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REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE  
UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS

(For the period 1 June to 30 November 1980)

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
INTRODUCTION . . . . .	2
I. COMPOSITION AND DEPLOYMENT OF UNFICYP . . . . .	3
II. UNFICYP OPERATIONS . . . . .	5
A. Mandate and concept of operations . . . . .	5
B. Liaison and co-operation . . . . .	6
C. Freedom of movement of UNFICYP . . . . .	6
D. Maintenance of the cease-fire . . . . .	6
E. Maintenance of the <u>status quo</u> . . . . .	7
F. Mines . . . . .	7
G. Humanitarian functions and normalization of conditions . . . . .	7
III. UNCIVPOL . . . . .	8
IV. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME . . . . .	9
V. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL . . . . .	10
VI. FINANCIAL ASPECTS . . . . .	11
VII. OBSERVATIONS . . . . .	13
ANNEX. REPORT OF THE SECRETARIAT SURVEY TEAM FOR THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS	
MAP. Deployment of UNFICYP, November 1980	

## INTRODUCTION

1. The present report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covers developments from 1 June to 30 November 1980 and brings up to date the record of activities of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) pursuant to the mandate laid down in Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent resolutions of the Council concerning Cyprus, including, most recently, resolution 472 (1980) of 13 June 1980.

2. In its resolution 472 (1980), the Security Council also urged the parties to resume the intercommunal talks within the framework of the 10-point agreement in a continuing, sustained and result-oriented manner, avoiding any delay, and it requested me to continue my mission of good offices, to keep the Security Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of that resolution by 30 November 1980. In pursuance of the resolution, I submitted to the Council on 11 August a report pertaining to my mission of good offices (S/14100). Further developments on this subject are summarized in section V below.

I. COMPOSITION AND DEPLOYMENT OF UNFICYP

3. The table below shows the establishment of UNFICYP as at 30 November 1980:

<u>Military</u>			<u>Total</u>
AUSTRIA	HQ UNFICYP	5	
	Infantry battalion UNAB 18	303	
	Military police company	6	314
CANADA	HQ UNFICYP	8	
	Artillery regiment "Cinquième Regiment d'Artillerie Légère du Canada"	468	
	Signal squadron	19	
	Medical centre	7	
	Military police company	12	514
DENMARK	HQ UNFICYP	5	
	Infantry battalion - DANCON XXXIV	347	
	Military police company	13	365
FINLAND	HQ UNFICYP	6	
	Military police company	5	11
IRELAND	HQ UNFICYP	7	7
SWEDEN	HQ UNFICYP	8	
	Infantry battalion UN 77C	407	
	Military police company	14	429
UNITED KINGDOM	HQ UNFICYP	19	
	HQ BRITCON	7	
	Armoured reconnaissance squadron - C Squadron The Blues and Royals	119	
	3RD Battalion The Royal Anglian Regiment	342	
	RHQ UNFICYP support regiment	42	
	Engineer detachment	8	
	Signal squadron	55	
	Army aviation flight	19	
	Transport squadron	101	
	Medical centre	6	
	Ordnance detachment	14	
	Workshop	39	
	Military police company	8	
	B Flight 84 Squadron RAF (Whirlwind)	38	817
			<u>2,457</u>
<u>Civilian police</u>			
Australia		20	
Sweden		14	34
	Total UNFICYP		<u><u>2,491</u></u>

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The current detailed deployment of UNFICYP is shown on the map attached to this report.

4. I have continued to keep the strength of the Force under review, bearing in mind the manning requirements for carrying out the operational commitments of UNFICYP under its mandate and financial limitations. In this connexion, I received on 31 July the report of the Secretariat Survey Team, which I had set up in May to carry out, in close co-operation with the Force Commander, a review of the establishment, strength and functioning of UNFICYP, with a view to assessing the scope for possible economies. The report of the team is reproduced in the annex below. The Survey Team maintained close contact with a working group set up for this purpose by the troop-contributing countries.

5. The Survey Team recommends a course of action (annex, para. 60) calling for a moderate across-the-board reduction in manpower levels; a possible withdrawal of certain units, a possible one-year experimental reorganization involving two of the contingents, and an arrangement to be negotiated with the parties, under which these would assume a fair share of the costs pertaining to the Force, including the cost of utility services, and facilitate certain UNFICYP operations. On 18 September, I transmitted the report of the Survey Team to the troop-contributing Governments and to the parties, and I have since engaged in consultations with them concerning the implementation of its recommendations.

6. Mr. Hugo Gobbi continues to be my Special Representative in Cyprus. The Force remains under the command of Major-General James Joseph Quinn.

## II. UNFICYP OPERATIONS

### A. Mandate and concept of operations

7. The function of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus was originally defined by the Security Council in its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 in the following terms:

"in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions".

That mandate, which was conceived in the context of the confrontation between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and between the Cyprus National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot fighters, has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Council, most recently in its resolution 472 (1980) of 13 June 1980. In connexion with the events that have occurred since 15 July 1974, the Council adopted a number of resolutions, some of which have affected the functioning of UNFICYP and, in some cases, have required UNFICYP to perform certain additional or modified functions. 1/

8. UNFICYP continues to supervise the cease-fire lines of the National Guard and of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces and to use its best efforts to prevent the recurrence of fighting (see sect. D below). It also continues to provide security for civilians engaged in peaceful activities in the area between the lines, in accordance with its normalization functions (see sect. E).

9. UNFICYP continues to use its best efforts to discharge its functions with regard to the security, welfare and well-being of the Greek Cypriots living in the northern part of the island.

10. UNFICYP has continued to visit, on a regular basis, Turkish Cypriots still residing in the south.

11. In addition, UNFICYP has continued to support the relief operations co-ordinated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and carried out in co-operation with the World Food Programme (WFP) (see paras. 33-38). It has also continued to discharge certain functions handed over to it by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) at the time of the withdrawal of its delegation from Cyprus in June 1977 (see S/13369, para. 12).

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1/ These include resolutions 353 (1974) of 20 July, 354 (1974) of 23 July, 355 (1974) of 1 August, 357 (1974) of 14 August, 358 (1974) and 359 (1974) of 15 August, 360 (1974) of 16 August, 361 (1974) of 30 August, 364 (1974) and 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974; 367 (1975) of 12 March, 370 (1975) of 13 June and 383 (1975) of 13 December 1975; 391 (1976) of 15 June and 401 (1976) of 14 December 1976; 410 (1977) of 16 June, 414 (1977) of 15 September and 422 (1977) of 15 December 1977; 430 (1978) of 16 June and 443 (1978) of 14 December 1978; 451 (1979) of 15 June 1979, 458 (1979) of 14 December 1979 and 472 (1980) of 13 June 1980.

B. Liaison and co-operation

12. UNFICYP has continued to emphasize the essential requirement of full liaison and co-operation at all levels to enable it to carry out its role effectively. These efforts have been met with a positive response from both sides. Liaison between UNFICYP and the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces and between UNFICYP and the National Guard remains satisfactory.

C. Freedom of movement of UNFICYP

13. As mentioned in my report of 3 June 1980 (S/13972, para. 13), following discussions between UNFICYP and the appropriate authorities concerning UNFICYP movement in the north, which had been restricted under guidelines issued by the Turkish Cypriot authorities in October 1979, a new set of guidelines was issued by the Turkish Cypriot side in December 1979. While the new guidelines represent some improvement of the situation, transit of UNFICYP vehicles continues to be restricted both by fixing the hours during which checkpoints can be used and by limiting the routes open to UNFICYP.

D. Maintenance of the cease-fire

14. UNFICYP surveillance over the area between the cease-fire lines is based upon a system of 136 observation posts, 63 of which are permanently manned. During the period under review, two permanently manned observation posts, A-09 in Famagusta and C-66 near the Nicosia airport, were changed to observation points manned on a part-time basis. Standing patrols are deployed as required to provide observation of sensitive areas. Vehicle-mounted patrols are conducted by day and night. The combination of static and mobile surveillance systems enables UNFICYP to conduct continuous surveillance of the cease-fire lines and provides the information necessary to identify cease-fire violations and the ability to react immediately. The project to improve the United Nations patrol track, which runs the length of the buffer zone, is still proceeding slowly. When this work is completed, ability of UNFICYP to monitor the cease-fire will be improved. This will further reduce reaction time and operational costs.

15. The nature and frequency of shooting incidents, movement and construction forward of the cease-fire line have remained essentially unchanged since my last report (see S/13972, paras. 15-16). Satisfactory channels of communication and liaison between UNFICYP and the two sides have enabled the force to control such cease-fire violations. In certain areas, the delineation of the cease-fire line is in dispute. Concerning one such area, the Ovgos River valley north of the village of Mammari, it was agreed that neither the Turkish forces nor the United Nations would patrol into the disputed area. This will maintain the status quo until a final agreement can be reached.

16. Improvements to existing positions and constructions of new fortifications, mainly by the National Guard, also remain the subject of disagreement. In most

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cases it was possible to find an agreed solution. In other cases, however, agreement has not been possible, owing to differing opinions with regard to the impact on the status quo of new positions constructed behind the cease-fire line.

17. There have been, as in the past, a number of complaints about aircraft flying on the wrong side of the cease-fire lines. In each instance, UNFICYP used available liaison channels with the parties to prevent any worsening of the situation.

#### E. Maintenance of the status quo

18. The cease-fire lines extend to a length of about 180 kilometres across the island, from the Kokkina enclave and Kato Pyrgos, on the north-west coast, to the east coast south of Famagusta, in the area of Dherinia. The total area between the lines, the width of which varies from 20 metres to 7 kilometres, covers about 3 per cent of the land area of the island.

19. UNFICYP has facilitated normal farming activity in the area between the lines, especially by providing escorts to enable farmers to work their fields and orchards in sensitive areas.

#### F. Mines

20. The seriousness of the land-mine hazard has not diminished since the last report (see S/13972, para. 20). UNFICYP continues to improve markings and barriers surrounding known or suspected minefields and maintains a programme of inspections and recording. Both the National Guard and the Turkish forces have responded in a positive way and have co-operated with UNFICYP in remarking and recording minefields.

#### G. Humanitarian functions and normalization of conditions

21. UNFICYP continues to discharge humanitarian functions for the Greek Cypriots remaining in the north. Temporary visits to the south for family and other reasons continue on an ad hoc basis, both directly and through the good offices of UNFICYP. During the period under review, a total of 484 Greek Cypriots came temporarily to the south for family reasons, and a total of 52 Greek Cypriots came temporarily to the south for medical reasons. Temporary transfers of Greek Cypriots to the north, as well as requests by Greek Cypriots holding foreign passports who return to the island from abroad to visit their relatives in the north, have not been granted, but these relatives are now permitted to travel to the south on such occasions.

22. Permanent transfers of Greek Cypriots from north to south have continued. The total number of such transfers since my last report has been 102, including 46 children, compared with 90 during the previous six-month period (see S/13972, para. 22), leaving 1,206 Greek Cypriots in the north. Transfers continue to be

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monitored by UNFICYP to ensure that they have been undertaken voluntarily. Three Turkish Cypriots crossed to the south, and two Turkish Cypriots returned to the north during the period under review.

23. The situation of the two Greek Cypriot primary schools operating in the north has changed little since my last report (S/13972, para. 23). The school in Ayia Trias now has 35 pupils, and at Rizokarpaso there are 73. The position regarding school holiday visits by Greek Cypriot children attending secondary school in the south to their families residing in the north remains unchanged (see S/13672, para. 26), and efforts by UNFICYP to arrange for such visits for the summer holidays were unsuccessful.

24. Two adult Maronites have been permanently transferred to the south since my last report. Contacts between members of the Maronite group residing on opposite sides of the cease-fire line remain frequent. In the north, they enjoy considerable freedom of movement, and visits from north to south and vice versa are arranged on an ad hoc basis.

25. UNFICYP officers, in performing certain humanitarian tasks in the north, continue to have the opportunity of speaking in private with Greek Cypriots living there.

26. Periodic visits by UNFICYP officials to the Turkish Cypriots living in the south are continuing, and contacts with their relatives in the north are maintained.

27. As reported previously (see S/13972, para. 27), the first phase of the Nicosia sewerage system went into operation on 24 May 1980. Planning is now in progress, in consultation with the European Economic Community, for the second phase of the project which will also be carried out under the auspices of the United Nations Development Programme and with the assistance of UNFICYP. A project manager has been selected for the UNDP-assisted Nicosia master plan project, and field work is expected to commence before the end of 1980. This project will benefit both communities in Nicosia.

28. UNFICYP has made arrangements to facilitate meetings between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot officials of the Water, Health and Veterinary Departments, as well as between press representatives from both sides.

29. The postal arrangements and delivery of Red Cross messages (see S/13672, para. 33) remain unchanged. Mail posted by Greek Cypriots in the north is being delivered in the south on a regular basis (see S/13972, para. 29).

### III. UNCIVPOL

30. UNCIVPOL continues to be deployed in support of UNFICYP military units and operates in close liaison with both the Cyprus police and the Turkish Cypriot police. UNCIVPOL contributes to the maintenance of law and order in the area between the lines and to the protection of the civilian population, particularly in areas where

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intercommunal problems exist. It assists in the control of the movement of civilians in the area between the cease-fire lines, escorts persons transferring from the north to the south and vice versa, inquires into complaints of criminal activity having intercommunal implications and, in the north, distributes social welfare payments to Greek Cypriots in their habitations and monitors their welfare. UNCIVPOL continues to maintain a Missing Persons Bureau at UNFICYP headquarters.

31. I have continued my efforts with a view to arriving at a solution of the problem of setting up an investigatory body for the tracing of and accounting for missing persons of both communities in Cyprus (see S/13972, para. 31). I recently conveyed to the parties certain ideas in this regard. I and my representatives are now engaged in renewed intensive consultations with the parties.

#### IV. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME

32. Since my report of 3 June 1980 (S/13972), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has continued, at my request, to assist the displaced and needy population in the island in his capacity as Co-ordinator of the United Nations Humanitarian Assistance for Cyprus. The scale of these activities, however, will be gradually adjusted to take account of present requirements. The competent authorities in Cyprus have been kept informed about these developments.

33. The 1980 programme provides \$US 15,101,000 to finance 17 projects. This programme, which is co-ordinated by the Cyprus Red Cross Society, involves participation in the construction of temporary housing and a general hospital and in the overseas procurement of equipment and supplies for the health, education and agriculture sectors.

34. Total contributions to the United Nations humanitarian assistance programme since 1974 amount to \$US 121,689,545 in cash and in kind from 38 donor Governments. A further \$US 382,417 has been received from non-governmental organizations and other donors, as well as \$US 8,942,055 in kind from the European Economic Community.

35. UNFICYP has continued to support the Co-ordinator's relief programme by delivering food supplies and other items. A major contributor to this programme since 1974 has been the World Food Programme. A total of 699 tons of relief supplies was distributed or delivered during the period under review through UNFICYP facilities. This included 513 tons, representing 229 truckloads of food-stuffs, clothing, gas and diesel oil, delivered to Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north, and 186 tons, i.e., 39 truckloads, delivered to needy Turkish Cypriots in the north. Since August 1974, a total of 19,628 tons of relief supplies has been provided to Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north, and 18,302 tons to Turkish Cypriots.

36. During the period under review, UNCIVPOL distributed social welfare payments to the Greek Cypriots in the north in the amount of £C 86,975.

37. UNFICYP provides emergency medical services, including medical evacuation by ambulance or helicopter. Delivery of medicines to the Turkish Cypriot community is made on a regular basis and emergency requests for medicines are met immediately.

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V. GOOD OFFICES OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

38. During the period under review, I have pursued the mission of good offices entrusted to me by the Security Council in paragraph 6 of its resolution 367 (1975) and continued by subsequent resolutions, including most recently resolution 472 (1980) of 13 June 1980. Following the mission to Nicosia, Ankara and Athens undertaken on my behalf by Mr. Perez de Cuellar, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, on which I reported to the Council at its meeting of 13 June (see S/PV.2230), intensive consultations continued both in New York and in Nicosia throughout July. On 6 August, Mr. Gobbi reported to me that agreement had been reached by the two parties to resume the talks formally in Nicosia on 9 August (see A/35/385-S/14100).

39. At the meeting held on 9 August, Mr. Gobbi delivered an opening statement on my behalf. The statement outlined my understanding of the common ground that had been worked out in the course of the consultations which had taken place over the preceding months and listed the four items to be discussed in the intercommunal talks on the basis of the 19 May 1979 agreement (see *ibid.*, annex). It was understood that those four items should be dealt with concurrently in rotation at consecutive meetings. Having heard the opening statement, the two interlocutors, Mr. George Ioannides for the Greek Cypriot community, and Mr. Umit Suleyman Onan for the Turkish Cypriot community, agreed to begin the substantive phase of the talks at the second meeting on 16 September 1980. It was also agreed that the proceedings would be kept confidential.

40. Since then there have been 10 meetings of the resumed intercommunal talks, and each of the four items of the agenda has been discussed at least twice. All meetings were held in private, in the presence of my Special Representative. The Greek Cypriot community was represented by Mr. Ioannides and his advisers, Mr. Michael Triantafyllides and Mrs. Stella Soulioti. The Turkish Cypriot community was represented by Mr. Onan and his advisers, Mr. Necati Munir Ertekun and Mr. Rustem Z Tatar. Experts of both sides also attended some of the meetings.

41. On 16 September, the interlocutors took up consideration of the first item, "Reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under United Nations auspices, in accordance with the provisions of point 5 of the 19 May 1979 agreement". The Greek Cypriot interlocutor submitted the proposals of his side. On 24 September, the interlocutors discussed agenda item 2, "Initial practical measures by both sides to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions, in accordance with the provisions of point 6 of the 19 May 1979 agreement, which states that special importance will be given to this matter". The Turkish Cypriot interlocutor presented the proposals of his side and the Greek Cypriot interlocutor also submitted detailed suggestions. On 1 October, the third item on the agenda, "Constitutional aspects", was taken up. The two interlocutors submitted their respective proposals for a future constitutional arrangement. Both sides undertook to study them, with a view to discussing them in depth at the next meeting on the subject. On 8 October, the fourth agenda item, "Territorial aspects", was discussed. Both interlocutors set forth their respective positions. There followed a frank exchange of views in the same good atmosphere as at previous meetings.

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42. On 15 October, the interlocutors resumed consideration of the first agenda item. The Turkish Cypriot interlocutor presented the proposals of his side concerning the resettlement of Varosha. On 31 October, the interlocutors continued discussion of the agenda item concerning initial practical measures. Areas of co-operation and the machinery required for that purpose were explored in detail. On 5 November, consideration of the third agenda item, "Constitutional aspects", was continued. There was a lengthy discussion, during which both sides explained further their respective constitutional proposals. On 12 November, the interlocutors continued discussion of the fourth agenda item, "Territorial aspects". Both sides further elaborated their respective positions on the subject and discussed in depth the various issues raised.

43. The third cycle of the talks began on 19 November, at which time the interlocutors resumed consideration of the first agenda item concerning the resettlement of Varosha. They explored at length each other's proposals and had a constructive and frank exchange of views on the item. On 26 November, the interlocutors took up again the agenda item concerning initial practical measures, which gave rise to a frank exchange of views. The constitutional and territorial items are scheduled to be discussed at the meetings to be held on 3 and 10 December, whereupon the interlocutors are planning to recess until 7 January 1981.

#### VI. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

44. Voluntary contributions in the amount of approximately \$262.2 million have been paid to the UNFICYP Special Account by 65 Member States and one non-member Government in respect of the periods from the inception of the Force on 27 March 1964 to 15 December 1980. In addition, voluntary contributions from public sources, interest earned on investment of temporarily undisbursed funds and other miscellaneous income received by the Account have totalled about \$7.3 million. Accordingly, some \$269.5 million have, so far, been made available to the UNFICYP Special Account towards meeting the costs of UNFICYP to the United Nations for the periods through 15 December 1980.

45. The costs to be borne by the United Nations for the operation of UNFICYP for the periods from the inception of the Force to 15 December 1980 are estimated at \$354.4 million. This figure includes the direct cost to the United Nations of maintaining the Force in Cyprus, as well as the amounts to be paid to Governments providing contingents in respect of their extra and extraordinary costs for which they seek to be reimbursed by the United Nations. The amount of \$269.5 million so far received by the UNFICYP Special Account falls short of the requirement of \$354.4 million indicated above by approximately \$84.9 million. However, in addition to the voluntary contributions that have already been paid to the Account, some \$4.6 million are expected to be received in due course against pledges made by Governments but not yet paid by them.

46. If to the amount of \$269.5 million so far received, the amount of \$4.6 million of anticipated receipts is added, the receipts of the UNFICYP Special Account since March 1964 can then be expected to total approximately \$274.1 million. The difference between this figure and the costs of approximately \$354.4 million to be met becomes \$80.3 million. Accordingly, unless additional contributions from existing or new pledges are received before 15 December 1980, the UNFICYP Special Account deficit as of that date will be \$80.3 million.

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47. If the Security Council should decide to extend for six months beyond 15 December 1980 the period during which the Force is to be stationed in Cyprus, it is estimated that the additional cost to the Organization for the Force would amount to approximately \$14.8 million, as detailed below. These estimates, which are based on the current strength of the Force and continuance of present reimbursement commitments, are subject to revision as and when the Survey Team's recommendations referred to earlier in this report (para. 5) are implemented, in consultation, as appropriate, with the troop contributors or the parties.

UNFICYP COST ESTIMATE BY MAJOR CATEGORY OF EXPENSE

(In thousands of United States dollars)

I.	<u>Operational costs incurred by the United Nations</u>	\$
	Movement of contingents	260
	Operational expenses	1,636
	Rental of premises	748
	Rations	990
	Non-military personnel, salaries, travel, etc.	1,777
	Miscellaneous and contingencies	200
	Total I	<u>5,611</u>
II.	<u>Reimbursement of extra costs of Governments providing contingents</u>	\$
	Pay and allowances	8,300
	Contingent-owned equipment	750
	Death and disability awards	<u>100</u>
	Total II	<u>9,150</u>
	Grand total (I and II)	<u><u>14,761</u></u>

48. The above costs of UNFICYP for the next six-month period, which will have to be covered by voluntary contributions, do not reflect the full cost of this operation to Member and non-member States. In fact, they exclude the regular cost that would be incurred by the troop contributors if their contingents were serving at home (i.e., regular pay and allowances and normal material costs), as well as such extra and extraordinary costs as the troop contributors have agreed to absorb at no cost to the United Nations. The troop-contributing Governments have informed me that the costs of UNFICYP absorbed by them are of the order of \$29.3 million for each six-month mandate period. Accordingly, the full costs of UNFICYP to Member and non-member States for the next six-month period are estimated at approximately \$44.1 million.

49. In order to finance the costs to the Organization of maintaining the Force for a period of six months after 15 December 1980 and to meet all costs and outstanding claims up to that date, it will be necessary to receive voluntary contributions to the UNFICYP Special Account totalling \$95.1 million.

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## VII. OBSERVATIONS

50. The foregoing pages provide a comprehensive account of both the peace-keeping and peace-making aspects of the United Nations operation in Cyprus during the past six-month period. These aspects are interrelated. UNFICYP has continued to perform its indispensable peace-keeping functions along the cease-fire lines and in the area between the lines, as well as humanitarian functions. Its activities, with the co-operation of the parties, have contributed to keeping the situation in the island calm. It is necessary, in this connexion, to bear in mind that the cease-fire in Cyprus is not, and, in present circumstances, cannot be self-sustaining. As noted in the recent survey report, its maintenance requires a continuous contribution by UNFICYP which strains the present resources of the Force.

51. I have continued to pursue the mission of good offices entrusted to me by the Security Council. A substantial forward step was achieved when the intercommunal talks were formally resumed on 9 August, after a hiatus of more than one year. The talks entered their substantive phase on 16 September. They have proceeded in a friendly and businesslike atmosphere. The third cycle of the talks, which is now under way, is scheduled to be completed on 10 December. The parties have stated their initial positions on the four items of the agenda (see para. 41 above), and there have been the first substantive responses. Some common ground has been indicated on certain practical questions. While progress so far has been slow, the discussions have been on the whole constructive, and it is to be hoped that an acceptable arrangement has at last been found for a sustained, serious and result-oriented joint exploration and negotiation of both the basic problems confronting Cyprus and the approaches to their solution.

52. One of the problems that the interlocutors will no doubt have to face at some point is the difficult issue of how and where to start the actual give-and-take which is the essence of an effective negotiating process. In this connexion, it is relevant to recall that the high-level accord of 19 May 1979 (see S/13369, para. 51) specified that certain matters are to be given priority or special importance as regards reaching agreement and implementation.

53. My Special Representative has kept me fully informed about the proceedings. At the same time, as part of the exercise of my good offices, it is my intention also to continue to maintain direct personal contact with the parties from time to time, with a view to reviewing periodically the progress of the talks and, as appropriate, exploring procedures that might facilitate the conduct of the negotiations. While a complex negotiating process such as the present one must, of necessity, proceed with careful deliberation, it must also, if it is to maintain its credibility, produce concrete results.

54. During the past months I have also continued my efforts to devise an acceptable formula for establishing an investigating body to trace and account for missing persons of both communities. I hope that the current intensive consultations will make it possible to move towards an acceptable and practical solution of this humanitarian problem.

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55. The financial situation of UNFICYP has continued to be a cause for growing concern during the period under review. The deficit of the UNFICYP account, including the current period, is now of the order of \$80.3 million. The claims of the troop contributors, which represent in some cases only a fraction of the actual costs incurred by those Governments in maintaining their contingents, have been paid only up to March 1976. It is my earnest hope that Governments will respond generously to my appeals for voluntary financial contributions and that Member States which have not contributed in the past will find it possible to review their positions in that regard.

56. As mentioned earlier in this report, I established in May 1980 a Secretariat Survey Team in response to the growing and very serious concern of the troop-contributing Governments over the disproportionate financial burden that they have been carrying. In its report (see annex), the Team has indicated certain courses of action which, if implemented, would result in reducing the cost of UNFICYP to both the United Nations and the troop contributors. These suggestions seem to me to be generally sound, and I intend, if the Council should decide to extend the mandate of UNFICYP, to proceed along the lines indicated, in consultation, as appropriate, with the Governments concerned and with the parties in Cyprus. In particular, I have appealed to the parties to co-operate with my Special Representative in devising arrangements under which they would absorb a fair share of the costs pertaining to the Force, including the costs of utility services, and otherwise facilitate its functioning.

57. In the light of the situation on the ground and of political developments, I have concluded once again that the continued presence of UNFICYP remains necessary, both in helping to maintain calm in the island and in creating the conditions in which the search for a peaceful settlement can best be pursued. I therefore recommend to the Security Council that it extend the mandate of UNFICYP for a further period of six months. In accordance with established practice, I have undertaken consultations on this subject with the parties concerned and shall report to the Council on these consultations as soon as they have been completed.

58. This report provides yet another opportunity for me to express my appreciation to the Governments contributing contingents to UNFICYP, both for the outstanding performance of the troops which they have placed under United Nations command and for bearing the considerable financial burdens involved. I also wish to place on record my gratitude to the Governments making voluntary financial contributions for their support of this important United Nations peace-keeping operation.

59. In concluding this report, I wish to express my warm thanks to my Special Representative in Cyprus, Mr. Hugo Gobbi, to the Commander of the Force, Major General James J. Quinn, and to the officers and men of UNFICYP and its civilian staff, who have continued to discharge with exemplary efficiency and devotion the important and difficult responsibilities entrusted to them by the Security Council.

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Annex

REPORT OF THE SECRETARIAT SURVEY TEAM FOR THE UNITED NATIONS  
PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN CYPRUS

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I. Establishment and terms of reference . . . . .	2
II. Functions and strength of UNFICYP . . . . .	3
III. Deployment and method of operation . . . . .	8
IV. Organizational structure . . . . .	11
V. Co-operation with the parties . . . . .	13
VI. UNFICYP financial situation . . . . .	16
VII. Options for a reduction of the Force . . . . .	19
VIII. Observations and recommendations . . . . .	24

Appendices

I. Pledges and payments to the UNFICYP Special Account . . . . .	28
II. Course of action recommended by the Secretariat Survey Team (summary table) . . . . .	31

## I. ESTABLISHMENT AND TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. On 2 June 1980 the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that he had set up a Secretariat Team to carry out, in close co-operation with the Force Commander, a review of the establishment, strength and functioning of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) with a view to assessing the scope for possible economies (S/13972, para. 4). The Team was composed as follows: Mr. George L. Sherry, Director, Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, Chairman; Mr. George Lansky, Special Adviser, Field Operations Division, Office of General Services; Mr. Gregory Issaevitch, Assistant Director, Office of Financial Services; Commandant Conrad Crean, Military Liaison Officer, and Mr. Giandomenico Picco, Political Affairs Officer, Office of the Under-Secretaries-General for Special Political Affairs, Secretary. The terms of reference of the Team were as follows:

"(1) The Secretariat Survey Team will carry out a detailed review of the establishment, strength and functioning of UNFICYP in order to assess the scope for possible economies in the operation of the Force.

"(2) The Team will give particular attention to the effect of reductions in the overall cost of UNFICYP on the ability of the Force to carry out the functions entrusted to it by the Security Council in its resolution 186 (1964) and its subsequent resolutions on Cyprus. The Team may, among other things, make an assessment of the effects on UNFICYP of various illustrative percentage, budgetary and/or manpower reductions.

"(3) The Team will conduct its work in close co-operation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and with the Commander of UNFICYP. Through its chairman, the Team will maintain contact with the working group set up by the troop-contributing countries for this purpose. In particular, the Team may receive from the working group papers and other communications designed to facilitate its work.

"(4) The Team will report its findings and recommendations to the Secretary-General in July 1980."

2. The Team met first in New York during the months of May and June. On 17 June it arrived in Cyprus to conduct its survey in close-co-operation with the Force Commander, Major-General J. J. Quinn. The Secretariat Team spent some nine days visiting the different contingents and units of the Force and their areas of operation and consulting the military element at headquarters of UNFICYP in Nicosia. Consultations were also held with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. H. J. Gobbi, and senior civilian and military members of the headquarters staff. The Secretariat Survey Team wishes to record its appreciation for the invaluable co-operation and assistance that was afforded to it during its stay in Cyprus. Both at United Nations Headquarters and while in Cyprus the Survey Team maintained close contact with the Working Group set up by the troop-contributing countries. It also had occasion to consult with the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot community.

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## II. FUNCTIONS AND STRENGTH OF UNFICYP

3. The function of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus was originally defined by the Security Council in its resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 in the following terms:

"in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions".

That mandate, which was conceived in the context of the confrontation between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities and between the Cyprus National Guard and the Turkish Cypriot fighters, has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Council, most recently in its resolution 472 (1980) of 13 June 1980. In connexion with the events that have occurred since 15 July 1974, the Council adopted a number of resolutions, some of which have affected the functioning of UNFICYP and, in some cases, have required UNFICYP to perform certain additional or modified functions. 1/ Accordingly, UNFICYP continues to supervise the cease-fire lines of the National Guard and of the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot Forces, and uses its best efforts to preserve the military status quo and to prevent the recurrence of fighting. It also continues to provide security for civilians engaged in peaceful activities in the area between the lines, in accordance with its normalization functions. UNFICYP continues to discharge its functions with regard to the security, welfare and well-being of the Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the northern part of the island. UNFICYP also visits on a regular basis Turkish Cypriots still residing in the south. In addition, UNFICYP functions in support of the relief operations co-ordinated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). It also discharges certain functions handed over by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) at the time of the withdrawal of its delegation from Cyprus in June 1977 (see S/13369, para. 12).

4. In pursuance of the above functions, the peace-keeping task of UNFICYP in military terms consists of monitoring any violation of the cease-fire and of the cease-fire lines and in seeking to restore the status quo ante when violations occur. Accordingly, the Force needs the capability to react promptly and effectively to any movement forward, encroachment or provocative improvement of fortifications by the parties along the lines which, if not checked, would lead to counter-measures by the opposing side and thus to further escalation. As it has not been possible, despite persistent efforts, for UNFICYP to arrive at an agreement with either

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1/ These include resolutions 353 (1974) of 20 July, 354 (1974) of 23 July, 355 (1974) of 1 August, 357 (1974) of 14 August, 358 (1974) and 359 (1974) of 15 August, 360 (1974) of 16 August, 361 (1974) of 30 August, 364 (1974) and 365 (1974) of 13 December 1974; 367 (1975) of 12 March, 370 (1975) of 13 June and 383 (1975) of 13 December 1975; 391 (1976) of 15 June and 401 (1976) of 14 December 1976; 410 (1977) of 16 June, 414 (1977) of 15 September and 422 (1977) of 15 December 1977; 430 (1978) of 16 June and 443 (1978) of 14 December 1978; 451 (1979) of 15 June and 458 (1979) of 14 December 1979; and 472 (1980) of 13 June 1980.

protagonist as to the delineation of the lines and the use and control of the buffer zone, UNFICYP supervises, by loose mutual consent, two unmarked, constantly disputed cease-fire lines. At the same time, and in addition to its military tasks proper, UNFICYP, under its mandate, is obliged to perform a number of humanitarian and economic tasks in the area between the lines as well as north and south of it in its efforts to help bring about a return to normal conditions. Many of these tasks devolve on UNFICYP because personnel of the Cyprus Government and of the Turkish Cypriot community are not in a position to exercise their normal functions in certain areas. Accordingly, UNFICYP soldiers provide security coverage for agricultural and other civilian activities within the buffer zone; assist in the maintenance and improvement of water and power lines and sewage services that cross the area between the cease-fire line; are engaged as necessary in fire-fighting and in the eradication of contagious diseases; provide transport and medical facilities across the lines; evacuate by road transport or by helicopter civilian patients in need of medical care; make security arrangements for the performance of religious services in militarily sensitive areas; and, as indicated in paragraph 3 above, provide humanitarian assistance to Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north and Turkish Cypriots in the south and perform certain functions previously carried out by ICRC in Cyprus.

5. Since August 1974, UNFICYP has been deployed along the cease-fire lines of the National Guard and the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot forces. These extend across the island from Kato Pyrgos in the west to Dherinia in the east, to a length of some 180 kilometres. The area between the lines varies in width from 20 metres to 7 kilometres. The UNFICYP position in this buffer zone is based on the requirements of the cease-fire called for by the Security Council in 1974. It is the position of UNFICYP that it is an essential element of the cease-fire that neither side can exercise authority or jurisdiction beyond its own cease-fire line or make any military moves beyond the lines. Maintenance of the status quo in the buffer zone also includes civilian activities and the exercise of property rights. In this connexion, UNFICYP discharges certain responsibilities with a view to safeguarding the legitimate security requirements of both sides while giving due regard to humanitarian consideration. It must be borne in mind that both parties have reservations regarding the role of UNFICYP in the area between the lines.

6. Though the number of incidents has steadily declined over the years, the cease-fire on the island is still challenged by the two opposing sides. A sample 10-day period during the month of June 1980 shows a total of 2 violations of the cease-fire by shooting, 7 violations of the status quo by construction of new fortifications or provocative improvement of existing ones along the lines or inside the buffer zone; 3 movements forward by military personnel, 3 violations of the air space and 6 violations of the maritime extension of the cease-fire line. The combination of static observation posts (OPs) and a mobile surveillance system enables UNFICYP to monitor the lines and provides the information necessary to identify violations and the ability to react promptly.

7. In the field of humanitarian and normalization activities, UNFICYP personnel, during the same sample period, were engaged in fire-fighting in the buffer zone

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some 15 times; undertook 2 medical evacuations by helicopter; and provided general security coverage for agricultural activities in the buffer zone, including agricultural escorts and some 100 man-hours devoted to providing security assistance for the island's anti-malaria campaign. Security arrangements for other civilian activities exceeded 200 man-hours. Furthermore, 3 convoys, which deliver food-stuffs and fuel, as well as Red Cross parcels, to Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north, were dispatched. During the 10-day period under review, UNFICYP personnel conducted 2 "runs" of oxygen and medical equipment from Nicosia south to the hospital in Nicosia north. Four times, in the same period, mail bags from the main post office in the south were delivered to the main post office in the north. Twice during the 10-day period UNFICYP visited the Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north to deliver social welfare payments, and once during the 10 days UNFICYP visited the Turkish Cypriots still living in the south in Paphos, Limassol and Larnaca. Stand-by and contingency plans for both operational and humanitarian activities accounted for other manpower needs during the 10-day sample period.

8. The operational manpower requirements of UNFICYP have to be analysed in terms of the tasks outlined above and of the workload generated by those tasks; these, in turn, are affected by conditions, military and political, prevailing in the island. The strength of UNFICYP has undergone considerable fluctuations over the past few years, in consequence of changing tasks and conditions. In the second half of 1974 UNFICYP, which a few months earlier had undergone a reduction in strength, was reinforced in order to deal with the hostilities which broke out after 15 July. By August 1974, the Force was 4,444 men strong. During the first six months of 1975 the Governments of Canada and the United Kingdom withdrew part of the additional officers and men they had provided during the events of the summer of 1974, reducing the Force's strength to 3,548. Following the transfer of the bulk of the Turkish Cypriot population to the north in September 1975 and the resulting marked reduction of UNFICYP commitments in the south, the Force strength was further reduced to 3,069 officers and men in November of that year, and to 2,798 by the end of 1976. Those reductions were achieved for the most part by cutting the operational strength of each battalion to two companies. During 1977, the Finnish battalion left Cyprus without replacement; the critical financial situation of UNFICYP was a compelling consideration in deciding on that move. Since then, the Force has remained some 2,500 men strong. The strength of the UNFICYP civilian police was reduced during the period 1974-1978 from 152 to 34.

9. The concern for a further reduction in the cost of UNFICYP is understandable in view of the relatively calmer situation prevailing along the lines, especially in comparison with the tension which characterized the years 1974 and 1975. As indicated above, this has been continuously taken into account, and a progressive reduction of the strength of the Force has been carried out over the years. It has been argued by some that the current number of minor incidents affecting the status quo and the cease-fire may not justify the present deployment of the Force, the implication being that the cease-fire in Cyprus could be made, as it were, "self-sustaining", even if UNFICYP were drastically reduced or removed entirely. The Survey Team undertook to analyse that argument with great care, since, if justified, it could conceivably make it possible to carry out the mandate at considerably reduced manpower levels and cost.

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10. After discussing this aspect of the matter with the Force Commander and Chief of Staff and the five sector commanders, the Survey Team identified the following elements as being essential in understanding the situation in Cyprus on the ground:

(a) There is still no agreement between UNFICYP and the two sides on the full delineation of the cease-fire lines and the use and control of the buffer zone. UNFICYP has submitted to each side maps showing its own version of the respective cease-fire lines; however, it has not been possible so far to reach full agreement, and considerable stretches of the line are still supervised on an ad hoc basis which either side can - and does - challenge on occasion.

(b) Wherever a real disagreement concerning the cease-fire lines exists, the parties continue, to this day, in their attempts aimed at establishing their version of the lines on the ground. At every attempt, UNFICYP promptly intervenes to re-establish the status quo. This is all the more necessary as each move of this kind, if not dealt with promptly, almost invariably gives rise to threats of retaliatory action by the other side, with an attendant danger of quick escalation, which could easily spread tension all along the lines.

(c) Even where an understanding concerning the cease-fire lines has been reached, movements forward and encroachments occur.

(d) The contingent commanders have expressed to the Secretariat Survey Team the view that the present system of physical presence/observation/reaction, based on a combination of static posts and patrolling, is indispensable in monitoring the activities of both sides and in promptly undertaking corrective action as required.

(e) The visible presence of UNFICYP still appears to be a necessary condition for maintaining the reasonably peaceful atmosphere now prevailing along the cease-fire lines. The Survey Team was informed that, especially with regard to civilian activities in the buffer zone, the presence of a new observation post or the continuing patrol of the area reduced the opportunities for tension between the two sides. By the same token the removal of the physical presence of UNFICYP personnel from some areas generates a sense of insecurity among the civilian population.

(f) Furthermore, the number of operational incidents which are reported at headquarters level, and therefore made known to the United Nations Headquarters in New York, represents only a portion of many more incidents which occur along the buffer zone day in, day out, and which are dealt with and resolved at platoon or company level. These incidents can only be tackled if the Force is deployed along the lines in such a manner that a sufficient number of men can be present at any place on very short notice on a 24-hour basis.

11. In the light of the aspects of the situation listed above, the Force Commander considers, and the Survey Team concurs in this opinion, that the cease-fire in Cyprus is not and, in present circumstances, cannot be self-sustaining. Its maintenance requires a continuous input by UNFICYP which, in fact, strains the

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present resources of the Force. The current degree of quiet along the confrontation line is, by and large, the result of the Force's presence and efforts in the area. In this connexion, the Survey Team wishes to recall the findings made by a predecessor Secretariat Survey Team, which visited Cyprus in 1969 (see S/9521, annex I). Despite the momentous events that have convulsed the island during the past 11 years, its observations are still valid and worth quoting.

"A tour of the contingents of the Force in their various positions and deployment areas throughout the island gives the impression of a well-organized, highly disciplined and economical operation in which leadership is good, morale is high and the relations with the local authorities and population of both communities are excellent. The fact that UNFICYP is a good bargain in terms of the improvement in the situation in the island and in the wider context of international peace is emphasized by the contrast between the present relatively relaxed atmosphere in Cyprus and the tension and violence, and the resulting international concern, which prevailed only a few years ago. It should also be noted that as far as costs are concerned, UNFICYP is relatively cheap as military organizations go, because the United Nations does not pay for a wide variety of basic costs, including, in some cases, the daily pay and allowances of the contingents.

"Although the United Nations operation has provided the necessary climate and conditions for a very considerable degree of pacification and normalization of life in the island, it cannot be removed in the present circumstances without a grave risk to continuing peace in Cyprus, with all the accompanying implications for international peace. The concern for a reduction in the cost of UNFICYP is understandable in view of the present peaceful situation in the island and of the fact that the United Nations Force is not as preoccupied with day-to-day incidents as originally was the case. The fact of the matter is, however, that the actual physical presence of UNFICYP and its interposition between the parties in areas of confrontation are at present an essential condition of the reasonably peaceful atmosphere in the island, an atmosphere which is in its turn indispensable to an improvement in the political climate and to the ultimate success of the intercommunal talks. While the basic problems of Cyprus remain unsolved, it would seem highly unwise to make a reduction in the strength and effectiveness of UNFICYP on the basis of the present degree of quiet, which is in large measure a result of its presence on the island.

"Although much progress towards normalization of life in the island has been made in the past year, there are important areas in which little or no progress has been made. From the UNFICYP point of view the most serious of these is the problem of military confrontation between the forces of the two communities. This confrontation is seen in its most acute form in and around the capital city of Nicosia itself, but it exists also in a number of lesser armed confrontations in other parts of the island. It is in these areas that the greater part of UNFICYP is deployed, often in static positions boldly interposed between the military and para-military forces of both sides. Until the military posts on both sides in these confrontation areas are removed, the removal of the UNFICYP presence would unquestionably give rise to grave risks of renewed violence."

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### III. DEPLOYMENT AND METHOD OF OPERATION

12. The deployment and method of operation of UNFICYP on the ground were examined carefully by the Survey Team, with a view to determining whether alternative methods more economical of manpower than the present ones might be introduced. As previously indicated, supervision of the cease-fire and of the buffer zone is now based on a combined static observation and patrolling system; the mix varies according to the terrain and nature of the military confrontation prevailing in various parts of the buffer zone. This system involves static observation posts (whose number now stands at 65) that are manned 24 hours a day; 67 observation points that are manned for one or more hours a day; temporary observation posts (standing patrols) that are positioned in areas of threat and tension; and mobile patrols that survey the area between observation posts, especially where such posts are not close enough to allow visual contact with one another. The Force Reserve (Armoured Reconnaissance Squadron) is deployed to the several contingents, and its Ferret scout cars carry out daily patrols of the buffer zone.

13. To carry out the mandate laid down by the Security Council, UNFICYP deploys troops mainly in the area between the lines, with base camps both in the north (Danish and Austrian contingents), in the south (British and Swedish contingents) and in the buffer zone (Canadian contingent). This enables the Force to monitor the cease-fire, to prevent minor incidents from escalating, to return to the status quo ante if violations occur, and, as necessary, to respond to economic and humanitarian requirements of the civilian population along the cease-fire lines and in other parts of the island where an intercommunal situation exists. As the cease-fire lines cut across the whole island, there are areas which may be considered more "incident prone" than others. The manpower level in each OP varies according to local conditions in this regard. By and large, however, the military confrontation posture of the two opposing military sides has not relaxed during the past two years.

14. The Team, in co-operation with the Force Commander, looked into the possibility of withdrawing some or even most of the OPs and relying to an increased extent on patrolling. It found that patrolling alone would, in most cases, be less effective than the present system, which enables a given military unit - company or platoon - to familiarize itself with a given area, with the location of the cease-fire lines, with the military personnel of both sides and with the complex network of local agreements concerning access, land cultivation etc. Quite apart from the military aspect, it is necessary to bear in mind that a permanent United Nations presence, such as is provided by OPs, plays a vital role in facilitating civilian activities, especially farming, in the buffer zone. Reducing or eliminating static posts and instituting more frequent, regular and random patrols would require an amount of manpower comparable to that which is committed under the present combined system, and would result in increased demands on transport, vehicle maintenance etc.

15. As regards humanitarian activities, static OPs could, of course, be replaced by UNFICYP escorts, which would require the same or greater commitment of manpower.

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At present, escorts are used regularly in areas which are out of sight of UNFICYP OPs or where farmers cultivate only intermittently. Using helicopters as an alternative to OPs or conventional patrols would be helpful, especially in daytime, but prohibitively expensive, and would have to be negotiated with the parties.

16. The Team's conclusion was that a surveillance system relying mainly on patrolling was likely to be as expensive as or more expensive than the present one. The problem is compounded by the lack of roads within or parallel to the buffer zone which would allow vehicular access to replace the observation functions of the OPs. A patrol system would therefore make it necessary to improve the existing UNFICYP patrol track, which in some places (notably the western part of sector I and substantial stretches in other sectors) is non-existent, rudimentary or impassable in winter. Turning the track into an all-weather road, at the present price levels, if a properly prepared route were in existence - which in many places it is not - would cost approximately £C 1.6 million. On this basis the cost of the entire project would be in excess of £C 10 million (including engineering surveys, drainage, levelling, blasting in some areas, bridging and culverts, labour costs, land costs, maintenance and access roads). In the conditions prevailing in Cyprus, a project of this kind would take over four years to complete. In view of the six-month duration of the normal UNFICYP mandate, it would be difficult to justify a financial commitment of this kind.

17. The Survey Team sought the advice of the Force Commander and the contingent commanders on the question of using sophisticated surveillance devices to reduce manpower needs. The Team found that some equipment of this kind, including night-vision, bloomed-lens binoculars, was standard equipment of some of the troop-contributing armies and available to their UNFICYP contingents. However, in the conditions prevailing in Cyprus, it was felt that there was simply no substitute for the physical presence of a United Nations soldier to prevent cease-fire violations and other incidents and to promote normal conditions.

18. The Survey Team also looked into the possibility of a more radical change in the operating method of the Force. This would involve, in effect, forgoing the comprehensive maintenance of the military status quo and ignoring minor changes along the cease-fire lines, such as the odd trench or bunker improvement, the prevention and correction of which, it was argued, require relatively heavy manpower commitments. Under the suggested alternative system, UNFICYP would concentrate on part-time rather than full-time surveillance, seeking to deal with serious encroachments into the buffer zone, as well as significantly provocative military behaviour. It could be argued that in any case UNFICYP does not have the capability to prevent a major attack if either party chose to mount one. It has even been argued by some that the "intimate presence" of UNFICYP may tend to encourage incidents, such as recent instances of verbal abuse or stone throwing, since the parties feel safe from retaliation or significant escalation.

19. In the opinion of the Survey Team, the approach outlined above, though perhaps feasible in other peace-keeping situations, simply would not work in the conditions prevailing in Cyprus. While minor cease-fire violations may not be important by

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themselves, they are almost invariably followed by more significant violations, which, in turn, give rise to threats of retaliation by the other side. It is, in fact, the practice of the parties in some areas, whenever an UNFICYP battalion is rotated and replaced by less experienced troops, to "test" the incoming soldiers by calculated minor violations, as if to see how far each side can go and still "get away" with improvements in its positions. Furthermore, any changes if undetected by UNFICYP for some time would be treated by those concerned as "established practice", making it increasingly difficult to eliminate them once they became entrenched. Therefore, quite apart from the clear terms of the mandate ("use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting") there is, in fact, no practical alternative to maintaining the military status quo; violations, if not nipped in the bud, may tend to escalate rapidly, beyond UNFICYP capability to handle them effectively with its present strength.

20. Something akin to this method could conceivably be envisaged if military observers - who would presumably detect major violations, or be called in on complaint of the parties - were in a position to call upon a substantial reserve force to rush to the scene and interpose between the two sides once a serious incident has happened or if escalation seemed to be threatened. This would entail a switch from a pre-emptive to a reactive posture for the Force and would be an expensive and risky way of dealing with the situation in Cyprus, which moreover would not necessarily result in manpower or financial savings. Here, as in the case of the approach outlined in the preceding paragraph, the fact is that it is more economical to prevent clashes than to confront them.

21. Of course, if the attitudes of the parties should undergo a significant change, certain approaches that have not heretofore been feasible could become so, and it might even be possible to envisage changing UNFICYP into a combined military observer-peace-keeping force operation, making possible substantial reductions in strength. The prerequisites for an operation of this kind would have to include most of the following:

(a) Agreed, delineated and marked cease-fire lines;

(b) A cease-fire agreement under which complaints of cease-fire violations would be investigated by UNFICYP, whose findings would be accepted by the parties; to this end, UNFICYP would be granted complete freedom of movement and access along the cease-fire lines, including the use of helicopters and/or fixed-wing aircraft; if possible, completion of the all-weather patrol track;

(c) An undertaking by both sides placing the area between the lines under exclusive UNFICYP observation and control as regards both security matters and civilian activities;

(d) An agreed procedure for visiting and humanitarian support of elements of either community residing in the area controlled by the other community;

(e) If possible, a thinning-out of the forward defended localities (FDLs) of the parties and their partial or complete withdrawal from the immediate vicinity of the marked cease-fire lines, resulting in a less provocative military posture;

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(f) A firm commitment, effectively enforced by the parties, to prevent incursions and other cease-fire violations by personnel under their authority;

(g) Agreements, if possible, concerning Varosha and the Nicosia international airport.

22. In the opinion of the Survey Team, the above requirements could, in practice, be more easily met if some progress were made towards an easing of the present political confrontation, especially if it were found possible for the parties to make some relatively minor political gestures and territorial adjustments. It should be noted in this connexion that a resettlement of Varosha under United Nations auspices would initially require the deployment of some 90 UNFICYP military and additional civilian police personnel. Similarly, reopening the Nicosia international airport under United Nations control would, in all probability, imply full UNFICYP responsibility for security, requiring the deployment, at least initially, of a full infantry company (instead of the present platoon), as well as a civilian police unit. However, these figures are deceptive, since achievement of either one or both of these agreements would, in fact, signify that the Cyprus problem was well on its way to significant progress or even to a solution. A development of this kind might make it possible in due course to change UNFICYP to a military observer/peace-keeping force, or even to a military observer/civilian police mission, with a view to its ultimate withdrawal.

23. As of now, the political positions of the two sides in relation to the broader problem of Cyprus have a direct impact on their positions in relation to the military confrontation and therefore affect the military environment in which UNFICYP has to operate. These positions of the parties go far to explain their attitudes concerning the buffer zone, including their views about any delineation of the cease-fire lines or their demarcation on the ground. Of course, in practice and on an ad hoc basis, both sides have tended to co-operate with UNFICYP far more closely than might be inferred from their official positions. This, in itself, is a tribute to the effectiveness of UNFICYP in handling a very volatile and difficult situation, but it does not argue in favour of any drastic reduction or restructuring of the Force. The parties would be unlikely to co-operate with each other as they now co-operate with UNFICYP, which they know they can do without prejudicing their political positions.

#### IV. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

24. The Survey Team also examined in detail the organizational structure of UNFICYP, with a view to determining whether a more economical arrangement could be devised. The Team found that this could theoretically be done, but perhaps only at the expense of those political characteristics of UNFICYP which distinguish it as a multinational peace-keeping force. These are the very characteristics that have ensured the Force's effectiveness in helping to maintain calm in the island and facilitating the search for a political settlement.

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25. The major components of the Force as at present constituted are an international headquarters, five major (and two minor) national contingents, a support regiment and two civilian police units. The major national contingents man the five operational sectors (from west to east - Danish, British, Canadian, Swedish and Austrian). Each contingent provides for this purpose an infantry battalion, numbering from 314 to 468, all ranks. Each battalion comprises a battalion headquarters, a headquarters company which includes administrative/support services and two line companies. Normal national military organization calls for a battalion to comprise four or five companies. Limiting the number of companies to two, as has been done in UNFICYP (see para. 8 above), does not entail any significant reduction in the battalion headquarters and administrative/support system, the structure and size of which are relatively inelastic.

26. This accounts for the higher than usual ratio of headquarters and administrative personnel to operational personnel in UNFICYP. This ratio could be improved by reducing the number of contingents, since each of the remaining battalions could function efficiently with three or four line companies instead of the present two. Some of the options listed in part VII of this report are based on this approach. It should, however, be realized that the multinational character of the United Nations Force would be adversely affected if the number of contingents were further reduced, and it would become more difficult to ensure a proper political balance.

27. As regards financing, reducing the number of contingents may or may not reduce the costs to the United Nations of the Cyprus operation. Some troop-contributing Governments, notably the United Kingdom and Canada, absorb at their own expense all or a major part of the cost of their UNFICYP contingents. Eliminating their battalions would reduce the cost borne by those Governments without producing significant savings for the United Nations.

28. Another logical alternative would entail reducing further the strength of each battalion, and some of the options in part VII are based on this approach. However, as indicated above, battalion headquarters and administrative/support services are relatively inelastic. It would, therefore, be necessary in most cases to reduce the number of operational men, with a consequent further increase in the ratio between headquarters/administrative and operational personnel, which would be uneconomic and undesirable.

29. Finally, one may seek greater uniformity in the organization and structure of the several battalions, some of which appear to require a larger proportion of administrative and support personnel than others. This approach also turned out, on closer analysis, to provide limited scope for economies. For example, the Canadian contingent, with 228 operational men on the cease-fire lines, has a "tail" - i.e., administrative/support services - of 146 men, in addition to its battalion headquarters of 98 men. However, the Team found that the battalion provided by Canada is a complete regular army combat unit, with full supporting services, most of the cost of which is absorbed by the Canadian Government at no expense to the United Nations. Since it uses its own support services, the Canadian battalion does not utilize the services of the UNFICYP support regiment, thus reducing the burden on that severely strained element of the Force.

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30. In certain other cases, the Team found that differences in size between battalions reflect differences in national military organizational patterns and traditions, which, by and large, have to be accepted as part of the price for maintaining a multinational force. However, the Team considered that where such differences result in substantial additions to the over-all size of a battalion, steps might be considered to correct the disparity, unless the troop-contributing Governments in question were prepared to absorb the extra cost.

31. Another aspect of the organizational structure of UNFICYP to which the Survey Team gave attention concerns the UNFICYP civilian police (UNCIVPOL). The functions of UNCIVPOL have undergone substantial changes since the events of 1974, especially in view of the present military and population distribution patterns which have minimized the incidence of intercommunal contact among civilians. Accordingly, the strength of UNCIVPOL, which had been increased from 144 to 152 during the 1974 events, has since been cut to 34. UNCIVPOL now performs, by and large, a supporting humanitarian and economic role for the benefit of the members of the two Cypriot communities. Members of UNCIVPOL distribute social welfare benefits and pensions to Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north, accompany UNFICYP military personnel on humanitarian visits to Greek Cypriots in the north and Turkish Cypriots in the south, and work in co-operation with the local police authorities with regard to intercommunal problems and criminal activities in the buffer zone. UNCIVPOL has two component units, the Australian unit, 20 policemen, which works with the British, Canadian and Danish contingents, and the Swedish UNCIVPOL unit, 14 policemen, which operates in support of the Swedish and Austrian contingents. The Survey Team found that while the personnel of the two UNCIVPOL units carry out important functions, some of these do not necessarily require police training and could, if needed, be taken over by military personnel. Financial considerations would necessarily play a major role in this regard.

#### V. CO-OPERATION WITH THE PARTIES

32. In examining the activities and method of operation of UNFICYP, the Survey Team was struck by the extent to which manpower requirements and costs depend on the co-operation extended to UNFICYP by the parties. UNFICYP is a peace-keeping force and avoids any combat role, subject, of course, to its right to use force in self-defence as a last resort, a right which it has not had occasion to exercise since 1974. Accordingly, UNFICYP peace-keeping functions are mainly discharged by the effect of its physical presence, by persuasion and by occasional interposition.

33. An effective working relationship and clear channels of communication have been established between UNFICYP and both the National Guard and Turkish forces; meetings are held at the Chief of Staff level on a regular basis or as the situation requires, as are meetings of sector commanders. When incidents occur, these are investigated and the results forwarded to both sides on a daily and weekly basis. In most cases, UNFICYP protests of violation of cease-fire are accepted by the parties concerned. In a few other cases, especially in areas where the

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location of the cease-fire line is disputed, negotiations - some of them protracted - may be needed or standing UNFICYP patrols may have to be deployed. Naturally, manpower levels must provide the capability to deal with incidents as they occur.

34. The freedom of movement of the United Nations Force is an essential element in this regard, since restrictions on the use of roads controlled by one or the other of the parties cause delays, sometimes considerable, in bringing in elements of the Force to deal with incidents. This, in turn, causes increased operating costs and manpower requirements, since if UNFICYP personnel cannot be rapidly moved to the scene of an incident they have to be so deployed as not to depend on road transport. Restrictions on freedom of movement, chiefly in the north, also affect the costs of UNFICYP economic activities.

35. The most conspicuous examples of restrictions on the freedom of movement of the Force in the north which have a direct bearing on its costs include:

(a) In the Danish contingent sector, UNFICYP is not permitted to use the road connecting Xeros to Skouriotissa or other roads that cross the cease-fire lines there. Instead, UNFICYP has to use the longer route running from Xeros to Morphou, Pano Zothia and then westward to Skouriotissa;

(b) The number of vehicles allowed to use the Nicosia/Famagusta road during any given day is restricted, obliging UNFICYP to use the longer Nicosia/Larnaca/Famagusta road;

(c) The route open to UNFICYP vehicles when visiting the liaison posts in the Karpass imposes a detour, requiring additional timing and mileage in certain cases;

(d) There are restrictions on the timing, types of vehicles and procedure for the use of the roads and checkpoints in the north, which further hamper UNFICYP personnel movement in the area.

36. In addition, there is the problem of the four UNFICYP liaison posts in the Karpass which play a direct role in the humanitarian functions exercised by UNFICYP on behalf of the Greek Cypriots in that area. These liaison posts are situated in villages which at one time were populated by Greek Cypriots; however, as these Greek Cypriots have moved to the south, few are left in the immediate vicinity of the UNFICYP liaison posts (LPs). The present arrangement causes considerable inconvenience and additional transport costs to UNFICYP. If a liaison post could be established in Rizokarpasso or Ayia Trias, the main villages now inhabited by Greek Cypriots in the area, UNFICYP would be in a position to reduce the number of such posts from four to two.

37. During its visit to Cyprus, the Secretariat Survey Team, referring to persistent past efforts of UNFICYP, brought the above problems again to the attention of the Turkish Cypriot community. The Team pointed out that a

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co-operative attitude by the Turkish Cypriot authorities in this regard would make it possible to rationalize the deployment and functioning of the Force in the north, withdrawing or reducing a number of UNFICYP facilities and installations. This might include, in addition to two of the liaison posts in the Karpass, one observation post in Famagusta (Othello Tower) and certain facilities along the Athna road, which would help reduce the financial and manpower burden on UNFICYP.

38. Another aspect of the impact which the co-operation of the parties may have on the costs of UNFICYP concerns the nature of the humanitarian activities of the Force and the responsibility for meeting the costs involved. The Team determined that significant elements of these humanitarian activities in reality were services rendered to the Government of Cyprus and/or to the people of Cyprus of both communities. A substantial portion of the manpower requirements and of the costs incurred by the Force is directly or indirectly attributable to these services. While the resulting manpower and financial commitments come within the broad and flexible terms of the UNFICYP mandate, the primary interest of the Government of Cyprus in the continuation of those services and commitments appeared manifest to the Survey Team. Among the activities in question, the following may be cited:

- (a) Security coverage for agricultural activities in the buffer zone;
- (b) Security coverage for Cypriot workers or technicians in the buffer zone;
- (c) Making fire-breaks and fire-fighting in the buffer zone;
- (d) Hydatid eradication;
- (e) Maintenance of water and power lines that cross the buffer zone;
- (f) Transporting civilian patients to medical facilities across the line and medical evacuations;
- (g) Delivery of medical supplies and equipment across the cease-fire lines (CFLs);
- (h) Transporting mail bags from north to south and south to north;
- (i) Assisting both communities in the development of electricity, water and sewage-disposal services, including security and other support for UNDP-sponsored activities;
- (j) Livestock transfers and related problems in the cease-fire line area;
- (k) Recovery, where possible, of personal and commercial properties from the buffer zone;
- (l) Making security arrangements for the performance of religious ceremonies in churches or cemeteries in the buffer zone;

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(m) Humanitarian assistance for the Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north and the Turkish Cypriots in the south:

- (i) Supply convoys;
- (ii) Transfers to the south;
- (iii) Social welfare payments;

(n) Monitoring the restoration of industrial activities in the buffer zone and monitoring warehouses and other commercial buildings in the buffer zone.

39. Preliminary estimates worked out by Secretariat Team indicated that the above tasks involved UNFICYP in the deployment of military personnel and UNFICYP civilian police who, if employed solely on peace-keeping tasks, could make possible savings in the manpower needs of the Force. Those services have hitherto been carried out at the expense of the United Nations and of the troop-contributing Governments, but in view of the financial situation affecting UNFICYP, the Survey Team felt that it would be difficult to justify a continuation of the practice.

40. In addition, the Survey Team noted that UNFICYP was being charged by both sides for water, electricity and garbage and sewage disposal. The amounts involved are of the order of \$500,000 per six-month period. The Team considered that services of this kind might appropriately be rendered to UNFICYP free of charge, bearing in mind in particular, the extensive assistance rendered by UNFICYP to both sides in the upkeep of those services in various parts of the island.

41. During its visit to Cyprus, the Survey Team on 26 June brought this matter to the attention of the Government of Cyprus, with the object of considering ways in which that Government might henceforth, under appropriate modalities, assume financial responsibility for the costs incurred by the United Nations under the above headings, in a manner consistent with the provisions of paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 186 (1964), with a view to relieving the serious financial situation confronting UNFICYP.

42. It was understood that the matter would be brought to the early attention of those concerned and would be further negotiated with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

## VI. UNFICYP FINANCIAL SITUATION

43. The arrangements relating to the financing of UNFICYP were laid down by the Security Council in paragraph 6 of resolution 186 (1964), in which the Council

"Recommends that the stationing of the Force shall be for a period of three months, all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them, by the Governments providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus. The Secretary-General may also accept voluntary contributions for that purpose".

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44. In accordance with the Security Council resolutions, the Secretary-General has issued regular and special appeals to all Member States and members of specialized agencies to make voluntary contributions to defray the costs of the Force. As of 23 July 1980, pledges of such contributions from 64 Member States and one non-member Government totalled \$261.7 million, of which \$258.4 million have been paid. (The details of the pledges made and payments received are outlined in appendix I.)

45. In order to provide contingents for UNFICYP, the troop-contributing Governments divert from national duty troops and other resources at an ongoing cost to them currently estimated by them at \$25.5 million for each six-month period. This figure includes (a) the troops' regular pay and allowances and normal material expenses for which, under existing arrangements, the United Nations is not required by the troop contributors to reimburse them; these therefore constitute costs of maintaining the Force which are being financed directly by the troop-contributing Governments; and (b) certain extra and extraordinary costs that they incur in respect of UNFICYP for which, under existing arrangements, the troop contributors would be entitled to claim reimbursement from the United Nations but which they have agreed to finance at their own expense as a further contribution to the United Nations operation in Cyprus.

46. The costs to be borne by the United Nations for the operation of UNFICYP, by major categories of expense, for the periods from the inception of the Force in March 1964 to 15 December 1980 are as follows (in thousands of United States dollars):

I.	<u>Operational costs incurred by the United Nations</u>	\$
	Movement of contingents . . . . .	7,847
	Operational expenses . . . . .	32,678
	Rental of premises . . . . .	7,208
	Rations . . . . .	21,477
	Non-military personnel, salaries, travel etc. . . . .	<u>27,263</u>
	Total, part I	<u>96,473</u>
II.	<u>Reimbursement of extra costs to Governments providing contingents</u> . . . . .	<u>257,882</u>
	Grand total, parts I and II	<u>354,355</u>

47. It will be evident from this table that approximately 73 per cent of the total cost of UNFICYP to the Organization consists of obligations to the troop-contributing Governments in respect of their contingents. The remainder constitutes operational costs incurred by UNFICYP for the necessary logistic support of the Force, including salaries and allowances of civilian staff and movement of troops between their home countries and Cyprus. The current cost of

UNFICYP to the United Nations runs at the rate of approximately \$14.6 million per mandate period. If to this figure one adds the \$25.5 million per mandate period that are absorbed by the troop-contributing Governments, the resulting total - \$40.1 million - represents the aggregate cost of this peace-keeping operation.

48. Voluntary contributions in the amount of \$258.4 million have so far been paid to the UNFICYP Special Account, and of the total of \$3.3 million of outstanding pledges, the amount of \$0.1 million is expected to be paid in the future. In addition, voluntary contributions from public sources, interest earned on investment of temporarily undisbursed funds and other miscellaneous income received by the Account have totalled about \$7.0 million. Accordingly, some \$265.5 million have so far been made available to the UNFICYP Special Account towards meeting the costs of UNFICYP to the United Nations for the periods through 15 December 1980. The difference between this figure and the 1964-1980 costs of approximately \$354.4 million is \$88.9 million. Unless additional contributions from existing or new pledges are received before 15 December 1980, this figure represents the UNFICYP Special Account deficit as of that date.

49. In view of the nature of the financial arrangements in relation to UNFICYP, payments to the troop-contributing Governments in respect of their extra and extraordinary costs for which they seek to be reimbursed by the United Nations can only be made as and when voluntary contributions or other income are received, and after the operational costs incurred directly by the United Nations have been met. During the past several years, the receipts of the UNFICYP Special Account (i.e., voluntary contributions plus interest and other miscellaneous income) have lagged behind costs (United Nations operational costs plus the reimbursement claims of the troop contributors). The aggregate deficit has been rising steadily at an average rate over the past five years of \$3.9 million per mandate period.

50. As a result of this situation, the United Nations has had no alternative but to fall behind more and more in meeting its obligations in respect of the reimbursement claims of the troop contributors. The last disbursement under this heading, made in June 1980, enabled the Organization to meet those Governments' claims up to March 1976. This means that the troop-contributing countries not only absorb at their own expense considerable costs incurred by them in maintaining their contingents but are, in effect, financing the deficit of the UNFICYP Special Account, since their claims in respect of their reimbursable expenses are met only after lengthy delays, which are made increasingly costly by the effects of inflationary developments. If, furthermore, it is taken into account that the troop-contributing countries are also, in many cases, substantial voluntary contributors to the UNFICYP Special Account, it will be realized that those Governments carry a disproportionate burden in keeping UNFICYP in operation.

51. In analysing the financial condition of UNFICYP, the Survey Team has reached the conclusion that the deficit financing of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus is creating an increasingly unmanageable situation, especially in view of the fact that there seems to be little prospect of sizable additional voluntary contributions becoming available for the support of UNFICYP. There is an evident need to reduce substantially the \$3.9 million gap between UNFICYP costs

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and revenues incurred during each mandate period, so as to slow down the uncontrolled growth of the deficit in the Special Account and the resulting lengthening of the time-lag between the expenses incurred by the troop contributors and payments to them in respect of their claims. Furthermore, the Team notes that reductions in the costs borne by the troop contributors for which they do not claim reimbursement from the United Nations would tend to ease the burden carried by those Governments as effectively as would a reduction of the UNFICYP deficit.

52. In order to achieve a reduction of the UNFICYP deficit, and of the financial burden carried by the troop contributors, the Survey Team envisages two sets of measures:

(a) Increasing UNFICYP revenues by negotiating arrangements under which the Government of Cyprus would assume a fair share of the costs for services that have hitherto been rendered to it at UNFICYP expense and inviting that Government (and to a lesser degree the Turkish Cypriot community) to waive certain payments (e.g., for electricity and other utilities) for which UNFICYP has hitherto been billed (see sect. V above);

(b) Reducing both UNFICYP costs and the expenditures absorbed by the troop contributors by instituting manpower reductions in the Force to the extent that this may be feasible without seriously impairing the ability of UNFICYP to carry out the provisions of its mandate (see sects. VII and VIII below). Manpower reductions will thus have to be envisaged both in order to limit UNFICYP costs proper, for which the troop contributors claim reimbursements from the United Nations, affecting the deficit of the UNFICYP Special Account, and in respect of costs absorbed by troop contributors at their own expense. As indicated above, the costs expected to be borne by the United Nations currently amount to approximately \$14.6 million per mandate period, while those absorbed by the troop contributors amount to approximately \$25.5 million per mandate period.

53. In analysing the different options which would reduce the manpower and the cost of UNFICYP, it should be borne in mind that at times percentage reductions in manpower do not correspond to similar financial percentage savings. In the case of troop contributors which provide contingents at no cost to the Organization, a reduction in manpower may represent a saving for the Government concerned but not necessarily for the United Nations. The costs to the United Nations on a man-month basis of the various contingents in respect of which Governments claim partial or full reimbursement from the United Nations vary from \$100 to \$1,500.

## VII. OPTIONS FOR A REDUCTION OF THE FORCE

54. In pursuance of its mandate, the Survey Team examined a number of approaches to bringing about reductions in the over-all cost of UNFICYP, bearing in mind the effects of such reductions on the continued ability of the Force to carry out the functions entrusted to it by the Security Council. Specifically, the Team looked into the possibility of making reductions while (a) maintaining the present posture of the Force, i.e., keeping its operational strength along the cease-fire lines essentially unchanged, or (b) modifying the present posture of the Force.

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The Team also examined (c) the effects on UNFICYP of various illustrative across-the-board percentage, budgetary and/or manpower, reductions.

Options based on present operational strength of the Force

55. (a) Rotating contingents every 9 or 12 months. In the case of contingents composed of volunteer personnel (Austria, Denmark, Sweden), this system would affect contractual and legal arrangements and might impair these Governments' ability to recruit. The financial implication of this option would be to reduce the over-all transport costs by 25 to 50 per cent per mandate. In itself this represents a minimal amount of the over-all cost of the Force.

(b) Withdrawal of one contingent, with the addition of one rifle company to each flanking contingent or of two companies to one such contingent. The major effects of this option would be to reduce the number of battalion headquarters to four, while maintaining the same number of infantry companies and therefore operational men. According to which contingent was withdrawn, this option would entail a manpower saving of 6 to 10 per cent. The cost reduction would range from no savings at all to some \$5 million, that is to say, up to 12.5 per cent of the total UNFICYP cost. The option also implies that one or two of the troop-contributing countries would have to be prepared to increase their commitment to the Force upon one Government's withdrawing its contingent. The Survey Team has had no indication that any of the troop-contributing countries are at this time interested in withdrawing from UNFICYP.

(c) Withdrawal of two contingents with an offsetting increase of four rifle companies by the three remaining contingents. This option would reduce the existing high ratio between battalion headquarters personnel and operational companies by reducing the number of contingent headquarters to three, the minimum required for command and control purposes in view of the length of the CFLs. According to which contingents would leave UNFICYP, this would entail a manpower reduction of 10 to 16 per cent. The approximate reduction of costs would be between \$1 and \$10 million, depending on which contingents were withdrawn and which country would provide two extra companies. These figures represent 2 to 24.5 per cent of the cost of UNFICYP.

(d) Alternating national contingents. If the three-sector concept under (c) above were acceptable, and if two contributors were prepared to provide battalions with four or five companies each, contingents could alternate every mandate. This option would require the Force to rely on six operational contingents. An efficient ratio between headquarters and operational personnel would thus be established. Such an arrangement would result in a 10 per cent reduction of the present establishment during any given six-month mandate. The financial implications would be the same as in option (c) above, with some additional costs for housing services of rear and advance parties, storage facilities and maintenance teams.

(e) Multinational battalions. This option would similarly allow the Force to retain the same number of rifle companies on the line while combining the

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headquarters and some support elements of two contingents. A combination of the two Scandinavian contingents and/or the two Commonwealth contingents could be envisaged. A combined battalion headquarters and support company would administer four rifle companies, two from each nation or, alternatively, four rifle companies from one nation during a six-month period and four rifle companies from the other nation during the second six-month period. This concept would produce slightly lower manpower savings than would (b) and (c) above, as some duplication of appointments would be unavoidable for national reasons. The international character of the Force would remain unaffected. There would be some problems relating to military and legal practices, pay, diet, equipment, maintenance, welfare and military training. The cost reduction would be approximately \$2.6 to \$3.2 million, that is, 6.5 to 7 per cent of the over-all cost of the Force, depending on the contingents involved.

(f) Offsetting the cost incurred by the Force in the performance of its humanitarian tasks. The bulk of these activities, which the Force carries out under its mandate, consists of services rendered to the Cyprus Government and to the people of Cyprus of both communities. The absorption of these costs by the two sides would enable UNFICYP to continue its task on the same level as heretofore (see sect. V above).

Options involving a change in the present structure of the Force.

56. (a) Withdrawal of one battalion without offsetting increases. This option would entail a manpower reduction of some 12 to 20 per cent, depending on the contingent withdrawn. The Force Commander believes that this solution is not feasible, considering that the Force is already stretched thinly. It would mean the loss of some 200 to 260 men of the 1,150 now deployed along the confrontation line and a reduction in the number of manned OPs from 65 to less than 50. The resulting increased need for patrolling would further reduce the ability to man the static OPs. Some essential peace-keeping requirements could not be met. This option would entail a cost reduction of approximately \$3.5 to \$8.6 million.

(b) Withdrawal of specific units of the Force

(i) The Force Reserve. This unit, 119 men strong, consists of an Armoured Reconnaissance (Scout Car) Squadron. Operationally, five of its six Scout Car troops, each consisting of four vehicles, are allotted to the several contingents on a daily basis. The sixth troop is held at the Squadron headquarters for mechanical overhaul of vehicles and on stand-by for Force contingency plans. This includes protection of the United Nations protected area (where UNFICYP headquarters is located), relief of embassies in Nicosia and evacuation of civilians in an emergency. The Survey Team explored the possibility of providing the contingents with suitable vehicles to enable them to take over the patrolling tasks now performed by the Force Reserve. This, of course, would make it necessary to curtail drastically various contingency plans for which the Force Reserve has been trained. The reduction would imply a manpower cut of 5 per cent but would result in additional costs for

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vehicles and specialists. Any savings would benefit the United Kingdom, which has been providing the Armoured Reconnaissance Squadron at no cost to the United Nations.

- (ii) Air Unit. The provision of helicopter lift is based upon a set requirement for a specific number of hours of flying time for the resupply of those observation posts which are not accessible by other means, for emergency medical evacuation, liaison, as well as for stand-by capability for troop movements in case of emergency. The present air support of the Force is provided by the British Army Air Corps Flight, equipped with four Alouettes, and by the 84th Squadron RAF, equipped with four Whirlwinds. The Survey Team considered that retaining the AAC flight with the addition of two Alouettes and withdrawal of the Whirlwinds would be marginally more cost effective than the present arrangements. However, the lifting requirement for resupply purposes to some of the more inaccessible OPs along the lines would have to be borne in mind. The United Kingdom authorities have been requested to carry out an analysis of aircraft available against tasking requirements.

By withdrawing the Force Reserve and the 84th Squadron RAF, the operational costs of the Force would be reduced by some \$2.3 million; that is to say, 5.6 per cent of the aggregate cost of UNFICYP to the United Nations and to the troop contributors.

- (iii) Piecemeal reduction of operational commitments. The Survey Team looked into the possibility of a reduction of individual posts and limited tasks throughout the Force. A number of specific suggestions were analysed with regard to all contingents which would lead to a manpower reduction of some 150 men and to a cost reduction of some \$2.3 million. This approach would imply a reduction in the number of OPs manned on a 24-hour basis, a reduction of the contingency planning to which a number of officers and men of UNFICYP are now assigned, a limitation in some of the non-military tasks now performed by the Force and, in general, a stretching of the Force to its operational limits.

(c) Military observer mission or combined military observer-peace-keeping force. Changing UNFICYP into an operation of this kind would depend on certain political prerequisites, which, in turn, would presuppose significant changes in the parties' positions and in the conceptions they hold about the military posture required of them. The prerequisites are outlined in paragraph 21 above. The resulting manpower savings could eventually amount to as much as 50 per cent. Cost reductions would be less than that, since additional aircraft and land vehicles would be required.

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Illustrative across-the-board percentage reductions

57. The troop-contributing Governments have expressed an interest in a study of the effects of illustrative percentage reductions on the structure and operational effectiveness of the Force. The following paragraphs, based on an analysis provided by the Force Commander, outline the effects of 10, 15 and 20 per cent manpower reductions, assuming maintenance of the present five-contingent arrangement.

(a) A 10 per cent cut in sector 1 (Danish contingent) would necessitate the withdrawal of the platoon now located in Kokkina and of the observation posts around it, or, alternatively, the maintenance of some OPs around Kokkina, with the reduction of one or two others in the sector. A 15 per cent cut would imply that all elements of sector 1 currently deployed in the north be repositioned in the south. (However, a move of this kind would entail a considerable write-off in capital investments at Xeros and Limnitis camps, which would have to be replaced by new facilities in the south.) A 20 per cent reduction of the contingent would curtail the number of remaining OPs, thus leaving no visual contact between them in an area where patrolling cannot readily be done, and would eliminate the capability for humanitarian assistance to both sides.

(b) In sector 2 (British contingent), a reduction of 10 per cent would require the curtailment of humanitarian and economic activities, which are the most extensive in the entire area of confrontation (the Morphou citrus area), and would preclude continued UNFICYP surveillance of the arms imported by the Cyprus Government in 1972. A 15 per cent reduction would erode the ability of UNFICYP to patrol the area between OPs in an area where, owing to the configuration of the terrain and the vegetation, visibility is limited. This would particularly affect the ability of UNFICYP to deal with encroachments (the forces of one side are now trying to encroach over an area of 5,000 metres by 1,500 metres). A 20 per cent reduction would require a cut in the number of OPs, which are already some 4,000 metres apart, and would further erode the ability of the contingent to deal with any encroachment by either party.

(c) In sector 4 (Canadian contingent), a 10 per cent reduction would affect the capability of UNFICYP in relation to contingency plans, which would include, in a severe emergency, the relief of embassies, security of the United Nations Protected Area and Nicosia airport. A 15 per cent reduction would, in addition, make it impossible for the contingent to perform any humanitarian task and necessitate a reduction in the number of OPs, although some mobile patrols could still be carried out. A 20 per cent reduction would necessitate the reduction of headquarters administrative manpower at present provided for the sector's support services. It will be appreciated that all other contingents are supported administratively by the UNFICYP support regiment.

(d) In sector 5 (Swedish contingent), the most extensive of the sectors, OPs are stretched to control the fertile "golden triangle", as well as the sensitive Louroujina salient and the mixed village of Pyla. A 10 per cent reduction would imply a re-examination of the support facilities in the headquarters company. A

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15 per cent reduction would, in addition, force a cutback in humanitarian and economic activities; a 20 per cent reduction would eliminate that capability and, in addition, erode the sector's ability to carry out any mobile patrolling.

(e) In sector 6 (Austrian contingent), a 10 per cent reduction could be achieved by withdrawals from the Famagusta area, both in Varosha and the old city of Famagusta. A 15 per cent cut would require that the OPs along the Sovereign Base Area (SBA) road (Athna Line) be abandoned, while a 20 per cent reduction would require in addition a withdrawal of the liaison posts in the Karpass.

#### VIII. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

58. In reviewing the considerations outlined in the preceding sections of this report, the Survey Team found that the scope for major economies was limited. It will be recalled that in the opinion of the Force Commander, the reductions that were completed in 1978 have brought the operational strength of the Force to near the minimum consistent with the implementation of the mandate. At the same time, it was evident to the Team that the financial problems facing UNFICYP and the burden placed on the troop contributors made it imperative to take steps to achieve an improvement of the situation.

59. The course of action outlined below has the concurrence of the Force Commander. It is based on the assumption that the over-all situation in Cyprus will remain, by and large, unchanged for the time being, that the Security Council will continue to extend the mandate of the Force on the same basis as at present, that the parties will continue to co-operate and may be persuaded to improve their co-operation with UNFICYP, that the present troop contributors will continue to make available contingents for service with UNFICYP and that voluntary contributions will continue to be received at approximately the same level as heretofore. Naturally, if the political situation in the island should improve substantially - for example, if an agreement were reached on the resettlement of Varosha under United Nations auspices and on initial practical measures to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions - some of these recommendations may, happily, be overtaken by events (see paras. 21-22 above). Conversely, a further deterioration of the situation is, at least theoretically, also possible; if this should happen, the Secretary-General may be expected to report on it to the Security Council.

60. The course of action envisaged by the Survey Team is intended to take into account the necessity of continued implementation of the mandate entrusted to UNFICYP by the Security Council, as well as the need for economies and the views of the troop contributors in this regard. The Team, of course, is aware that some of these criteria may be hard to reconcile in practice. Its recommendations are based on a combination of elements drawn from the options outlined in the preceding section of this report. The Survey Team recommends the following course of action:

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(1) Across-the-board reductions.

A moderate across-the-board reduction in manpower levels, distributed as follows: Danish contingent 24-34, British contingent 20-25, Canadian contingent 32-40, Swedish contingent 27-34, Austrian contingent 10-18, UNFICYP headquarters (including international staff) 2-7. This would also result in certain savings in headquarters support services. In order to allow for flexible, and, in certain instances, phased implementation, the above figures provide, in each case, for a range of reductions. Reduction: 115-158.

(2) Withdrawal of certain units.

(a) Force Reserve. The Survey Team considers that if manpower cuts are undertaken in order to reduce the costs of UNFICYP to the United Nations and to the other troop contributors, it would be fair to consider steps, if desired by the Government of the United Kingdom, to reduce the British commitment as well, since that Government provides the largest contingent at no cost to the United Nations, as well as logistic support. The Team found that the British battalion in sector 2 and the support regiment are fully employed and, indeed, severely strained. This leaves the Armoured Reconnaissance Squadron (Force Reserve), an important and very effective element of the Force (see para. 56 (b) (i)). While the Team is unable to recommend the withdrawal of this key unit, it considers that if a reduction of the British commitment were felt to be imperative, there would be no alternative to such withdrawal, which would produce no savings for the United Nations. Reduction: 119.

(b) Air support. If a reduction of the British commitment were desired, it may also be necessary to consider withdrawal of the 84th Squadron RAF Flight, (Whirlwind helicopters). The Team was informed that, if the choice had to be made, and subject to the survey requested of the British authorities, the Army Aviation Flight (strengthened by two Alouette helicopters) should be retained by UNFICYP. Helicopters are expensive to operate, but they are essential for resupplying otherwise inaccessible OPs in sector 1 and for certain important command and control and humanitarian functions (see para. 56 (b) (ii)). Reduction: 32-34.

(3) A one-year experimental reorganization.

This could involve alternating two of the contingents at six-month intervals, each of the troop contributors concerned providing an augmented contingent (consisting of a battalion headquarters and four line companies) for one of the two mandate periods in a year; or the withdrawal of one contingent with the addition of two rifle companies to another contingent. While either of these options would be technically feasible and would produce sizable economies, the Survey Team has noted that this approach raises a number of unanswered questions and therefore suggests that, if adopted, either solution be undertaken initially on an experimental basis, subject to review after one year's operation. The Team also recognizes that, for a variety of important reasons, the troop-contributing Governments concerned may be reluctant to undertake a reorganization on the scale indicated. It would evidently be for those Governments to weigh the relative importance of the factors involved, bearing in mind, in particular, the financial implications. Reduction: 110-130.

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(4) Co-operation of the parties.

(a) Negotiating arrangements under which the Government of Cyprus would assume a fair share of the costs of economic and humanitarian services that have hitherto been rendered by UNFICYP free of charge. For example, the UNFICYP civilian police (Australian and Swedish units) perform functions that come almost exclusively under the heading of humanitarian and economic services for the benefit of the members of the two communities, at an aggregate cost to the troop contributors and the United Nations of more than \$500,000 (see paras. 39-42).

(b) Negotiating arrangements under which the two sides would absorb the costs of water, electricity and garbage and sewage disposal that are currently billed to UNFICYP (see para. 40).

(c) Negotiating arrangements with the Turkish Cypriot community to facilitate UNFICYP's operations in the north by reducing or eliminating certain restrictions on its deployment and freedom of movement (see paras. 35-37).

The recommendations outlined above, with their financial implications, are summarized in the table in appendix II.

61. The course of action outlined in paragraph 60 above would, if fully implemented, entail a total manpower reduction ranging from 376 to 441 men, i.e., 15 to 18 per cent of the present strength of the Force. The budgetary implication would be a reduction of some 15.2 to 16.8 per cent of the \$40 million aggregate cost of the operation borne by the UNFICYP Special Account and by the troop contributors, that is to say, some \$6.1 to \$6.7 million. Of these amounts, some \$4 to \$4.3 million would represent a direct reduction of the costs absorbed by the troop-contributing Governments, while some \$2.1 million to \$2.4 million would appear as a reduction of the UNFICYP Special Account deficit, which, as described above (see para. 50), is now, in effect, financed by the troop-contributing countries themselves. (However, the withdrawal of one contingent - see para. 60 (3) above - would give rise to extra costs to the Government providing the two replacement companies.) The approximate figures referred to in this paragraph do not reflect additional contributions for the support of the UNFICYP Account (or waiver of amounts billed) to be negotiated with the Cypriot authorities (see para. 55 (f)).

62. The reduction envisaged by the Survey Team would allow UNFICYP, with the co-operation of the parties, to continue to perform its major functions, although this would mean stretching the Force to its limits. The Team is also aware that the manpower reductions suggested in this report would not make life easier for the officers and men of the Force, who have discharged their demanding responsibilities with dedication and courage and who rightly feel that UNFICYP - the senior peace-keeping force now in operation - can be regarded as a model of efficiency and economy. In the last analysis, the success of UNFICYP in fulfilling its peace-keeping role depends on the United Nations troops in the field and on the willingness of the parties to co-operate with the United Nations Peace-keeping Force.

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63. The Survey Team considers in this connexion that the time may have come for another effort to persuade the parties to undertake a modification and relaxation of their military posture, which appears to be increasingly out of proportion with any reasonable military requirements. In the opinion of the Team, the military and political realities in Cyprus are such that the security requirements of the parties can be met without maintaining the present deployment along the cease-fire lines. Indeed, a reduction in density of the parties' forward defended localities on both sides and some mutual withdrawals could go far to reduce the tension prevailing in the island. It should be possible for farmers to be able to venture into the buffer zone to cultivate their fields, under UNFICYP arrangements and control, without requiring constant observation and escorts. All it would take is a more relaxed attitude on both sides towards innocent civilian activities that cannot conceivably harm their interests. Any movement in the direction of a less virulent military confrontation would enable UNFICYP to consider more substantial reductions in strength than can safely be envisaged at present, and perhaps even a change in the nature of the Force, resulting in significant savings to the United Nations and to the troop contributors and, more importantly, in progress towards the achievement of the purposes of this operation as laid down by the Security Council.

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Appendix I

PLEDGES AND PAYMENTS TO THE UNFICYP SPECIAL ACCOUNT FOR THE PERIOD  
 27 MARCH 1964 TO 15 DECEMBER 1980 AS AT 23 JULY 1980

(In United States dollar equivalent)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Total pledges</u>	<u>Payments received</u>
AUSTRALIA	2 319 889	2 319 889
AUSTRIA	3 065 000	3 065 000 a/
BELGIUM	3 355 146	3 355 146
BOTSWANA	500	500
CANADA	-	-
CYPRUS	2 416 359	2 416 359
DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA	600	600 d/
DENMARK	3 885 000	3 885 000 a/
FINLAND	900 000	900 000 a/
GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF	18 500 000	18 500 000
GHANA	76 897	76 897
GREECE	16 950 000	16 950 000
GUYANA	11 812	11 812
ICELAND	53 157	53 157
INDIA	40 000	40 000
IRAN	144 500	94 500
IRAQ	40 000	30 000
IRELAND	50 000	50 000
ISRAEL	26 500	26 500
ITALY	6 381 645	6 347 128
IVORY COAST	60 000	60 000
JAMAICA	31 033	31 033
JAPAN	2 840 000	2 840 000
KUWAIT	115 000	115 000
LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC	1 500	1 500 e/
LEBANON	3 194	3 194
LIBERIA	13 321	11 821
LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA	50 000	50 000
LUXEMBOURG	90 711	90 711
MALAWI	5 590	5 590

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<u>Country</u>	<u>Total pledges</u>	<u>Payments received</u>
MALAYSIA	7 500	7 500
MALTA	1 820	1 820
MAURITANIA	4 370	4 370
MOROCCO	20 000	20 000
NEPAL	800	800
NETHERLANDS	2 518 425	2 518 425
NEW ZEALAND	71 137	71 137
NIGER	2 041	2 041
NIGERIA	10 800	10 800
NORWAY	5 868 265	5 868 265
OMAN	8 000	8 000
PAKISTAN	41 791	41 791
PHILIPPINES	11 500	11 500
QATAR	21 000	21 000
REPUBLIC OF KOREA	16 000	16 000
SENEGAL	4 000	-
SIERRA LEONE	46 425	46 425
SINGAPORE	7 500	7 500
SOMALIA	1 000	1 000
SWEDEN	6 120 000	6 120 000 a/
SWITZERLAND	4 589 844	4 589 844
THAILAND	2 500	2 500
TOGO	1 020	-
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	2 400	2 400
TURKEY	1 839 253	1 839 253
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	10 000	10 000
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND	56 483 902 b/	56 483 902 a/
UNITED REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON	13 567	13 567
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA	7 000	7 000
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	122 400 000 c/	119 221 177

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<u>Country</u>	<u>Total pledges</u>	<u>Payments received</u>
URUGUAY	2 500	2 500
VENEZUELA	18 000	18 000
VIET NAM	4 000	4 000 <u>f/</u>
YUGOSLAVIA	40 000	40 000
ZAIRE	30 000	30 000
ZAMBIA	38 000	28 000
	<u>261 691 714</u>	<u>258 401 854</u>

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a/ Payment has been made or will be made by means of an offset against the Government's claims for reimbursement of its costs.

b/ Maximum amount pledged.

c/ Maximum amount pledged. The ultimate contribution will be dependent on contributions of other Governments.

d/ Contributions received in 1964.

e/ Contributions received in 1967.

f/ Contributions received in 1964-1966.

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Appendix II

COURSE OF ACTION RECOMMENDED BY THE SECRETARIAT SURVEY TEAM

Action	Manpower savings		Financial savings (approximate)		
			(In thousands of United States dollars)		
			UNFICYP Special Account	Costs absorbed by troop-contributing Governments	Total
A moderate across-the-board reduction	Danish	24-34	276-390	29-42	305-432
	British	20-25	- -	297-372	297-372
	Canadian	32-40	84-105	451-564	535-669
	Swedish	27-34	293-368	222-280	515-648
	Austrian	10-18	52-94	61-109	113-203
	UNFICYP hqs	2-7			20-70
		<u>115-158</u>	<u>705-957</u>	<u>1 060-1 367</u>	<u>1 785-2 394</u>
Withdrawal of certain units:					
Force Reserve		119		1 770	
Air support		32-34 (approx.)		466-565	
				<u>2 236-2 335</u>	<u>2 236-2 335</u>
A one-year experimental reorganization (alternation of two contingents)		110-130	1 400	670	2 070
Co-operation of the parties					
(a) Cypriot authorities' contribution to meet the costs incurred by UNFICYP in the performance of its economic and humanitarian tasks.			Added income (and/or cost reductions) to be negotiated with the Cypriot authorities		
(b) Waiving billings for utilities services.					

