



General Assembly Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/42/260
S/18832
29 April 1987

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-second session
Items 24, 73, 131, 133 and 140 of the
preliminary list*
THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA
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GOOD-NEIGHBOURLINESS BETWEEN STATES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-second year

Letter dated 29 April 1987 from the Permanent Representative
of Democratic Kampuchea to the United Nations addressed to
the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith, for your information, a document entitled "The situation in Kampuchea during the ninth dry season (October 1986-April 1987)" (see annex).

I should be most grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under items 24, 73, 131, 133 and 140 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) THIOUNN Prasith
Permanent Representative

* A/42/50.

ANNEX

The situation in Kampuchea during the ninth dry season
(October 1986-April 1987)

(Excerpts from the statement of 15 April 1987 by Mr. Khieu Samphan, Vice-President of Democratic Kampuchea in charge of Foreign Affairs, on the occasion of the Kampuchean traditional New Year (B.E. 2530) and the twelfth anniversary of the founding of Democratic Kampuchea)

We have in the past, especially in April last year, summed up three major difficulties of the Vietnamese enemy as follows:

1. They have been driven into a total impasse on the battlefield of Kampuchea;
2. They have been facing mounting difficulties in Viet Nam itself because of their defeats in Kampuchea;
3. They have been suffering increasing isolation in the international arena.

So far, Viet Nam has not been able to solve any of these three major difficulties; on the contrary, they have been more acute than before and have openly broken out at the end of last year. To this day, they remain unresolved and there is no sign of their solution in sight.

Viet Nam's most striking difficulties which have openly broken out have been on the home-front:

1. Viet Nam's economy has plunged to the bottom of its pitch and still remains there;
2. The living conditions of the Vietnamese people have been hardest hit. This has affected the whole Vietnamese society;
3. A grave rift exists among Vietnamese top leaders in the party, as well as in the State organs.

Of all Viet Nam's three home-front difficulties, the one that has suffered most drastic deterioration has been the unresolved rift among its top leaders. Besides, the gloomy situation of its economy and the very poor living conditions of its people have added up to more pressure on the Vietnamese leadership.

What are the causes of all these Vietnamese home-front difficulties? It is the successive defeats of Viet Nam's war of aggression in Kampuchea.

I. MILITARY SITUATION DURING THE 1986-1987 DRY SEASON

On the battlefield in Kampuchea, throughout this current dry season, the Vietnamese aggressors have been able to carry out operations only at platoon, company or battalion levels. Only in Pailin (province of Battambang) were they able to launch attacks at regiment level. Yet even in Pailin, our forces have successively repulsed their operations which are going to be definitively put out of action. Such a situation clearly indicates that during the current ninth dry season, the Vietnamese military strength has, to an important extent, further worn down.

As far as we are concerned, we have been more active and efficient in dismantling the Vietnamese administrative centres in villages and communes throughout the country and around cities or towns, especially the provincial chief-towns of Battambang, Siemreap and Kompong Thom and the capital city of Phnom Penh.

By attacking the Vietnamese enemy in such a way, we have been able to significantly transform the situation in all fields. The political and military maps have thus drastically changed. On the one hand, the Vietnamese forces have been compelled to concentrate mainly in cities or towns in order to cope with our attacks. On the other hand, the Kampuchean people have more actively participated with our army in the fighting against the Vietnamese aggressors. Another most noticeable development has been the fact that the forcibly-enlisted Khmer soldiers have now become an important force who joins us to fight back against the Vietnamese enemy. Thus the Vietnamese troops have been more and more like "fish out of water", unable to contain our attacks around major towns or cities, or to seal off the border. In addition, their already-low morale has further worn out.

So Viet Nam's difficulties in its war of aggression in Kampuchea are not limited to one or two fronts, but are due to the overall situation. The co-operation of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea with the other two patriotic forces of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea and especially their co-operation with the local population and the forcibly-enlisted Khmer soldiers to attack and dismantle the Vietnamese administrative centres in villages and communes, have every day dried up the supply sources of the Vietnamese war of aggression in military, political and economic fields, as well as in food supplies. The situation has indeed far-reaching repercussions in Viet Nam itself, where its difficulties have become more and more acute with each passing year. With such a development of the situation on the battlefield, we can clearly see that Viet Nam's already-serious difficulties will only worsen. Therefore, we now can see the light of the final victory of our national liberation struggle.

All this has been the result of the hard struggle of our National Army and people and of all patriotic forces, with the assistance and support of all our friends, near and far, throughout the world.

However, the Vietnamese enemy are still trying desperately to hang on. They are not yet willing to let go their hold of Kampuchea. But no matter how hard they try to hang on, the situation on the battlefield, together with the pressure of the

international community, will drive them to face unbearable difficulties compelling them to negotiate with the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK).

II. CGDK'S STAND ON THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF KAMPUCHEA

We would like to take this opportunity to point out once again the following:

1. The problem of Kampuchea has been created by the Vietnamese war of aggression against Kampuchea. If Viet Nam wants to seek a political solution to the Kampuchean problem, it has to negotiate with the CGDK, the sole legal and legitimate representative of the people of Kampuchea who, as the victim of the Vietnamese war of aggression, have been waging a national liberation struggle. The Vietnamese aggressors cannot, through deceitful diplomatic manoeuvres, legalize their war of aggression in Kampuchea and refuse to negotiate a political settlement of the Kampuchean problem with the CGDK.
2. The Vietnamese aggressors will never succeed in their attempt to resort to a "national reconciliation" slogan for misleading purposes or to force the Kampuchean people to lay down their weapons and abandon their sacred struggle. National reconciliation can only come about within the framework of an independent, united, peaceful, neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea free from foreign occupation.

On 17 March 1986, His Royal Highness Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, President of Democratic Kampuchea, formally announced, on behalf of the CGDK, the eight-point peace proposal for a political settlement of the Kampuchean problem which, if adopted, would provide an honourable way for the Vietnamese to withdraw in an orderly manner and would clear the way for national reconciliation among all Kampucheans. That eight-point peace proposal constitutes another important historic victory for the Kampuchean people in their struggle against the Vietnamese aggressors. It has been one of the results of the development of the great national union forces. It also constitutes a firm foundation upon which the great national union can be consolidated and developed at present in our struggle until the withdrawal of all the Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea and in the future, after the Vietnamese withdrawal.

Later on, at the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly, His Royal Highness Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, President of Democratic Kampuchea, has again painstakingly dwelled on the CGDK's eight-point peace proposal.

On 18 February 1987, the CGDK again issued an appeal to the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to accept the CGDK's eight-point peace proposal.

That appeal pointed out among other things that:

"By accepting the CGDK's eight-point peace proposal for a political settlement of the Kampuchean problem, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam (SRVN) would not 'lose face':

1. The CGDK's eight-point peace proposal would allow the SRVN enough time and the necessary conditions to withdraw its forces safely and in an orderly manner from Kampuchea;
2. As far as its 'protégés' in Kampuchea are concerned, the SRVN would have time to consolidate them. They would not only be assured of no reprisal, but would take part, within the framework of the policy of national reconciliation and great union, in a quadripartite coalition government entrusted with organizing free and United Nations-supervised elections;
3. Our two countries would re-establish good relations through a treaty of friendship, co-operation and non-aggression;
4. Kampuchea would not ask for war damages."

We would like to urge the SRVN to heed the voice of reason and to favourably respond to the sincere friendship of the people of Kampuchea and the CGDK by accepting the CGDK's eight-point peace proposal.

As for the Soviet Union, during his recent tour to some countries in South-East Asia and Asia Pacific, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze was himself aware at first hand that all the countries of the region would judge the Soviet policy towards South-East Asia and Asia Pacific through its actual attitude on the Kampuchean problem. In this respect, the CGDK appeal of 18 February clearly indicated that:

"By ending its assistance to Viet Nam's occupation of Kampuchea, the USSR's interests in this region would not only be secured, but further consolidated and expanded in the economic, political and diplomatic fields. Its old friends would not be lost while it gained new ones in South-East Asia and in the world. Its interest in South-East Asia and in Asia Pacific would not be questioned from all quarters as is today the case. It would only be acclaimed for this concrete attitude, which would be a clear indication of its peaceful gesture."

* * *

The Vietnamese are facing increasingly serious difficulties in their continued war of occupation in Kampuchea. Yet they are not willing to let go their hold of Kampuchea.

They still continue to massacre the Kampuchean people and to plunder their properties. They still continue to implement their "K.5" scheme by rounding up the Kampuchean people and sending them to die in western border regions. They still

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continue to forcibly conscript the sons of the Kampuchean people into their army and send them to die in their places.

The Kampuchean people cannot undergo such suffering and misery under the iron grip of the Vietnamese aggressors. They must live as the masters of their own motherland.

On this auspicious occasion, we would like to renew our deep gratitude to all peace- and justice-loving countries in the world for their assistance in and support for the just cause of the Kampuchean people. We would also like to call upon them to continue to do so and especially to support the CGDK's eight-point peace proposal. An independent, united, peaceful, neutral and non-aligned Kampuchea, free from any foreign military base on her soil, which will emerge as the result of the implementation of the CGDK's eight-point peace proposal, will be an important factor in the balance of power that will guarantee peace, security and stability in South-East Asia and in Asia Pacific.
