

## UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON KOREA

## FIRST INFORMATION REPORT

(Period 1 - 19 February 1949)

Note by the Secretary-General: The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate to the Members of the General Assembly, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 45(f) of General Assembly resolution 195 (III) of 12 December 1948, the first information report of the United Nations Commission on Korea.

Seoul, 4 March 1949

- I. ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMISSION.
- II. MAIN ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMISSION AND ITS SUB-COMMITTEES
- III. OTHER ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION

## I. ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMISSION

(a) Meetings of the Commission and Sub-Committees

1. During the period covered by the present report, twelve plenary meetings of the Commission were held, including one public meeting on 12 February 1949. The first meeting was held on 2 February 1949. With the adoption of the Commission's resolution at the fifth meeting on 9 February 1949, two sub-committees were established (see paragraph 17). Sub-Committee I held five meetings and an interview with the President of the Republic of Korea and Cabinet Members, and Sub-Committee II held two meetings.

(b) Arrival of Delegations and Secretariat at Seoul

2. At the end of January 1949, the representatives of China, Mr. Liu Yu-Wan (principal) and Mr. T. T. Ssutu, (alternate) and the acting representative of France, Mr. Henri Costilhes, were present in Seoul.

3. On 30 January 1949, the representative of Syria, Mr. Yasin Mughir, and an advance Secretariat party of four, headed by Mr. Graham Lucas, Assistant Secretary, arrived in Seoul - the Secretariat group for the purpose of making the initial arrangements for the first meeting of the Commission.

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\* First issued at Seoul as document A/AC.26/8.

4. The representative of India, Mr. Anup Singh and the representative of the Philippines, Mr. Rufino Luna, together with two assistants, arrived on 1 February, so that at the first plenary meeting of the Commission on 2 February 1949, five of the seven delegations were present.

5. The representatives of Australia, Mr. Patrick Shaw (principal) and Mr. A. B. Jamieson (alternate), together with the main body of the Secretariat, headed by Mr. Egon Ranshofen-Wertheimer, Principal Secretary, and Mr. Sanford Schwarz, Deputy Principal Secretary, arrived at Seoul on 5 February 1949.

6. As of 19 February, official information concerning the arrival date of the delegation of El Salvador had not been received.

(c) Election of Officers

7. Owing to the absence of the delegations of Australia and El Salvador at the first meeting of the Commission, it was decided to elect a temporary chairman for a fifteen-day period, to be succeeded in rotation by representatives in the English alphabetical order of the countries represented until such time as the Commission decided upon a permanent system of chairmanship. Mr. Liu Yu-Wan (China) was elected temporary Chairman.

8. At the sixth meeting, the Commission decided that the chairmanship should rotate every month in the English alphabetical order of countries represented, the Chairman to assume office immediately. Mr. Patrick Shaw (Australia) accordingly took the chair.

9. Mr. Liu Yu-Wan (China) was elected Rapporteur.

(d) Adoption of rules of procedure

10. At the first meeting, the Commission decided to follow provisionally the rules of procedure of the Temporary Commission, pending examination with a view to amendment at a later date.

11. At the sixth meeting, provisional rules of procedure as amended were adopted by the Commission.\*

(e) Report on credentials

12. At the eighth meeting of the Commission, the report on credentials was approved. The Principal Secretary reported that the Secretary-General of the United Nations had received notification from the Governments concerned of the following appointments to the Commission: Mr. Patrick Shaw\*\* and Mr. A. B. Jamieson as representative and alternate representative of Australia; Mr. Liu Yu-Wan and Mr. T. T. Ssutu as representative and alternate

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\* A/AC.26/2.

\*\* Mr. Shaw returned to his post in Japan on 23 February and was succeeded by Mr. Jamieson as Australian representative.

representative of China; Mr. Henri Costilhes as representative of France pro tempore pending the arrival of the French representative; Mr. Anup Singh as representative of India; Mr. Rufino Luna as representative of the Philippines; Mr. Yasin Mughir as representative of Syria.

13. Written confirmation of the credentials of the representative of Syria was subsequently received from Lake Success.

## II. MAIN ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMISSION AND ITS SUB-COMMITTEES

### (a) Plenary meetings of the Commission

#### (1) Courtesy call on the President of the Republic of Korea

14. At its first meeting, the Commission decided to pay a formal call on President Syngman Rhee. The President received the Commission on Wednesday afternoon, 2 February 1949.

#### (11) Discussion concerning the future work of the Commission: establishment of two Sub-Committees

15. During the second through the fifth meetings of the Commission, discussion centred on the question of possible approaches which the Commission might make in seeking to bring about the unification of Korea and, in particular, discharging its tasks with respect to paragraphs 4 (a), (b), (c) and (d) of General Assembly resolution 195 (III) of 12 December 1948. It was generally agreed that, as a first step, the Commission should seek to implement paragraph 4 (a), insofar as it concerned the lending by the Commission of its good offices in order to bring about the unification of Korea, and should endeavour to give effect to paragraphs 4 (b) and (c). The Commission considered that it was not feasible in the initial stages to extend the work of the Commission to the objectives contained in paragraph 4 (d) of the resolution.

16. During the course of discussions, the views of the members crystallized in favour of establishing two sub-committees, the first to seek to facilitate the removal of barriers to economic, social and other friendly intercourse caused by the division of Korea (paragraph 4 (b)), and the second to be available for observation and consultation in the further development of representative government based on the freely-expressed will of the people (paragraph 4 (c)).

17. At the third meeting, two ad hoc committees were established to draft the terms of reference for the two sub-committees. The first ad hoc committee, composed of the representatives of Australia, India and the Philippines, drafted the terms of reference for Sub-Committee I to implement paragraph 4 (b) of the Assembly resolution. The second, composed of the representatives of China, France and Syria, drafted the terms of reference for Sub-Committee II  
/to implement

to implement paragraph 4 (c) of the resolution. The ad hoc committees submitted their respective draft resolutions at the fourth meeting of the Commission. After some discussion, the Commission decided to combine the two draft resolutions into one resolution and, at the fifth meeting on 9 February 1949, the resolution, as amended, establishing Sub-Committees I and II, was adopted unanimously (Annex 1).

18. It was decided that Sub-Committee I would consist of the representatives of Australia, India and Syria; and Sub-Committee II of the representatives of China, France and the Philippines.

(iii) Reports of Sub-Committee I

Interview with the President of the Republic  
of Korea and Cabinet members

19. At the seventh and ninth meetings of the Commission, consideration was given to a report by Sub-Committee I of an interview with President Rhee and his Cabinet on 11 February 1949 (Annex 2). The report emphasized the Korean Government's views that attempts on the part of the Commission to establish contacts with the North should be initiated through the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Contact with North Korea

20. As a result of an exchange of views concerning methods of approach in contacting North Korea, the Commission agreed that one such approach should be made through the Soviet authorities, and Sub-Committee I was requested to draft a communication to the Government of the USSR for the consideration of the Commission at its tenth meeting.

21. At the tenth and eleventh meetings of the Commission, the recommendations of Sub-Committee I, concerning contact with North Korea and incorporating the text of a telegram to the Government of the USSR were discussed. The Commission adopted the Sub-Committee's recommendations and the text of the telegram as amended, the latter embodying a request to the Government of the USSR to lend its good offices to establish contact with leading personalities in North Korea (Annex 3). The telegram was sent to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission to the Government of the USSR on 18 February 1949.

(iv) Report of Sub-Committee II

22. At its twelfth meeting on 18 February, the Commission began consideration of the report and recommendations of Sub-Committee II for implementing its terms of reference. The report recommended, among other things, that the Sub-Committee should (a) prepare a chronology of important developments since the establishment of the Korean Government;

/and (b)

and (b) gather views and opinions on the problems of the further development of representative government and of unification.

23. The Commission will continue the discussion at the fourteenth meeting on 23 February 1949.

(v) First public meeting of the Commission

24. The first public meeting of the Commission (eighth plenary meeting) was held on 12 February 1949. Leading Korean officials and personalities, including President and Mrs. Syngman Rhee, American Mission officials and members of the Diplomatic Corps were present. The agenda included a message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a policy statement of the Commission read by the Chairman, and policy statements made by the representatives of Australia, China, France, India, the Philippines and Syria on behalf of their respective Governments.

(vi) Korean Government liaison with the Commission

25. At the ninth meeting on 15 February 1949, the Commission was informed of the appointment by the Korean Government of a Liaison Committee consisting of Chough Pyong Ok, Chairman, Chang Kee Young, alternate representative, and Lee Choon Hi, liaison officer. An interview between members of the Commission and the Liaison Committee was held on 16 February 1949 (Annex 4).

(vii) Access of Koreans to the Commission

26. At the tenth meeting on 16 February 1949, the Commission unanimously adopted an Australian draft resolution recording the Commission's desire that reputable Koreans, wishing to approach the Commission or any of its members for bona fide purposes, be freely permitted to do so.\*

(b) Work of the Sub-Committees

(i) Sub-Committee I

27. Sub-Committee I, established by resolution of the Commission on 9 February 1949 held five meetings during the period covered by the present report. Mr. Anup Singh (India) was elected Chairman.

28. The Sub-Committee held an interview with President Syngman Rhee and his Cabinet on 11 February 1949 for the purpose of obtaining the views of the Government concerning the approaches which the Commission might make in establishing contact with North Korea (Annex 2).

29. During the course of its work, the Sub-Committee considered the problem of the means to be employed in establishing contact with North Korea as a first step in carrying out its terms of reference. All possible channels of communication and travel are presently being explored in an effort to make this contact.

\* A/AC.26/3.

30. At the request of the Commission, the Sub-Committee made two principal recommendations concerning communication with the North, one of which involved sending a telegram to the Government of the USSR as a means of making known the aims and purposes of the Commission. The recommendations, as amended, were adopted by the Commission at its eleventh meeting on 18 February 1949 (Annex 3).

(ii) Sub-Committee II

31. Sub-Committee II, established by resolution of the Commission on 9 February 1949, held two meetings. Mr. Henri Costilhes (France) was elected Chairman.

32. At its first meeting, the Sub-Committee exchanged views concerning the terms of reference of the Commission and the Sub-Committee, and discussed the programme of work.

33. At the second meeting, the Sub-Committee requested the Chairman and Secretary to prepare a chronology of important developments in Korea since the establishment of the Korean Government. It was also decided that before any extensive study on the development of representative government and its related subjects could be undertaken by the Sub-Committee, it would be desirable to gather the views and opinions of officials, experts and organizations.

III. OTHER ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION

(a) Mass Meeting at Seoul Stadium - 12 February 1949

34. On Saturday afternoon, 12 February 1949, the Korean authorities held a public mass meeting at Seoul Stadium in honour of the Commission. An estimated fifty thousand people heard statements by the Chairman of the Commission, the Prime Minister of Korea, the Chairman of the National Assembly and provincial representatives.

(b) Observation tour along the thirty-eighth parallel

35. On Saturday, 19 February 1949, the Commission made an observation tour along the south side of the thirty-eighth parallel in order to examine conditions in the area. Arrangements were made through the Korean Government and no attempt was made to penetrate the line.

36. The Commission visited Kaesong, approximately one mile from the parallel; Paekchon approximately 18 miles west of Kaesong, where a police station had been destroyed recently by North Koreans; and an outpost on the parallel, about three miles north of Tosong. The Commission was accompanied by Korean civilian and military officials as well as by security forces.

ANNEX 1\*

ESTABLISHMENT OF SUB-COMMITTEES

Resolution adopted at the fifth meeting of the Commission,  
on 9 February 1949

The Commission, as a first step to carry out the provisions of the General Assembly's resolution of 12 December 1948,

Bearing in mind the provisions of paragraph 4 of the resolution which require the Commission to lend its good offices to bring about the unification of Korea, to seek to facilitate the removal of barriers to economic, social and other friendly intercourse caused by the division of Korea, and to be available for observation and consultation in the further development of representative government based on the freely-expressed will of the people,

Establishes two sub-committees herein designated as Sub-Committees I and II: Sub-Committee I to be composed of the representatives of Australia, India and Syria; Sub-Committee II to be composed of the representatives of China, France and the Philippines;

Directs Sub-Committee I to:

1. Utilize every available medium such as the press, radio, public meetings and personal contact in order to impress upon the people throughout Korea the Commission's earnest desire to extend its good offices to remove existing barriers in Korea with a view to promoting unification;
2. Study the nature and extent of existing economic, social and other barriers in Korea; obtain full information from official as well as from unofficial sources concerning efforts to remove such barriers; and recommend methods for further improvement;
3. Explore means for promoting social and cultural relations among the people throughout Korea;

And, as a means of discharging the tasks enumerated in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3,

4. Make immediate contact with North Korea with a view to arranging visits there for the Commission, its subsidiary bodies or individual members;

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\* A/AC.26/1.

Directs Sub-Committee II to:

1. Study the development of representative government in Korea;
2. Be ready for consultation with governmental authorities and provide such information and advice as may be requested;
3. Gather from experts and organizations opinions and views which have a bearing on the further development of representative government in Korea; and further

Directs these Sub-Committees to submit reports of progress to the Commission fortnightly and at such other times as they may deem appropriate.



ANNEX 2\*

SUB-COMMITTEE I

SUMMARY RECORD OF AN INTERVIEW WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC  
OF KOREA AND CABINET MEMBERS, NATIONAL CAPITOL, SEOUL,  
ON 11 FEBRUARY 1949 AT 11:30 A.M.

CHAIRMAN: Mr. Anup Singh (India)

Members: Mr. Shaw (Australia)  
Mr. Mughir (Syria)

Secretariat: Mr. Lucas

Mr. Singh (Chairman) put the first question to President Rhee and Cabinet members:

"What are the views of the Government concerning efforts which the Commission might make at some future date toward establishing contact with the North Korean authorities, and what means might be employed in accomplishing this task?"

President Rhee replied that, with respect to finding a solution to the problem of unification, the Government of Korea had exhausted all peaceful means. On the other hand, the Government would be reluctant to use force. The President stated that, in his view, the only possible approach which the Commission might make in contacting North Korea would be through the Soviet Union which continued to exercise control in North Korea. The Government of Korea or the United Nations Commission should direct its requests to the Soviet Union only, since that country was responsible for establishing the 38th parallel as a barrier between the North and South, for setting up an illegal government composed of traitors in the North, and for promoting aggression in Korea.

The United Nations, in the resolution of 12 December 1948, had declared that the Government of South Korea was the only lawful one, and it would be anomalous for the United Nations Commission to contact an illegal authority in the North. The Soviet Union had declared that it had withdrawn its occupation forces (but not its authority) from the North, and therefore the United Nations Commission was responsible for determining the accuracy of this declaration. President Rhee was of the opinion that the first step would be to request permission from the Soviet authorities to enter North Korea for the purpose of verifying the fact that occupation forces

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\* A/AC.26/SC.1/1.

had been withdrawn. If this fact were found to be true on the basis of observation, the second step would be to investigate local conditions. Since the people's government of North Korea was an illegal one, the Commission should demand the dissolution of this government.

Mr. Singh (Chairman) asked the President whether the Commission should not contact the North Korean authorities in the event that the Soviet authorities had withdrawn completely.

President Rhee replied that, in his opinion, the Commission should concentrate its efforts on attempting to obtain a guarantee from the Soviet Union that, if its occupation forces had been withdrawn, it would stay out of Korea and that it would not interfere in Korean internal affairs. If the Soviet Union denied the Commission's request to verify the fact of troop withdrawals, the nations of the world would undoubtedly take cognizance of the problem. It was important for the world to know whether or not the Soviet Union continued to retain some degree of authority in the North. Since world opinion was a potent weapon, the President felt that the Soviet Union could no longer afford to defy the United Nations with respect to the problem of the independence of Korea. If the Soviet Union could be induced to withdraw completely from Korea, his Government could settle the problem of unification within a few weeks.

The Sub-Committee made it clear to President Rhee and Cabinet members that, in accordance with the terms of the General Assembly resolution of 12 December 1948, it did not intend to contact the North Korean authorities but rather leading political personalities in North Korea.

The President indicated that if the United Nations Commission made any direct contact with the so-called North Korean Government or its leaders, it would have the worst possible effect in the South. Consequently, his Government could not lend its co-operation in this respect.

At the present time, the Government of South Korea sought to co-operate with the United Nations in solving the problem of unification along peaceful lines. However, it might be essential for the Korean people themselves to find a solution without assistance. The President stated that the Korean Government wished to avoid bloodshed, and hoped that the problem of Korean independence and unification would not precipitate a crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The President emphasized that the Commission or its members would be unable to enter North Korea without the consent of the Soviet Union. Previous attempts to make contact had been in vain. Many Koreans in the South were influenced by Communists, and they believed that the United Nations Commission would be helpless and that South Korea would be unable

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to defend itself. If the United Nations Commission could verify the fact that Soviet occupation forces had been withdrawn, the Government of South Korea would be able to unify the country.

The President summed up his position as follows:

"The thing to do is go over there and settle this problem ourselves. With the exception of some of the hirelings of the Soviet Army most people would co-operate with us. It is a simple matter. We have restrained ourselves because we want to settle this matter in a peaceful way in co-operation with the United Nations and the United States. So long as the United States is involved we do not want to involve neighbour nations. So long as the United Nations and the United States can take care of the Soviet Union so that she cannot come down on us, the matter could be settled in a few weeks. Whether we have sufficient army is a question."

The President stated that in 1948, Mr. K.P.S. Menon (India), Mr. Samuel Jackson (Australia), and Mr. Victor Hoo (Assistant Secretary-General) had supported direct contact between political leaders of the North and South. President Rhee prophesied the futility of the present United Nations Commission attempting to bring together leaders of the North and South. In amplification of this point of view, the President stated that following the conferences of political leaders of the North and South, which were held in April 1948, certain leaders in South Korea had declared that conditions in North Korea under Soviet occupation were superior to those in South Korea under American occupation. These leaders denied that electric power and water derived from the North would be cut. However, in May 1948 electric power from the North was cut. There was ample evidence, therefore, to prove that the North Korean authorities would not co-operate with the Government of South Korea.

The President concluded by emphasizing that his Government "would not co-operate" in any efforts which the Commission might make in seeking to establish direct contact with the North.

Mr. Singh (Chairman) put the second question to President Rhee and Cabinet members:

"What are the Government's views and plans, if any, concerning the breaking down of economic barriers between the North and South?"

President Rhee did not reply directly to this question, but at the close of the meeting, Miss Louise Yim, the Minister of Commerce and Industry, stated that during the period of American military government, certain contracts had been negotiated between the Soviet and American authorities which provided for limited exchanges of goods (mostly fertilizer).

Following the establishment of the Korean Government, a ship had proceeded to North Korea to bring back a cargo of fertilizer. Upon arrival at a North Korean port, the ship had been confiscated. There was now no legal commerce between North and South Korea.

Mr. Singh (Chairman) put the third and final question to President Rhee and Cabinet members:

"In view of a report in the Korean Press (The Union-Democrat, 23 January 1949) to the effect that the President had stated that the Government alone had access to the Commission, what were his Government's views concerning the Commission's consultation with unofficial organizations and personalities during the course of its work?"

President Rhee replied that, while the Government had no objection to such consultations, it was assumed that the Commission was accredited solely to the Government of South Korea. Certain personalities who were "politically finished" would be apt to confuse the general public by a distortion of the facts and consequently weaken the position of the Government.

The interview ended at 12:40 p.m.

ANNEX 3\*

CONTACT WITH NORTH KOREA

REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE I

(Adopted at the eleventh meeting of the Commission on 18 February 1949)

The following recommendations of Sub-Committee I were adopted by the Commission:

- (1) A telegram to be sent to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission to the Government of the USSR in the form described below, this telegram to be regarded as one method of making known to the North Koreans the aims and purposes of the Commission.
- (2) The Sub-Committee to continue to explore practical means of travelling to North Korea by air, sea, rail or road. Should a visit appear possible, the absence of a reply from the Government of the USSR should not stand in the way of a proposed visit, to "make immediate contact" as authorized by the Commission in article 4 of its resolution of 9 February, which established Sub-Committee I.

Text of telegram to the Secretary-General  
for transmission to the Government of the  
USSR

Request you on behalf of UNCOK to transmit following message to Government USSR quote the United Nations Commission on Korea, established by resolution of the General Assembly of 12 December 1948 to lend its good offices to bring about the unification and complete independence of Korea, is now meeting at Seoul. On 9 February 1949 the Commission established a Sub-Committee specifically charged with the task of making immediate contact with North Korea to arrange visits there for the Commission, its subsidiary bodies or individual members with a view to breaking down existing barriers between North and South Korea. The Commission wishes to ensure transmission of its aims and purposes by every possible means. Owing to the lack of normal communication between North and South Korea, the Sub-Committee is exploring various means of making contact with leading personalities in North Korea and as one such means requests the Government of the USSR to lend its good offices to establishment of the desired contact for the purpose stated above.

Shaw, Chairman UNCOK unquote.

\* A/AC.26/4.

ANNEX 4\*

NOTES ON AN INTERVIEW BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION  
AND THE LIAISON COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE KOREAN  
GOVERNMENT - Duk Soo Palace - 16 February 1949

After the usual exchange of courtesies Dr. Chough Pyong Ok, Chairman of the Liaison Committee, stated that he would like to outline to the members of the Commission his Government's interpretation of the Commission's task. He began by saying that, in the opinion of the Korean Government, unification of Korea meant unification on the basis constituted by the establishment of the South Korean Government. In other words, his Government felt that the Commission would have to go to North Korea and supervise the elections which would be held to fill the 100 vacant seats reserved for representatives from North Korea in the Assembly.

While expressing his Government's view that the Commission was required to go North in order to carry out its task, Dr. Chough was emphatic in cautioning the Commission concerning the manner in which it should address the North Korean authorities in order to avoid any suggestion of reorganization of their regime. It was in this connection that he expressed great resentment over the cable sent by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Foreign Minister of the North Korean regime acknowledging receipt of the application of the latter for membership in the United Nations. He stated that the cable had been intercepted at the RCA station in Seoul and was not being sent on to its destination.

Concerning consideration of paragraph 4 (c) of the General Assembly resolution Dr. Chough gave it as the opinion of his Government that the phrase "further development of representative government" referred to the development of such government above the 38th parallel. The Chairman pointed out that the Commission had interpreted this to mean rather the development of representative government throughout the whole of Korea, and that members of the Commission would be happy to give any advice they could if called upon to do so. Dr. Chough replied that this would of course always be borne in mind and that he was sure there could be a useful and beneficial exchange of information. He reverted again immediately, however, to the primary necessity of establishing democratic government in the North. Although Dr. Chough did not refer specifically to the Commission's task of observing the withdrawal of occupying forces he did express himself rather heatedly on the recent motion before the South Korean Assembly in which 30-odd members had demanded the withdrawal of United States forces. He stated that the supporters of this motion had either been misled or were carrying out Soviet policy. In making such a move their action was calculated to cause unrest

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\* A/AC.26/W.6.

in South Korea and was unwarranted. Decisions on so important a point were a prerogative of the Government.

As Dr. Chough made no reference to the removal of barriers to economic, social and other friendly intercourse between the two halves of Korea, this point was brought up by the Chairman of the Commission. Dr. Chough's reaction was very strong. He stated that there was now no economic intercourse between the two parts of Korea and that his Government did not intend that there should be any. The North, he said, would take advantage of any opening in this direction to encourage trade in a direction that would not only benefit the North but would undermine the economic structure in the South. Moreover, the North could not be trusted to supply only goods. He instanced a comparatively recent case in which a cargo of fish was received from the North and subjected to a check by the police who, he said, found that the fish contained thousands of currency notes which were obviously intended to be used to pay Communist agents in the South.

The resolution does not speak specifically of cultural intercourse but Dr. Chough referred excitedly to culture. There was an old culture in the South, he asserted, but in the North there was now only Marxist ideology. To talk of removing cultural and like barriers, therefore, would be to invite the unleashing of a flood of Communist propaganda.

Dr. Chough then referred to the statements made at the public meeting of the Commission and particularly to the Commission's resolution of 9 February. The Korean Government was considerably disturbed at the implication that the Commission intended to conduct interviews with persons outside the Government. The lawful governmental body was the most suitable for contact, he continued. In fact, were it to be learned that the Commission was consulting with certain personalities in Seoul, public opinion would be confused and thrown into doubt. He implied that the result might be very serious. Asked whether his Government did not see any value in the Commission's consulting with what might be regarded as an opposition party, he began a strong attack on Kim Koo. He referred also to Kim Kiu Sik and said that these men and their supporters could not be considered an opposition party at all. They wanted to overthrow the Government from the bottom up and secure unification on their own terms. He had told Chiang Kai-shek when he saw him in China on his way to Paris that Kim Koo was finished. Addressing the Commission directly, Dr. Chough said: "He is a rebel: he is a traitor". Both Kim Koo and the South Korean Labour Party, he continued, were puppets of the North Korean Government which was in turn a puppet of Soviet Russia. The only terms on which Kim Koo could be accepted would be after he had publicly come forward and stated: "We made a mistake. We will co-operate

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with the Government and the United Nations".

Mr. Costilhes, referring to a warning against creating public unrest, asked whether it was not possibly the publicity that might be associated with interviews with personalities outside the Government that was worrying the latter. Dr. Chough said that of course publicity was especially harmful and repeated his reference to the opening of flood gates of propaganda. His whole manner implied that whether or not any publicity was given to interviews with such personalities the Korean Government would look on them most unfavourably. The Chairman thanked Dr. Chough for his explanation on this point and stated that the Commission would always bear in mind what he had said, but that he would understand no guarantee could be given as to whom the Commission would see.

Dr. Chough referred next to the policy statements read by delegates at the public meeting. He said that his Government was disturbed by Mr. Mughir's statement that if the Commission could not accomplish its purposes he would pack his bags and go home. The Government had every confidence in the ability and eagerness of Commission members to discharge their duties, Dr. Chough added. However, there was a feeling in Korea that the Commission might possibly stay say ten months without accomplishing any actual result. But the presence of the Commission would nevertheless be regarded as a symbol of protection and security. The Korean people were in fact hoping for a miracle but even if there were no miracle the presence of the Commission had a historical implication, namely, to protect this young child of democracy on behalf of the United Nations. Statements such as Mr. Mughir's were very discouraging to the Koreans.

Mr. Chang Ki Young then spoke a few words. He reverted to the subject of interviewing Korean personalities. He said that doubts had been created among the Korean people when the Temporary Commission had interviewed certain people. Happily, however, the Temporary Commission had made a majority decision to hold the elections and there was now a lawful government with which the Commission could consult. Asked whether the Government would object to the Commission's consulting opposition members of the National Assembly, Mr. Chang was evasive. He did not indicate that the Government would welcome such a procedure.

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