are taken into account, they will help to lead to agreement on a challenge inspection system which, in our opinion is worthy of the name.

As our negotiations proceed in various forums, it is common and refreshing to observe that when, perhaps on account of the fatigue and excessive emphasis on details that inevitably go hand in hand with any negotiating process as intense as ours, we get unnecessarily side-tracked in the negotiations, a delegation reminds us of the direction and aim of the exercise. Consequently, we must remember that we are actually negotiating a security agreement, an agreement that has clear and precise objectives and does not try to impose restrictions on the chemical industry, an agreement that in fact seeks to offer sufficient guarantees so that in signing it, States will gain an additional degree of security. This morning, while considering the verification system under article IX, my delegation, without seeking to correct anyone's course, would merely like to remind the Conference of the nature of our negotiations. I am sure that we shall not forget this basic premise in the forthcoming months, which will undoubtedly be the final months.

By way of conclusion, allow me to indicate that as representative of a State that ratified the Geneva Protocol of 1925 without any reservations, we think that the time has come - the time can no longer be delayed - for those who ratified it with reservations to withdraw them so as to begin the 1992 session, during which the convention will be concluded, with a renewed spirit and commitment.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Ambassador Neagu.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania) (translated from French): Two weeks ago, in the statement which I had the honour to deliver in this important forum, the Romanian delegation was pleased to note the imminent signature of the Treaty on the reduction of strategic armaments. Now, my delegation would like to join all the other delegations in praising the conclusion of this document by the Presidents of the United States and the USSR, George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev. For the record, I would also like to state that Romania considers this to be one of the greatest achievements on the road to disarmament.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

The signature of the START Treaty puts an end to a period of common endeavours and mutual concessions, the only way of solving difficult problems of such dimensions and significance as those settled in this Treaty. By virtue of its content and final objective, the new Soviet-American Treaty can be regarded as an international instrument of truly historic significance. It gives expression to the present situation of the relationship between the two great nuclear Powers and international relations in general, as a result of profound changes that have occurred in Europe and all over the world.

The particular importance of the START Treaty consists, first of all, in our opinion, in the fact that for the first time an agreement has been reached for the effective reduction of total American and Soviet strategic nuclear armaments, a reduction of the number of both nuclear warheads and their strategic means of delivery to a substantially lower level of 30-50 per cent.

This agreement is, however, important not only for the substantial reductions in the nuclear capabilities of the two major nuclear Powers, but also for the increased stability that comes out of it. At the same time, the solutions agreed on a number of negotiating issues can be looked upon as a starting-point for new agreements whch will be of particular significance, taking into account the large amounts of armaments which still exist in the nuclear stockpiles.

Romania welcomes the intention of the United States of America and the USSR to carry on this process that has just begun in order to undertake new negotiations in the direction of further strengthening strategic stability, inter alia, in outer space. It hopes that such efforts will lead to the conclusion of new substantive agreements which uphold the structural changes and positive evolutions of our time. This, of course, will also be of great help for our negotiations in the Conference.

Mr. President, this is the last meeting under your presidency. I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to express my appreciation for the way in which you have conducted our deliberations. For me as a newcomer in this important negotiating body, your skill and professionalism were of particular interest.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Romania for his statement, for his praise of the START Treaty and for his kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Morocco, Ambassador Benhima.

Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco) (translated from French): Mr. President, your presidency of the Conference on Disarmament is drawing to a close, a presidency which you have assumed with the skill of a veteran diplomat and the wisdom of a man imbued with eminent human qualities. I congratulate you on behalf of my delegation.

Recently, Ambassador Chadha took leave of the Conference. A few moments ago, it was the turn of Ambassador Elaraby, whose appointment to head the Egyptian mission in New York is the consummation of his strenuous work in Geneva. In a few days, Ambassador Ricupero, whose extensive learning and

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

perspicacity we appreciate very much, will leave us for Washington. To our three distinguished colleagues we express our wishes for happiness and success in their new duties, and to Ambassador Brotodiningrat we extend a welcome to Geneva.

Disarmament has become a universal concern since the international community became acutely aware of it. Hence any measure, regardless of its scope, becomes significant because it forms part of the process of general and complete disarmament. In that context, it is incontrovertible that the initiation of nuclear disarmament constitutes both an important milestone for the establishment of a climate of trust among States and a decisive factor to strengthen peace and security in the world. One need only recall the fears aroused by the arms race in the very recent past and by the apocalyptic consequences of a nuclear war to grasp the historic scope of the START Treaty signed on 31 July in Moscow, an event that we welcome. Consummating 10 years of laborious and often difficult negotiations, the Treaty provides for a 30 per cent reduction in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States of America and the Soviet Union and opens the door to a dynamic process that should in what we hope will be the near future, cover the thousands of nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles not covered by the Moscow Agreement. This agreement is clearly the point of departure for smoother bilateral negotiations, the final aim of which would be the progressive and substantial dismantling of all nuclear arsenals. We hope that all the nuclear Powers will find in this dynamic process adequate grounds for reassurance concerning their own security, thereby facilitating their involvement in a broader process of reducing their nuclear potential.

The arms race in outer space remains a major source of concern for the international community. If we are not careful the growing trend towards its militarization would present serious threats to international détente, which is now being consolidated, and would ruin progress achieved in other areas. Everything possible must therefore be done to preserve this common heritage of all of mankind and to devote all mankind's energies to ensuring access to the peaceful uses of outer space. To realize this ambition and achieve the goal related to all issues connected with nuclear disarmament, it is imperative for the Conference to go beyond the stage of general debates and discussions and initiate substantive work on all issues without further delay. The demand for negotiations dealing with these fundamental issues is repeated at each session. As the sole multilateral negotiating forum in this field, the Conference has vested in it a responsibility that it cannot shirk or mask, and has a mandate that it must fulfil.

Among the vital issues on the agenda is a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty has been urged by the United Nations General Assembly, because it will lead inevitably to the prevention of both horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Guided by this conviction, my delegation welcomed the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee last year, even though its mandate remains very limited. Guided also by the conviction that the complete prohibition of nuclear tests is an indispensable step along the path to nuclear disarmament, my delegation welcomes with interest the new draft treaty tabled by Sweden. We are

(Mr. Benhima, Morocco)

convinced that it will enrich deliberations on this issue, in particular through its provisions related to verification procedures and those concerning the organization. It is clear that the negotiation of such a draft treaty can take place within the Conference only if the Ad Hoc Committee has a mandate authorizing it to engage in this work. Our determination to consider this draft jointly could be demonstrated by giving the Committee a mandate to discuss it in a useful and constructive fashion.

The delegation of the Kingdom of Morocco concurs with the other members of the Conference in their wish to see the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons finalized within the planned time-frame. The conclusion of such a convention, in our opinion, is a very important disarmament measure. The substantial progress achieved has warranted our hope that the finalization of a text acceptable to all is near at hand. We do not, however, overlook the serious difficulties which remain.

Unanimous regret has been expressed in the Conference at the considerable time that has been devoted to procedural and organizational matters. Hence the need for our forum to make a resolute commitment to defining ways and means of improving the functioning of the Conference and endowing it with the necessary requisites for improved effectiveness. Several proposals have been presented to that end. My delegation hopes that, once they have been examined, satisfactory solutions will emerge under the dynamic impetus provided by Ambassador Kamal.

The Conference on Disarmament is pursuing its task at a time when the current far-reaching changes are outlining the contours of the world of tomorrow and defining the major orientations of man's destiny. The welcome trend in international relations that has emerged in the wake of the cold war offers greater opportunities to the Conference on Disarmament, which should spare no effort to attain the objectives it has been set. Despite our differences of perception as to certain aspects of our work, we should demonstrate our will to overcome the present difficulties in order to build a future of peace and security for future generations.

In conclusion, allow me to refer to an idea expressed recently by His Majesty the King of Morocco in a statement on the Middle East problem: "If disarmament is a logical consequence of peace, it is equally an indispensable precondition for long-lasting peaceful relations among peoples and States". Hence, Mr. President, we continue to believe that our quest for disarmament is a matter of necessity and not just of virtue.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Morocco for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. That concludes my list of speakers for today. May I ask whether any other representative wishes to take the floor at this point? I see none. Then we will turn to other business.

You will recall that, in the programme of work for this annual session, we had agreed to hold two weekly plenary meetings during the period 12-23 August. After consultations with the coordinators, consensus has been reached in cancelling the two plenary meetings that had been scheduled for

(The President)

Tuesday 13 and Tuesday 20 August. That agreement has been reached as no speakers were inscribed for those two meetings and it seemed advisable therefore to make the resources allocated for those meetings available for other purposes. It is understood that, as has been the practice up to now, one weekly plenary meeting would be held during those two weeks, namely on the two Thursdays, 15 and 22 August. I suggest now that we adopt formally the decision to cancel those two Tuesday meetings.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Next, the secretariat has circulated today the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. As usual, the timetable is indicative and may be subject to change, if needed. On this understanding, I propose that we adopt the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: In connection with the timetable for the current week, I am requested by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons to announce that the Ad Hoc Committee will hold another meeting tomorrow, Friday, at 3 p.m., in this conference room.

I have no other business for today, and shall now proceed to make my closing statement at the end of the presidency of the United States of America.

At the beginning of my presidency, I was informed how lucky I was since most of the hard work of setting things up and getting them going had already been done by my capable predecessors, and it would fall to my successor to wind up the CD's work for the year. Well, that proved to be the case; there were few procedural accomplishments these past four weeks. Happily, the trade-off seems to have been that we have moved forward in some important substantive areas in the chemical weapons talks, bringing us closer to the target of a convention by next year.

I also take note of progress made in the second meeting this year of the Group of Scientific Experts and the completion of the GSETT-II experiment; the acceptance of Malta as the thirty-seventh CD non-member participant this year; and also the work done by Ambassador Kamal's open-ended consultations on improved and effective functioning. It is my hope that in addition, our discussions on report-writing will encourage those responsible to minimize the time devoted to it so as to allow us to spend more time working on substantive CW issues. In this connection, I welcome the decision confirmed here today to reduce the plenary meetings scheduled for the next two weeks to one per week.

As I mentioned at the beginning of my presidency, I asked Ambassador Kamal to assist me in private, informal consultations concerning the possibilities for expansion of the CD's membership. All of you are aware that he has pursued this task energetically and with tact. After extensive consultations, however, we compared results and reluctantly concluded that agreement on an

(The President)

expansion plan acceptable to all is still elusive. Moreover, we found an increasing number of delegations who feel the expansion issue might better be left for a later time because they fear the politicization of the CD expansion question while we are making a major effort to achieve a CW convention.

The signing of the START Treaty in Moscow last week is a major arms control event which contributes significantly to strategic stability and security in the world. I would hope we can draw inspiration from this signal accomplishment to reinvigorate our own efforts in the CD to complete a chemical weapons convention by next year, a goal we set for ourselves in the revised mandate we recently approved for the CW Ad Hoc Committee.

Many issues remain, but we cannot for a moment slacken our efforts to resolve them if we are to achieve a CW convention in the time that is left to us. Specifically, we must make the maximum possible use of the inter-sessional time between our formal CD meetings, as our CW Ad Hoc Committee Chairman, Ambassador Batsanov, seeks to do. Our Governments and peoples will expect us to produce results in the time-frame we announced. The credibility and even the future of our Conference could be at stake. I therefore urge that we capitalize on the momentum we have recently created for ourselves, reinforced by the historic moment created by signature of the START Treaty, to finish the negotiations on the single most important multilateral arms control treaty in many years. Its time has come.

As I now pass on my responsibilities to Ambassador Arteaga, he has my earnest best wishes and full support for continuing the forward momentum of our work. He brings great skill and experience to the task, and we all wish him well as he assumes the CD presidency for the next five months, not four weeks but five months.

Ambassadors Komatina and Berasategui and their skilled secretariat have my full appreciation. Without their diligent efforts, the work associated with the presidency would have been difficult. I would also like to thank the group coordinators who made up the CD President's bureau.

This concludes my closing statement. I have no other business for this plenary meeting and would now proceed to adjourn it. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 15 August at 10 a.m

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.602
15 August 1991

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 15 August 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Horacio Arteaga (Venezuela)

GE.91-62259/3605B

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 602nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First of all, I would like to make my opening statement. It is an honour for me to take up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament on behalf of Venezuela. On this occasion I should like to emphasize the irrevocable commitment of Venezuela and the President of the Republic, Carlos Andrés Pérez, to the cause of disarmament, which in this Conference enjoys a forum of fundamental and prime importance. As far as we are concerned, everything that has to do with efforts to promote the different and complex aspects of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, is of fundamental significance, and we will therefore continue to participate actively in this and other relevant forums. Venezuela believes in the potentialities of this Conference and the joint capacity to move forward, ever more resolutely, towards the goals we have set ourselves, in accordance with the requirements and expectations of these tumultuous times.

I should like to express my gratitude and sincere congratulations to Ambassador Stephen Ledogar of the United States for the effective, skilled and responsible way in which he chaired the work of the Conference during his term. We truly appreciated his presidency. I also extend my appreciation and congratulations to the distinguished Ambassadors Rasaputram of Sri Lanka, Hyltenius of Sweden, Batsanov of the Soviet Union and Solesby of the United Kingdom, who have wisely discharged that function since the beginning of the current year.

I wish to express my complete readiness and full determination in discharging the tasks that fall to me during this period, which includes the drafting and final adoption of the report that the Conference has to submit to the forty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly. I am certain that I will enjoy the valuable cooperation of all the distinguished delegates and the always efficient support of the secretariat, Ambassadors Komatina and Berasategui, in carrying out my tasks, especially in drafting and adopting the report, which, as you know, reflects the intensive work carried out in the course of the year.

The international situation in which we find ourselves is different from that of only a few years ago. The historic events of recent times have marked the abandonment of old antagonisms and intransigence, and have allowed the emergence of better prospects for peace, solidarity and understanding in the concert of nations. The dialogue and openness which now characterize world events have helped to foster disarmament agreements and confidence-building measures, and should encourage greater progress in this field in an upward process. Even such serious and regrettable crises as the Gulf war served to make the international community aware of the threat posed by the use of weapons of mass destruction and the need to adopt concrete measures to eliminate that danger.

We welcomed with great satisfaction the strategic nuclear arms reduction treaty (START) recently signed by the United States and the Soviet Union after nine years of painstaking negotiations. This is a very important step in the

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history of the bilateral negotiations on arms control, which we hope will generate an atmosphere of greater transparency and trust in international relations, as well as future disarmament agreements which will make it possible to replace nuclear deterrence by a strategy founded on common security. It is also our hope that agreements of such significance will have a favourable impact on the tenacious disarmament efforts being pursued in the multilateral sphere, and specifically in this Conference.

It is always hoped that the message forwarded to the United Nations General Assembly by the Conference on Disarmament in its annual report will record progress in the negotiations carried out under its auspices. On this occasion it is striking that genuine progress has been made in dealing with the subject of chemical weapons. Of clear importance in these negotiations is the inclusion of the reference to the prohibition of use in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, as well as in relevant parts of the draft convention, and provisions on the total destruction of chemical weapons. We recognize the encouraging turn taken by these negotiations as a result of the decision of the United States Administration not to use chemical weapons against any country, in any circumstances, and to destroy all its arsenals of such weapons. As stipulated in its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is to intensify its work with the aim of achieving final agreement on the convention by 1992. I should like to encourage all delegations to continue their efforts to that end.

With regard to other items on the agenda I should add that a new methodology of work has been established in the various committees, which has allowed a better assessment of the different aspects relating to the items before them. I think that as a result of this work we will be able to make progress subsequently in a more thorough analysis with a view to adopting measures.

Recently the informal meetings on items 2 and 3 of our agenda, nuclear disarmament and prevention of a nuclear arms race, were completed. In the discussion the various positions were set out in detail and important information was received on various initiatives of special interest. I cannot fail to mention in particular the consultations carried out by Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan on improving the functioning and effectiveness of the work of the Conference. They undoubtedly constitute an appropriate basis for the future consideration of this subject. Furthermore, the consultations carried out on the expansion of the membership of the Conference have been useful in clarifying positions and allowing more thorough consideration of the subject.

I would like to wish the chairmen of the various committees every success in the process of negotiation and adoption of their reports. I am entirely at your disposal to cooperate wherever I can. Let us make the best possible use of the time available to make progress in our work.

(The President)

On the list of speakers for today are the representatives of Argentina, the United States of America, Canada (who will be speaking as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. I now give the floor to the first speaker on the list, the representative of Argentina, Ambassador García Moritán.

Mr. GARCÍA MORITÁN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): I would like to express my delegations particular satisfaction, Mr. President, that a representative such as youself of a great Latin American country has taken up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament today. I am certainly not the first or the last Argentine diplomat to have the honour and pleasure of working under your guidance. I witnessed the way in which your extensive diplomatic experience made itself felt on the regional stage when you were Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Venezuela, and we have every confidence that our negotiations will benefit at this final stage from your personality, experience and professionalism.

A little more than a year ago we and the distinguished delegation of the Federative Republic of Brazil began the practice of making joint statements at this Conference on substantive questions of common interest. At that time I had occasion to set forth some joint general comments in relation to the first item on our agenda. At the beginning of the current session, the distinguished Ambassador Rubens Ricupero - whom I will miss very much following his departure from this conference - addressed the Conference in connection with the Declaration on Common Nuclear Policy signed by the Presidents of our two countries at Foz do Ignaçú in November 1990. On that occasion, the Ambassador of Brazil said that the joint machinery and procedures established by our countries in the nuclear field were the corollary and natural result of broad, stable and close cooperation embracing all major fields. These achievements in turn proved that confidence-building in the nuclear field could be achieved through close cooperation in the technical and political fields on the basis of openness and transparency.

This morning, speaking once again on behalf of the two delegations, I would like to point out that under the first stage outlined in the Declaration, on 18 July 1991, in Guadalajara, Mexico, on the occasion of the recent summit of heads of state and government of Latin American countries, Presidents Menem and Collor signed an "Agreement between the Argentine Republic and the Federative Republic of Brazil for the exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear energy". In operational terms, the agreement formally establishes a joint accounting and control system for nuclear materials, with the aim of verifying compliance with commitments entered into, in particular as regards surveillance of all nuclear materials in all nuclear activities carried out in the two countries. To administer the system, the agreement creates a supervisory Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control. This agency will be composed of two bodies - one of a political nature, the Commission, which will supervise the overall operation of the system, and a

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

technical body, the Secretariat, which will coordinate the actions necessary to gather information, carry out inspections and process the data collected. Moreover, as additional and, I think, unquestionable evidence of the peaceful nature of the nuclear programmes of the two countries, we are negotiating a joint safeguards agreement with IAEA.

Brazil and Argentina consider that such initiatives constitute a full, sufficient and verifiable guarantee of the peaceful aims of their nuclear programmes. However, considering the importance they attach to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the two countries will adopt initiatives whereby it will enter fully into force, including action to update and improve the Treaty.

The agreement between the Argentine Republic and the Federative Republic of Brazil for the exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear energy requires legislative approval in the two countries for its entry into force, and the text will be circulated in this Conference in due course.

The agreement consolidates in a legally binding instrument the special relations of cooperation existing between our countries in the nuclear field. In this context, it should be noted that the regime established by the agreement will be complemented by measures in the field of economic integration aiming at the free movement of nuclear materials and equipment between the two countries. This aspect is also of particular importance because it is an integral part of a more comprehensive plan for development encompassing all spheres of production in the two countries and extending to Uruguay and Paraguay in the context of the Southern Common Market.

In this endeavour, which involves breaking out of underdevelopment once and for all, we give due priority to scientific and technological programmes. We are very pleased to have arrived at an instrument which offers an appropriate response to the legitimate concerns which may be prompted by dual-use advanced technologies. This example of international cooperation demonstrates how it is possible to find the path to a wider exchange in such a way that advanced technologies do not remain the privilege of a few. In that context, the broad-ranging process of integration between Argentina and Brazil and its ramifications for the other countries of the sub-region demonstrate, in our view, how the indispensible possession of advanced technologies can be reconciled with a regional framework that is stable, predictable and free of suspicions from the security viewpoint.

The accidents of time and history have presented all of us with the unexpected opportunity of playing leading roles in a world of increasing interdependence and integration. Economic and industrial factors, and the transnational effects of technology, have created a network of mutual interests and confidence-building measures which allow us to deal multilaterally with political problems on different bases. In the view of Argentina and Brazil this situation requires a search for a clear, international consensus in key areas. In science and technology, it seems to us essential to embark on a detailed analysis on the basis of criteria which

(Mr. García Moritán, Argentina)

are more in keeping with the times. We pointed this out in a joint document at the United Nations Disarmament Commission. It seems that a process of this kind would require, on the one hand, that we tackle the qualitative problems related to weapons of mass destruction, and on the other hand, agree on balanced guidelines that take into account aspects connected with the dual use of any technology while at the same time not affecting or impairing the need for the continuous development, application and transfer of new technologies and the related economic and industrial requirements. As we are demonstrating in the regional framework, we believe that it is possible to establish appropriate confidence-building machinery aimed at strengthening international security with mutually complementary actions in an effective system of cooperation in advanced technologies.

In the political lexicon of our times the word "change" features as a constant. There is another which is perhaps used less frequently but has a particular priority in matters of security - "stability". Both concepts suggest that change, which must be promoted and monitored, requires an indispensable amount of global stability in order to generate an appropriate framework of peace and security. In this context, we believe that indispensable progress at the regional level should indisputably be accompanied by harmonization at the global level. The system of collective security envisaged by those who drafted the Charter of the United Nations now has a chance, in our view, to be translated into concrete terms. What needs to be done - no more and no less - is to define it and put it into effect in a balanced manner, perhaps in this very Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement on behalf of the delegations of Argentina and Brazil, as well as the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I give the floor now to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Ledogar.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): I take the floor today for several purposes. The first is to welcome, wholeheartedly, your accession to the CD presidency. Thank you for your kind words a few moments ago about my just concluded term of office. Yours, however, will be both more challenging and more extensive, but without question you are exactly the right diplomat with exactly the right talents to give us the precise direction and leadership that we will need. As I mentioned in my own closing speech last week, you have my full support and that of my delegation as you take on this important responsibility for the next several months.

Secondly, I would like to introduce a United States paper that deals with a national trial challenge inspection at a United States commercial chemical production facility last year. This inspection represents one of a series of such exercises that the United States Government is carrying out at commercial and government facilities. Rather than go into the details at this time of the lessons learned during this productive experience, I will simply note that the paper has been turned over to the secretariat for circulation as an official Conference document. It should be available to you shortly.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

The third and fourth elements of my remarks today deal with chemical weapons, and with the report writing process in which the CD is now engaged. Although the latter item is more immediate in terms of the time pressures we face, I wish to make my principal remarks first on the far more important and central goal of our Conference at this moment: completion of a chemical weapons convention by 1992. Since President Bush announced his chemical weapons initiative last 13 May, the CW Ad Hoc Committee has made significant progress. Article I of the draft convention now explicitly bans use of chemical weapons, against anyone, under any circumstances. In article IV there is now no question about the obligation to complete the destruction of chemical weapons during the 10 years after the convention enters into force. Agreement seems near to place articles X and XI in appendix I of the "rolling text", and we should be able to take the same step with an improved article VI as well. We are now in the midst of serious exploration of challenge inspection, perhaps the thorniest issue in our convention. And we also believe that progress in a number of other areas such as jurisdiction and control will be reflected in the "rolling text".

Bearing in mind our goal, I submit to you that we must now make a conscious decision to direct our energies more closely on the major issues for the remainder of 1991. In my view there are currently four such issues at this stage: challenge inspection, verification in the chemical industry, the composition and decision-making process of the executive council, and universality. I will address each of these issues in turn.

On challenge inspection, as you know, the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Australia presented a new approach last month designed to move the Conference at last toward resolution of this key issue. The four delegations sought to strike the right balance between access necessary for effective verification, and the need to protect sensitive activities that are not related to chemical weapons and avoid potential abuse of challenge inspection provisions. The regime we propose balances all of the security interests of States parties. It will enhance prospects for universal compliance and, when it enters into force, will give the international inspectorate the ability to discover the facts. It will deter would-be violators, and at the same time provide States parties with reasonable protection of their legitimate activities.

No text is perfect. We have taken due note of the views expressed on the proposal in the Ad Hoc Committee. We are encouraged by the general support shown in discussions so far for the concept of graduated, managed access to challenged sites. We are aware that some delegations would prefer more mandatory access, and that others would like to see stronger mechanisms for protecting sensitive sites. We are also pleased that our proposal has generated useful conceptual discussion of the role of the executive council. Much remains to be thrashed out, but we are confident that we can reach consensus on this critical question.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

With respect to monitoring the chemical industry, the proposal made by eight non-aligned delegations in July was a major advance. It preserves key features of the regime that is currently set forth in article VI of the "rolling text", but closes an important loophole that would have allowed many relevant facilities to escape inspection. As a result of the eight-delegation proposal the Ad Hoc Committee has almost reached consensus to extend the monitoring provisions in Article VI to all CW-capable facilities. Work remains to delimit the industry and exclude those not posing a risk and to work out the inspection regime, but we believe that the general support for coverage of such facilities should be reflected in appendix I of the "rolling text".

Much discussion has taken place on the selection process for facilities to be inspected. We, and many others, believe that the selection process must reflect security interests. Given the many thousands of relevant facilities, States parties must play a role in designating facilities for inspection. This approach is not challenge inspection in disguise. These inspections are routine, and will be conducted accordingly. We recognize the concerns of others about abuse through national selection and believe that safeguards must be incorporated, for instance agreed limits on the annual number of inspections in a given State. We are grateful for the work of the Chairman of Group B on this issue, and will give his proposed approach careful study.

Some have argued that the composition and decision-making process of the executive council can be settled only at the end of these negotiations. We believe, on the contrary, that broad consensus is developing in the Committee, and that agreement on the structure and operations of this vital executive body will help us settle other, more substantive, issues. We believe there is broad support for an executive council of approximately 20 to 25 members. Selection would be based on a combination of geographical and industrial criteria. Decision-making on substantive issues would be by a qualified majority. Several delegations have already expressed views on the executive council and we hope that Working Group C can take this up immediately.

The fourth major issue that I want to discuss is universality. How can the Conference structure the convention to encourage all States to join? I want to express my agreement with my distinguished Argentine colleague, Ambassador García Moritán, who noted last week that a chemical weapons convention is primarily a security agreement. Other delegations have pointed out the need to include restrictions and disincentives for countries who, after a reasonable period of time, choose to remain outside. We strongly agree. We have proposed that, after a suitable transition period, arrangements for trade in CW-related chemicals should discriminate against non-parties. Our proposal will require parties to refuse to trade in CW-related materials with all States that do not become parties to the CW convention within a reasonable period of time. These provisions relate directly to the central purpose of the convention, and to the security of future States parties. We will ask for your support on these grounds.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

There is one more issue that I would like to discuss today, namely longstanding problems of "old" or "abandoned" chemical weapons. This issue is not now a major obstacle to completing the convention. If it can be resolved promptly it will not become one. However, we must come to grips with it. We recognize that this issue reflects a number of different problems, all of them politically sensitive. Concern has been expressed, for example, about negative public reaction to labelling such "chemical weapons" in the convention. The term "chemical weapons" has a powerful emotional and political impact and there is a risk of public misunderstanding. For this reason, we believe it would be useful to explore the possibility of a differentiated approach to the required declarations. This would ensure that the differing situations are not lumped together under the single heading of "chemical weapons".

Another concern is over the responsibility for destruction when chemical weapons produced by one State are found on the territory of another State. It would be best for such matters to be settled between the two States involved. In any case, we cannot afford to have a loophole allowing a State party to retain chemical weapons on its territory if not removed or destroyed by the State owning them.

Unfortunately, much of the discusson on these issues has taken place without adequate information. I propose to you that the Conference can no longer work on the basis of rumours and corridor conversations. We urge the Governments that have problems with old and abandoned chemical weapons to provide technical information on the nature of the problems that exist. This could be done, for example, during the meeting of destruction experts that will be held this fall. We believe that such information would not only help to clarify the situation, but also would facilitate cooperative efforts to ensure that the weapons are disposed of safely. In this connection, I would like to recall the offer of the United States to provide technical assistance for destruction of chemical weapons to any State faced with this problem.

On the subject of adequate information, a number of participants in the negotiations have not yet indicated whether or not they possess chemical weapons. We call on them to do so, in order that members of the conference can make an accurate assessment of the dimensions of the chemical weapons problem.

I would now like to review where we are at this stage in the CW negotiations. As I mentioned earlier, many of the issues on which we have made progress this summer were reflected in the CW Ad Hoc Committee Chairman's paper last spring as the key issues requiring political attention and which might ultimately be elements of a possible package. Earlier this summer the United States made substantial moves on many of these key issues, particularly on the questions of right of retaliation, and on our two per cent proposal to achieve universality, and also on articles X and XI. Additionally we have introduced provisions for challenge inspection and we stand ready to discuss the executive council and the issue of costs. In light of these steps, I

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

confess to some disappointment in recent days on both substantive and procedural grounds. We have heard threats by individual delegations that unless they get what they want in one article, they will hold up another article. Such tactical linkage which is devoid of substantive rationale only invites retaliation in kind.

At this stage in the negotiations, if we are to have a CW convention in 1992, we believe that all serious proposals, and especially proposals receiving broad support, should be reflected in appendix I of the "rolling text", if necessary with footnotes and/or brackets. The time has come to cease unfocused general discussions. If we are to find solutions to the issues, the best basis is actual language proposed for the convention. Let us cease arguing over the placement of papers in other appendices. Then we can focus our efforts on the proposed treaty text itself, seek compromises where possible and where not, clearly identify alternatives for political solution.

Let me add that we are disappointed that a small number of delegations are blocking agreement on a work programme to carry the CW Commitee through till next January. My Government finds this difficult to understand, in view of the opportunity to wrap these negotiations up and achieve a convention next year. My delegation does not consider this matter closed, and will continue to press for CW work during the eight weeks of the BWC Review Conference and the disarmament portion of the First Committee. To that end we call on capitals represented here to augment their delegations as necessary.

In my statement today I have outlined the areas of which I believe work should focus, and the approach we should take. Let me leave the subject of chemical weapons with a cautionary note. I have heard it said that some in this chamber believe that following the Gulf War and operation "Desert Storm", the United States has less interest in a CW convention. This argument holds that we have demonstrated that for ourselves, chemical weapons capability on the part of an aggressor can be handled with weapons in our conventional inventory, and that we and the Soviet Union have taken care of the problem of our own large CW stocks and security requirements with our bilateral arrangements.

This line of argument is mistaken. United States security will be enhanced by the convention. Furthermore, the United States has allies and friends around the world whose security, including security from chemical attack, is vital to us. The United States-Soviet bilateral agreement signed by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev 1 June last year is integrally linked with achievement of a CW convention. So we will continue to work as hard as ever for agreement here. It would, however, be equally mistaken to believe that the United States and its allies are more interested in achieving a CW convention than other members of our Conference, and accordingly that an increasing number of provisions unrelated to chemical weapons can be added to the Treaty in the expectation we will continue to make concessions. We are not les demandeurs in this negotiation. Conclusion of a CW convention will enhance the security of each and every State that becomes a party. This is important, a worthy goal: Let's keep it in sight.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

Let me turn now to an area where our performance has been less than outstanding - the Conference's annual report-writing process. This process threatens to get out of control. I submit that we spend too much time (approximately 3 of our 24 working weeks) and too much money (well more than $US 1,000 a page) on report-writing. The time has come for reform.

During my recent CD presidency I made a serious attempt to reduce the CD report-writing effort in order to allocate more time to our CW negotiations. I suggested preparing a relatively brief report, based on the requirements of rule 45. This would have meant dropping the compilation of groups' political views on each agenda item - the most time-consuming, contentious and wasteful part of the report-writing effort. It replicates information available elsewhere, and it generates large quantities of political smoke and fire more appropriate to the General Assembly than to the more practical negotiating body we work in. Furthermore, the CD secretriat asked that the CW portion of the report be shortened by dropping appendix II, thereby saving a significant amount of money.

While these objectives had broad support, some participants insisted there could be no changes in cherished routines. Only in the case of the radiological weapons and outer space ad hoc committee reports have we thus far seen efforts made to shorten reports or eliminate political wrangling. Everywhere else we see business as usual - or worse. The NSA and NTB committee draft reports are already heavily politicized, in some cases with rhetoric reminiscent of the height of the cold war. In the NTB draft report one regional group has taken a verbatim transcript approach and is attempting to drive in more than eight full pages of text advertising or supporting its views. They have resorted to distortion of fact and misrepresentation of the views of others. The West was left with few options to achieve the necessary accuracy and balance, other than to draft eight pages of its own if it wished to propose them for bitter negotiation. So much for the effort to reduce the CD report-writing chore so as to devote more time to CW!

While I held your seat, Mr. President, my position required me to act evenhandedly and to take the views of all CD members and groups into account in conducting our business. To some extent I had to put my national role and objectives on the shelf during that period. That is no longer the case. While it may be too late for wholesale changes in the report-writing process, I propose that we try now to begin a less politicized and more cost-effective effort. Specifically, I would urge the negative security assurances and nuclear test ban ad hoc committee chairmen to try to limit political position statements by each group to no more than one or two pages each. This limit should also apply to the reports on CESNAR, PNW and CPD. My delegation is prepared to withhold consensus on those substantive sections of the CD report which are polemical, imbalanced, and unfactual.

(Mr. Ledogar, United States)

These are drastic steps. At a time when we are trying to negoitiate an important global treaty, however, I believe they are absolutely essential. By consensus we set a deadline for ourselves of achieving a CW convention by 1992. We enshrined this goal in a revised mandate for the CW Ad Hoc Committee. Yet we are letting "business as usual" entangle us in sterile report-writing debates reminiscent of a time gone by.

Thus, I hereby request that the problematic committee contributions of this year be compressed and limited to each group's views and that the issue of CD report-writing be placed on the agenda of next year's open-ended consultations on improved and effective functioning. We must provide for a much briefer, cheaper and more useful report, which people might actually read. The current product meets almost none of these criteria.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and his kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Canada, Mr. Robertson, who, in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons will present the Committee's report, which has been distributed today as document CD/1099.

Mr. ROBERTSON (Canada): Mr. President, since this is the first time a member of our delegation has taken the floor since you assumed your presidency, allow me to begin by joining those previous speakers who have commended that fact and let me also assure you that the members of the Canadian delegation are willing and would be very pleased to assist you in the carrying out of your tasks in any way possible. You have a very long term ahead of you as our President, until the CD is re-established in 1992, and among the other issues you will be confronted with is that of assuring that useful work on the chemical weapons convention can be carried out during the inter-sessional period. We wish you every success.

Now I would like to say a few words in my capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, and I take pleasure in introducing the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, which is before you today in English under symbol CD/1099.

The Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons was among the two committees re-established at the start of the Conference's session and I understand that it is the first to submit its report to the Conference. There are several reasons why this is so. One of them was the really excellent positive, cooperative and professional spirit displayed by delegations throughout the session in our consideration of the item. Another reason was the speedy resumption at the beginning of our work of the two-track approach to the issue: track A quickly resumed work on the draft articles of a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons and track B continued to consider possible elements relevant to the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities.

(Mr. Robertson, Canada)

Yet another reason for the rapid presentation of this report was the energetic and skilled work performed by the coordinators of the two tracks, Mr. Scott Omene of Nigeria and Mr. Gueorgui Dimitrov of Bulgaria. I should like to express my personal appreciation as well as that of the members of the Ad Hoc Committee to them both for a job well done. Finally, a relevant factor that explains why our work moved along well in the Ad Hoc Committee was that it is done on the basis of texts presented from previous years. Thus little time is needed for general debate and the bulk of the work can be relegated to the two contact groups.

What did we accomplish this year? In general terms, at least compared to the dramatic movements we have seen and have heartily welcomed in other disarmament fields, it might appear that not much has been gained. However, through its regular albeit time-consuming, step-by-step approach to the issues before it, the Ad Hoc Committee has made relative progress.

With respect to the draft articles for a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, there is now in the text an alternative proposal to tackle the question of scope and definitions. Delegations will have this proposal under study during the inter-sessional period. New agreed texts were also elaborated to provide for amendments and for review conferences, while the verification and compliance provision was further refined.

As regards the possible elements relevant to a convention on the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities, let me first point out that the crucial question of the scope of an eventual convention, that is, what facilities would be protected, saw no movement. It is clear therefore that more time will still be needed on this point. However, further refinements and clarifications have been made to the elements dealing with the register and to parts of the verification and compliance schema.

In its conclusions, the Ad Hoc Committee has recommended that the Conference decide on an early re-establishment of the Committee next year. As outgoing Chairman, I thoroughly endorse this recommendation.

In closing I wish to take this opportunity to thank again all delegations for their contributions to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee and for their support to the Chair throughout the year. Allow me also to again congratulate the two coordinators of the contact groups, Mr. Omene and Mr. Dimitrov. And I also want to thank all the concerned members of the secretariat for their support and help.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons for introducing the Committee's report, and also for his kind words addressed to myself. I wish to convey our congratulations to Mr. Robertson on his guidance of the work of the Committee, which enabled it to reach consensus rapidly on the report he has just introduced. I intend to put the report, contained in document CD/1099, before the Conference for adoption at our next plenary meeting on Thursday 22 August.

(The President)

I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ambassador Solesby.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): I should like first of all to join previous speakers in congratulating you, Mr. President, on your accession to your post. We all know well your wide experience and your skills and we have every confidence in the wise leadership you will give us during the remaining weeks of this session and beyond.

Today, I would like to make a statement regarding agenda items 2 and 3 on behalf of the Western Group.

In this time of profound and rapid change, the Western Group continues to attach significance to the nuclear items on our agenda. We welcome discussions in this forum regarding nuclear disarmament because we believe such discussions play a positive role in strengthening international security and stability in the nuclear age. However, it remains the view of the Western Group that the prevention of a nuclear war can only be dealt with satisfactorily in the broader context of the prevention of war in general. The real question at issue is how to maintain peace and international security in the nuclear age. The prevention of war in the nuclear age is a global concern and not merely the responsibility of certain States or military alliances. This fact has been sadly underscored by the tragic events of this past year in the Gulf.

Times are changing, more hopefully perhaps than at any time in history. But a time of change is inevitably a time of uncertainty, of turmoil, and fear as well as of hope. The challenge for all of us is to see that these changes are directed in peaceful and positive channels. Developments in East-West relations and in other regions suggest that real progress is possible in the field of arms control and disarmament. The changes that are taking place are bringing us closer to the realization of the vision of a more just, humane and democratic world. If sustained, these trends will strengthen the prospects for fundamental improvements in international relations, a prerequisite for real progress not just in nuclear disarmament but in all disarmament matters.

The basic goal of Western arms control and disarmament policy has been and continues to be to prevent war by strengthening security and increasing stability at the lowest level of forces and armaments consistent with the requirements for legitimate individual or collective self-defence. We are convinced that arms control and confidence-building measures will continue to help shape and consolidate the development of a new cooperative order, as envisaged in the United Nations Charter, in which no country need harbour fears for its security. The Western Group believes that negotiations in all regions of the world intended to reduce the risk of conflict, to eliminate arms races, and to build mutual confidence in an equitable and stabilizing manner can contribute significantly to international security.

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

The Western Group of States have worked for many years to advance progress in the fields of non-proliferation and disarmament on a regional and global basis. The Gulf crisis demonstrated that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and of systems capable of delivering them, as well as excessive build-up of conventional arms, undermine international security and increase the risk of armed conflict throughout the world. To meet this challenge, we have renewed our commitment to the earliest possible achievement of advances in the international forums dealing with specific proliferation issues.

The Western Group is strongly committeed to, and will continue to work towards universal adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty. In this regard, the Western Group welcomes the recent important accessions in southern Africa to the Treaty and China's recent affirmation of its intention, in principle, to accede to the NPT. The other members of the Western Group also welcome France's decision, in principle, to accede to the Treaty. The Western Group calls on all States to become parties to the NPT, in that universal membership and full compliance with its provisions by all parties are important for the further strengthening of that Treaty. The Western Group supports the role of IAEA in facilitating the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in administering safeguards. We also support responsible export behaviour by States which are in a position to cooperate with others in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Recalling that it is incumbent upon all States to intensify their efforts and take steps to promote disarmament, the members of the Western Group observe with growing concern the acquisition and the development of ballistic missile technology for, possibly, other than peaceful purposes by an increasing number of States. The elimination of this potential source of international instability and insecurity requires work at the bilateral, regional and international levels. The Western Group welcomes the efforts made by some countries to improve their national export behaviour and also welcomes the wish of others to participate with the original seven countries in the Missile Technology Control Regime. We will urgently pursue efforts in the United Nations and elsewhere to address the problem of excessive build-up of arms by ensuring transparency and restraint.

We welcome the successful completion and continued implementation of the INF Treaty which has eliminated and entire class of nuclear weapons. We welcome too the exchanged instruments of ratification and protocols between the United States and the Soviet Union for the two nuclear testing treaties, the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosion Treaty, on 11 December 1990 in Houston. We also welcome the START Treaty recently signed by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev which represents a major achievement in securing a more stable, predictable balance at lower levels of strategic nuclear forces. Once ratified, this treaty will reduce, over seven years, each side's strategic nuclear weapons from their current level of between 10,000 and 11,000 weapons down to between 8,000 and 9,000 weapons.

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

The START agreement includes a major reduction in the most destabilizing and dangerous weapons, land-based ballistic missiles and their warheads, and places restrictions on specific types of strategic weapons.

We fully support the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to pursue new talks on strategic offensive arms, and on the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms. This agreement was outlined in the joint statement of 1 June 1990 on future negotiations on nuclear and space arms and further enhancing strategic stability.

With regard to the implementation of agreements to facilitate further reductions in the sub-strategic nuclear forces, the Western Group of States, members of the Atlantic Alliance, stated the following in the July 1990 London Declaration:

> "The political and military changes in Europe, and the prospects of further changes, now allow the Allies concerned to go further. They will thus modify the size and adapt the tasks of their nuclear deterrent forces. They have concluded that, as a result of the new political and military conditions in Europe, there will be a significantly reduced role for sub-strategic nuclear systems of the shortest range. They have decided specifically that, once negotiations begin on short-range nuclear forces, the Alliance will propose, in return for reciprocal action by the Soviet Union, the elimination of all its nuclear artillery shells from Europe.
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> "New negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of short-range nuclear forces should begin shortly after a CFE agreement is signed. The Allies concerned will develop an arms control framework for these negotiations which takes into account our requirements for far fewer nuclear weapons, and the diminished need for sub-strategic nuclear systems of the shortest range."

The members of the Western Group are actively working for further progress in the field of nuclear disarmament. The Western Group shares the objective of general and complete disarmament, but recognizes that its achievement will require a series of arms control steps in non-nuclear as well as nuclear areas. In these areas all States bear a responsibility.

In closing, the Western Group reiterates its will to continue to pursue vigorously the conclusion of disarmament agreements that enhance the security of all members of the community of nations.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for her statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, Dr. Ola Dahlman, who will introduce the report of the Group, which has been distributed today with the symbol CD/1097.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Sweden): I will today introduce the progress report of the recent meeting of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, contained in document CD/1097. This meeting, which was the thirty-second session of the Group, took place between 29 July and 9 August 1991. Experts and representatives from 28 countries participated. Representatives from the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the International Maritime Satellite Organization, usually referred to as INMARSAT, participated in parts of the session. The Group enjoyed throughout the session the eminent services of the secretariat.

I am pleased to report to the CD on the successful conduct of the Group's Second Large Technical Test - usually referred to as GSETT-2. The test was conducted as planned between 22 April and 9 June 1991 and included six weeks of continuous data recording and reporting. As I have reported to the CD on earlier occasions this full-scale test has been carefully planned, and detailed instructions were prepared under the guidance of the coordinator of the test, Mr. Peter Basham of Canada. Several preparatory tests have also been conducted during the last two years. This approach, by which facilities needed for the full-scale test were gradually built up in participating countries, turned out to be most useful.

Thirty-four countries participated in the full-scale test. This is an increase of 10 countries compared to the preparatory test. The Ad Hoc Group very much welcomes this broadened participation, which includes also countries in Africa and South America. To a great extent this increased participation was obtained thanks to international cooperative efforts at a national and institute level. Countries having expertise and facilities supported, through bilateral arrangements, the establishment and operation of stations and national data centres in countries having less expertise in seismology.

The cooperative spirit among all participants in the test has been a cornerstone in our test without which we would never had succeeded. Many presentations in the Ad Hoc Group described and welcomed this cooperation and described how instruments, computer hardware and software were exchanged among participating institutes and how experts went to stations or data centres in other countries to help installing new equipment or to make existing computers and programs run properly or even to cope with the heavy workload during the conduct of the experiment.

This experiment has been a practical demonstration of close and successful international cooperation.

I will now try to describe the size and complexity of this full-scale test. The 34 participating countries contributed data from in all 60 seismological stations on all continents including Antarctica. Data were reported on a daily basis from these stations through national data centres to the four experimental international data centres operated in Australia, Sweden, the United States and the Soviet Union. In all more than 30,000 messages were exchanged during the six-week period. Information on more than 100,000 observed seismic signals were reported by the national data

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

centres. These reports contained both parameter or level I data, giving a summary description of the observed signals, and the complete and thus more voluminous wave-form or level II data. The total amount of information exchanged would in expert language be described as over 1 gigabyte of data. To get an idea of the large amount of information involved we might think of this 1 gigabyte converted into statements in this very room. It would correspond to a statement that would go on for eight hours a day, seven days a week and that would last for the rest of this century.

The analysis of the 100,000 reported signals conducted at the four experimental international data centres made it possible to define and locate in all 6,000 events all over the globe. Nature challenged us - following a large earthquake in the Caucasus on 29 April several hundreds of aftershocks occurred during a short time. The large amount of data generated by these earthquakes stressed the system and caused overload at several centres, which was a useful experience.

To handle and exchange this amount of information on a global scale is a substantial undertaking even using modern communication technology and computers. We have challenged modern technology and utilized the most modern computer and communication systems available to cope with our task. We have successfully concluded a most extensive and complex experiment which goes beyond what has ever been conducted for scientific purposes in the field of seismology. It is also to my knowledge by far the most extensive multilateral test ever conducted for arms limitation and disarmament purpose. We did not get this for free.

The successful outcome of the test is the result of dedicated work by hundreds of people at seismological stations, and at national and international data centres, who by their enthusiasm, skill and long working days overcame the many practical problems that occurred throughout the test. On behalf of the Ad Hoc Group I wish to express our great appreciation to all these people around the world who so successfully contributed to our work.

At its session the Group reviewed the results and experience obtained at national and experimental international data centres. A large amount of information was brought forward, and only a tentative analysis and assessment could be made during the two-week session. Some preliminary results are compiled and annexed to the progress report; please allow me to make some preliminary comments in that regard.

Despite welcome participation in the full-scale test by a number of new countries the global distribution of participating stations is still uneven with almost half of the participants coming from Europe and few participants in Africa, Central and South America. The test demonstrated the power of the modern array stations, and a vast majority of the observations during the test came from such stations. We have to consider how to utilize this techology, which is becoming cheaper, on a global scale. The demonstration by Germany, to which also members of the CD were invited, was most timely and showed an interesting concept of a "CD station" built on modern technology.

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

The national data centres seem to have been working in a satisfactory way all over the globe. Much effort has been put into these facilities, and it is important to consider how to maintain these facilities which are of crucial importance for a global system.

The international data exchange, between national and international and among the international data centres, which caused great problems during the preparatory experiments, now worked in a most satisfactory way. Data arrived promptly, and only a couple of hundreds out of 30,000 messages were lost, which is a remarkably low figure. It should be possible to improve the communication system even further by using a more homogenous system. Today a great variety of means are being utilized.

Analysis at the experimental international data centres was conducted utilizing both parameter and wave-form data. Parameter data were processed using an essentially automatic procedure, whereas the analysis of wave-form data requires interactive analysis where a seismological expert interacts with a graphic computer screen. The experimental international data centres managed, by and large, to cope with their heavy workload. The time available for comprehensive analysis of wave-form data was however limited. Further analysis of the valuable database collected during the experiment is needed to fully evaluate the full potential of the wave-form analysis. It is expected that such additional analysis will be undertaken at the experimental international data centres prior to the Group's next session.

The purpose of the experiment was, as its name indicates, to test the various technical components of the system. In addition, however, valuable information of a more basic character was obtained. A thorough analysis of this extensive material will take considerable time and has to be conducted in close cooperation with scientific institutions around the world. I will however make a few preliminary observations. The problem of associating observed signals to defined events is still a serious one, and almost half of the signals observed during this test were unassociated in the present analysis. The system designed by the Group is essentially a teleseismic system based on observations in the range of 2,000 to 10,000 km from the stations. It has been clearly demonstrated during this test and in the national scientific contributions to the Group that the observation capabilities at regional distances, e.g. up to 2,000 km from the stations, are very good. This might have an important implication on the design of the system. A third important issue is how to handle, in the context of the global system, the information provided by national seismological networks in individual countries, which is often of very high quality.

The Ad Hoc Group noted that a comprehensive evaluation of the results of GSETT-2 will be a substantial undertaking. It has established five study groups, each headed by a convener, to deal with different aspects of this evaluation work. The Ad Hoc Group will make all efforts to complete a report on a comprehensive evaluation of the technical aspects of the test during the

(Mr. Dahlman, Sweden)

spring session of 1992. The full seismological evaluation will need considerably more time, and will be reported on later. In this regard, the Group believes it will be desirable to have facilities available to the extent required for a successful evaluation of GSETT-2.

At the invitation of the Conference on Disarmament a representative of the International Maritime Satellite Organization, INMARSAT, attended a session of the Group and presented information on their global system for information exchange. INMARSAT also conducted a demonstration of its system, which was attended also by members of the Conference. INMARSAT now offers an interesting possibility of providing information exchange on a global scale from seismological and other monitoring stations located in areas where other high-quality means of communication are not available. The Group expressed its appreciation to INMARSAT for its valuable contribution to the Group's work.

The Ad Hoc Group continued preliminary discussion on its future work. It expressed the view that much valuable work can be conducted under its current mandate with regard to international cooperative measures to detect and identify seismic events. The Group expects to be able to develop specific recommendations in this regard during its next session, taking into account the results of GSETT-2.

The Ad Hoc Group suggests that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 2 to 13 March 1992.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group for introducing the report, as well as for the useful information that he has given the Conference. With regard to the report in document CD/1097, the Ad Hoc Group transmits to us a recommendation contained in paragraph 19 under which it would meet next from 2 to 13 March 1992. I propose to submit the recommendation to the Conference at the next plenary meeting on Thursday, 22 August. Obviously any delegations that wish to make comments on the report contained in document CD/1097 can do so in the plenary then or later as they wish.

I have no further speakers on my list for today. I wonder whether any other delegation wishes to take the floor?

I should like now to refer to another matter. Today the secretariat has circulated a timetable of meetings that the Conference and its subsidiary bodies will hold during the coming week. The timetable was prepared following consultations with the chairmen of the ad hoc committees. As usual the calendar is of an indicative nature and can be amended if necessary. In this respect I should like to point out two changes that were agreed upon during the consultations held this morning in the bureau of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. The first involves the addition of a new meeting of Group C on Tuesday, 20 August at 3 p.m. The second relates to the meeting to be held on Friday, 23 August at 10 a.m. Instead of Group C, this meeting will be

(The President)

allocated to Group B. The secretariat will distribute the revised text in delegations' pigeon-holes. If there is no objection, I will take it that the Conference approves the timetable as amended orally.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I have no other business, and therefore I shall now adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will take place on Thursday, 22 August at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.603
22 August 1991

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 22 August 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Horacio Arteaga (Venezuela)

GE.91-62341/3751B

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The 603rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

At the start of our work today, I have the pleasure to welcome warmly on behalf of the Conference, and on my own behalf, two distinguished colleagues who are joining our disarmament negotiating body. I am referring to the new representatives of Egypt, Ambassador Mounir Zahran, and India, Ambassador Prakash Shah. Both Ambassadors have had extensive and outstanding diplomatic careers. Ambassador Prakash Shah is certainly an old friend. He was Ambassador of India in Venezuela, where he worked very hard and left very pleasant memories. In welcoming the two distinguished representatives I would like to assure them of the close cooperation of my delegation and my own personal cooperation, within the context of the activities of the Conference. I am convinced that they, like their predecessors, will make a valuable contribution to the work we are doing.

As I announced at our last plenary meeting, I will be putting to the Conference for decision today, once we have reached the end of the list of speakers, the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons and the recommendations appearing in paragraph 19 of the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. I shall then invite the Conference to take note with satisfaction of the report of the Chairman of the open-ended consultations on the effective functioning of the Conference, contained in document CD/WP.410. In that context I shall read a statement relating to the participation of non-member States in our work.

On the list of speakers for today I have the representatives of Cuba, Nigeria, Hungary, Germany, Sweden, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, who will do so in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan, who, as Chairman of the informal consultations on the functioning of the Conference, will be presenting the relevant report, Mexico, Indonesia and France. I now call on the first speaker on my list for today, the representative of Cuba, Ambassador Pérez Novoa.

Mr. PEREZ NOVOA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): For me it is a source of pride and great satisfaction to take the floor in this plenary under the presidency of a representative of our continent and the fraternal people of Venezuela. Knowing your ability and experience, I venture to state that you will lead our work towards positive results in such complex times. I do not wish to miss this opportunity to reiterate what I have already said to your predecessors concerning the positive work they have accomplished in moving our work forward and in pursuing the goals of the Conference. I should also like to welcome most warmly those colleagues who have just arrived in Geneva and extend to them the cooperation of my delegation, as well as wishing every success to those who are leaving us to take up new duties.

(Mr. Pérez Novoa, Cuba)

Cuba, which has suffered directly and sometimes intensely the dangers of the military threat since the triumph of the revolution, has worked consciously to halt and reverse the arms race and has been, is, and will be an active protagonist in multilateral relations to achieve treaties leading to international peace and security which are fair for all. All of us as members of the Conference on Disarmament bear a great responsibility in negotiating sound and firm agreements which lead us to the elimination and destruction of the arsenals of armaments which jeopardize the very existence of mankind. In discharging such a responsibility there are priorities that we cannot forget. Rightly and in response to the clamour of mankind, it has been decided that our priority was, and is, to eliminate nuclear-weapon stockpiles and production facilities from the face of the Earth. Regrettably we must say that the danger of nuclear explosions, not only as a result of military confrontation, but equally because of technical shortcomings or negligence, continues to threaten our existence.

Some of the main and most important possessors of chemical and nuclear weapons are urging the immediate and rapid conclusion of the convention on chemical weapons. Yet it is surprising that they are not as passionate in clamouring for the rapid elimination of nuclear armaments and new armaments technologies which constitute the most serious threat for mankind. My Government considers that all our efforts must be channelled towards effective treaties to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons. In that context, aware that any agreement eliminating any category of weapons will contribute to international peace and security, it believes that the early conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons, even though it might be a partial achievement within the context of the more complex problem of general and complete disarmament, is a step forward in the elimination of one of the categories of weapons threatening mankind. It is for that reason that the outcome of our work is a matter for constant attention in the bodies created to this end by our national authorities, which, drawing on the objectives we must reach, have taken a number of initiatives such as the dismantling of Cuban facilities that consume chemicals which will fall under the convention and a complete study of the levels of consumption and import of these chemicals.

Before expressing specific views on the "rolling text", I should like to make some general comments. We should not forget that for many years there were obstacles which delayed our negotiations for the conclusion of the convention, among them the insistence on the right to retaliation and on the retention of 2 per cent of chemical arsenals. We feel satisfied that these obstacles have now disappeared, and we would be even more satisfied if this had been the result of the multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament and not the outcome of bilateral agreements which we must now welcome and acknowledge, since this undoubtedly constitutes a step forward towards the conclusion of the convention. Even though we deem it important to take advantage of this situation to achieve the early conclusion of the convention, to the benefit of the security of all our peoples, we cannot accept demands that we should sacrifice the time available to us for other negotiations in the field of disarmament.

(Mr. Pérez Novoa, Cuba)

For Cuba, a country which does not possess chemical weapons, the conclusion of a non-discriminatory convention which prohibits the development, stockpiling, acquisition, transfer and use of these weapons and makes the necessary provision for the destruction of existing stockpiles, production facilities and launching systems, is not only of crucial importance but is an essential guarantee in its perception of security. This should be a convention embracing all States which possess chemical weapons. In it all States must have equal duties and rights, whether or not they possess chemical weapons, even though, as a simple reflection of reality, those that possess them will bear certain additional obligations.

We have always held the view that we are not negotiating a treaty for horizontal non-proliferation in the field of chemical weapons, but rather a comprehensive CW disarmament treaty, and hence the text we agree should not contain any article enabling any State party, after the end of the scheduled destruction period, to have this type of weapon in its arsenals or maintain its capacity to produce them. The convention should encompass all currently existing chemical weapons, including binary and multicomponent weapons, regardless of their structure and composition, and should extend to all facilities for producing and stockpiling such weapons. The future convention should not contain any provisions that could limit or restrict international trade in chemicals for purposes not prohibited by the convention; on the contrary, it should provide certain guarantees that it will not offer a screen for discriminatory practices based on criteria foreign to its letter and spirit. Cuba shares the views already expressed in this room that, once the convention is concluded, there should not be any additional verification machinery that could in practice establish a dual legal regime to monitor trade in chemicals for purposes permitted by the convention. Along with 18 other members of this Conference, we have sponsored the proposed amendment to paragraph 2 of article XI concerning the elimination of all current discriminatory restrictions against States parties as soon as the future convention enters into force for them.

The economic and technological development of States parties should not be adversely affected under any circumstances. Likewise, the parties to the convention should have access to assistance in the eventuality that chemical weapons are used against them or in the case of the threat of the use of such weapons. We also believe that the convention should be adopted unreservedly, as this would effectively contribute to strengthening its provisions and its moral authority.

As for the essential problem of verification, which continues to be the subject of debate, we believe that the best system of verification which can be devised cannot be perfect, and hence moderation and awareness of the context within which the system agreed is to be applied must guide our deliberations in the matter. It will be necessary to strike an appropriate balance between what is required for a reliable and effective system and what can be viable without creating a financial burden which is unnecessary, costly and may even discourage universal adherence to the convention.

(Mr. Pérez Novoa, Cuba)

The different types of inspection to be devised will have to be complementary in nature; they will have to be as minimal and as non-intrusive as possible without affecting the legitimate interests of States in the field of industry. Routine inspections will have to keep to the nature of the purpose for which they were conceived and, in our view, do not require elements that might be called for by challenge inspections.

We have carefully studied all proposals submitted so far to tackle the problems connected with article IX. The team of inspectors participating in the verification system will have to be as broadly representative of the States parties as possible and on each occasion be approved by the States affected. In no case should challenge inspections be used in an indiscriminate manner by any State and they should be kept free of all political or other considerations. This is why we attach importance to the concern raised in respect of the existing possibility of abusing this type of procedure, and we believe that in one way or another this concern can and must find room in the text we agree.

In respect of the composition, functions and role to be played by the executive council, we believe that this organ will have to guarantee proper geographical representation. Its size should be representative of the membership of the convention, it should not have permanent members and all States that wish to be part of it should be elected by the Conference whilst respecting the principle of re-election of all members of the council. All countries should have a vote and their financial contribution could be apportioned on the basis of the scale of assessments established by the United Nations for its regular budget. We believe that the technical secretariat should be representative of the various countries that will or might be parties to the convention and all its posts will be open to citizens of any State party. As for the financing of the future organization, we believe that this is a very important aspect. It is our impression that delegations have a clearer idea of what the system of financing should not be than what it should be. Our delegation has identified some principles that could provide the basis for future consideration of this matter which we will be setting out in the course of these negotiations. The financing of the costs incurred as a result of routine and challenge inspections could require additional provisions, and hence the alternative solutions require further study and consideration.

We believe that in the last few months we have achieved substantial progress in negotiations on the current "rolling text" of the future convention on chemical weapons. We must recall that this negotiating process has been and is the result of negotiations among the members of the Conference on Disarmament and that most countries - which we hope will sign the convention so that it enjoys universal participation - are not aware of this text. Hence we supported the letter sent by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons and the President of the Conference on Disarmament to the Member States of the United Nations, drawing their

(Mr. Pérez Novoa, Cuba)

attention to the forthcoming conclusion of the negotiating process on the convention, and we promoted the idea of informing the permanent representatives of our region which are not members of the Conference of the specific features of the evolving text. However, we consider that this is not enough given the imminence of the early conclusion of the convention and our interest in its gaining maximum participation. We suggest that the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament should immediately initiate a wide-ranging process of information and clarification for the benefit of permanent representatives of Governments which are non-members of the Conference on Disarmament on the "rolling text" of the convention so as to enable them to sign the convention immediately once it is concluded.

Allow me in conclusion to reiterate that it is our most heartfelt desire that the impetus currently enjoyed by the negotiations on chemical weapons, after long years of stagnation, should not only be crowned by success as soon as possible, but also that it should extend sooner rather than later to all the other items on the agenda of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Cuba for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now call on the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Azikiwe.

Mr. AZIKIWE (Nigeria): Mr. President, I am pleased to see you presiding over our work, the representative of a country with which Nigeria has excellent relations. Although this is a crucial period of our session, my delegation is confident that you will successfully discharge your responsibilities in the days ahead. I would like to take this opportunity to compliment your predecessor, Ambassador Ledogar for his significant contributions during his presidency.

A number of colleagues have left us since I last took the floor. May I use this opportunity to wish them every success in their future endeavours? I would also like to welcome our new colleagues who recently joined us.

As this year's session draws to a close, it is only natural that we take stock of our efforts and relate them to the anticipation with which it began. The first part of my statement this morning will be devoted to chemical weapons. We find most encouraging the positive spirit of cooperation that has generally prevailed in the negotiations. Already, both the United States and the Soviet Union had last year reached an agreement to stop the production of chemical weapons. My delegation welcomes the timely initiative of the United States in resolving the two key issues that had created obstacles to our negotiations in the past. We note with satisfaction their unconditional commitment to the destruction of all their chemical weapons stocks and facilities within 10 years of entry into force of the convention. We believe that this willingness to accommodate differing views is a hopeful sign towards resolving other thorny issues in the "rolling text".

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

The endeavour to complete our work should, however, not blind us to present-day realities. The final phase of our work will require careful and coordinated efforts by all delegations to ensure its consolidation through agreement on the few outstanding issues. We must demonstrate the vision and tenacity that the opportunity requires and identify practical, forward-looking ways towards an early conclusion of a comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention on the complete prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons, and their destruction.

Despite apparent repetition, we find it essential to emphasize that Nigeria does not possess chemical weapons, nor does it intend to acquire them. Notwithstanding that our chemical industry is still in its infancy, my Government earlier last month held a national seminar on the future of chemical weapons. The importance that my country attaches to the convention is motivated by our desire to achieve an agreement consistent with global security concerns, but at the same time guarantees that the development of our chemical industry will not be unduly impeded. In short, the convention must be economically neutral.

Our principal concern still remains that the proposed ban and restrictions would seriously affect a wide range of industries in the chemical field, because of their heavy dependence on the importation of raw materials, including chemical agents. Indeed, it could result in supplies being hampered, protracted delays and escalation in their prices. Related equipment could be similarly affected. These are very real concerns, and I believe that we are not negotiating a convention that would paralyse the chemical industry of States parties, especially from the developing countries. Such a perception would have dire consequences for universality. Hence we believe that all existing export control measures in the chemical industry must be abolished when the convention enters into force. Obviously, steps must be taken to allay such fears.

We welcome the agreement reached during the inter-sessional meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee to include the articles on assistance and protection, and on economic and technological development, as well as a new article on sanctions, in the "rolling text". This augurs well for the early conclusion of the convention. The importance that we attach to these articles arises from our belief that the convention should help to foster friendly relations among its adherence through cooperation in chemical industry. It should also provide a framework, in addition to other international mechanisms, to develop close ties through the demonstration of solidarity among States parties in times of crisis. Articles X and XI, and that on sanctions, have these potentialities and their provisions must be positively elaborated so that the potentialities can be fully realized.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

Specifically on the issue of sanctions, my delegation last year advocated the provision of penalties for the violation of the convention. Notwithstanding the fact that the record of imposition of sanctions is mixed at best, its inclusion in the convention could enhance universal adherence. For a developing country like Nigeria, the creation of awareness that the use of chemical weapons would not be cost-free, through a commitment to sanctions by the States parties, would deter aggression by non-States parties.

The burden of creating a credible sanctions policy as a reprisal against the use of chemical weapons will no doubt fall on the executive council acting under appropriate supervision of the Security Council as outlined by Ambassador Elaraby of Egypt in his plenary statement on 8 August. My delegation is mindful of the difficult legal problem of trying to legitimize sanctions against non-States parties to the future convention. However, we regard them as measures that are indispensable for the undiminished security of States parties.

It would be exceedingly myopic to believe or think that the benefits of these articles will flow only to the States parties from the developing countries. As we are living in an interdependent world, all efforts must be made to ensure that the convention is as attractive as possible in order to attain the widest possible adherence.

Another unresolved key issue is verification, both routine and challenge, which remains very difficult. We must continue to address it very constructively, and with perseverance. We regard routine inspection as a purely technical exercise which should be left to the technical secretariat to conduct. Only this approach can guarantee a fair, equitable and non-discriminatory system. Challenge inspection is qualitatively different. Firstly, it is initiated by a State party. Secondly, it is intended to address some specific doubts and concerns. This aspect of the inspection, together with the special interest it is bound to generate among States parties, gives it a specifically political and therefore very sensitive character. It bears repeating that the image of a State party, the challenged State, will be at stake. Thus it can only be expected that after the organization has completed its inspection of the State party's facility, the same organization should make a categorical pronouncement on the State party's compliance or not, on the basis of the inspection report. It should be a collective exercise, from the beginning to the end, especially in view of its political nature. We trust that this important aspect of the issue and of course the level of intrusiveness or the role of the observer will continue to receive careful consideration.

History has repeatedly demonstrated the fact that we cannot really enforce or legislate morality. We all know that good intention is one thing and honest implementation is quite another irrespective of whether the selection of facilities for inspection is done by the technical secretariat or States parties.

(Mr. Azikiwe, Nigeria)

I should now like to take up the question of nuclear disarmament which constitutes priority items on our agenda. The trend within recent years has been moving towards an era of pragmatic cooperation among States. Most importantly, the climate for consideration of disarmament matters has certainly improved. This evolution, the absence of which hitherto had provided a ready excuse for lack of progress in the disarmament process has since resulted in the successful conclusion of the INF Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. Last month witnessed another historic occasion when the two countries concluded the START agreement on cuts in their strategic nuclear weapons.

Although there are major challenges ahead, the two nuclear-weapon States must strive to maintain the momentum as there is no room for complacency. We cannot afford the resurgence of old tensions. The strategic arms control agenda is far from exhausted. START is just the beginning of a continuous process towards nuclear disarmament. There is much we can learn from the implementation of the INF Treaty. Its value lies in the promise of providing the basis for a more far-reaching agreement on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. We should however bear in mind that the ultimate goal of the bilateral negotiations is for a total and complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. It is against this background that we call on the Conference to take such measures that will lead to immediate commencement of multilateral negotiations on the nuclear test ban as a matter of priority. We look forward to the early establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee with a negotiating mandate at the next session.

Recently a number of countries including South Africa signed the non-proliferation Treaty. Two nuclear-weapon States, France and China have announced their intention in principle to accede to the Treaty. This augurs well for the NPT which has served as the most important international agreement limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. We heartily welcome them to our fold. The growing support will no doubt further strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Although these developments are a welcome step in the right direction, there are still serious concerns to be addressed. Within my region Africa, the crucial question still relates to the IAEA's safeguards of all South Africa's nuclear facilities, or highly enriched uranium in its possession. Furthermore, there is the reality of the existence of some nuclear weapons it has already produced, tested and possibly deployed. Nigeria attaches immense importance to the effectiveness of the safeguards system, which should be strengthened and the existing loopholes blocked. To do otherwise would undermine the non-proliferation regime.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement and the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of Hungary, Ambassador Tóth.

Mr. TOTH (Hungary): Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on your assumption of the post of President in this very important and concluding phase of the current session of the Conference on Disarmament. Let me add that I do not envy you in fulfilling your difficult task, but my delegation is prepared to give you all of its support in your undertaking. I would like to join in your words of welcome extended to our newly arrived colleagues, Ambassador Mounir Zahran of Egypt and Ambassador Prakash Shah of India.

The recent events in the Soviet Union caused alarm and anxiety all over the world. The abortive coup d'état was a direct assault on an unfolding democracy. My country is extremely relieved and happy to note the positive turn of events and the restoration of the constitutional power in Moscow. Hopefully, with this positive development, the fears of a shadow creeping over international disarmament efforts will be removed as well.

After years of strenuous negotiations a major disarmament agreement affecting the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States was signed at the Moscow summit meeting held a couple of weeks ago. The envisaged reduction by some 30 per cent of the offensive arsenals will undoubtedly contribute to the creation of a more secure and stable world and to paving the way for further steps in the nuclear field, particularly in eliminating short-range nuclear forces.

Other events of this year so far had a complex impact on our proceedings. Perhaps the most significant influence can be attributed to the Gulf conflict, to the lingering threat of the use of chemical weapons in the war. Expectations concerning the outcome of the conflict and the possible terms of its settlement had a discernible effect on the negotiations on the total prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles, leading to meaningful work on pending issues of the future chemical weapons convention.

No less importance can be attached to the arms control and disarmament initiatives that were launched following the ending of the Gulf crisis. The chemical weapons initiative of the United States President, the new arms control and disarmament plan put forward by the President of France are major developments. Important steps were also made towards achieving the universality of the NPT, including the announcement of the decision in principle of two nuclear-weapon States, France and China, to sign the non-proliferation Treaty.

The re-evaluation by the United States of security policy related to chemical weapons has had an immense effect on the CW negotiations. We certainly add our voice to the numerous appraisals expressed in this hall regarding the decision announced by President Bush a couple of months ago to move away from a position previously held concerning the conditional destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles and the right of retaliatory use of chemical weapons. That initiative marked a genuine intent to conclude a

(Mr. Tóth, Hungary)

chemical weapons convention as early as possible, and led to the creation of the favourable atmosphere in which the negotiations are now progressing. The Hungarian delegation cannot but welcome the plans to intensify the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, allocating as much time as possible for substantive work in order to meet the objective adopted in the new mandate of the Committee. We appreciate the efforts made by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Batsanov, seeking to find additional time for negotiations without the intention of interfering with other no less important events of multilateral disarmament. We do believe that some kind of activity, apart from a full session of the Committee, is possible even during periods coinciding with the work of other disarmament forums. In this regard, consideration might also be given to making good use of the presence at the United Nations General Assembly of high-level political decision makers. Their gathering in New York could be exploited for giving additional political support or impetus to the CW negotiations.

The report of the Conference on Disarmament to be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly later this fall will reflect the results achieved so far in the CW negotiations. The achievements will duly represent the current state of affairs in the negotiations and will - in a way - also indicate the fields requiring further work for concluding the CW convention. One such field is of course verification which, by nature, is one of the crucial elements of any arms control or disarmament agreement. During this year's session important new approaches have been injected into the work on the verification regime to be applied to activities not prohibited under the convention. We attach equal importance to the fact that after a period of stalling, substantive discussion in the framework of the Ad Hoc Committee was resumed on the other element of the future verification system, namely, challenge inspection. The latter was substantiated not least by new ideas presented by a number of delegations giving ample material to work on with the aim of resolving the issue. The intensification of work on the verification system to be created under article VI of the draft convention was a result of the common recognition that existing provisions on the verification of activities not prohibited under the convention are far from satisfactory. We welcome the new approaches aiming to integrate the major and most relevant part of the international chemical industry in a more comprehensive system of verification. They all appear to seek some sort of solution to eliminate existing loopholes. It is also encouraging that the chemical industry is ready to provide access to all of its facilities for the main purposes of verification.

When we attempt to patch up the holes of the safety net identified with the verification system we should not overlook the imperfections that exist elsewhere. I would like to refer to the schedules of chemicals that are to play a fundamental part in conducting inspections. It is obvious that the contents of the schedules will determine to a large extent the scope of any inspection to be carried out in the future. Now, for example, as we look at schedule 1, listing chemicals known to be chemical weapons, we may have to

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face the fact that certain chemicals publicly described as possible agents for warfare are missing from our list. Also, there is good reason to presume that declared chemical-weapon States and other States known to have displayed "interest" towards this means of warfare might be in the possession of CW formulas that have not been made public so far. Thus, the danger of circumvention is inherent. Of course, it is hard to imagine any method to deal with the latter phenomenon. Yet we must be aware of certain facts of life if we are to maintain our clearsightedness.

While there is an unquestionable need to have an adequate regime to make sure that chemical industries of future States parties are really engaged only in activities not prohibited under the convention, we should be realistic in our final objectives. It should have become obvious by now that a truly foolproof verification regime of the chemical weapons convention would entail financial and other burdens that most future parties would be reluctant to bear. However, a trade-off between possibilities and the safeguarding of implementation is indispensable. In our view, the verification system can be considerably strengthened by an enhanced challenge regime providing increased effectiveness relating, in particular, to facilities declared under article VI of the future convention.

It has often been said that one of the main purposes of verification is to detect non-compliance and through this, to deter potential violators. At the same time, realizing the limitations of any workable and feasible verification system for the chemical weapons convention, we might look at other ways as well to enhance the deterrence against possible violators. It is obvious that verification has the best chance to reveal a violation arising from the actual use of chemical weapons. This form of violation was also considered by the initiative put forward by President Bush as a grave breach of international law, and I do not believe that anybody in this hall thinks otherwise. Accepting this as a premise, the international community should have the resolve to take appropriate and determined action against any State that initiates the use of chemical weapons. This action, of course, would mean sanctions in the first place. The terms of the cease-fire putting an end to the Gulf conflict as reflected in United Nations Security Council resolution 687 established stringent rules and conditions for the vanquished and have provided an important precedent. Such terms in themselves could also become a form of dissuasion to any future aggressor or violator. It could also effectively complement the deterrent potential of verification expected to detect non-compliance. Thus, it might be advisable to take another look at provisions on "measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions" that have recently been introduced into the draft convention.

There is one more issue that cannot be avoided when discussing the prohibition of use of chemical weapons, and that surely is the relation of the chemical weapons convention to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. We regard the CWC as replacing totally, for States parties, the obligations and rights assumed

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under the Geneva Protocol. In accepting the spirit and the substance of the CWC, there remains no sound reason to maintain reservations attached by certain States to the Protocol. We certainly endorse the call to withdraw all reservations to the Geneva Protocol upon signature of the CW convention, at the latest. We welcome the decision by a number of States parties to the Geneva Protocol to withdraw their reservations.

Hungary has, on earlier occasions, stated that States parties to the CW convention, while assuming significant obligations, cannot be entitled to merely the same rights that non-States parties without obligations might enjoy. In this regard, the CW convention really needs to be positively discriminatory vis-à-vis States parties. Discrimination that might arise from the future CWC is to be exercised towards States failing to join the convention. If universal adherence to the future convention is a desired objective, this certainly must be kept in mind. We are, of course, aware of the existence of certain arrangements aiming to curb the actual threat of CW proliferation. Such arrangements have indeed contributed to non-proliferation efforts. However, with the achievement of the total and comprehensive ban of chemical weapons through the CW convention, these measures - being a product of a totally different situation - need to be re-examined and should be harmonized with the purposes of the convention.

The recent progress in the negotiations on the chemical weapons convention, and the expected completion of these negotiations by 1992, will also affect the third review conference of the biological weapons Convention. May I just recall the often heard expectation that a well-founded CWC might pave the way for the more effective functioning of the biological weapons Convention? This is not the first occasion during the 1991 session of the Conference on Disarmament when the topic of biological weapons appears in a statement. In the framework of our informal consultations on the future of the CD, several delegations raised the possibility of conducting meaningful negotiations to establish a verification mechanism in this field. The arms control and disarmament plan introduced by the distinguished Ambassador of France on 3 June also contained a concrete proposal on the verification of the 1972 biological weapons Convention.

In our view, the question of an ensured prohibition of biological weapons is gathering increasing importance. The recent findings of the United Nations inspection teams in Iraq have caused a frightening alarm that the grave danger of biological warfare has not yet disappeared. It is our firm belief that the BWC is of crucial significance, making an undeniable and relevant contribution to international security. The system of confidence-building measures adopted at the 1987 follow-up technical meeting also played a useful role in strengthening the Convention. These positive facts, however, should not tempt us to sit back comfortably and enjoy a false feeling of satisfaction.

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Important lessons have to be drawn from the functioning of the confidence-building system. Some of its elements need strengthened and widened scope, while the effectiveness of others is yet to be proven. A major task ahead of the Conference lies in modifying the actual modalities of the confidence-building system. In this respect, it seems inevitable to widen the scope and increase the number of involved facilities on the one hand, and concentrate the reporting on relevant and significant information on the other. The scope of the CBMs should also be wider with regard to the defence-related activities permitted under the Convention, and also to such activities that might carry an indirect danger for humankind, e.g. through damaging the environment. Another important problem is data-processing - or rather its present absence. The structure of the reports has to be modified in a way so that it would open the possibility of computerized analysis. Access to this database should be provided for all States parties. As for the future steps in the field of confidence-building, it might be advisable to establish the basis of direct communication methods between the facilities that were actually accounted for in the yearly report.

It might also be advisable to assess the present approach to the confidence-building measures and reaffirm the political commitment undertaken for participating in these measures. Another important responsibility of the review conference lies in strengthening the character of the convention as an instrument of non-proliferation, without of course changing the basic principles regarding commercial relations and scientific cooperation.

In the light of the fresh evidence that one of the signatries to the BWC conducted a biological warfare programme, the question of verification cannot be considered any more as only a theoretical one. On the contrary, this problem seems to be more topical than ever before. One of the most important and probably most difficult tasks ahead of the third review conference is to lay the groundwork for the further consideration of the establishment of a future verification system of the BWC.

Naturally, a relatively short conference cannot cover the whole problem of verification in its entirety and complexity. One possible solution is to concentrate our efforts on questions of principle and leave the practical details to a new follow-up process. It is evident that any kind of follow-up will have to face a laborious task, where a great deal of detailed technical work is to be accomplished. In the light of this, we think that such a process should not necessarily be tied to a rigid time frame. The primary nature of such a follow-up will probably have to be an exploratory one. We must not forget that verification of the BWC constitutes a very specific task, and it may easily turn out to be even more difficult than that of the CWC. As an introductory measure to further negotiations, possible approaches have to be defined and examined from the points of view of practicability, effectiveness and costs.

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The Gulf conflict and its aftermath have consequences that go far beyond ongoing multilateral disarmament efforts. The activities carried out and the findings made by the United Nations Special Commission established to implement the relevant paragraphs of Security Council resolution 687 have a clear message to convey to the international community as a whole. Clandestine and overt attempts at proliferation, excessive conventional arms build-up having nothing to do with the needs of legitimate self-defense, have displayed vividly their extremely destabilizing effects for international security. There appear to be discrepancies between the existing, but by no means comprehensive multilateral disarmament machinery, including its legal instruments on the one hand and the revealed facts of reality on the other. Unfortunately, the problems have surfaced in areas where there was an apparent feeling of security. Uncertainties have arisen regarding the effectiveness of multilateral arms control and disarmament regimes established in the field of weapons of mass destruction. This realization might call for reflection on the effectiveness of some of the relevant aspects of existing security and disarmament treaties and other corresponding arrangements.

There is currently an important and welcome political driving force to finalize the convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles. Such an influence is indispensable for the conclusion of any disarmament agreement. However, we must not forget the lessons of the Gulf conflict I have just referred to, namely that some uncertainties have arisen regarding existing multilateral disarmament agreements. It surely cannot be denied that those agreements were concluded on the basis of what could then be politically achieved, yet practice appears to have defied some of the objectives. This, in our view, needs to be taken into account while working on new agreements in order to avoid future "disappointments" in matters related to international security.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Germany, Ambassador Ritter von Wagner.

Mr. von WAGNER (Germany)(translated from Spanish): Mr. President, a week ago you took up your very important task of President of this Conference. We wish you every success. There is no doubt that you are highly qualified to guide us in our deliberations in the most effective manner. As your presidency will be the last in this year's session, it will cover the most important stage in the negotiations, right up until the initial weeks of next year. Under your presidency we can be sure that we will attain the lofty goals to which we aspire.

(continued in English)

Before introducing the reports on two trial challenge inspections conducted in Germany earlier this year, I would like to start with some observations on this issue in general. In the past our work on the CW convention has been criticized repeatedly from outside the CD, pointing to

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our distance from reality in our negotiations at the detached conference table. Although critics might not be wrong in some respects, it is not true as to verification exercises. Up to now, we have a record of approximately 50 trial routine and trial challenge inspections, carried out by various CD members and observer countries in the past few years. This gives evidence of a solid, still growing practical basis and a wealth of operational experience available to us in concluding, at last, our work on the CW convention.

Some countries, including my own, have also reported on bilateral trial challenge inspections, which not only added further elements of realism to a learning process in very practical terms, but at the same time served in building confidence between the countries involved. In this context, my delegation wishes to express its particular appreciation of the interesting joint report tabled recently by the Republic of Poland and the Soviet Union in document CD/1093.

Within the framework of a series of German trial challenge inspections, such an inspection was conducted for the first time at a large chemical complex at the end of February 1991. Another trial challenge inspection was conducted with participants from five other CD countries at a German air force base in May 1991. I have pleasure in introducing today the reports on these two trial challenge inspections, which are tabled as documents CD/1101 and CD/1102 (working papers CD/CW/WP.360 and CD/CW/WP.361).

In order to gain, for the first time, experience in the inspection of a large production site typical of the German chemical industry, a plant site located in Frankfurt-Hoechst was selected, comprising approximatey 800 buildings and 100 individual production facilities, covering an area of over 4 square kilometres. Document CD/1101 describes in detail the scenario, the conduct of the inspection and the lessons learned. Above all, this trial inspection showed that a suspected violation of article I of the convention can be investigated successfully even in the case of a very large chemical plant site. Nevertheless, the suspicion needs to be sufficiently concrete and specified in the request. In this case, the suspected production of the schedule 1 precursor chemical DF was investgated. Another important lesson learned refers to the requirement of inspectors to be specially trained to perform such a difficult inspection task in the chemical industry. Expertise not only in chemical processes, including processes possibly used in CW production, but also in chemical engineering and plant construction, was found to be absolutely crucial. This similarly applies to the members of the escort team of the national authority.

As regards the size of the inspection team, 11 inspectors split up into four subteams were able to inspect less than a third of the facilities within the two days of trial inspection. To facilitate their task, a number of inspection assistants were found to be needed. These assistants should be assigned to each subteam to carry out, for example, sample-taking and analytical screening.

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The inspection excluded the aspect of securing the site. Since securing a site of this size in a meaningful manner poses major problems, it had been decided not to overload the scenario of this first trial challenge inspection of such a site.

Basically, the trial inspection caused no problems regarding commercial confidentiality. However, it was felt that this aspect could not be enacted in a sufficiently realistic manner, given the artificial absence of real distrust in the case of this exercise. Nevertheless, the area of applied research, which represents the stage between research and production, was identified to be a particularly sensitive one: the information that could have been collected here is of extraordinary commercial value to the owner and, therefore, requires special protection. With regard to the observer, there was no indication that his role would differ from that at military facilities. In both cases he should be kept informed on how the inspection was proceeding by the chief inspector only, while it should be at the discretion of the challenged State to determine the extent of access granted to him. The observer's rights need to be clearly delimited further.

Finally, sampling and analysis proved to be particularly difficult tasks. The necessity of further development of methods and instrumentation, identified previously by the technical groups chaired by Dr. Rautio, was confirmed during this exercise. Both the number of samples and the time required for analysis need to be reduced drastically. Methods to be developed should include simple pre-screening means backed up by more sophisticated screening methods, such as recently proposed by Australia in CD/CW/WP.353. Thus, more intrusive and time-consuming in-depth analyses of samples on the site would be minimized. The use of analytical instruments of the central laboratory at the site proved to be problematic, since they took considerable time to be adapted to the needs of the inspection.

Some of the experiences I have mentioned were confirmed during the first trial challenge inspection with multinational participation and are described in detail in document CD/1102. The inspection at the Bad Kreuznach military air base, consisting of two distant areas, proceeded from the suspicion of chemical weapons being stored and personnel being trained in the use of these weapons. One of the aims in this trial inspection was to gain practical experience with an international inspection team typical of those that will be dispatched by the future technical secretariat. The inspectors, who came from Argentina, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and Germany, worked extremely well together. From time to time, the course of the inspection was interrupted to discuss questions raised by team members participating in a CW-related inspection for the first time. These discussions turned out to be of great value to all participants. The need for the inspectors appointed by the technical secretariat to be thoroughly prepared and well trained again became clear.

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The observer in this trial inspection, whose role was assumed by the United Kingdom, was accorded a high degree of openness, although, like the observer in previous German trial challenge inspections, he was constantly escorted. In some cases, at the request of the representative of the inspection site, he was kept at a safe distance from the inspected sensitive object.

Finally, returning to the point of the criticism of the work done in the CD, namely to be lacking the necessary sense of reality, let me add one practical proposal that builds on practical experience: in order to narrow down, in the future, the unavoidable gap between inspection exercises and real inspections, CW dummies could be hidden at the inspection site, with the task for the site management not to disclose their existence and to attempt to evacuate them in spite of the site being secured.

All in all, apart from many other lessons learned, it can be concluded from this first multinational trial challenge inspection that the challenge inspection regime envisaged can fully meet the requirements as an important verification instrument of the CW convention. It can be handled in such a way as to ensure the necessary degree of openness, while taking into account the national security interests of the inspected State.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Germany for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I also congratulate him on his excellent Spanish. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius.

Mr. HYLTENIUS (Sweden): Mr. President, before I address the topic of my intervention today, I should like to congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency of the Conference. As members of the Group of 21, our two delegations cooperate very closely on a number of disarmament issues. I am sure you will continue to guide the work of the Conference with great skill. Thanks and appreciation of my delegation go to your predecessor as President, Ambassador Ledogar of the United States, for the authoritative and efficient manner in which he discharged his duties in this important office. I should also like to take this opportunity to extend a warm welcome to Ambassadors Zahran of Egypt and Shah of India, as well as to Ambassador Neagu of Romania and Ambassador Brotodiningrat of Indonesia. My delegation and myself look forward to continuing with them the excellent cooperation we have had with their predecessors.

The negotiations on the chemical weapons convention now seem to be entering into their final and decisive phase. They have continued to advance under the skilful leadership of Ambassador Batsanov, the chairmen of the working groups and the friends of the Chair. Provided that the necessary flexibility and determination is shown by all participants, there is every reason to expect that our efforts will be crowned with success in the course of the coming year. The convention would be a historical achievement and make the world a better place both for ourselves and for generations to come.

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Article I constitutes the backbone of the draft convention. One of the major hurdles for the convention has recently been eliminated, through the inclusion of a provision on the total prohibition of use of chemical weapons in the scope of the convention. This was absolutely necessary and has considerably increased the prosects of progress on other remaining issues. A few remaining problems pertaining to articles I and II have not been actively discussed for several years. They must now be addressed and resolved. One of them is the question of prohibiting military preparations for use of chemical weapons. It was introduced in the negotiations long ago under circumstances that differ considerably from the present state of affairs. Today we have an unconditional prohibition of use in article I, and the need for a specific prohibition of military preparations does not, therefore, appear to be of the same importance as before. Thus, my delegation considers that paragraph 4 in article I is no longer needed.

The question of herbicides is another unresolved issue related to article I. It is the long-standing position of my delegation that the future convention should encompass a prohibition to use herbicides as a method of warfare. When the matter was discussed previously concerns were expressed that prohibiting the military use of herbicides could be interpreted as also prohibiting a State party from using herbicides, for example, to clear its own air bases, an activity which may be instrumental in supporting its war efforts. However, the formulation "as a method of warfare" makes it clear that such interpretations would not be possible. My delegation favours the inclusion in article I of a prohibition against the use of herbicides as a method of warfare, as contained in footnote 1 to the article. In view of tragic experiences in this field the chemical weapons convention could not simply ignore this problem. It is obvious that such an extension of the scope could not be coupled with verification mechanisms of the kind envisaged for chemical warfare agents. In the view of my delegation the only feasible verification would be the investigation of alleged use.

The difficult problem of "old chemical weapons", abandoned as stockpiles on the territories of other countries or found as remnants on the battlefield, will also have to be resolved. There are several problems connected with this issue, the most difficult being the question of responsibility for such weapons. There must also probably be some time limit for weapons to be included in this category. It seems to me that the problem of old chemical weapons will primarily have to be resolved bilaterally between the countries concerned, and that the multilateral convention should only refer to it in general terms.

A major breakthrough has been made over the past two years in finalizing the order of destruction in articles IV and V and their annexes. With the withdrawal of the "2% proposal" we now have an agreed text with agreed time-frames for the destruction of chemical weapons and an unambiguous obligation to destroy chemical weapons production facilities.

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This year new ideas have been introduced concerning the verification of the chemical industry. I note with great satisfaction the converging positions on the inclusion of "capable facilities" under article VI and appreciate that delegations do not reject the exploration of new ideas.

My delegation welcomes the fact that a substantial part of the chemical industry seems to be prepared to provide free access for international inspectors. Such an approach would considerably facilitate the definition of "capability". If a somewhat narrower concept is considered desirable however, my delegation believes that the exemption of certain kinds of production is the least complicated way to go.

A verification regime building upon an extended scope of declarations and nominations by States parties would constitute an important confidence-building measure, which would provide a possibility to demonstrate compliance with the convention. In the view of my delegation, declarations should be linked to production, present or planned.

The inspection site should in our view correspond to an entire plant site. From this follows that an inspection could include a variety of procedures depending on the nature of the site. The aim of an inspection should be to verify the declaration. A relatively simple inspection procedure should be the basis, with the possibility of increasing the intrusiveness, if the inspectors deem it necessary. The number of inspections possible within a given budget would then be significantly higher compared with the system currently outlined in the "rolling text".

The selection of facilities for inspection under article VI must be performed in such a way that the security concerns of States parties are taken into account. We do not, however, understand the reasoning behind a pre-determined concentration on inspections of schedule 2 facilities. In fact, my delegation does not believe that a risk assessment can be based on simple technical criteria. Thus, a selection by the technical secretariat based on such criteria would not be sufficient for singling out the most relevant facilities. A State party should take its own decision as to which facility it considers should be inspected. This must be the basis. It is conceivable, however, that inspections proposed by States parties could be complemented by inspections initiated by the technical secretariat according to agreed guidelines.

There has been much discussion about anonymous nominations. The preference for such nominations for inspections builds upon two different presumptions: first, that anonymity would avoid creating bilateral political problems and, second, that it would not be correct to single out one State party among several having made the same nomination. The list of nominated plant sites could be included in the annual report of the technical secretariat with an indication of the number of nominations for each of them.

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While very little work remains on article VII, much more should be done to start preparations for its implementation as the convention now approaches its completion. Regional efforts to publicize the forthcoming convention and its implications for the States parties on the national level play a very constructive role in this context. I should therefore like to take this opportunity to express the appreciation of my Government of the initiative that led to the regional workshop recently held in Mexico City under the auspices of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs for the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.

The "rolling text" with regard to article VIII has been cleaned up considerably. The core issues that remain to be solved are the composition, functions and decision-making of the executive council. How can we strike the right balance between representativity and efficiency of the executive council? It goes without saying that all States parties must be eligible for the executive council. This is not enough, however. The number of members of the council and the length of their term of office should also guarantee all States parties the possibility of serving on the council at reasonable intervals. This would undoubtedly be one important factor contributing to the universal adherence that we are all striving for. At the same time we must ensure that the efficiency of the council is not hampered. Therefore, my delegation suggests that 25-30 States parties be elected by the conference of the States parties for a two-year term. Furthermore, we suggest that provision be made for the possibility of enlarging the council at a later stage, if and when it is deemed appropriate.

The basis for the allocation of seats should be the need to ensure balanced geographical representation. However, other interests must also be reflected when composing the structure of the executive council. Political factors and the size of national chemical industries are also relevant. These interests should, at least to some extent, be taken into account within each regional group as it considers its internal allocation of seats.

It is necessary to apply a nuanced approach to the problem of inspections under article IX. This article should cover a whole spectrum, from consultations and requests for clarification on matters of compliance with the convention to requests for on-site inspections, which may be either undramatic or more or less confrontational. That is why my delegation has proposed using the term "inspections on request". It is evident from the discussion that a deliberate choice to make on-site inspections under article IX confrontational - as the term "challenge" implies - also inevitably puts more emphasis on the question of abuse.

It has been argued that if a violation cannot be proven the request should be considered an abuse of the convention. This is, of course, a grossly oversimplified view, but it may serve to deter any State party from requesting on-site inspections under this article unless it is practically 100 per cent sure that a suspected violation can be proven. Such an outcome

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would jeopardize the whole effort to achieve an effective verification regime. Its purpose must be to deter violations of the convention rather than requests for inspections.

The terminology is of course less important than the substance of the matter under negotiation. The Swedish delegation will therefore not insist on the term "inspections on request", if this would hamper further progress on this article.

Sweden welcomes the fact that the presentation of CD/CW/WP.352 has now again brought article IX to the negotiating table. We particularly welcome the amendments proposed by the delegation of France. Together with previous documents, including CD/CW/WP.316, these contributions form a good basis for the work on article IX. The conclusion of that work is, in the view of my delegation, the most urgent task of the Ad Hoc Committee.

The trend in the field of disarmament during the last few years has been to work towards greater transparency and openness as well as greater instrusiveness in terms of verification regimes and clarification of doubts about compliance. This is an important trend that inspires confidence and thereby promotes the security of States. It is on the basis of this trend, as well as of the need to create an effective "safety net" in the verification regime, that my delegation has approached article IX of the draft convention.

It is important to keep in mind that the work on a verification regime containing, among other important parts, inspections on request does not have a bearing on the chemical weapons convention only. It will also form the framework for the elaboration of verification regimes in other future multilateral treaties on arms limitation and disarmament.

In the opinion of my delegation it is of the utmost importance that a request for an inspection be complied with by the technical secretariat automatically and without delay. Time is of the essence. A phased approach might be a way to take care, at least to a degree, of both the demand for automaticity and the concern regarding possible abuse. A time-consuming process, hampering the start of the inspection, could erode the credibility of the convention. Besides, it is likely that the executive council will closely follow the entire process of an inspection on request and thus play a significant role in deterring abuse of the convention.

Most countries have military installations which are of the highest importance to their national security. Sweden therefore favours a procedure which makes it possible for a State party to protect its national security without giving it the right of denying access to the facility in question. Managed access offers an acceptable way of dealing with these problems. In the view of my delegation, the more restricted access approach contained in CD/CW/WP.352 gives too much freedom to the inspected State party. It may be added that the need for a strict verification regime seems vindicated by recent events.

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It would be wrong to prescribe in advance what the executive council should do once the inspection report has been submitted. There is in fact a wide range of possibilities depending on the nature of the report: the report may provide compelling evidence of a violation, it may show that there was no evidence of a breach of the convention, or it may be inconclusive. The executive council should be free to draw its own conclusions and decide on measures it deems appropriate. It is not possible to cover in the text of the convention every conceivable case, nor is it desirable even to attempt such a futile exercise.

What is essential, nay necessary, is to have a convention that deters potential violators and inspires confidence in the effectiveness of its verification and complaints procedures. This also goes for the problem of possible abuses of its provisions. Article IX must not become a paper tiger. It must have real teeth.

It is of vital importance to ensure the multilateral character of the convention. It has been proposed that the requesting State party should have the right to send a representative to observe the conduct of the inspection. As I have stated before, my delegation has reservations against such an arrangement for two reasons. Firstly, it implies that the interntional team of inspectors cannot be trusted and therefore has to be checked by the requesting State party. This is not acceptable as a matter of principle and would create a very bad precedent for other international treaties. Secondly, it is questionable whether such a clause would be politically realistic. It is hardly conceivable that certain States would allow representatives of certain other States to be present at installations which they regard as sensitive. However, if some States parties would like to make bilateral or regional arrangements for the presence of observers at inspections on request they should be free to do so. But it should not be obligatory under the convention to allow the presence of observers from the requesting State. Such a clause might seriously undermine the convention's chances of obtaining universal adherence.

Sweden welcomes the agreement in the Ad Hoc Committee to include the draft texts of articles X and XI in appendix I. The agreed formulations in article X will make it easier for States parties to mobilize assistance in cases of the use or the threat of the use of chemical weapons by giving this provision the intended operational character. The settlement of this issue represents an important step forward in the negotiations.

For several years Sweden has argued for the inclusion of the text on article XI regarding economic and technological development in appendix I. No delegation had or has, in the view of my delegation, anything to gain by holding up this important issue.

Another result of the fruitful work that has recently taken place is the agreement on the article regarding the relationship between the future convention and other international agreements. Concerns that a future

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convention might affect obligations under the Geneva Protocol are now dispersed. The Swedish delegation is satisfied with the present wording of this article, which follows closely the pattern set out in other disarmament treaties.

Tangible results have been obtained in the negotiations on the organization, measures to redress a situation and ensure compliance, including sanctions, amendments, settlement of disputes, and jurisdiction and control. The constructive attitude taken by delegations augurs well for the inter-sessional work in the area of legal and institutional matters.

Over the many years that the work on a chemical weapons convention has been going on progress has been slow, not because sufficient time has not been allocated but because of the lack of a genuine will in some quarters to engage in serious negotiations. It is above all a question of the will to engage in a process of give and take. This must be our focus. We now stand a better chance than ever to conclude these negotiations. Let us not miss this opportunity.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement and the kind words he addressed to me. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Ambassador Králik, who will introduce the report distributed this morning as document CD/1104.

Mr. KRALIK (Czechoslovakia): I have the honour to present the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons on the work of this Committee during the 1991 session of the Conference on Disarmament. Before doing so, Mr. President, I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate you on taking up the presidency of the Conference for this month and for the coming period while the Conference is in recess. Your ability, knowledge of disarmament affairs and personal enthusiasm ensure the efficacy of your guidance.

The report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons is available to the delegations under the symbol CD/1104. The report reflects discussion on security assurances from different points of view and perceptions, which is very interesting and instructive. Many other points relating to the influence of the current international climate on security concepts and arrangements have been raised. Some of the issues were rather controversial but, I believe, the members of the Ad Hoc Committee now have a clearer picture of the items put before the Committee. Some orientations for constructive debate discovered during this session remain opened for the coming year. Within the Ad Hoc Committee we had a fruitful exchange of views on problems which will become more and more

(Mr. Králik, Czechoslovakia)

important in our time and also in the future. We have sought to avoid a traditional repetition of well-known positions, and I personally have looked for a working philosophy for comprehensive effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. However, we remain far from consensus on the substance of global security assurances or making any kind of breakthrough in this very sensitive field. But in the Committee we have listened to some interesting ideas, which could and should be elaborated on further.

In conclusion I would like to thank the group coordinators, Dr. Karem from Egypt, Mr. Duboisson from Belgium and Mr. Dimitrov from Bulgaria, as well as Mr. Guoling from the delegation of the People's Republic of China, for the cooperation and assistance they have provided to me during the session. I would like to thank the Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Bogomolov, and his assistant Miss Borisoff. The same thanks I would like to extend to the interpreters and translators for their work. And I am also very thankful to my collaborator Dr. Gaspar for his assistance during the time I have accomplished my duties as Chairman.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons for introducing the report that appears in document CD/1104, as well as the kind words addressed to the Chair. I would also like to congratulate him on the completion of the work of that subsidiary body. I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Kamal, who will introduce his report on the open-ended consultations he chaired on the effective functioning of the Conference.

Mr. KAMAL (Pakistan): On behalf of my delegation, Sir, may I congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Conference on Disarmament at this important juncture and also welcome our new colleagues, Ambassador Zahran of Egypt and Ambassador Prakash Shah of India?

As the Chairman of the informal open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament I have the honour to report on the results of these consultations. At the Conference's 586th plenary meeting it was decided that the informal open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament, which were initiated in 1990, would be continued during the 1991 session under the same chairmanship. The consultations were then conducted in a series of six meetings.

Discussions took place, once again, in a thorough debate on a wide range of subjects of common concern. Among these were the questions of the possibility of the expansion of the membership of the Conference, for which different formulas were advanced, of a re-examination of the existing groupings in the light of political changes which had taken place over the

(Mr. Kamal, Pakistan)

past year, of a consideration of the possibility of amendments to the agenda of the Conference, of the interpretation and implementation of the rule of consensus, and of the review of administrative procedures agreed during the previous year's consultation.

The debate resulted in consensus on the following areas of possible improved and effective functioning. On intensification of work, there was general agreement that work on the chemical weapons convention had reached a stage where intensified work was necessary towards the objective of an early conclusion of negotiations. Agreed periods for intensified work, particularly during inter-sessional periods, were reported to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee concerned, and some of this intensification has already been implemented.

On non-member participation, a proposal for better participation by non-members in the work of the Conference on Disarmament was examined in detail, and it was agreed that the objective could be met by the following presidential statement to be read for the record at a plenary meeting of the Conference:

> "In connection with rules 34 and 35 of the rules of procedure, which deal specifically with invitations to States non-members to participate in the work of the Conference, it is the sense of the Conference that the secretariat shall apply the current practice as follows:
>
> "1. Non-member States invited by the Conference to participate in its work may, unless decided otherwise by the Conference, participate in formal plenary meetings, informal plenary meetings on substantive items of the agenda, and meetings of subsidiary bodies established in accordance with rule 23, without having to specify in advance which ones.
>
> "2. As regards seating arrangements, non-member participants shall be seated in meetings following the English alphabetical list, beginning with the non-member whose name will be drawn by lot by the President immediately after the initial decision is taken by the Conference at the beginning of the year on requests for participation, and rotate at the same time as the Conference."

It was felt that the exercise of informal open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament had once again proved its utility, not only in the general airing of views on matters of interest and concern, but also in the areas where positive decisions had been taken. The hope was widely expressed that the exercise would continue during the 1992 session, on the same format and under the same chairmanship as in the previous two years.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement, which has been circulated as document CD/WP.410, and his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marín Bosch.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): The historic links between Venezuela and Mexico have been enriched over the last few decades by close cooperation in many fields. Personally speaking, I have had the pleasure of knowing you since we were together in New York in the 1970s. Consequently I am extremely pleased to take the floor under your presidency, a presidency which you are already exercising with your recognized diplomatic skill. I should also like to associate myself with your words of congratulations and welcome addressed to the new representatives of Egypt and India, Ambassadors Mohamed Mounir Zahran and Prakash Shah.

The Government of Mexico continues to attach great importance to work on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, an item which has been on the agenda of this Conference since 1980 and which occupied a prominent place on the agenda of the ENDC as long ago as 1962. The history of multilateral disarmament negotiations shows how useful it would have been to have this programme from the 1960s onwards. The United Nations General Assembly, aware of that need, has been urging the member States of this Conference to redouble our efforts in this field. For two years now, within the context of the Third United Nations Disarmament Decade the General Assembly has reiterated this appeal. In the past decade modest progress has been made in the Ad Hoc Committee on this topic. Since last year, however, it has not been possible to re-establish the Committee. Hence the proposal made in February of this year to appoint a special coordinator for item 8 on our agenda. I should like in my capacity as Special Coordinator on item 8 (an appointment which I very much appreciate) to inform the Conference of the result of my consultations in the course of this year.

My report has the virtue of being extremely brief, as regrettably no significant changes have been recorded in the positions of the delegations present here. This is shown by the written communications conveyed to me by the spokesmen of the various groups on this item, as well as the delegation of China. The Group of 21, through its coordinator, the delegation of Cuba, reiterated the position set out in this plenary on 30 May last to the effect that the Ad Hoc Committee should be re-established as soon as possible. The delegation of China conveyed the same opinion to me. Meanwhile, the Western Group, through the delegation of Australia, conveyed to me what it had stated in this plenary, also on 30 May last, to the effect that it continues to consider that the circumstances are not yet propicious to continue the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, and consequently they do not wish the Committee to be re-established. Lastly, the delegation of the Soviet Union, which coordinates the Eastern European Group, indicated to me that some delegations in that Group said that the Conference - and I quote in English to avoid any distortion -

(continued in English)

> "should do some additional work and conduct productive discussions about concrete future activity of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament before its re-establishment".

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Brotodiningrat.

Mr. BROTODININGRAT (Indonesia): Mr. President, at this late hour of our debate I shall try to be brief, but allow me nevertheless to begin by joining the previous speakers in congratulating you on your accession to the presidency of the Conference and by wishing you every success in the discharge of your demanding tasks. My delegation would also like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Stephen Ledogar of the United States. I am also pleased to welcome our new colleagues Ambassador Zahran of Egypt and Ambassador Prakash Shah of India. At this particular juncture of our work, my delegation wishes to make some observations on agenda items 1 and 4, as well as briefly on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference.

Let me first address agenda item 1 by welcoming the encouraging development in nuclear arms limitation and reduction. The long and delicate nuclear disarmament negotiations have been marked this year by the accomplishment of the INF Treaty, the first ever agreement eliminating a specific category of nuclear armaments, and more recently by the signing of START between the United States of America and the USSR, which will reduce some 30 per cent of the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two countries. It is the sincere hope of my delegation, not only that this agreement between the two States will soon be implemented, but also that further efforts for strategic arms reduction between them will be vigorously pursued.

While my delegation warmly welcomes these achievements, we nevertheless continue to believe that a comprehensive nuclear test ban is an essential step in halting the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons. It has been generally acknowledged that the development of new nuclear weapons will only complicate efforts to reverse the global arms race. The speedy achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban is, therefore, a global concern. The Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban has been established this year with the mandate to initiate, as a first step towards achieving a nuclear-test-ban treaty, substantive work on specific and interrelated test-ban issues, including its structure, scope and those of verification and compliance. It is encouraging to note that the Committee has, inter alia, addressed the questions of the possible establishment of a permanent global monitoring network, temporary localized monitoring and on-site inspections. The scientific Group on seismic events has also held a series of meetings including a very useful one with the Ad Hoc Committee. The draft protocol II of the PTBT on the verification of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and the draft of the comprehensive test-ban treaty, as contained in document CD/1089, has also been discussed and in our view is still in need of further elaboration.

Although for those of us who have consistently advocated the establishment of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the work carried out in the Committee has somewhat fallen short of expectations, its intensive debate has indeed been an

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

encouraging sign hopefully leading towards more serious negotiations. Given the complexity of the question of a nuclear test ban and in view of the need for further substantive work, we believe it is imperative that the Conference allow the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban for the coming 1992 session. In the same vein we would like to recall once again that, as stipulated in the preambular paragraph of the 1963 PTBT, the original parties proclaimed that one of their principal aims was the speediest possible achievement of an agreement which would eliminate the incentive to produce and test any kind of weapons, including nuclear weapons. Therefore, we continue to believe that the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and the process of achieving a comprehensive test-ban treaty through the amendment of the 1963 PTBT should complement each other.

Turning to agenda item 4 on chemical weapons, my delegation would firstly like to make some observations on an issue that has attracted considerable attention, namely the verification of non-production of chemical weapons in the chemical industry, under article VI of the draft convention. We firmly believe that the regime should be formulated to accommodate the legitimate interests of the chemical industries, especially those in the developing countries. It should be conceived in such a way as to safeguard the objective comparative advantages of particular industries against possible abuse motivated by commercial interests. In this regard it is important to ensure that the burden of compliance with the convention will not fall disproportionately on the emerging industries in developing countries. Hence there is a need to strike an appropriate balance between justified security considerations and legitimate economic interests. The formulation of provisions governing the implementation of this article should therefore be given priority by the Committee before finalizing the article itself. Given the fact that the implementation of the convention will affect thousands of facilities located in both developed and developing countries, the formulation of such provisions should also take into account the different levels of development of the States parties to the convention. We also share the view that the States parties should play a role in the selection process of facilities to be inspected. It is in this context that the Indonesian delegation stands ready to explore every possible avenue, together with other delegations participating in the negotiation, in order to establish a monitoring regime of the convention under article VI.

Article XI, which deals with economic and technological development, has also been intensively discussed during this year's sessions of the Committee. Like many other delegations, we consider this article to be a strong incentive for States to join the convention. We would go even further by suggesting that this article would give even greater motivation if it is to promote cooperation among States parties in activities which are not prohibited by the convention.

The agreement on the inclusion of a provision prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, and the basic undertaking on the total destruction of chemical weapons stocks as well as their production facilities, has indeed

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

removed the stumbling-block in the negotiation on article I. There are still, however, crucial issues which need to be resolved, such as the question on how to put into practical terms this basic undertaking on the destruction of chemical weapons stocks and their production facilities. We see that the political will which has emerged recently has provided us with an opportunity to begin the elaboration of practical measures regarding the destruction of chemical weapons stocks and their production facilities. In this connection, a new cooperative approach in order to find a practical solution to this question may be initiated among possessors of these weapons. Some States have given indications of their possession of chemical weapons and their production facilities. The information supplied by these States, and any future information given by other possessor States, would serve as the basic modality for the initiation of the new cooperative approach which I have just mentioned in this respect. Being a State party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol without reservation which has never possessed nor produced chemical weapons we are very keen to see the total elimination of these weapons.

On the question of the composition and decision-making process of the executive council, my delegation wishes to recall the points it raised before the Committee during the discussions on this matter last year. We continue to believe that the representation of States parties to this body should reflect a balance in the political reality and geographical equitability of the States parties. In this regard, we preliminarily envisage the figure of 35 States as members of the executive council with the possibility of expanding the membership as the number of States parties increases. The example of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency might serve as a point of reference in the establishment of such a body.

The progress made in nuclear disarmament between the United States, and the Soviet Union and other progress registered in regional disarmament has created a new sense of optimism for new opportunities in multilateral disarmament. However, this optimism is somewhat tempered by the meagre results of various multilateral disarmament forums, including the Conference on Disarmament. It is in this context that the need to improve the effectiveness of the Conference is now more pressing than ever. We should spare no efforts in exploring more effective working methods in order for the Conference to fully discharge its mandate as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body.

My delegation is pleased to note our recent agreement that non-member States may participate in formal plenary meetings, informal plenary meetings on substantive items of the agenda, and meetings of subsidiary bodies established in accordance with rule 23, without having to give advance notice. We share the view that the participation of non-member States should be encouraged and facilitated in order to enhance the prospect of universal adherence to agreements under negotiation in the Conference. On the other hand, we find it regretable that no progress has been made in the consultation concerning the "rules of consensus" and other important matters. Over the years the "rules of consensus" have often been applied as a veto and thus

(Mr. Brotodiningrat, Indonesia)

hampered progress in the work of the Conference. Particularly disappointing is the difficulty to reach consensus on the establishment of ad hoc committees and their respective mandates. We would thus take this opportunity to reiterate our support for the proposal of the Group of 21, last July, to establish ad hoc committees on all items at the outset of the CD's annual session. By doing so, the beginning of substantive work would no longer be delayed by discussions on the establishment and the mandates of the ad hoc committees. There is still much work ahead of us in our common efforts to improve the effective functioning of this unique forum. It is for this reason that my delegation shares the widely expressed view that the informal open-ended consultations should be continued during the 1992 session under the wise guidance of the same Chairman.

We note that the preparation of this year's Conference report is under way. I would therefore conclude my brief statement by expressing the hope that the drafting and adoption of the final report, which should reflect the views expressed during this session, will proceed as smoothly as possible.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now call on the representative of France, Ambassador Errera.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): First of all, Mr. President, I should like to offer my most heartfelt congratulations upon your accession to the presidency. My delegation welcomes the fact that a man of your experience and skill is presiding over our work at such an important time. Doubtless both your professional and your personal qualities will be of very valuable assistance to us. Hence my delegation wishes you every success and assures you of its full cooperation. I should also like to pay tribute once again to your predecessor, Ambassador Ledogar, for the skill and authority with which he discharged his duties. Lastly, I would like to note and welcome the arrival of the Ambassador of Egypt, Dr. Mounir Zahran, and the Ambassador of India, Mr. Prakash Shah, the representatives of two great countries with which my delegation is looking forward to continuing the relations of trust and friendship that it enjoyed with their predecessors.

I should like to address two subjects today. On the one hand, as I announced on the day following the signature of the START Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, my delegation wishes to outline France's position on this event which has rightly been described as historic. I should also like to announce the submission by my delegation, as an official document of the Conference, of the communique of the Paris meeting of the representatives of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council on arms transfers and non-proliferation.

The French Government welcomed with keen satisfaction the signature of the START Treaty, which represents an important phase in the Soviet-American strategic dialogue aimed at arms control and disarmament. This is borne out

(Mr. Errera, France)

by the fact that for some systems the reduction is as great as 50 per cent, and that overall the implementation of the Treaty will result in a reduction of the order of 25 to 30 per cent of the total number of American and Soviet nuclear arms equipped with strategic delivery systems. My Government therefore considers that the START Treaty constitutes an excellent basis for other efforts to achieve additional limitations and reductions of the arsenals concerned. Aside from the fact that the implementation of the Treaty, once it is ratified, will take seven years, the work ahead remains considerable, in view of the enormity of the arsenals that had been built up over decades of East-West confrontation. That is why France commends the intention of the United States and the Soviet Union to undertake without delay a new series of discussions aimed at enhancing strategic stability even further, inter alia by dealing with the relationship between offensive and defensive systems. We note with interest that the space component of the Soviet-American strategic negotiations will continue to be on the negotiating table, and we therefore urge the conclusion of an agreement which would thus make it possible to avoid a destabilizing arms race. The French Government therefore supports the efforts of the United States and the USSR aimed at further cuts in their strategic arms.

The magnitude of their arsenals gives them good reason to continue their disarmament effort in respect of their own weapons. Even after the implementation of the START I agreement, there will still be a world of difference between the French nuclear deterrent and American and Soviet arsenals. From the outset France took a decision to acquire only the means necessary to pursue a policy of deterrence, that is, an arsenal sufficient to convince a potential aggressor - in any circumstances and whatever his means of defence - that he would run the risk of being confronted with a capability that could inflict on him, by way of reprisals for an attack, irreparable damage, that is to say damage out of proportion to the possible benefit he perceives. France will work to maintain its own capability within the strict limits of the principle it has always endorsed, the principle of minimum deterrence, naturally with the concomitant constraints on the continuation of its underground testing. France sincerely hopes that the United States and the USSR will be guided by this principle of minimum deterrence in their future strategic negotiations. The French Government wishes to recall that, for its part, it has never excluded the possibility of playing its role at the appropriate time in the nuclear arms control and disarmament process. Whatever its desire may be to see progress achieved in this nuclear disarmament, my Government wishes to recall that direct participation by France in negotiations would not be meaningful unless favourable conditions for such a dialogue were met, and the French Government will decide in due course whether future negotiations have brought such conditions closer.

Nuclear deterrence is the child of both the Second World War and East-West confrontation. The fact is that the fear and horror of nuclear war have made it possible to maintain peace for 40 years in Europe despite extreme tension and a one-sided build-up of gigantic conventional arsenals on our continent. Such a situation obviously cannot be changed overnight. Continuous

(Mr. Errera, France)

and parallel efforts are required in the political sphere and the military sphere. The year 1990, with the end of the division of Germany and of Europe, the agreement on conventional disarmament and the CSCE summit, marked a historic turning-point. Even though uncertainties may remain - as current events have reminded us - 1991 has recorded further decisive progress with the START I agreement. Agreement on a comprehensive convention to ban chemical weapons is in sight. But the task remains considerable, and we must spare other regions of the world the conflicts and dangers that Europe has experienced. That is why my Government is extremely alert to the problems of non-proliferation in the nuclear sphere, as in the sphere of chemical and biological weapons, and that of ballistic missiles.

With specific reference to the subject of regulating conventional arms transfers and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, my delegation, on instructions from my Government and in agreement with the other parties concerned, has just submitted as an official document of the Conference (under the symbol CD/1103) the communique of the meeting that the representatives of the five countries held in Paris on 8 and 9 July last. I think that we can all agree on the unprecedented nature of such a meeting and the importance of the discussions and the decisions that were reached. Without entering into the details of the communique, I should like to draw the Conference's attention to the following elements. The Five confirmed that they would not transfer conventional weapons when, in the light of the circumstances, such transfers would be likely to jeopardize stability. They agreed to support continued work to establish, under the aegis of the United Nations Secretary-General, a register of arms transfers, drawn up on a non-discriminatory basis, as a step towards increased transparency on arms transfers and in general in military matters. They also strongly supported the objective of establishing a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East, through the full implementation of Security Council resolution 687 and the adoption by all the countries in the region of a comprehensive programme of arms control. Lastly, they expressed their intention to continue their discussions on these subjects, inter alia with a view to establishing guidelines to ensure the observance of rules of restraint as regards arms transfers.

My delegation considers it a matter of the utmost importance for the Conference on Disarmament to be kept informed of the work of the Five in these areas, work which complements the efforts of other States or groups of States. For its part it will do its best to contribute to those efforts.

I should now like to say the following in my personal capacity. I know that it is not customary in this forum to comment on an event or to express feelings, still less emotions. But there are times when morality and politics converge. There are times when, through its force, through its intensity, an event takes on universal significance. There are times when what is generally called progress takes on its full meaning. So when a country - and not just any country - succeeds in avoiding a hazardous enterprise, when a people expresses its will to resist and says no - no to threats, no to intimidation,

(Mr. Errera, France)

simply in order to live freely, and when men through their inspiration and their courage open the way to the noblest of all victories, the victory of freedom, we must be glad and we must say so. We must be glad for those who, because they wished it, succeeded in preserving their liberty; we must be glad at the triumph of the principles, values and ideals which we all espouse, that is to say the democratic principle, respect for the law; and lastly we must be glad too that the process of disarmament will continue, because - let us make no mistake - if disarmament agreements have been concluded in the recent past - the agreement on intermediate nuclear forces in 1987, the agreement on conventional forces in Europe in 1989, the START agreement last month, which I have just referred to - if the conclusion of a global convention banning chemical weapons is within reach today, this is indeed because, in part at least, a process of reform and democratization was undertaken in the Soviet Union. There can be no doubt that the interruption of that process, a reversal of the trend in the Soviet Union, would have had particularly adverse effects for disarmament efforts and hence for our Conference. For that reason too we must be glad.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the distinguished representative of France for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I should now like to call on Ambassador Mounir Zahran of Egypt, who has asked to speak.

Mr. ZAHRAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, allow me to express my delight at your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament during this important period of our work. I am confident that your competence and wide diplomatic experience will be reflected in the achievements of this important negotiating forum in furtherance of the goals and objectives towards which we are all striving, namely the establishment of international peace and security through disarmament endeavours.

I take this opportunity to express my sincere appreciation for the kind welcome extended to me by yourself and also by the Ambassador of India and the other ambassadors. I wish to assure you and all the members of this Conference of my firm desire for continued cooperation, coordination and consultation at all stages of our work between my country's delegation and the delegations of all the States members of the Conference on Disarmament, which, in actual fact, constitutes a unique framework for the comprehensive discussion of disarmament matters since it is the only United Nations negotiating body concerned with those matters.

Egypt's interest in disarmament matters and in our Conference stems from basic principles that are deeply rooted in our Arab and African identity and inherent in our membership of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement, of which Egypt was one of the founder members and in the work of which it is still playing an active role, particularly in condemning the use of force in international relations and in advocating the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, the prohibition of the arms race in outer space, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction.

(Mr. Zahran, Egypt)

I take this opportunity to draw attention to President Hosni Mubarak's initiative in which he proposed that all weapons of mass destruction, without exception, should be removed from the Middle Eastern region, on the understanding that this would apply equally to all States of the region without distinction or discrimination. This initiative forms part of Egypt's endeavours to achieve the goals and objectives of full and general disarmament and to use the savings resulting therefrom to further the development endeavours of the developing countries. In this connection, we welcome the statement issued at the meeting of experts of the five permanent members of the Security Council, held at Paris on 8 and 9 July of this year, in which they referred to the importance of turning the Middle East into a zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

I also wish to express my gratitude to the Ambassador of the Netherlands for the kind invitation that he extended to me, at the beginning of my assignment to this Conference, to visit The Hague on 23 and 24 August to inspect the facilities that his friendly Government is offering to accommodate the organization that we intend to establish within the context of the negotiations for the drafting of a treaty prohibiting chemical weapons. The visit will undoubtedly be of benefit in our deliberations on this subject.

In conclusion, Mr. President, allow me to emphasize once again how proud I am to be working with you. I wish to assure you of my sincere desire to cooperate with you in this important international forum, as well as my sincere desire to cooperate with all the delegations to the Conference on Disarmament and its secretariat.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Egypt for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The representative of China, Ambassador Hou Zhitong, has asked for the floor and now I invite him to make a statement.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese): I am sorry to ask for the floor at such a late hour, but I would like to inform you that my statement will be very brief. First of all, as I am taking the floor for the first time under your presidency, allow me on behalf of the Chinese delegation to congratulate you on taking up the presidency of the CD. I am confident that with your rich experience and outstanding diplomatic skills you will be able to accomplish in an exemplary manner the enormous and difficult task during the last stage of this session and provide a sound basis for next year's work. I would like to assure you that in discharging your responsibilities you will receive the full support and cooperation of the Chinese delegation. At the same time I would like to express my appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Ledogar of the United States, for his outstanding contributions. I would like to take this opportunity to warmly welcome the Ambassadors of Indonesia, Romania, Egypt and India, who have recently taken up their posts. I wish them every success and I am looking forward to closely cooperating with them. At the same time I would also like to express my best wishes to the Ambassadors of India, Egypt and Brazil who have left us.

(Mr. Hou, China)

We have just listened very attentively to the important reports submitted by three committee chairmen - the distinguished Ambassador of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Králik, the distinguished Ambassador of Pakistan, Mr. Kamal, and the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, Mr. Marín Bosch. We warmly congratulate them and thank them for their outstanding efforts and contributions. The positive positions adopted by China on the issues in question have been reflected in relevant documents and during the process of consultations. We have taken note of document CD/1103, which has been circulated today, and we have also listened with attention to the statement made by the distinguished Ambassador of France, Mr. Errera. In his statement he mentioned, inter alia, the meeting of the five permanent members of the Security Council on arms control in the Middle East, as well as the final communiqué.

I would like to point out that, in the view of China, the meeting was an important one, to which the international community attached great importance. As a permanent member of the Security Council, China participated in the meeting in a serious and responsible manner. During the meeting, the head of the Chinese delegation, the Vice-Foreign Minister of China, Mr. Liu Huaqiu, delivered important statements comprehensively expounding China's foreign policy of independence and peace and its principled stand and proposals on the issues of arms control in the Middle East, as well as his views and comments on the final communiqué of that meeting. On the instructions of the Chinese Government, I have already addressed a letter to the President of the CD requesting the circulation of the two statements made by Mr. Liu Huaqiu as an official document of the CD, and their translation into the other official languages of the CD so that the international community will understand comprehensively and fully the principled policy and positions of the Chinese Government. It is only natural that, for technical reasons, the translation of this document will take some time. I would like to express my appreciation to the CD secretariat for its assistance.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of China for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on Ambassador Prakash Shah of India, who has asked for the floor.

Mr. SHAH (India): I take the floor not because I have anything substantive to contribute at this stage to the deliberations of this Conference, but I would not wish to let this opportunity pass by without thanking you, Mr. President, and through you the colleagues in this Conference, for the very warm words of welcome that you have extended to me. I should also like to thank all those colleagues who spoke before me for their words of welcome and their offer of cooperation. As a newcomer to the CD, I shall need both their cooperation and their guidance in ample measure. Mr. President, I am specially happy that I am joining the deliberations today at a time when you have assumed the presidency. Knowing you as I do for many years, I have no doubt that at this critical juncture in the deliberations of the CD, your experience and abilities and your personal qualities will be

(Mr. Shah, India)

sorely needed for guiding the deliberations to a successful conclusion. All I would like to say here is that you have the full cooperation, not only of myself but also of my delegation, in making your task both smooth and successful.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of India for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now call on Ambassador Batsanov of the Soviet Union, who has asked for the floor.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I have asked for the floor in my capacity as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in order to make a brief announcement regarding the work of the Ad Hoc Committee this afternoon. The open-ended consultations scheduled for 3 p.m. on inspections under article IX will not be held because of the need to conduct various other consultations. At 5.45 p.m. in conference room I there will be a meeting of the extended bureau to consider a number of unagreed issues related to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee.

As I have the floor I would like to say a few words in my capacity as representative of the Soviet Union. First of all, I welcome you cordially to the responsible post you are now occupying and in that connection I should like to wish you every success. Your experience, diplomatic skills and outstanding personal qualities give us an assurance that success will accompany us at this decisive stage of the work of the Conference. I should also like to express my gratitude to your predecessors, Ambassadors Solesby and Ledogar, for their effective guidance of the work of the Conference during earlier periods. On behalf of the Soviet delegation and on my own behalf I also extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues, Ambassador Prakash Shah of India and Ambassador Mounir Zahran of Egypt, and I should like to express my conviction that the relations of friendship and cooperation between their delegations and ours will be further productively developed.

In conclusion a few words about the fact that reference has been made at today's meeting to the dramatic events that have taken place recently in my country. I am deeply grateful to Ambassador Tóth and particularly to Ambassador Errera for the sentiments of satisfaction that they have expressed in connection with the failure of the anti-constitutional, anti-democratic coup. News of this collapse was received with profound relief and elation throughout the world, and first and foremost, of course, by the overwhelming majority of Soviet people. But even more important for us were the expressions of sympathy and solidarity which began to flood in literally from Monday morning, when it was still unclear what the outcome of the attempted coup would be. On behalf of the Soviet delegation I should like to express profound appreciation to all those colleagues who stood by us in those difficult days.

The victory of the young democracy in the Soviet Union naturally owes a great deal to the unprecedented international support and the firm rejection of the attempts to restore totalitarianism. But of course the main reason for

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

the victory lies within our country, in the far-reaching changes in our society that have occurred during perestroika, in the boldness and decisiveness, the readiness for self-sacrifice on the part of the man in the street and the resolve of the leaders of the democratic forces, among whom the President of Russia, Boris Eltsin, undoubtedly played a special role. Of course this victory has not eliminated all the problems, the often difficult problems, objective problems, that the Soviet people and Soviet society are now confronted with. These problems have yet to be dealt with, particularly in the economic sphere but also in a number of other spheres. But it has shown that there are forces within our society that are capable of resolving these problems by pursuing democracy, the pre-eminence of universal human values and the progressive integration of the Soviet Union in the world community of nations. Once again, many thanks.

And now, as a very last word, I revert to my duties as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee. Literally while I was speaking my attention was drawn to one more change in the schedule of meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, as follows: I must inform all delegates that the meeting of Group B scheduled for tomorrow has also been cancelled. So I would request you all to note that as appropriate.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for his important statement and for the announcements he has just made, which we have duly noted. As President of this Conference, under the current circumstances, and as the representative of Venezuela, I cannot fail to highlight the significance of the words just spoken by Ambassador Batsanov of the Soviet Union. At this moment I cannot but express our infinite satisfaction at what doubtless is the final victory of democracy and fundamental freedoms in the Soviet Union. A victory which, as Ambassador Batsanov has just said, can be attributed to the Soviet people, its will to preserve and consolidate its important achievements of the last few years. I think I am reflecting the sentiments of all the representatives in this Conference when I emphasize the significance of what is happening in the Soviet Union and at the same time express my wishes for a steady improvement in the destiny of that great country which we so very much admire and appreciate. Thank you very much, Ambassador Batsanov, for your words. I now call on the representative of Cuba, who has asked for the floor:

Mrs. BAUTA SOLES (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, this morning my Ambassador had an opportunity to congratulate you on the post you occupy in our Conference and to express our confidence that with your usual skill you will fully discharge the functions conferred upon you. I shall therefore confine myself to adding my voice to that of my Ambassador. As the delegate of Cuba I should like to thank all the distinguished ambassadors who have introduced reports this morning on the specific aspects of the work which have been entrusted to them in the course of the meetings of our Conference which are now coming to an end. I have also asked for the floor to express appreciation - on behalf of the Group of 21 on this occasion - for the information provided to this plenary on the outcome of his consultations on

(Mrs. Bauta Soles, Cuba)

the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on item 8 of our Conference, the comprehensive programme of disarmament, by the distinguuished Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch in his capacity as special coordinator for that topic. The report succinctly and clearly reiterates the wishes of the Group of 21, which, in keeping with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, seeks the re-establishment of the Committee and progress at its meetings. In our capacity as coordinators on the item for the Group we have also taken note of the wishes similar to ours expressed by the delegation of China, and those of some members of the Eastern European Group which also seem to tend in a similar direction. We hope that these majority interests will be duly weighed up for the purpose of eliminating the obstacles that precluded the re-establishment of the Committee on item 8 at this session, so that when our work begins again and the subsidiary bodies are re-established, the subsidiary body on agenda item 8 will not once again be an exception.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Cuba for her statement, of which we have taken due note, as well as her kind words addressed to the Chair. Are there any other delegations wishing to take the floor? If not, I suggest we turn to other matters. In connection with the report introduced today by Ambassador Králik, contained in document CD/1104, I should like to inform you that I will be putting this before the Conference for adoption at the next plenary meeting on Thursday 29 August. I now invite the Conference to adopt the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, which was circulated last week in document CD/1099. If there are no objections I shall take it that the report is adopted.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I now intend to put before the Conference the recommendation contained in paragraph 19 of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, which has been circulated in document CD/1097. The recommendation provides that the Ad Hoc Group will meet in Geneva from 2 to 13 March 1992. If there are no objections I shall take it that the Conference adopts that recommendation.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I now invite the Conference to take not with appreciation of the report submitted today by Ambassador Kamal in his capacity as Chairman of the open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, circulated in document CD/WP.410.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I should like to convey to Ambassador Kamal our sincere congratulations on the effective, competent and enthusiastic way in which he chaired the informal consultations. In connection with document CD/WP.410 I shall now proceed to make a statement on

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the participation of non-member States in the work of the Conference. I shall do so in English, as this was the language in which the text was negotiated in the informal consultations.

"In connection with rules 34 and 35 of the rules of procedure, which deal specifically with invitations to States non-members to participate in the work of the Conference, it is the sense of the Conference that the secretariat shall apply the current practice as follows:

"1. Non-member States invited by the Conference to participate in its work may, unless decided otherwise by the Conference, participate in formal plenary meetings, informal plenary meetings on substantive items of the agenda, and meetings of subsidiary bodies established in accordance with rule 23, without having to specify in advance which ones.

"2. As regards seating arrangements, non-member participants shall be seated in meetings following the English alphabetical list, beginning with the non-member whose name will be drawn by lot by the President immediately after the initial decision is taken by the Conference at the beginning of the year on requests for participation, and rotate at the same time as the Conference."

Before turning to the timetable of meetings for next week, I should like to report to you on our coming steps in respect of the annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. Today the secretariat has circulated the substantive paragraphs relating to agenda items 2, 3 and 7. Those related to agenda item 8 will be circulated shortly, possibly tomorrow, in delegations' pigeon-holes. In this connection it is necessary for us to begin our consideration as soon as possible once delegations have had enough time to consider them. I think that this requirement will be fully met if the group coordinators and coordinators on the items mentioned meet with me on the 27th at 3 p.m. in room I. Of course, any other delegations wishing to participate will be welcome. I hope we shall succeed in concluding our work on the substantive paragraphs on that occasion, as we will then have to take up the technical parts of the report and it is necessary to facilitate the task of the translation, typing and reproduction services which, as a result of some delays with the reports of the subsidiary bodies, are now receiving all the material for the annual report almost simultaneously. I repeat, then - and regrettably on this point the President has no flexibility, despite all his goodwill - 27 August at 3 p.m. in room I.

I suggest that we now turn to the timetable of meetings for next week. In keeping with the understanding reached in the consultations between the President and the coordinators, services normally as signed to subsidiary bodies that have concluded their work have been placed at the disposal of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. On Thursday 29 August we shall proceed to consider, immediately following the plenary meeting, the technical parts of the annual report and the paragraphs relating to the work of the Conference on its improved and effective functioning. The relevant drafts will be

(The President)

circulated at the beginning of next week. The timetable circulated today by the secretariat takes account of these considerations. Of course, at this very late stage in the annual session some re-adjustments might be necessary, but it would be desirable to avoid delays or complications, as these might in one way or another jeopardize the conclusion of our work on 4 September. I suggest, then, that we adopt the timetable on that understanding.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I have no further business for today, and consequently I shall proceed to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday 29 August at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.604
29 August 1991

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 29 August 1991, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Horacio Arteaga (Venezuela)

GE.91-62482/3754B

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The 604th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is now called to order.

I am particularly pleased to welcome warmly, on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf, the new representative of Brazil, Ambassador Celso Luiz Nunes Amorim, a diplomat with an outstanding professional career who has just joined us. In so doing, Sir, I would like to stress the close and cordial links uniting our two countries, a model of good-neighbourliness, and the personal commitment as well as the commitment of my delegation to cooperate with you within the context of the activities of the Conference. I am certain that Ambassador Nunes Amorim will make a most useful contribution to the work we are doing here. So welcome, Mr. Ambassador.

As I announced at our last plenary meeting, I will put before the Conference for decision today, once we have concluded the list of speakers, the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, contained in document CD/1104. As agreed in the timetable of meetings for this week, the Conference will hold an informal meeting immediately following the plenary meeting to consider the technical parts of the report to the United Nations General Assembly, which have been circulated in documents CD/WP.409 and 411.

On the list of speakers for today I have the representatives of Italy, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, who will do so to introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, Argentina, on behalf of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, and the Republic of Korea. I now call on the first speaker for today, the representative of Italy, Ambassador Negrotto Cambiaso.

Mr. NEGROTTO CAMBIASO (Italy): Mr. President, at the outset, allow me to express to you my most sincere congratulations and satisfaction at seeing you, the distinguished representative of Venezuela, a country with which Italy shares ancient and fraternal ties, presiding over our work. I am sure that under your capable guidance the Conference on Disarmament will be able to conclude successfully its activities for the 1991 session. I would also like to avail myself of this opportunity to express my appreciation to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Stephen Ledogar, for the skilful manner in which he presided over the Conference in the previous month; and in the meanwhile welcome all the new permanent representatives and colleagues who have joined us since the Italian delegation last took the floor in the CD plenary.

Before the annual session of the Conference on Disarmament draws to a close, I would like to summarize some of the views of my country regarding the negotiations which have been taking up so much of our time and efforts this year, and which we sincerely hope are now approaching the much longed-for conclusion. The events we have jointly witnessed would have provided us, in times less "interesting" than the current ones, with enough substance to fill up a timespan of various decades, rather than simply a few months. And, since in this final stretch of the millennium, days are unwinding as if each one of

(Mr. Negretto Cambiaso, Italy)

them contained events of a whole year, it is wise not to lose sight of day-by-day realities, paying the utmost attention to all those unrepeatable opportunities occurring almost daily.

The new impetus to the chemical weapons negotiations is the result of a tragic event, as a war always is, from which an innumerable set of lessons were drawn; and I would like to refrain from adding any further to it. We are now facing a new reality. It is encouraging to see that many former obstacles have been swept away. What is most important is the positive reality that has emerged from the tragedy of the war, resulting in a renewed role for the international community, not merely of a declaratory nature, to reaffirm legality against violence. We are faced now with an extraordinary opportunity to consolidate this yet fragile new dimension for the role of the international community. We should secure all its implications, as it not only represents the very foundation of the convention and of its future organization; but also because of the urgency, on a more general outlook, to provide credible and acceptable frameworks to ensure stability, while former strategic balances are breaking down.

Our debate on article IX is important in itself as well as for some of its implications of a more general nature. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, to whom I would like to convey the sympathy and appreciation of the Italian delegation, has therefore been right in devoting prior attention to the issue, against the backdrop of the ongoing events of the Gulf War aftermath. The problems yet to be solved on challenge inspection are basically turning around the critical question of striking the right balance between the protection of the legitimate interests of a State (security and confidentiality) and the need to consolidate the ever-increasing role of the international community through its organs, represented, in the specific case of article IX, by the executive council, the technical secretariat and by the inspection team.

In our view, it is possible to reach a compromise between these requirements, without undermining the prominence of the role of the future organization in fulfilling the main duties it has been entrusted by the convention. The availability of a neutral instrument above parties is useful to ensure and verify compliance but it also represents a guarantee against possible distortions of controls to the detriment of State parties' interests. It would not otherwise make sense to set up a new, costly and complex international organization if controls of the kind foreseen by article IX could be implemented through inter-State mechanisms, such as those existing in the INF, Stockholm and CFE agreements.

Allow me to cite some concrete examples, with regard to the role of the above-mentioned three organs, beginning with the director-general of the technical secretariat. He seems already implicitly empowered to check whether the elements of the request are assembled according to the basic procedural requirements listed in part III of the protocol on inspection procedures as annexed to document CD/CW/WP.352, as well as in the relevant section of the "rolling text". Upon notification, the requirement is in fact spelled out that the request should contain, inter alia, "the concern regarding compliance

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with the convention, including a specification of the relevant provision of the convention about which concerns have arisen, and the nature and circumstances of the suspected non-compliance", failing which one could envisage the return of the incomplete request to the challenging State, with an invitation to insert any missing elements. It would not be a substantive "filter", irreconcilable with the need for tight time-frames, but, rather, a procedural one, which the director-general of the technical secretariat would be called upon to fulfil through a formal evaluation of the admissibility of the request.

Furthemore, another element would seem relevant to the purpose of preventing negative consequences for the inspected State arising from requests not consistent with the scope of the convention: I am referring to the role of the inspection team and to the possibility that, during the conduct of the inspection, or even when drafting the inspection plan, a certain leeway and flexibility may be recognized in implementing the degree or the extension of the intrusiveness of the inspection, whenever it came across manifestly unfounded requests. In such circumstances it could even, in extreme situations, assume the responsibility of suspending or interrupting the inspection, thereby declaring it null and void. We therefore share the views of those who consider that the mandate should be flexible enough for the inspection team to tailor the inspection to the conditions they meet on the site.

The material conduct of the inspection can also provide us with some of the answers for the central dilemma of this system of verification, consisting in the search for the all too famous best balance between protection of confidentiality and the required intrusiveness of the controls. We are of the opinion that it may be possible to include more stringent provisions in the useful approach reflected by the four Western delegations, as far as inspections of undeclared sites are concerned, irrespective of the need to ensure in any case greater intrusiveness for the verification system of declared facilities.

We acknowledge the legitimate concerns of countries that, more than others, may find themselves potentially exposed and at a greater risk of disclosing national-security-related information not relevant to the convention. Concerns of such a nature, according to recent experience with national trial inspections (and as indicated also in the above-mentioned document), may be taken into account, in certain specific and sensitive circumstances, by giving exceptionally only individual inspectors access to certain parts of the inspection site, binding these inspectors with specific commitments about non-disclosure of unrelated confidential information. Furthermore, with regard to the need to secure the site in advance, in order to protect it from tampering of any kind, further thought should be given to the various possibilities of giving the inspection team discretion in checking incoming and outgoing traffic, by means of randomized controls, especially when inspecting large sites, or adopting some criteria in terms of quantitative thresholds (such as the tonnage of vehicles). We are of the view, in other words, that there is still further negotiating "room for manoeuvre" in order to reconcile positions and requirements which we believe will be less constraining in reality than in theory.

(Mr. Negretto Cambiaso, Italy)

Many delegations are also questioning the compatibility of the role of the observer, or his mere presence, with the neutral and super parties nature of the inspection team. We believe, like others, that the role of the observers should be a subsidiary one as opposed to the primary role of the team. But, at the same time, we are of the view that the observer could represent a useful instrument for the good conduct of the inspection, as he will be the conveyor of any information at the disposal of the requesting State that might be usefully disclosed to integrate the initial input by the latter. It would otherwise be difficult for a State party to entrust the organization with the task of verifying the well-foundedness of its own concern without feeling obliged at the same time and in its own interest to allow the organization to avail itself of all relevant information at the disposal of the State party itself.

I would at this stage also like to express a few considerations on the role of the executive council in the final stage of the challenge inspection. In the opinion of the Italian delegation, it should not be necessary to provide for an automatic convening at the end of the inspection, if only for practical and financial reasons, on the condition, however, that a single State be allowed to request such a meeting. Where the executive council is convened, two main procedural scenarios are set: in the first, an initial debate would take place on the substance of the final report, with no consequences in terms of possible recourse to measures to redress the situation. It would at that stage be simply a question of "reviewing" the situation and each member of the council, as well as each of the two concerned States, will be entitled to express its views on the conclusions of the report. It would not be necessary, at this juncture, to have any specific voting requirements by the executive council, as it would add nothing to a debate which would per se clearly indicate what the prevailing views are.

If, however, the executive council were to deem it necessary to have a follow-up to the review of the situation, in terms of promoting "any appropriate further action" - to quote the exact wording in the "rolling text" as well as in other relevant documents - in that case a decision by the executive council might prove necessary through recourse to the voting procedures agreed in the convention. We reserve the possibility of introducing a more precise textual proposal on this specific point.

In concluding on article IX, on which I have perhaps dwelt too extensively because of its symbolic character, I would state our readiness to agree on an inspection instrument that should be both effective and devoid of the possible arbitrary uses that some States, in good or bad faith, might make of it. An inspection system, in other words, entrusted to the superior responsibility of a multilateral and international organization going beyond the States themselves.

Consistently with such a general political approach, Italy is accurately assessing the possibility of carrying out a series of trial inspections, of multilateral and bilateral character, with countries belonging to the Mediterranean and middle eastern areas, which are particularly close to us and with which we share close ties of cooperation.

(Mr. Negretto Cambiaso, Italy)

Please allow me to briefly touch upon another specific but still important point. In our view, the possibility of the continued existence of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 beyond the entry into force of the convention could well be discussed, especially as a means to safeguard the international community from future withdrawal of States from the convention. However, the question of whether reservations to the Geneva Protocol should be allowed to continue to exist is a different issue and should be considered separately. Such reservations, on the entry into force of the convention, would no longer be compatible with the new version of article I, which provides for an unconditional prohibition of use. It would seem contradictory to allow a State to commit itself to such a new and far-reaching prohibition, while maintaining at the same time reservations safeguarding its right to retaliate "in kind".

Gaps to be filled up are always to be found, when a historical phase is over and a new one appears, charged with great promise but also with unknown factors, casting implications not always easily foreseeable. The stability of the world belonging to the recent past was, to say the least, the result of a negative factor: the fear of a nuclear holocaust in case of a military conflict of vast proportions with neither winners nor losers.

With the end of East-West confrontations, reliance on nuclear weapons is bound to face drastic reductions. This is Italy's persuasion and I am glad to associate myself with the worldwide appreciation for the signature of the START Treaty in Moscow, that we consider a first important step towards greater and more ambitious goals. Other positive forces are taking shape today, first and foremost those represented by public opinion and the consent of the people. We have seen in recent days the extent of their effectiveness. There is a need for such emerging consensus to rest on updated international structures, on a global or regional basis.

The convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons contains a number of important innovations, to be connected with a growing role of the organs of the international community, above States parties. Other opportunities are ahead of us in the field of multilateral disarmament, and I would like to confirm that my country has trust in the future role of this negotiating body, worthy of being strengthened and updated at the appropriate time, in terms both of its composition and future competences. In the meanwhile it would be useful to devote the efforts we usually make to putting forward our own views also to the understanding of everyone else's positions. This could help us in avoiding unnecessary and time-consuming procedural wrestling. We are willing to cooperate in this direction, and we are confident in the success of our future endeavours.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Italy for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I now call on the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ambassador Ri Tcheul.

Mr. RI (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) (translated from French): Allow me first of all, Mr. President, to congratulate you warmly on taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament at this important stage and to wish you every success in your responsible task. This session of the Conference on Disarmament is about to complete its work in a very different climate from those that preceded it in recent years. Internationally, where tensions are diminishing and confrontation is giving way to reconciliation and cooperation, the peoples of the world no longer wish to return to the cold war, but ardently desire real disarmament being brought about as quickly as possible in order to maintain security and lasting peace. Most particularly, having witnessed the development of the situation that arose before and during the Gulf war, which took place under the threat of the use of nuclear and chemical weapons, they aspire to seeing the day come soon when our planet will be free for ever from power politics and sophisticated war matériel, which have caused immeasurable misfortune and suffering to a great many innocent inhabitants of that region.

In order to establish lasting peace and security around the world and to bring about development, there must be an end to the source of the factor of disturbance. At the present stage disarmament or arms control is not for most developing countries an immediate priority because they do not have an immense quantity of weapons to reduce, nor are they able to take part in the arms race, as the great Powers are. However, international relations today oblige them to attach great importance to disarmament. This is because comprehensive and global disarmament is vital for them, given the history of colonization by armed forces, the two major world wars that covered the globe, several hundreds of clashes and violent postwar conflicts - here I would like to stress that almost 170 armed conflicts, large and small, which have followed more than four decades of the postwar period, have broken out, all of them in the developing countries - and the current state of affairs under the permanent threat of nuclear weapons. The latter do not need the circumstances in which they will be obliged to spend considerable sums on importing weapons from the developed countries, but a climate of peace in which they can devote those sums to economic recovery. In other words, they need relations of international cooperation for their prosperity, but not a military threat from which they must suffer directly or indirectly. In short, this is tantamount to saying that it is incumbent upon the developed countries in general and the nuclear-weapon States in particular, beginning with the super-Powers, to be in a position, indeed to have the duty, to establish in the sphere of disarmament such an international climate of peace for humanity. With this in view, we welcome the agreement on the complete destruction of chemical weapons arrived at by the Americano-Soviet super-Powers, and the signing of the Treaty on intermediate nuclear forces and the START Treaty, and we also appreciate the signing of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. As everyone is aware, such occurrences did not come about because of the talent of a few individuals, but were the result of a policy following the political will of the authorities. Consequently, we are persuaded that it is only when not only their political promise, whether in the case of a treaty, a convention or an agreement, has been implemented as quickly as possible, but also when it has been extended to a great many other sectors and regions, that the multilateral negotiations on disarmament will easily attain their final objective.

(Mr. Ri, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

What is currently threatening the existence of humanity itself is, first and foremost, an enormous quantity of nuclear weapons deployed in different parts of the globe. The reduction and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all their forms, a ban on nuclear testing to prevent qualitative enhancement, and their complete abolition, constitutes the unanimous demand of the peoples of the world. Although a number of positive initiatives and measures have been adopted to reduce nuclear weapons, problems here and there still arise which prompt a great deal of concern on the part of humanity. Since this is just a beginning, as long as new nuclear tests continue in order to improve the quality of these weapons, which offsets and goes far beyond the cuts, and as long as the changes to promote the dismantling of nuclear weapons on foreign soil have no practical effect. We hope that on the basis of their international obligations to dispel the disquiet of the peoples of the world, the nuclear super-Powers will adopt measures to bring about the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the region most threatened by nuclear war, first and foremost, so that their promise can be fulfilled constantly.

It is very well known that it is the Korean peninsula which is the most dangerous region where a nuclear war could break out in the aftermath of the Gulf war. The survival of the Korean people has been threatened for more than 30 years by 1,000 nuclear weapons deployed in the southern part of the Korean peninsula. These nuclear weapons not only seriously threaten peace and security in Korea, but also exacerbate the regional situation to the utmost. No country in Asia will believe that the nuclear weapons in South Korea would remain targeted on the North or that they would not one day be pointed towards themselves. These nuclear weapons were deployed, we are told, by one of the main nuclear-weapon countries during the cold war period when they considered the Korean peninsula as their theatre of operations for a nuclear showdown, as a means of dissuasion. That having been said, nothing can justify the presence of a great number of nuclear weapons in South Korea, in the context of a shift from confrontation to cooperation and the conclusion of agreements on the reduction of nuclear weapons.

Against this background, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, on 30 July last, submitted a new proposal for converting the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The text of the proposal was distributed as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament (CD/1096), the main thrust of which is as follows. The north and south of Korea shall agree on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula and make a joint statement thereof. They should negotiate the matters concerned and adopt a joint declaration with legal effect not later than the end of 1992 providing in particular for a ban on the testing, manufacture and possession of nuclear weapons by north and south, the prohibition of the deployment and passage of such weapons and related military exercises in the sphere of the nuclear-free zone, and verification of the absence of nuclear weapons through inspections of the north and south.

The United States, and the Soviet Union and China, the nuclear-weapon States neighbouring on the Korean peninsula, shall legally guarantee the nuclear-free status of the Korean peninsula, once an agreement is reached and this region is proclaimed a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Within one year after

(Mr. Ri, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

the north and south of Korea jointly declare the establishment of a nuclear-free zone, the nuclear-weapon States should remove all factors contravening the nuclear-free status and give assurances that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. In particular, measures should be taken to withdraw American nuclear weapons from South Korea. Asian non-nuclear-weapon States shall support the conversion of the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-weapon-free zone and respect its status.

Our new proposal took into consideration the position recently adopted by the United States whereby they would not object in principle to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, provided that the parties involved agreed on this point, and the support they have shown for the establishment of such zones in the Middle East, in South Asia and in Africa. The United States Department of State issued a declaration that was not negative, I would even say positive, towards our proposal, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Korea, through a spokesman, alluded to his consent, albeit conditional, to discussion of our proposal.

My Government is ready to undertake negotiations with the south Korean side at any time and at any level, and the same applies to the United States. It is convinced that once negotiations have begun, a happy future will open up as regards the conversion of the Korean peninsula into a non-nuclear zone. It would harm no one but would benefit everyone. Given that our proposal provides for realistic and practical measures, the denuclearization of the peninsula, if the authorities of South Korea and the United States truly desire it, will be attained in very short order. If the Korean peninsula is made into a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the source of any nuclear war will be eliminated, and this will create conditions conducive to consolidating peace and security in Korea and in Asia and the peaceful reunification of Korea.

For more than 10 years the Conference on Disarmament has engaged in an effort to eliminate chemical weapons, one of the weapons of mass destruction, from the Earth once and for all. It has taken various steps, particularly this year, to draw the attention of many countries to the importance of the issue of chemical weapons, while intensifying negotiations for the preparation of the convention. As a result of these endeavours, we have seen some successes: the number of participants in the session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons has risen among non-member States; a breach has opened in the negotiations and agreement has been reached on many provisions. This gives hope for the adoption of the convention by the end of 1992 at the latest. We feel that problems such as the verification system, the executive council and others can be resolved if the negotiations are directed towards taking sufficient account of the concern of non-chemical-weapon countries, particularly developing countries. Clear experience has also been acquired this year to enhance the effectiveness of the Conference on Disarmament. This is, we may say, a forum for the adoption of general disarmament measures to ensure peace and security throughout the world. For that reason participation in the Conference on Disarmament should be enhanced on a large scale, so that the problems of the widest possible variety of regions and categories are fully reflected and dealt with. We consider that the number of member States should be increased and in the immediate future the participation of non-member

(Mr. Ri, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

States in the Conference made much easier. In this regard my delegation would like to propose that we consider changing the procedure so that, if non-member States submit an application to participate in sessions of the Conference on Disarmament, their participation can be renewed by tacit agreement every year unless any objection is raised.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of India, Ambassador Shah, who will introduce the report distributed this morning with symbol CD/1106.

Mr. SHAH (India): Before I present the report, Mr. President, let me join you and other previous speakers in welcoming Ambassador Celso Amorim of Brazil amongst us. I wish him success in his endeavours here and extend the full cooperation of my delegation to him.

I have taken the floor to present the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban which is on the table today as document CD/1106. Having presided over the Ad Hoc Committee only during its last stage of the final consideration and adoption of its report to the Conference, my task has been easy. The harder work had already been accomplished over the year by my predecessor, Ambassador Chadha. Even before the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee this year, there were many questions as to what the Ad Hoc Committee would be doing and how it would go about its work. The fact that its work has gone smoothly and it was conducted in a cordial and constructive atmosphere owes much to the excellent cooperation all delegations extended to my delegation throughout the year.

Before his departure, at a plenary meeting on 25 July, Ambassador Chadha gave his impressions of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. I should like to refer delegations to that statement again. A spirit of compromise was manifest during the organization of the work and the quality of the debates on the three clusters of questions which the Ad Hoc Committee had assigned itself, namely general debate, structure and scope and verification and compliance, was indeed high.

I should like to emphasize that the report in front of you today represents a serious and considered, and at times highly technical, exchange of views held this year. The goal was to lay the groundwork for eventual negotiations on a nuclear test ban. The goal, I believe, has been largely achieved. The report deals with substantive issues. It touches on the main questions relating to the achievement of a nuclear test ban. As we are all aware, nuclear testing is not only a technical issue, but also a highly political issue connected directly to the defence and security concerns of States. In a rapidly changing world, a phrase which tended in the past to be a cliché, but now has taken on new significance, it is even more imperative that the security concerns of all sides must be respected. I believe the report presents in a balanced manner the genuine differences of perception of security needs that continue to exist with relation to a nuclear test ban.

(Mr. Shah, India)

Bearing those differences in mind, the Ad Hoc Committee accomplished an important task: the international community represented here in this negotiating forum has kept the question on its agenda, in the context of a subsidiary organ, exploring the areas of agreement and disagreement and preparing for future work. An important contribution to future work on the item was made in the agreement reached by the Ad Hoc Committee to recommend that it be re-established at the beginning of its 1992 session. I definitely endorse this recommendation.

Allow me to express my appreciation to the delegations participating in the work of the Committee this year. Allow me also on behalf of Ambassador Chadha and my delegation to express a special note of thanks to all ambassadors who took a special interest in the deliberations and in particular the group coordinators: Mr. José Felicio of Brazil, Mr. Max Gevers of the Netherlands and Mr. Vladimir Gaspar of Czechoslovakia. I also thank Mr. Zhang of China for his contribution. It would be remiss of me not to mention the excellent support my delegation received from Mr. Cassandra and Mrs. Cummins from the secretariat. Both of them worked extremely hard for the sake of the successful conduct of the Ad Hoc Committee's work. Finally, may I, on behalf of the Ad Hoc Committee, thank all the interpreters responsible among others for the efficient translation of complicated terminology which contributed to the smooth conduct of our meetings this year?

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of India for introducing the report that appears in document CD/1106. I should also like to sincerely congratulate the delegation of India, responsible for the chairmanship, on the conclusion of the work of that subsidiary body. I now call on the distinguished representative of Argentina, Mr. Grossi, who, on behalf of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, will introduce the report of that Committee, which is contained in document CD/1105.

Mr. GROSSI (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Allow me at the outset to extend the most cordial welcome on behalf of my Ambassador and my delegation to the ambassadors of India, Prakash Shah, Egypt, Mounir Zahran, and Brazil, Celso Amorim, who are joining this Conference at an especially important time in its negotiations. We are certain that their presence will give impetus and creativity to this multilateral negotiating body on disarmament. As of now we pledge our firmest support and cooperation in our joint efforts.

On behalf of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on item 5 of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Roberto García Moritán, I have the signal honour this morning to put before the Conference for its consideration the report of the Ad Hoc Committee entrusted with the consideration of item 5 on the agenda of our organ, Prevention of an arms race in outer space, contained in document CD/1105. In so doing my delegation would briefly like to stress some aspects related to the report we are introducing today. These pertain to the task we have been accomplishing during this session in the exercise of the chairmanship of this subsidiary body. Firstly, we believe that the report we are introducing this morning

(Mr. Grossi, Argentina)

contains certain elements enabling us to assert that the Committee has worked hard in an attempt to find areas of consensus in a field which is not always easy. A reading of the report will indicate that the members of the Committee considered it appropriate this year to adopt a more dynamic and practical methodology which would enable them to tackle the items before the Committee in a more detailed manner. The Chair thus drew up a series of lists of topics, for the purpose of bringing some order into the debate and also to single out those issues which incontestably enjoy the attention of delegations, leaving aside those which do not seem to awaken such interest. The lists have been annexed to the report and might perhaps serve to guide future debates within this Committee.

For the first time since its establishment in 1985, the Committee made use of the device of friends of the Chair, in order to tackle three specific subjects. Respectively, these were important terminological issues for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, aspects connected with verification of anti-satellite weapons, and confidence-building measures, including improvements in the existing and future databases in the space field. On behalf of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, I should like most especially to express my gratitude for the valuable cooperation extended in their capacity as friends of the Chair by Mr. Anthony Monckton of the delegation of the United Kingdom, Mr. Mahmoud Karem of the delegation of Egypt and Mr. Mikhail Antyukhin the delegation of the Soviet Union, who coordinated the consultations related to the three items indicated in the order I mentioned. The results of their efforts can be consulted by delegations in the shape of the working documents which will contain their respective reports. The work of the group coordinators, Mr. Christer Elm of the delegation of Sweden for the Group of 21, Mr. Marc Finaud of the delegation of France for the Western Group and Mr. Plamen Grozdanov of Bulgaria and Mr. Mikhail Antyukhin of the Soviet Union for the Group of East European and other States, as well as the distinguished delegate of China to the Committee, Mr. Zhan Yang, also deserve all our thanks. We also most warmly thank the Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Vladimir Bogomolov.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is a subject of crucial importance for the security of all States, whether space Powers or not. The Ad Hoc Committee which this Conference on Disarmament established six years ago for the first time reflects that interest and attempts to make progress in conformity with its programme of work towards the definition of areas of convergence. We hope that the work that we have done this year has contributed to that lofty goal.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement. I would be grateful if you would convey to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee our most sincere congratulations on the conclusion of the tasks assigned to that subsidiary body. I now call on the representative of the Republic of Korea, Mr. Moon.

Mr. MOON (Republic of Korea): Mr. President, as it is for the first time that my delegation takes the floor under your presidency, I wish, on behalf of my delegation, to extend to you our warm congratulations on your assumption

(Mr. Moon, Republic of Korea)

of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation is confident that, under your able and experienced guidance, the 1991 session of the Conference on Disarmament will achieve a substantial and successful conclusion.

My delegation wishes to just briefly touch upon the nuclear question on the Korean peninsula. It is well known that the conclusion of the safeguards agreement with the IAEA as a commitment to the implementation of non-proliferation has promoted confidence-building among the States parties and facilitated adherence to the NPT by other non-parties, thus strengthening the effectiveness and universality of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

As was already mentioned in my delegation's earlier statement of 27 June, the unsafeguarded nuclear facilities of the States parties to the NPT, particularly the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, reportedly possessing significant nuclear facilities, have been the subject of international concern. This concern has been expressed without ambiguity by a number of countries in the meetings of the IAEA Board of Governors and other international forums such as the NPT Review Conference. My delegation wishes to stress that the concern expressed in one way or another is not the view of a single country but the collective concern of the world community.

As a result of the concerted efforts of the international community, we are now witnessing a step forward with regard to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's conclusion of a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. At the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in June, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea agreed with the draft safeguards agreement proposed by the IAEA, with a view to submitting the draft agreement to the IAEA Board of Governors for approval at its September session.

While welcoming such a development, my delegation cannot but express our particular concern that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea still attaches extraneous elements to the conclusion of the safeguards agreement as well as to the implementation. We all know that to bring extraneous elements to the NPT system is contradictory to the obligations incurred by member countries under the NPT.

The earliest and speediest conclusion of the safeguards agreement with the IAEA is the only way to put an end to the lingering suspicions and misgivings of the world community. My delegation believes that a move in this direction will contribute not only to strengthening of the universal application of the NPT regime, but also to removing obstacles standing in the way of inter-Korean confidence-building and the reconciliation process.

Now my delegation cannot but refer to the North Korean proposal, that is, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone on the Korean peninsula. Since the proposal on the establishment of such a zone was launched by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the late 1970s, the proposal has not received much support from the international community. The proposal, being ideal in its concept, but unrealistic in its implication, has been advanced

(Mr. Moon, Republic of Korea)

without taking into account the regional politico-military situation as well as the views of other States in the region, which is a fundamental prerequisite for the proposal coming under this category.

In this regard, we wish to recall again that the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament as well as the Final Declaration of the third NPT review conference stated, inter alia, that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should be based on arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned and should also take into account the characteristics of the region. The proposal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea therefore falls far short of the internationally recognized standards on the establishment of such a zone.

With regard to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's recent proposal concerning the establishment of such a zone on the Korean peninsula as made in its Foreign Ministry's statement of 30 July, my delegation wishes to reiterate my Government's position by quoting the statement by the Republic of Korea's Foreign Ministry's spokesman on 1 August.

> "Firstly, the Korean Government takes note that North Korea's proposal concerning the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula as made in its Foreign Ministry's statement of 30 July 1991 contains some new details compared with its previous proposals.
>
> "Secondly, the Korean Government wishes to make it clear that as a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, North Korea should accept full-scope IAEA inspection on all nuclear-related material and facilities on its soil, including the reprocessing facilities. The fulfilment of this obligation cannot be linked with any other issues.
>
> "Thirdly, after having made this clear, the Korean Government considers that, for the purpose of reducing tension and building confidence on the Korean peninsula, military and other matters including nuclear non-proliferation can be discussed between the South-North Korean authorities in the future."

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Republic of Korea for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. There are no more speakers on the list. Would any other delegation like to take the floor? I call on the representative of Brazil, Ambassador Celso Nunes Amorim.

Mr. AMORIM (Brazil): Mr. President, I will be very brief, but I want to thank you very much for the kind words you addressed to me. It is an honour and a pleasure for me to be welcomed at the Conference on Disarmament by a representative of a Latin-American country, a neighbouring country of Brazil with which we enjoy special relations. You have been appointed President of this Conference at a very important moment of finalizing the report to the

(Mr. Amorim, Brazil)

General Assembly, and I trust that your able guidance will, as it has already, bring us to our desired results of informing the United Nations of the fruitful work of the Conference in the 1991 session.

Let me also thank all the colleagues present in this session for the warm welcome I received, and most specially Ambassador Shah of India and my colleague from Argentina. In response to your friendship I offer the full cooperation and the constructive participation of my delegation in the activities of the Conference. It is a great honour for me to attend the sessions of the Conference in this Council chamber at such an important moment for the fulfilment of its tasks. It will be a heavy responsibility for me to discharge the functions which in the past were carried out by many prominent representatives of Brazilian diplomacy. It is my strong wish to continue their work in such a way that my country can further contribute to the cause of international security and disarmament. To accomplish my tasks, I rely on the most valuable help offered to me by the distinguished delegates to the Conference, and by yourself, Mr. President.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Brazil for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I shall now very briefly call on the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Mr. HAN (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): I will be very brief. With regard to the question of Korea there are a lot of things to say, politically, militarily, historically, but this should be discussed between the countrymen from North and South - we could solve these problems. This is not the forum to mention and discuss those things. Therefore I refrain from saying all the details. But I would like to emphasize one thing clearly, that the real threat of nuclear war is not from the North, but from the long-standing side, from the South. This is well known. I would like to emphasize once again that my Government has not the willingness to produce nuclear weapons and we have no big capabilities to do so and we do not have the necessity to produce and to have those awful weapons on Korean territory. I made it clear. We have the constant policy to conclude and to implement our international obligations under the NPT, so we have negotiations though we have some difficulties in the real situations. We have negotiations; progress we have made, and we will fulfil. When some persons are talking loudly about these questions as a new danger in Korea, this is something else to cover the real threat. Therefore we ask them to stop such manipulations in the future.

With regard to our proposals for a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula, this is derived from the anxiousness and strong aspirations of the Korean people to escape from the nuclear threat and nuclear disaster which presently prevails on the Korean peninsula. This is not a trick, this is not a kind of game, nobody can play with such serious problems. This proposal has been broadly supported by various circles of the international community, not only the Governments but also many social circles - I would like to make it clear - as well as this endeavour of our Government should be fulfilled with the support of the international community. When we proposed these new proposals the Governments of the Soviet Union and China immediately supported

(Mr. Han, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

them and a positive reaction was shown for the first time by the Government of the United States. Therefore, this fact shows that the Korean peninsula is a place where the world community is drawing deep attention and should be solved as soon as possible.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I suggest we move to other matters. As I mentioned before, I will now invite the Conference to adopt the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, which was circulated last week in document CD/1104. If there are no objections I shall take it the report is adopted.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): In connection with the two reports introduced today, I propose to put them before the Conference for adoption during the plenary meeting of 4 September next.

Before proceeding to examine the calendar of meetings for next week, I would like to report to you on the status of the annual report to the United Nations General Assembly. The open-ended informal consultations on agenda items 2, 3, 7 and 8 have been concluded successfully. The secretariat is preparing the revision of the working papers in all official languages. It is hoped that the texts in English will be ready tomorrow, Friday afternoon and at the latest on Monday afternoon in the other official languages.

The subsidiary bodies have concluded their work and their reports are being prepared in all the official languages. The report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will be ready later than the others, as this Committee concluded its work at the eleventh hour on Tuesday. The English text will be available on Tuesday the 3rd in the morning and the remaining languages first thing on Wednesday the 4th. Owing to the size of the report and the fact that the Committee was not able to conclude its work last Monday as planned, it has not been possible to have it available earlier.

As I announced today, we shall be considering in an informal meeting this morning immediately following the plenary the technical parts of the report appearing in documents CD/WP.409 and 411. I hope that these will not prompt any difficulties. In any event, it is obvious that as the necessary documents are circulated delegations will need time to consider them. Hence it seems desirable that the second and last reading of the draft annual report should take place in an informal meeting on Wednesday, 4 September, before the adoption of the report in plenary. This has also been our approach in years past when this was necessary. So for the meetings on the 4th, we shall have the following documentation: documents CD/WP.409 and 411, relating to the technical parts of the report, along with an addendum if any amendments prove necessary, and revision 1 of the four documents already circulated on the substantive paragraphs relating to agenda items 2, 3, 7 and 8. The new documents will be distributed in delegations' pigeon-holes as they come out.

(The President)

The timetable for next week circulated today by the secretariat takes into account the observations I made on the annual report. Also, in accordance with the understanding arrived at in the President's consultations with the coordinators, to which I referred at the last plenary meeting, the services assigned to subsidiary bodies that have concluded their work have been put at the disposal of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. I suggest then that we adopt the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I should now like to inform you of a change regarding the meeting scheduled for 3 p.m. this afternoon in room V. According to the timetable for this week, that meeting was to be a meeting of Group B of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. It has now been decided that, instead of that group, it will be Group C that will hold a meeting on that occasion.

I have no further business, and shall therefore proceed to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Wednesday, 4 September, immediately following the informal meeting devoted to the consideration of the draft annual report.

The meeting rose at 11.30 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.605
4 September 1991

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on
Wednesday, 4 September 1991, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. Horacio Arteaga (Venezuela)

GE.91-62517/3781B

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The 605th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is called to order.

The entire international disarmament community has learned with great sorrow of the loss of one of the most important persons in the field of multilateral negotiations. Ambassador Alfonso García Robles leaves an indelible memory which goes beyond the borders of his own country and region to attain worldwide scope. In addition to having served as Secretary of External Relations for Mexico, he held many senior posts in his country's Foreign Ministry, and in particular was head of the delegation to this negotiating body between 1967 and 1989. For many years he was the dean of the Ambassadors accredited to this Conference, and participated in the negotiations on the four international instruments concluded in this room, contributing through his vast knowledge as well as his extraordinary skill and diplomatic experience to the success of those negotiations. The text of each of those instruments contains provisions that reflected his concerns and aspirations. While his input at the multilateral level was decisive, his contribution at the regional level with the elaboration of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, on the first nuclear-weapon-free zone declared in an inhabited region, can be regarded as a model of intelligence, tact and tenacity in the service of a Latin American ideal that he never lost sight of, despite his undeniable importance and personal significance in worldwide multilateral negotiations.

Alfonso García Robles, the worthy recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, marks a whole era in multilateral diplomacy in the area of disarmament, an era that would not have been the same without his presence, an era that is deeply indebted to him and with which his name will always remain associated. Even the present configuration of this sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, as may be seen in paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and in our own rules of procedure, owes a great deal to this distinguished and unforgettable figure. The rotating presidency, the establishment of subsidiary bodies and the annual agenda, inter alia, were the result of tireless and effective work.

His contribution to the major problems of international peace and security was not restricted to his work as a distinguished member of the Mexican diplomatic service. He also participated in drafting the San Francisco Charter, he was a brilliant head of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat and he was the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for the Middle East. But this unsurpassed international career cannot lead us to forget that Alfonso García Robles combined this with exceptional human qualities which earned him the respect, admiration and friendship of all who had the privilege of knowing him. As a Venezuelan and a Latin American I wish to add that I feel very proud of the work of this distinguished figure. On behalf of the Conference on Disarmament and on my own behalf, I would ask the representative of Mexico to convey to his Government, to Mrs. García Robles, who, with her well-known charm and human touch, was at his side during the course of his

(The President)

exemplary career, and also to his children, our deepest condolences at a loss which affects us greatly. I now give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Shah, who will speak on behalf of the Group of 21.

Mr. SHAH (India): I take the floor on behalf of the Group of 21 to perform a sad duty. It is with great shock and a deep sense of sorrow that I and my colleagues in the Group of 21 have learnt of the passing away of Ambassador Alfonso García Robles of Mexico. Ambassador García Robles had long played such a vital role in the field of multilateral disarmament that his passing away will be a great loss not only to us in G-21 but to the entire international community interested in achieving disarmament.

Ambassador García Robles' career was intimately tied to the multilateral efforts for peace and disarmament and to the work of the United Nations. He contributed to the preparatory work that led to its establishment and vigorously defended, all throughout his life, the principles enshrined in its Charter in every capacity that he held.

Since his appointment in 1967 as head of the Mexican delegation to the then Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament he devoted a major part of his career to disarmament matters. Earlier, he had brought to a fruitful conclusion the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. In the 1970s, as the Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations, Ambassador García Robles contributed greatly to developmental issues in addition to his work on disarmament matters. From December 1975, he was appointed Mexico's Minister for Foreign Affairs and served in the Cabinet for almost a year. In 1978, Ambassador García Robles was instrumental in the elaboration of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In 1982, his devotion to the cause of disarmament and his efforts towards that end received the highest recognition when he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, together with Alva Myrdal of Sweden.

For more than 20 years Ambassador Alfonso García Robles was the pillar of strength in the work of the Group of first 8 and now 21 non-aligned and neutral States. He came to embody the spirit of our Group. Today, on behalf of the Group of 21 and on my own behalf, we pay our humble but sincere tribute to his memory.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of India for his statement made on behalf of the Group of 21. I now call on the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Mr. Kenyon, who will do so on behalf of the Western Group.

Mr. KENYON (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): Mr. President, the Western Group has asked me to join you and the rest of the Conference in honouring the memory of Dr. Don Alfonso García Robles, who was a tireless worker for arms control and disarmament, the objectives for which this Conference was founded. Many of us move in and out of this kind of work; some stay in it longer than others; but he gave a great part, particularly the latter part of his lifetime, to seeking progress in this area. It is sad that

(Mr. Kenyon, United Kingdom)

he should pass away at a time when the dam seems to be breaking and we seem to be making more progress in many areas than we have before. I will not enumerate what he did. You did this, and the delegate of India speaking on behalf of the Group of 21 has done that already. I would like to say that my impression of Don Alfonso was that he seemed to combine a dedication and a serenity; I recall that sometimes I would go to him and say, "Given the positions of different delegations, how can you expect us to make any progress on this issue?" And he would smile and say, "One can always hope". And I think hope is a very important thing if one is working in this difficult area. In many ways and in many details we did not share his views as to how to make progress in arms control and disarmament, but we certainly shared his objectives, which were to make this world a safer place for everyonė, and I think the best way to honour his memory is probably to redouble our efforts in pursuing those objectives. On behalf of the Western Group, I would join you in asking the delegation of Mexico to pass our condolences to his family.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for his statement on behalf of the Western Group. I now call on the representative of Hungary, Ambassador Tóth, who will speak on behalf of the Group of Eastern European and Other States.

Mr. TOTH (Hungary): Let me say a few words on the sad occasion of the death of the distinguished diplomat of Mexico, His Excellency Mr. Alfonso García Robles, on behalf of the delegations of Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It was only a year and a half ago that representatives at the Conference on Disarmament bade farewell to a colleague leaving the negotiating body who had left an indelible mark in the history book of multilateral disarmament diplomacy. I do not wish to enumerate his services rendered to the cause of disarmament that are well known to the international community. Mr. García Robles was a unique diplomat, not only because he had devoted more than a quarter of a century of his life and professional career to disarmament but also because of the outstanding achievements that bear the mark of his personal contribution. In spite of great professional successes, he had never been complacent but remained persevering in his quest for a more secure and peaceful world. His untiring efforts were acknowledged when he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1982. A substantial, productive and successful life like his can only be admired and envied. Allow me, through you, Mr. President, to express to his wife and family, and to the delegation, Government and people of Mexico, the deepest sympathy and sorrow of the delegations of Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, at the passing away of His Excellency Mr. Alfonso García Robles, whose memory will remain with us in the many years to come.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement on behalf of the Group of Eastern European and Other States. I now give the floor to the representative of China, Ambassador Hou Zhitong.

Mr. HOU (China) (translated from Chinese): The Chinese delegation learned with deep grief and shock of the death of the former Ambassador of Mexico to the Conference on Disarmament and Nobel Prize laureate, Mr. García Robles. This is a colossal loss to the people of Mexico and a loss to the international community. Here in the name of the Chinese delegation I would like to express my deepest condolences to the Ambassador of Mexico, Ambassador Bosch, and through him to the Mexican people and Government and to Ambassador Robles' family.

Ambassador Robles was a veteran of international disarmament, an international activist of acclaim. He made commendable and significant contributions to the cause of international disarmament and won respect and acclaim worldwide. Furthermore, Ambassador Robles was a founder of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in Latin America, which created the first nuclear-free zone in the world. He made an indelible contribution to the success of the first SSOD and to the formulation of its Final Document. He made firm and unremitting efforts in the restructuring of the multilateral international disarmament forums, including the CD, and the consideration of important disarmament items such as the disarmament decades. Here I would also like to point out that Ambassador Robles was an old friend of the Chinese people. He once paid a visit to China at the invitation of the Chinese Government and worked for the promotion of friendship and cooperation between the peoples of China and Mexico. We will continue to draw inspiration from the his noble qualities, wisdom, diplomatic skills and contributions.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of China for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador García Moritán, who will speak on behalf of the Latin American member and non-member countries participating in the work of the Conference.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): The very special feelings that I might have expressed on behalf of the delegations from Latin America which are members of the Conference on Disarmament and those attending as observers have been very well voiced by the coordinator of the Group of 21. However, we thought it appropriate to add a few words about a man who already appears on the pages of the history of diplomacy as a result of the enormous influence of his personality and approach over more than half a century. As Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico, as an international civil servant and as a diplomat representing the great nation of Mexico he involved his country and all of Latin America in the struggle for peace, security and development. The untiring efforts of the former dean of the disarmament corps merit broad recognition, as was noted by the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly when Don Alfonso García Robles ended his long professional career in the multilateral field. Suffice it to mention, in that regard, that he was the only diplomat who participated in all the disarmament negotiating forums. He was head of his country's delegation to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the Committee on Disarmament and the Conference on Disarmament. Furthermore, as was quite rightly pointed out by the Nobel Committee in setting out the reasons for his being awarded the Peace Prize in

(Mr. García Morítán, Argentina)

1982, his outstanding efforts were significant in opening the eyes of the world to the threat facing mankind with the continuing nuclear arms race. At the regional level, his memory will also be indelible. In his long career he was the architect of a pioneering instrument in the establishment of the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a populated area, the Treaty of Tlatelolco. He was also a pioneer of the process of regional integration who through the search for regional security and its global ramifications, perceived the foundations for the harmonious and integrated development of the whole of Latin America and the Caribbean. We Latin Americans, we who have been his friends and colleagues, and who, as in my own case, have been his disciples, will be unable to forget his tremendous human qualities in addition to his professional skills. Perhaps one of the best tributes that we could pay to his memory is to continue to redouble our efforts to promote the goal of common security through disarmament, through observance of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the realization of the purposes for which García Robles fought so hard - summarized in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which also includes, as we all know, what we might refer to as the birth certificate of this Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement on behalf of the Latin American member and non-member countries participating in the work of the Conference. I now invite the Conference to observe a minute's silence in memory of Ambassador D. Alfonso García Robles.

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Thank you very much. I now give the floor to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Marín Bosch.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): President Carlos Salinas de Gortari will lead the posthumous tribute to Ambassador Alfonso García Robles to be paid by the people and Government of Mexico in just a few hours in the Foreign Ministry of my country. But this Council chamber was of very special importance and meaning to Don Alfonso, and consequently we wish to express appreciation for everything that has just been said in this forum. We will convey it to our Government and to Mrs. Juanita García Robles and their children.

The professional life of Ambassador Alfonso García Robles covered a turbulent and contradictory half-century. There were ill-fated years and times of hope. In 1938, when he concluded his post-graduate studies in Paris and The Hague, he was invited to give a series of lectures in Europe on a very controversial topic - the reasons for the nationalization of the Mexican oil industry in 1938. And on the eve of the Second World War, he joined the foreign service. The upheaval was followed by the promise of a better world, and Alfonso García Robles was present at its creation, first at the Latin American level in the Chapultepec conference and subsequently at the San Francisco conference. After a decade as Director of the United Nations Political Division he rejoined our foreign service. He was a delegate

(Mr. Marín Bosch, Mexico)

to the first conferences on the law of the sea, then Ambassador to Brazil and, as Under-Secretary for Multilateral Affairs, the architect of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

During the complex negotiations on that Treaty there was an episode that demonstrates his tenacity. In the Mexican Foreign Ministry some wished to abandon the negotiations, and at a particularly difficult time it was hinted to him that perhaps the President shared that view. Under-Secretary García Robles asked to see the President and persuaded him not to give up the undertaking. The Treaty was signed in 1967, the year when he came for the first time to this Conference on Disarmament. He was Permanent Representative in New York from 1970 to 1975, when he was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. From 1977 onwards he devoted himself fully to the work of this Conference. His contribution to disarmament was recognized in 1982 when, together with Ms. Alva Myrdal, he received the Nobel Peace Prize. In addition to the Treaty of Tlatelolco he participated actively in the negotiation of the various multilateral instruments in the ENDC and the CCD and in the restructuring of the latter. He played a decisive role in the elaboration of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament and was a most enthusiastic promoter of the World Disarmament Campaign and the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Certainly he was not always the favourite delegate of the big military Powers, but everyone respected him; particularly his colleagues in what was originally the Group of 8 and is now the Group of 21. I had the good fortune to work with Ambassador García Robles from the first day I joined the foreign service, and I was also fortunate enough to be honoured by his friendship. His personal style can be summed up in a phrase he used often: suaviter in modo, fortiter in re. He was a teacher to several generations of Mexican diplomats and a source of reference and advice for many political leaders of my country. His opinions were well-founded and people listened to him. For him diplomacy was never the art of dissimulation. More than anything else he was the faithful interpreter of the principles of our foreign policy, and thus a good friend of the United Nations and an untiring defender of its noble ideals and purposes. He was an internationalist par excellence and served universal causes loyally.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement. We will now move on to outstanding matters that require our attention today. On the list of speakers for today are the representatives of Brazil, Chile, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, who will take the floor as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to introduce the report of that subsidiary body, and Germany. Before I give him the floor, I would like to extend a warm welcome on behalf of the Conference and on my own behalf to our distinguished visitor today, His Excellency the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Ambassador Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja. Ambassador Azambuja needs no introduction. His outstanding work in this Conference as a representative of his country is well remembered and - perhaps it may be appropriate to mention this - many of his wise comments in this negotiating body are still very much with us in our everyday work. Apart from the fact that we are

(The President)

naturally very happy to have him with us again, I am sure that his statement today will be most useful to us in our future undertakings. I call on His Excellency the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Ambassador Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja.

Mr. AZAMBUJA (Brazil): Mr. President, thank you, and thank you for the very kind and very warm words of welcome. I find myself in the difficult, almost impossible, position of not being able to refer personally to each one of those in this room. I am so close to so many of you; it gives me so much joy and pleasure to see you again that I find it impossible to address to each one of you words of friendship and of encouragement. Let me just say that I am delighted to be here, I am happy to be here and that, in a way, this has become an historic session, not because of what I am going to say, but because of what was said about Alfonso García Robles, to whom I will refer at the end of my statement. But I will read the text I have in front of me, thanking, of course, Mr. Martenson, Mr. Komatina, and all the rest of you for being here.

First of all let me congratulate you on your appointment as President of the Conference on Disarmament. It is my privilege to come back to this plenary, to address the Conference and to see you, my dear friend Ambassador Arteaga, of neighbouring Venezuela, presiding over the work of the Conference in this very important period.

I am grateful to you all for allowing me some time to make this statement on behalf of my Government at this very busy last meeting of the 1991 session, which is dedicated primarily to the final approval of the report to the General Assembly. I couldn't, of course, let pass such a precious opportunity of coming back among old and new friends of the CD and presenting a brief up-date of some Brazilian positions and concerns in the field of disarmament and international security. Before doing so, I would like to touch on a point of special pride and satisfaction to my Government and to myself. As you recall, a little more than a year ago, the delegations of Argentina and Brazil started the practice of making joint statements to the plenary sessions of the Conference. The most recent one was the intervention of my good friend Ambassador García Moritán in relation to our bilateral agreement for the exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear energy, signed by Presidents Menem and Collor in Guadalajara in Mexico in July 1991. It is our intention to make joint statements as frequently as possible in the field of disarmament, as we are increasingly doing in other forums, as a testimony of our growing integration and closer identity of views.

I am convinced that the ever deepening understanding between Brazil and Argentina in sensitive areas, such as the nuclear one, will have a positive influence over our region as a whole and to some extent on prevailing attitudes towards cooperation and exchanges in technology, equipment and materials of possible dual use. I need not repeat the expressions of the Ambassador of Argentina in relation to our own nuclear agreement and to the wide-ranging process of integration being carried out between our two countries. May I just stress that our experience in the nuclear field proved that the establishment of appropriate confidence-building mechanisms based on an effective system of cooperation in advanced technologies is a firm path

(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

towards enhanced regional security. It is my belief that bilateral and regional understandings of this kind can also be reached in other regions and on a global scale, thus contributing to the cause of a disarmed and secure world.

In the same spirit, I am very pleased to announce that a joint declaration on the complete prohibition of chemical and biological weapons will be signed tomorrow in Mendoza, Argentina, by the Ministers of External Relations of Argentina, Brazil and Chile. The Government of Uruguay will also adhere to this instrument. This very important declaration will reaffirm our formal engagement not to develop, produce, acquire or use those inhumane means of warfare and will also address the question of exports of chemical substances that can be used as precursors for chemical weapons, pending the conclusion of the chemical weapons convention. This important collective step in the field of regional security and confidence-building constitutes also a very relevant contribution to international efforts to prevent the spread of chemical weapons. It demonstrates the readiness of our countries to make all efforts to avoid the introduction of weapons of mass destruction in the region while at the same time preserving the whole gamut of peaceful uses of science and technology for our economic development and the welfare of our peoples. I am quite sure, incidentally, that Ambassador García Robles would be delighted to hear this announcement were he still in our midst.

As you are aware, Argentina and Brazil presented recently to the UNDC a proposal for the multilateral consideration of criteria related to the transfer of "sensitive" technologies. We are jointly taking the initiative of promoting the discussion of that subject in the next session of the General Assembly. We would be very interested that many more delegations could react to the document presented to the UNDC, as some representatives of industrialized countries already did, such as Ambassador Gérard Errera, of France.

The recent events in our fast-changing world demonstrated that improved mechanisms are needed to prevent threats to international security. In the perspective of countries like Brazil, such mechanisms, stringent as they may be, should not impose additional barriers to technology access, which is essential for our development. In other words, many difficulties are faced because of the lack of predictable, clear and universally applicable rules for the transfer of dual-use technology.

About two years ago, when I was the representative of Brazil to the Conference on Disarmament, I stated that - and I am quoting myself - "verification will undoubtedly be the crucial subject of disarmament negotiations, multilateral or bilateral, from now to the end of this century". I am very glad to see today that many countries seem to share those views. Proposals were presented aiming at the establishment of a verification regime for a nuclear test ban; measures to strengthen the biological weapons Convention may also be examined at the forthcoming review conference of that Convention, to take place over the next weeks in Geneva. Another evidence of the importance of this subject is the careful attention it received in this year's session of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

With regard to the negotiation of the chemical weapons convention, the delegation of Brazil is instructed to contribute, as effectively as possible, to the achievement of the objective of concluding the draft next year. As to the verification regime of the convention, it is our hope that an efficient mechanism is established so that we avoid the creation of a cumbersome and costly organization. Likewise, it seems convenient to avoid unnecessary interference with the civilian industrial activities in our countries. In this sense, we considered as a positive step the offer made by the industry representatives, when they met in Geneva last June, that they would be prepared to accept inspections any time anywhere. Serious consideration should be given to that offer, for it could enable the adoption of random inspections in civil chemical facilities, thus allowing for a simple and less costly mechanism that could, at the same time, serve the verification purposes of the convention.

I also think that an appropriate regime of inspections on request could contribute to our aim. More transparency could be obtained if all countries would accept the concept of inspections on request to their chemical facilities, without the right to refusal. I could not envisage a more transparent and non-discriminatory regime, which could at the same time reduce the number of routine inspections and the costs of the future organization.

Negotiations are starting, I understand, in connection with the composition and functions of the executive council of the future organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons. It is of utmost interest to my country that an acceptable agreement is reached that allows for balanced representation of regions, political groups and countries, also taking into account the importance of the chemical industry in the overall context.

It seems to me that after a chemical weapons convention is in force with its verification regime in operation, countries applying other controls and restrictions to international transfers of dual-use chemicals and facilities should suspend them. On the other hand, it would enhance the convention regime and promote universal adherence if reservations to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 could be formally withdrawn when the convention comes into force.

We would receive with great appreciation a formal renunciation by all Latin American countries of all weapons of mass destruction. In our region, more precisely in South America, which is recognized to be the least armed region in the world, economic and social problems are an essential part of collective security. That is why we have to tackle poverty-related questions and request international cooperation to improve our economies and ensure the necessary technology transfers.

At this moment, we are negotiating the chemical weapons convention with renewed enthusiasm, thanks to the positive evolution in the positions of the United States of America and the Soviet Union, which permitted the adoption of an unconditional prohibition of chemical weapons in article I of the draft convention. But besides chemical weapons we continued to debate on important items of the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. In this connection, I would like to note the new dimension given to the consideration of item 1, Nuclear test ban.

(Mr. Azambuja, Brazil)

The President of Brazil has welcomed the conclusion of the START Treaty between the United States of America and the USSR as a very important step towards nuclear disarmament. In his communications to Presidents Bush and Gorbachev, President Collor recalled that Brazil had renounced non-peaceful uses of atomic energy and he expressed the hope that the bilateral treaty brings new momentum in the process towards ever decreasing thresholds of nuclear arms, bearing in mind the long-term objective of complete nuclear disarmament and the ban on all types of weapons of mass destruction.

Countries not possessing weapons of mass destruction and having declared the intention of not developing such weapon systems have the right to receive, at the very least, assurances that those will never be used against them. We hope all weapons of mass destruction can be destroyed in the not very distant future and that the countries having such capability renounce once and for all resorting to the improvement of their weapons and to the development of new and more sophisticated ones.

Recent events in the world are proving the need for enhanced collective security measures. Important proposals in this area were put forward after the recent Gulf crisis. Brazil is giving attentive consideration to all proposals that may lead to global disarmament. We all know that whenever multilateral disarmament negotiations are involved renewed efforts will be required on the part of the Conference on Disarmament. I am confident that this Conference will not frustrate the expectations regarding the role it has to play in this disarmament effort. For my part, I can assure you that Brazil will be committed to new universal and non-discriminatory disarmament understandings to which negotiations of this Conference may lead.

In my final words I would like to pay tribute to an old friend, Ambassador García Robles, from whom I learned so much. I very much regret his death and I am sure that all of us will miss him in the Conference on Disarmament. I will never forget the outstanding performance of this brilliant Ambassador of Mexico, since those distant days when he was the leader of the Mexican delegation and I a junior member of the delegation of Brazil to the negotiations which resulted in the Treaty of Tlatelolco. I am honoured to occupy now his place at the United Nations Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. Ambassador García Robles was a model for all diplomats working in the field of international security and disarmament. I hope Ambassador Marín Bosch will convey to Mrs. Juanita García Robles and to the boys my deeply felt sentiments.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank His Excellency the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil for his important statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Chile, Mr. González.

Mr. GONZALEZ (Chile) (translated from Spanish): My delegation is particularly pleased to address the plenary of the Conference on Disarmament at a time when its work is being presided over by a distinguished and

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experienced Ambassador of Venezuela, a country with which we have historical ties of friendship that have been forged from the dawn of Latin American independence.

Today, the Conference on Disarmament is concluding its 1991 session. We think that this is an appropriate time to assess the work done during these last few months, particularly from our standpoint as a non-member of the Conference. It is therefore our intention to highlight the positive and negative aspects thereof, constantly guided by a genuine constructive spirit.

First of all we must note the renewed impetus of the negotiations for the conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons once and for all, to the extent that it is no longer illusory to think that the work on this matter can be finalized during the course of next year. The extension of the negotiating mandate, the progress made on vital articles such as articles I and II and the intensive discussions on verification and challenge inspection are tangible examples of this. This is solely the result of the flexibility shown by the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union in withdrawing their proposals on maintaining a percentage of their stockpiles and on the right to retaliate. We are therefore witnessing a clear case where bilateral initiatives, far from replacing multilateralism, strengthen it in a constructive fashion, so that the Conference on Disarmament, the sole negotiating body in the United Nations system, can attain its important goals.

Chile, like the entire international community, is convinced of the imperative need to conclude as soon as possible an agreement banning the manufacture, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. In previous statements and in its response to the outline for the exchange of basic data proposed by Germany, it has clearly reiterated that it does not produce nor does it intend to produce this type of weapon, as I wish to reaffirm on this occasion. In that respect, and in order to show the determination guiding us in these areas, I am pleased to announce in this Conference that my country has initiated domestic legislative procedures for the withdrawal of the reservations entered by Chile when it ratified the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

The step that we have taken in this field is, as we see it, a sign of our faith in the results achieved in the negotiations to which I have referred, and also a measure aimed at increasing international and regional trust. We are encouraged to note that several States that had entered similar reservations are prepared to adopt similar measures and we appeal to those that have not yet done so to do likewise so that at the signing of the convention on chemical weapons there will be no reservations to the Geneva Protocol. It is also a particular pleasure for my Government to announce that, as the distinguished Ambassador of Brazil has already said, tomorrow, 5 September, in the city of Mendoza, together with Argentina and Brazil, a joint declaration will be signed on the complete prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, which is clear evidence of the political will which spurs our countries on in our efforts to create real conditions for peace and international stability. At the same time, we particularly welcome the fact that the Government of Uruguay will be joining in that commitment and

(Mr. González, Chile)

we hope that many other countries will do the same. In this respect the Mendoza agreement, in addition to reaffirming the various unilateral declarations on the non-possession of chemical weapons, refers to the decision to cooperate closely to expedite the conclusion of the convention and to sign it simultaneously as original parties, as well as the intention to institute appropriate measures to monitor substances defined as precursors of chemical warfare agents and the study of mechanisms necessary to ensure compliance with the commitment entered into, until such time as the future convention comes into force. In a similar area, readiness is expressed to look into systems that would help to strengthen the verification machinery under the convention on the prohibition of biological and toxin weapons. Finally, the hope is expressed that other States of the region will endorse the content of this declaration.

It is clear that in various bodies and forums, Latin America is taking major, effective steps forward as regards disarmament problems, arms control and the creation of a climate of mutual trust as expressed in agreements such as the Mendoza agreement, which contribute indirectly but in a meaningful way to strengthening true security based on the elimination of conflict scenarios and their replacement by the promotion of democracy and human rights in the region. In this connection, Chile attaches great importance to regional confidence-building measures, and in this respect has noted with interest the initiative launched by the President of Peru for the holding in Lima next November of a meeting of the foreign ministers of the member countries of the Rio Group aimed at beginning studies and exchanges of views for the purpose of reaching agreement on limiting conventional military arsenals involving high-technology weapons, as well as other matters deemed to be of interest.

As this Conference prepares to adopt a new report to be submitted to the General Assembly containing a summary of the debates and progress made in its subsidiary bodies during this period, allow me to refer to the statement made in this very room on 8 February 1990 by the then representative of Brazil, who, happily, is with us today, Ambassador Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja, who is now Secretary-General in the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With great vision he said:

> "Unless we effectively broaden our working agenda, this Conference could shrink to no more than a de facto preparatory committee for the future convention on chemical weapons, and only later seek new missions to accomplish. This is a minimalist approach and one that falls far short of the expectations of the international community, one that would make a mockery of our many declarations and resolutions and one fraught with the danger of the long agony of a progressively more enfeebled negotiating body."

He went on to add that "the time has come for aggressively creative new thinking, and ... we have 'in-house' the ability and the experience to suggest ways and means for our renewal and for enduring perhaps even greater usefulness in a dramatically altered international political environment."

(Mr. González, Chile)

These words, uttered at the beginning of the 1990 session, are equally relevant as this session ends, and we consider that they can offer food for lengthy reflection by the delegations present here with next year's session in mind. In fact if we analyse the results achieved by the ad hoc committees in the past few months, we can easily reach the conclusion that apart from matters relating to chemical weapons, the remaining topics on the agenda, despite the efforts of many of their chairmen, were considered superficially and therefore progress has not been substantial, as this mandate of a negotiating body entitled us to expect. This is simply the logical outcome of the existence of working groups that do not have the essential negotiating mandate and therefore have to confine themselves to compiling statements and a variety of background material.

My delegation is very much aware of the need to give priority to work on chemical weapons and supports that decision, but it cannot go along with the idea of postponing all the other items in such a way as to convert this Conference into a preparatory conference for the chemical weapons convention. That is why we recognize the great value of the initiative recently submitted by Sweden in document CD/1089, containing a revised version of its own draft treaty on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, which had been submitted in 1983. We believe that that initiative is a useful and timely contribution which has come at a time when the Committee in question, like several others, is stagnating because of a lack of political will to deal with substantive matters. We would therefore venture to propose that among the measures studied annually by the Conference for improving its functioning, we should include next year the permanent establishment of the ad hoc committees with clear-cut and well-defined mandates, so that it is not necessary to devote long weeks each year to discussing how they should be re-established.

With respect to the question of participation by observers, this year the Conference decided as a measure aimed at bringing about improvement that interested countries would not have to indicate which subsidiary bodies they wished to attend and that their seating in this room would rotate. Without going into the pros and cons of these decisions, which we consider merely procedural, I only wish to point out that these measures were agreed without consulting the countries directly involved, that is, the observers. It is an established custom in this Conference that thorough consultations are held before any decision is adopted. However, in this instance which affects non-member States, no one took the initiative of consulting them. In our case, had we been consulted, we would have indicated that if the aim is to facilitate participation by observers, the matter should be studied in a broader fashion, including matters such as requests for participation not having to be renewed annually, and observer countries also being able to be present during informal meetings of the plenary.

The foregoing leads me to wonder whether, in the current period on the international stage, which has witnessed the collapse not just of walls but of the most solidly built authoritarian systems, accompanied by the renewal of the democratic spirit and a willingness for dialogue, this Conference is adjusting to the new times by acting in a transparent fashion. Unfortunately our response to this basic concern is negative, as despite many fervent

(Mr. González, Chile)

statements in this room we have not really seen any substantive changes, and everything continues as if the world remained divided into two irreconcilable blocs. If some delegations suspect exaggeration, then what is the explanation for the fact that after more than six years the Conference has still not been able to resolve the question of its expansion? How can one understand that, at a time when the political scenario has changed radically and the problems which arose in the past have been overcome, it is now that claims are made that dealing with this topic could lead to the dangerous politicization of the Conference? Could expansion by four, five or six new members really endanger the successful conclusion of the chemical weapons convention, or would it on the contrary help to reflect greater universality in respect of the rest of the international community on a matter which is naturally of universal scope? It is not our intention to repeat now the decisive arguments put forward in this room by the distinguished Ambassador of Spain just a few months ago on this same point, but I do wish to say that as an observer country and candidate for membership of the Conference, we fully share his concerns and hope that the period of recess that is now beginning will serve as an incentive for all the parties to deal decisively with this matter which has been with us for such a long time.

I would not wish to conclude these words without expressing my gratitude once again to the distinguished representative of Sweden, Ambassador Hyltenius, for the interest and understanding that he showed in submitting a specific proposal, which in our opinion constitutes a basis for negotiation, gratitude which is also due to all the other ambassadors who have presided over the Conference during the course of this year and thus held informal consultations on the same point. We think that because of its importance and sensitiveness, the study of the matter of expansion next year should be separated from that of improving the effectiveness of the Conference, so that one or if possible a group of coordinators could deal with it in a firm and decisive manner. We will also raise this matter in our statement within the framework of the First Committee of the General Assembly. We also wish to thank the many delegations that actively supported us in the Group of 21 in order that interested observer delegations should be able to participate with the same status in its expanded discussions. Unfortunately the consensus rule enabled the small number of delegations that objected to this step to block its introduction, but we trust that the pause for thought that they themselves sought will lead to an early and successful conclusion for the purpose of showing that the non-aligned countries are able and prepared to initiate the transparency and democracy so sorely needed in this Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Chile for his statement and his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Batsanov, who in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons will introduce the report of that subsidiary body, contained in document CD/1108.

Mr. BATSANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Thank you, Sir. You have given me the floor in my capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. However, I must at the outset ask for your forgiveness and say a few words in my national capacity. I would like to say that as the representative of the Soviet Union and as someone who has worked in, I think, all the diplomatic posts within the Soviet delegation to this Conference, I am extremely grieved at the unwelcome and untimely death of Ambassador Alfonso García Robles. I had the good fortune to know him for quite a long period of time, first of all as one of the junior officials in the Soviet delegation, and then I was fortunate enough to be his colleague here in the Conference, and on every occasion I could not help admiring the way he operated, his tenacity and also his extraordinary capacity to find ways out of situations which allowed the positions of the parties involved in the discussion - very often this included the Mexican side - to be duly respected. So I would like to endorse what was said by my coordinator, Ambassador Tóth, and his request for our profound condolences to be conveyed to the Mexican people, and Government, and the relatives of the deceased, and truly I am deeply moved by this event.

Now, if I may, I will move on to introducing the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, which is contained in document CD/1108. It was adopted by our Committee on 27 August. As in previous years, the report consists of three parts: the technical part, appendix I, containing the text of the draft convention, and appendix II, containing material for further work. It can be said without exaggeration that the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in 1991 has taken on a completely new character. The stage has been passed where many doubted it was possible to rapidly conclude the negotiations on the convention banning chemical weapons. The negotiations in the Ad Hoc Committee have now entered a new, more advanced stage. This is reflected, inter alia, in the change in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons.

On 20 June, further to its decision of 14 February to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, the Conference on Disarmament added to the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee. The scope of the future convention was expanded to include a fundamental obligation, that of prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. Furthermore, the Committee was instructed to intensify the negotiations "with a view to striving to achieve a final agreement on the convention by 1992". In pursuance of this decision the Ad Hoc Committee has already conducted an additional session of limited duration from 8 to 19 July 1991, and I must add that this was a rather productive session. In this context, I would like to draw the attention of delegates to the Ad Hoc Committee's recommendation that it should continue work on the draft convention until the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons by the 1992 session of the Conference on Disarmament, except for three periods: 9 to 27 September; 14 October to 15 November; and 23 December to 3 January 1992. However, even during those periods, in the view of the Ad Hoc Committee, the Chairman and the members of the bureau should hold active private consultations to prepare the ground for the work of the Committee. There will also be a meeting of experts on technical aspects of the destruction of chemical weapons from 7 to 11 October.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

I would now like to dwell briefly on the principal results of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee over the past year. Even a cursory glance at the text of the draft convention introduced today will indicate the substantial body of new material which has been included in the draft convention as a result of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee this year. Once again we have a very large document, 225 pages long, at least in the Russian version, but that is not the point; the point is that we have quite a few really new provisions in the draft convention, new important provisions. I am referring first and foremost to the provisions forming the core of the future convention on the prevention of chemical weapons, on which we were unable to arrive at a solution over a long period. I am talking about the issues included in the "security basket". On the basis of the results of work this year, article I of the draft convention now contains an obligation for States parties "never under any circumstances to use chemical weapons". The issue of the mandatory 10-year period for the destruction of chemical weapons and production facilities has also been finally resolved. Article X on assistance and protection against chemical weapons and article XIII on "Relation to other international agreements" have also been included in the draft. And I would particularly like to stress that in these articles there are no unagreed provisions at all. Also included in the draft convention are article XI on economic and technological development, article XII on measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions, and article XVI on settlement of disputes. Efforts to finalize the text of these three articles will of course be continued.

The Ad Hoc Committee had at the centre of its attention issues related to machinery for verifying compliance with the provisions of the convention. This relates to both verification under article VI, "Activities not prohibited under the Convention", as well as challenge inspections, that is to say, inspections under article IX. The results of the work done on article VI are reflected in the document submitted today. Although there are certain conceptual differences of view concerning the scope of verification in civil commerical industry, the work that has been done makes it possible to state that there are realistic prospects for a compromise solution. Many interesting proposals and suggestions have been put forward on the problem of solving the issue of challenge inspections. Intensive consultations on this subject have been conducted by the Ad Hoc Committee Chairman. Here again we should note a desire on the part of all participants in the negotiations to work seriously in order to find a mutually acceptable compromise. After intensive consultations during our work this year it has also been possible to make distinct progress on the important issue of the use of terms "jurisdiction and control" in the text of the convention. New provisions in this regard are reflected in articles I, III, IV, V and VI. In addition, extensive work has been done in all the groups to "clean up" a large number of articles in the draft convention.

At the end of the summer session, or rather the third part of the session of the Conference on Disarmament, as it is now known, the Ad Hoc Committee began discussions on the issue of the composition of and decision-making procedure in the executive council to be established under the convention. There is no need to stress how important the settlement of this issue is. Of

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

course, serious work will be needed here, and we will need to do our utmost to reduce our differences on this subject. It would not seem to be a wise idea to postpone a final decision on the whole complex of problems concerning the executive council until the very end of work on the draft convention. Important issues which we still have to deal with in the near future are questions relating to the financing of the future organization and its structure. The recent specific proposals which have been put forward on this subject are of interest and deserve in-depth study.

The considerable progress achieved on the multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction was made possible thanks to the efforts made by all participants in the negotiations, including the 37 States that are not members of the Conference on Disarmament, and their desire to seek mutually acceptable compromise solutions, their readiness to devote maximum attention, regardless of the time required, to moving work on the Convention forward as fast as possible. I can safely state that the groundwork for the present progress was largely laid by my predecessors as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and by all the many years of painstaking work on the draft convention. Of course, we still have much to do in order to complete the work on the convention next year.

In submitting the report I must express my warmest thanks to the chairmen of the three working groups, Mr. Mashhadi from Iran, Mr. Gizowsky from Poland and Mr. Perugini from Italy. I was also helped in my work by the friends of the Chair, Ambassadors Loeis and Brotodiningrat from Indonesia, Mr. Meerburg, the Netherlands and Mr. Canonne, France. The members of the bureau of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons did all they could to help move ahead with work on the draft convention. Enormous work was also done by Mrs. Rautio, Finland, in the Group on Analytical Database and Laboratories. We may rightly consider this work as practical preparation for the operation of the future organization. On behalf of the participants in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons I would also like to take this opportunity to extend our gratitude to the Government of the Netherlands for organizing the visit to The Hague, where the Government of the Netherlands proposes to locate the headquarters of the future organization under the convention. Allow me also to thank the Secretary of the Ad Hoc Committee, Mr. Bensmail, his deputy, Ms. Hoppe, and their assistants, Ms. Darby and Ms. Roux, and to note their great professionalism and invaluable assistance in our work. I would also like to extend our appreciation to the interpreters and translators as well as all the technical personnel who contributed to the effectiveness and proper organization of our work.

As I have already said, in approving its report to the Conference on Disarmament, our Ad Hoc Committee is not in any way preparing to wind down its work. Quite the contrary - this year the "inter-sessional period" promises to be especially busy. So please do not be surprised at my next statement: if the Conference agrees with the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee, the Committee's next meeting will be held on Monday, 30 September, at 3 p.m. in room V, so please note that down.

(Mr. Batsanov, USSR)

And the final point: in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee there is no reference to anybody being recommended for the post of Chairman for the next yearly cycle of the Conference on Disarmament. In fact, I don't know, maybe a shorter term of office than mine awaits the future Chairman. At all events, there is no such recommendation, and that is because when we adopted the report last week in the Ad Hoc Committee, we did not yet have a candidate we could include in the report. However, I am now delighted to inform you and officially report that we have consensus to the effect that Dr. Adolf Ritter von Wagner, Ambassador and representative of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament, is recommended as the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for the next yearly cycle of the Conference on Disarmament. I am convinced, and I am expressing the shared view of all the participants in the CW negotiations, that this is a fine choice. We know the distinguished Ambassador von Wagner as an experienced CW negotiator. This year he had a heavy burden on his shoulders as the Western Group's coordinator on chemical weapons, and I think we can be certain that he will be a fine Chairman for next year. Therefore, on my own behalf, and on behalf of the other members of the Ad Hoc Committee, I would like to congratulate Ambassador von Wagner, so to speak, on his forthcoming designation as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, in January, of course. On the basis of my own experience, I could at the same time express some commiseration with him. But that is what his destiny is now going to be. Yet again I congratulate him and express the hope that the Conference on Disarmament will endorse our report, the report of our Ad Hoc Committee.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for his statement. I have no other speakers on my list. I suggest that we move on to adopt decisions on those ad hoc committee reports that have yet to be approved. We will do so following the order of their introduction in plenary. We will begin with the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, contained in document CD/1106. If there are no objections, I will take it that the Conference adopts the report.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): We move on to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, which appears in document CD/1105. As there are no objections, we will adopt it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): We are now to adopt document CD/1108, containing the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. If there are no objections, we will adopt it.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I now give the floor to the representative of Germany, Ambassador von Wagner, and I take this opportunity to congratulate him on his appointment as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons for next year.

Mr. von WAGNER (Germany): I take the floor on behalf of the Western Group as their CW Coordinator to express our gratitude through you, Mr. President, to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Serguei Batsanov. He has guided the Ad Hoc Committee with great wisdom, sensitivity and patience, as witnessed by the report we have just adopted.

With the exception of the "challenge" part of article IX, for the first time in CW negotiating history, all the elements of a complete draft convention are on the table in the Ad Hoc Committee. This has become possible due to important progress achieved during the past 24 negotiation weeks plus two inter-sessional weeks. I shall abstain from repeating the different points which I had originally listed in my manuscript since Ambassador Batsanov has just alluded to them so eloquently. Remaining problems, however, must be mentioned and should not be underestimated. Although there seems to be general support for a graduated "managed access" approach, the discussion on challenge inspections so far hints at major negotiation difficulties concerning the role of the executive council as well as other issues. On the question of verification of chemical industry we need to find a cost-effective and practicable system, balancing breadth of coverage with protection of legitimate industrial activity. Provisions concerning trade with CW-related chemicals for peaceful purposes will not be an easy problem to solve. Against that, the composition and the functions of the executive council seem to be questions which - once political decisions are taken - could be solved rather quickly. Destruction of old and abandoned chemical weapons urgently needs in-depth consideration. Lastly, on the issue of universal adherence to the chemical weapons convention, important proposals are still on the agenda.

All these problems are solvable. The groundwork has been laid. The details - in which, according to a well-known proverb, the devil sits - can be worked out. What the Conference and the Ad Hoc Committee need is the determination of delegations to do so. Governments and delegations must be aware of the enormous gain in security which could be registered for all States through a well-verified and reliable chemical weapons convention. If delegations have forgotten the risk which otherwise would exist, they should remember the war between Iraq and Iran as well as the recent Gulf war - wars which are almost unimaginable in some other regions of the world.

Each international legal instrument involves the acceptance of certain obligations and restrictions. In the case of the chemical weapons convention the price of such acceptance is made worthwhile not only by security gains but also by the creation of a climate of confidence in which international cooperation and peaceful trade in chemicals can prosper. Let's be realistic: the overall balance is extremely positive. Let's draw the right conclusions from this assessment and establish the CW convention by May 1992.

This ends my statement on behalf of the Western Group. Please allow me to add a personal note on my own behalf. You, Mr. President, and the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee have mentioned my name as being nominated for the next session next year of the Conference on Disarmament. I have considered, before

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you mentioned me, whether it would be appropriate from a protocol point of view to mention what I wanted to say, and I came to the conclusion that probably it was not appropriate, but since you, in your wisdom and you, Mr. Chairman, in yours, have mentioned me, I will just tell you that I am deeply moved and that I am very grateful mainly to the Western Group delegations who have given me the honour of being their candidate for the post of Ad Hoc Committee Chairman, and to you who have endorsed this nomination.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Germany for his statement. We have thus completed consideration of the reports of the subsidiary bodies. It now falls to us to adopt the annual report to the United Nations General Assembly contained in documents CD/WP.409, 409/Corr.1, and 411 and the Rev.1 versions of documents CD/WP.412 to 415, with the changes introduced orally in the informal meeting. The secretariat will fill in the blank spaces and dotted lines in the texts containing the draft report. As usual the final text of the annual report will incorporate the reports of the five ad hoc committees that were established in 1991. I now put before the Conference for adoption the draft annual report contained in the documents I have just mentioned. Does any delegation wish to take the floor before we adopt the report? The representative of Mongolia has the floor.

Mr. GONGOR (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): The Mongolian delegation regrets the footnote to paragraph 12 of the draft report (document CD/WP.409 and Corr.1), which is not in keeping with the decision adopted earlier by the Conference on the expansion of the membership of the Conference whilst maintaining a proper balance. The Mongolian delegation considers that such a footnote can only be made on questions of the substance of the work of the Conference this year, and not in reference to a decision adopted earlier.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement, which we have duly noted. If there are no objections, I shall take it that the Conference adopts its annual report to the United Nations General Assembly.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): Does any delegation wish to take the floor now? I suggest that we move on to another matter. Under rule 7 of the rules of procedure of the Conference, we are required to set the actual dates for the three parts of the 1992 session. I propose the following dates: Tuesday 21 January to Friday 27 March for the first part; Monday 11 May to Friday 26 June for the second part; and Monday 20 July to Thursday 3 September for the third part. Of course, it is understood that these dates do not prejudge any decision that the Conference may adopt, should it be necessary, on additional work during the breaks between the first and second and the second and third parts. It is also clear that if for any reason we were to adjust these dates during 1992, we could do so at any point during the session. If there are no objections, I shall take it that the Conference accepts the dates indicated.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I will now make my closing statement as President of the Conference.

We have come to the conclusion of the 1991 session of the Conference on Disarmament. I may say that this year's work in this forum has been stimulated by the new international climate of dialogue, openness and cooperation prevailing among nations, major agreements in the field of arms control and other initiatives aimed at strengthening the non-proliferation regime. At the start of what could be an era of new opportunities, at the beginning of history instead of the end as it has been called, the international community should encourage a renewed commitment to, and the strengthening of, the peace and security mechanisms created under the Charter of the United Nations. Thus, at present, when we speak of a new world order - when, under unprecedented circumstances, conditions exist for promoting understanding, solidarity and just international relations - there is a need for efforts to replace old approaches aiming at absolute security by structures based on common security. In this context the Disarmament Conference has a significant contribution to make. In this Conference we have noted a considerable shift towards positions that are more constructive and conciliatory. I think that what could be and I hope will be an auspicious trend should encourage future progress in achieving agreements on the various topics on our agenda.

When I began my term of office as President of the Conference on Disarmament, I highlighted the progress made in the negotiation of the chemical weapons convention. Today, Ambassador Batsanov of the Soviet Union, who is chairing the work of that Committee with great skill, submitted the report on its work, which is a clear reflection of the progress achieved. Mention should be made of the improvements in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee as well as in various relevant articles, through the inclusion of specific provisions on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons and guarantees with respect to their total destruction, as well as the decision to include various articles in the text of the draft convention. Article X, on assistance and protection against the use of chemical weapons, is particularly important, as well as article XI on economic and technological development. The Ad Hoc Committee will continue to work during the inter-sessional period, so as to give impetus to the negotiations with a view to final agreement on the convention in 1992. I also wish to express our gratitude to the Government of the Netherlands for their invitation to visit The Hague. We are giving very serious consideration to the offer of the Government of that country to host the headquarters of the future chemical weapons organization.

This year, too, useful work has been done on the nuclear test ban, which is a topic of vital importance. We are all aware of the difficulties which existed in the past as regards re-establishing the Committee on this item. In the 1990 session the decision on its re-establishment was adopted perhaps rather late, as a result of which it had very little time to complete its work. This year the decision was taken in good time, which allowed a more structured debate on the various aspects involved. Significant differences remain but, as we see it, there is greater understanding of the various

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positions and proposals submitted. It is to be hoped that the Committee will continue its work, taking into account the ground already covered as well as the need to channel its work towards an objective that is essential and cannot be deferred - the establishment of a complete nuclear test ban.

Another area that will require additional effort by the Conference is that relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The work of the Ad Hoc Committee this year has been fairly fruitful, allowing more appropriate and in-depth analysis of the aspects relating to this topic. A good number of proposals have been submitted on measures to prevent an arms race in outer space, and this should encourage the Committee to step up its efforts to achieve concrete agreements.

It is clear that efforts aimed at improving the functioning of the work of this Conference have not yet been exhausted. In consultations various aspects relating to this topic were taken up, in what has been a very useful exercise which should be continued. More time and reflection will also be required to give due consideration to the topic of the expansion of the membership of the Conference - a topic which is of course of incontestable importance.

Many constructive statements have been made in plenary meetings during this year, some of them from distinguished figures. Another factor that deserves mention is the active participation in this Conference by observer countries, which have made a positive contribution to our work. As we round off the work of this session, we can see that the role that this forum is destined to play is more pertinent than ever. Consequently, we should endeavour to live up to the challenges and demands posed by the present times, in keeping with the interest and the trust which the international community has placed in this Conference, whose credibility needs to be enhanced. Let us make good use of the experience we have gained and the results of our work to generate the necessary political impetus that will enable us to rise to achieve the concrete and higher objectives that justified the establishment of this multilateral negotiating body.

Today we have adopted the report of the Conference on Disarmament for 1991, which I will present to the forty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly. This report is a faithful reflection of intensive work and the spirit of cooperation shown. I wish to thank sincerely all those who have participated in this task, and I would urge them to continue in this same constructive spirit in the future. Once again, I wish to thank my predecessors for the efficient manner in which they presided over the work of the Conference throughout the course of this year, and also the chairmen of the various committees that were set up for their talents and great dedication in carrying out their responsibilities. I wish to express my deep gratitude to all the secretariat and conference services staff, particularly Ambassador Komatina, the Secretary-General, and Ambassador Berasategui, the Deputy Secretary-General. Without the cooperation

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and diligent efforts of the secretariat, it would have been impossible for the Conference to discharge its tasks fully. We also wish to thank the team of interpreters and translators, who have given us invaluable support in our work.

I have now concluded my closing statement, and I wish to report to you that I have no other business to take up before the closure of the work of the Conference. It remains to remind you that, in keeping with the decision adopted today by the Conference with respect to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, that subsidiary body will continue its work during the inter-sessional period in keeping with the recommendation in paragraph 16, subparagraphs (c) and (d) of the above-mentioned report.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will take place on Tuesday 21 January 1992 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.

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