

# Security Council

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON

(for the period 21 July 1991-21 January 1992)

#### Introduction

By its resolution 701 (1991) of 31 July 1991, the Security Council 1. decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a further interim period of six months, that is, until 31 January 1992. The Council also reiterated its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries; re-emphasized the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978, 1/ approved by resolution 426 (1978), and called upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate; and reiterated that UNIFIL should fully implement its mandate as defined in Council resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions. The Council requested the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of the resolution and to report to the Council.

2. The main developments in the UNIFIL area up to 29 November 1991 were described in a special report of that date. 2/ Reference will be made to that report where appropriate

#### Organization of the Force

3. As of January 1992, the composition of UNIFIL was as follows:

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#### Military personnel

Fiji	HO UNIFIL	14	
)-	Infantry battalion	665	
	Force Mobile Reserve	34	
	Military police	9	722 <u>a</u> /
Finland	HQ UNIFIL	13	
	Infantry hattalion	502	
	Force Mobile Reserve	20	
	Military police	. 9	544
France	HQ UNIFIL	20	
	Composite battalion (maintenance		
	company, defence company		
	armoured escort company)	469	
	Military police	10	499
Ghana	HQ UNIFIL	28	
	Infantry battalion (including		
	engineer company)	817	
	Force Mobile Reserve	36	
	Military police	_7	888 <u>a</u> /
Ireland	EQ UNIFIL	34	
	Infantry battalion	302	
	HQ Camp Command	84	
	Force Mobile Reserve	17	
	Military police	_12	749
Italy	HQ UNIFIL	- 4	
-	Helicopter unit	44	
	Military police	_4	52
Nepal	HQ UNIFIL	12	
	Infantry battalion	801	
	Force Mobile Reserve	31	
	Military police	_5	849 <u>a</u> /
Norway	EQ UNIFIL	39	
	Infantry battalion	653	
	Maintenance company	169	
	Force Mobile Reserve	28	
	Military police	17	906
Sveden	hç unifil	21	
	Logistic battalion	517 <u>b</u> /	
	Force Mobils Reserve	6	
	Military police	8	<u>552</u>

Total, UNIFIL

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5 764

g/ Includes an officer temporarily assigned to serve as military adviser to the Versonal Representative of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

b/ See para. 7 below.

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The deployment of UNIFIL as of January 1992 is shown on the map attached to the present report.

4. Lieutenant-General Lars-Eric Wahlgren of Sweden continued as Commander of UNIFIL.

5. Sixty-five military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) assisted UNIFIL in the performance of its tasks. These unarmed officers are organized as Observer Group Lebanon and are under the operational control of the Force Commander of UNIFIL. They man the five observation posts along the Lebanese side of the Israel-Lebanon armistice demarcation line. They also operate four mobile teams in that part of the area of operation which is controlled by Israel. Two military observers are assigned to UNIFIL headquarters.

6. Logistic support for UNIFL: was provided by the Swedish logistic battalion, elements of the French composite battalion, the Norwegian maintenance company, the Ghanaian engineer company and the Italian helicopter unit and by some sections of the civilian staff, especially in the areas of communications and vehicle maintenance. UNIFIL employed 530 civilian staff, of whom 165 were recruited internationally and 365 locally.

7. The medical unit, which Sweden had provided since 1980, was withdrawn at the end of October 1991. Since the lengthy search for a replacement had not been completed at that time, temporary arrangements were made, whereby Norway and Sweden jointly provided a small medical team for emergencies. This team will be replaced at the end of April 1992 by a regular medical unit from Poland. 3/, 4/

8. The Force Mobile Reserve, a composite mechanized company, currently consisting of elements from seven contingents (Fiji, Finland, Ghana, Ireland, Nepal, Norway and Sweden), has frequently been called upon to reinforce UNIFIL battalions when serious incidents have occurred and during rotations.

9. I regret to report that one Irish, one Nepalese and one Swedish soldier lost their lives as a result of firing. A Ghanaian soldier died as a result of a traffic accident. Fourteen others suffered injuries as a result of firing or explosions and three as a result of traffic accidents. Since the establishment of UNIFIE, 184 military members of the Force have died, 69 as a result of firing or mine or bomb explosions, 78 in accidents and 37 from other causes. Two hundred and seventy-two have been wounded by firing or mine or bomb explosions.

10. UNIFIL has continued its programme of protective works at positions throughout its area of deployment. Work has also continued on a new compound usar Ebel as Saqi for the headquarters of the Norwegian battalion; the move into the new headquarters has been nearly completed. Work has commenced on a new, more secure headquarters for the Irish battalion, near Tibnin. S/23452 English Page 4

11. UNIFIL continued to have difficulty maeting its requirements for land and premises. The main reason for this is that for several years the Government of Lebanon has failed to reimburse the owners of the properties used by UNIFIL. The last time such payments were made was in 1987. This problem has been raised with the Lebanese authorities on numerous occasions.

### Cooperation with the Lebanese Army

12. As in the past, UNIFIL from time to time sought the Lebanese Army's assistance to deal with internal security situations in the UNIFIL area which could not be solved by the Lebanese gendarmerie. This assistance has proven effective, generally requiring no more than the dispatch of a few officers for a short time. In mid-November 1991, however, protracted clashes among the inhabitants of Tayr Dibbah, a village close to the north-western limits of the UNIFIL area, occasioned the deployment of a company-sized Lebanese Army detachment. The members of the detachment searched houses and confiscated weapons and within three days the situation was brought back to normal. The Lebanese Army has since maintained a presence in the village.

13. In accordance with its mandate of assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the roturn of its effective authority in the UNIFIL area, UNIFIL continued discussions with the Lebanese military authorities concerning arrangements for the transfer to the Labanese Army of responsibility for security in certain areas presently controlled by UNIFIL. The deployment of the Lebanese Army in 1991 to other parts of southern Lebanon, including the Tyre pocket, added impetus to these discussions, as did the Army's success in Tayr Dibbah. Agreement has now been reached that the western part of the Ghanaian battalion sector should be handed over to the Lebanese Army, as recommended by a mixed military working group comprising representatives of the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL. The area in question is generally west of Marakah; of the villages shown on the map attached to the present report it includes Burj Rahhal, Bidyas, Dayr Qanun an Nahr, Abbasiyah, Tura, Tayr Dibbah and Al Bazuriyah. The handover is to take place as soon as the necessary arrangements have been made. The UNIFIL troops thus freed will be redeployed to the east and south, where there is a greater need for their presence.

### Situation in the UNIFIL area of operation

14. Israel continued to control in southern Lebanon an area manned by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and the de facto forces (DFF), the so-called "South Lebanon Army". The boundaries of the Israeli-controlled area (ICA) have not been clearly defined but are determined de facto by the forward positions of IDF and DFF. It includes territory adjacent to the armistice demarcation line, parts of the Fijian, Nepalese, Irish and Finnish battalion sectors and the entire Norwegian battalion sector, as well as sizeable areas to the north of the UNIFIL area of operation. IDF and DFF maintained 65 military positions within the UNIFIL area of operation, as shown on the attached map. The map also indicates where the ICA extends beyond the limits of UNIFIL's area of operations. 15. The Norwegian battalion sector is a special case as it has been entirely within the ICA since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. UNIFIL has nevertheless continued to do everything possible to ensure the peaceful character of the sector, in accordance with its mandate. As was pointed out to the Israeli authorities, this requires that IDF/DFF should not undertake military operations in the sector. For some time UNIFIL's position in this regard was respected and the inhabitants of the sector were able to lead comparatively peaceful lives. However, Israel changed its policy and, during the reporting period, IDF/DFF again undertook frequent operations there including foot and vehicle patrols and shooting into and within the sector. The security services organized by Israel established civil administrations in Chebaa, Kafr Hammam and Kafer Chouba, villages which in the past had been able to prevent the establishment of such administrations.

16. UNIFIL continued to oppose attempts by armed elements to enter or operate within its area of deployment. At times this led to friction at UNIFIL checkpoints, occasionally followed by harassment and threats directed at members of the Force. As the members of the Security Council were informed at the time, a serious incident took place on 14 September 1991, when UNIFIL intercepted three armed men west of Yatar, in the Nepalese battalion sector. The three men made as if to give themselves up but then suddenly fired a rocket-propelled grenade, killing a Nepalese soldier on the spot. Fire was returned and one of the three men was killed. The other two withdrew. The identity of the three remains unknown. In the same sector, explosive devices placed at UNIFIL posts injured a total of four Nepalese soldiers in two incidents on 10 August and 31 October 1991.

17. Another serious incident, of which members of the Security Council were informed the same day, took place on 13 September 1991, following the landing of six armed Palestinians in rubber dinghies on the shore near Nagoura. Three of the six landed at UNIFIL headquarters, were apprehended by UNIFIL and subsequently handed over to the Lebanese authorities in Beirut. The other three landed south of Nagoura and detained 12 UNIFIL soldiers who had been on their morning exercise run. UNIFIL representatives immediately began negotiations with the Palestinians, with a view to getting them to give up their hostages and turning themselves over to UNIFIL. At the same time, DFF surrounded the location, a vacant building not far from the Israeli border installations; Israeli naval vessels came close inshore and Israeli helicopters howered in the vicinity. While discussions were still under way, the building came under automatic weapons fire from all directions, killing a Swedish soldier and wounding three French and two Swedish soldiers. One of the Palestinians was killed and another seriously wounded. They were taken by the IDF. The United Nations has protested to the Palestine Liberation Organization about the actions of its members in this incident. It has similarly protested to the Government of Israel about the actions of IDF/DFF.

18. During the period under review, UNIFIL recorded 52 operations by resistance groups against IDF/DFF (10 in August, 9 in September, 17 in October, 5 in November, 8 in December and 3 in the first half of January). The main means employed in these operations were roadside bombs, but there

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were also attacks with small arms, rocket-propelled grenades and rockets. The roadside bombs claimed a number of casualties among IDF/DFF. They also claimed civilian victims: on 13 August two men were wounded in an explosion near Bayt Yahun, and on 6 September two women were killed in an explosion near Al Gantarah.

19. As already reported in November 1991, 2/ IDF/DFF increasingly reacted to attacks by firing indiscriminately into nearby villages, especially after sustaining casualties. They employed heavy artillery, tanks and sometimes helicopter gunships. The villages of Yatar (13 October, 17 January), Tibnin (6 October, 17 January), Haddathah (13 August, 6 October, 17 January), Ayta az Zutt (13 August, 6 October), Brashit (13 August, 23-31 August, 6 October), Qabrikha (17 August), Majdal Silm (4 October), Frun (8 August) and Deir Siriane (29 July) were targets of such firing. At least 7 Lebanese civilians were killed and 30 wounded by IDF/DFF fire. During the nine-day-long shelling of Brashit at the end of August, several thousand people fled their homes to seek safety further away.

20. There has also been a substantial increase in the number of firings by IDF/DFF at or close to UNIFIL positions. UNIFIL reported 263 cases of such firing, compared to 90 during the previous six-month period. A very serious incident on 15 November, in which DFF shot and killed an Irish soldier at At Tiri, was reported in detail on 29 November 1991. 2/ In the same village, Irish soldiers narrowly escaped death and injury in the night of 22/23 December when IDF/DFF fired two task flechetts (antipersonnel) rounds, one of which hit UNIFIL position 6-44. These incidents were vigorously protested to the Israeli military authorities.

21. In the small village of Rshaf, IDF/DFF have for some weeks now prevented the inhabitants from going directly to the neighbouring villages to the north, with which they have traditionally had much more frequent communications than with the villages to the south in the ICA. This restriction was imposed following a bomb explosion in Rshaf on 29 December, which caused casualties among the DFF. As a result, shortages developed in the village and UNIFIL, together with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), has provided the villagers with food and fuel. On 17 January another bomb explosion in Rshaf caused further casualties among the DFF, who responded by firing at Yatar, Haddathah and Tibnin.

22. As in the past, UNIFIL troops detonated mines, roadside bombs and unexploded remnants of war and dismantled ordnance of various types in the area of deployment. Forty-six controlled explosions were carried out.

23. UNIFIL continued to extend humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in its area, to the extent possible within available resources. Such assistance was provided in the form of medical supplies, water, clothes, food, fuel, electricity, engineering work and escort for farmers. In addition, water projects, equipment or services to schools and gifts of materials to social services and needy people were provided from resources made available by troop-contributing Governments. UNIFIL medical centres and

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mobile teams provided cars to an average of 3,000 civilian patients per month and a field dental programme was also provided. The Force cooperated closely on humanitarian matters with the Lebanese authorities, the United Nations agencies and programmes operating in Lebanon, ICRC and non-governmental organizations.

### Finencial aspects

24. By its resolution 46/194 of 20 December 1991, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for UNIFIL at a rate not to exceed \$13,337,000 gross (\$13,089,000 net) per month for the period beginning 1 February 1992, should the Security Council decide to continue the Force beyond its current mandate period. The authorization is subject to the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions as to the actual level of commitments to be entered into for each mandate period that may be approved subsequent to 31 January 1992. Should the Council decide to extend UNIFIL, the costs to the United Nations for maintaining the Force would be within the commitment authorized by the Assembly in its resolution 46/194, assuming an average maximum force strength of 5,850 troops and continuance of the Force's existing responsibilities.

25. At the beginning of January 1992, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNIFIL Special Account for the period since the inception of the Force through 31 January 1992, amounted to \$264.1 million.

## **Observations**

26. The last six months have been more difficult than preceding periods both for UNIFIL and for the inhabitants of south Lebanon. Hostilities between Lebanese resistance groups and IDF/DFF intensified and the number of casualties rose.

27. UNIFIL continued, to the best of its ability, to prevent its area from being used for hostile activities. It also continued to do all it could to protect civilians caught up in the conflict, although its ability to do so was limited by the amount of firing directed at UNIFIL itself. I appeal to all parties concerned both to respect UNIFIL's international and impartial status and to show proper regard for the lives of non-combatant men, women and children.

28. The hostilities in the UNIFIL area have generally focused on certain IDF/DFF positions that are close to population centres and in areas where UNIFIL is deployed. My predecessor proposed to the Government of Israel that IDF/DFF be withdrawn from these positions, which would then be taken over by UNIFIL. It is clear that such a move would have a beneficial effect and that the proposal merits an early and positive response. 29. The Lebanese Army's forthcoming assumption of responsibility for a part of the UNIFIL area of operation is encouraging. This important step continues the process of Lebanese Army deployment, which has brought it to Tyre and other parts of southern Lebanon and it will certainly contribute to internal stability and to the restoration of the Government's authority in the area. UNIFIL also benefits from the move, as it frees personnel to strengthen its deployment in other parts of the area of operation. I look forward to further such moves and to their being matched by the progressive deployment of UNIFIL to the international border in accordance with Security Council resolution 425 (1978).

30. Israel's general attitude to the situation in southern Lebanon and to UNIFIL's mandate remains as described in previous reports. The Israeli authorities continue to state that they have no territorial ambitions in Lebanon, that the "security zone" is a temporary arrangement necessitated by the security of northern Israel so long as the Lebanese Government is not able to exercise effective authority and prevent its territory from being used to launch attacks against Israel. While taking note of the Lebanese Government's efforts to restore its authority in southern Lebanon, the Israeli Government is not at present prepared to modify the arrangements which, in spite of resolution 425 (1978), it has established on Lebanese territory. Nor does it consider that UNIFIL, as a peace-keeping force, can replace them. The Israeli authorities have recently added that, following the beginning of the Arab-Israeli peace talks, all problems between Israel and Lebanon should be dealt with in the bilateral talks in the framework of the peace process. including the interpretation and implementation of resolution 425 (1978) and subsequent resolutions of the Security Council. Meanwhile Israel continues to maintain the DFF and to consolidate its hold over the ICA, which is increasingly becoming separated from the rest of Lebanon.

31. The Government of Lebanon has outlined its position in a letter which its Permanent Representative to the United Nations addressed to me on 17 January 1992. 5/ In that letter the Permanent Representative also informed me that the Lebanese Government has decided to request the Security Council to extend UNIFIL's mandate for a further period of six months.

32. While the situation in the area has remained difficult and UNIFIL is still far from being able to carry out its mandate, the Force's contribution to stability in this very volatile region remains important. It is all the more valuable at a time when Arabs and Israelis are angaged in peace negotiations. I therefore recommend that the Security Council accept the Lebanese Government's request and extend UNIFIL's mandate for another period of six months, that is, until 31 July 1992.

33. Given the great and growing demand for the peace-keeping services of the United Nations and the financial burden which this entails for Member States, I intend to examine critically the costs of all existing operations. UNIFIL, with its budget of over \$157 million net per annum accounts for an important proportion of current expanditure on peace-keeping. My attention has been drawn to the Secretariat's review of the scale and deployment of UNIFIL whose

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results were conveyed to the Security Council by my predecessor a year ago. 6/ Like him I consider the recommendations summarized in paragraph 59 of that document to be on the right lines and I would urge the Council to approve them. They would permit a reduction of some 10 per cent in the military strength of UNIFIL without affecting the Force's operational capability to carry out the tasks assigned to it by the Security Council.

34. While urging the Security Council to enable me to take economies in UNIF I's future operations, I must also draw attention to the continuing serious shortfall in the funding of the Force. At present, unpaid assessments amount to some \$264 million. This represents money owed to the Member States contributing troops to serve in UNIFIL, often in conditions of danger and discomfort. It is worth remembering that those Member States contribute their troops voluntarily to the Force; they are not obliged to do so. I appeal to all Member States to pay their assessments promptly and in full and to clear all remaining arrears.

35. In conclusion, I wish to pay tribute to Lieutenant-General Lars-Eric Wahlgren, the Force Commander, and to all the men and women under his command and operational control, both military and civilian, for the manner in which they have carried out their difficult task. Their discipline and bearing have been of a high order, reflecting credit on themselves, on their countries and on the United Nations.

#### Notes

1/ Official Records of the Security Council, Thirty-third Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1978, document S/12611.

- 2/ S/23255.
- 3/ 5/23439.
- 4/ S/23440.
- 5/ S/23435.
- 6/ S/22129/Add.1.

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