

FINAL RECORD OF THE EIGHTY-FIRST MEETING  
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 24 April 1980, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. L. SOLA VILA (Cuba)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria

Mr. A. SALAH-BEY

Mr. A. BENYAMINA

Argentina:

Mr. A. DUMONT

Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia:

Mr. A. BEHM

Ms. M. WICKES

Belgium:

Mr. A. ONKELINX

Mr. J-M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. P. VOUTOV

Mr. I. SOTIROV

Mr. K. PRAMOV

Mr. POPTCHEV

Burma:

U NGWE WIN

Canada:

Mr. D.S. McPHAIL

China:

Mr. LIANG Yu-Fan

Mr. YANG Hu-Shan

Mr. LO Ren-Shia

Mr. PAN Zhen-Chiang

Mr. XING Shie-Jie

Cuba:

Mr. L. SOLA VILA

Mr. F. ORTIZ

Mrs. V. BORODOWSKY JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. RUŽEK  
Mr. P. LUKES  
Mr. V. ROHAL-ILKIV

Egypt:

Mr. O. EL-SHAFEI  
Mr. M. EL-BARADEI  
Mr. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE  
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France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE  
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER  
Mr. M. GRACZINSKI  
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Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PFEIFFER  
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Hungary:

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Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. C.R. GHAREKHAN  
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. D.B. SULEMAN

Iran:

Mr. M. DABIRI  
Mr. D. AMERI

Italy:

Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO  
Mr. F. DE LUCA  
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Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA  
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Kenya:

Mr. S. SHITEMI  
Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mr. M. CACERES

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. L. ERDENECHULUUN  
Mr. BAYART

Morocco:

Mr. K. HADDAOUI  
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. R.H. FEIN  
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Nigeria:

Mr. O. ADENIJI  
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Pakistan:

Mr. M. AKRAM

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Mr. J. AURICH MONTERO

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA  
Mr. H. PAC  
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Romania:

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Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD  
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Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN  
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Mr. A.I. TIOURENKOV  
Mr. A.N. SERGUEYEV  
Mr. E.D. ZAITSEV  
Mr. E.K. POTYARKIN  
Mr. V.M. GANJA

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES  
Mr. N.H. MARSHALL

United States of America:

Mr. C. FLOWERREE  
Mr. M. DALEY  
Mr. S. FITZGERALD  
Mr. H. WILSON  
Mr. C.G. TAYLOR

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT  
Mrs. G. DA SILVA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. D. DJOKIC

Zaire:

Secretary of the Committee on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General

Mr. R. JAIPAL

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): Document CD/94 of 18 April 1980, submitted by the delegation of Belgium and entitled "Proposed definition of a chemical warfare agent and chemical munitions" is available to the Committee today. I also wish to inform the Committee that the following documents have been received and will be circulated shortly:

(a) Document CD/95, submitted by the delegation of Australia and entitled "An illustrative list of subjects which might be examined by the Committee on Disarmament in considering agenda item 1 'Nuclear test ban'";

(b) Document CD/96, submitted by the delegation of Poland and entitled "Ad Hoc Working Group on CW -- initial work programme: working document";

(c) Document CD/97, submitted by the delegation of Sweden and entitled "Working paper on the prohibition of chemical warfare capability".

Mr. ONKELINX (Belgium) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, my statement today -- and I must apologise somewhat for this -- will relate to the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The concern currently being voiced by the international community regarding the possible use of chemical weapons justifies the importance which my Government attaches to the early conclusion of a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

We welcome the decision of the Committee on Disarmament to set up a Working Group whose present terms of reference are to define the questions to be dealt with in negotiating this convention.

It is essential, now, that this Working Group should be able to start soon on the task we have entrusted to it.

In order to accomplish its task, the Working Group has at its disposal, in addition to three draft conventions submitted during the time of the CCD, several contributions made within the framework of the Committee, which reflect the desire of a large number of countries to make headway with these difficult negotiations.

I shall quote as the main examples of these contributions:

The joint Soviet-United States statement of 7 August 1979 (document CD/48) which, incidentally, we hope to see followed by a new joint initiative by these two States in the near future;

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

The various elements of appreciation with a view to elaborating a convention, as provided during the 1979 session of our Committee by the Netherlands, Italy, Poland and Finland; and

The conclusions of the workshops on verification organized by the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, and the Australian project for an informal meeting of the Committee with the participation of experts.

My delegation also wishes to make its contribution to this joint effort, especially with regard to the scope of a future treaty.

Details of these considerations are contained in document CD/94 which the Belgian delegation has just tabled in the Committee and on which it would welcome comments by members of the Committee.

I wish to point out also that several elements in our document are replies to specific items in the Netherlands questionnaire (CD/41). My delegation also reserves the right to refer to other points in this questionnaire in the light of decisions taken by the Committee and the Working Group on the procedural proposals presented by the Netherlands in its document CD/84.

Any approach to the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons must logically begin with a generally accepted definition of its essential component, a chemical agent, since there is no doubt that without a chemical agent a chemical weapon is inconceivable.

However, a chemical weapon cannot be adequately defined by reference to the chemical agent alone since it is essential to take into account the case of chemical weapons which may be obtained in complete form or the case of chemical weapons whose operation is based on new technological principles, such as binary weapons.

It is therefore necessary to define also what is meant by chemical munitions, and even by a complete chemical weapon in cases where means of dissemination other than conventional munitions are used.

Furthermore, it seems obvious to us that the definition must be conceived in its most general sense in order to cover all chemical weapons since a restrictive definition might, by an a contrario implication, legitimize the development, production and stockpiling of categories of chemical weapons which fell outside such a definition. Any convention should therefore, in our opinion, affirm the principle of a ban on all chemical weapons.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

The document submitted by my delegation defines the notion of a chemical warfare agent by specifying the method leading to the definition.

This method makes use of two complementary criteria which are, briefly: the general purpose of the agent; its toxicity, which is itself defined in terms of various complementary approaches.

The draft definition so elaborated reads:

"A chemical warfare agent is any chemical substance or any combination of chemical substances which is used by reason of its duly defined toxic properties, whether they are those of the substance itself or those of one of the final products of the combination."

As you will see, this definition takes into account inter alia the existence of binary weapons which, although they are a special case, do not constitute a separate category by reason of the general-purpose criterion which led in particular to the definition of the notion of chemical warfare agent and which also applies to the precursors.

The distinction between single-purpose agents and dual-purpose agents, which is implicit in the draft definition but would have to be spelt out in a convention, raises -- especially in the case of dual-purpose agents -- the problem of declaring stocks and placing them under the surveillance of a verification body which would be qualified to determine whether the size of the stocks detected was justified on grounds of protection and research in the case of single-purpose agents, and on adequate economic grounds in the case of dual-purpose agents.

As I said before, the definition of a chemical warfare agent does not suffice to cover the notion of chemical munitions and weapons. This is particularly evident from the fact that the problem of stockpiling chemical substances could be evaded by converting such substances into chemical weapons and stocking them in this form.

This leads us to define chemical munitions as being "any munitions in which the conventional charge is replaced either by a chemical substance or by a combination of chemical substances, and which are used by reason of their duly defined toxic properties, whether they are the properties of the chemical substance or those of the final product of the combination". To complete this definition,



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it should be specified further that the prohibition extends also to any method of dissemination involving a chemical charge whose characteristics fall within the definition of a chemical warfare agent. Also, an exception should be made for tear gases and grenades containing them, because of their role in the maintenance of order.

These, Mr. Chairman, are the considerations I wish to bring to the attention of the Committee on Disarmament in presenting document CD/94. I hope that they will constitute a positive contribution to the work of our Committee and of the Working Group which has just been set up.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, may I express, on behalf of my delegation, best wishes for the successful performance of the Committee on Disarmament during your Chairmanship in the current month of April. With your permission, my delegation would like today to make some comments on item 2 of our agenda, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". Since 1 February last year, this Committee has had before it a working paper submitted by a group of socialist countries (CD/4). That document elicited a mixed response from different members of the Committee. Among others, we might recall the considerations expounded by Mrs. Thorsson, on behalf of the Swedish delegation, when she urged the sponsors of CD/4 to translate their proposals into more specific terms. The Brazilian delegation also believes that a larger degree of specification is required for a meaningful consideration of this item. Pertinent suggestions were advanced by the Group of 21 and are contained in document CD/36. Unlike the treatment given to other items on its agenda, the Committee has been unable to discuss, let alone agree upon, the establishment of a working group on this subject.

We deem it worthwhile to stress that we are dealing here with the most important of all questions related to disarmament, the real raison d'être of the negotiations in which the international community has been involved for more than three decades. This is really what disarmament is all about: first and foremost, to do away with the most dangerous category of weapons ever invented, through negotiations aimed at the final objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The Committee on Disarmament should not lose sight of this goal, both because it has been singled out by the United Nations as the highest **priority** task and because it is incumbent upon the Committee, the single negotiating body as defined in the Final Document, to undertake negotiations to that end.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

Brazil has repeatedly stated its belief that disarmament negotiations are of paramount concern to all mankind, and hence that the community of nations has a right to participate in the deliberations related thereto, without any discrimination whatsoever. At the same time, however, we have witnessed a growing tendency for discussion, in ever dwindling circles of great Powers, of questions of the utmost importance for the world at large. Those negotiations, conducted in closed quarters, underscore of course the special responsibility borne by the nuclear-weapon Powers for nuclear disarmament; but it should not be forgotten that bilateral or trilateral negotiations on disarmament issues must be complementary to, and work to the advantage of, multilateral negotiations conducted in a broader context. Some sort of compatibility between the two types of negotiation should be found, lest the fate of disarmament continues to hinge precariously on the state of relations among the nuclear-weapon Powers and more particularly between the two super-Powers.

We thus welcome the opportunity to discuss the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament under the aegis of the CD. The fact that representatives of all five nuclear Powers are seated around this table enhances the prospects for success. But in order to engage in serious, substantive discussions on this matter, it is imperative that rhetorical politics be replaced by a genuine will to negotiate.

It should be taken for granted that the first task of the Committee on Disarmament is to find an acceptable basis for those negotiations. The very general terms in which existing proposals have so far been formulated must thus be refined so that the areas of negotiation are clearly spelled out. It should then be possible to arrive at a definition of the stages according to which each specific subitem could be agreed upon. In that exercise, it would be useful to keep in mind that the main goals to be sought are measures of real disarmament, as opposed to mere collateral measures of arms control, or non-armament. Certain arms control agreements have, instead, tended to ensure that the possibility of further technological improvement remains open, resulting inevitably in the continuous spiralling of the arms race at the highest level of nuclear sophistication. So far, the SALT agreements have not produced actual reductions of armaments, although there is promise that the next round would be meant to achieve progress in that direction. Brazil, like the overwhelming majority of United Nations Members, would hope that this promise be fulfilled without further delay.

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We would wish, for instance, to see concrete proposals on the actual freezing of the technological improvement of systems such as the carriers of nuclear weapons (ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, mobile systems and the like) or curbs on the increased accuracy of multiple-headed missiles, or checks on nuclear warfare budgets, and last, but not least, the reversion to exclusively peaceful purposes of the research and development of space technology. Similarly, concrete proposals on the freezing, reduction and ultimate destruction of specific types of nuclear weapons could be advanced in the context of nuclear disarmament. We would envisage an explicit characterization of weapons such as land-based, sea-launched or air-borne missiles and their respective warheads. Serious and responsible attention directed to such matters would certainly bring us closer to, and have a more direct bearing on, the achievement of the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament which has lately shown a tendency to be shrouded by the clouds of oblivion.

It is not by mere chance, or because of some oversight when pressing the voting button at the General Assembly, that the scores of resolutions passed over the years assign to general and complete disarmament the distinction of being the final objective of all disarmament endeavours. The Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament likewise corroborates the resolve of the international community, and is supposed to have provided additional impetus towards that direction. In all those documents, nuclear disarmament has been accorded the highest priority by the community of nations.

Other important international instruments also contain express mention of general and complete disarmament as the ultimate objective to be sought. It has never been possible, however, to obtain a firm, binding unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament. Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, for instance, does not embody anything more explicit than an undertaking by all Parties to "continue to pursue in good faith" negotiations on both counts. The major policy decision asked from all non-nuclear-weapon countries - to forego their sovereign right to the nuclear option -- cannot be balanced against the absence of a steadfast commitment to nuclear disarmament on the part of the nuclear-weapon Powers. Brazil, among other significant voices, has expressed its concerns even before 1968. We could recall, in this context, document ENDC/178

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of August 1966, which states the principles that should be embodied in a fair, balanced and equitable instrument to govern an effective and lasting non-proliferation régime. We consider that position to be as timely now as it was in the 1960s.

Brazil, for its part, has given ample international expression of its support for the utilization to the fullest extent of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes while at the same time unequivocally renouncing the acquisition of nuclear weapons. We have signed and ratified the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, and especially the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America of 1967, widely known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

I have dwelt on questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons for two main reasons which are, in our opinion, very relevant to our debate on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The first is that the international community is now increasingly concerned and disturbed by the continuous addition of newer and even more sophisticated systems to the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon Powers, and especially of the super-Powers. Agreements on arms control arrived at between them seem to have had an effect diametrically opposite to the objectives avowedly sought. The second reason is that negotiations on nuclear disarmament aimed at stopping and reversing the current escalation must be brought back to the very centre of our preoccupations in this Committee. Serious discussion and negotiation on nuclear disarmament have long been discarded and neglected because of their alleged complexity. The cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament is the synonym to vertical non-proliferation, a theme that has been remarkably absent from disarmament talks, both bilateral and multilateral. The continuance of unchecked vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and the enforcement of an international régime of horizontal non-proliferation do not seem, in the long run, to be compatible with each other.

To achieve progress in nuclear disarmament, which we regard as the most pressing and important issue at hand, it is indispensable that the nuclear-weapon Powers display the political will to negotiate multilaterally on effective measures of nuclear disarmament. Differences of outlook among the five nuclear-weapon Powers should be quickly resolved. General formulations should be scrutinized, specified and detailed, so that the Committee on Disarmament may start dealing with specific, realistic and negotiable proposals from nuclear-weapon Powers and from the non-nuclear-weapon nations alike. Rhetoric is not, and can never be, a substitute for disarmament.

Mr. GARCÍA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): In paragraph 124 of the Final Document on its first special session devoted to disarmament, the United Nations General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to set up "an advisory board of eminent persons, selected on the basis of their personal expertise and taking into account the principle of equitable geographical distribution," to advise him on various aspects of studies to be made under the auspices of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and arms limitation, including a programme of such studies.

The Advisory Board to which the General Assembly referred was established by the Secretary-General shortly thereafter and held its first session in November 1978, at which it discussed, inter alia, the purposes to be served by United Nations studies in the area of disarmament and arms limitation and agreed that these include:

- "(I) Assisting in ongoing negotiations on disarmament and arms limitation;
- (II) Assisting in the identification of specific topics with a view to initiating new negotiations;
- (III) Providing the general background to current deliberations and negotiations;
- (IV) Assessing and promoting public awareness of, the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race and its impact both on international security and development."

In 1979, the Board held its second and third sessions and, in discussing the functions entrusted to it, came to the conclusion that the task of elaborating the comprehensive programme of disarmament studies must be a continuing process, conducted in the light of the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The Board nevertheless expressed the opinion that, while it should adopt an integrated approach to this task pending the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, its recommendations could cover only some specific topics, which would have to be selected on the basis of priorities.

The Board also confirmed the conclusion it had reached at its first session, namely, that it could itself generate proposals to the Secretary-General for study, although it was mindful of the constraints on the number of studies that could

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

usefully be undertaken at the present time. Accordingly, the Board considered the various proposals for study submitted by its members and, after an extensive analysis of the arguments put forward by the sponsors of the proposals, agreed to recommend that only one study should be made -- a study on the subject of a nuclear test ban. That recommendation, which the Secretary-General endorsed, led to decision 34/422, which was adopted by the General Assembly on 11 December 1979 and in accordance with which the Committee on Disarmament received, last week, the study on a "comprehensive nuclear test ban" (CD/86), which was prepared by the four consultant experts referred to therein with the assistance of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament.

A thorough examination of the study proves beyond any doubt how sensible it was of the Board to recommend its preparation. Indeed, having made a careful selection of the very abundant material available, its authors have produced a 30-page report containing a clear and methodical synthesis of the main elements that have to be taken into account in order to attain what is rightly described in the introduction as "a prime objective of the United Nations in the field of disarmament". In our opinion, the study will be extremely valuable both for the negotiations which, we hope, will soon be starting again at the multilateral level and as a means of providing international public opinion with accurate information.

It is in no way my intention to comment on the contents of the document to which I have been referring. Its relative brevity should in itself be an invitation to read it in full, not once, but several times, since, even if the foreword and the annexes are added to the 30 pages constituted by the study as such, the total amounts to only 53 pages. I will merely mention some of the many facts and opinions that are stated in the study and that warrant attention because of their particular significance:

1. Noting that no other question in the field of disarmament has been the subject of so much international concern, discussion, study and negotiation as that of stopping nuclear-weapon tests, that it has been a separate item on the agenda of the General Assembly every year since 1957 and that the General Assembly has adopted 36 resolutions on it, i.e. far more than on any other disarmament topic, the authors of the study conclude, in paragraph 60, that:

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

"In spite of all these actions by the General Assembly, including the adoption of seven resolutions condemning nuclear-weapon tests and just as many requesting that the highest priority be given to a comprehensive test ban, the international community is still waiting for the comprehensive test-ban treaty. Testing is continuing notwithstanding 24 resolutions urging that all nuclear-weapon tests be suspended in all environments."

Further on, in paragraph 115, they refer in the following terms to three concessions made by one of the parties:

"The obstacles to effective negotiations among the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States on a comprehensive test ban seemed to have been removed in 1977, when those States agreed that on-site inspection to verify compliance with the treaty might be carried out under certain circumstances, that explosions for peaceful purposes would be covered by a protocol which would be an integral part of the treaty, and that participation of all nuclear-weapon Powers would not be required for the treaty to enter into force."

And, in the following paragraph, they conclude that:

"In considering those issues, it should be noted first that various reasons have been adduced to justify the continuation of nuclear-weapon testing. Among those most often propounded is that test explosions are necessary to maintain confidence in the reliability of the stockpiled weapons. In reply to this contention, highly qualified views have been advanced to the effect that the state of stockpiled nuclear weapons can be checked without nuclear testing. Even assuming that the nuclear weapons were subject to deterioration, any such deterioration would affect the arsenals of all nuclear-weapon Powers. Moreover, experts who have studied the problem consider that the less confidence there is in nuclear weapons, the less would be the temptation to rely on them."

2. The trilateral negotiations between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, which culminated in the instrument commonly known as the partial test-ban Treaty, lasted only ten days, from 15 to 25 July 1963. The explanation for the rapidity of those negotiations which is all the more extraordinary if one compares it to the more than 20 years spent unsuccessfully trying to achieve a general prohibition, is given unambiguously in paragraphs 48 to 51 of the experts' study, which read as follows:

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"By 1963, the USSR and the United States had already carried out extensive series of tests in the atmosphere and knew that testing underground, which would be continued, could provide most of the information required for further nuclear-weapon development. That facilitated, to a large extent, the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty.

"In practice, the partial test-ban Treaty did not slow down the nuclear arms race among the major nuclear Powers, except to the extent that it placed technical constraints on the underground testing of large thermonuclear weapons.

"After the signing of the Treaty, the rate of testing, in fact, increased. Of 1,221 nuclear explosions reported to have been conducted between 1945 and 1979, 488 were carried out in the 18 years preceding the conclusion of the Treaty, and 733 in the 16 years after the signing of the Treaty. Thus, the rate of testing was, on average, 45 per year after the Treaty as compared to 27 per year before it. The three nuclear Powers party to the partial test-ban Treaty, namely, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States, account for more than 90 per cent of all nuclear explosions.

"Despite the commitment to pursue a comprehensive test ban, no actual negotiations took place for a decade."

3. The paragraphs concerning a comprehensive test ban in the statement made by the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 29 February 1972 -- paragraphs which, I note in passing, the delegation of Mexico took the liberty of quoting in full in its statement on 21 June 1979 (CD/PV.34) -- are, with good reason, reproduced in the appendix to the study. Of these paragraphs, there is no doubt that those which are the most relevant to any negotiations on this topic are the following:

"When one takes into account the existing means of verification by seismic and other methods, and the possibilities provided by international procedures of verification such as consultation, inquiry and what has come to be known as 'verification by challenge' or 'inspection by invitation', it is difficult to understand further delay in achieving agreement on an underground test ban.

"In the light of all these considerations, I share the inescapable conclusion that the potential risks of continuing underground nuclear weapon tests would far outweigh any possible risks from ending such tests."

In addition, the Secretary-General's foreword to the study contains the following emphatic and unequivocal statement:



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"In my first statement to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in 1972, I stated the belief that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem had been so fully explored that only a political decision was necessary in order to achieve agreement. I still hold that belief. The problem can and should be solved now."

In 1972 the same high international official had stated that:

"The widespread impatience and dissatisfaction of the non-nuclear-weapon States with the failure of the nuclear Powers to stop nuclear-weapon tests has been clearly demonstrated ...".

The following statement in paragraph 15 of the study which we have just received quite amply bears out that well-founded opinion:

"As a result of the failure to stop nuclear weapon testing, many States became disillusioned and increasingly discontented. Non-nuclear-weapon States in general came to regard the achievement of a comprehensive test ban as a litmus test of the determination of the nuclear-weapon States to halt the arms race."

My delegation considers that, in a year like this, when the second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is to be held, assessments such as the two which I have just quoted should not be disregarded by the three nuclear-weapon States, which act as the depositaries of the Treaty. We believe that they should do not only the possible but even the impossible to ensure that, during the summer session, a working group of the Committee on Disarmament can be established to negotiate a draft treaty on a comprehensive nuclear test ban taking into account the elements transmitted to it as the outcome of the trilateral negotiations.

It should not be forgotten that, in the preamble to this Treaty, emphasis was placed on the need to "achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time" and that, in article VI, commitments were made relating to the "cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament".

It is essential also to bear constantly in mind the fact that, when negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty began, the General Assembly insisted that an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers was an indispensable element for ensuring that the non-proliferation régime would be acceptable to all.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): I should like to associate my delegation with those who have extended a warm welcome to you in your capacity as Chairman of the Committee for the month. It must be gratifying to you, as it is to my delegation, that your term of office has finally seen agreement on the outstanding points enabling the four Working Groups of this Committee to get under way.

I should like today to take the opportunity, before this spring session of the Committee closes, to make a few remarks on the subject of new weapons of mass destruction and radiological weapons. We have listened with interest to a number of interventions on both topics during recent plenary meetings.

My delegation, in a statement made in July last year, welcomed the joint initiative of the United States and Soviet Union in tabling the major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. On that occasion we asked a number of questions about the draft, and we look forward to a full discussion in the Radiological Weapons Working Group of these points together with those raised by other delegations.

In further considering the joint draft, and in listening to the remarks made by other delegations, one or two other thoughts have occurred to us, which it seems appropriate to feed into our discussion at this stage.

Firstly, with regard to article II, paragraph 2, of the proposed draft treaty, we have heard concern expressed that the use as a weapon of radioactive material produced by an underground explosion would continue to be permitted. In our view, this is only a marginal problem. It would in practice be extremely difficult to collect such material, and, in any event, once any material thus collected was attached to a delivery system, it would immediately come under the prohibition in paragraph 1 of the same article of the treaty.

Similarly, while we fully understand and share the view expressed by a number of our colleagues that this treaty should not proscribe or limit the peaceful uses of radioactive material, we do not think that this need be a serious concern. It is clear from articles II and III of the United States/USSR draft that the treaty applies only to those uses of radioactivity which cause --I quote --"destruction, damage or injury", and article V specifically excludes peaceful uses from the scope of the treaty. Article V might, however, be strengthened by the addition of a sentence to provide explicitly for the exchange of information between States, on the lines of article III, paragraph 2, of the ENMOD Treaty.

On article VII, of the draft, we should be interested in due course to hear the reasons for the listing of certain treaties in the arms control field. In

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

particular, we are not entirely sure why the Geneva Protocol of 1925 has been singled out here for specific mention.

Finally, with regard to article XI, we should be content to accept the period of ten years which it is suggested should elapse before a review conference of the treaty is held. Bearing in mind the increasing number of arms control meetings which are now being held, we consider that such a period is not unreasonable for a treaty which, we judge, will be likely to cause very few problems in its operation.

I should like to turn now to the much broader subject of a prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction. The Committee will be aware from interventions by my delegation, both here and at the United Nations, that the British Government like others holds strongly to the view that it would be a most serious and regrettable matter if any new kinds of weapons of mass destruction were invented and deployed for use. For this reason, we have twice co-sponsored resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly urging States to refrain from the development of such weapons, and asking this Committee to maintain a watch on this matter.

The Committee has heard a proposal, most recently in a slightly revised form by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union on 1 April, that this Committee should establish an expert group on this subject. My delegation believes that members of this Committee should ask themselves very carefully what would be the purpose of such a body. As regards the need to monitor the possible emergence of new weapons of mass destruction, we note that although time has been allotted for the discussion of the subject in the past three sessions of the CD and the CCD, contributions have been few and no substantial evidence of any kind has been put forward to indicate that there are or even could be new weapons of mass destruction in prospect.

Another task proposed for the expert group would be to prepare the draft of a comprehensive agreement on the subject. Here my delegation would like to know how one could negotiate a comprehensive agreement on what would still be a hypothetical subject-matter, since by definition the intention would be to legislate for weapons which had not yet been invented. My delegation have always adhered to the view -- which we have not heard contested -- that if disarmament treaties are to be a basis of real international confidence, they need to be specific in scope, and susceptible of carefully worked out procedures for their verification. It seems to us therefore that a treaty dealing with hypothetical weapons could not fulfil these requirements. A further role envisaged for the expert group would be to prepare specific agreements on individual types of weapons of mass destruction which might be identified. This activity certainly makes good sense in principle as a contribution to arms control

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

in general, but in practice it would depend upon the identification of particular weapons. As I have already said, no such weapons have so far been identified. If in the course of our periodical reviews of the subject this Committee were to identify a potential new weapon of mass destruction, then, and only then, in our view would this task become possible and appropriate. My delegation is accordingly inclined to think that the proposal to establish an expert group is still premature.

Mr. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, may I extend to you my congratulations on your assumption of the Chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the current month. At the same time, my thanks go to the Chairman for the last month, Ambassador Yu Pei-Wen. He and his predecessor, Ambassador McPhail, made the necessary preparations in order to enable you, Mr. Chairman, to announce the Chairmen for the four Working Groups which the Committee decided to set up at an earlier stage of its work.

My delegation appreciates the fact that consensus has been reached on the nomination of the Chairmen for the Working Groups for 1980. We will, in the remaining days, join the common efforts to make up for the time we have lost by the somewhat protracted consultations on that question. We hope that it will be possible during these days to mark out the lines along which we can proceed with the actual work in the Working Groups during the summer session.

My delegation has refrained from taking up in the plenary issues on our agenda which, we felt, could be dealt with better in the Working Groups. I may refer to my statement on 25 March in the Plenary that we will make more detailed comments in the course of the discussions in the Working Groups.

Having expressed my appreciation of the final establishment of the Working Groups, I will not hide my delegation's disappointment that it has so far not been possible to decide on the question of the invitation of non-members wanting to address the Committee. It is to be deplored that countries which have already given proof of their interest and their dedication, and which have shown that they can give substantial contributions to the cause of disarmament, could not be given the chance so far to take an active part in the work of the Committee on Disarmament. It is, in our view, most unfortunate that linkings have been created which, taking into account the mandate of the Committee on Disarmament, cannot in our opinion be justified.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and take note of the request on which the Committee will subsequently decide. As the Chair has already pointed out, I am in your hands to take this matter further.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation would like today to comment on some statements made at the Committee's last meeting.

The head of the United States delegation made a statement on the use of chemical weapons. As we know, this question is not a new one, but was frequently raised by the world public during the years of the war by the United States against Viet Nam, when United States forces made extensive use of chemical weapons against the peoples of Indochina, with grievous consequences which are to this day being experienced not only by the Vietnamese but also by many United States Servicemen who took part in the war. And now this question has arisen again. Facts regarding the use of chemical weapons by counter-revolutionary forces in Afghanistan have recently been cited also in a declaration of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan issued on 11 April 1980 (CD/89).

How did the United States delegation respond to this? In the first place it repeated the slanderous fabrications regarding the use of chemical weapons by Soviet forces in Afghanistan, but did not at the same time provide any -- I repeat, any -- evidence.

In its statement, references were made once again to various press reports. What kind of reports these were, and what value they have, will be clear from some examples which we take the liberty of quoting. The following is one example. A man named Miller, a Hong Kong correspondent of the United States agency, United Press International, who for some unknown reason had turned up in Afghanistan, quoted a so-called "eye-witness" of the use of chemical weapons by Soviet aircraft in the province of Kunar as saying that gas had come into the house where he was and he had fallen down and gone to sleep and did not wake up for two hours and that, when he woke up, he had no idea where he was.

Obviously realizing how shaky the evidence of this "eye-witness" was, Miller added in his report that the actual occurrence of the raid, which was alleged to have taken place on 22 February, could not be confirmed from independent sources.

Another example. The New York Post recently reported that it was in possession of fragmentary reports of what it described as the use of toxic chemicals by Soviet forces. Some days later The New York Times reproduced the same information, citing certain unnamed Russian acquaintances.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

What can one say of all these reports, which are disseminated by United States mass media and then find their way into other organs of the press which are thirsty for any anti-Soviet sensation or rumour? In the East, there is a saying that: "You can't hide a camel under a cloak". In the same way, lies cannot be represented as the truth, even if they are disseminated by newspapers with a claim to seriousness.

The head of the United States delegation in the Committee on Disarmament was unable to think of anything better, in support of his imaginary theory about the use of chemical weapons by Soviet forces in Afghanistan, than to refer to a statement by his colleague in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. Such a reference is unlikely to convince anyone, since it would be difficult to imagine that a statement by a representative of the United States Government in a neighbouring room would differ from a statement made in this room. But we would like to draw attention to another matter. In the above-mentioned statement in the Commission on Human Rights, no facts were cited either, but mention was made of reports to the effect that "Soviet or co-operating Afghan forces may have" -- I stress -- "may have used lethal chemical agents ...". Detailed evidence on this matter, to which the United States representative in the Commission on Human Rights vaguely referred, was not of course provided in his statement either.

Lastly, even the United States representative in our Committee stated openly himself that "the world does not yet possess final conclusive physical evidence of the use of lethal chemical agents" by Soviet forces in Afghanistan. In that case, one wonders why the United States side considers it possible to indulge in speculation on this issue, poisoning the atmosphere in the Committee on Disarmament and elsewhere.

Another important conclusion which arises from the statement by the United States delegation is that in essence the statement contains an admission of the possibility of the use, by bands of mercenaries in Afghanistan, of chemical weapons manufactured in the United States of America. The United States representative stated outright that in the past the United States had supplied and sold certain chemical agents to Governments with which it had security relationships. He did, it is true, say that the United States side had no knowledge that such United States manufactured agents had been transferred to bands of mercenaries. But the answer to this question is given by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan whose armed forces, after defeating a group of counter-revolutionaries in the Herat Province area, seized from it chemical hand grenades manufactured in the United States.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

To avoid making baseless statements, such as those made by persons who concoct reports of various kinds about the use of chemical weapons by Soviet forces, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan held a press conference at which it displayed hand grenades marked: "Manufactured in the Federal Laboratory, Salisbury, Pennsylvania, USA, 1973.". The effect of these chemical agents on animals was also demonstrated. Frankly, we do not altogether understand the irony that was evident in the statement of the United States Ambassador when he referred to the demonstration of the harmful effect of the chemical agents on animals. Was he expecting, perhaps, that the effect of chemical weapons manufactured in the United States of America would be demonstrated on human beings?

The United States representative ventured to describe this press conference as "a spectacle", and sought to throw doubt on the incontrovertible reliability of the facts referred to above.

In case anyone has doubts in this regard, let me quote document CD/89 which states that:

"The Government of Afghanistan expresses readiness to investigate and examine, along with competent international authorities, the use and the functioning of these American-made grenades and show how these exported mercenaries use them against peaceful populations."

Lastly, some words about the tone of the statement by the United States delegation. It was delivered in a rude manner; it was full of attacks of various kinds against my country and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and its tone was angry and irritated. But we know the head of the United States delegation in the Committee to be a calm and even-tempered man. All one can say, then, is: "Jupiter, you are angry; that means you are in the wrong".

Comrade Chairman, a few words now on the statement by the representative of China. We have the impression that he did not understand the essence of the critical comments made by the representative of Poland, Ambassador Sujka, about the Chairman of the Committee for March.

The Soviet delegation wholeheartedly supports the comments by the Polish delegation. The Chairman of the Committee in March did serious harm to the work of the Committee by distributing document CD/76 without consulting the Committee, although he was fully aware that on this document there can be no consensus in the Committee, if only because the group of criminal individuals who claim to represent the non-existent "Democratic Kampuchea" are not recognized by a considerable majority of States members of the Committee -- the socialist countries, many of the non-aligned countries, and many Western States. Knowing as we do that the head of the Chinese

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

delegation is an experienced diplomat, we cannot believe he was so naive as to fail to realize that an impasse would thereby be created in the Committee -- particularly since, as has later become known, he was warned in advance of such a likelihood.

None of the previous eight Chairmen of the Committee has ever once permitted himself to give instructions for the distribution of a document on which divisions of opinion might arise in the Committee. As is known, it was precisely in March 1980 that a situation of this kind arose for the first time in the Committee. Thus, by distributing a deliberately controversial document, the Chairman for March set a dangerous precedent which, as was to be expected, has for long diverted the Committee's attention from the consideration of substantive questions of disarmament.

What is more, for the first time ever in all the practice of the Committee's work on disarmament, the Chinese delegation blocked the participation, in the Committee's work, of a State that is not a member of this body. In this respect, too, the Chinese delegation created a dangerous precedent which has already done great damage to the authority of the Committee. Moreover, this was done in respect of a State whose participation in the work of the Committee in 1979 was not contested by anyone. Last year all 39 members of the Committee on Disarmament supported the request of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam; and it took part in the work of the Committee. The injustice and the discriminatory nature of China's position are all the more evident in view of the fact that the State concerned is a State which has been the victim of extensive use of chemical weapons and which understandably has something to say on the question of the actual consequences and the enormous danger of the use of such weapons.

With regard to the nature and role of the temporary presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, a topic which in truth has no relationship to the work of the Committee on Disarmament but is nevertheless a favourite topic in statements by the Chinese delegation, we would like to make the following comments.

Soviet forces in Afghanistan are performing the same internationalist duty in providing assistance to the Afghan people in its struggle against external and internal forces of counter-revolution as they did in 1945 when they assisted the Chinese people in its struggle against external and internal forces of reaction. As is known, the part played by the Soviet Army in the liberation of North-East China, and its temporary presence on Chinese territory for that purpose, were greatly appreciated by the People's Republic of China and by the Chinese people.

It would seem that the Chinese delegation -- yes, and not only they -- might do well to remember this page of history, and also the history of the struggle for recognition of the legitimate rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, to which we have already referred.



(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In his statement on 5 February the head of the Chinese delegation said that: "China has now decided to take part in the work of the Committee as from this year, and we are ready to join all of you in the deliberations actively and do our share for progress in genuine disarmament and for the cause of peace."

Three months have passed since that statement was made. Frankly speaking, we have not noticed any constructive steps or proposals by the Chinese delegation. Instead, on every convenient, or inconvenient occasion, during the general debate or in the discussion on questions of chemical weapons, or during the consideration of organizational matters, we constantly hear anti-Soviet outbursts. I would ask the Chinese representatives: have there not been enough of these attacks, is it not time to stop? Or is this what the Chinese delegation regards as its contribution to the work of the Committee?

We hope that the Chinese delegation will at last understand that the Committee on Disarmament is a serious body which exists for the purpose of conducting constructive negotiations on the most urgent problem of our times, the problem of disarmament, and not for systematically and tediously rending the air with anti-Soviet outbursts.

Comrade Chairman, in the letter from A.A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, addressed to Mr. K. Waldheim, Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the tasks of the Second Disarmament Decade, it is emphasized that the Soviet Union considers that in the present complicated international situation it is extremely important not to weaken but, on the contrary, to stimulate the efforts of all peace-loving States to strengthen peace, to eliminate the threat of war, and to achieve concrete measures in curbing the arms race and achieving disarmament.

The Soviet Union has on a number of occasions declared that it is willing to limit and prohibit any types of weapons on a mutual basis, by agreement with other States, and of course without impairment of anyone's security and on terms of complete reciprocity between States possessing the armaments concerned.

In the light of this position, the Soviet delegation gives full support to the proposal made at the last meeting by Ambassador Gharekhan, the representative of India, for the establishment within the Committee, of a working group on questions of nuclear disarmament. We would also like to confirm that the Soviet delegation does not object either to the establishment of a working group on a nuclear tests ban, in which all nuclear Powers would take part and which would have the task of discussing questions relating to a complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

Mr. ALLISON (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, on behalf of my delegation I wish to state how very pleased we are to see you in the Chair for the month of April and to pledge our continued support for the remainder of your tenure. We also wish to congratulate you on the strenuous personal efforts you have made to resolve some of the more thorny problems of this Committee. As we know, it takes the barking of the strong and the pleadings of the weak to create a balance in the world. My delegation believes that the answer to the accusations and counter-accusations by the pinnacle of power in the world is complete disarmament.

I am taking the floor this morning in my capacity as the current Co-ordinator of the Group of 21 to reiterate the Group's position on the question of a comprehensive test ban treaty which is on our agenda for this week.

I would like to draw the attention of the Committee to a statement made on behalf of the Group on 4 March 1980 by Mr. Shitemi of Kenya, and also contained in document CD/72, in which the Group of 21 referred to its statement of 27 February 1980 (CD/64) on the establishment of working groups which, it declared, provided the best available machinery for the conduct of concrete negotiations within the Committee. The Group then went on to urge "that a working group be established on the item on the Committee's agenda entitled 'Nuclear test ban' during the first part of its 1980 session", that is, during this spring session if possible.

The Group would like to stress here that it is still of this conviction that an ad hoc working group on a nuclear test ban should be established without any further delay. We have seized every opportunity to emphasize the urgency and importance of concluding a comprehensive test ban treaty. This sense of urgency is shared by the international community as expressed in General Assembly resolution 34/73 that urges negotiations on a CTBT as a matter of the highest priority.

The three nuclear-weapon States participating in the preparatory talks on a CTBT have a special responsibility to bring their negotiations to a positive and early conclusion in conformity with the will of the General Assembly. The Group of 21 requests the three negotiators to submit to the Committee a detailed report on the state of their endeavour. However, we are of the view that negotiations within the Committee do not necessarily have to await the report of the trilateral talks.

The Group notes the proposal by ~~one~~ of the delegations for the Committee on Disarmament to commence work on the institutional and administrative aspects of an international seismic monitoring network. However, the Group of 21 is of the view that the basic mandate of all working groups should be to undertake concrete negotiations for the implementation of agreed measures called for in the

(Mr. Allison, Nigeria)

Final Document. Therefore, an ad hoc working group on a CTB should focus concretely on the central issues of a CTB rather than on secondary issues that could appropriately be dealt with by a technical committee or sub-groups created by the working group.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I would like to quote from the foreword by the Secretary-General, Dr. Kurt Waldheim, to the report on a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CD/86):

"In my first statement to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in 1972, I stated the belief that all technical and scientific aspects of the problem had been so fully explored that only a political decision was necessary in order to achieve agreement. I still hold to that belief. The problem can and should be solved now."

This is a view which the report itself bears out; and it is our conviction in the Group of 21 that this Committee has the political will to carry it out.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Nigeria for the statement made on his own behalf and on behalf of the Group of 21. I am sure that the Committee will take note of that statement for all appropriate purposes.

Mr. TERREFE (Ethiopia): Comrade Chairman, I would like to state very briefly the views of my delegation with regard to the topic on our agenda, "Nuclear test ban". Since the capability to produce nuclear weapons has continued to proliferate with the spread of nuclear technology, the issue of a nuclear test ban indeed goes to the heart of the disarmament question.

The report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (CD/86) on a comprehensive nuclear test ban which was submitted to the Committee last week traces the history of the subject, and reveals inter alia that the partial test-ban treaty, which took some five years of negotiations, did not slow down the nuclear arms race among the major nuclear Powers. As has already been stated by the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, the rate of testing has in fact increased. Of the 1,221 nuclear explosions reported to have been conducted between 1945 and 1979, 488 were carried out in the 18 years preceding the conclusion of the Treaty and 733 in the 16 years after the signing of the Treaty.

Similarly, strategic nuclear arsenals continue to grow to the point that at present there are reported to be over 17,000 nuclear-warheads possessed by the five nuclear-weapon States. Added to these facts, the growing confrontation between the major nuclear Powers and the increasingly dangerous situations arising, particularly

(Mr. Terrefe, Ethiopia)

in the areas of the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, as well as the adoption of plans for the deployment of new types of medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe and the delay of the SALT II ratification, are eroding détente and increasing mutual suspicions.

The trilateral negotiating parties for a comprehensive test ban have not as yet submitted their report to the Committee. Considering the highest priority allocated to the subject by the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as well as the relevant General Assembly resolutions, the Group of 21 has called for the setting up of a working group on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, which my delegation had supported.

I also wish to reiterate the support of my delegation for the initiative advanced in this direction by the socialist countries in document CD/4, which remains a valuable contribution to the discussion on this subject.

In February last year the Ethiopian delegation expressed its strong desire that the Committee on Disarmament should consider the proposals contained in CD/4 which proposed that consultations and negotiations should be undertaken on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they are completely destroyed. Developing countries which constitute the overwhelming majority of the world population aspire to end the arms race and to reduce the confrontation among the nuclear Powers. It is disconcerting for us that the threat of the use of force as a means of settling international disputes is on the increase. These are sufficient reasons to initiate serious and immediate negotiations in the CD on a priority basis with a view to an early conclusion of a treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

Comrade Chairman, with your permission, I would like to say a word about the work of the Committee. My delegation views with regret the obstructionist tendencies that are becoming too apparent in the work of the Committee. It is unfortunate that we have allowed extraneous issues to divert our energies and delay the work of the Committee, particularly as regards the participation of non-member States in the work of the Committee. In the guise of discussing the procedural aspect of our work, some members are bent on airing thorny problems which do not fall within the Committee's purview.

Since a number of delegations have stated their positions on the question of Kampuchea's representation, I would like to place on record that my Government recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea as the legitimate representative of the people of Kampuchea.

(Mr. Terrefe, Ethiopia)

In conclusion, Comrade Chairman, I would like to take cognizance of the constant and untiring efforts that you have devoted to reaching consensus in the selection of the Chairmen of the four Ad Hoc Working Groups, one of which has already started its work.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): My statement today will consist of two parts, the first part on behalf of my delegation and the second part on behalf of a group of countries for which I act as co-ordinator during this period.

It will come as a surprise to nobody that in my opening remarks I should re-state once again that the Netherlands Government attaches great importance to the early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. But if we keep repeating this, as so many others here in this Committee and elsewhere do, it is because we hold that a CTB would constitute not only a major achievement in the field of arms control and disarmament, but also it should be achievable at short notice. The eminent importance of a CTB treaty to the slowing down of the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, is self-evident.

We have stated on several previous occasions, here in this Committee and also in the United Nations General Assembly, that the conclusion of a CTB should not be made dependent on ratification of SALT II. On 5 February this year my delegation remarked:

"As we have pointed out on previous occasions, both here in the Committee on Disarmament and in the United Nations General Assembly, the possibility that SALT II might not be ratified in the near future makes it all the more necessary that a comprehensive test ban be concluded as soon as possible."

The United Nations General Assembly too has passed numerous resolutions calling for a speedy conclusion of a CTB. Apart from slowing down the nuclear arms race by reducing the possibilities for the development of new nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States, an adequate CTB treaty would also constitute an inducement to non-nuclear-weapon States, which are so inclined, to refrain from the development of nuclear weapons. This additional advantage of a CTB has not been denied by the three nuclear Powers involved in the trilateral negotiations.

So, it would seem that, if unfortunately a CTB should fail to materialize, then we must fear that not only disarmament will suffer, but also other measures of arms control, including our efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons.

It is in this perspective that the CD must consider its responsibilities and its possible rôle as a serious, multilateral negotiating forum. We are of the opinion, and I am sure this opinion is shared by most if not all in this Committee, that the CD cannot afford to remain passive with regard to such an important issue. We have to develop a suitable rôle for the CD with regard to CTB.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

It would seem to us that the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts points in the right direction and we should explore whether further activities in that direction would be useful and desirable. The very interesting and constructive proposal put forward by the Australian delegation and supported by Canada should also be considered since, in our view too, those activities might constitute a sound basis on which to proceed.

We have listened with particular attention to the very interesting statement made by Mr. Behm of the Australian delegation on Tuesday; we would encourage Australia to pursue this line and my delegation will certainly study the matter and revert to it at a later stage.

In order to allow the CD to fulfil the constructive rôle required from it, but also in view of the Second NPT Review Conference, it is essential that the three negotiating parties submit a substantial report to the CD within the near future. This report should contain adequate information not only on progress achieved, but also on the nature of the outstanding problems.

As to the verification problems, we appreciate that the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union will require certain additional, trilateral arrangements regarding certain aspects of verification, but this should not prevent the CTBT from being basically a multilateral treaty; this is essential if the CTB is to be sufficiently significant to other States for them to adhere to the Treaty. If not, the CTB will lose part of its value as an arms control measure.

Therefore, only if the CTB is developed as a truly multilateral instrument, will it have an impact on the non-proliferation régime. A CTBT that has an insufficiently multilateral character runs the risk of receiving little support and adherence from other States, both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States.

This is the reason why the Netherlands has repeatedly stressed the importance of ensuring that verification must be a matter that concerns all parties to the Treaty, and not only the three nuclear-weapon States that are presently negotiating, although we do recognize -- as I already said -- that those three States might require some additional, trilateral arrangements.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

In so far as such additional, trilateral verification arrangements are concluded, the technical data obtained under those arrangements should also be fed into the multilateral verification system, available to the international community of all parties to the treaty.

To sum up, the point I am trying to make is the following.

Firstly, if the CTB is to have its full, beneficial effect, it should not be presented to the international community on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, but it should be presented in a manner which makes it clear that it is a truly international commitment, engaging not only the three initial negotiating parties, but the whole international community.

Secondly, the most important, practical link through which a CTB can thus engage the international community in its totality is through the verification of the treaty obligations. If the verification were to have a predominantly trilateral character and consequently remained beyond the grasp of the international community, it seems doubtful whether such a highly desirable link would come into existence, since many States might see no reason to join the treaty.

Thirdly, the proper instrument to forge that link and therefore to turn the CTB into a truly international instrument, engaging the whole international community, is this multilateral negotiating body, the Committee of Disarmament.

Here lies our duty. We trust that the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States will allow us to do our duty. We trust that the members of the Committee are willing to do their duty. Our duty lies in helping to develop a truly international verification system for the CTB. How to go about this? As I have already indicated before, it seems to us that the international seismic network now being prepared by the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts would offer a sound base for multilateral verification. So as to waste no time, the CD should see to it that this international seismic network, as well as the required data centres, are developed as far as possible at the time of the completion of a CTB treaty. The usefulness of such a system would be enhanced by experimental exercises of the international seismic network or parts thereof. Another way of asserting the rôle and responsibilities of the CD would be along the lines of the Australian proposals, as I already mentioned. The Netherlands delegation supports the appeals made in this context by the distinguished Ambassador of Japan on 28 February and 6 March 1980.

(Mr. Foin, Netherlands)

As to the other aspects of a CTB treaty I have the following brief observations:

The duration of the CTB treaty should ideally be unlimited. However, as long as participation by other nuclear-weapon States is uncertain, acceptance of an unlimited duration seems unlikely. On the other hand, a CTB treaty of too short a duration would not be very attractive to non-nuclear-weapon States since a treaty of which the duration would be limited to only a few years could not, from the arms control point of view, be considered as a very important measure.

It is obvious that, if by any chance a short-term CTB treaty were not to be renewed and the nuclear-weapon States were to resume testing, a quite unstable situation would ensue with perhaps even more participants in the nuclear arms race than before.

For this reason a CTB treaty of, in principle, unlimited duration is certainly preferable; its implementation could be reviewed after, say, five years; also renunciation could be provided for under certain specific circumstances.

Finally, I take pleasure in paying tribute to the authors of the recently published CTB study, circulated as document CD/86. In our opinion this report merits our gratitude. It is well conceived and well presented in a balanced way. We can go along, in principle, with the conclusions. It will be a useful source of reference and consultation.

I now wish to make a statement on behalf of the group of member States for which I act as spokesman during the present period. My delegation, and a number of others, believe that the Committee should consider as an urgent matter, at its next meeting, under the agenda item relating to requests for association with the work of the Committee at this session, the three requests of Austria, Denmark and Spain.

In previous discussions of this item, no negative views were expressed on these three requests.

It is therefore the view of the countries within the group in which I participate, and on whose behalf I make this joint statement, that the Committee should quickly reach a positive consensus on this matter. We consider it important that this step be taken before the conclusion of the first part of the session. Accordingly, we request that you include this item on the agenda of the Committee's next plenary meeting, so that these three requests will be disposed of as the urgent matter we believe this to be.

That is the end of the statement I was to make on behalf of the group which I represent. It is my personal hope that this matter will be dealt with in a constructive and forthcoming manner, befitting a negotiating body that is supposed to solve serious matters and difficult problems with mutual understanding.



The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): The whole Committee has heard the statement made on behalf of the Group of Western countries, and the Chairman also has taken note of it.

There are still a number of delegations on the list of speakers for today's meeting. It is now 12.55 p.m., and we do not think that there would be time to continue with the statements. Also, in accordance with the programme of work adopted by the Committee and its subsidiary bodies at our 80th plenary meeting, it was my intention to convene an informal meeting, immediately after the close of the present meeting, to discuss a nuclear test ban; this would be followed by an exchange of opinions on the question of the Committee's documentation and related matters on the basis of the document which has been prepared by the secretariat in the light of Ambassador Jaipal's statement, and has been distributed informally.

In addition, the Working Group on Radiological Weapons will begin its work at 3 o'clock this afternoon.

In view of the importance of the subjects and the short time remaining for the work of our spring session, I would like to suggest that we should resume our meeting at 4 p.m. and continue until 7 p.m.

If there is no objection, we will suspend the meeting until 4 p.m. today.

It is so agreed.

The meeting was suspended at 1 p.m. and resumed at 4.30 p.m.

Mr. SHITEMI (Kenya): Mr. Chairman, allow me on behalf of my delegation to congratulate you on your assumption of the Chairmanship of our Committee for the month of April. You have discharged your responsibility to our satisfaction. It is under your Chairmanship that we have been able to move quickly to the appointment of Chairmen for the four Ad Hoc Working Groups we created. We note with pleasure and satisfaction that one of those groups has already started working; and we take this opportunity to congratulate all the four Chairmen and assure them of our support.

Mr. Chairman, for over three decades now, the attention of the international community has been focused on the real danger posed not only by the presence of nuclear weapons in certain countries in the world but by the apparent escalation

(Mr. Shitemi, Kenya)

of the arms race, which has in turn increased tension in the world. This has encouraged many more nations than the five nuclear States to seek to own these horrible weapons. This is a situation that must not be allowed to get out of hand. As things stand now, the world is already on the precipice of the final abyss. We are living in an age of extreme peril. Human lives are endangered by the mismanagement of the natural resources and misuse of the knowledge we have inherited from human history. Since the Second World War, the world has witnessed war after war, and the victims of such wars are counted in millions; yet, in spite of the obvious danger humanity faces, we continue to be impervious to good counsel whereby we are urged to disarm or perish. These are situations created by our own short-sightedness and by our own greed.

Mr. Chairman, we need to take full stock of our assignment contained in General Assembly resolution 33/60 in which the CD is called upon to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty. This assignment, which was regarded by the General Assembly as of the highest priority, remains unfulfilled. This is because certain nations still believe that, the more the over-kill levels of nuclear weapons are exceeded and the effectiveness and accuracy of delivery systems of such nuclear weapons improved, the greater the deterrent. We believe this to be false. The late Admiral Earl Mountbatten stated in a speech given at Strasbourg on 11 May 1979, that -- and I quote:

"The Western powers and the USSR started by producing and stockpiling nuclear weapons as a deterrent to general war. The idea seemed simple enough. Because of the enormous amount of destruction that could be wreaked by a single nuclear explosion, the idea was that both sides in what we still see as an East-West conflict would be deterred from taking any aggressive action which might endanger the vital interests of the other ... . As a military man I can see no use for any nuclear weapons which would not end in escalation, with consequences that no one can conceive -- the nuclear arms race has no military purpose whatsoever. Wars cannot be fought with nuclear weapons. Their existence only adds to our perils because of the illusion they have generated ...".

As we sit here today, war weapons of unimaginable destructive capacity are being manufactured relentlessly and huge financial profits are earned out of this

(Mr. Shitemi, Kenya)

enterprise. The most "buoyant sector of the world's economy is the arms business. Annual sales of military equipment for both nuclear and conventional war, now amount to \$120 billion a year. World-wide, the technology of destruction gets more political attention and more public funds than most other social amenities. In pounds per person, the world has more explosive power than food" (from World military and social expenditures, 1979).

Mr. Chairman, something is terribly wrong with our priorities if we can spend more on the manufacture of explosive power than on food while nearly 650 million go hungry. We need to re-examine not only our priorities in terms of world security but our very moral fibre.

Paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament states inter alia that "the achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned." Last year this Committee received two proposals on nuclear disarmament -- document CD/4 from the socialist States and document CD/36/Rev.1 from the Group of 21. In our view, these two papers prepared the ground for further negotiations on nuclear disarmament: and yet, in spite of these efforts and the pleas from the General Assembly, this is one topic that remains floating as it were in the air. It is the only one we have not assigned to an ad hoc working group, and yet everything else hangs or falls on its fate.

Some delegations have suggested measures for a cut-off of the further production of fissionable material for weapon purposes and the transfer of stocks of such materials to useful purposes. Considering that such a cut-off measure would contribute to the efforts to promote non-proliferation, limit the production of nuclear weapons and facilitate nuclear disarmament, the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session transmitted this proposal to this Committee for negotiation. Although prospects for an early agreement halting the production of weapons-grade fissionable materials do not look very promising, all efforts must be directed to finding a lasting solution to this problem.

We urge the speeding-up of the trilateral negotiations and the formation of a CTB ad hoc working group to start negotiations to elaborate a treaty that would render any further testing of nuclear weapons illegal and outmoded. Without this

(Mr. Shitemi, Kenya)

more, we believe it will become increasingly difficult to stop nuclear proliferation. Several States with nuclear weapon capability are not yet parties and are not likely to become parties to the NPT, owing to what they regard as the discriminatory and unequal nature of the treaty and the slowness of the implementation of articles IV and VI.

Mr. Chairman, there are in our midst nations that still follow the old Roman saying: "If you desire peace, prepare for war." If I may quote once again from Earl Mountbatten, he said that:

"This is absolute nuclear nonsense and, I repeat, it is a disastrous misconception to believe that, by increasing the total uncertainty, one increases one's own certainty".

A comprehensive test-ban treaty will go a long way to demonstrating the desire and commitment by nuclear weapon States to the goal of general and complete disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Kenya very much for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chairman.

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, since I have not previously had occasion to take the floor during the period of your Chairmanship, I should like, at the beginning of my statement, to express our satisfaction at seeing you preside over our discussions and to wish you every success and a happy and fruitful culmination of the work of the Committee under your admirable and skilful guidance. The period of your Chairmanship is assured of a place in the annals of the Committee since it was under your Chairmanship that the Chairmen of the four Working Groups were appointed and that these Groups were convened and began their work.

Venezuela's position on some of the fundamental questions arising in connexion with a comprehensive nuclear test ban was made clear in my statement at the Committee's 66th plenary meeting on 6 March.

Our position is also reflected in document CD/72, which contains the statement of the Group of 21 on this item. The content of this statement has been reiterated in this Committee this morning by the Co-ordinator of the Group of 21, the distinguished representative of Nigeria.

On the present occasion I should like to make some remarks on the orientation which, in our opinion, the Committee's work should follow in future.

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

We have received, and have read with great attention, the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, contained in document CD/86. We consider that this document represents a very important contribution for the consideration of this item, and we should like to express our appreciation for the assistance we have received from the Secretary-General.

The statement of the Group of 21, reproduced in document CD/72, contains two affirmations on this item which are, in our opinion, fully corroborated and endorsed in the Secretary-General's report.

In its statement, the Group of 21 declares that it believes that there is adequate material to initiate immediate negotiations on this subject. This view is reflected throughout the Secretary-General's report; and in addition, it is categorically stated in the last paragraph of the foreword which has been quoted on a number of occasions today, and in which the Secretary-General reiterates the belief, which he stated in 1972, that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is necessary in order to achieve agreement. The problem, says the Secretary-General, "can and should be solved now".

In its declaration, the Group of 21 also called for the establishment of a working group on the item during this first part of the 1980 session, in order to start multilateral negotiations for the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. In our opinion, the report of the Secretary-General makes it sufficiently clear that the item can perfectly well be the subject of multilateral negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament, and that the consideration of outstanding questions in this body, far from obstructing the crystallization of agreements, would help considerably to facilitate the removal of the obstacles which have been encountered in the trilateral negotiations.

With regard to those negotiations, my delegation wishes to express its regret that the negotiating Powers have not provided the Committee with the information -- for which they have so often been asked -- on the state of the negotiations. My delegation welcomed, as, I believe, did many other delegations of States members of the Committee, the statement by the representative of the United Kingdom at the 65th meeting of the Committee on 4 March, when he announced that his delegation was in detailed consultation with the United States and Soviet delegations with a view to the provision, in this Committee of as full a statement as possible about the course of the trilateral negotiations. Unfortunately, that offer has remained unfulfilled. Such information would have been extremely useful for all our countries which are still waiting, with considerable impatience, for the day when we shall receive the joint initiative so often announced and repeatedly requested by the General Assembly.

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

The lack of information makes the initiation of multilateral negotiations more urgent than ever. We believe that the Committee on Disarmament should once again deal with this issue as the first item in its programme of work for the second part of the session, and should proceed to establish a working group on the item without waiting for the information offered by the negotiating Powers. We have noted the statement made this morning by the representative of the Soviet Union, to the effect that his delegation would not object to the establishment of such a working group.

During this first part of the session, the Committee has received some proposals from member States.

The first of these was the proposal submitted by the Australian delegation. I should first of all like to thank the Australian delegation for their interesting and constructive initiative. With regard to the proposal itself, with all due respect and friendship for the delegation of Australia, I should like to say that in our delegation's opinion the Committee should not at the moment become absorbed in the study of questions which are rather of a subsidiary nature. We are not unaware of the importance of the question of institutional arrangements and the definition of the administrative, financial, technical and operational features of an international seismic detection network. We believe, however, that these important aspects, which the Australian delegation has emphasized on two occasions in plenary meetings, could be studied and considered by a sub-group of the ad hoc working group which we hope to see established shortly on the item.

With regard to the proposal by the Belgian delegation for holding an informal meeting of the Committee with the participation of experts members of the Group of Scientific Experts on seismic questions during the second part of the session, we consider this a very sound idea and gladly support it. A meeting such as that suggested by Belgium would, if it does not prejudice or interfere with the work of the Group or of the Committee, certainly be useful and fruitful, particularly for countries such as my own which do not have experts who can participate directly and permanently in the work of the Group of Seismic Experts.

We also regard as very interesting the proposal by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for holding a workshop on the demonstration of procedures to obtain seismic data. We have brought this proposal to the attention of our Government; and we hope in due course to be in a position to inform the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany of the possible attendance of a participant from Venezuela.

I should like to end my statement by quoting the last of the conclusions expressed by the authors of the report transmitted by the Secretary-General. It is contained in paragraph 161 of that report, and reads:

"A permanent cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests has long been demanded by the world community and its achievement would be an event of great international importance".

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Venezuela for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): At the outset I want to express the satisfaction of my delegation that we have now, at last, elected the Chairmen of the four Working Groups which we have so far decided to set up. We are glad to see that two of those groups have already started their work in a very constructive and business like way. We should like to state our appreciation to you personally, Mr. Chairman, for your efforts to achieve these difficult decisions.

The item we are dealing with this week, CTB, has for many years -- and rightly so -- been accorded the highest priority on the disarmament agenda. Sweden attaches the greatest importance to the conclusion of a CTBT and we have repeatedly made our position clear in the matter. Most recently this was done in this Committee by Sweden's Foreign Minister, Mr. Ullsten, on 5 February and subsequently by Mrs. Thorsson, Under-Secretary of State, on 12 February. There is therefore no need for me to restate our position. I would, however, seize this occasion to recall some factors which at this point in time give a particular urgency to the call for a CTBT.

A few months ago it was assumed that ratification of the SALT II was imminent. Now that the SALT process has come to a standstill, we are anxiously looking for attainable measures related to nuclear disarmament.

The conclusion of a CTBT is, in the opinion of my delegation, an objective which can be attained within a reasonably limited time. We are satisfied to note that it has now been clearly stated that the CTBT is not dependent on the ratification of SALT II. It is our position -- as expressed by my Foreign Minister -- that the CTBT should be concluded without awaiting the ratification of SALT II. We do not consider a CTB to be a disarmament measure properly speaking, but it would be highly instrumental in the efforts to prevent further qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. An early conclusion of a CTBT, or at least a decisive breakthrough in the trilateral negotiations on the subject, is at the present time imperative.

Concrete progress in the CTB issue is of vital importance for the efforts to maintain existing non-proliferation measures and to develop them further. The Second NPT Review Conference is rapidly approaching. A total lack of concrete results in the field of nuclear disarmament, or even tangible progress in the negotiations on this matter, will put a serious strain both on the non-proliferation régime as such and on the efforts to bring the forthcoming NPT Review Conference to a successful conclusion.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

The Swedish delegation shares the view expressed by many others -- including the Secretary-General of the United Nations -- that the scientific and technical basis exists and that a CTBT can be achieved once the necessary political decisions are made. The three nuclear-weapon States involved in the tripartite CTB talks have a special responsibility to demonstrate their political will in this regard, and we urge them to bring their negotiations to a positive and early conclusion.

The acting Chairman of the Group of 21 has drawn our attention today to the proposals by the Group of 21 (CD/64 and CD/72) that an ad hoc working group be established on the item of our agenda entitled "Nuclear test ban". There is adequate material available to initiate negotiations on this item and, in view of the urgent need for concrete progress, there is no room for further delaying the establishment of the proposed working group. A full and detailed account of the status of the tripartite talks would undoubtedly constitute an important contribution to the multilateral endeavours in the matter and we urge the three negotiators to submit such a report without delay. We regret that we have not for this occasion received any report about the negotiations which have been going on since July last year.

The verification process is an important feature of a CTBT, and that aspect of the matter will attain particular significance in the forthcoming multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. The work of the Seismic Expert Group demonstrates that a world-wide monitoring system of a CTBT is feasible. There should be no delay between the entry into force of a multilateral treaty and the establishment of an international structure for the monitoring of the treaty. The results of the efforts by the Seismic Group are, however, of a highly technical nature and in the process of the multilateral negotiations they will have to be integrated into the structure of the treaty.

In this context, I would like to refer to the suggestion advanced by the Australian delegation and supported by Canada, to the effect that the Committee should start to work out an institutional framework of an international seismic detection system. At our plenary meeting last Tuesday this suggestion was repeated and further expanded by the Australian representative. We welcome this initiative, which we will study most carefully, in particular with respect to the proper time and forum for the consideration of this question. My delegation shares the view



(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

that the Committee should lose no time in order to ensure that the monitoring system will become operational, and this not later than the entry into force of the CTBT. It is, however, obvious that a working group as we envisage it should have the broader task of negotiating a CTBT in all its aspects and, in principle, on the basis of the results of the preparatory trilateral talks. The legal and administrative aspects of an international seismic monitoring system will certainly be an important element in that context and the discussions proposed by the Australian delegation may make it possible to speed up the negotiations on this specific question.

I should also like to state that my delegation supports the proposal by the Belgian delegation that a meeting should be held with the participation of the seismic experts in order to give delegations an opportunity to obtain details and information on the work of the Seismic Experts Group. Finally, I wish to state that we have found the study carried out by the Secretary-General of the United Nations with the assistance of four highly qualified experts on the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, to be concise, accurate and well balanced. We are convinced that it will be a useful tool in our deliberations and negotiations for the future.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chairman.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): Mr. Chairman, when I spoke in the Committee on 20 March, I welcomed the Australian proposal to hold an informal meeting with chemical weapons experts to discuss various technical issues relevant to a chemical weapons convention. That proposal is contained in document CD/59 dated 12 February 1980. I wonder whether it would not be useful for the Committee to discuss the Australian proposal and, if it were to be acceptable, to decide as soon as possible on the approximate dates for such a gathering. It would certainly be helpful to my Government if it could have an indication of those dates before we conclude the first part of our 1980 session next Tuesday. Also, from the point of view of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons which I have the honour of chairing, it would be useful to know if and when such a meeting would take place, since a discussion took place yesterday in the Group concerning the dates between which the chemical weapons experts of our Governments could be usefully present in Geneva.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): Later on, when we have come to the end of the list of speakers, the Chair will make a proposal regarding the date for a meeting of the Chairman with the Chairmen of the Working Groups and the future chairmen of the Committee for 1980 with a view to establishing whether it would be possible for us to have the programme of meetings and the working schedules of the various working groups already approved in their entirety when we arrive for the summer session.

We have been having talks about this during the meeting. The Chairman's original idea was to hold these consultations tomorrow; but, as the Chairman of one of the Working Groups would be unable to attend a meeting tomorrow, our idea is that, if there is no objection from the other Chairmen of Working Groups or from the future Chairmen of the Committee in 1980 -- Czechoslovakia, Egypt and Ethiopia -- this meeting might be held at 2.30 p.m. or 3 p.m. on Monday. Everything depends on this situation, and I hope that understanding will be shown for the request made to the Chair by the delegation of Nigeria. Our idea had been to hold a meeting tomorrow; but, if there is no objection, we could schedule it for 2.30 p.m. on Monday.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, first of all my delegation would like to take this opportunity to congratulate you on the part you played in bringing about an agreement on the question of the Chairmen of the four Working Groups we have established. My delegation is most gratified that at least two of these Working Groups have already begun their substantive work and that the other two will do so in the near future.

It was not the intention of the Pakistan delegation to speak in the Committee today on matters of substance, since we shall do so at our next meeting. However, I would like to say a few words on a matter that was raised this morning by certain delegations; that is the question of the participation of non-member States in the work of the Committee. Attempts have been made here to portray, in a somewhat perverted light, the inability of the Committee on Disarmament

(Mr. Akram, Pakistan)

to respond to the requests from five of the six non-member States. My delegation was particularly concerned that some members found it fitting to charge the Chairman of the Committee for last month with bad faith. My delegation and I believe that the majority of delegations in the Committee have expressed their deep appreciation for the manner in which the Chairman of the CD for the month of March, Ambassador Yu Pei-Wen of China, discharged his responsibilities. He worked diligently to resolve the procedural problems which confronted the Committee last month; and, if he was unable to guide the Committee to a solution of all issues, one of which is still pending, the blame for this must be placed elsewhere. Towards the end of last month, the Chairman of the Committee made an illuminating statement on the question of participation of non-members, which established the responsibility for the failure of the Committee to take a decision on the matter. My delegation finds it difficult to envisage any valid objection to the circulation of a document from a Government which represents its country at the United Nations. One or more members may not like this or that Government; but, were we to discriminate against members of the United Nations because some of us do not like or recognize a particular Government, a can or worms would be opened on which it would be difficult to replace the lid. I think it would be most suitable for the future work of our Committee if we were to guard against the tendency to ascribe partiality to any Chairman of our Committee, because I think the compliment could be bestowed upon more than one personality in our membership.

For the record, I would like to state the position of the Pakistan delegation on the question of participation of non-member States in the work of the Committee on Disarmament. The initial position of my delegation, which was stated here as early as last year during the formulation of our rules of procedure, was as follows: we stated then that, as far as the Pakistan delegation was concerned,

(Mr. Akram, Pakistan)

the provisions of paragraph 128 of the Final Document imply that any non-member State should be invited to participate in the work of our Committee if it makes a request to do so. Of course, the State in question must be one that is recognized by the international community as legitimate, and we have no other criteria to judge the legitimacy of a Government or State than that of its recognition by, and membership of, the United Nations.

Within this framework, my delegation therefore proposed that all six requests before the Committee should be approved without further debate or discussion. Some other members of this Committee, however, insisted that they be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. This position is recorded in a document circulated by these States. It became quite clear, at least to my delegation, that their insistence was related to certain reservations or objections to one of the six requests. Nevertheless, in response to the insistence of these States, my delegation accepted your proposal to take up the requests from non-member States one by one, in the order of their submission. In accordance with this procedure, a decision was taken by the Committee approving the Chairman's proposal and thereafter the Committee took up for consideration the first request, that of Finland, which was approved by consensus. The Committee then turned to the second request, that of Viet Nam. My delegation proposed that, although in principle we had no objection to the request of Viet Nam, a decision should be deferred until the request of Democratic Kampuchea had been considered; and we were satisfied that this request from a State in the same region would be treated in a similar and non-discriminatory manner. In response to a question from the Chair, my delegation stated quite clearly that, at that moment, there was no consensus on the request for participation from Viet Nam. The Committee thereafter should have turned to the consideration of the third, fourth, fifth

(Mr. Akram, Pakistan)

and sixth requests for participation from non-member States. You, Mr. Chairman, did propose that the Committee devote some time to the consideration of the third request, that of Denmark. However, one or two delegations took the position that, unless and until the request for participation by Viet Nam was approved by the Committee, they would not agree to turn to the consideration or approval of the other pending requests for participation. The debate was adjourned at this juncture.

My delegation believes that this deferral of the consideration of the remaining requests from non-member States and the long time which has elapsed without action on this question, are contrary to the decision taken by the Committee to consider these requests one by one, in the order of their submission. The decision in question was to consider them one by one, and not to approve one before turning to the other. We understand your desire to promote harmony and good will in the Committee and it is because of our desire to collaborate with you that we have not referred to this question or raised it in the Committee until we were compelled to do so by certain recent statements that we have heard at meetings of this body. The unwarranted assertions made about certain statements in the Committee compel my delegation to recall these facts. They clearly indicate where the onus lies for the prevention of a favourable response by the CD to requests from non-member States.

In the light of the present situation, my delegation would like to urge you, Sir, to proceed without delay to implement the decision of the Committee to take up the consideration of the remaining requests for participation by non-member States one by one -- that is, to turn next to the consideration of the request from Denmark, thereafter the requests from Spain, Austria and Democratic Kampuchea. Under our rules of procedure, any move to proceed in a different manner from that decided upon by the Committee would require a consensus of the whole Committee to change its previous decision. It continues to be a hope, Sir, that the CD will find it possible to approve all the five remaining requests for participation from non-member States -- that is, from Denmark, Spain, Austria, Viet Nam and Democratic Kampuchea.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I take note of the statement by the representative of Pakistan. I can assure him that, as soon as we come to the end of the list of speakers, the Chairman will put the situation to the Committee. As the representative of Pakistan pointed out, decisions of the Committee are always taken by consensus and not by the Chair. If that were not the case, the Chair might possibly have taken other decisions which we consider more essential than the decisions in question, in a desire to advance the work of the Committee.

Mr. BEHN (Australia): Mr. Chairman, I should like to associate my delegation with those which have extended to you their congratulations on the fact that you, as Chairman of the Committee, have presided over the Committee's work during a period in which it has with some difficulty arrived at what I consider to be a very important agreement on the question of the Chairmanships of the four Working Groups. I would also like to associate my delegation with the congratulations that have been extended to each of the Chairmen of the four Ad Hoc Working Groups. This afternoon one of those Working Groups, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Kömives, already began its work in a very good atmosphere and constructive spirit. That Working Group, I think, repeated the good beginning that can also be attributed to the Working Group on Chemical Weapons which met yesterday.

I have asked for the floor now, to support the recommendation made by the distinguished Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Okawa -- his suggestion being that we should as soon as possible set dates during which we might consider the proposal made by my delegation earlier during this part of the 1980 session. I would offer the strong support of my delegation to your proposal that there be a meeting between yourself, the respective chairmen of the Committee for the rest of 1980 session and the Chairmen of the four Ad Hoc Working Groups, next Monday. I would ask that at this meeting you attempt to come to a conclusion at least on the indicative dates for the work of the Chemical Weapons Group during the summer part of the 1980 session because, in our view, it is very important that we have as much time

(Mr. Behm, Australia)

as possible to arrange for the participation of experts in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on chemical weapons in order to co-ordinate the translation into reality of our proposal for the seminar or the informal meetings of experts and the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group. We would be very grateful if, by the end of the spring part of the session, we could have some dates between which we might be able to consider the realization of our proposal.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Australia for his statement and can assure him that the Chair will make every effort at the meeting on Monday to establish a schedule for the work of the Ad Hoc Working Groups.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): As one of the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Working Groups, I am most grateful to you for arranging to call us for a meeting on Monday afternoon at 2.30 p.m. I would wish to submit to you that yesterday we decided that the Working Group on Chemical Weapons would meet at 3.30 p.m. on Monday, 28 April; and I wonder whether in view of the 2.30 meeting we should move the Chemical Weapons Working Group Meeting to 4 o'clock. I personally would not think that the meeting of the Chairmen would take too long; and, if you consider it necessary, I would be perfectly willing to maintain the time of 3.30 p.m. as agreed upon in the Working Group yesterday. However, if in your judgement it would be safer to move it to 4 o'clock, I would be very glad to comply; and I would therefore wish to inform the members of the Working Group, through you, that we would meet at 4 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): We suggest that the meeting of the Chairman with the Chairmen of the Working Groups and the future chairmen of our Committee should be held at 3 p.m. on Monday, because of certain commitments of the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament. This would mean that, as you yourself have proposed, the Working Group on Chemical Weapons would meet at 4 p.m.

Our meeting would be held at 3 p.m. We think that, given a spirit of understanding and the Committee's desire to make progress in its work, we could complete our business with the Chairmen and the future chairmen in less than one hour.

There are no further names on our list of speakers.

I should now like to make a statement in my capacity as representative of Cuba to the Committee on Disarmament. If you will allow me, I shall make this statement in my capacity as representative of the Republic of Cuba.

Mr. SOLA VILA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): The Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries declared that:

"The Conference reaffirmed the adherence of non-aligned countries to the objective of general and complete disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament under effective international control, and their determination to act within the United Nations and other bodies to achieve this objective. It drew attention once again to the fact that the Final Document of the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament, convened at the initiative of the non-aligned countries, represents a solid basis for setting in motion the process of real disarmament, relieving mankind from the horrors of war and eliminating the increasing threats to human survival.

"In this context, the Conference called for the urgent implementation, within a specific time frame, of the Programme of Action, particularly of the nuclear disarmament measures, contained in the Final Document of the special session. The Conference called for the immediate cessation of the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, a halt in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and of all nuclear weapons, and the reduction of nuclear weapons stockpiles leading to their elimination. Pending the elimination of nuclear weapons, the nuclear-weapon States are called upon to renounce the threat or use of nuclear weapons and to cease the testing of nuclear weapons."

Cuba is strongly in favour of the cessation of nuclear tests as an essential step for preventing the development of nuclear weapons and affording the opportunity of reaching a comprehensive agreement on general nuclear disarmament, accompanied by international guarantees.

Today the international situation is tense. Cuba notes that warmongering circles in the United States are persisting in their campaign of arms build-up, cold war and constant provocations.

In the next few days, the Caribbean will be the scene of military manoeuvres which are aimed directly against Cuba.



(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

We denounce these manoeuvres as dangerous to international peace, disarmament and détente.

Since the end of last year, with the establishment of the so-called special emergency forces based in Cayo Hueso, the United States Government has again stepped up its provocations and threats against my country.

The manoeuvres announced, in which more than 20,000 men, 42 ships and over 350 aircraft are to participate, will take place in the Cuban territory of Guantánamo, which the United States Government is usurping against the wishes of our people and our Government.

According to Western wire services, the object of the manoeuvres is to demonstrate Washington's power in the trouble ridden Caribbean region. The national liberation struggle of the peoples of Latin America cannot be checked, and fortunately history cannot be reversed.

It is significant that, for the purpose of these manoeuvres, it has been announced that the civilian personnel of the naval base illegally maintained by the United States at Guantánamo are to be evacuated. We hope that good sense will prevail over folly.

In denouncing these provocations, Cuba wishes to alert world public opinion, Governments and particularly, this Committee on Disarmament, in view of the responsibilities incumbent upon it as a disarmament body, to the danger which all this poses to world peace.

The people of Cuba fears neither manoeuvres nor acts of aggression. The might of the Carter Administration does not cause the Cuban people to miss any sleep or to lose its tranquillity and happiness.

We shall continue along the path of socialism and non-alignment, working and struggling with enthusiasm in the assurance of final victory.

In alerting the countries members of the Committee on Disarmament to the dangerous situation created by United States imperialism in the Caribbean, we confirm the firm intention of our people to repel any invasion or aggression against our country. To quote the remark made by General Antonio Mace -- one which is reiterated today by the Cuban people -- "anyone who tries to seize Cuba will only get the dust of its soil drenched in blood, if he does not indeed perish in the fight".

This concludes my statement as representative of Cuba to the Committee on Disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): You will recall that, at our plenary meeting today, Ambassador Fein, representative of the Netherlands, asked the Chairman to include in the agenda for the next plenary meeting of the Committee an item relating to the requests of Austria, Denmark and Spain to be associated with the work of the Committee, so that those three requests would be dealt with as the urgent matter which a group of members of the Committee consider them to be.

You will also recall that, at our 79th plenary meeting, I informed the Committee of the consultations I had conducted with regard to requests from non-member States to participate in our discussions. I informed the Committee on that occasion of the lack of a consensus on the remaining requests by States non-members of the Committee, and I expressed the opinion that it would not be desirable for the Committee to re-open this question for consideration until circumstances favoured a consensus.

The Chair is always ready to submit this question to the consideration of the Committee again, if members believe such action to be necessary. Since the Ambassador of the Netherlands, representing the Group of Western States, has proposed that the requests of Austria, Denmark and Spain should be considered at the plenary meeting next Tuesday, I would be pleased to arrange this, provided that the Committee agrees. As I have stated on a number of occasions during our discussions on this matter, the Chair is in the hands of the Committee and will proceed in accordance with its wishes. For that reason I would like to hear the Committee's views, since the Chair believes that the request made this morning by Ambassador Fein, representative of the Netherlands, on behalf of a group of States members of the Committee could be dealt with under rule 31 of our rules of procedure, which provides that, while the work of the Committee is in progress, member States may request the inclusion of an urgent item in the agenda and that the Committee shall decide whether and when it should be considered.

I would repeat that the Chair is in the hands of the Committee and that it has made countless efforts, bilaterally and through the groups, to try to resolve this situation.

The members of the Committee have the floor, but first of all the distinguished representative of the United States has asked to be permitted to speak.

Mr. FLOVERPEE (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, I must say this is a red letter day for me, leaving aside the comments you have just made in your capacity as the representative of Cuba. We had some discussions this morning which I feel constrain me to make a comment or two. Those of you who have followed

(Mr. Flowerrec, United States)

closely the deliberations of this body may have noticed a slight difference in the approach of my delegation and that of the Soviet Union on the question of the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan. In spite of the flattering remarks made by Ambassador Issraelyan about my personal qualities, I feel constrained to correct at least one of the impressions he left in his remarks this morning. He spoke about one aspect of my comments last Thursday, in which I referred to the transfer of certain chemical material to other Governments by my Government. In his statement this morning, Ambassador Issraelyan seems to have forgotten that in making that comment, I made it quite clear that the agents sold were non-lethal agents of the type used for maintaining public order. We spoke later about a particular type of gas called CS, commonly known as tear gas; and that is what we were referring to in our statement of last Tuesday. But I will not attempt to rebut, point by point, the assertions that Ambassador Issraelyan made this morning. You have heard both our statements. There is doubt about what is going on in Afghanistan and neither I nor my Government have denied that there are some ambiguities in the situation. But the way to clear those up, and the way to relieve the doubts and concerns that have been raised by reports which my Government takes very seriously, as do the Governments of other countries, is to have an unhindered impartial examination of all reports or evidence of use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan and let the chips fall where they may.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, are we discussing general questions or the question you have just raised on participation? My intention was to say a few words on participation.

As you are aware, my delegation has always paid great attention to this question. I had the honour to take the floor on this matter several times during our debate and my delegation shares the general concern. We are very unhappy that up to now we could not yet take a decision on the requests of certain non-members to participate in the work of our body. It seems to me that everybody is aware of the difficulties we have been facing with regard to this question -- not my delegation nor my group only but others also. However, since certain delegations insist on taking up this matter again, we would not oppose it. We would be ready to go along on the basis of the understanding we reached here, to take up these requests case by case; but I would like to make a small suggestion on the item the Netherlands has just suggested. I would suggest that we take up the consideration of requests of non-member States, not confining it to a certain number.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): Mr. Chairman, I am very grateful to the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic for the forthcoming attitude he has taken towards the request that I formulated this morning. The reason why I suggested, on behalf of the group I represent for the moment, that we discuss this matter again at our next formal meeting is this. You recall I had made this statement this morning and, when I said "at our next meeting", I did say it on the assumption that this morning's meeting would be terminated and that the next one would be on Tuesday. Now the reason why we formulated this request was because we hope somehow that further discussions in a friendly and a good spirit might lead to a solution, or at least a partial solution; and you are aware of the fact that the group of countries for which I spoke are particularly interested in salvaging the requests of those countries who apparently are not involved in the controversy on which I do not wish to dwell at the moment. That is why I mentioned specifically the requests, in alphabetical order, of Austria, Denmark and Spain. If the representative of the German Democratic Republic would like to widen the scope and discuss all the requests, then I will certainly not want to oppose that, because we are not opposed to the admission of any of the applicants. As I said in my own statement about two weeks ago, we would support an invitation to all of them; but the intention of my group is to stress particularly the three that I have mentioned.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, we listened very carefully to the statement made this morning by Ambassador Fein, and that made just now by Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic; and I believe that we could now proceed to consider this matter exactly as we decided to do at our previous meetings -- that is, to consider the requests one by one from the point at which we finished. This is how I understood the remarks made by Ambassador Herder.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): I wonder whether the distinguished representative of Pakistan could agree with us and the German Democratic Republic that we would for the moment leave open the way in which we would deal with these matters. We know there has been a proposal to deal with the requests one by one, in alphabetical order; and I have stated two weeks ago that we would be perfectly willing to do so. We would also be willing to follow other methods, whichever would appear to be the best method of solving the problem, and I would appeal to

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

our colleague from Pakistan not to foreclose for the moment any venue that there may be to solve this problem, even if the solution is only partial.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): It would seem, Mr. Chairman, that this question will be considered and, we hope, resolved in a manner which is acceptable to all on Tuesday morning.

Unfortunately, I shall not have the satisfaction of participating in that meeting, because unavoidable duties require my presence in New York, duties which are in fact closely linked to our disarmament work. For this reason, Mr. Chairman, I would venture to mention the very comprehensive statement which I made on this matter at the meeting of 10 April 1980. This very full statement is to appear in document CD/PV.77 which, the Secretariat has informed us, will in all likelihood be distributed tomorrow, at least in English.

I venture to hope, Mr. Chairman, that the distinguished representatives who read this statement carefully will come to the conclusion that it is realistic, objective, balanced and that, as a well-intentioned attempt to reconcile the different opinions and find a solution, it may have some positive effects in the discussions on Tuesday.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, as Ambassador Garcia Robles has just announced that he will not be here next Tuesday when we will take up this matter, I would like to use this opportunity to say a few words in connexion with his suggestion; otherwise I would have waited until Tuesday. I certainly prefer his presence with us when I am saying this.

It seems to me that the suggestion he made on a very complicated and highly political subject deserves serious study; it is a generally known realistic approach. Ambassador Garcia Robles has tried to take the situation into consideration and to draw the necessary conclusions from it. This does not mean that my delegation could accept everything he has suggested. Certain points we certainly could not accept. But what is important is that the suggestions he made could serve as the basis for a solution which would permit us to take favourable

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

decisions on the requests for participation which we have before us, without upsetting anyone and without leaving aside the specific interests of representatives. Therefore I wanted to point out that my delegation considers that this suggestion deserves to be further studied, and consultation should be started with a view to finding a solution. Otherwise, I doubt whether we could get out of this deadlock into which we were placed by certain delegations.

Mr. AKRAMI (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, I was seriously tempted to respond favourably to the request made by the distinguished Ambassador of the Netherlands for some flexibility with regard to the kind of solution that could be promoted on this question. However, after listening to the Ambassador of Mexico and the Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic, I must say that I find that my delegation is not in a position to respond flexibly to any proposal that the Committee proceed in a way which is divergent from the decision taken by the Committee to proceed with the consideration of the five remaining requests, one by one. This is a decision of the Committee; the Committee is bound by that decision; it requires a consensus of the Committee to change it. I would submit, Sir, that the very fact that this matter has not been considered so far, and has been delayed so long, is contrary to that decision of the Committee. It should have been dealt with some time ago. Therefore, I would respectfully submit that, having heard these statements, I would urge you to implement the decision which you proposed and which the Committee accepted some time ago.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): I have listened very carefully to the statements made, and I wonder whether it would not be wise if we now adjourn and continue our discussion on Tuesday morning, after we have had some time to reflect on things with each other.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): We would have no objection to closing the meeting and continuing on Tuesday, on the understanding that we intend to seek a solution in the days between now and Tuesday. The Chairman would like to reiterate his attitude on this matter.

On 9 April one decision was taken and subsequently, in the plenary, a group of delegations suggested that the Committee should not take further decisions which, under our rules of procedure, must be taken by consensus. In the absence of a consensus, the Chair cannot force anyone to continue the discussion. If now Mr. Fein, representative of the Netherlands, requests that this discussion should be terminated, the Chair's interpretation is that there is no consensus for continuing the discussion on this question. The Chair has tried to act; and, if we have at any time been in error, which we do not believe to be the case, it has been in an impartial spirit and in a search for a solution. Speaking personally, the Chairman is not characterized by Christian meekness, by which I mean that we are not inclined to accept attacks on the Chair in respect of matters which the Chairman has never had anything to do with, and on which he has not taken a position.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, I would like to make it crystal clear that in none of the remarks I have made is there the slightest implication, Sir, about your impartiality, your goodwill and your active efforts to promote a solution to this question. We fully realize the difficult situation in which you are placed, and we fully realize that the fact that the matter has been deferred by you and by the Committee for so long is precisely because you wish to promote a genuine agreement on this question. That is why my delegation did not raise this matter and did not press for the implementation of the decision taken by the Committee. It was only in response to unwarranted statements that we heard today that we were obliged to remind the Committee of its decision, and to reiterate that the way in which the Committee would have to proceed, if this is the desire of certain delegations which have expressed concern on this matter, would be in accordance with this decision. The only point I am making, is that, if the Committee is to proceed in any way other than in accordance with its previous decision, this requires consensus on the part of the Committee to change its previous decision; and we have already stated that the kind of solution proposed by the Ambassador of Mexico, with all due respect, is in our view discriminatory and unacceptable. So perhaps some other solution has to be found; but this has to be done, I think, through consultations and not by trying to impose a different solution from that on which the Committee itself has previously taken a decision.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Pakistan for his clarification concerning the Chair. The Chair intends to include in the agenda for Tuesday the requests by States non-members of the Committee to participate in the Committee's work.

If there is no objection, they will be so included.

It is so agreed.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): As agreed at our 80th plenary meeting -- and it is now 6.10 p.m. -- we would suggest that the Committee should not hold an informal meeting on item 1 of our agenda -- "Nuclear test ban" -- since a group of delegations has requested that this item be discussed informally. I leave it in the hands of the Committee.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): A brief word of clarification, Mr. Chairman. Since we are now in a plenary meeting for which a record will be produced, and since the distinguished representative of Pakistan has referred to the Mexican proposal, saying that he finds it discriminatory, and since so far in this record there is no substantive proposal nor any procedural proposal by the representative of Mexico, we would have to turn to another record, which has not yet appeared, to see what the proposal was.

Since I have here the text of what I said on that occasion, i.e. on 10 April, I will therefore read out the very short passage that refers to this question, so that the reader can see whether or not the proposal contained any discriminatory element. What I said on that occasion, Mr. Chairman, in that portion of my statement, which was largely extempore, was as follows:

"From the foregoing considerations, in our opinion, various conclusions can be drawn and, among these conclusions, I would like to emphasize the following: of the six requests to participate which we have received, five come from States which according to the rules of procedure have an unrestricted right to be invited. One of them we already invited yesterday", I went on to say. "This was Finland. There are another four in the same position -- Viet Nam, Denmark, Spain and Austria. The second conclusion is that, with respect to Kampuchea, the Committee has received two requests to participate: one from Democratic Kampuchea, contained in document CD/76, the other from the People's Republic of Kampuchea, contained in document CD/87. Once the Committee has made good the omission which now exists in the rules of procedures, and once it has adopted a rule relating to these cases, we shall never again have to face problems such as that which has taken up so much of our time.



(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"In the meantime, Mr. Chairman", and I am still quoting from what I said on that occasion -- "my delegation would suggest that with respect to the two requests from Kampuchea, you, as Chairman of the Committee, might invite one representative from the 21 members of the Committee who voted in favour of the report of the Credentials Committee in New York; one representative from the eleven members of the Committee who voted against that report, and a third, who would be what is usually called an umpire in a dispute, from among those who abstained. Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, with the help and co-operation of these three representatives, you could find a solution, a solution that would be provisional until we make good the omission in the rules of procedure, a solution that would be acceptable to all."

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, since the distinguished representative of Mexico has chosen to repeat his previous proposal in this Committee, for the record, I would like to recall that at the previous meeting we had not replied in detail to his proposal, because we found that the proposal is not acceptable to our delegation. I would also like to state very briefly for the record that, for my delegation, the distinction which he has drawn between the six requests -- that is, between five on the one hand and the one from Democratic Kampuchea on the other -- is a distinction which is unacceptable. All six States concerned are Members of the United Nations, and we do not think that this Committee can arrogate itself the right to act as a Credentials Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): Would there be any objection to holding an informal meeting to discuss nuclear tests until 7 p.m., up to which time we have interpretation services?

Mr. DJOKIC (Yugoslavia): Mr. Chairman, I would certainly not object, if that is the wish of the Committee, to work until seven o'clock; but in view of the late hour and the significance of the question, which should be deeply considered at an informal meeting, maybe it would be better to adjourn the meeting now and to schedule the informal meeting of the Committee on Monday morning, immediately after the meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. Perhaps the Ad Hoc Working Group could begin at 10 o'clock. I am confident that the Group will be able to finish its first meeting in a rather short time -- maybe one hour at the most. Therefore the informal meeting of the Committee could start at 11 o'clock on Monday morning.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): In that case, if the Committee has no objection, we might schedule an informal meeting to discuss nuclear tests for Monday morning. In the light of the experience of the Working Groups it might be scheduled for 11.30 a.m. instead of 11 a.m.

If there is no objection, it will be held at 11.30 a.m. on Monday.

It is so agreed.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held at 10.30 a.m. on Tuesday, 29 April.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.