

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 7 April 1987, at 10 a.m.

President:            Mr. M. Vejvoda            (Czechoslovakia)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 403rd plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference starts today its consideration of agenda item 6, entitled "Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons", in accordance with its programme of work. In conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, however, members wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

At the request of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, I wish to inform the Conference that the Ad Hoc Committee will hold its first meeting this afternoon at 3.30 p.m., in this conference room. Prior to that, at 3 p.m., the Group of 21 will hold a brief meeting in the same room. I have on my list of speakers the representatives of the United States of America, the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. I now give the floor to the first speaker, the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Hansen.

Mr. HANSEN (United States of America): Today I would like to devote my statement to the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Rolf Ekéus of Sweden, the negotiations in the 1987 session are well under way. The organization of work into clusters, as suggested by Ambassador Ekéus, has given new structure to the discussions and seems to have helped them move ahead. The cluster co-ordinators -- Mr. Nieuwenhuys of Belgium, Mr. Macedo of Mexico, and Dr. Krutzsch of the German Democratic Republic -- are making important contributions, as well, to advancing the complex and detailed work of negotiating the provisions of the Convention.

Clearly, the work on a chemical weapons ban has been intensifying over the last year. In part, this can be attributed to the commitment by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, made at the November 1985 Summit in Geneva, to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on this matter. Both the United States and Soviet delegations have helped to turn this commitment into practical progress.

Since the beginning of the 1987 CD session, important changes have appeared in the position of some delegations, and the United States Government is carefully assessing the political and substantive significance of these developments. In this context, I would note that we welcome these developments but emphasize that we will not accept a watered-down, ineffective convention. The negotiation of an effective convention is a complex undertaking in which details are of great significance. The CD must therefore pursue this objective with appropriate care and deliberation.

That said, my statement today contains suggestions and proposals I hope will advance the further work of the Committee in a number of important areas.

Over the course of the chemical weapons negotiations the United States has stressed that effective verification provisions are essential for building confidence in compliance. But, clearly, confidence is not something that

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suddenly appears the day the convention enters into force. Unless some degree of confidence among States already exists, it must be created, or reaching agreement will be an extremely difficult task. Thus, the building of confidence must be a step-by-step process that begins well before the negotiations have been completed.

Confidence-building should start with greater openness on the part of all members of the CD. The United States is concerned that some other States participating in the negotiations have been extremely secretive about their chemical weapons programmes. If countries possessing chemical weapons refuse to acknowledge such capabilities during the negotiations, confidence is seriously undermined. Therefore, we must all agree that greater openness is essential for building the kind of confidence States must have before they will be willing to give up their own chemical weapons. The United States has consistently stressed this concern in bilateral negotiations and wishes to make this point clear in the multilateral context.

The fact that the United States maintains a chemical weapons deterrent and retaliatory capability has long been a matter of public record. On 10 July 1986, the United States delegation sought to promote the confidence-building process by unilaterally providing its negotiating partners here with further detailed information about its stockpiles of chemical weapons, including information on stockpile locations and the chemicals in the stockpile. We urge others to follow our example of openness.

On 5 March of this year the Soviet Union finally made an oblique reference to its possession of chemical weapons in a plenary statement. The United States welcomes this small, helpful step by the Soviet Union. We hope it was only the first step towards increasing openness by the Soviet Union and its allies about their chemical weapons programmes. Other States could usefully take similar steps.

In this connection we have also noted the candid statement by the Foreign Minister of France on 19 February that his country is considering endowing itself with a limited and purely deterrent capability in the chemical weapons field.

It should not be forgotten that over the years a number of States, primarily from the Western Group, have made clear in the CD that they do not possess chemical weapons. Such statements can only be welcomed.

Many CD member States, however, have said nothing. Most undoubtedly do not possess chemical weapons; but it would be very useful for them to say so. Unfortunately, it cannot be ruled out that other States participating in the negotiations do possess chemical weapon capabilities. For example, we would welcome clarification by the Iranian delegation of press reports concerning an Iranian chemical weapons capability.

Because of the magnitude of the chemical weapons capabilities possessed by the Soviet Union, the United States has stressed to Soviet authorities the importance of greater openness. But the principle applies equally to other States. Within the CD, we call upon all our negotiating partners to indicate possession or non-possession of chemical weapons and chemical weapons

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production facilities. It would be useful if the secretariat were to compile all relevant statements, with the assistance of delegations making them. We also call upon the Soviet Union, and any others who acknowledge possession of chemical weapons, to provide more detailed information, as the United States has already done.

Our objective is to rid the world of chemical weapons. This can only happen if all of the States possessing chemical weapons become parties to a future convention. Obviously, this will not happen automatically. The members of the CD need to consider carefully how to promote the widest possible adherence to the convention. It is not too soon to address the question of how to obtain participation in the convention by as many as possible of the 15 or so States that are currently believed to possess a chemical weapons capability. Similarly, States need to consider the risk posed by States which possess chemical weapons remaining outside the convention. What can be done to minimize this risk? These are, of course, hard questions, but they must be faced.

I would now like to address a number of specific negotiating issues relating to the CW Convention.

One useful result of the intersessional negotiations was agreement that article III of the rolling text should include a provision to declare any "facility or establishment" for the development of chemical weapons. However, the discussion showed that the scope of the key phrase "facility or establishment" was very unclear. Thus, a footnote in the rolling text states that more work is necessary. To assist in resolving this matter the United States proposes that the phrase in question refer to facilities or establishments that "specialize" in chemical weapons development. This would provide a practical approach that covers the locations of direct concern. It would avoid covering facilities that may have only an indirect or one-time involvement, such as a wind-tunnel that might on occasion have been used for aerodynamic tests.

Much has already been achieved in Cluster I in developing procedures for the declaration of chemical weapons and for monitoring the declared stocks prior to destruction.

One important step was made when the Soviet delegation announced on 17 February that it could agree to destruction of all chemical weapons and would no longer insist on a right to divert some chemicals to peaceful purposes. This was a constructive step. It was, however, curious to hear the Soviet accusation on 5 March that the United States had then blocked agreement in this area by changing its previous position. At the bottom of this tempest-in-a-teapot was the United States view that such common and innocuous commercial chemicals as sulphur and isopropyl alcohol that were stored for chemical weapons purposes need not be destroyed and might be diverted for civilian use. Apparently the Soviet delegation had failed to notice that the United States adopted this view more than a year ago, in early 1986, as a move toward the Soviet position. To be castigated now for moving to the Soviet position calls into question the seriousness of the Soviet accusation. None the less, since our attempted concession has apparently become an obstacle in the negotiations, we will resolve the problem by returning to our original

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position that all chemical weapons stocks, including harmless precursors stored for chemical weapons purposes, should be destroyed. There should now be full agreement in this area.

With respect to chemical weapons production facilities, my delegation has suggested that work in Cluster II focus initially in areas where there is broad agreement. We believe it is appropriate for the Committee to examine how a verification system for eliminating such facilities would function. My delegation has introduced an informal outline to assist in this examination. To help these discussions move forward, we are circulating today a paper containing more detailed suggestions for a step-by-step approach to verifying the elimination of CW production facilities.

A clear idea of the verification steps necessary for international assurance that parties are eliminating their chemical weapons production facilities is essential from the beginning. For an effective verification system, we must ensure that the measures for declarations, inspections and on-site monitoring with instruments are carefully integrated with specific verification objectives. Before one can decide what to declare, the purpose of declarations must be clear. Before one can write procedures or determine the frequency of inspection, one must know the objectives of an inspection. Before one can decide on what types of instruments may be needed, one must know what objectives instrument monitoring must satisfy. In our outline, we propose such objectives for each facet of the verification system for chemical weapons production facilities.

In article V we also note that there are still fundamental issues to be resolved about how chemical weapons production facilities are to be eliminated. However, we believe that broad agreement in principle already exists on the general approach to verification in this regard. In our view much important work can be done toward converting this agreement in principle into provisions for a verification without prejudging the remaining issues.

The final issue on which I would like to comment today is challenge inspection. This subject remains one of the key negotiating problems, although by no means the only one. There seems to be broad agreement that quick action is needed to carry out inspections and that in at least two cases inspection will be mandatory. While we regard the evolution of the Soviet approach in a positive light, we view the new Soviet position announced on 17 February as being internally inconsistent and falling far short of what is needed for an effective challenge provision.

Allow me to give two examples of why the Soviet position is internally inconsistent.

In his statement of 17 February the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union said that the Soviet Union will be pressing for the most stringent system of supervision and verification. The USSR has argued for strict routine inspection provisions for the chemical industry. Yet it continues to oppose mandatory challenge inspection, the most stringent system proposed, for the vast majority of plants in the chemical industry that it is ostensibly so concerned about. For under the Soviet approach, only the relatively few plants already subject to declaration would be open to

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mandatory challenge inspection. Soviet statements about stringent verification and the detailed Soviet position are clearly not consistent with each other.

Furthermore, the Soviet delegation emphasizes the importance and utility of alternatives to on-site inspection. It has suggested such alternative measures as viewing a facility from outside and collecting chemical samples nearby. But it cannot explain, or has not explained, for example, how these or any other alternative measures would be useful in determining whether or not a suspect munitions bunker contains chemical weapons. It seems obvious that only inspection of the bunker itself will permit an inspector to determine whether or not there are chemical weapons inside. But if the Soviet delegation knows of an alternative to inspection that would resolve such questions, such alternative should in our view be thoroughly explained. The United States is not opposed to discussing effective alternatives, but if an alternative cannot be agreed the mandatory right to access within the 48-hour period must remain.

The issue of challenge inspection will be discussed soon in Cluster IV. We welcome the examination of each facet of challenge inspection, as is planned. Such an approach can help to focus on the substantive merit of methods for ensuring effective verification; this, rather than arguments based on authorship, is what is required. The United States delegation will participate actively and constructively in the forthcoming discussion. We will not, however, relax our standards for effective verification.

When a revised version of the "rolling text" is prepared at the end of April, it should demonstrate that much has been accomplished during the Spring part of the 1987 session. But it will also show that much more remains to be done, not only in resolving key issues, but also in working out the detailed procedures required for effective implementation. Much will remain to be accomplished in drafting effective provisions and in establishing the level of confidence necessary to make a chemical weapons convention a reality. That should be a challenge to all of us.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the United States of America for his statement, and now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Rose.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): Comrade President, first of all permit me to congratulate you on behalf of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic on the assumption of your important duties as President of the Conference on Disarmament in the month of April.

We take utmost pleasure in the fact that the final and, thus, particularly significant phase of the spring session is being held under your able and skilled guidance. As an outstanding diplomat of your country, and equipped with rich experience in disarmament affairs, you are in a very special way cut out for this office. And then, of course, you are the representative of a fraternal socialist country that plays an important part in the international endeavour to achieve disarmament. I wish to assure you of my delegation's closest co-operation. I should also like to take this

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opportunity to express to the representative of Socialist Cuba, Comrade Lechuga Hevia, who served in the President's chair last month, my sincere gratitude for the excellent job done. My delegation greatly appreciated the dedication he displayed in presiding over the Conference in the past few weeks.

My delegation would like to make some observations on the Progress Report to the Conference on Disarmament on the Twenty-Third Session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, put out as document CD/745. Our thanks go to the Group's Chairman, Dr. Ola Dahlmann, and the other experts for the competent and constructive work they have done. Their efforts represent an essential part of the activities the Conference is undertaking in order to bring about a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. Every single scientific and technical and methodological problem solved by the Group is a contribution towards progress on an NTB treaty and helps clear the road of remaining obstacles.

The Report provides a useful overview of the various components of which a seismic data exchange system will be made up. In fact, it signals that obvious headway has been achieved in devising a global international system to exchange seismic data -- a system which will routinely rely on waveform (Level II) data for all seismic events. As far as preparations for the international experiment on the exchange of such data are concerned, progress has been recorded as well.

I think we should commend the Group on the single-mindedness with which it has tackled its tasks, using the latest seismological findings and the most modern data acquisition, transmission and processing techniques. If you compare the present Report with previous ones, what leaps to the eye is that automation and computerization are becoming more and more important in international seismic data exchanges.

The scientific and technical issues to be discussed and resolved by the Group are very complex indeed. Even though the mandate requires that they be dealt with from a methodological point of view only, everyone will readily admit that details may very well produce difficulties. It will be easier to overcome them if national efforts in the relevant fields are increased and international co-operation is deepened.

In approving the Progress Report, my delegation endorses also the recommendations advanced in paragraph 13. As has been said already, timely and thorough preparations for the international experiment on the exchange of Level II seismic data, scheduled to be conducted in 1988, will be of major importance. For this reason, the Group of Scientific Experts must at all times be afforded the working conditions it needs in order to carry on smoothly. Within the scope of the resources available to the Conference on Disarmament in the week from 27 to 31 July 1987, the Group should, therefore, be provided with the conference services required to ensure effective work.

The global seismic data exchange system envisaged will have a crucial role to play in reliably verifying compliance with a future treaty on the

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cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. The meaningful work done by the Group of Experts should induce the Conference, in parallel, to commence and vigorously pursue the drafting of all the elements of an NTB treaty.

Here is what the Foreign Ministers of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, who met in Moscow recently, had to say on this subject (see CD/748): "The Warsaw Treaty Member States reaffirm their determination to seek a general and complete ban on nuclear tests, and are in favour of the start of talks with a view to concluding an agreement on this issue as soon as possible".

In his Message of 1 April to the participants in the Conference on Disarmament, Comrade Gustav Husak, President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, has very aptly stated that the way States approach the solution of this issue is a clear indication of their attitude towards nuclear disarmament as a whole.

In conclusion, my delegation would like to reiterate its view that the Conference on Disarmament should set up an appropriate ad hoc committee right now.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the President and my country. I now give the floor to the last speaker on my list for today, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stülpnagel.

Mr. von STÜLPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): Thank you, Mr. President. It is a particular pleasure for me to congratulate you on your accession to the Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament for this and, I assume, the coming month. We know that you will lead us with relaxed sovereignty and we promise you our full support.

It is now just about 25 years on which this Conference can look back in its uninterrupted multilateral efforts towards armament control and disarmament. The concrete hazards and the undefinable risks which threaten us in the era of weapons of mass destruction compel all delegations to face their political responsibility for the present and future generations of mankind and to make every effort for constructive thinking, analytical dialogue and creative confidence-building. Confidence-building, which is at the heart of armament control and disarmament requires the preparedness for compromise and an objective evaluation of given facts. There is no other global negotiating forum for disarmament, and consequently there is no doubt about the competence of the Conference on Disarmament. We are all well aware of our Conference's potential and its limitations, and we know that one of its most important features is the "constructive parallelism" of multilateral and bilateral negotiations which remains essential and has properties to be developed further.

My delegation's evaluation of the potential of our Conference does not allow me to share the pessimism expressed in statements made at the start of this year's session. Rather I would join the voices of hope which were equally expressed. Ever since the United States and the Soviet Union agreed



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on preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, East-West relations have visibly acquired momentum. The talks of Reykjavik have shown that both super-Powers have developed an active interest in establishing a stable relationship and concluding substantive agreements. This resolution can be instrumental to create new perspectives for East-West relations and for disarmament and arms control and this will concern not only bilateral but also multilateral negotiations. The dialogue on security of all sides has been enhanced considerably during the last few years and has laid the foundation for genuine contributions which our negotiations can make towards the creation of a more peaceful world with military postures on lower levels. What is required from this Conference is to explore the available possibilities and not to let any opportunity for agreement pass.

In my delegation's opinion, a fundamental redefinition of the relationship between bilateral and multilateral negotiations is not needed. Their relative weight will by itself bring about an order of precedence. What matters is to recall the premises on which success in the individual forums depends.

The latest proposals for an agreement aimed at eliminating Soviet and American long-range intermediate nuclear forces (LRINF), which were originally submitted at Reykjavik and have recently been updated, hold out realistic prospects of an early bilateral settlement of this problem.

The elimination of all LRINF in Europe would be in keeping with the objective energetically pursued by the members of the Western defence alliance since the 1979 two-track decision. The early conclusion of an agreement would be a visible sign of the seriousness and credibility of the arms control efforts. It would generate important stimuli for other areas of negotiation, not least in multilateral forums.

The document of the Stockholm Conference of September 1986 is a tangible proof that multilateral agreements are possible, and the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament showed, by agreeing on an extensive Final Document, that consensus is essentially possible on such far-reaching issues as the principles underlying disarmament and arms control measures. The fact that many of these principles still have to be translated into practical disarmament measures of States does not invalidate these principles; instead it demonstrates that the international community still lacks the requisite associated confidence, political determination and readiness to acknowledge the legitimate security needs of other States or groups of States.

It is our conviction that security is the central element of any policy for disarmament and arms control. The Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament recognizes the principle that, setting out from the need to build confidence, disarmament measures should be achieved in an equitable and balanced manner so that each country's right to security is guaranteed and it is ensured that at no stage an individual country or a group of countries may derive advantages from these measures over other countries.

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The highly intricate interdependence of global and regional security structures necessitates cautious and balanced tuning of decisions and measures. The varying degrees of importance accorded to them cannot be exchanged at random. While regional imbalances undermine the global balance, a significant global imbalance may degrade regional efforts. This applies to weapon categories and security structures alike.

Under the prevailing conditions, agreements on concrete arms limitation and disarmament measures can only be achieved step by step, if security is to remain undiminished. At each stage of reductions and limitations of forces and armaments, countries must continue to enjoy credible security.

Experience shows that a maximalistic approach can obstruct one's view of what is feasible. As a result, the potential of consensus which would permit long-term realization of more extensive goals remains unused. My delegation is pleased to note that this perception is becoming more widespread. With this in mind, we would like to make some practical remarks on current areas of activity of this Conference.

An example which shows that consensus is emerging gradually on even highly controversial issues of this Conference are the efforts being made to re-establish an ad hoc committee on item 1, comprehensive nuclear-test ban. Ambassador Butler deserves our thanks for having once again expressed quite clearly in his speech on 5 March what my delegation had stated on 17 February: that it is time to transpose the growing common ground achieved in this sphere into practical work. It is clear to my delegation that the Conference can best perform such practical work by setting up an ad hoc committee. In so doing, one should not place undue emphasis on the formulation of its mandate.

In this connection, my delegation regards as encouraging the remarks made by Ambassador Rose on 17 March on the subject of an NTB/CTB. We are pleased to note that they reflect an idea which we too presented to the Conference: that a satisfactory verification system for monitoring compliance with an NTBT/CTBT should be operative when the desired treaty comes into force.

The contribution on the subject of verification which we have made of late at this Conference and in the Group of Seismic Experts serves to outline the associated tasks. While suggesting that the verification problems can certainly be solved, we must not forget how much work is still needed until a global seismic monitoring system can be achieved. My delegation has repeatedly pointed out that in a world in which we hope there will soon be fewer nuclear weapons, any circumvention of a comprehensive test ban would present an unacceptable security risk for the countries faithful to the treaty establishing the ban. Not least for this reason, a solution to the rather artificial problem of peaceful nuclear explosions must be found which is genuinely satisfactory and acceptable from the point of view of security.

As the statements made by the highest representatives of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on various occasions demonstrate, a comprehensive test ban treaty remains a primary arms control objective for my country. In my delegation's opinion, it is high time for this Conference to get down to forward-looking concrete work.

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The opportunities emerging in the field of nuclear disarmament call for increased efforts to establish a stable balance of conventional forces. Especially in Europe, the conventional arsenals are excessive and unbalanced to our disadvantage. No country can claim to be more interested than the Federal Republic of Germany in strengthening stability and security throughout Europe by means of greater openness and a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at a low level. It is my country which is affected most by the hazards emanating from the existing conventional imbalance. In view of the devastating potential of modern conventional weapons, the effects of a conventional conflict would be immeasurably greater than the destruction caused during World War II.

In the North Atlantic Alliance we therefore strongly urged that new steps be taken towards conventional arms control. In the decision taken by NATO Foreign Ministers on 11 December 1986, in which we participated actively, we wanted to make it quite clear that the Alliance adheres to its strategy of preventing any war, not just a nuclear war but also a conventional war.

It is against this background that we view the discussion of items 2 and 3, whose treatment does not require, in my delegation's opinion, the establishment of a subsidiary body of this Conference with special powers. It would appear expedient to examine the specific features of the highly different regional security situations and potential developments so as first to obtain a clear picture of the arrangements needed, of the practicable steps and feasible developments. Extensive procedural debates on the nature and form of a suitable framework for discussion of these items clearly prevents the commencement of deliberations for achieving such clarity. My delegation believes that last year's open-ended consultations or, respectively, informal plenaries provide a suitable framework for differentiated work.

In this connection, the question arises of what importance remains concerning "effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", the so-called negative security assurances, in the perspective of nuclear disarmament. It is obvious that concrete measures, as proposed in the bilateral negotiations at Geneva, would have an impact on the urgency and on the nature and scope of negative security assurances. However, these should, in my delegation's opinion, differ according to the respective prevailing constellation. Agreement on a negotiated common formula for incorporating all five nuclear-States into an unconditional, identical security assurance for non-nuclear-weapon States stands little chance of being translated into practice without prior agreement on stabilizing ceilings for weapons and forces. My delegation therefore suggests that the treatment of item 6 be closely linked to the discussion of items 2 and 3, with unrestricted use being made of the existing mandate.

As regards the abolition of chemical weapons, my delegation has spoken on this subject on various occasions of late and expressed its satisfaction at the visible advances being made in individual sectors. In its view, the negotiations have acquired a momentum which not only reflects the deep concern universally felt about this scourge facing mankind, but also increasingly testifies to the political obligation to prevent further instrumentalization of this category of weapons. These negotiations simultaneously benefit from

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new expectations and proposals in other areas of arms control, for example in respect of verification problems. The growing momentum of the negotiations in elaborating language must now be fully exploited so as to conclude as early as possible a chemical weapons convention -- a subject to which my Government accords the highest priority.

My delegation's concentration on the main elements of the convention is meant to be a practical contribution. All delegations know the dilemma between the necessary political oversight and decision on one side, and the unavoidable scrutiny of the small print on the other. We must be guided by the principle that the underlying uniform commitments for all countries must first be dealt with politically and then be formulated in no vague terms. For example, only by an adequate verification régime can all countries be convinced that a convention banning chemical weapons worldwide is the most reliable guarantee that they will not be used. Such verification must be both effective and practicable. Striking the necessary balance is a major task for this Conference. We feel that on the central political issue of a chemical weapons convention, that of on-challenge inspections, this balance has been achieved satisfactorily in the British proposal in Working Paper CD/715. We therefore continue to strongly support this proposal.

My delegation was one of the first to underscore, by means of various contributions and proposals, its determination to participate in the efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space as part of the complementary role played by the Conference in this sphere. My delegation has never succumbed to the illusion that the overriding criteria of stability in outer space can be resolved in multilateral agreements before decisive breakthroughs have been made in bilateral negotiations. However, in this connection we have always striven for "constructive parallelism" and supported realistic, complementary efforts. We regret that the analytical step towards identifying lacunae and shortcomings in existing law on outer space has not been taken until now. Though shortcomings have been defined and deficiencies deplored, they have neither been linked to one another nor examined with a view to achieving concrete "remedial measures". My delegation therefore feels that, before unanimous agreement has been reached on definitions and interpretations, it is not expedient to examine associated compliance aspects of existing or intended activities in outer space. We consider it necessary and advisable to evaluate in a coherent fashion what legal arrangements are needed and indeed feasible for a prohibitory convention, which is seemingly not possible at present.

In the field of radiological weapons, this Conference has pursued numerous, diverse approaches. It has not been possible to continue along certain paths because of a clash of interests, some of which had eventually very little to do with the central problem. The question now arises of whether certain national interests are of such great importance in terms of security that individual countries pursuing their own interests can in the long run hamper or prevent solutions in this field, thus thwarting the intentions of the overwhelming majority of delegations. A serious appraisal of the respective positions is needed. My delegation is convinced that such an appraisal will then permit genuine progress on the two items for which such extensive conceptual preparations have been made, namely a convention banning radiological weapons as well as the protection of nuclear plants against attacks.

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The limitation of my suggestions to what is realistically feasible is the outcome of a pragmatic approach geared to achieving tangible results. It does not by any means detract from the role of this Conference or from the sum total of its legitimate and more extensive tasks. Security structures are of a fragile nature. Security and stability at a lower level of armaments and on better conditions require balanced interaction of bilateral and multilateral efforts. The concentration on ultimate goals must not make us blind to the requisite, feasible steps leading to those goals. It is these steps that afford us opportunities and impose responsibilities on us in our ongoing work.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador von Stülpnagel, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me. I have no other speakers on my list, so allow me to ask if there is any delegation wishing to take the floor at this stage. I recognize the distinguished representative of the USSR, Ambassador Nazarkin.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): First of all, Comrade President, may I congratulate you, the representative of the fraternal country of socialist Czechoslovakia, on your assumption of the duties of President of the Conference on Disarmament for April. The Soviet delegation is convinced that under your leadership the Conference will be able to achieve positive results in its work. We wish you every success in this difficult and responsible post. We would also like to thank your predecessor, the distinguished Ambassador of Cuba, Comrade Lechuga Hevia, for the contribution which he made to the work of the Conference as President of this body.

First of all, I would like to make a few comments on the statements we have just heard by the representative of the United States, Ambassador Hansen. I wish to note the positive elements contained in his statement. The United States has declared that it will remove one of the obstacles to the agreement on the question of the destruction of CW stocks. This is undoubtedly a positive development, and I hope that the delegation of the United States will pursue the chemical weapons negotiations in the same positive spirit.

The distinguished representative of the United States raised the question of challenge inspection. That is today one of the most important issues facing us in the chemical weapons negotiations, and the exchange of views on it is undoubtedly essential. Evidently, such an exchange is also appropriate in a less formal situation, and on the whole this is happening. Therefore, it would hardly be correct for me to embark on a detailed discussion of the comments made today by Ambassador Hansen. We will have occasion to do this in other circumstances. I would just today like to point out that, unfortunately, on the basis of the comments made by Ambassador Hansen on challenge inspection, we see that there still remains the position which the United States adopted three years ago, back in 1984, concerning the automatic nature of challenge inspections.

This will not be conducive to progress in the negotiations, considering in particular the fact that many other delegations have made very varied comments on other ways in which the question of challenge inspection could be resolved. Ambassador Hansen, as far as I could see, showed interest in the

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idea of alternative measures. I would not like to deprive the authors of that idea -- it was put forward as you know, by the United Kingdom delegation -- of the opportunity of justifying their own proposal. But in any case the detailed exchange of views on the nature of alternative measures could well take place during a less formal exchange of views.

I would like to appeal to the United States delegation to give serious consideration to the British proposal and adopt a more positive and constructive view of it, as it enjoys broad support in the negotiations. In fact today we heard support for it confirmed by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany in the statement of Ambassador von Stülpnagel. I think that on the basis of the British proposal movement towards a solution to the problem of challenge inspection could be achieved.

Now, the matter of confidence. Of course, it is extremely important, and obviously it cannot be built in one day. I noted that Ambassador Hansen made a positive appreciation of the steps recently taken in that direction by the Soviet side. At the same time, I must point out that confidence-building is a two-way process. Ambassador Hansen referred to the fact that the United States has published data on its chemical weapons -- I have the following to say in that connection: of course the publication of some weapons data is evidence of a certain level of openness, but from my standpoint, confidence would be strengthened much more by information, not on armaments or plans to produce binary weapons, but on arms reductions or on the renunciation of plans to develop armaments. Such steps would indeed lead to the building of true confidence. In this connection, I would refer to the appeals made by the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, in March this year, not to undertake any steps which might complicate the achievement of mutually acceptable accords in the negotiations or slow them down, and also not to produce chemical weapons, including binary or multi-component varieties. Such measures would in fact help to develop confidence and hasten successful progress in the chemical weapons negotiations.

Since I have taken the floor, I would like to take this opportunity also to make a few comments on an earlier United States statement made on 2 April.

The representative of the United States, Mr. Barthelemy, then raised what he called "fundamental points" on items 2 and 5 on our agenda. I would like to remind you that my statement on 3 March referred to this topic too. This circumstance, obviously, gives me the right to assume that my statement of 3 March was one of those to which the delegation of the United States was reacting, although our delegation was not directly referred to by name. I must say that I was not fully sure that Mr. Barthelemy was referring to my statement even after reading through the text of Mr. Barthelemy's statement, which he was kind enough to provide me with, after the meeting on 2 April. The point is that although both he and I were considering the self-same matters, I unfortunately did not see any direct reaction in his statement to the arguments which I adduced. Nor did I see any reaction to the questions which I raised. In a desire to turn a "dialogue of the deaf" into a true dialogue, I thought it appropriate to return to the conceptual positions referred to on both 2 April and 3 March and I will try to do that as briefly as I can.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

If we look at post-war history, we see that each new turn of the screw of the arms race, which is precisely the most characteristic phenomenon of this period of human history, has been justified by the United States by the fact that supposedly it has to re-establish the balance of power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Of course, there are no scales where you can weigh up and compare the military power of the two sides. However, it is useful not to forget that it was not the USSR but the United States which first produced the atom bomb. The United States surrounded our territory with a network of military bases with jets which could deliver atom bombs to destroy our towns. Our development of intercontinental ballistic missiles which made it possible to deliver nuclear warheads against targets in United States territory was only a response to the nuclear threat to which we were subjected by the United States, not the other way round.

This was not the beginning of an arms race in outer space, as pictured by Mr. Barthelemy on 2 April. We were indeed the first to launch an artificial Earth satellite. This launch was carried out in accordance with the scientific research programme of the International Geophysical Year, in other words solely for peaceful purposes, and again it did not signify the beginning of the arms race in outer space. For the time being, there are no strike space weapons in outer space. There are military satellites -- early-warning satellites, communications and navigation satellites and so forth -- but space is, for the time being, free of weapons which shoot. That is precisely why the question is now to prevent an arms race in outer space, not to allow strike space weapons, that is to say, weapons which could destroy any kind of target. By the way, this was set down in the Soviet-American document adopted here in Geneva, in January 1985, as an objective in the Soviet-American negotiations. There it is stated that the objective of the negotiations will be agreements aimed at "preventing an arms race in space and preventing it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability". I stress that the reference there is to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

But now this aim is being pushed further and further away as the result of the attempts by the United States Administrations to deploy strike space weapons within the context of the Strategic Defence Initiative. In my statement on 3 March, I dwelt in detail on the nature of the SDI, on the direct link between offensive and defensive weapons, and I also noted the contradiction between the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and attempts to put the SDI over as the avenue towards the disappearance of nuclear weapons. Mr. Barthelemy did not dispute the arguments contained in my statement made on 3 March, and thus I allow myself to draw the following conclusions.

First, it is impossible to deny the unbreakable link between strategic defensive and offensive weapons when determining the balance of power. The acquisition by one side of a defensive capability is tantamount to its acquisition of supplementary strike capacity.

Second, it is impossible to deny that weapons launched into space in order to hit intercontinental ballistic missiles may also attack the satellites of the other side, and also with further elaboration, could be used

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

for purely offensive purposes, in particular for striking from space at targets in the atmosphere and on the Earth's surface, for example, airborne command posts, oil reservoirs, and other installations.

Third, it is impossible to deny the destabilizing nature of such armament systems which are called upon to change the balance of power, in particular taking into account the fact that it only takes minutes or even seconds to bring such systems into operation. The SDI is precisely such a weapons system. Moreover, because of its specific nature, it enhances the destabilizing effect because it creates the illusion that the side carrying out a first strike will go unpunished.

Finally, the SDI programmes an arms race for many decades to come. The improvement of the "shield" always leads to the improvement of the "sword", and as the experience of history shows, there are no limits to this process of improving sword and shield.

I would like once again to come back to the question of nuclear deterrence. The main argument which is used by those who support nuclear deterrence is that for 40 years there has not been one single case of the use of nuclear weapons, and that a global conflict has not occurred, although we have been very close to it several times.

There is no doubt, and nobody will deny this, that the deterrent nature of nuclear weapons is a reality. But unfortunately that reality is fraught with danger. We should not forget that, while reducing the possibility of the outbreak of a global conflict, nuclear weapons in no way rule out such a possibility, and it would have catastrophic consequences. We see that we need to reduce the level of nuclear confrontation down to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. At the same time, of course, the process of reduction of other types of weapons would continue, and comprehensive security would be strengthened in other areas too -- political, economic and humanitarian.

We propose that we try to achieve the goals of creating a nuclear-free and non-violent world first and foremost by means of disarmament measures. What remains unclear, and Mr. Barthelemy's statement unfortunately did not clarify this point, is how the concept of nuclear deterrence can be combined with the disappearance of nuclear weapons, to which the SDI should supposedly lead. Is the West abandoning deterrence totally, or is it exchanging nuclear deterrence for some other sort of deterrence, for example, space deterrence?

Finally, one further fundamental point: the question of negotiating from a position of strength. The United States delegation on 2 April said that the deployment of United States medium-range missiles has supposedly induced us to propose the elimination of that class of weapons in Europe. Just imagine what would happen if the American side managed to convince us of the correctness of their logic. Then we, in order to succeed in the disarmament negotiations, would have to increase our armaments in all directions, and the same thing would be done, I suppose, by the United States. Actually, this is what happened recently -- although, of course, we enhanced our defence capability to ensure that our security did not suffer. However, a time came when the Soviet leadership had to take decisive action in order to smash the suicidal logic of the arms race. Such acts of political wisdom include our proposal on



(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

medium-range missiles. The attempts to pass that proposal off as the result of the pressure of the Pershings on us is just an apology for the arms race. It is rather odd that the United States delegation selected the tribune of the Conference on Disarmament for propaganda in favour of the arms race and not negotiations on disarmament. To preach the arms race from the tribune of the Conference on Disarmament is a depressing paradox, that eloquently characterizes the United States approach to disarmament.

Finally, a small comment on Mr. Barthelemy's scepticism on the question of glasnost or openness. In the USSR very serious and thoroughgoing -- I would say revolutionary -- changes are taking place. Naturally, people in other countries wish to understand what is happening, to grasp these changes objectively. Only after understanding their content, purpose and aim can one correctly judge our international policy. Now more than ever before it is determined by internal policy, that is to say our interest in concentrating on creative work to improve our country. That is precisely why we need firm peace, predictability and a constructive direction in international relations. Those who understand this welcome our changes. I would refer to what was said by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, when at the end of her visit to our country expressed her positive attitude to the changes taking place in our country. But there are those in the West who fear that the greater disclosure of the opportunities inherent in socialism will strengthen our structure. Obviously, they do not want that -- they are afraid of it. Hence the attempts to cast doubts on what is happening in our country. These are obviously based on the viewpoint that what is good for one side is bad for another. This is an obsolete, outworn way of thinking. The fact that we want to make our country better will not make things worse for anybody else. The whole world can only gain from it. We would very much like this to be understood.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. Now before I proceed to make several announcements, I should like to ask once again if any delegation wishes to take the floor? The distinguished representative of the United States has the floor.

Mr. HANSEN (United States of America): Thank you, Mr. President. First, I must apologize to you for not acknowledging the fact that you have assumed the Presidency. This is due only to my own incompetence and to nothing else, and also to my absence from Geneva. I do wish to congratulate you on your assumption of the Presidency and assure you of the goodwill and co-operation of my delegation in your difficult task.

I reluctantly would want to turn a three-speaker agenda into a five-speaker agenda, especially when I myself would give two of those speeches. Nevertheless, there are some things that I feel need to be said in the interest of balance, and in the interest of providing all of us with different views on problems with which we must cope. I note that in all likelihood we will begin soon to have an Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space, in which one of the key elements ought to be discussions of the realities that exist. I think that that is in many respects a more appropriate forum than this to deal with some of the details that confront us.

(Mr. Hansen, United States)

I was not here to listen to colleague, Mr. Barthelemy's, speech; I have read it. It is not my intent to either take a distance from that or to defend it -- it stands on its own merit. I myself found it to be logical in its composition and accurate in what it said. One of the things that we are talking about in this forum, or will be talking about in more detail, is the idea of the militarization of space, or if you will, to prevent an arms race in space. This requires that we understand, to the extent that information is available, what this means to us. Are we talking about an offensive military capability in space, a defensive military capability in space, military communications in space, or military intelligence-gathering devices in space. There must be some attempt to draw the line on what this means. I shall not try to do that, but I would note that the projecting of a missile into space bearing nuclear charges certainly fits one definition of the militarization of space, and certainly ICBMs, of which there are a great many, are planned to project nuclear devices through space to attack targets of another country. There are also, according to the analysts of my country, plans to send nuclear devices into space as defence against such ICBMs, and there I am speaking of the ABM system which surrounds Moscow, known in the West as Galosh. There exists a very strong possibility that said (Galosh) missiles are, in fact, nuclear-tipped and that the defensive effort would be brought about by the explosion of a nuclear weapon in space.

The existence of such a system does reflect, as my distinguished colleague Ambassador Nazarkin said, the interaction between sword and shield; others could better explain the Marxist dialectic on the relationship of offence and defence than I. I would only note that it exists, and that in the context of offence and defence it has often been expressed, particularly in the nuclear sphere. I would note that two Chiefs of the General Staff of the Soviet Union have been most explicit on this count, Marshall Sokoluvskiy and Marshall Ogarkov. While I have mentioned that, I should also like to read to you from a rather interesting book entitled "Military Strategy" written under the guidance and editorship of Marshall Sokoluvskiy. The book was written in 1963, in its first edition; its last edition in 1968. I do not want to pretend to tell you the currency of this book, but as an historical instrument I wish now to quote from this book. I am going to read you four paragraphs, and I beg your indulgence:

"Priority in such outstanding stages in knowledge of the universe as the launch of the first SPUTNIK of Earth, the first flight of man in space, the first group flight of man in cosmic space, the first cosmic flight in the world of a woman, the first exit of man into open interstellar space, belongs to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union created the most powerful rockets in the world, the carriers of cosmic objects. The Soviet Union was the first in the world to create the hydrogen bomb and the intercontinental ballistic missile, and also a number of new kinds of rocket armaments which are new in principle."

It goes on to talk about the incorporation of various cosmic means into the defensive organization of the Soviet Union:

(Mr. Hansen, United States)

"The second half of the twentieth century will, in the opinion of scientists, be a century of space and thermal nuclear energy which cannot fail to influence the development of corresponding means of destruction and of the means of their delivery to the target.

"Taking into account the fact that the Soviets created hydrogen weapons before the United States, and most of all, that the United States does not possess super powered thermonuclear charges such as those possessed by the USSR, we consider our superiority over the Western block in nuclear weapons to be indisputable. By the admission of competent American specialists, our superiority in total nuclear might of strategic rocket weapons is very considerable."

I dislike the type of exchanges which sound like two religious zealots interpreting the Bible, but it is of course important that we have facts at our disposal. I spoke earlier in the context of chemical weapons urging that we build confidence, that there be greater openness among all of us in the context of chemical weapons. I call upon us in this context to be open about what is happening in space. It should in this context be noted that the Soviet Union has had an operational orbital interceptor and anti-satellite weapon since 1971, that is for 14 years, and it has ground-based lasers which have been tested against objects in space. I mentioned the location of Sary Shagan. When we want to deal with issues of this type and this magnitude and this soberness, then let us also be open. The Soviet Union has spent roughly as much on strategic defence as it has on strategic offence, reflecting again this interplay between sword and shield. It does have the world's only operational anti-ballistic missile system which is being consistently and continually upgraded. It has an enormous number of airplanes which are part of what is known as air defence of the homeland. It has programmes to shield its political leadership and it has an extensive civil defence programme. We do not question the Soviet Union's right to have these programmes.

In a forum where we attach highest priority to nuclear issues and to nuclear disarmament, there is an obvious acceptance of the fact that nuclear weapons are terrible instruments. In Beijing (China), I recently listened to testimonies of people who had been in Hiroshima and Nagasaki who talk about the terribleness of nuclear weapons -- there is no question about that. Why then should anyone take great umbrage at any nation attempting to defend itself from such weapons? The task that faces us is, of course, to reduce those weapons and, if possible, to totally do away with them. That task is only possible when we build confidence among nations; when we reduce the suspicions that exist among nations, when we learn to co-operate in peaceful and constructive ways.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the President. Does any delegation wish to take the floor? The distinguished representative of the USSR has the floor.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I do not intend to turn this meeting into an exclusive exchange of views between two delegations; I would like to say just a few words. I too

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

have many quotations which I could well use to prove, as was done by the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Hansen, that the United States military leaders at one time or another considered that the United States of America had reached military supremacy; but the reproduction of all those quotations would take up far too much time. I will just give you one small quotation from former United States President Nixon who, in July 1985, in an interview with the United States magazine Time in connection with the fortieth anniversary of the United States of America as a nuclear Power, noted that the Americans were surprised when the Russians produced the bomb (this is a reference to the atom bomb in 1949) and so both States had the bomb, but the Americans had more, and that is when they began to use it as a diplomatic club. Now there was a growing revisionist theory that the bomb did not play an important part in United States foreign policy after the Second World War: that theory was being developed because the bomb was very unpopular, but he (President Nixon) did know that it played a role.

From this quotation from the former United States President it is quite clear what the source of the arms race was. Of course it zig-zagged about, but its sources were such as described by Mr. Nixon in the quote I have just given you.

In conclusion, I would like totally to express my solidarity with Ambassador Hansen in what he said at the end of his second statement, when he called for the building of confidence and for productive and constructive negotiations to be conducted. On this point we absolutely agree with him.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the distinguished representative of the USSR for his statement. May I now make a few announcements.

Members will recall that, at our last plenary meeting, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events introduced the Progress Report of that Group, as contained in document CD/745. As usual, the Conference will adopt the recommendation contained in paragraph 13 of that Progress Report relating to the dates for the next session of the Ad Hoc Group. I intend to put before the Conference that recommendation at our 405th plenary meeting, to be held on 14 April.

I should like also to recall that the United Nations Office at Geneva will be closed on Friday 17 April and Monday 20 April, which are official holidays for the Organization, and, accordingly, no conference services will be available during those days. The timetable to be adopted by the Conference at our next plenary will reflect this fact. The CPD Contact Group on Outer Space will meet immediately after this plenary in Room I and the usual consultations of the Group Co-ordinators with the President, to which are also invited the Co-ordinators of items 2 and 3 for tomorrow, will begin at 3.15 p.m. sharp, not at 3.30 p.m. This concludes my announcements, and I have no other business for this plenary meeting. I therefore intend to adjourn it. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 9 April, at 10 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.