

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.402
2 April 1987

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SECOND PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 2 April 1987, at 10 a.m.

President:

Mr. M. Vejvoda

(Czechoslovakia)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 402nd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

As I assume the Presidency for the month of April, I should like to read out a message transmitted to the Conference by the President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Dr. Gustav Husák.

"Dear delegates,

I avail myself of this opportunity to extend to all participants in the Conference on Disarmament my sincere greetings.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic attaches to the Conference on Disarmament extraordinary importance. Since the very beginning of the existence of that organ, we have been actively participating in its work. Efforts to strengthen peace, enhance international security and stability, limit and halt the arms race and adopt effective measures that would lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control constitute an unchanging axiom of our foreign policy. These goals cannot be achieved without broad international co-operation, confidence, reasonable compromises and respect for the principles of reciprocity, equality of commitments and refraining from acts threatening the security of any of the parties.

In view of the current international situation and of the realities of the nuclear and space age, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic together with its allies propose to establish a comprehensive system of international peace and security based on the premise that it is impossible to build one's own security at the expense of the security of others, and providing for an organic connection between its principal spheres -- military, political, economic and humanitarian. We consider it necessary that this concept be taken into account in the practical work of the Conference, primarily in the deliberations on the complex of issues relating to nuclear disarmament, prevention of an arms race in outer space and prohibition of chemical weapons.

A constructive platform for the solution of those issues is provided by the programme of the elimination of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction by the end of this century put forward by the Soviet Union on 15 January 1986, the far-reaching proposals of the Soviet Union presented at the Soviet-United States summit meeting at Reykjavik, the numerous initiatives adopted at recent sessions of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty, as well as the proposals of the non-aligned and other peace-loving countries.

The latest significant proposals of the Soviet Union envisaging the elimination of medium-range missiles from Europe offers a real chance of reducing the danger of military confrontation on our continent as well as in the whole world. We have a sincere interest in speedily reaching an agreement on that subject. If this happened, the counter-measures we adopted together with the Soviet Union in order to safeguard our own

(The President)

security after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had decided to deploy in Europe the Pershing-2 and cruise missiles would not be needed any longer.

The ongoing stage of the deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament is considered by us to be the decisive phase. The central problem which exposes the line of division between old and new thinking and conduct lies, in our view, in the question of the halting of nuclear-weapon tests. The approach to this highly significant and sensitive issue reveals the true attitude of States to the problem of nuclear disarmament as such. We profoundly regret that the generous gesture made by the Soviet Union in declaring a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing has not been reciprocated and that a number of nuclear explosions have been carried out in the United States during its validity. Yet, it would not be advisable to give in to resignation or scepticism. The Conference on Disarmament provides every opportunity for a successful solution of the question relating to the structure and scope of an agreement on general and complete prohibition of testing of nuclear weapons, including measures to secure its strict observance and verification.

It is proper that the Conference should focus its attention on prevention of an arms race in outer space. Extension of the arms race to outer space would not guarantee anyone's security and, moreover, it would multiply the risk of the outbreak of a war, posing a qualitatively new threat to all States, regardless of their location or affiliation to any politico-military groupings.

We deem it especially important to achieve progress on the question of chemical weapons. If an agreement on general and complete prohibition of such weapons and on their elimination was formulated already this year, it would be a practical contribution to the strengthening of mutual trust and an inspiring example proving that multilateral talks on disarmament can produce significant concrete results in the form of real treaties, agreements or conventions.

Guided by our desire to do our utmost to facilitate that process, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic have been actively advocating the establishment of chemical and nuclear-weapon-free zones in central Europe, which would contribute to the elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction from that sensitive area. Together with the German Democratic Republic, we have put forward concrete proposals to this end.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic will continue to the largest possible extent to promote progress in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. I am convinced that all States, large, medium-sized and small alike, irrespective of their social systems, can play a positive role in the pursuit of the goals of disarmament provided that they show

(The President)

decisive political will to do so. I am confident that you will exert all your skills and every effort in the interest of the noble objective and that you will utilize the broad negotiating potential of the Conference on Disarmament in an effective manner. I wish you every success in this endeavour.

Gustav Husák"

Our conference is entering today the last month of its work in the spring part of the session. While it would be still premature to draw conclusions from this first part of the session, it would be appropriate to look briefly at where we stand and in what directions our efforts should be further intensified.

Let me start with the positive. Early in this year's session we managed to re-establish the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, which then immediately resumed its intensive work aimed at the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition and destruction of CW. Further progress has been achieved and there is a practically unanimous view that efforts should continue persistently so that the convention could be finalized as soon as possible, preferably already in 1987. I am confident that the Ad hoc Committee, under the guidance of Ambassador Ekéus of Sweden, will do all in its power to speed up progress towards the convention.

Let me remind you, distinguished delegates, that just a week ago a political body of high importance -- the Committee of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty -- launched an appeal to all the participants of our Conference regarding the prohibition of CW. In the separate statement on this subject the ministers called upon all States to refrain from all steps that might complicate the achievement of a mutually acceptable agreement on the prohibition of CW and not to produce any CW, including binary or multi-component CW, not to deploy them in foreign countries and to withdraw them from those foreign countries where they are already present. The ministers expressed the belief that 1987 can and must be the year of the commencement of complete and general chemical disarmament. The statement I referred to reflects interest in the work of this Conference and the importance of our negotiations on the prohibition and elimination of CW.

The Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament under the leadership of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, enters its seventh year of active work in order to fulfil its mandate and to submit to the United Nations General Assembly a complete draft CPD. We should pay more attention to this Committee during this month, since it is supposed to enter a final stage of its work.

A number of other committees were established. The Ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Pugliese of Italy, is about to start its work. In view of the importance and urgency of the task it has been assigned we hope that this

(The President)

Committee will, during this month, reach some conclusions which will enable us to advance our work further. Ambassador Meiszter of Hungary assumed the chairmanship of the Ad hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons. His task will not be easy but we realize that both prevention of the appearance of RW as well as ensuring security for the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes are subjects of high importance and the Conference cannot ignore them. One more proof of this is great attention which is now paid to the ongoing United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.

Turning to the negative I have to point out that the Conference has, as yet, not been able to take any action on the first three items, containing priority measures of nuclear disarmament. Our inability to establish working bodies on such important items as nuclear test ban and nuclear disarmament has, unfortunately, become a pattern of our work in the course of recent years. In my opinion there is a danger that we might become too much accustomed to the lack of negotiations in this unique multilateral negotiating body. Indeed, there is a rather unnatural discrepancy in this Conference, which can negotiate very actively on, for example, the prohibition of CW, but is not capable of the slightest practical move on the NTB and a number of other important items.

As I said at the beginning, it is too early to try to draw any conclusions whatever from our work so far. I would like to believe that the same applies also to our approach to the three nuclear items. Let us hope that the door has not been closed definitely on work aimed at the achievement of the NTB in the way we were requested by the forty-first session of the General Assembly. But let us also realize that April is the last month of the spring session and that if we want to address the NTB seriously it is high time to do so. It is my intention, in my capacity as President of the Conference, to do my utmost and to explore any possibilities in this regard. In fact, at our meeting yesterday with the Co-ordinators we already started a first exchange of views on what practical steps could be done with respect to the first three items of the agenda. With respect to the NTB, the only reasonable framework we should strive for is the Ad hoc Committee. There is a number of draft mandates for such a Committee and in the coming days we shall look at them again to see if a mutually acceptable basis for the NTB Committee could be evolved. With respect to items two and three, various proposals have been advanced previously, including proposals to convene a series of informal meetings of the plenary. I believe that we should continue to consider these proposals, possibly in conjunction with some topics which could be discussed at such informal meetings.

There is a number of open questions concerning the organization of our work which will be dealt with appropriately.

(The President)

I should now like to proceed with our business for today. Firstly, I should like to express to Ambassador Lechuga Hevia of Cuba, on behalf of the members of the Conference and myself, our warm appreciation for the effective and able manner in which he conducted the activities of the Conference during the month of March. His knowledge of multilateral diplomacy has been an asset that has helped us in finding solutions to some difficult problems facing us. He has also laid the foundation for further work on finding appropriate organizational arrangements for some items on the agenda of the Conference which have been at a stalemate for a considerable time. Ambassador Lechuga Hevia thus continued the successful work of Ambassador Fan Guoxiang of China, who presided over the Conference during the month of February.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda item 4, entitled "Chemical Weapons". However, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Poland, Algeria, Bulgaria and Nigeria.

In addition, Doctor Ola Dahlman, Chairman of the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, will introduce the progress report of that Group, contained in document CD/745. You will recall that this document was circulated to all members of the Conference at the 399th plenary meeting.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of Poland, Ambassador Turbanski.

Mr. TURBANSKI (Poland): Comrade President, let me begin by expressing my great satisfaction at seeing you, the representative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Poland's neighbour, close friend and ally, in the chair of the Conference on Disarmament for the last month of the spring session. I have had the privilege not only of witnessing your diplomatic skills over many years but also of closely co-operating with you at various conferences, including the Conference on Disarmament. The skills, combined with your wide-ranging experience in international forums, combined with your personal warmth and friendliness, make me confident that you will competently and efficiently lead the Conference towards further progress in its work. I can assure you that the Polish delegation shall spare no effort to co-operate with you also as Co-ordinator of the Group of Socialist Countries during the month of April. It was with great interest that I listened to the message of the President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Comrade Gustav Husák, which expressed ideas which Poland fully shares. The statement was a clear demonstration of the high priority given by Czechoslovakia to the Conference on Disarmament. Permit me also to use this opportunity to express my delegation's gratitude to your predecessors, Ambassador Fan Guoxiang of China and

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

Ambassador Lechuga Hevia of Cuba, who chaired our work in February and March, respectively. Their perseverance and personal devotion have moved the Conference closer to the resolution of some of the outstanding issues.

The purpose of my statement today is to offer some remarks concerning agenda item 5 -- prevention of an arms race in outer space.

My delegation has noted with satisfaction the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee almost at the very beginning of this spring part of the Conference's session. We hoped for the meaningful continuation of what was accomplished by the Committee last year. Unfortunately, our hopes have been reduced to a certain extent as the Committee has stood logjammed for a month already.

General Assembly resolution 41/53 again requested the Conference on Disarmament "to re-establish an Ad hoc Committee with an adequate mandate ... with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements as appropriate to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects". We consider the mandate, also covering the consideration of proposals for measures aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space, as a logical next step after last year's substantive work of the Committee. But we see it as only a partial implementation of paragraph 8 of resolution 41/53.

One State's abstention has prevented this resolution from being passed unanimously. We hope, however, that no State will ultimately prevent the Conference to meet fully the General Assembly request and to do the work which almost all States voted for in the Assembly.

The Polish delegation would certainly prefer to participate in the work of a body with an explicitly negotiating mandate; not only because we would prefer to follow a position consistent with what we have advocated in the General Assembly, and not only because we do regard the Conference on Disarmament as above all a negotiating forum.

It is also our firm conviction that the prevention of the arms race in space has long been ripe enough to become a subject of negotiations. We do recognize existing difficulties and doubts of different kind in this field. We think, however, that such problems could best be dealt with within the process of negotiations and not outside it. My delegation continues to believe that sooner or later all the delegations will find it unavoidable to arrive at this point of view.

The mandate based on a compromise we have adopted allows for much more than informal consultations on the programme of work. The long-lasting dormancy of the Ad hoc Committee is a point of serious concern to my delegation. We believe, however, that difficulties will be overcome and work

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

will start soon. Otherwise we will again have to include in the Conference's report a sentence saying that had the Committee started earlier, its achievement would have been much greater.

Up to now, no strike weapons have been deployed in space. However, the situation is about to be changed. The American concept of anti-ballistic missile defences (BMD), as described in President Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative, is pregnant with very serious political, strategic and military consequences. The first lesson which can be learned from the historical experience is that security is, above all, a political task. The introduction of BMDs will not solve the problem of security. The deployment of weapons in space will only introduce into a remarkably stable strategic relationship between East and West an unprecedented degree of uncertainty and nervousness, attempting to provide hardware answers to political questions.

The emergence of BMDs will generate a total or ultimate arms race and render disarmament impossible. The subject is known well enough and there is no need to elaborate on it further. What is worth mentioning is that the SDI, once unleashed, has gained its momentum within the United States, irrespective of any international context. Partial technologies and different spin-offs can fuel either the creation of new weapons or the amelioration of existing ones, and they do so, indeed, prior to the final decision "whether the initiative is feasible as a whole". Thus, the "contribution" of the Initiative to the speeding-up of an arms race is really manifold.

What is the actual goal underlying the SDI? It is widely recognized that it would be a dangerous illusion to believe that a technological breakthrough could create a vastly improved security. Real security can only be found in co-operation with a possible adversary, not at his expense.

Based on this premise, the basic concept of the ABM Treaty -- mutually assured deterrence -- is still valid. Allow me to quote what President Nixon said in explaining his decision to forego a broad defence of the nation in favour of the limited ABM system primarily to defend United States retaliatory forces. "The heaviest defence system we considered, one designed to protect our major cities, still could not prevent a catastrophic level of United States fatalities from a deliberate all-out Soviet attack. And it might look to an opponent like the prelude to an offensive strategy threatening the Soviet deterrent." Here we are.

The ABM Treaty is a milestone in the political approach to curbing the arms race, avoiding nuclear war and providing hope that nations and their leaders can act to keep nuclear war from erupting. It has proved highly effective in preventing an arms race in space.

It provides for the prohibition of the development, testing or deployment of space-based ABM systems, including those dependent on exotic technology. The Treaty should be strengthened and complied with, instead of bending its

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

language and torturing its basic meaning, as was demonstrated in the October 1985 memorandum regarding the United States ratification record of the ABM Treaty.

Recently, Senator Sam Nunn asserted that "his research had led him to the conclusion, compelling beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Senate's ratification of the Treaty in 1972 was based on a restrictive interpretation of the pact". Also Judge Soafer, the chief author of the above-mentioned memorandum, "explicitly and repeatedly disavowed the October 1985 memorandum ...". Let us hope that these signs mark a better future for the ABM Treaty.

Naturally, the future of the Treaty is entirely the province of the Contracting Parties. However, it has implications with respect to the security of the whole world, and the international community so affected has the legitimate right to express its views on the matter. Thus, a hope could be voiced that the United States will find it possible to accept the proposal by the Soviet Union to strengthen the régime of the ABM Treaty and to agree on what is indeed prohibited and what is permitted by the Treaty. This would at least keep BMDs in laboratories, as originally proposed by President Reagan.

Thirty years after the launching of the first satellite of the Earth, it can be asserted with confidence that no major conflicts have occurred with respect to the legal status of outer space and celestial bodies. The existing body of space law -- no matter how incomplete -- has proven its capability to regulate effectively the relations of States in the exploration and use of space and to prevent -- so far -- the extension of the arms race into this environment. The significance of this legal system has additionally been illuminated by the painstaking efforts to dodge its provisions undertaken by those who would like to proceed with a gun-spacecraft policy.

Undoubtedly, the existing legal order of outer space is not perfect. However, weak points and gaps, by virtue of their existence, do not prejudice the worthlessness of any legal system as such. Everything depends on political will and political choice -- what purpose is a given legal regulation expected to serve.

According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, any treaty should be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. Thus, in the view of my delegation, lacunae in the space law must not be used as loopholes for pouring weapons into outer space, because the primary goal and a clear intention of any arms-control-related agreement is to prohibit or limit military activities and not to justify the expansion of an arms race.

The need for a comprehensive and more detailed regulation of contemporary and especially future space activities by the international community cannot be questioned. As it has been stressed on numerous occasions in this Hall,

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

the globality of the subject matter requires global solutions. It is only natural that the Conference on Disarmament should embark on this task -- enormously difficult as it is, but one which has to be undertaken. In our opinion, the work on the identification and analysis of weak spots and lacunae of the existing legal régime of outer space has already been accomplished by the Ad hoc Committee during its previous sessions. What is necessary now is to begin negotiations aimed at improving and strengthening this régime.

Further measures are needed to prevent the arms race in outer space. Certainly, it would be desirable to count on the solution of all problems by the adoption of a single agreement. We all agree that a process should be initiated through which step-by-step agreement or agreements could be worked out progressively, with the final aim of excluding the risk of a lethal competition in space.

In considering issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space as provided for in its mandate, the Ad hoc Committee should immediately embark on the concrete discussion of measures to eliminate the possibilities of the deployment of weapons in space. The Polish delegation is deeply satisfied to realize that other delegations wish to follow a similar position. It has been proved unequivocally by proposals discussed during the current session by the delegations of the USSR, France, Egypt, the Netherlands, Venezuela, Romania and Mongolia. These proposals form a very good basis to start business-like work towards the elaboration of effective international instruments. My delegation is prepared to take an active part in this work.

As I have already pointed out, up to now there have been no strike weapons in space. That is why my delegation welcomes wholeheartedly the Soviet proposal aimed at banning the use of force in outer space and from space against the Earth. Such a ban would strengthen significantly the general renunciation of the use or threat of use of force embodied in the United Nations Charter and would update it to the conditions of the nuclear and space age. It would not only be a strong bulwark against weapons in space: it would contribute to a confidence-building process as a whole and to the further strengthening of strategic stability.

But, realistically thinking, one must assume that the elaboration of the above-mentioned instrument would take some time; and in space issues, time is running short at a space-age speed. Thus, while working on the ban on the use of force in space, the Conference could also consider additional measures which would forestall and frustrate the stationing of arms in orbit. For instance, as has been proposed by Italy and most recently supported by Venezuela, the Conference could discuss the adoption of a protocol to the Outer Space Treaty. As an interim measure, such a protocol could prohibit the deployment of strike weapons in space, without the need to elaborate from scratch a new legal instrument to this effect.

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

We realize, certainly, that one important definitional question would have to be solved -- namely, the definition to be given of what constitutes a "strike weapon". Significant work on this subject was done during the previous session of the Committee. It should be continued and completed in the course of the present session. Within the scientific community there is a widespread opinion that proceeding from technical characteristics it is possible to distinguish between passive systems in space which already exist and active or strike weapons for use within, into or from space. Such weapons do not exist yet, but they are being developed actively, at least in one country. If the scientists are right, it must be possible accordingly to formulate legal instruments that would outlaw space strike weapons and provide for proper verification.

The problem of protection of satellites has been discussed on numerous occasions by many delegations.

The Polish delegation fully supports the elaboration of an international legal instrument for guaranteeing the immunity of satellites. Such an instrument would contribute also to the creation of the International Satellite Monitoring Agency as proposed by France, which -- in turn -- could form the essential part of the International Space Organization, as proposed by the Soviet Union. I would like to draw the attention of all delegations not only to the formal attractiveness of the above-mentioned proposals, but also to their characteristic sequence and inherent logic of succession. This is by no means only a coincidence.

One more remark as to the immunity of satellites: it should be granted for all of them. Sometimes the problem of the dual nature of military functions of satellite happens to be raised. It is argued that satellites that are deployed to verify arms control obligations could be simultaneously used for the gathering of sensitive military information. Yes, that can be the case. But to draw the precise line between different functions of satellites is almost impossible, and could be compared to the question of verification of what goes on in laboratory work on any subject. It is impossible to monitor what happens in a scientist's brain, and it is likewise impossible to know in advance in what manner a satellite computer has been programmed. Hence, the only way out is to grant immunity for all satellites.

To make this legal immunity more effective, we should also outlaw the means of breaking it, namely ASAT weapons, prior to their deployment. The ban on ASAT weapons, including the elimination of existing ASAT systems, would contribute greatly to the strengthening of the strategic balance and to confidence-building. As an actual arms control measure, it would also mark important headway on the road towards general disarmament.

The next important problem relating to the protection of satellites which has frequently been raised in this Hall is connected with the growing space traffic and the so-called dual-purpose or dual-capability of space objects. It is feared that an attack on a spacecraft could be carried out by simply

(Mr. Turbanski, Poland)

ramming it with another space object, i.e. without necessarily using a weapon. A solution could be found by concluding the "rules of the road" agreement proposed already by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany and advocated by some other delegations. What I would like to draw attention to is that recently the concept in question has been given additional substantiation, because, logically, "the rules of the road" agreement should become an essential part of the French proposed code of conduct of States in space. Again, two different proposals coming from different delegations compose a logical whole.

Each of the three above-mentioned concepts, namely, the international protection régime for satellites, the ban on ASAT weapons and the "rules of the road" agreement would -- if implemented -- mark a significant step on the road towards peace in space. But they are coherently linked together and supplement each other. Thus, in our opinion, the smartest thing the Conference can do is to change quantity into quality, and to start work towards negotiations on international instruments in those three spheres. It would be a bold move, it would require a lot of courage and imagination, but it would be a responsible answer to the challenges the Conference faces now. For beyond any doubt, such a set of agreements, once it has entered into force, would bring about a qualitatively new political environment. In the meantime, any substantial progress in negotiations could facilitate a headway in the bilateral negotiations.

And last, but by no means the least, the question of verification, which in space -- given the vastness of this domain and the technological advancement of space activities -- will create serious difficulties. That is true, but it is worth remembering that each day of delay in the creation of a verification régime will render these difficulties more serious, for increased sophistication of weapons objectively tends to make the task of verification more complicated. Proceeding from this premise, the Polish delegation supports the Soviet initiative to consider the possibility of creating an international inspectorate the task of which would be to monitor the non-deployment of weapons in space, and the rights of which would go so far as an on-site inspection. What stricter régime could be envisaged? Besides, I should like to draw once again the attention of the Conference to the apparent logic of such a move. The International Inspectorate, possibly a division of the International Space Organization, would be an inescapable link in the above-mentioned chain of structures and instruments. All of them, taken together, would constitute a solid frame of the system of peaceful exploration and use of outer space.

These are the tasks which, in the opinion of my delegation, should become the fruitful domain of activities of the Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space, under the able guidance of Ambassador Aldo Pugliese. We hope the Committee will embark on this work immediately, because time is running short, and in space issues -- allow me to repeat -- at space-age speed.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Poland, Ambassador Turbanski, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Algeria, Ambassador Hacene.

Mr. HACENE (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. President, as I am speaking in the Conference for the first time may I start by congratulating you on your accession to the Presidency of our Conference for the month of April and say that I am pleased for two reasons to see in this post the representative of Czechoslovakia, a country with which Algeria has traditional ties of friendship, and the colleague I had the great pleasure of knowing in New York 25 years ago.

I would also like to express to Ambassador Fan Guoxiang of China and Ambassador Lechuga Hevia of Cuba our gratitude for their contribution to launching this session of the Conference. May I also thank all the representatives who have welcomed me, and assure them of my full co-operation and of my delegation's readiness to make every contribution to the smooth conduct of our work. In addition, I would like to express here my sincere condolences to the delegation of the United States of America following the death of Ambassador Lowitz, and associate myself with the unanimous tribute paid to his memory.

A year ago, the session of the Conference opened in an atmosphere of optimism justified, inter alia, by the dialogue which had been renewed by the United States and the Soviet Union and the undertakings given by both parties in the Joint Declaration adopted following the Geneva Summit in November 1985. At the time, everyone expressed the hope that a new process of disarmament negotiations would finally begin and that there would be a real movement towards improving the international environment.

However, we are compelled to note that we have fallen short of that expectation: 1986 was marked in particular by the intensification of the arms race, increased use of force in various regions of the world, and the continuing impediments to the start of a resolute process in the disarmament field.

In carrying out an assessment of the international context in which this session of the Conference is taking place, we cannot ignore this balance sheet which arouses in several respects a feeling of frustration.

At the same time we cannot ignore the fact that today there are new promising signs of a constructive dialogue between the two greatest military Powers of the world. This dialogue has been expressed through the declared determination of both parties to embark on negotiations for the total elimination of a category of their nuclear weaponry. Success in these negotiations would prove, should this still be necessary, that the security of nations cannot be sought in an arms build-up but rather in their steady and continual reduction.

On that basis, one can only express the hope that the same thinking will guide the negotiations on all other types of weapons. We also hope that the goodwill demonstrated by the United States and the Soviet Union in the ongoing

(Mr. Hacene, Algeria)

negotiations will extend to our own consideration of the items on the Conference's agenda, and that this will lead to a climate of greater confidence which is essential for a genuine disarmament process and the establishment of equal security for all.

It goes without saying that it will take decisive action and the contribution of the entire international community to meet this challenge. In the area of disarmament, bilateral negotiations, however significant and important, can in no way replace the multilateral negotiating effort. As the heads of State and Government of the non-aligned countries stated in the Harare Declaration last September, "Bilateral and multilateral negotiations on disarmament should mutually facilitate and compliment and not hinder or preclude each other".

In that context the Conference on Disarmament, as an expression of the democratization of the disarmament debate, is a unique and irreplaceable forum. It would be regrettable for this body to be restricted to a minor role as would appear to be suggested by its record over eight years of functioning.

This situation is particularly significant if we bear in mind the stalemate with respect to nuclear issues. It is, moreover, in striking contrast with the priority openly attached to these issues and the pressing appeals of the international community that mankind be freed from the threat of nuclear annihilation, as evidenced yet again by the resolutions of the forty-first session of the General Assembly and the non-aligned Harare Declaration.

These appeals, together with the unanimous recognition of the fact that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought", should prompt our Conference to set up appropriate subsidiary bodies under items 2 and 3 of our agenda.

The obstacles met in deciding on a negotiating mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban raise the same questions as to the willingness to stop and reverse the nuclear arms race.

The speedy conclusion of a treaty completely prohibiting nuclear tests, something that the international community so fervently desires, is more relevant than ever in so far as such tests today serve not only to improve nuclear arsenals on Earth, but also to develop space weapons.

Given this situation, it is regrettable that the opportunity provided by the moratorium on nuclear tests declared by one of the major Powers, was not seized in order to begin the negotiations expected under agenda item 1. At the forty-first General Assembly it was noted that positions were closer when it came to the issue of a nuclear-test ban, and this is something that certainly must be appreciated. However, the question stands as to whether in

(Mr. Hacene, Algeria)

the Conference there is the necessary, and shared, determination to work towards genuine progress in the preparation of a treaty totally prohibiting nuclear tests.

Among the priority issues before our Conference is that of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The interest in this topic stems, of course, from a deep and legitimate concern at the danger that this new dimension of the arms race will create for the security of all.

It is our conviction, as we have repeatedly stated, that the extension of the arms race to outer space will only expand the potential domain for confrontation and push our goal of general and complete disarmament even further away.

The preparations underway for developing new weapons systems for outer space therefore make the much-awaited negotiations under item 5 of our agenda particularly urgent.

Furthermore, the common determination to exclude outer space from Great Power rivalry that we believe can be seen through the resolutions of the General Assembly, should logically have led to the granting of a genuine negotiating mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

There can be no doubt that the process of drafting a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons has entered a crucial phase. The progress achieved at the previous session under Ambassador Cromartie is certainly an encouraging result, as well as a stimulus for the ongoing negotiations. Agreement has still to be reached on significant aspects of the convention, but this should not deter us from our objective of concluding this instrument. A spirit of flexibility and mutual concessions continue to be the best means of overcoming the obstacles to definitive elaboration of a future convention. The proposals made over the past few weeks are, in my delegation's opinion, an example which should be followed if we are to reconcile the various approaches.

Furthermore, we are sure that the competence and experience of the new Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekéus, will be a great help for making full use of the years of effort invested in the consideration of the various aspects of the draft convention and finding an appropriate solution to the questions which remained outstanding.

The conclusion of an agreement for the complete elimination of chemical weapons would be a milestone in multilateral disarmament efforts. Clearly, such an agreement will be even more significant if it could win the support of all States. To this end, it is essential that the chemical weapons ban should not lead to discriminatory measures or impediments for the chemical industry which, as we are all aware, is of particular importance in the development processes of our countries.

(Mr. Hacene, Algeria)

Following the same trend of thought, we think that the future convention would be all the stronger if it promoted international co-operation in the chemical industry, and here we must focus on the importance, in our view, of article 11 of the draft convention.

In keeping with the decision of the General Assembly, our Conference has been called on to submit before the end of the first part of the session a complete draft of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. This is certainly a significant challenge in several ways and merits our special attention. An agreement on a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament would be a just reward for the work carried out for many years under the dedicated Chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles. It would also be a means for each country to reiterate the commitments entered into in the Final Document of SSOD 1.

Finally, it would be of symbolic importance on the eve of the Conference on Disarmament and Development and the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament. The challenge, in any event, remains the same: that of grasping the interrelated problems of disarmament development and security, and embarking resolutely on the actions that must be taken to establish genuine collective security.

As several speakers have already stated, the proximity of SSOD 3 means that it would be an excellent opportunity for a critical analysis of our work and an opportunity to show our determination to shoulder our responsibility as members of the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament. This is no doubt a legitimate expectation that cannot be ignored without undermining the credibility of the Conference itself.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Algeria of his statement and for the kind remarks he addressed to the President. I now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria Ambassador Tellalov.

Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): Comrade President, I also begin my statement by warmly congratulating you upon your accession of the post of President of the Conference of Disarmament for the month of April. As Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia are socialist countries which enjoy excellent relations, this will greatly facilitate the co-operation of our two delegations. I would like to express my delegation's satisfaction of seeing you in the Chair, Comrade Vejvoda. We with you joined this body at nearly the same time, when we succeeded in establishing between us very friendly relations, and I may assure you today that I would do my best, and my delegation also, to fully support your endeavours to further advance the work of this Conference. It is with deep interest and great attention that we listened to the important message to the Conference addressed by the President of Czechoslovakia, Gustav Housák, which my delegation fully supports. May I use this opportunity also to thank your predecessor Ambassador Lechuga Hevia, who performed his duties in a brilliant manner in the previous month.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

In my statement today, I too would like to speak briefly on item 5, "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space".

Active discussions have been going on on this issue both in plenary and in the respective subsidiary bodies. This is an expression of a growing concern that there is a real danger of extending the arms race to outer space.

Bearing in mind this threat, the Foreign Ministers of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty who met in Moscow last week called for "immediate termination of the implementation of the SDI, as well as the development of projects such as the "European Defence Initiative".

Along with the majority of delegations in this Conference, the delegation of Bulgaria is alarmed by recent reports that the "research" stage of the SDI programme is approaching a point where decisions on field testing and consequently the deployment of space weapons will be taken. Such a step would lead to weaponization of outer space, and could unleash an extremely dangerous round of the arms race. The efforts to achieve the generally agreed objective of prevention of arms race in outer space would thus be frustrated.

The distinguished representative of Egypt, Ambassador Alfarargi, spoke about this in plenary on 17 February. Together with him, we are also at a loss as to how to perceive the fact that the declared objective of the bilateral negotiations on space and nuclear weapons is "to prevent an arms race in outer space while at the same time the United States develops, with the purpose of deploying, space weapons systems about which negotiations are going on for their prohibition and for destruction of existing systems". On the same date the distinguished representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Dhanapala, rightly drew our attention to the fact that "our discussions here are taking place while irreversible steps are being planned to place weapons in space".

I need perhaps not say more to illustrate that the contemplating of measures to prevent an arms race in outer space is an urgent issue. The urgency of this task should be as high as that of advancing the goal of nuclear disarmament, whose top priority is generally recognized. It cannot be otherwise, since one can hardly imagine deep reductions of the strategic nuclear arsenals if weapons are going to be deployed in outer space. Therefore, we hope that the bilateral negotiations on space and nuclear weapons will soon lead to results.

The task of preventing an arms race in outer space has global aspects. Weaponization of outer space would directly affect the security interests of all nations. All States have, therefore, both the right and the obligation to participate in, and contribute to, the efforts to avoid such a race. As a multilateral negotiating body, the Conference on Disarmament can and must play a central role in this field.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

In this respect, we fully share the view expressed by President Hussak in his message of today to the effect that: (quote), "Extension of the arms race to outer space would not guarantee anyone's security and, moreover, it would multiply the risk of the outbreak of a war, posing a qualitatively new threat to all States, regardless of their location or affiliation to any politico-military groupings".

Having said this, we welcome the fact that the Ad Hoc Committee on item 5 was established earlier this year. This offers the Conference an opportunity of going deeper into the problems that have to be solved with a view to arriving at an appropriate agreement, or agreements, to prevent an arms race in outer space. For the last two years the Ad Hoc Committee has examined and identified almost all issues relevant to this objective. Turning to a more practical and result-oriented work in the Committee is now widely expected. We welcome, therefore, the understanding expressed by the President of the Conference that "consideration of proposals for measures aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space is covered by the mandate contained in Working Paper CD/WP.268". Concentrating on such proposals this year would also be in conformity with the consensus statement contained in paragraph 80 of the Final Document that "in order to prevent an arms race in outer space further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held", in accordance also with the spirit of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. A good basis for substantive work along these lines does exist.

The delegation of Bulgaria is ready to consider all proposals on specific measures aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

A new idea relevant to all specific measures providing for the non-introduction of space weapons has been advanced by the delegation of the Soviet Union. The proposal to establish an international inspectorate for the purpose of verifying such agreements was formally made on 3 February by the First Deputy Foreign Minister, Y.M. Vorontsov. The distinguished representative of the USSR, Ambassador Nazarkin, elaborated on this idea in his statement on 17 March. He suggested that such an inspectorate should be given the right of access to all objects designed to be launched and stationed in outer space, as well as to their launching vehicles.

The new Soviet idea is a valuable one. It seems to us that a comprehensive agreement on non-deployment of weapons in outer space could be effectively verified through co-operative measures providing for inspections of the launching sites. Such launches cannot be hidden. They have long been monitored by national technical means. Complementing these activities by international on-site inspections would strengthen the verification régime. International inspectors, present at the launching of space objects, would have the right of access to them as well as to their launching vehicles, thus ensuring confidence in compliance with the respective agreements banning deployment of outer space weapons. This is valid for weapons of any type, whether ASAT or ABM, which are designed to be deployed in outer space. The

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

idea of an international inspectorate could, therefore, be utilized for the verification purposes of both an ASAT ban and a comprehensive prohibition of space weapons.

We cannot but conclude that the establishment of an international inspectorate deserves very serious attention. We believe that the Ad Hoc Committee should consider it carefully, in the context of examining appropriate measures to prevent the weaponization of outer space. The Committee could, inter alia, elaborate on the principles of the establishment and functioning of such a system.

The delegation of Bulgaria would favour the continuation in the Ad Hoc Committee of the work aimed at a comprehensive prohibition of the whole class of space weapons. Arriving at a general agreement on the scope of such a ban would facilitate our task. Several interesting formulations were suggested last year in an initial attempt to define the weapons that are to be outlawed. We are ready to continue the exploration of this avenue.

Appropriate partial measures could also lead us to the achievement of the same objective. On 19 March, Ambassador Taylhardat spoke about the possibility of amending article 4 of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, so that its prohibition provisions cover any type of outer space weapons. This is an approach which, in our submission, deserves to be analysed and pursued further in the Ad Hoc Committee.

A number of delegations have proposed that the Conference on Disarmament should elaborate an agreement on an appropriate ASAT ban. The idea of ensuring immunity of satellites has been put forward as a partial measure. This idea underlines the need to prevent the development, testing and deployment of new dedicated ASAT weapons systems, and to eliminate the existing ones. The suggested approach envisages also establishing a prohibition on the use of force against space objects. The merit of such a provision is that it would outlaw interference with the normal functioning of space objects by any weapon system which normally serves other purposes but could be used in an ASAT mode.

We support such an approach to the ASAT ban, and believe that the Ad Hoc Committee should allocate more time to its consideration. Anti-satellite weapons are generally considered to be destabilizing. The destruction or disruption of early-warning and strategic communications satellites could, for example, facilitate contemplating a first strike. The arms control missions of satellites are also extremely important. Furthermore, ASAT developments could well cover possible efforts to circumvent the existing restraints on ABM systems, due to the similar character of these two technologies. A multilateral agreement, preventing introduction of ASAT weapons in outer space and providing for the verifiable destruction of the existing ASAT systems, would be in the interest of all States, both those launching space objects into orbits and those using the services of satellites.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

In conclusion, I wish to express our hope that consultations on the programme of work of the Ad Hoc Committee will be concluded as soon as possible, with positive results, and that substantive work will start soon. I should like to congratulate Ambassador Pugliese of Italy on his election as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee and wish him success in promoting the search for solutions to advance our common work and achieve practical results.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Tellalov, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President. I note the presence among us of the former representative of Nigeria to the multilateral disarmament negotiating body, Ambassador Olu Adeniji, at present the Director General for International Organizations in the Ministry of External Affairs of Nigeria, who will be addressing the Conference now, but before I give him the floor, I wish to extend to him a warm welcome amongst us. Your experience and diplomatic skill are well known, Sir, and I am sure that your contribution to our work today will be followed with interest by all members. You have the floor now, Ambassador Adeniji.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): May I, at the beginning, extend to you my warmest congratulations on your assumption of the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. With your outstanding diplomatic skill and wealth of experience, I am confident that you will guide the Conference successfully in the month ahead.

It is a moving experience for me to have the opportunity to be present here today amongst you after almost 6 years of my re-assignment from Geneva. It is reassuring to see several eminent disarmament veterans, true veterans, whose company and co-operation I had immensely enjoyed when I was the Head of the Nigerian Delegation to this Conference and, even after I left, whose co-operation I still continued to value, both in the United Nations General Assembly sessions and in the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament studies.

Since the awful realities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki dawned on the international community 41 years ago, the United Nations, representing the conscience of the world, has exerted continuous efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction from the arsenals of States in an attempt to make this world a much more secure place for all its inhabitants. Regrettably, negotiations on arms reduction and disarmament, at the various forums over the years have continued to founder on the rock of rivalry and deep distrust between the two Power blocs. Instead of making steady progress towards achieving disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, the leaders of the two alliances, the two super-Powers, have continued to imbue this awesome weapon with an aura of indispensability in their security systems. In the name of deterrence, nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the super-Powers have attained a degree of sophistication that is capable of triggering a global nuclear winter from which there will be no shelter for anyone.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

As the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, it has always been my view that the Conference on Disarmament should provide an effective forum for the negotiation of genuine measures on priority questions of disarmament. This was the hope when the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament spent so much time on the mechanism for negotiations. When I look back on the universal euphoria which the first special session generated, when I recall the great effort exerted in laying a sound basis that would enable the Conference to discharge its onerous responsibilities, I cannot but express utter dismay that in the years since 1979, this Conference has not been able to produce a single disarmament agreement. Worse still is the fact that the Conference has since its establishment failed to create subsidiary bodies with adequate negotiating mandates to facilitate work on those priority items on its agenda which are a nuclear-test ban, cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.

Clearly, this unwholesome situation is attributable to the dogmatic attitude of some nuclear-weapon States, which, having acquired nuclear weapons, consider these as instruments of power and prestige, and would prefer that such negotiations as there are on nuclear disarmament should be confined exclusively to a bilateral framework. The Nigerian Delegation has always held the view that bilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures are helpful, but they are by no means an alternative to multilateral negotiations. Both efforts, on the bilateral plane as well as in this forum, must complement each other in order to be purposeful and effective. To create obstacles deliberately to hamper the Conference is to deny even to the bilateral negotiations and the bilateral negotiators, what should constitute a universal input into the solution of issues of global concern; an input which should provide a base for ensuring the universality of disarmament agreements and thus help to create confidence for adherence. If anyone is in doubt as to the consequence of an attitude which takes the rest of the world for granted as long as the super-Powers contrive to reach an agreement on whatever issues catch their fancy, let him look at the fate of the bilateral draft Radiological Weapons Convention.

I used the expression "whatever issues catch their fancy" in relation to the negotiating technique of the two super-Powers. For they have avoided the adoption of a negotiating agenda which is in consonance with the serious danger posed by the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race. Paragraph 47 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament stated:

"Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons".

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

Paragraph 50 of the same document then provided a mini-programme for nuclear disarmament. I use the term "mini-programme" because in paragraph 109 the special session called on this Conference, your Conference, my distinguished colleagues, to "undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated". While paying tribute to the tenacity of Ambassador Alfonso García Robles as Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on the CPD, one cannot but be amazed at the rate of progress in drawing up the programme which, it should be recalled, ought to have been adopted by the second special session devoted to disarmament in 1982.

The approach adopted in dealing with the three items of nuclear disarmament at this Conference is fast converting the role of the Conference into that of a deliberative organ and subjecting its credibility to serious doubt. Yet the same special session which set up this Conference in its new format also made sure that it created an adequate mechanism for deliberation. The present situation of the CD is certainly damaging to its image and requires urgent rectification. I believe that there is urgent need to resolve to return to the Conference the negotiating mandate which it was given by SSOD I; a mandate which has been renewed by successive sessions of the General Assembly. In this connection, the three nuclear disarmament items on the agenda of the Conference should be given the priority attention which they deserve. That basic step in a credible nuclear disarmament programme, a comprehensive test ban, should engage the attention of your Conference with the view of elaborating an agreement not with a view to talking about it again, but with the view of elaborating an agreement that can be submitted to the General Assembly.

It is a welcome relief to note that some progress has been made in the negotiations in the Ad hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons with a view to achieving accord on a chemical weapons convention. I would like to appeal to all members of the Conference to do their utmost to ensure the early conclusion of the Convention. I do realize that some details still remain to be resolved. However, given the prevailing spirit of understanding and flexibility which is being shown, I am optimistic that a chemical weapons convention is within reach of the Conference. When it does happen, and I hope it will be sooner rather than later, it will be a most welcome breakthrough which should have positive effect on negotiations on other priority areas.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement and for his congratulations to the President. Before I give the floor to other speakers, I think the representative of Canada raised his hand. Does that mean that you want to take the floor now, Sir? I now give the floor to Ambassador Beesley of Canada.

Mr. BEESLEY (Canada): As you know, Mr. President, I had been inscribed initially as a speaker and I had asked that my name be removed because of continuing informal discussions of which we are all aware, but I now wish to go ahead with my statement and in so doing I must apologize for the fact that it will be, to some extent, extemporaneous but that will not be the first time that you have borne with me in this respect.

May I begin, Mr. President, by congratulating you on your assumption of office and indicating to you my personal knowledge that you have already begun your task with the kind of vigour I would have expected of a representative of a country who plays hockey so well, produces so many superb tennis stars, and in many other respects shows the kind of perseverance, talent and vigour that we expect to see in this coming month. May I also take the opportunity of congratulating your immediate predecessor, Ambassador Lechuga Hevia of Cuba, for the efforts he made in laying the groundwork for what I hope to see forthcoming during the remainder of our spring session and, of course, our summer session. I hope I will not be committing a breach of protocol if I go back one step further and reiterate the many expressions of appreciation to my colleague on my left (geographically he sits on my left), Ambassador Fan Guoxiang who did such a superb job in the first month of this spring session. But on a more sombre note I would like to say, since this is the first time I am speaking in plenary, what so many others have said perhaps more eloquently than I, how much we regret the death of our esteemed and valued friend and colleague, Don Lowitz. Having already expressed personally my condolences to his widow, Shana and to his delegation, I did wish to say in the Conference on Disarmament that my delegation and my Government shares the view of all that we are all the poorer for having had this loss.

I was proposing to intervene primarily to announce the holding of a Workshop on Outer Space by the Government of Canada in the month of May and to take this opportunity to express personal invitations to the heads of delegations -- all delegations -- to the Conference on Disarmament, to that Workshop or to their nominee for those who are unable to participate. I will come back to that in a few moments and spell out the nature of the invitation. Before doing so, however, I wish to provide some background, which is certainly known to some of those present but perhaps not at all, concerning Canada's approach to the question of prevention of an arms race in outer space, because that is our object and purpose and it is quite evidently a widespread and widely-shared object and purpose.

If I could be permitted for just a moment to recall some earlier development, on 26 August 1982 Canada submitted its first substantive Working Paper to the Conference on Disarmament, which was then operating under another name, on the outer space issue. I would remind delegations that the document, entitled "Arms control in outer space", (CD/320), undertook to discuss generally the subject of arms control and outer space in terms of stabilizing and destabilizing characteristics -- a topic that is current still. I would recall also that for a number of years prior to 1985 the Conference on Disarmament and its predecessor organization had clearly recognized the importance of the outer space issue. It was only, however, on 29 March 1985 that the CD succeeded in reaching agreement on a mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. This development was warmly welcomed by Canada and other members of the CD, as the

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

first of the crucial steps to organize examination of the subject; this process was, of course, in accordance with the United Nations General Assembly resolution relevant at that stage, which was adopted without dissent during its thirty-ninth session on 12 December 1984 and which called upon the CD to consider the question of preventing an arms race in outer space as a matter of priority. I would like to re-emphasize that phrase, "as a matter of priority".

The mandate since adopted and amended remains, of course, in the view of the Canadian delegation a realistic one, as I recall stating at the time; we regarded the mandate as neither too narrow or restrictive, nor too wide-ranging, but rather one permitting the CD to begin concrete action and undertake substantive work immediately. It is worth recalling that the mandate was to examine as a first step, at that stage of substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is worth noting that the mandate that we are now working on continues to permit us to make specific examination of existing treaties, bilateral and multilateral, with a view to determining the content of the existing legal régime and in the process, of course, determining whether there are lacunae which ought to be filled in order to prevent an arms race in outer space. I think this is common ground, there is no doubt on that; but in any event Canada has pursued that objective.

I mentioned the first Working Paper that we had tabled, and in so doing I wish to emphasize that while Canada is not the only country tabling working papers, there are far too few in this field, and in others, and I believe, as I have said on many occasions, that the way to concretize our work is to put our views in the form of working papers that go beyond the kind of statements which we all make in plenary and must make as part of the negotiating process. May I recall that we tabled a second Working Paper, which we considered to be directly on point entitled "Survey of International Law Relevant to Arms Control in Outer Space" (CD/618), dated 23 June 1985. In addition, we tabled a third Working Paper (CD/716) which we continue to believe to be relevant, and indeed some of the statements this morning indicated its continued relevance, on terminology relevant to arms control and outer space; that is a document dated July 1986.

In tabling these Working Papers we had hoped to be of assistance to the Conference, and perhaps to the United Nations General Assembly First Committee, in that we did not attempt to present a Canadian point of view -- a specifically governmental point of view -- but rather to outline the issues which in our view have to be addressed.

We are conscious, of course, of the statement by the President for March, Ambassador Fan Guoxiang, in making it clear as he did that there is no obstacle to discussing measures. For my part, I have good reason to recall, as President of the Conference in August 1986, that our report has, as I recall, some 11 paragraphs which refer to the questions of measures, and so do not consider that as a controversial issue. We have discussed measures: we undoubtedly will discuss measures. But I would like to emphasize that in an

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

exercise of this complexity and importance, if we want to be serious, let us examine the existing régime, determine what lacunae, if any, exist, and then consider what remains to be done. I don't think we should put the cart before the horse; neither do I suggest that we spend years engaging ourselves in the kinds of arguments that lawyers can sometimes be very skilled at in disagreeing on the legal régime. There is a good deal of scope for immediate work, concrete work, and substantive work to be done, I hope, at this spring session and certainly in the summer session.

In the light of this background information that I have provided, I would like to say that it is obvious that not only our delegation and the Canadian Government but all governments and all delegations understand that one of the most important and difficult arms control and disarmament issues with which the international community must come to grips concerns the kinds of military activity which can legitimately be carried out in outer space, and those which cannot. Technological advances combining with international political dynamics force these questions to the fore with increasing urgency. It is extremely encouraging that the United States and the USSR agreed in early 1985 to make the prevention of an arms race in outer space an agreed bilateral objective. This agreement attests to the importance and indeed the urgency of the subject, and as I just mentioned, in that same year this Conference agreed to establish for the first time a subsidiary body to address the same ultimate objective, but in a multilateral context and certainly without detriment to the bilateral efforts. If I may be permitted I should like to quote from one of our own Working Papers that expresses in this case our own view as well as we are able to do on the relationship between bilateral and multilateral negotiating processes, which we have never considered to be mutually exclusive. From the Canadian perspective, "the creation of the Ad Hoc Committee in the outer space issue was fully in accord with Canada's express policy and constitutes a significant step forward in coming to grips with the subject." That remains true. "The mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee both complements and accurately reflects the reality concerning the bilateral negotiations under way between the United States and the USSR in Geneva", and this is the part I want to stress. That mandate, as it now exists, and as it has been affirmed in this session, "neither undermines, prejudices, nor in any way interferes with the bilateral negotiations," and this fact is considered by Canada to be absolutely central to the successful outcome of both sets of deliberations.

I do not now intend to table another working paper but I do wish to proceed now to mention the Workshop I referred to earlier. Having tried to help lay the groundwork, in so far as we are able to do so, and building upon the work done by many delegations in plenary and in the Outer Space Committee, we have concluded that the approach being followed is a useful one, but it should be pressed forward by specific exposure to practical issues. We were gratified that we were able to agree relatively quickly on the mandate; we share the concern at the delays that have occurred since, but we also share the widespread desire, which we hope is universal, that we will soon be able to hold a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space and get on with the

(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

work that is expected of us. Recognizing, however, that there is much remaining to be done of a serious nature, of a concrete nature, of a substantive nature, I am pleased to announce today that as part of Canada's contribution to the work of the present session of the Conference, Canada is inviting each of the heads of delegations present here, or a designated representative, to attend an Outer Space Workshop in Montreal from 14 to 17 May 1987. We are also pleased to extend the invitation to observer delegations and to representatives of the Secretariat. The dates again have been carefully chosen (14 to 17 May) with a number of considerations in mind. Our dilemma was to find an appropriate time and venue for such a Workshop, given the very full schedule of the Conference on Disarmament, which is much fuller than we would even know from the press reports or from many other sources -- it is a very heavy schedule. We decided to follow the example of other Member States which have hosted Workshops in their own countries with a view to contributing to progress in the activities of the Conference on Disarmament. It seemed appropriate under the circumstances to schedule the Workshop for a period when at least a significant number of representatives will already have crossed the Atlantic to participate in other activities of the United Nations including, of course, the UNDC. It was just such an approach, as we recall, that the United States adopted when it hosted its Chemical Weapons Workshop in Utah in 1983. In this case we are proposing that the Workshop take place during the period of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, but without hampering the work of that important deliberating body. Many participants will already have gathered in New York. The departure for Montreal would take place on the afternoon of Thursday, 14 May 1987; work would carry on into the weekend, with participants returning to New York early on Sunday 17 May. The Canadian Government will provide transportation from New York to Montreal, return, and of course will cover the expenses of related costs in Montreal as other Workshops have done. The Workshop will focus on certain legal and technical aspects of the outer space issue, including presentation and opportunity for round-table discussion on both aspects. Also included will be a visit to the Satellite and Aerospace Systems Division of SPAR AEROSPACE Limited to illustrate certain practical capabilities and constraints regarding the space-to-space application of space-based remote sensing systems. Although my instructions do not say so, I feel certain we would want the Secretariat to be adequately represented also at this Workshop.

In closing, may I apologize for not addressing a number of other extremely important issues on our agenda, but the very discussion we have heard today, coupled with developments behind the scenes, convinced me that it was timely to make this announcement today, which I will confirm by letters to all of you.

In closing, may I say that we look forward to hosting as many delegations as possible in Montreal in May.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words he expressed to me and to my country: I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, who will introduce the progress report on the Group's twenty-third session, contained in document CD/745.

Mr. DAHLMAN (Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events): Mr. President, it is a pleasure to be here today to present to you the results of the recent meeting of the Ad Hoc Group and to introduce to you its progress report contained in document CD/745.

The meeting took place from 2 to 13 March 1987 and experts from 22 countries attended the session. The World Meteorological Organization was also represented. Throughout the session we enjoyed the eminent services of the secretariat.

I am pleased to introduce a progress report that contains substantial progress towards the design and testing of a modern international seismic data exchange system. The Group has reached agreement in principle on the design of such a modern system, a system which is based on the expeditious exchange of all available seismic information, both waveform and parameter data, for all detected signals, and the routine use of all data at international data centres. In developing such a system modern technology and all achievements in seismology should be utilized.

I am now going to describe to you the Group's present view of such a system. In doing so I will stress that all the detailed work remains to be done, some of which involves the breaking of new ground in seismology.

The Group wants to emphasize that the new system, although considerably modernized and improved, should have the same overall task as has earlier been agreed upon. This is to provide comprehensive information, collected on a global basis and processed according to agreed procedures, so as to assist States in their national verification of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. The system also maintains the overall structure earlier agreed upon, consisting of seismological stations and national facilities in participating States contributing data through an international data exchange to specially established international data centres.

I am now going to describe the different components of the system.

As to the global network, it must include at least 50 seismological stations. The stations have to be located in such a way that they provide an adequate global coverage. They should further preferably be located at sites where the background noise level is low. Well-sited stations will increase the overall capability of the system.

The stations of the network have to conform to certain specified technical standards. To provide a global standard the Group agreed to work out technical specifications of a modern prototype station called CD -- or Conference on Disarmament -- station. Such a station should be able to

(Mr. Dahlman, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group
of Scientific Experts)

collect and exchange waveform data from seismic events at all distances. The design concept should also include so-called array stations, consisting of a number of sensors placed in a well-defined configuration to form an antenna. An array will improve the detection capability and also provide preliminary locations of detected events.

Even if the achievement of a homogeneous network of standardized stations is a desirable goal it is recognized that not all stations may conform to such standards.

It is foreseen that a national facility, tentatively called a national data centre, should be established in each participating State as a point of contact for the international system. Such facilities may be organized differently in different States.

The national data centres should be responsible for providing agreed seismic data from all participating stations within the country to the international data centres and to receive the processed information. The data to be expeditiously transmitted contains digital waveform data for each detected event and basic parameter data necessary for routine determination of location, depth and magnitude of seismic events. The routine exchange and use of waveform data means that the number of reported parameters would be substantially reduced compared to what was earlier foreseen. National data centres should further supply, on request, waveform data for any specified time interval. This would require that data are continuously recorded and stored.

Large sequences of seismic events may sometimes occur, for example following a large earthquake, and it may be necessary to define special procedures for reporting the large amount of data that is generated in such cases.

Data reporting within the global system, and thus the capability of the system, is primarily based on signal detection at individual stations. It is therefore essential to develop improved signal detection methods, using automatic computer processing supplemented by interactive analyst review.

A demonstration was given by the Federal Republic of Germany during the session, illustrating how seismological data could be efficiently retrieved, presented and processed by interactive computer procedures. I regard this to be a valuable and interesting demonstration of a modern national seismological data processing facility.

The global system would require efficient data communication facilities both between the different international data centres and between international and national data centres. The data volumes to be exchanged are orders of magnitudes larger than those foreseen in the previous system.

The Group agreed that high-capacity, dedicated data communication links, using satellite transmission or other means, should be established between

(Mr. Dahlman, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group
of Scientific Experts)

IDCs. These dedicated links should be operated in such a way that any data transmitted from a national to an international data centre will automatically and instantaneously be transmitted to all other IDCs.

These communication links should have sufficient capacity to handle also the substantial exchange of data and information between the various IDCs.

National data centres would communicate with the international centres using the most efficient and appropriate communication channels available in the particular region. This might include on-demand commercial communication links or the use of the Global Telecommunication System of the World Meteorological Organization.

During its session the Group received a report from an informal workshop on data communication held in Canada from 6 to 8 October 1986 -- a workshop in which many experts from the Group participated and which, in my view, provided valuable technical information of importance for the design of the data exchange system.

An important new function of international data centres will be the use of seismic waveform data in their regular analysis. The Group agreed that IDCs should fully utilize available waveform and parameter data in the process of event definition, location and estimation of source parameters.

To utilize waveform data implies considerable new requirements for the IDCs, not only with respect to data handling and analysis facilities, but also concerning the scientific methods and procedures for analysing data from a global network. The necessary methods and procedures for the analysis of globally collected waveform data do not exist today and have to be developed. This will require considerable scientific efforts.

The Group agreed that the IDCs should be open facilities providing free and easy access to any data and analysis results. Participating States should be able to automatically access and extract information from the data bases at the IDCs.

As I reported in my intervention on 14 August 1986, the Group has agreed that a large-scale experiment should be conducted in approximately 1988. The purpose of this experiment should be to test the various components of the system I have just described. It would include the testing of procedures to record and extract data at national data centres and to report these data to experimental international data centres. The reported data would be analysed in a co-operative effort among the established experimental international data centres, using the new methods and procedures being developed. The results of the analysis will be reported back to the participants. The Group envisages that experimental international data centres will be in operation during the experiment in Canberra, Moscow, Stockholm and Washington.

(Mr. Dahlman, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group
of Scientific Experts)

Experts from the institutions responsible for the preparatory work at these four locations met in Stockholm from 21 to 23 January 1987, in an informal workshop to discuss, in technical details, methods and procedures to be used at international data centres. The Group received a report from this meeting.

Such a large-scale experiment is a considerable undertaking that would require careful planning and also a number of preparatory experiments. A stage-by-stage approach would thus be required in which initially a number of bilateral and multilateral experiments will be needed. Bilateral and multilateral data exchange experiments using waveform data are already going on between several institutions around the world. It will be essential to conduct such preparatory experiments also to test the various proposed functions of international data centres. This will require a close co-operation among the four EIDCs and also the co-operation of some national data centres.

The Ad Hoc Group suggests after consultations with the Secretary-General of the Conference that its next session, subject to approval by the Conference on Disarmament, should be convened from 27 July to 7 August 1987. The Group takes note of information received from the secretariat that under the current financial restrictions, meetings of the Group from 27 to 31 July would be allocated the usual services only if they are available from within resources already assigned to the Conference for that week, but that the meetings of the Group from 3 to 7 August 1987 would be held with the usual conference services. This concludes my presentation and my introduction of the Group's progress report.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, Dr. Dahlman, for his statement. I have no other members on the list of speakers for today. Does any delegation wish to take the floor? The distinguished representative of the Netherlands has the floor.

Mr. SCHUURMAN VOLKER (Netherlands): Mr. President, although my Ambassador will do this more extensively at a later stage, allow me nevertheless to congratulate you on the assumption of the Presidency.

I noted that you introduced, in your presidential statement, a quotation from the statement recently made by the Warsaw Treaty Organization Foreign Ministers on CW. I am sure that you were moved to do so by the importance of the subject, and that you did not want to suggest in any way that this subject does not have priority for others. Allow me to recall in this respect the communiqué of NATO Foreign Ministers in December of last year, in which they stated that they seek with determination to reach a convention on CW that will be effectively verifiable.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the Netherlands. That means that both NATO countries and Warsaw Treaty countries have the same aim. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the distinguished representative of the United States.

Mr. BARTHELEMY (United States of America): Mr. President, may I congratulate you as President of the Conference for the month of April. I would also like to congratulate Ambassador Lechuga Hevia who persistently and most equitably led the Conference during the month of March. My delegation pledges to you its co-operation in advancing the work of the Conference on each and every item on its agenda and programme of work.

During the first few weeks of the 1987 session of the Conference, two United States representatives spoke on the agenda items "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" and "Prevention of an arms race in outer space." I do not wish to be redundant. However, having listened to a number of speakers in recent weeks, including today, address agenda item 5, my delegation is struck by the need to return to several fundamental points. They explain why we conclude that a number of our colleagues need to devote fresh thought to agenda items 2 and 5.

The first point I wish to recall is that these two subjects cannot be isolated from each other. It is well known that there has been East-West competition for nearly four decades and that that competition has manifested itself in aggression and in large forces under arms and military expenditures. There has been competition in conventional and nuclear arms for these four decades. What is frequently forgotten or -- in the case of some perhaps -- obfuscated is that there is no basis for pointing to the danger of the beginning of a new "arms race in outer space." For competition in that area -- competition associated with nuclear arms -- is not new, or even recent. It has existed now for 30 years. It was in early 1957 that the USSR began advanced development and testing of new ballistic missiles with substantially increased lift capacity. Then, in October 1957, the Soviet Union succeeded in launching into space and inserting into orbit the first artificial satellite, Sputnik I. It was not long after that both the Soviet Union and the United States achieved the capability to utilize the ballistic missile to deliver nuclear weapons on targets in other continents. Thus, the medium of space was utilized as a central medium for pursuit of East-West nuclear competition.

Now it is certainly true that, despite these facts, a number of important arms limitation agreements have been reached relating to space. I mean in no sense to belittle the importance of these agreements. Central in this area have been the Outer Space Treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The SALT I Agreement also put certain upper limits on elements of ballistic missile and other strategic weapon competition. But even had SALT I been fully complied with -- and it was not fully complied with -- it could not have prevented the substantial increase in the number and power of ballistic missile warheads that thereafter occurred.

Now if priority belongs, as is generally acknowledged, to disarmament measures in the field of strategic nuclear arms, then surely the strengthening of mutual strategic security, or at least stability, through reducing the

(Mr. Barthelemy, United States)

chance of a disarming first strike by any one, should be of paramount importance. This fact was recognized by both sides at the time of the January 1985 agreement to begin the nuclear and space talks, and again at the Geneva and Reykjavik summits. Deep reductions in strategic offensive nuclear forces are crucially important for a number of reasons. One of these, of course, is that it would, if properly negotiated and structured, reduce the danger of a first strike, strengthen strategic stability, and thus increase mutual strategic security. In light of the agreed objectives in nuclear and space talks (NST), it is odd indeed to hear the present state of the strategic nuclear balance described, as it was by one speaker today, as "remarkably balanced."

Now it is difficult to conceive of advancement, much less achievement of the important goals set in NST, without the presence of certain basic conditions. One of these is full compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements in force.

A second condition is a high degree of transparency -- on both sides -- with regard to forces in being and to overall intentions. This implies not just glasnost (or openness) -- perhaps the openness of an occasional snapshot of an otherwise closed society. It implies a great deal more candour about national military forces and programmes. Third, it also implies, I would argue, avoidance of any conscious misrepresentation of the programmes and policies of the other side. In this regard, of course, misunderstandings leading potentially to crisis situations are far less likely in an environment in which both sides demonstrate a high degree of transparency as regards their policies and force programmes. I am assuming, for the moment, the absence of aggressive intent involving use of force.

Further, in the view of my delegation, it is destructive to effective arms limitation and disarmament if proposals are advanced that are either purely declaratory, are ill-defined or unverifiable, or are blatantly one-sided in their effect.

I must again call the attention of the Conference to the very peculiar circumstance that some members, who in the past outspokenly decried the doctrine of mutual assured destruction with regard to strategic nuclear weapons, of recent date seem to have become not only willing to accept this doctrine but to reject any effort to reduce reliance upon it. For how else are we to characterize the blind opposition to strategic defence that we have heard in this hall on several recent occasions? Despite the relentless deployment by the Soviet Union of new offensive ballistic weapons and concurrent pursuit of ballistic missile defence over the last 15 years, we still encounter some who think of any Western effort to give consideration to ballistic missile defence as irresponsible, threatening or destabilizing.

For its part, the United States has been cautious in describing the potential for ballistic missile defence, and it has -- once again, openly -- set strict criteria for possible future ballistic missile defence programmes.

(Mr. Barthelemy, United States)

It has also stressed the importance of negotiations in this area and of the maintenance and strengthening of stability.

Contrast this serious approach with claims advanced simultaneously that, firstly, any defence against ballistic missiles is a dream, and, secondly, such technological breakthroughs are going unavoidably to destabilize the strategic balance and inexorably lead to war.

Representatives at this Conference owe it to themselves, to their Governments, to the people they represent and to the nations that do not have the opportunity to sit at this table to acquaint themselves seriously with the issues on our agenda. If those responsibilities are taken seriously, the opportunity exists to influence favourably the bilateral negotiations on nuclear and space arms. Whereas, if delegations are uninformed, they court the danger of encouraging one side in the bilateral nuclear negotiations to believe that its goals can be achieved without compromise and without taking full account of the security of the other side.

In this regard I am reminded that some years ago a number of members of the Conference on Disarmament outspokenly urged that the member States of NATO would serve international security by responding to the deployment of more than one thousand long-range intermediate nuclear force warheads on the continent of Europe by taking no action. When, nonetheless, a limited deployment of such weapons on the Western side was decided on and begun, we see that the initial deployer belatedly agreed on the mutual goal of the elimination of these weapons totally from the European continent.

Could agreement on this interim objective of zero/zero deployment of long-range INF have been achieved without deployments? I leave the answer to that question to any delegation still in doubt to ponder upon.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the United States for his statement. Again, does any delegation wish to take the floor? This is not the case.

I have requested the secretariat to circulate an informal paper containing a timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. The timetable has been prepared in consultation with the Chairmen of the subsidiary bodies. I would also like to say that I talked to Ambassador Pugliese, the Chairman of the Outer Space Committee, and he indicated that he may organize a meeting of that Committee on Tuesday. However, this will be decided later. As usual, the timetable is only indicative and subject to change, if necessary. I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Sweden.

Mr. EKEUS (Sweden): Mr. President, I hope I will later on be able to welcome you in a more formal way, but anyhow I welcome you now to the Presidency of the Conference for this month. You have just distributed the timetable of meetings that does not contain any reference to a meeting of the

(Mr. Ekeus, Sweden)

Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. However, you have just said that a meeting will be scheduled for next week, as expected and welcomed by my delegation.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of Sweden, and I am sure that the distinguished representative of Italy, Ambassador Pugliese, Chairman of the Outer Space Committee, will take that wish fully into account. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable of meetings.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: As there is no other business to consider, I intend now to adjourn the plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 7 April 1987, at 10 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.