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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE
STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Thirty-fourth year

Letter dated 20 July 1979 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of
the Permanent Mission of Democratic Kampuchea to the United
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, for your information, the communiqué of the High Command of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea concerning the current military geography in Democratic Kampuchea. This communiqué was distributed on 16 July 1979 by the High Command of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea.

I should be grateful if you would have this text circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 46 of the provisional agenda, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) CHAN Youran
Acting Permanent Representative
of Democratic Kampuchea

* A/34/150.

ANNEX

Communiqué, dated 16 July 1979, of the High Command of the
Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea concerning the current
military geography in Democratic Kampuchea

The High Command of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea has been authorized by the Government of Democratic Kampuchea to make public the current military geography in Democratic Kampuchea:

I. Situation of the military geography

The situation of the military geography in Democratic Kampuchea around mid-July 1979 is as follows:

1. Regions under the control of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea

These represent one quarter of the total area of Kampuchea and include the highland regions, the plains regions, the mountain regions and the most remote areas and extend throughout all parts of the country.

2. Regions temporarily under enemy control

These represent one quarter of the total area of Kampuchea and include the cities and towns and the regions along major strategic highways. In April 1979, the territory temporarily controlled by the enemy covered one half of the total area of the country. However, since May, the Vietnamese aggressors have begun to abandon the highland regions. They have been forced to do so, on the one hand, because we have developed our guerrilla activities and resumed control of a considerable part of the most remote areas and, on the other, because we have considerably enlarged our guerrilla zones and guerrilla bases.

3. Our guerrilla zones and guerrilla bases

These represent one half of the total area of Kampuchea and include in general the plains regions and those served by communication lines. In April 1979, our guerrilla zones and guerrilla bases were less numerous than at present; they now represent one half of the total area of the country. This development is the result of the increase in and intensification of our guerrilla activities, in co-ordination with the actions and uprisings of the inhabitants of the regions temporarily controlled by the enemy and of the self-defence forces and Khmer soldiers enlisted for service by the enemy.

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II. The four categories of forces fighting
against the Vietnamese aggressors

The change in the situation which is currently taking place on the battlefield is due essentially and basically to the fact that, since May 1979, we have combined four categories of forces to combat the Vietnamese aggressors by applying the guerrilla fighting line with daily increasing efficiency and strength. These four categories of forces are as follows:

1. Our official armed forces

These comprise the regular forces, the zonal forces and the regional forces, which constitute a major nucleus of our armed forces. After resisting the Vietnamese aggression throughout the whole of the last dry season, in 1978-1979, we proceeded to reorganize these armed forces. We have already largely completed this. They are currently distributed in small groups in order to launch guerrilla activities throughout the country, in the mountains and forest regions and in the plains regions and the regions along large and small communication lines, as far as the outskirts of certain towns. The guerrilla units led by these official armed forces are developing quantitatively and qualitatively and are becoming daily more active and more powerful.

2. Our base guerrillas

These come directly from the people and are developing both quantitatively and qualitatively in all zones, regions and districts throughout the country. They are continually gaining strength in guerrilla activities conducted everywhere against Vietnamese aggressors. Our base guerrilla units are also expanding in all areas, with the development and intensification of the increasingly vehement struggle of the population living in the regions temporarily controlled by the enemy.

3. The revolutionary violence force of the whole people of Kampuchea

The whole people of Kampuchea, both in the regions under the control of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea and in the regions temporarily controlled by the enemy, and particularly in the latter, have risen up in revolt to fight the Vietnamese aggressors with their own hands by recourse to revolutionary violence in the form of revolts, acts of sabotage and localized uprisings, etc. This movement is gaining momentum in all zones, regions and districts throughout the country, including the eastern zone. During last June alone, recourse to violence against the Vietnamese aggressors took many different forms and occurred on several hundred occasions. This development will continue even more vigorously during the current month of July. The Kampuchean people from all social strata and of all ages are rising up and directly confronting the Vietnamese aggressors, motivated not only by national hatred but by personal hatred too. For everyone is the direct object of incredible demands on the part of the Vietnamese aggressors, to the point where they can no longer tolerate them

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and are rising up to strike mortal blows at the enemy throughout the whole country. The force constituted by this outraged people is magnificent and irresistible.

4. The Khmer forces enlisted by the Vietnamese occupiers to serve their policy of aggression, expansion, annexation and extermination of the Kampuchean race

During the past two months, uprisings by the self-defence guards and the soldiers and administrators whom the Vietnamese occupiers have enlisted to serve their policy of aggression, expansion, annexation and extermination of the Kampuchean race have been developing and spreading throughout the regions under their temporary control. All these compatriots can no longer tolerate the unheard-of demands and atrocities, the most degrading humiliations and the murders and massacres pure and simple of which they are the direct victims, because the Vietnamese aggressors accuse them of assisting the fighting men of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea. They can no longer tolerate the enemy's arresting, torturing and murdering their relatives and dear ones or ordering them to arrest and shoot innocent inhabitants, by the tens and hundreds each time, in their own villages and communes.

The third and fourth categories of forces are in full revolt in the regions temporarily controlled by the enemy, including Phnom Penh and the other towns, and are striking mortal blows at the Vietnamese bandits.

All the above-mentioned four categories of forces are proving extraordinarily powerful. They are developing and gaining strength spontaneously and are crashing down strenuously on the aggressor, expansionist, annexationist Vietnamese who are trying to swallow up territory and exterminate the Kampuchean race. The enemy will certainly end up by being annihilated and eliminated.

III. The forces of Vietnamese aggressors

At the present they total some 200,000 men.

At the outset, they had only 120,000, for launching invasion attacks and taking over the towns, provincial capitals and major strategic highways. Then, in March, the Vietnamese brought in reinforcements of over 30,000 others to take over our plains regions. In April, they sent more reinforcements of over 30,000 men to take over the mountain and forest regions. Thus, since 25 December 1978 up to the present, the Vietnamese have put in the field more than 180,000 troops for aggression against Kampuchea. During the last dry season, in 1978-1979, the Vietnamese aggressors lost over 40,000 men, either killed or wounded, 20,000 of whom they lost in December 1978 and in January and February 1979, when our forces were still concentrated in one group and striking violent blows at the enemy. From May up to the end of June, the Vietnamese lost some further 10,000 men, either killed or wounded.

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Apart from these losses, the Vietnamese troops of aggression in Kampuchea have been affected by several thousand desertions - men returning to Viet Nam through the forest or the mountains, men who have refused to go to the front and preferred to be arrested or imprisoned in the barracks of the major units and those who have sought refuge in Thailand.

The Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea are also affected by diseases such as malaria, typhoid fever and amoebic dysentery. Many of the new Vietnamese recruits are of urban origin, most of them being former high-school and college students; they are therefore highly vulnerable to these diseases. On the Kompong Som and Koh Kong fronts, during the first two months of the current rainy season alone, several thousand Vietnamese soldiers were afflicted with malaria and typhoid fever. Thus, out of the whole of the front in Kampuchea, the number of Vietnamese soldiers immobilized by disease totals some 10,000, at least.

At the same time, the morale of the Vietnamese soldiers has also been seriously affected. They resent the long-drawn-out war of aggression. Daily they have to face guerrilla warfare, wallow in water and mud, live in deep forests and be exposed to the stinging of mosquitoes and other insects and to all kinds of disease. This only increases the aversion which all these soldiers feel towards the war of aggression which they feel is inevitably doomed to defeat. Furthermore, the morale of the Vietnamese soldiers has fallen even lower when they hear news from their country about the famine which is raging there, the exploitation and oppression of the people by the Hanoi authorities and the daily exodus of thousands of Vietnamese refugees and news of the universal condemnation to which the Le Duan-Pham Van Dong clique is daily subjected.

In such a situation, the Vietnamese aggressors find themselves short of manpower for continuing their offensive, destroying the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea and establishing their control over the whole of Kampuchea. The Vietnamese enemy has assigned the major part of its remaining forces to the defence of Phnom Penh, the other towns and certain positions along the major strategic highways, in the ports and the eastern zone and along the Kampuchean-Thai border. Accordingly, the Vietnamese troops of aggression are short of men in many regions and localities in the interior of Kampuchea.

During the coming months of the current rainy season, with the increasing range and intensity of our guerrilla attacks, the Vietnamese troops will be weakened still further.

However, the successive experiences of the bloodshed suffered by our fighters and people have taught us that the Vietnamese enemy will not fail to exert every effort to muster all the forces left to it in order to launch new attacks against us during the next dry season, in 1979-1980. We must be masters of the situation ahead of time, both as regards our position and as regards concrete measures in all areas. Above all, we must continue our offensives against the Vietnamese aggressors by making full use of the four categories of forces, strenuously and continuously during the next few months of the current

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rainy season and must continue them even more strenuously during the next dry season. Only on this condition can we in all circumstances be masters of the situation vis-à-vis the Vietnamese aggressors.

IV. The political, economic and diplomatic situation of the Vietnamese aggressors

It is necessary to examine the political, economic and diplomatic situation of the Vietnamese aggressors in direct liaison with the military front.

By comparison with last May, the situation of the Vietnamese aggressors on the political, economic and diplomatic planes has deteriorated noticeably, both on the Kampuchean front and also in Viet Nam itself and on the international scene.

In Kampuchea, the most striking fact on the political plane during last June and at the beginning of the current month of July has been the unmitigated struggle of the inhabitants, who have had recourse to revolutionary violence, and of the self-defence guards and Khmer soldiers who were enlisted by force by the Vietnamese and who have risen up against them. That is a special aspect of the war being waged by our people against the Vietnamese aggressors. The latter are not only despised, condemned and scorned by all social strata and all categories of the Kampuchean people, but they are also the object of attacks by the whole people of Kampuchea, who have had recourse to revolutionary violence in order to combat the Vietnamese aggressors directly.

As regards the situation in Viet Nam, it has greatly deteriorated during the last two months, to the detriment of the Le Duan-Pham Van Dong clique, which is now hard-pressed in every respect.

1. The Hanoi authorities are being forced to have recourse to enforced military service in order to raise tens and hundreds of thousands of new recruits.
2. Their economic situation has deteriorated considerably.
3. The living conditions of the people are becoming constantly worse.
4. The Le Duan-Pham Van Dong clique stinks like a corpse to the whole world because of the problem of hundreds of thousands and millions of refugees.
5. The population, and the young people in particular, in Viet Nam are against the Hanoi leaders.

This disastrous political situation is striking a violent blow at the morale of the Vietnamese people and causing unrest within the Vietnamese Army and Party. This situation will never return to normal because all areas are affected, and systematically so. No one area can compensate for the weakness of other areas.

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The Le Duan-Pham Van Dong clique will have no other course than to enlist tens and hundreds of thousands more recruits, because it fears the popular uprisings which are striking it from the rear. The situation is deteriorating in all areas in Laos, because Viet Nam, which is swallowing up Laos, is encountering increasing difficulties in that country. And the tense situation on the borders between China and Viet Nam is causing additional difficulties for Viet Nam.

As regards the economic situation of the Vietnamese, it is daily deteriorating further. Agricultural production is collapsing, and industry is short of raw materials. Foreign aid has for the most part been cut off and is being curtailed yet further. In 1977 Viet Nam's food deficit totalled 2 million tons. It rose to over 4 million tons in 1978 and will be at least 5 or 6 million tons in 1979. The deficits are piling up year by year. It should be noted that, since 1954, which saw the birth of the "Democratic Republic of Viet Nam", up to the present, the Vietnamese have been begging for food every year. Since 1975, when the two parties in Viet Nam were united, the Le Duan-Pham Van Dong clique has been hoping to solve the food problem for the whole of Viet Nam by depending on the South Vietnamese economy and South Vietnamese provisions. However, the disastrous policy of the Hanoi authorities in Viet Nam itself, their policy of aggression, expansion and annexation in Kampuchea and Laos and their policy of intimidation of the people of South-East Asia have aroused increasing opposition on the part of the Vietnamese people, particularly the people of South Viet Nam. In the circumstances, how do the Hanoi authorities hope to remedy the disastrous economic and financial situation and, in particular, the food shortage? And this situation is deteriorating daily.

As regards the diplomatic situation of the Vietnamese, this is at a nadir and is constantly deteriorating. South-East Asia, Oceania, Africa, South and North America, Western and Eastern Europe are opposing Viet Nam more strongly and more resolutely for its aggression against Kampuchea, for the refugee scandal, for its annexation of Laos, for the threats which it makes regarding South-East Asia and for the presence of Soviet military bases on its territory. The international movement against the Le Duan-Pham Van Dong clique has become widespread and is developing throughout the world.

It thus seems clear that this political, economic and diplomatic situation with which the Le Duan-Pham Van Dong clique is struggling has a fateful repercussion on the military situation of the Vietnamese. We must take advantage of the development of this situation and redouble efforts to contribute more actively to the struggle on the military front and also on the political, economic and diplomatic fronts, against the aggressor, expansionist, annexationist Vietnamese - who swallow up territory and are seeking to exterminate the Kampuchean race - during the current rainy season and the next dry season.

The Vietnamese aggressors and their supporters are engaging in and will continue to engage in sly manoeuvres of every kind. We must not relax our vigilance. But, if we deploy all our efforts and make full use of the four categories of forces for the successful accomplishment of our tasks for the current rainy season and the next dry season, in co-ordination with our endeavours on the political, economic and diplomatic fronts, the situation of the military geography will turn very swiftly to our advantage and to the detriment of the Vietnamese aggressors in all areas.
