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REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION
IN CYPRUS

(for the period 1 December 1986-29 May 1987)

CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraphs</u>
INTRODUCTION	1 - 3
I. MANDATE AND COMPOSITION OF UNFICYP	4 - 9
II. RELATIONS WITH THE PARTIES	10 - 12
III. FUNCTIONS OF UNFICYP	13 - 50
A. Maintenance of the cease-fire	13 - 20
B. Maintenance of the <u>status quo</u>	21 - 34
C. Restoration of normal conditions	35 - 40
D. Humanitarian functions	41 - 50
IV. FINANCIAL ASPECTS	51 - 54
V. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL	55 - 62
VI. OBSERVATIONS.....	63 - 75
<u>Map.</u> DEPLOYMENT OF UNFICYP, May 1987	

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covers developments from 1 December 1986 to 29 May 1987 and brings up to date the record of activities of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to the mandate laid down in Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent resolutions of the Council concerning Cyprus, including, most recently, resolution 593 (1986) of 11 December 1986.
2. In the last-mentioned resolution, the Security Council called upon all the parties concerned to continue to co-operate with UNFICYP on the basis of the present mandate. It also requested the Secretary-General to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the resolution by 31 May 1987.
3. I have taken this opportunity to revise the structure employed in recent years for reports to the Security Council on UNFICYP. The new layout used in the present report is intended to describe the Force's activities in a more logical sequence and without undue repetition.

I. MANDATE AND COMPOSITION OF UNFICYP

4. The function of UNFICYP was originally defined by the Security Council in its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 in the following terms:

"in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions."

That mandate, which was conceived in the context of the confrontation between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities and between the Cyprus Government National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot fighters, has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Council, most recently in its resolution 593 (1986). In connection with the events that have occurred since 15 July 1974, the Council has adopted a number of resolutions, some of which have affected the functioning of UNFICYP and, in some cases, have required the Force to perform certain additional or modified functions relating, in particular, to the maintenance of the cease-fire (see S/14275, para. 7).

5. The table below shows the establishment of UNFICYP as at May 1987:

<u>Military Personnel</u>			
Austria	HQ UNFICYP	5	
	Infantry battalion, UNAB	290	
	Military police company	<u>6</u>	301
Canada	HQ UNFICYP	7	
	HQ CANCON	5	
	2nd Battalion, Royal 22nd Regiment	478	
	Signal squadron	14	
	Military police company	<u>11</u>	515
Denmark	HQ UNFICYP	5	
	Infantry battalion, DANCON 46	323	
	Military police company	<u>13</u>	341
Finland	HQ UNFICYP	6	
	Military police company	<u>4</u>	10
Ireland	HQ UNFICYP	6	
	Military police company	<u>2</u>	8
Sweden	HQ UNFICYP	8	
	Infantry battalion, UN 90C	353	
	Military police company	<u>13</u>	374
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	HQ UNFICYP	23	
	HQ BRITCON	5	
	Force scout car squadron, A Squadron, 13/18 Royal Hussars (QMO)	109	
	3rd Battalion, The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers	320	
	HQ UNFICYP support regiment	44	
	Engineer detachment	8	
	Signal squadron	55	
	Army aviation flight	18	
	Transport squadron	103	
	Medical centre	5	
	Ordnance detachment	12	
	Workshops	30	
	Military police company	<u>9</u>	741
			<u>2 290</u>
<u>Civilian police</u>			
Australia		20	
Sweden		<u>18</u>	38
TOTAL UNFICYP			<u>2 328</u>

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6. During the reporting period, the strength of UNFICYP remained at 2,328. No significant changes were made in the Force, although small adjustments were made in two sectors to address local manning requirements. The current detailed deployment of UNFICYP is shown on the map attached to the present report.

7. On 12 February 1987, the Government of Sweden informed me that, following its decision in August 1986, at my request, to increase its contingent in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), it had undertaken an assessment of its total involvement in United Nations peace-keeping operations. The Swedish Government expressed its concern both at the financial arrangements for UNFICYP, which obliged Sweden and the other troop-contributing Governments to absorb continuously increasing costs, and at the impasse that was blocking progress in the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem. The Swedish Government went on to say that unless substantial improvements could be achieved both in the financial situation of UNFICYP, in particular through the introduction of financing by assessed contributions, and in the prospects for a political solution, it would be forced to withdraw the Swedish contingent from UNFICYP as of 1 January 1988.

8. Two members of the Force died as a result of accidents during the period under review. The total number of fatal casualties since the inception of UNFICYP in 1964 is 141. Three emergency medical evacuations involving UNFICYP members in the United Nations buffer zone were carried out in a timely and professional manner by helicopters of the 84th Squadron, Royal Air Force (see S/18491, para. 5).

9. The Force remains under the command of Major-General Günther G. Greindl. Mr. James Holger continues to serve as my Acting Special Representative in Cyprus.

II. RELATIONS WITH THE PARTIES

10. UNFICYP has continued to emphasize the essential requirement of full liaison and co-operation at all levels to enable it to carry out its role effectively. These efforts have been met with positive responses from both sides.

11. UNFICYP has continued to enjoy freedom of movement in the southern part of the island, except for military restricted areas. In the northern part of the island, the guidelines established in 1983 (see S/15812, para. 14) were further improved during the period under review. Kambos road is now open for UNFICYP resupply activities in sector 1 and the Xeros-Morphou-Kyrenia and Morphou-Philia-Skylloúra roads have been opened for UNFICYP recreational purposes (see S/18491, para. 12).

12. On 24 April 1987, His Excellency Mr. Denktas addressed to me a letter protesting about a visit that the Minister of Defence in the Cyprus Government, Mr. Eliades, had made to Austria at the invitation of the Austrian Government and in particular about press reports that the purpose of the visit was to negotiate the purchase of military equipment from Austrian firms. Mr. Denktas stated that these events cast doubt on the impartiality of the Austrian contingent of UNFICYP and added that unless the Turkish Cypriot side's concern was dispelled, it would be difficult for that side to continue co-operation with the Austrian contingent. I conveyed to Mr. Denktas a message in which I reminded him that the personnel of

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United Nations peace-keeping operations were responsible only to myself and to the Security Council and that there could therefore be no linkage between their peace-keeping functions and the policies of the Governments that contributed them. I added that I would nevertheless discuss the matter at a high level with the Austrian authorities, which I subsequently did. They informed me that the visit of Mr. Eliades to Austria was a routine event and that press allegations about arms deals were pure speculation. The export of military equipment was strictly controlled under Austrian law, and it was a matter of principle that such equipment was not exported to crisis areas. For this reason and because Austria is a troop-contributor to UNFICYP, the export of military equipment to Cyprus would not be permitted. I have so informed His Excellency Mr. Denktas in a letter dated 28 May 1987.

III. FUNCTIONS OF UNFICYP

A. Maintenance of the cease-fire

13. The cease-fire lines extend approximately 180 kilometres from the Kokkina enclave and Kato Pyrgos on the north-west coast to the east coast south of Famagusta in the area of Dherinia. The area between the lines is known as the United Nations buffer zone. Its width varies from 20 metres to 7 kilometres and it covers about 3 per cent of the island, including some of the most valuable agricultural land in Cyprus.

14. The United Nations buffer zone is kept under constant surveillance by UNFICYP through a system of 144 observation posts, 62 of which are permanently manned at the present time. The number of manned posts was increased by 4 since the last report. Additional mobile and standing patrols are employed to provide increased presence in sensitive areas. High-powered binoculars and night-vision devices are used to monitor the cease-fire lines on a continuous basis.

15. The UNFICYP patrol and communications track, which runs the length of the buffer zone, is used to monitor the cease-fire lines and to resupply observation posts, and enables the Force to react promptly to any incident. During the period under review, much of the engineer support by British Army units was again concentrated on maintaining the track in sector 1, thereby permitting the resupply of observation posts by road throughout the year.

16. During the period under review, the number of cease-fire violations remained at a low level. The frequency of shooting incidents was reduced and there were no exchanges of fire between opposing forces. The number of temporary moves forward decreased, while the number of attempts by both sides to construct new fortifications and to improve existing positions again increased slightly. UNFICYP continued to be successful in restoring the status quo ante.

17. In Nicosia, nevertheless, the troops of both sides continue to be in dangerous proximity to each other. UNFICYP remains greatly concerned by this situation since a significant number of cease-fire violations and other related incidents have occurred in that area. UNFICYP continues its efforts to reduce tension at the most dangerous points in Nicosia.

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18. During the period under review, new civilian construction projects close to the lines in Nicosia continued to be of concern to the respective sides. UNFICYP monitors these projects and uses its good offices to confirm the civilian nature of the construction and thus alleviate the two sides' concern.

19. Overflights of the United Nations buffer zone continued. Aircraft of the Turkish forces accounted for four incidents. There were six overflights by civilian aircraft coming from the southern part of the island. All overflights were protested.

20. UNFICYP continued to maintain signs and barriers at known and suspected minefields. In January 1987 personnel of the Danish contingent destroyed one anti-tank mine in the buffer zone along the Kambos road.

B. Maintenance of the status quo

21. During the period under review, the Cyprus Government repeatedly protested about the increase in the number of the Turkish forces in the northern part of the island and the qualitative improvement of their military capability. In a letter to me dated 21 May 1987 in which he again protested about the presence of Turkish troops in Cyprus, President Kyprianou stated that there were now 34,000 to 35,000 Turkish troops in Cyprus and that the number of heavy tanks had increased by 50 per cent to 300. The evidence of an increase in the Turkish forces' strength referred to in my last report (see S/18491, para. 22) has been further supported by open observation by UNFICYP as well as by reports made public by various Governments. UNFICYP estimates that, while no additional units appear to have been moved to the island, the number of Turkish soldiers in Cyprus is now in the order of 29,000. The UNFICYP observations also confirmed that not all the tanks due for replacement have yet been withdrawn from the island and that this has resulted in a substantial increase in the number of tanks. UNFICYP will continue to monitor the replacement programme.

22. I raised the question of the military build-up in Cyprus on several occasions with the Turkish authorities at all levels. I expressed my concern over the existing situation and appealed to the Government of Turkey to reduce its forces on the island. In mid-May 1987, the Turkish authorities advised me that the level of their forces in Cyprus fluctuated because of the need to train newly arrived conscripts before the troops they were to replace had been rotated back to Turkey. They acknowledged that the modernization programme had resulted in a temporary increase in the number of tanks on the island but said that this was for logistical reasons and because of the need to train crews to operate the new tanks before the old ones were shipped back to Turkey. They assured the United Nations that upon completion of the programme the number of tanks on the island would revert to what it was previously. They stressed that it was not their intention to seek political or military advantages.

23. During the period under review, the Government of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot side again expressed to me their concern about the strengthening of the National Guard. In a letter dated 30 March 1987, His Excellency Mr. Denktas drew

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attention to an agreement that had reportedly been signed between the Governments of Cyprus and Greece for the acquisition by Cyprus of a significant amount of arms and armaments reported to be worth 20 million Cyprus pounds. Mr. Denktas stated that this agreement constituted further proof of an ongoing arms build-up by the National Guard. The Government of Cyprus reiterated to me that its acquisition of new equipment was for purely defensive purposes. In this connection, it may be recalled that I informed the Security Council as early as December 1982 that the National Guard was pursuing a programme of modernization (see S/15502, para. 22). Since then the programme has involved mainly the purchase of armoured vehicles.

24. The ability of UNFICYP to monitor changes in troop strengths and equipment on both sides unfortunately remains restricted. Its plan for verification inspections of military forces (see S/15812, para. 23), which would reduce the level of mistrust between the parties, has yet to be accepted by both sides. UNFICYP remains ready to implement the plan at short notice. I have instructed the Force Commander to pursue this matter with both sides and it is my hope that both will recognize the benefits of such an arrangement. In the mean time, UNFICYP continues by open means to monitor the forces on both sides.

25. During the period under review, developments in Varosha have been an issue of major concern and have adversely affected the political climate on the island. In November 1986, UNFICYP became aware that students attending a university established by the Turkish Cypriot authorities in Famagusta were being accommodated in buildings inside the fenced area of Varosha. UNFICYP established that one of the two hotels that have been used by the Turkish forces as recreational facilities since 1974 and another recently renovated hotel were being used to house students, whom the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities said were dependents of personnel of the Turkish forces in Cyprus. As I was concerned by this breach of the status quo in Varosha, which also provoked vigorous protests from the Greek Cypriot side, I made representations to the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities at all levels to have the status quo restored.

26. His Excellency Mr. Denktas told me in January 1987 that it was not his intention to change the status quo in Varosha, that the students were there only temporarily and that they would vacate the premises as soon as alternative accommodation became available. In a letter dated 10 March, President Kyprianou again protested at the change in the status quo in Varosha and requested that this matter be resolved without delay. In a reply dated 9 April 1987, I indicated to him that I was pursuing my efforts to achieve prompt restoration of the status quo. In a further letter dated 11 May 1987, he reiterated the need for the urgent restoration of the status quo. He also asked me to call upon the Government of Turkey to transfer Varosha to the administration of the United Nations in line with paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 550 (1984). Despite a number of further representations, it has not yet proved possible to obtain a date for the departure of the students from the two hotels occupied by them.

27. In the light of these developments in Varosha, I judged it important to ensure that there was a clear understanding between the United Nations and the Turkish authorities with respect to the status quo in the fenced area of Varosha pending a settlement. To this end on 11 March 1987, I transmitted to the Turkish Permanent

Representative to the United Nations a map defining the perimeter of the fenced area and the activities within it which constitute the status quo as recorded by the United Nations. I pointed out that the restrictions imposed on freedom of movement of UNFICYP within the fenced area hampered its ability to discharge its responsibilities adequately and made it difficult for me to fulfil my reporting obligation to the Security Council. I added that the recent developments had brought out the need to correct this situation and that I would instruct the Force Commander of UNFICYP to meet the Commander of the Turkish forces in Cyprus to work out arrangements that would give UNFICYP personnel the freedom of movement necessary to verify that the status quo was maintained.

28. In early April, General Greindl communicated proposals to that effect to the Commander of the Turkish forces in Cyprus, who subsequently informed him that the matter should be raised with the Turkish Cypriot authorities. The Commander of the Turkish forces in Cyprus confirmed however that all previous arrangements and understandings with respect to the deployment of UNFICYP in Varosha would be observed. In a letter to me dated 11 May 1987, His Excellency Mr. Denktas expressed the view that there was no common understanding between the Turkish Cypriot side and the United Nations regarding the status quo in Varosha. I have reiterated on several occasions to the Turkish and the Turkish Cypriot authorities that the United Nations considers the Government of Turkey responsible for maintaining the status quo in the fenced area of Varosha.

29. During the reporting period, the Government of Cyprus again protested to the United Nations about the influx of settlers from Turkey. In his letter dated 21 May 1987, President Kyprianou stated that their number was reliably estimated to be between 60,000 and 62,000. The Government of Cyprus made the point that the significance of the settlers was also reflected in the fact that they had established a party of their own, which was a member of the existing coalition in the northern part of the island. I have been informed that the Foreign Minister of Turkey, on the other hand, stated before the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 7 May that the Turkish Cypriot side had not attempted to change the demographic structure of Cyprus by bringing in settlers. He said that a number of Turkish Cypriots living abroad had decided to return to the northern part of the island and that 14,000 temporary and seasonal Turkish and other workers had also been admitted in view of the shortage of skilled and unskilled labour on the Turkish Cypriot side. I must reiterate the concern that I expressed in my last report that nothing should be done to change the demographic composition of the island.

30. During the period under review, concern was expressed on the Greek Cypriot side about the sale of goods coming from the northern part of the island in Pyla, a mixed village which lies in the buffer zone. The Turkish Cypriot side for its part expressed to UNFICYP its concern lest any change in the existing arrangements in Pyla adversely affect the Turkish Cypriot inhabitants of the village. UNFICYP stressed to both sides the importance of not disturbing relations between the two communities in this sensitive area, as well as the need to maintain the status quo in Pyla.

31. The Government of Cyprus has again complained to the United Nations about the desecration of churches located in the northern part of the island. It has given the United Nations a list of 85 religious buildings that have allegedly been desecrated. The churches specifically mentioned during the reporting period are Chrisosotiros in Akanthou, Timios Stavros in Kato Zhodia, Timios Prodromos in Lapathos, Saints Constantine and Helen in Vasilia, and Saint Demetrianos in the village of Larnaka of Lapithos. On my instructions, UNFICYP raised these cases with the Turkish Cypriot side but has not yet received any conclusive response. The Turkish Cypriot representatives again referred to the destruction of 103 mosques between 1963 and 1974, for which the Turkish Cypriot side holds the Greek Cypriot side responsible either directly or indirectly (see S/18491, para. 34).

32. I attach great importance to the preservation of the religious and cultural heritage of the island and I consider it the responsibility of those concerned to ensure that no desecration or destruction takes place. Since it has so far not been possible to devise a viable mechanism to enable the two sides to attend to such complaints in a satisfactory manner, I intend to explore with them whether ways can be found to surmount the existing difficulties.

33. The Cyprus Government has again lodged a protest about the changing of numerous place-names in the northern part of the island. It has submitted an updated list containing names that have reportedly undergone changes in the recent past. In response to UNFICYP representations, the Turkish Cypriot side stated that most of the changes resulted from the need to bring place-names into line with modern Turkish usage. It was brought to the Turkish Cypriot side's attention by the United Nations that this did not conform to the relevant resolution on national standardization adopted at the Third United Nations Conference on the Standardization of Geographical Names. 1/ The Turkish Cypriot side stated that they did not feel bound by decisions adopted by this Conference.

34. Another matter of concern reported to UNFICYP by the Government of Cyprus was the alleged decision by the Turkish Cypriot authorities to expropriate plots of Greek Cypriot-owned land and to transfer them to Turkish Cypriot persons and organizations. UNFICYP took up the matter with the Turkish Cypriot side, which pointed out that, in line with procedures that have been in existence for some time, no actual transfer of ownership had taken place.

C. Restoration of normal conditions

35. As part of its efforts to promote a return to normal conditions, UNFICYP has continued to facilitate economic and other civilian activities in the areas between and adjacent to the cease-fire lines. In particular, it has continued to encourage farming, which it monitors carefully. UNFICYP has received good co-operation from both sides in this regard.

36. During the period under review, efforts by UNFICYP and other United Nations agencies to promote normal contacts between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots continued. Although some progress was achieved, much more could have been accomplished if the parties had been more forthcoming in facilitating such efforts.

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37. UNFICYP has continued to expend considerable effort to ensure that the water distribution system is fairly and efficiently operated for the benefit of both communities. Measures taken by the copper-processing plant at Skouriotissa (see S/16858, para. 35) have improved the quality of the water flowing to the northern part of the island and further corrective work by the mining company should ensure continued improvement. UNFICYP visits this area regularly as part of its monitoring procedures and the Department of Water Development is advised of the results.

38. The anti-mosquito programme, which was arranged by UNFICYP after consultations with both parties, continues. Spraying, which began on 17 March 1987, is progressing satisfactorily and is scheduled to end on 17 December 1987.

39. UNFICYP has continued to carry out the arrangements for the delivery of mail and Red Cross messages across the cease-fire lines.

40. The UNFICYP Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) continues to work in close co-operation with the Cyprus Police and the Turkish Cypriot Police. UNCIVPOL contributes to the maintenance of law and order between the cease-fire lines and provides police services to civilians who reside in villages within that area. UNCIVPOL assists in the control of the movement of civilians in the area between the lines, escorts persons transferring from one side to the other and carries out inquiries into criminal cases that have intercommunal implications. A number of independent inquiries have been completed with the co-operation of the authorities of both communities.

D. Humanitarian functions

41. UNFICYP has continued to provide humanitarian support to the Greek Cypriots living in the northern part of the island, who now number 679. Of the two Greek Cypriot primary schools (see S/15149, para. 26), the school in Rizokarpaso now has 30 pupils and the one in Ayia Trias has 10. UNFICYP officers have continued to interview, in private, Greek Cypriots who apply for permanent transfer to the southern part of the island, in order to verify that all transfers take place voluntarily. Nine such transfers took place during the reporting period, most of them involving elderly people who went to live with relatives. UNFICYP also facilitates temporary visits by Greek Cypriots to the southern part of the island, of which 560 took place during the reporting period. As for children from the northern part of the island who attend schools in the southern part, it proved possible at Christmas 1986 and Easter 1987 to arrange a larger number of visits by these children to their families than had been the case in previous years. UNFICYP distributed 199 tons of foodstuffs and other goods provided by the Cyprus Government and the Cyprus Red Cross to Greek Cypriots living in the northern part of the island and UNCIVPOL continued to distribute social welfare and pension benefits to them.

42. UNCIVPOL also continued to distribute pension payments to Turkish Cypriots resident in the northern part of the island who were formerly employed by the Government of Cyprus.

43. UNFICYP continued to make periodic visits to Turkish Cypriots living in the southern part of the island. It also helped them to maintain contact with their relatives in the northern part and 19 reunions, involving 98 persons, were arranged at the Ledra Palace hotel with the co-operation of the Cyprus Government authorities. During the reporting period, six Turkish Cypriots moved permanently from the southern to the northern part of the island.

44. The number of Maronites living in the northern part of the island is now 327. UNFICYP continued to assist in arranging contacts between Maronites living on opposite sides of the cease-fire lines and such contacts took place frequently.

45. UNFICYP continued to provide emergency medical services, including medical evacuation, to civilians of both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities. It escorted Turkish Cypriots to hospitals in the southern part of the island and regularly delivered medicines to the Turkish Cypriot community.

46. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has continued to act as Co-ordinator of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance for Cyprus, channelling contributions for the displaced and needy persons on the island. The 1987 programme provides financing for 23 new projects as well as additional funding for two large bicommunal projects begun under the 1986 programme, at a total cost of \$10 million. These are implemented by the Cyprus Red Cross Society and cover, inter alia, the construction costs of medical and educational facilities; bicommunal projects for construction of a main trunk sewer in Nicosia and for major conservation works within the old walled city of Nicosia; the overseas procurement of equipment and supplies in the fields of health and sanitation, education and agriculture; professional training; expert missions; and feasibility studies.

47. UNFICYP has continued to support this programme by delivering agricultural, educational and medical equipment. A total of 602 tons of supplies were delivered during the period under review.

48. Joint activities between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities in the framework of ongoing projects, assisted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), continued throughout the period under review. As part of the Nicosia Master Plan project, weekly meetings took place between the two sides to carry out detailed planning for the implementation of investment schemes identified by the project. Both sides also received training in the application of microcomputers to the programmes of the Nicosia Master Plan and produced promotional material intended for potential international funding sources. Detailed design work on two residential areas of the old walled city of Nicosia was also carried out.

49. UNDP continued to co-ordinate the work being undertaken under the Nicosia sanitary/sewage and domestic water supply project to provide improved facilities and connections to both communities in Nicosia. In addition, UNFICYP provided logistic support. The UNDP handicrafts training project continued in the areas of ceramics and pottery, through the strengthening of two workshops established in Nicosia.

50. An expert continued to provide assistance to the veterinary services of both communities in the control of animal infertility diseases throughout the island. The project of the World Food Programme for feeding some 22,000 school children and persons in social welfare institutions also continued during this period.

IV. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

51. The cost to the United Nations of maintaining UNFICYP for a further period of six months beyond 15 June 1987, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of the Force and assuming continuation of its existing strength and responsibilities, is estimated at \$15.5 million, as detailed below:

UNFICYP cost estimate by major category of expense
(Thousands of United States dollars)

I. Operational costs incurred by the United Nations

Movement of contingents	289
Operational expenses	1 280
Rental of premises	795
Rations	790
Non-military personnel, salaries, travel, etc.	2 361
Miscellaneous and contingencies	<u>250</u>
Total I	<u>5 765</u>

II. Reimbursement of extra costs of Governments providing contingents

Pay and allowances	8 700
Contingent-owned equipment	915
Death and disability	<u>100</u>
Total II	<u>9 715</u>
Grand total (I and II)	<u><u>15 480</u></u>

The increase of approximately \$1.1 million over the current mandate period is essentially due to fluctuations in exchange rates.

52. The above figures do not reflect the full cost of the operation. They exclude, in particular, the regular costs that would be incurred by the troop contributors if their contingents were serving at home (i.e. regular pay and allowances and normal expenses for matériel), as well as such extra costs as they have agreed to absorb. The troop-contributing Governments have informed me that the costs absorbed by them are in the order of \$36.3 million for a six-month period.

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53. That part of the financing of the cost of the Force that is borne by the Organization is dependent entirely on voluntary contributions from Governments. These contributions have not been sufficient to meet the cost of the Force. As a result, the deficit in the UNFICYP Special Account is expected to be \$154.9 million at the end of the current six-month period, unless additional contributions are received. As a consequence, the troop-contributing countries' claims for reimbursement have been met only up to June 1979.

54. Members of the Council will recall that in paragraph 65 of my last report (S/18491), I expressed the view that the Council might wish to consider whether it would be appropriate to change the system of financing UNFICYP from voluntary contributions to assessed contributions. In a letter to me dated 10 December 1986, the troop-contributing Governments expressed their full support for this suggestion (S/18517). In late March 1987, by which time there had been a further worsening of the financial situation of UNFICYP, each of the members of the Security Council was asked to give serious consideration to the merits of the suggestion and to agree that with effect from the mandate period beginning 16 December 1987 (assuming that the Council decides to extend the Force's mandate again), the United Nations share of the costs of UNFICYP should be considered as expenses of the Organization, in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations. I understand that consultations on this question are at present in progress between the troop-contributing countries and the members of the Council. Meanwhile, on 29 May 1987, I received from the Permanent Representative of Greece to the United Nations a letter which conveyed his Government's support for UNFICYP and for the proposed change in the system of financing of the Force (A/41/992-S/18884).

V. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

55. During the period under review, I pursued the mission of good offices entrusted to the Secretary-General by the Security Council in resolution 367 (1978) and continued in subsequent resolutions, most recently in resolution 593 (1986).

56. In my report of 2 December 1986 (S/18491) I referred to the mission I had sent to Cyprus the previous month. Its purpose was to explore possible ways of moving forward, in view of the replies I had received from the two sides to the draft framework agreement I had presented for their consideration on 29 March 1986 (see S/18102/Add.1, paras. 9-13). The mission suggested on my behalf that senior members of my staff should meet the two sides to prepare for the convening of a joint high-level meeting, which would begin negotiations on all outstanding issues and agree on the procedures for continuing those negotiations. However, neither side supported this idea and both maintained the positions they had taken in April 1986. At the same time they said that they recognized that I had to pursue my effort to find a way to overcome the existing impasse.

57. After further reflection, I decided to send another mission to Cyprus in early February 1987 to explore again with both parties how progress could be made. I instructed the mission to remind both leaders that my function was to produce ideas and suggestions to help the two sides to find a solution, but that I, of course, could not impose anything on either side. At the same time, given my mandate from the Security Council, I could not allow my effort to be frozen either because one side found a particular suggestion unacceptable or because the other side, having accepted a suggestion, insisted that my effort could not proceed until the other side had also accepted it.

58. The mission was further instructed to say to the two sides that, given the firm positions taken by them on the March 1986 document, I felt that a way had to be found to proceed with discussions and that my efforts to find a way to overcome the existing impasse could be greatly helped if their respective positions on the issues that impeded progress could be clarified. With this in mind, I suggested that a process of informal discussions be initiated between my aides and the two sides. I stressed that these talks would be strictly confidential as well as non-binding and their purpose would be solely to assist me and not to renegotiate any document I had presented since August 1984.

59. On 17 March 1987, the Greek Cypriot side informed me that it accepted this suggestion for informal talks. The Turkish Cypriot side advised me on 15 May 1987 that it would not accept my suggestion, unless the Greek Cypriot side first accepted the March 1986 document.

60. It will be recalled that during my meeting with President Kyprianou on 26 September 1986, he asked me to sound out the members of the Security Council on his proposal that I convene an international conference on the "withdrawal of the Turkish occupation forces and settlers, and effective international guarantees" (see S/18491, para. 52). As I reported to the Council in December 1986, President Kyprianou was informed the previous month that my soundings had revealed differing positions and a lack of agreement on his proposal.

61. In a letter to me dated 10 March 1987, President Kyprianou stressed again the need to convene an international conference, expressed the belief "that none of the arguments against his proposal that had been put forward can be considered as valid", and reiterated his view that I "should endorse this proposal and proceed with a determined effort to convince those of the members of the Security Council who appear to be unfavourable of the necessity for the convening of an international conference under the auspices of the United Nations". In my reply of 10 April 1987, I informed President Kyprianou that the position remained unchanged. I took the opportunity to reiterate that I was deeply aware of the fundamental importance of the issues of troop withdrawal and international guarantees and of the need to tackle them expeditiously, and I pointed out that this had been and would continue to be one of my priority objectives. In a letter to me dated 11 May 1987, His Excellency Mr. Denktas stated that the negative position of the Turkish Cypriot side on the convening of an international conference remained

unchanged. He also emphasized the need to deal with all issues as an integrated whole in line with the approach followed since August 1984. In a further letter to me dated 19 May 1987, President Kyprianou reiterated the position he had taken in his previous letter.

62. During the period under review, the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus held five sessions, including 12 formal meetings in which the three members of the Committee and their assistants participated, and 6 informal meetings attended only by the three members. The Committee's investigatory work (i.e. the interviewing of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot witnesses about the cases before it) has continued with the participation of the third member and/or his assistants. The three members examined ways of speeding up the pace of investigations on the cases of missing persons presented to the Committee.

VI. OBSERVATIONS

63. The state of affairs in Cyprus gives increasing cause for concern. It is a matter of satisfaction that UNFICYP has continued to carry out its duties with efficiency and impartiality, and I take this opportunity to pay special tribute to Major-General Günther Greindl for the skill and judgement that he continues to display in carrying out his difficult and demanding duties. But in other respects the situation is not encouraging: a deadlock exists at present in my efforts to restart effective negotiations between the parties; distrust between the leaderships of the two communities remains deep; tension has risen over the question of Varosha; a potentially dangerous military build-up is taking place on the island; and the troop-contributing Governments, without whose generosity UNFICYP could not be kept in existence, are increasingly dissatisfied, both at the unfair and growing financial burden they have to bear and at the lack of progress on the political front.

64. If this disturbing trend is to be reversed, it is essential that a way be found to resume an effective negotiating process. During the course of the initiative that I launched in August 1984, I have put forward a number of substantive ideas for the consideration of the two sides, the most recent of which was the draft framework agreement of March 1986. In each case my purpose was to build on the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979 by consolidating the points on which agreement had already been achieved and by suggesting procedures for resolving the remaining issues.

65. In January 1985, the Turkish Cypriot side accepted the draft agreement contained in the documentation I had presented, while the Greek Cypriot side stated that it could accept the documentation only as a basis for negotiations. My efforts to overcome the differences that emerged at that time did not prove successful. The consolidated draft agreement and draft statement was accepted by the Greek Cypriot side in early April 1985, but was rejected by the Turkish Cypriot side. Subsequently, the Turkish Cypriot side accepted the draft framework agreement of March 1986. The Greek Cypriot side said that before it would express its views on the contents of that document

there must first be agreement on what it described as the basic issues of the Cyprus problem. This position has since been repeated with increasing emphasis.

66. We are thus at an impasse. The Turkish Cypriot side has continued to insist that no discussions may take place unless the Greek Cypriot side accepts the document of March 1986. I have repeatedly pointed out that, as I have been entrusted with a mission of good offices, I am not in a position to impose anything on either side and cannot allow my mission to become frozen simply because one side accepts one of my suggestions and the other does not. The Greek Cypriot side, for its part, has continued to press me to promote its proposal for an international conference. This proposal is rejected by the Turkish Cypriot side and by the Government of Turkey and my consultations indicate that the positions of the members of the Security Council, including the permanent members, are divided on it.

67. In view of the positions of the two sides, I have tried to obtain their agreement to procedural proposals which would at least maintain discussion of the issues separately with each of the parties. Again it has not proved possible to obtain the agreement of both sides. While the Greek Cypriot side has responded favourably, the Turkish Cypriot side continues to insist that the March 1986 document must first be accepted by both. I continue to believe that the informal discussions I suggested in February 1987 could help create the conditions for the resumption of substantive negotiations in due course. The alternative, in my view, will be a continued deterioration of the situation with all that this may imply.

68. The present impasse, marked by an inability on the part of the two sides to agree on the manner in which a negotiating process can be kept in being, poses the question whether a settlement can still be concluded on the basis of the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements. I continue to believe that it can, provided that both sides show greater understanding of each other's aspirations and concerns. Both sides continue to assure me of their commitment to the 1977 and 1979 agreements and of their readiness to negotiate seriously about the establishment of the federal republic envisaged therein. The problem is that the conditions on which each side now insists make it impossible in practice for negotiations to take place. I would urge both sides to bear in mind the risk that if they continue to insist on these conditions, there will be no realistic prospect of negotiating a settlement of the Cyprus problem.

69. A major cause of the present difficulties is, of course, the deepening distrust between the two sides and the lack of contact, at all levels, between the two communities. Continuation of this trend will further undermine the prospects for a negotiated settlement. A climate must be created in which effective negotiations can take place. Towards this end, I intend to continue to explore with the parties certain measures that would create confidence between them, in the hope that this will make it possible to resume the negotiating process that began in August 1984 and build on what has been achieved so far. The goal remains an overall agreement that I continue to

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conceive of as an integrated whole. I also appeal to both sides to co-operate with the efforts UNFICYP and other United Nations agencies continue to make to promote normal contacts between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.

70. Distrust in recent months has in particular been heightened by the strengthening of the Turkish forces in the northern part of the island. On this issue, I have repeatedly explained to the Government of Turkey that the Greek Cypriot side feels threatened and in these circumstances feels obliged to strengthen its own defences. I have therefore urged Turkey to make a start by reducing its forces on the island. I take this opportunity to renew that appeal.

71. I am concerned by any build-up of military forces in the island, which, as recent developments have shown, is bound to be a cause of increased tension. It is important that the current trend be reversed. In this context, I would again commend to the Security Council, as well as to the two parties in Cyprus and to the Government of Turkey, the verification proposal that I first floated in 1983 (see S/15812, para. 23) and that I have instructed the Force Commander to raise again with the two sides. This call is for UNFICYP to undertake regular inspections to verify the level of forces on both sides, a technique that has proved effective in reducing tension in other situations of potential conflict.

72. The current problem in Varosha has also aggravated the situation. I once again appeal that an early date be provided for the students to vacate the two hotels they occupy so that the status quo can be restored.

73. It will be apparent from the preceding paragraphs that, in the present difficult situation, I regard it as essential that UNFICYP should be kept in place. It is sometimes said that "UNFICYP has become part of the problem", the point being that by keeping the peace between the two sides UNFICYP saves them from the consequences of their failure to agree on a political solution. In my view, this is a fallacious and dangerous line of argument: fallacious, because the United Nations is dedicated to the principle of settling disputes by peaceful means rather than by the use or threat of force; and dangerous, because withdrawal of UNFICYP could quickly lead to a recurrence of hostilities. I therefore recommend to the Security Council that it extend the mandate of the Force for a further period of six months. I am also persuaded by the advice I have received from the Force Commander that as long as the Force is required to maintain effective control of the United Nations buffer zone, it would not be prudent to make any significant reduction in its effective strength. In accordance with established practice, I have undertaken consultations with the parties concerned on the renewal of the Force's mandate, and I shall report to the Council on these consultations as soon as they have been completed.

74. I shall also report further to the Council on the outcome of the consultations about the financing of UNFICYP, to which reference is made in paragraph 54. The accumulated deficit has increased by almost \$10 million during the mandate period that is about to end and now totals nearly

\$155 million. During the same period, only \$2.2 million have been contributed or pledged by Member States, against expected expenditures of some \$14.4 million. These figures illustrate the gravity of the problem. I continue to feel that it is not fair to ask the troop-contributing Governments to bear so large a share of the financial cost of UNFICYP and it is therefore to be hoped that the necessary agreement will be forthcoming to make the change to assessed contributions. Meanwhile, I again express my gratitude to those Governments that have made voluntary financial contributions.

75. Finally, I take the opportunity to extend my thanks to the troop-contributing Governments for their continuing support to this important and effective peace-keeping operation. I also wish to express my appreciation to my Acting Special Representative, Mr. James Holger, to the Force Commander, Major-General Günther Greindl, and to the officers and men and women of UNFICYP and its civilian staff, who have continued to discharge with exemplary efficiency and devotion the important and difficult responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council.

Notes

1/ See Third United Nations Conference on the Standardization of Geographical Names, vol. 1, Report of the Conference (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.79.I.4), resolution 16.

