

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 28 April 1987, at 10 a.m.

President:

Mr. M. Vejvoda

(Czechoslovakia)

The PRESIDENT: I call to order the 409th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. In conformity with our programme of work, the Conference will continue today with consideration of item 8, entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament". In accordance with rule 30 of its rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may take the floor concerning any subject which is relevant to the work of the Conference.

I should like to inform members that once the list of speakers is exhausted, I intend to convene an informal meeting to consider a request from a non-member to participate in the work of the Conference. After that informal meeting, we shall resume the plenary in order to continue our consideration of that request.

On my list of speakers for today I have the representatives of Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, Zaire, Pakistan and France.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list for today, the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Tellalov.

Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): Comrade President, the 1987 spring session of the Conference on Disarmament is coming to a close. It seems to us that the progress scored by the Conference, on the one hand, and its failures during the spring session, on the other, are too obvious to be commented upon in detail. Therefore, my delegation would like to express its satisfaction that the agenda and programme of work of the Conference were adopted without delay, that five Committees were created and four of them are working. At the same time we do not wish to conceal our disappointment at the fact that the Conference was once again unable to come to grips with the priority items on its agenda -- the problems of nuclear disarmament.

During the current session important events have taken place in the context of Soviet-United States relations. These developments are being followed with great interest, since they hold out hope that an appropriate agreement or agreements can be reached for starting the process of nuclear disarmament in Europe and in the world. In this connection my country warmly welcomed the recent Soviet initiatives announced by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in Prague. Since I take the floor after the Foreign Minister of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Comrade Bohuslav Chnoupek, and some of my colleagues, who spoke about this, I guess I should confine myself to making just a few points.

The proposal of the Soviet Union to start discussion on the issue of reducing and subsequently eliminating missiles with a range of 500 to 1,000 kilometres deployed in Europe is aimed at finding a solution to a problem which has recently been turned into a stumbling-block to the negotiations on medium-range nuclear missiles. My delegation finds it quite natural that, while negotiations proceed, the negotiating parties should undertake not to increase the number of their operational-tactical missiles in Europe. We hope that the new Soviet initiative will dispel the danger of making the INF negotiations hostage to the problem of shorter-range missiles. We cannot but recall that the Soviet leadership made yet another important concession by accepting that the agreement on medium-range missiles be linked

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

to an obligation to eliminate all operational-tactical missiles in a relatively short and precisely determined period of time. There is no doubt that the reduction and eventual elimination of entire classes of nuclear weapons require the establishment of an efficient system of strict verification and compliance with the agreements.

For some time now, it has seemed that there are attempts to couple an agreement on medium-range missiles with the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces. It seems to us quite obvious that such attempts do not stem from a sincere desire to facilitate the bilateral negotiations in Geneva between the Soviet Union and the United States. It is perhaps appropriate to recall that in Budapest the Warsaw Treaty member States issued a programme under which it is proposed to treat the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments jointly with questions related to tactical nuclear missiles and aviation, nuclear artillery and other tactical nuclear means of warfare. Consultations are taking place in Vienna among member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO. In this context an interesting idea has been put forward, namely to convene a meeting of foreign ministers of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, with a view to taking a decision to open comprehensive negotiations aimed at radical reductions of armed forces, conventional armaments and tactical nuclear weapons.

At our previous plenary meeting my delegation listened with great attention to the statements of Ambassador Hansen of the United States and Ambassador Nazarkin of the USSR, who informed us about the course of the negotiations and talks held in Moscow during Secretary Schultz's visit. We very much appreciate this information. It is encouraging that optimism now prevails both in Moscow and Washington, where it is believed that an agreement on INF reductions may be possible in the not-too-distant future.

Today I wish to dwell on item 3 of our agenda, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". It may sound paradoxical, but it is an indisputable fact that item 3, the importance of which hardly needs any proof, has sunk into a state of oblivion within the activities of the Conference on Disarmament.

Back at the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament all States declared, in the Final Document of the Session, that "removing the threat of a world war — a nuclear war — is the most acute and urgent task of the present day". Back in 1978 it was generally agreed that "all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider as soon as possible various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and related objectives, where possible through international agreement", and that "all States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed and which would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

The issue of prevention of nuclear war was included in the Conference agenda in 1983. Since 1984, this issue stands as a separate item. To this day the United Nations General Assembly has adopted over 17 resolutions reaffirming the necessity of undertaking effective action for preventing nuclear war and inviting the Conference to start, as a matter of highest priority, negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on appropriate and practical measures to this end. These resolutions received the endorsement of the overwhelming majority of United Nations Members. From 1983 to date, the Conference on Disarmament has been presented with more than 30 documents on item 3, including 13 working documents containing proposals for specific measures aimed at the prevention of nuclear war. It is quite obvious that these documents reflect a very broad spectrum of opinions, ideas and proposals on item 3, for they have been submitted by States of the socialist group, the Group of 21, the Western Group and China.

One cannot but regret that the Conference is still not in a position to proceed to concrete work on item 3. We have entered into the fourth consecutive year where agreement on a decision of a purely procedural nature still eludes us.

It is our considered view that the establishment of ad hoc committees offers the best available machinery for the conduct of multilateral negotiations on items on the Conference agenda. This is valid for item 3, too.

It seems to us that document CD/515/Rev.2, presented by the Group of 21, continues to provide a good basis for searching for a compromise solution. As a matter of fact the draft mandate contained in this document has a very modest objective: the Conference requests the ad hoc committee "to consider all proposals relevant to agenda item 3, including appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war". In other words, the draft mandate envisages a small first step which seems to be unavoidable.

It is for us very disappointing that, due to the position of one group of States, the Conference is virtually paralysed on item 3. It is true that the Conference is also being prevented from discharging its responsibility as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum on a number of items on its agenda. As to item 3, one has, however, to recognize that the problem is somewhat of a different nature. As a matter of fact, up to now the Conference has been prevented from doing the most innocent thing one can imagine in multilateral diplomacy, i.e. considering in depth an item on its agenda and discussing ideas and proposals related to it. In all respects the situation is an abnormal one. It reflects no credit whatsoever on the Conference.

This is the reason why my delegation would like to confirm its readiness to seek a compromise solution which would allow the Conference to break the deadlock on item 3. Under the present circumstances we fully understand the position taken at our plenary meeting on 23 April by Ambassador Marko Kosić of Yugoslavia, who stated that "if the Conference is unable to reach consensus on the establishment of individual subsidiary bodies, it should find ways of discussing these issues, including at plenary sessions; but the results of the discussions should be reflected in the report of the Conference".

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

Comrade President, the Bulgarian delegation also wishes to take up briefly item 4, "Chemical weapons".

The negotiations on a total and comprehensive chemical-weapons ban, which have been going on for several years now, have entered a decisive stage. On the basis of a multitude of proposals, our common efforts have led to the drafting of provisions or the outlining of possible solutions on practically all issues within the scope of the draft convention. In this respect my delegation is pleased to note the purpose-oriented and, on the whole, efficient work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons throughout this spring session.

This is to be credited, in particular, to those delegations which tabled new constructive proposals and contributed to arriving at mutually acceptable compromises in key sectors of our common endeavour. My delegation wishes to join those delegations which have already noted the significant contribution of the Soviet delegation, namely its proposals of 17 February and 5 March 1987.

We welcome the patience and skill with which Ambassador Ekéus is pursuing his task as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We also appreciate the contributions of the three cluster co-ordinators.

The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria attaches major importance to negotiating a chemical-weapons ban. May I recall that my country is not developing chemical weapons, does not manufacture such weapons and has none stationed on its territory. As is well known, the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria is doing its best to transform the Balkans into a zone free of chemical weapons. This is an initiative promoted jointly with the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania. It is perceived as a partial measure aimed at furthering efforts towards a global solution to the chemical-weapons ban issue.

I would like to inform this body that on 30 December 1986, the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria adopted a decree setting out restrictions on the export of chemicals which are produced in large commercial quantities and which could be used for chemical weapons purposes. This measure is in keeping with the need to secure the functioning of the régime of non-production of chemical weapons in the future convention.

We welcome the statement of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev that the USSR has ceased production of chemical weapons. Now that the two militarily most powerful States are not producing chemical weapons, conditions are most favourable for the speedy elaboration of an international convention on a total and comprehensive chemical-weapons ban. My delegation neither underestimates nor overestimates the problems that remain to be resolved. It seems to us, however, that all necessary prerequisites are at hand for achieving compromise solutions to the outstanding issues. Thus, the elaboration of the convention is within our reach. If political realism and a sense of responsibility prevail, the year 1987 may enter into history as the beginning of general and complete chemical disarmament.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

It is clear that the summer CD session will be of decisive importance. My delegation is hopeful that the period extending up to the beginning of the summer session will be used in a most rational manner to search for compromise solutions acceptable to all.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Tellalov, for his statement and I now give the floor to the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Comrade President, to begin with, I wish to take this opportunity, like other delegates before me, to offer a warm welcome to the new Indonesian representative, Ambassador Agus Tarmidzi, and to assure him of my delegation's constructive co-operation.

In document CD/743, the Group of socialist countries presented its views and position on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. That document is aimed at setting up an ad hoc committee of the Conference to discuss and reach an understanding on all the elements of such a treaty.

On behalf of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, I would like to introduce today a working paper, based on document CD/743, which contains some additional suggestions as to what that subsidiary body should concern itself with. In fact, the document could function as a guideline for a systematic, goal-oriented exchange of views and for negotiations. It reflects both relevant proposals tabled at the Conference and new ideas advanced by various delegations. The text is at your disposal under reference number CD/746.

The first part of the paper deals with the contents and scope of a nuclear-test ban. All test explosions of nuclear weapons by all States should be prohibited in all environments and for all time. No party should cause, encourage or in any way participate in the conduct of nuclear-weapon tests. Appropriate ways and means must be found to rule out circumvention of a nuclear-test ban by nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

Part two of the paper addresses possible means of verification, such as seismic and other national technical means, including remote sensing, and on-site inspection. In addition, a number of suggestions are made regarding the exchange of seismic data -- suggestions which, in my delegation's view, require further detailed and in-depth discussion or which have already been taken up by the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts.

The third and final part of the working paper contains some observations on the necessary procedures for consultation and co-operation.

Since this is the last opportunity for me to speak during the spring session, I wish to thank you very much, Comrade President, for the dedication and expertise with which you have sought to induce the Conference to make headway, notably on items 1 and 2 of its agenda. I do hope that you will be rewarded for your untiring efforts already at the beginning of the summer session, in that the Conference may engage in the plenary in an informal structured discussion on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and in that a committee may be established with a view to drawing up a treaty on the comprehensive cessation of nuclear-weapon tests.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose, for his statement and I now pass the floor to the representative of Zaire, Mr. Monhsemvula.

Mr. MONSHEMVULA (Zaire) (translated from French): Mr. President, may I first of all be allowed to convey to you on behalf of my delegation and on my own behalf my most sincere and warmest congratulations on your accession to the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament in the course of this month of April, which is coming to an end now. Thanks to your skill, your lengthy experience in disarmament matters and to your background as an experienced diplomat you have very successfully led our work to the satisfaction of one and all. May I also congratulate their Excellencies Ambassadors Fan Guoxiang of China and Lechuga Hevia of Cuba, who successfully chaired the work of the conference in the course of February and March respectively.

Although we have already done so in writing, we should none the less like to reiterate our deepest condolences to the United States delegation, and through it to Mrs. Shana Lowitz, for the untimely loss of Ambassador Lowitz. We remember him well as a worthy representative of his country, as a competent and moderate diplomat, a man of few words, extremely courteous towards everyone. His death is a sad loss both for the members of the Conference and for his compatriots.

I should also like to extend my gratitude to the Personal Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General and Secretary-General of the Conference, Ambassador Komatina, as well as to his deputy, Ambassador Berasategui, for their effective and significant contribution to our work.

Like previous speakers, I should like to greet the new ambassadors who have come to join us at this Conference. These are the ambassadors of the following countries: Algeria, Brazil, France, Japan, Italy, Romania, the USSR, Yugoslavia, the United States of America and Indonesia.

The issue of disarmament is of concern to all the Governments and peoples of the world in view of the escalation of the arms race on Earth, the allocation of vast and increasing funds for military purposes, the growth of military contingents and the improvement of armaments of all types. The arms race and more particularly the nuclear-arms race have continued as never before in the course of the last four decades, thus posing a grave threat to international peace and security. Nuclear weapons are the gravest threat looming over mankind and the survival of civilization. We know that a nuclear war at this time would be tantamount to the pure and simple annihilation of all human life on Earth. This is the reason why the United Nations General Assembly devoted two special sessions to disarmament, during which all the Member States of the United Nations unanimously adopted a comprehensive programme for general and complete disarmament under effective international control. This disarmament programme is designed to guarantee a better world, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust among States large and small, to strengthen international co-operation and understanding and to implement the principles of respect for the national sovereignty of each State, non-recourse to the threat or use of force against

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the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States.

The Conference on Disarmament has before it a lofty and arduous task in the eyes of the world community. Today, due to the existence of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, the question of the strengthening of peace and security is the collective business of all nations: true security has thus become universal. The accumulation of these weapons in the name of national security has turned into a wrong concept. Disarmament measures should be adopted in a balanced and equitable manner, so that each State's right to security is guaranteed and no State or group of States derives advantages as compared to others at any stage of this process. At each stage the purpose should be to ensure undiminished security whilst reducing armaments and military forces to the lowest possible level.

As in past years, the Conference has this year continued its consideration of the various items on its agenda without succeeding in arriving at a single agreement. Ad hoc committees with negotiating mandates have been set up. However, there is still a paradox in respect of agenda items 1 to 3, even though these are items of the highest priority in the view of most of the members of the Conference. The reasons for the refusal to create ad hoc committees under these items are essentially to be found in the lack of political will, distrust and lack of understanding among States, principally nuclear-weapon States, tensions between blocs and between military alliances, differences in socio-economic systems, ideology and various hotbeds of tension in the world.

The delegation of Zaire considers the prohibition of nuclear tests as the most important of all disarmament issues, as it is the first essential step towards the reduction of armaments until they have been completely eliminated. Nuclear tests are continuing despite the provisions of the 1963 partial test-ban treaty. We are keenly aware that in undertaking these tests, the nuclear Powers are seeking not only to check the effectiveness and reliability of nuclear weapons but especially to develop new types of increasingly effective weapons. The greatest competition is between the two most powerfully armed States, in other words the two super-Powers.

It is deeply regrettable that the USSR resumed its testing on 26 February after the United States explosion of 3 February, thus putting an end to its moratorium which had lasted for over a year, had been applauded by all and was in conformity with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations -- the reason being the failure of the United States to reciprocate. However, in the course of its forty-first regular session, the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 41/46 entitled "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions", appealed to all States members of the Conference to establish at the beginning of the session an ad hoc committee with a negotiating mandate, and also called upon the States depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear-Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to halt all nuclear-test explosions without delay.



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It is in the same spirit that the heads of State of the six countries meeting several times repeated their appeal to the nuclear Powers and affirmed, inter alia, that they remain convinced that no issue is more urgent and crucial today than bringing to an end all nuclear tests. The initial hurdle of verification is no longer warranted, as the General Assembly has declared itself convinced that current means of verification are adequate to ensure the implementation of a nuclear-test ban treaty, and that the alleged lack of such means is just an excuse to develop and further perfect nuclear weapons. Moreover, the work of the Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events strengthens the chance for an agreement on this item within the context of the international experiment in the exchange and processing of level I and II seismic data to which the United States and the USSR have agreed. It is therefore a matter of vital urgency that the Conference should initiate substantive consideration in connection with item 1 by setting up an ad hoc committee with a negotiating mandate. To this end document CD/520/Rev.2 submitted by the Group of 21 on 21 March 1986 could provide a valid point of departure.

The United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 41/47 urged the Conference on Disarmament to commence practical work on a nuclear-test ban treaty at the beginning of its 1987 session. It also urged the Conference to take immediate steps for the establishment with the widest possible participation, of an international seismic monitoring network to make it possible to monitor and verify the effective implementation of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty. All this goes to underline the urgent need to conclude a comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty coupled with appropriate and effective verification measures. In this area the delegation of Zaire once again warmly welcomes the decision of the Chinese Government to participate in the work of the ad hoc committee if it is established.

Bilateral meetings between the USSR and the United States have a certain influence on the development of the work of this Conference. We are entitled to feel that there is a glimmer of hope on the horizon. Although the Reykjavik Summit last October was a failure, the radical proposals for the balanced reduction of nuclear arsenals remain on the negotiating table. We should also recall that in the course of 1986, which the United Nations declared International Year of Peace, the Conference on Disarmament was informed of a statement made on 15 January by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev, on a programme for eliminating nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction by the year 2000. The unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions observed by the USSR covered the whole of the same year. In Harare the Heads of State and Government of the Non-aligned Movement reflected their great concern for peace among all nations of the world in their Declaration.

Before that, in 1985, Zaire, like many other countries, welcomed the meeting on 8 January between the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union and the United States for the resumption of bilateral negotiations and the limitation of nuclear and space weapons. The summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev on 21 November 1985 reflected the same concerns as those voiced by the Conference on Disarmament.

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We have noted with satisfaction that the two Governments recognize their special and joint responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. They agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. They renounced the quest for military superiority. In the declaration of 21 November 1985, both parties came out in favour of early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50 per cent reductions in the nuclear arms of both sides appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim INF agreement.

Europe remains the continent with by far the greatest concentration of nuclear weapons, conventional weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Efforts made so far to remove the threat of a war from that continent and to adopt prompt and concrete measures to establish trust between the parties are laudable. We should succeed in achieving greater openness in the conduct of military affairs. In this context it is imperative to harness the potential of the Halifax Declaration of the Atlantic Alliance on limiting conventional weapons throughout Europe. This declaration is, moreover, in line with that made by General Secretary Gorbachev on 18 April 1986, in which he indicated that the Soviet Union was also ready to contemplate reductions in conventional forces from the Atlantic to the Urals. The results of the Stockholm Conference on confidence-building measures in Europe are promising. Negotiations between the two greatest Powers are continuing with a view to dismantling Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe within five years. All these are steps on the way to disarmament. The delegation of Zaire invites the two nuclear Powers to forge ahead, as we consider that concerted bilateral efforts complement the efforts within the Conference.

The resolutions relating to disarmament adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in the course of its forty-first regular session include resolution 41/53 on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Under this resolution the General Assembly, whilst requesting the Conference to consider the question as a matter of priority, urged the United States and the Soviet Union to pursue intensively their bilateral negotiations in a constructive spirit aimed at reaching early agreement for preventing an arms race in outer space, and to advise the Conference on Disarmament periodically of the progress of their bilateral sessions so as to facilitate its work.

The delegation of Zaire hopes that outer space will be explored and used solely for peaceful purposes, and that the exploration and use of outer space will be conducted for the benefit of mankind as a whole. The provisions of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space should be strictly applied. Moreover, paragraph 80 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly of 1978 advocates new measures and international negotiations in this area. The General Assembly also called upon all States, especially those with major space capabilities, to refrain, in their activities relating to outer space, from actions contrary to the observance of the relevant existing treaties.

An arms race in outer space would have incalculable consequences and would render obsolete certain international agreements prohibiting the placing of nuclear weapons in orbit around the Earth or on celestial bodies. The Conference should do its utmost to conclude agreements which can be

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complementary to the provisions of the 1967 Treaty relating to the exploration and use of outer space. Likewise, respect for commitments entered into by the two major nuclear Powers under the ABM Treaty would ensure greater security and increase confidence among all States on the planet.

Negotiations to arrive at an effective and verifiable convention banning chemical weapons are well under way. These weapons of mass destruction are spreading into several countries, and are currently sowing devastation in the Iran/Iraq war and in Kampuchea. It is therefore of the greatest urgency for the members of the Conference to work actively to overcome the few outstanding difficulties so that a draft convention is submitted to the forty-second regular session of the United Nations General Assembly pursuant to the letter and spirit of its resolution 41/58 B. The convention, while safeguarding the civilian chemical industry and international co-operation in this field should contain provisions designed to achieve the destruction of existing arsenals and ban all super-toxic lethal chemicals and other chemicals used for military purposes.

The violation by some States of the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, is an additional reason to conclude as early as possible a convention on chemical weapons which would be complementary to the Convention on biological weapons that entered into force on 26 March 1975, which has been called the first world disarmament treaty and is in fact the sole international legally binding instrument in which the parties have committed themselves to prohibiting and preventing the development, manufacture and stockpiling of a whole class of weapons of mass destruction, and have also assumed a commitment to destroy them or to divert them to peaceful purposes.

Another item high on the agenda of the Conference that has not yet been tackled is the relationship between disarmament and development. Through disarmament the nuclear Powers would release colossal sums that would fund a wide range of research in the economic and social areas, bearing in mind the waste of vast sums for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Here we should stress the role of nuclear energy in economic and social development, as well as the role of other nuclear applications in various areas such as agriculture, food, health, medicine, water resources, industry and industrial research.

Zaire, thanks to its uranium resources, has made a significant contribution to the development of nuclear energy. The uranium which was used for the first scientific experiments on fission was extracted from the mines of Shinkolobwe in Shaba. Thus the fuel for the world's first operational atomic reactor, in the Chicago football stadium, was manufactured from concentrates produced in Zaire. History will also record that nuclear research in Zaire began on 6 June 1959, when its first nuclear reactor, TRIGA, MK I, in the Regional Centre for Nuclear Studies in Kinshasa, entered into operation. It was the first reactor to operate on the African continent.

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The second atomic reactor, TRIGA MK II, which was inaugurated on 30 March 1972, is now the most powerful reactor in Africa, at least in terms of pulsed power. This reactor is an essential tool for the production of radio-elements and radiation sources used in many industrial and scientific applications. The sizeable research potential developed in the Commissariat-General for Atomic Energy through its own research programmes has been drawn upon to meet the needs of the country in a variety of areas, particularly agriculture, medicine, the mining industry, metallurgy, the environment, agro-industry, etc. The use of radioisotopes in medicine has become quite common in the University Clinics in Kinshasa. The applications of nuclear techniques in the mining industry and metallurgy and in agriculture have produced very encouraging results.

As you see, nuclear research in Zaire is based on peaceful applications for development. The International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, which was to be held in Paris last year and which is now to be held from 24 August until 11 September in New York City, should do its utmost to arrive at a consensus on its lofty objectives. The money spent for the annihilation of mankind could, through nuclear disarmament, be allocated to development by placing man at the centre of that development.

Glancing around the various continents, it is easy to see that Africa is the least well-protected, least secure continent. We are fully appreciative of efforts made to remove the nuclear threat. The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco created a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. The Treaty of Rarotonga of 6 August 1985 gave rise to a denuclearized zone in the South Pacific. In the Balkans a Declaration has been made concerning a zone which is not only nuclear-free but also chemical-weapons free. These are specific, tangible steps which constitute effective measures to guarantee lasting security and peace for these regions. The Nuclear Powers should logically sign all these instruments. In Africa the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa goes back to 1964. Today this Declaration is defied by the odious policy of the racist puppet Government of Pretoria. South Africa, bolstered by its nuclear capacity, threatens the whole continent with nuclear war. As His Excellency Ambassador Afande of Kenya so properly stressed in his statement on 24 February, South Africa is allegedly preparing Marion Island in the Antarctic for the installation of nuclear weapons.

The Lomé Declaration adopted at the end of the Conference on Security, Disarmament and Development in Africa held in Lomé on 11 and 12 August 1985 considers peace and security as a very high-priority objective for the independent States of Africa and the foundation of economic and social development. The Declaration also advocates concerted efforts among States to avoid an armed race which would make it possible to cut back vast expenses which jeopardize economic and social development. It recognizes that the minority racist régime of South Africa with its apartheid policy is the principal cause of destabilization in Africa. It expresses the firm conviction that it is through the elimination of apartheid and the accession of Namibia to independence that the conditions for peace and security in southern Africa will be realized and peaceful co-operation throughout the whole continent will be implemented.

(Mr. Monshemvula, Zaire)

If all these conditions were met, the signature of a treaty on the denuclearization of Africa would enjoy better chances of success. Zaire for its part has spared no effort to work towards this objective. Zaire's relations with its neighbours are peaceful, and its policy has always been to maintain good relations with other States in the region, whatever their political colour.

As far as the results of the Conference are concerned, my delegation would like to welcome the re-establishment of the following ad hoc committees in the course of the spring session: the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, the Ad hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons and the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

The United Nations General Assembly expects a full draft comprehensive disarmament programme, as well as a draft convention on the complete banning of chemical weapons, to be submitted this year.

In this connection, my delegation would like to express its sincere gratitude for the tremendous efforts made by Ambassador García Robles, the Nobel Peace Prize winner, who tirelessly continues to chair the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the eloquent Ambassador Cromartie, who last year took over the chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and the talented and indefatigable Ambassador Ekéus, who has now taken over the chairmanship of that Committee. If the Conference succeeds in submitting these two drafts within the deadlines, it will have shown the world that increasing progress towards general and complete disarmament can be expected in future.

Finally, the delegation of Zaire would like to reaffirm its conviction that it is within the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, that all efforts should be focused towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. It calls on all members of the Conference to redouble their efforts to rid the world of the scourge of war and offer present and future generations a better and prosperous world.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Zaire for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Mr. Asif Ezdi.

Mr. ASIF EZDI (Pakistan): Mr. President, my delegation has taken the floor today to introduce a proposal on the draft Convention on Chemical Weapons. This proposal relates specifically to the subject of assistance falling under article X of the Convention. We understand that it is being issued today as a document of the Conference under the number CD/752, and as a working paper of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons as CD/CW/WP.165.

(Mr. Asif Ezdi, Pakistan)

Pakistan has always supported a comprehensive, effective, verifiable and equitable ban on chemical weapons, and is therefore gratified at the progress which is being made in the negotiations taking place under item 4 of our agenda. At the same time, we also realize that the conclusion of such a convention would not by itself rid the world of the chemical weapons threat. If universal adherence is too ambitious a target to aspire to in the short term, the importance at least of all countries possessing chemical weapons stocks or chemical weapons capabilities becoming parties to the Convention at an early date can hardly be over-emphasized. As long as such countries remain outside the Convention, those which neither possess chemical weapons nor have the intention of acquiring them would continue to feel threatened, and might justifiably be reluctant to assume the obligations of a State party. Unless something is done about this dilemma, a considerable number of the latter category of States may thus not be in a position to adhere to the Convention.

There is another scenario that presents a similar problem. This would arise if a State party acted in violation of its obligations. In such an event, any other State party which felt threatened as a result could feel compelled to withdraw from the Convention in order to acquire a deterrent capability of its own. Such an act could in turn lead to the withdrawal of other States, thus subjecting the chemical weapons prohibition régime to a degree of strain which it might not be able to withstand.

The problems I have just referred to do not admit of any easy solution. Yet we feel that if appropriate provisions are included in the Convention, a lot could be done to enhance incentives for States to adhere to it and to reduce pressures on a State to withdraw from it because it feels threatened by the chemical weapons capability of another State. This could be achieved in two ways: firstly, by assurances that a State party which feels exposed to a chemical weapons threat will be able to count on assistance from other States parties in resisting that threat; and secondly, by effective sanctions against a State which is the source of a chemical weapons threat to other States.

While we recognize that both these ways of approaching the problem -- assistance to the threatened State and sanctions against the State which is the source of the threat -- are in a certain sense interrelated, it is the former, perhaps the less difficult of the two, which is the subject of the proposal made by Pakistan in document CD/752. Article X of the draft Convention already provides us with the necessary framework.

Our proposal is based on the premise that the existence of a chemical weapons threat anywhere in the world would jeopardize the viability of the CW Convention. It should therefore be a matter of concern for all States which have a stake in the preservation of the Convention, and calls for an appropriate response from them in the form of assistance to the threatened State.

If States are assured that by becoming parties to the Convention they would be able to rely on effective assistance from other States parties in the event of a chemical weapons threat, the incentives for adhering to the Convention would be substantially increased. Similarly, if States which have

(Mr. Asif Ezdi, Pakistan)

become parties to the Convention can depend on the support of other States parties in meeting a chemical weapons threat, the pressures to withdraw from the Convention in order to match the chemical weapons capability of an adversary would be considerably reduced.

Besides promoting the universality and viability of the Convention, effective provisions on assistance would by themselves have a deterrent effect upon States which might be considering the production or acquisition of chemical weapons or contemplating their use. If a State still undertakes the production or acquisition of chemical weapons or resorts to their use, an authoritative finding by the Executive Council to this effect would be of great political value. In addition, the assistance which the Executive Council or individual States might extend to the threatened State would hopefully enable it to cope with the situation which it faces.

The language proposed by Pakistan for article X is contained in the annex to document CD/752. It builds on the assistance provisions contained in two earlier multilaterally negotiated conventions, namely the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 and the ENMOD Convention of 1977. Our proposal seeks to expand and strengthen these provisions, keeping in view the differences in the subject-matter of these three agreements. Relatively few States, it is believed, had biological weapons programmes at the time of the conclusion of the BW Convention, and instances of use of these weapons in the past have been infrequent. Similarly, environmental modification techniques have apparently not been employed on the scale that that Convention prohibits. As against this, the chemical weapons threat is much more serious. These weapons have often been used in this century, and exist today in the arsenals of an increasing number of States. In view of these considerations, we feel that assistance provisions of the kind contained in the BW and ENMOD conventions would not be adequate for a chemical weapons convention, unless they are considerably improved upon.

Under our proposal, the threatened State would be able to call for assistance not only against another State party but also any other State whose activities present a threat to the objectives of the Convention. Such a request would be addressed to the Executive Council, which would in the first instance undertake a factual determination as to whether the requesting State faced a chemical weapons threat. In carrying out this task, the Executive Council would have the power to initiate an investigation or inquiry, including on-site inspection. In the event of a finding that the requesting State did face a chemical weapons threat, the Executive Council would also be obliged to decide on concrete measures of assistance to the threatened State including, in particular, assistance in protective measures. The precise nature and modalities of the assistance to be given would be for the Executive Council to decide in each individual case, depending on the circumstances. In addition to any collective action which the Executive Council might undertake, individual States would also be in a position to assist the requesting State once the Executive Council had determined that it faced a chemical weapons threat.

(Mr. Asif Ezdi, Pakistan)

Besides the assistance which a State party might request and obtain in the face of an actual threat, the Consultative Committee would be entrusted with the task of initiating assistance programmes to enable interested States to develop a protective capability of their own. Furthermore, individual States would assume the obligation to encourage the free exchange and transfer among States parties of equipment, material and scientific and technological information relating to protection against chemical weapons.

We believe that the proposal contained in document CD/752 is both necessary and realistic. The obligation of providing assistance which States parties would assume would not, in our opinion, be too onerous considering the advantages that would accrue from it for the Convention. These advantages can be summarized in three words: universality, viability and effectiveness.

My delegation welcomes the fact that the programme of work of the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons envisages the commencement of work on article X during the 1987 session. It is our hope that, when this article is taken up, our proposal will receive consideration from other delegations.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement, and now I give the floor to the representative of France, Ambassador Morel.

Mr. MOREL (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, first of all allow me to express the pleasure of the French delegation at seeing the representative of a country with which France maintains friendly relations preside over the Conference during this month of April. We are familiar with your vast experience in the United Nations and in disarmament. We are also familiar with your wisdom, and we have been able to appreciate the skill with which you have very actively guided our work over the past weeks -- as a prelude to leadership in sports activities in coming months, to judge by the document distributed to the Conference this morning. I would like to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Lechuga Hevia, for the efficiency he showed in discharging his noble functions. Finally, I wish to extend a welcome to the new representative of Indonesia Ambassador Agus Tarmidzi, and assure him that my delegation will continue to co-operate actively with his.

In recent weeks the question of negotiating a convention banning chemical weapons has been the subject of a number of major statements that my delegation has studied with keen interest. Eager to attach all due importance to this discussion, France has produced a number of proposals on the non-production of chemical weapons, notably with a view to creating a Scientific Council. Today we would like to make one or two remarks on three points that we believe crucial to the negotiations: the destruction of stocks, the procedure of challenge inspection and the crucial question of security stocks.

First of all, with regard to the destruction of stocks, my delegation noted with interest the statement made here on 14 April by the representative of the Soviet Union concerning the proposals put forward on this subject



(Mr. Morel, France)

in Prague on 10 April by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Mr. Gorbachev stated that "as far as stocks of chemical weapons are concerned, the Soviet Union has started building a special plant to destroy them". My delegation welcomes this step in the direction desired by all because it deals with a practical aspect of the destruction of existing stocks, an essential element of any agreement providing for a complete ban. We think it would be all the more useful to hear from the Soviet delegation certain clarifications on the following points:

The first question deals with the relationship between the provisions of the draft convention concerning the starting of the process of eliminating chemical weapons on the one hand, and the commissioning of the destruction plant envisaged in the Soviet proposal on the other. More specifically, the draft convention provides that each State party should begin destroying its stocks of chemical weapons a certain number of months (yet to be decided) after the entry into force of the Convention. This time span is therefore relatively short. On the other hand, the Soviet statement indicates that a possibly fairly lengthy period will be necessary for the construction of a disposal plant. Therefore there is a risk that this plant might not be ready to operate when required. There is a possible time lag here, and we would like to have further information about this point.

The same query is also valid for the annual destruction capacity of the facility concerned. The draft convention, as we know, specifies a destruction period spread over 10 years. In this connection the Soviet representative stated here on 5 March that each year each State party should eliminate each year a ninth of its stocks in each of the existing categories. Therefore we think that the additional information concerning the ways and means of operating this destruction facility should lead the Soviet delegation to provide details of the volume that the USSR would have to destroy, and also the annual destruction capacity it thinks it will have to have.

The fact is that we have only very recently received indirect and very incomplete information with regard to the very existence of Soviet chemical weapons stocks. Hence the recent Soviet announcements concerning destruction give us an opportunity to get down to specifics in this fundamental aspect of the convention. It seems to us desirable that all countries participating in the negotiations should be in a position to assess the future relationship between the disposal plant and the stocks themselves. The bilateral Soviet-United States exchange visits proposed recently cannot serve as an adequate source of information for the entire international community.

The question of challenge inspection has recently been the subject of very useful exchanges of views, and we have noted with a great deal of interest the comments that have been submitted to the Conference on this subject. On the basis of the position my country has already set out on several occasions when giving its full backing to document CD/715 submitted by the United Kingdom, we would like to present today one or two comments of a practical nature with regard to the conduct of such inspections.

(Mr. Morel, France)

Generally speaking, we feel that it could be useful to inject a little method into our work, and to that end differentiate between three successive phases that would raise different problems: initiation of the inspection, the inspection process itself, and the final report and results phase.

First of all, we consider -- and it seems to us that agreement could be reached on this -- that all States parties should be able to activate the challenge inspection procedure. Any intervention by a collective body at the beginning of the procedure would in our view create more problems than it would solve. Obviously we cannot overlook the risk of an improper request for inspection: this is a real difficulty but introducing a screening mechanism would run the risk of weighing down a procedure which is designed to be rapid. The process itself will quickly show whether or not the procedure has been abused. Therefore we think that the question of abuse of procedure is a subsidiary matter.

The second phase, the process of inspection proper, is obviously crucial and therefore demands special attention. Two concerns should guide the conduct of this process. First of all, we must constantly bear in mind the trigger, in other words the crisis of confidence between two States as regards respect for the Convention. The primary purpose of challenge inspection is clear: to restore confidence as soon as possible. Secondly, this initiative is of a serious nature because it reflects the concern of the requesting State as regards the chemical safety, and because it could lead to the application of the Convention by one or several States being called into question.

The procedure must therefore be activated and organized between two partners, with the assistance of the corps of inspectors. Within a short time, these should be in a position to halt the procedure if it proves inapplicable, or else to pursue the procedure to completion, in the form of a full and objective report, either by means of direct access to the plant itself or by alternative means.

In any event the requested country remains obliged to satisfy the requesting country. This does not involve what may seem the improper exercise of a sort of privilege, but stems from the obligation for full respect that has been entered into by all States parties.

While observance of the Convention and its corollary, that is to say the restoration of confidence, may not be modified, its implementation may be adapted to circumstances. This is the purpose of the alternative measures: far from offering a loophole, these are other means of arriving at the same result as an alternative to direct inspection, which obviously is still the simplest solution.

We think it is desirable to envisage the maximum number of realistic possibilities as regards alternative measures in order to assess the role these alternative measures could play in the dialogue between the two States. But it seems neither possible nor desirable to codify them in the body of the Convention in circumstances that could rapidly become obsolete or prove too rigid.

(Mr. Morel, France)

The third and last phase deals with the report of the inspectors, and more generally speaking the outcome of talks between the requesting State and the requested State. In every case the report of the inspectors will be passed to the Executive Council, which will have the task of evaluating its findings. We believe that at this stage it is too early to spell out how the Executive Council may act. This being the case, any intervention in the procedure by the institutional bodies set up under the Convention should occur at this stage and not before.

But it must be quite clear that whatever the final outcome of the report and the contacts between the requesting and requested countries, it remains the duty of the latter to respect the Convention strictly.

I have indicated the major importance that my delegation attaches to the question of security stocks, and I would like to make one or two remarks on this topic. Generally speaking we start from the idea that the destruction of existing stocks and production facilities is a lengthy undertaking, one that is technically complex and financially costly. It has been agreed during the course of negotiations that this would be spread over a period of 10 years. This period would be in fact the first phase in the implementation of the Convention. Its proper functioning would be a pre-condition for the next phase: it is clear that the definitive régime of the Convention -- that is to say the total elimination of stocks and their non-reconstitution -- would enter into effect in the second phase only if the first phase had been completed satisfactorily.

The purpose of this 10-year first phase is to bring the effective chemical weapon capacities of all States to the attention of parties to the Convention and allow the verification of the data supplied; to define ways and means and phases for reducing the levels of chemical weapons over the 10-year period; and to test the effectiveness and compliance with the Convention of the concrete proposals actually implemented by the States over this period so as to move progressively towards the objective set for the end of the 10-year period -- the complete elimination of stocks and production facilities.

Since it goes without saying that this Convention will not encroach in any way on the rights and obligations of each State party to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 under that Protocol, the use of chemical weapons will obviously remain prohibited during the 10-year period under the conditions stipulated in international law. Nevertheless, this period will give rise to a new situation from the point of view of the security of the States parties, one which must be considered with the greatest care.

It is important to guarantee not only the future security of signatories once stocks have been totally eliminated, but also their immediate security during the 10-year period. However, the issue of maintaining security during this period has not yet been the subject of the detailed debate which is necessary in order that consensus should be established in this area.

(Mr. Morel, France)

In August 1985 France submitted a contribution to discussion on this subject (document CD/630) which elaborated on the concept of balance in security, through the maintenance, over the 10-year period, of a genuine balance which will preserve the security of the States parties. In view of the extreme quantitative and qualitative disproportion in existing stocks, the application of a more or less linear system of destruction could lead only to increased insecurity right from the very beginning of the 10-year period for countries with only limited stocks, compared with States that have very large stocks. Consequently, the French paper CD/630 introduced the concept of security stocks that States would be authorized to hold right to the end of the 10-year period.

I would add that the concept of security stocks does not concern only States that declare chemical weapons stocks in the 30 days following the entry into force of the Convention. All States have an interest in maintaining the balance. If balance is not assured -- or if it is jeopardized either gradually or abruptly, for instance if one of the States parties withdraws from the Convention or refuses to proceed further with the elimination of remaining stocks -- the security of all the States parties could be threatened. We therefore hope that the Conference will look in detail at this aspect of the Convention, and we will shortly be presenting proposals to this end.

The PRESIDENT (translated from French): I would like to thank the representative of France for his statement and for the kind and encouraging words that were extended to the President.

(continued in English)

That concludes the list of speakers for this morning. Does any member wish to take the floor at this stage?

As announced at the beginning of this plenary meeting, I intend now to suspend it and to convene in five minutes' time an informal meeting of the Conference to consider a request from a non-member to participate in our work.

The meeting was suspended at 11.40 a.m. and resumed at 12 noon

The PRESIDENT: The 409th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament is resumed.

As discussed at the informal meeting, I put before the Conference for consideration a communication addressed to me by the Permanent Representative of Iraq, in which he expresses the wish to make a statement at the earliest date in the Conference, in accordance with the relevant rules of procedure and with reference to General Assembly resolutions listed in his communication. As per established practice, the secretariat has circulated copies of the communication.

Is there any objection to inviting the Permanent Representative of Iraq to make the plenary statement as requested?

The distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran has the floor.

Mr. SHAFII (Islamic Republic of Iran): Mr. President, as a matter of principle, my delegation cannot support the request made by Iraq for the very simple reason that Iraq, by its intensified, continuous and systematic use of chemical weapons, has shown disregard for the work and goals of this Conference and also for the views of the international community. I need not embark on any elaboration on the use of chemical weapons by Iraq, since numerous technical and medical reports by United Nations experts confirming the use of chemical weapons by Iraq have been accessible to members of this body, and all distinguished delegates are aware of them. Several members of this Conference, along with many other members of the international community, have voiced their concern and condemnation in this regard.

In the view of my delegation, the participation of Iraq, which has such an undisputable record in the violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, would not contribute to the work of the Conference. Therefore, my delegation would like to register its opposition to the request made by Iraq.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his statement, and now give the floor to the representative of Egypt.

Mr. ALFARARGI (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Thank you, Mr. President. First of all, I wish to express my appreciation for your excellent work as President of the Conference during the month of April, a task to which I personally attach considerable importance. You have helped to facilitate and simplify my own task in the month of June. I also wish to express my gratitude to Ambassador Lechuga Hevia of Cuba for his work as President of the Conference in the month of March.

We are once again faced with an unusual situation in the Conference on Disarmament. A State Member of the United Nations, which is not a member of the Conference, has requested permission to make a statement before the Conference, and this request has been opposed by one of its 40 members. The request submitted by Iraq is based on firm legal principles, in the formulation and adoption of which the members of this Conference participated. These principles are in keeping with the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, including resolution 41/86, adopted at its last session, which reaffirms, inter alia, the right of all States not members of the Conference on Disarmament to participate in the work of the plenary sessions of the Conference on substantive questions.

It should be noted that this General Assembly resolution sets the framework for the application of articles 32, 33, 34, 35 and 36 of the rules of procedure, which were adopted by all the 40 members of this Conference, including Iran, whose representative is now objecting to Iraq's participation in its work.

Furthermore, our interpretation of the concept of "consensus" in no way implies that each State member of the Conference is entitled to exercise a right of veto, to which no reference is made in the rules of procedure. We are all aware that the principle of consensus is intended to promote the lofty objectives of this Conference, and should not be interpreted as signifying

(Mr. Alfarargi, Egypt)

that the least co-operative member can impose its views as the "lowest common denominator". This year, we are discussing an important topic, namely the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, and I believe that, if the Conference now decides that an objection by a single State can interrupt its work, our discussion of the improved and effective functioning of the Conference would be self-contradictory.

With regard to political principles, I wish to point out that the dispute between Iran and Iraq relates to the use of chemical weapons. Iran has accused Iraq of using chemical weapons, and Iraq has made a similar accusation against Iran. In fact, chemical weapons are among the items on the agenda of this Conference, and many delegations have said that this is the item on which we are most likely to reach agreement. Moreover, we all know that membership of this Conference should be regarded as a privilege but not a monopoly of the group of 40 States. In other words, we should give non-member States the opportunity to participate in the work of this Conference in so far as is permitted by the rules of procedure and the resolution of the General Assembly.

Finally, how often have two States members of this Conference been involved in a conflict or dispute that has led them to the brink of war and, notwithstanding that fact, by virtue of their membership, have been able to make statements expressing their respective points of view without any objection being made by other members of the Conference? In short, this Conference is now faced with specific questions: firstly, the failure to implement the General Assembly resolution in spite of the fact that, at the beginning of each session, the Conference adopts the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations as the basis for its work throughout the year. Accordingly, we must now consider this matter in that context. By disregarding a General Assembly resolution, the Conference will undoubtedly set a precedent that will have adverse effects on its future work. Secondly the principle of consensus has been abused by a member of this Conference and, consequently, could be similarly abused by any of the 40 States. We must also consider the effects that this will have on the work of the Conference.

Finally, we must think in a consistent manner. We are discussing the improved and effective functioning of the Conference, and a decision is being adopted today which detracts from the improved and effective functioning of this Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Egypt for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. I must add only that you may be certain that his work in June will be neither easy nor simple.

Now I would like to ask if any other members of the Conference wish to take the floor.

In view of the statement made by the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, I have to note that there is no consensus at present on the request contained in the communication from the Permanent Representative of Iraq. Since there is no other business, I intend to adjourn this plenary meeting.

I give the floor to the representative of the Islamic republic of Iran.

Mr. SHAFII (Islamic Republic of Iran): Thank you, Mr. President. My delegation listened with interest to the statement made by the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt. The distinguished Ambassador of Egypt tried to place his arguments for helping Iraq to participate in the work of the Conference on a legal basis. I am afraid to say that the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt, who attaches much importance to this legal basis, is forgetting one very important violation of one of the most important conventions and protocols that we have, and that is the Geneva Protocol of 1925. In the course of this Conference, in the meetings that we have had, we have been careful to see if the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt or his delegation would say a word about the violation of the Geneva Protocol by Iraq, or not, and -- not to our surprise -- we noticed that no word has been said by the Egyptian delegation in this regard. On the contrary, when the violator of the Geneva Protocol wants to participate in the Conference, not from a sincere desire to help or contribute to the work of the Conference but for its own political ends, the Ambassador of Egypt tries to help him to get into the Conference.

The distinguished Ambassador of Egypt said that if we do not accept the request of Iraq we contradict ourselves. Allow me to say to the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt: "Your Excellency, you are in contradiction with yourself in what you say and in what you do. While you support the legal basis or respect for this law, at the same time you ignore a very important violation of a very important convention."

The distinguished Ambassador of Egypt referred to an accusation made by Iraq concerning the use of chemical weapons by Iran, or he said that Iraq says it has not used chemical weapons. I do believe, Mr. President, that this is an old story, and the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt himself knows quite well that he is not telling the truth. He knows that Iraq has used chemical weapons, and he knows that we have not used them, and while I am speaking here a United Nations delegation is there trying to find out for themselves whether Iran has used chemical weapons or not. But before the results of the investigation come out, let me just tell everybody that we have never used chemical weapons and that it is a very close friend of Egypt, Iraq, which is using chemical weapons consistently.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran for his statement, and give the floor to the representative of Egypt.

Mr. ALFARARGI (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. President, I do not wish to waste the time of the Conference. However, very briefly, I would like to say that, if Iran has nothing to fear from the attendance of Iraq, it should allow Iraq to attend. If Iran has a just cause, it should know that the advocate of right and justice has nothing to fear if permission is granted for the opposing party to attend in order to make a statement.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Egypt for his statement. Are there any other speakers? I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Mr. SHAFII: (Islamic Republic of Iran): Very briefly, Mr. President, I just want to remind the distinguished Ambassador of Egypt that Iran does not fear the presence of anyone, including Iraq, in this Conference. We also at the same time do not fear to speak out the truth and to state our viewpoints as they are.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Are there any other speakers? I see none.

As there seems to be no other business, I intend to adjourn, but before adjourning I would just like to inform you that the Contact Group on the verification section of the Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament will meet immediately after the adjournment of this plenary meeting in room I.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 30 April at 10 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.