

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

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5 JUNE 1963
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTIETH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday 5 June 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

(Canada)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. J.F.M. BELL

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. L. SIMOVIC

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. F. DOBIAS

Mr. V. GOTMANOV

Ethiopia:

Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI

Mr. P. TOZZOLI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. G. ZETTERQVIST

Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A.A. ROSHCIN
Mr. O.A. GRINEVSKY
Mr. I.M. PALENYKH

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. M.S. AHMED
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J.G. TAHOUDIN
Mr. J.M. EDES
Mr. J.K. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. A.L. RICHARDS
Mr. D.E. MARK
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I declare open the one hundred and fortieth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I feel that before moving to the regular business of today's meeting, the Committee would wish me, as Chairman, to say a few words of tribute to His Holiness Pope John XXIII, who passed away since we last met. I believe that this is appropriate because of the deep interest His Holiness showed in disarmament -- at which we are labouring here -- and in peace between the nations. Representatives will recall the eloquent remarks of the representative of Brazil, Mr. de Melo Franco, at our meeting on 17 April 1963, immediately after the publication of the encyclical Pacem in Terris, and I should like to quote our Brazilian colleague's words:

"... the gentle old man of the Vatican draws the trust and hopes of the world by pricking the conscience of the great with simple truths in simple terms...

"... His thoughts are simple, because the vast truth which they announce is simple too. He tells us that without disarmament there will not be peace, and that the idea of security founded on a balance of ever-growing destructive forces is a mad idea." (ENDC/PV.121, p.6)

May I quote also from the encyclical itself. On reading it, I was particularly struck with the following passage:

"All must realize that there is no hope of putting an end to the building up of armaments, nor of reducing the present stocks, nor, still less, of abolishing them altogether, unless the process is complete and thorough and unless it proceeds from inner convictions: unless, that is, everyone sincerely co-operates to banish the fear and anxious expectation of war with which men are oppressed. If this is to come about, the fundamental principle on which our present peace depends must be replaced by another, which declares that the true and solid peace of nations consists not in equality of arms, but in mutual trust alone. We believe that this can be brought to pass, and we consider that it is something which reason requires, that it is eminently desirable in itself and that it will prove to be the source of many benefits."

Leaders of the nations of the world have sent messages expressing the sorrow of their people at the passing of this great and good man. Those of us here who are not of the Roman Catholic faith will mourn also with the faithful, and hope that though Pope John XXIII is dead his wise words will live in the hearts of all those who may have the power of decision in the world for peace or war, for life or death.

Mr. CHRISTOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): The Bulgarian delegation shares the emotion and the feelings caused by the death of Pope John XXIII. Pope John XXIII showed a clear understanding of the great problems of our time. In his wisdom he drew the attention of all men to the catastrophic nature of a thermonuclear

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war. With all the authority of his office, he joined his voice to the voices of all those who appeal for reason, disarmament and peace. Pope John XXIII thus rendered very great service to mankind, and men of goodwill will remember him with gratitude.

The Bulgarian delegation has had occasion to explain its reasons for considering that the measures designed to eliminate the threat and danger of a nuclear war are the most important and the most urgent items on the agenda (ENDC/1/Add.3) of our Committee. The discussion which has taken place here for several months on item 5 (b) has emphasized the urgent necessity of finding a solution to the main problem of our time, the nuclear problem, because the fate of the world depends on its solution. It should be obvious therefore that any plan of general and complete disarmament must first of all provide for measures which will open the way to such a solution and offer the conditions essential to an agreement.

Of the two drafts before us, only the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union (ENDC/2/Rev.1) provides for measures capable of eliminating the nuclear danger in the first stage. That is a fact. Secondly, whatever may be said, the draft submitted by the United States delegation (ENDC/30,corr.1,Add.1,2) does not provide for any measure of nuclear disarmament in the first stage. That is another fact. The measures contemplated in the United States draft are not nuclear disarmament measures, and the repeated attempts of the Western delegations to present them as such cannot modify their nature. These are the two facts that we can never lose sight of. That is the starting point of any analysis of the proposals dealing with this problem and of any comment on this important subject.

Before commenting on the measures advocated by the Western delegations, I should like briefly to recall that several delegations have expressed their point of view on nuclear disarmament measures during the discussion of the provisions of the preamble and of chapter II of the treaty (ENDC/2/Rev.1). In our opinion, three main points were brought out during the discussion: first, the need to give priority to questions of nuclear disarmament and to apply nuclear disarmament measures at the very beginning of the disarmament process. As Mr. Atta, the representative of Nigeria, said on 12 June 1962:

"Mankind has developed a strong aversion to nuclear warheads, and as long as they are preserved in any shape or form, men will never be free from the fear that they might be used." (ENDC/FV.54,p.33)

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Secondly, any treaty should, in its first stage, provide for measures for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons or for their neutralization.

Thirdly, it should be made impossible for anyone to keep nuclear weapons after the end of the disarmament process.

During the discussion, the Western delegations firmly declined to recognize the urgency of countering the nuclear danger by means of measures for its elimination in the first stage of disarmament. Their refusal leaves no doubt of their desire to retain both nuclear weapons and the vehicles for their delivery. The Western representatives have repeatedly developed their ideas on this question and have built up a whole doctrine to support the contention that the world will have to get used to living with the nuclear danger throughout the disarmament process and even beyond it.

We do not think we are mistaken in saying that this is precisely the doctrine which recurs in the two statements made here on 15 and 29 May by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, (ENDC/PV.132, p.32) (ENDC/PV.138, p.38 et seq.) respectively, when speaking on item 5 (d) of the so-called nuclear disarmament measures provided for in the first stage of the United States plan. We have studied very carefully these two statements and the problems they deal with and shall endeavour, as best we can, to set forth our opinion on the subject.

On 15 May, the United States representative listed four "major measures" proposed by the United States in regard to nuclear disarmament in the first stage.

(ENDC/PV.132, p.32)

The first of these measures provides for the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons, which, according to the United States delegation, would have the effect of halting the arms race in the field of nuclear weapons production.

The second measure is the proposal for a reduction in the stockpiling of fissionable materials, beginning with the transfer of specified quantities of weapons grade U-235 to purposes other than use in nuclear weapons.

Under the third proposal, States would undertake certain obligations with respect to the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.

The fourth provides for the "freezing" of the technology of nuclear weapons by means of the ban on nuclear tests.

I propose to discuss more particularly the first two of these proposals, but before doing so I think I must clarify some points which are closely related to the problem with which we are dealing.

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The first is this: We all know that the Western delegations have often stressed the importance which their governments attach to the principle of progressive reduction of armaments, in other words, across-the-board percentage reduction. But in the case of nuclear weapons that principle is entirely disregarded by the United States plan. The measures proposed by the United States provide, as from the first stage, for a different approach as regards different types of weapon, which would lead to a modification of the relationship among these different forms of weapon in favour of nuclear weapons, since the stocks of nuclear weapons would remain intact.

We might, of course, be told that the United States plan provides for a 30 per cent reduction in the delivery vehicles for these weapons; but the 90 per cent of the vehicles retained after the first year, the 80 per cent retained after the second year and the 70 per cent retained after the third year would amply suffice for delivering the existing stock of nuclear weapons to the target. In this way, the across-the-board reduction is interrupted at one of the crucial points of the disarmament measures.

Another matter deserving close attention is that of the nature of nuclear disarmament. This problem was discussed at length here and the conclusion we are driven to is the following: to be effective, that is to say, if it is to remove the nuclear danger, nuclear disarmament must be complete, which means the elimination of all weapons or vehicles and of the actual possibility of carrying out a nuclear attack. So long as that possibility exists, it is idle to speak of nuclear disarmament.

It is at this point that several questions arise, such as: Do the measures advocated by the United States delegation take into account the demands of nuclear reality? Are they of such a nature as to eliminate the possibility of a nuclear conflict? Can it be said that their adoption would change the existing state of affairs? Surely, all these and other similar questions must be answered in the negative.

A third point which needs clarification concerns the arms race. In his statement of 15 May, the United States representative asserted that the arms race in the field of production of nuclear weapons would be halted by the cessation of the production of fissionable materials. (ENDC/FV.132, p.32) I cannot believe that the United States representative regards the arms race as a phenomenon characterized only by the production of fissionable materials and, consequently, by the manufacture of additional quantities of nuclear weapons. I have no intention of minimizing or under-estimating the part played by the production and stock-piling of additional quantities of nuclear weapons in the arms race; we have said before now that we regard the very existence of nuclear weapons as an intolerable threat and danger. Nevertheless, it must not be

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forgotten that the arms race in general -- and the nuclear arms race in particular -- is a complex phenomenon. It has several political, strategic and military aspects, as well as economic aspects since the war industry is an inexhaustible source for the large capitalist monopolies.

I do not think there is any need here to go into details concerning all the factors which are at the root of the arms race and which condition it. Yet no one can deny that the essential and the most disquieting elements in the arms race are the improvement of nuclear weapons themselves, the improvement of their means of delivery in order to make them more rapid, more accurate, and better able to carry their nuclear charges farther, the dissemination of nuclear weapons, and so on. Further, for another well-known reason, the nuclear arms race cannot be linked only with the production of additional quantities of nuclear weapons, and still less to the future production of fissionable materials. Everyone knows now that the stocks of nuclear weapons possessed by the nuclear Powers have a destructive capacity amply sufficient to transform the whole earth into a mass of ruins. According to an American scientist, Professor Pauling, the present power of these stocks amounts to 320,000 megatons. In order to have an idea of what that represents, let us remember that the total weight of explosives used during the Second World War was equivalent to 10 million tons of TNT. The exhaustion of the existing stocks of nuclear weapons would require the daily explosion for almost one hundred years of the same quantity as that used during the whole of the Second World War.

At the stage we have reached, to assert that the cessation of the production of fissionable materials would lead to the halting of the nuclear arms race, while disregarding the other aspects of the problem -- as did the United States representative -- would mean at least attributing to the cessation of the production of fissionable materials an importance that this measure does not have.

Moreover, to see that there is no real intention of ending the nuclear arms race, we need only read the following passage in Mr. Stelle's statement:

"... States ... would be declaring only those installations within their boundaries involved in the process of making fissionable materials. Other installations involved in the production of nuclear weapons and their storage, and hence concerned with certain vital national security interests, would not, under our proposal, need to be declared at this early point in the disarmament process." (ENDC/PV.132, pp.32/33)

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Nothing could be more clear. The manufacture of nuclear weapons on the basis of already existing stocks of fissionable materials would not be affected and would continue.

If we could draw the conclusions which follow from what we have attempted to explain, we might say that the argument of the United States representative setting out the so-called measures for nuclear disarmament would not stand up to realistic scrutiny. We have seen that the cessation of the production of fissionable materials and the transfer of a certain quantity of Uranium 235 cannot result in halting the nuclear arms race. The nuclear power remains, the possibility of starting a nuclear conflict remains, and the menace and the threat of such a conflict are not eliminated. Given the vast existing stocks of fissionable materials, the cessation of their production would not stop the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Consequently, the quantities of nuclear weapons will continue to increase throughout an unspecified but certainly very long period, since in the Western drafts the elimination of nuclear weapons is provided for only in the final stage, and even then we are not certain whether it is to be a definitive elimination, since there are plans for equipping the future peace force with such weapons.

I shall not stress this point further, and to shorten my statement, I should like to add a few comments on the statement made on 29 May (ENDC/PV.138, p.35 et seq.) by the United Kingdom representative. In our view, this statement is interesting and significant in more than one respect because it throws particular light on the United States proposals and supplements them in a way which I am sure has not failed to arouse the interest of the members of the Committee.

It is true that the United Kingdom representative opened with the statement that the proposals are important, sound, realistic and so forth, (ibid.p.39) but immediately afterwards, we see that, whereas Mr. Stelle said that the arms race in the field of nuclear weapons would be halted by the cessation of the production of fissionable materials, Mr. Godber implied (ibid.p.41) that, inasmuch as any accurate control of the quantities previously produced was impossible, the arms race would continue. Briefly, this is what the United Kingdom representative said in this connexion:

First, the Western Powers do not believe that it will be possible to establish effective control on the measures they propose in the field of nuclear disarmament, even if that control were organized in accordance with their demands and within the framework of their own draft.

Secondly, the Western Powers doubt the efficacy and the real scope of their own measures.

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Thus, the statement of the United Kingdom representative allows us once more to grasp certain aspects of Western policy in the field of disarmament, and in particular nuclear disarmament, which is the great obstacle encountered by our Committee.

Of course, the minor divergences between the two Western delegations which I have referred to are only apparent, and we do not think that one can attach any great significance to them. The reason why I mentioned them was not that I was looking for some contradiction as to substance, but that they reflect the deadlock in which the disarmament policy of the Western Powers finds itself.

In our view, this explains why only a few days ago the United Kingdom representative painted for us such a gloomy picture in which anyone could see that nuclear disarmament was fading away like a mirage. Mr. Godber spoke only of the risks with which nuclear disarmament would be fraught, of the difficulties which make any verification impossible, of the dangers of weapons which would remain concealed, and so on.

We know that this tendency of the Western delegations to prove that nuclear disarmament would be impossible has, one might say, existed at all times. On 23 April 1956, for instance, Mr. Nutting, the United Kingdom representative in the Disarmament Sub-Committee, said:

"...science simply will not permit us to go forward with an arrangement for eliminating nuclear weapons. It just is not possible; we cannot detect them."
(DC/SC.1/PV.82, page 41)

And in essence Mr. Godber did not say anything different. You will remember that just a year ago in this Committee the United Kingdom representative spoke of the same problems in the same spirit. (ENDC/PV.50, p.10 et seq.)

It was then that the Indian representative pointed out some of the gaps in the United Kingdom delegation's thesis. With regard to the apprehensions concerning the concealment of fissionable materials with which it would be possible to manufacture nuclear weapons, Mr. Lall made several pertinent comments which are still valid. They show that the problem is not only one of verifying the existence or non-existence of stocks of fissionable materials, but of the total destruction of the armaments industry:

"all its bomb-making capacity will be destroyed or converted".

Those are the words used by Mr. Lall, who added:

"Then how will it be possible to make that fissile material into bombs? That is the point about general and complete disarmament and that is why it is now essential". (ENDC/PV.51, p.27)

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A study of the United Kingdom representative's "very technical" statement on 29 May (ENDC/PV.138,p.39 et seq.) gives the very clear impression that all his arguments lead to one conclusion, I would even say to the single conclusion, that nuclear disarmament is unrealizable -- that it is a dangerous illusion. The United Kingdom representative has done everything in his power to convince us that the so-called nuclear disarmament measures provided for in the United States draft are ineffective and could in no way lead to the elimination or reduction of the nuclear danger.

If that was the object of Mr. Godber's statement, we can say without hesitation that it was quite unnecessary to prove the obvious. In our earlier discussions, it was convincingly shown that the United States plan does not provide for any genuine nuclear disarmament measure in the first stage.

What is significant, however, is that Mr. Godber passed over in silence the fact that, whereas the United States plan does not offer a solution of this crucial problem either in the first or in the second stage, we have other proposals which do offer an effective solution of the problem. These proposals, set out in the Soviet Union draft treaty, are moreover perfectly practicable. The reason why the United Kingdom representative is so pessimistic about the possibilities of verification is probably and above all that he did not wish to remember the Soviet proposals, repeatedly confirmed by the Soviet Union delegation, to the effect that if the Western Powers would agree to provide, in the first stage, for the prohibition and abolition of nuclear weapons, then the necessary conditions would exist for the cessation of the manufacture of fissionable materials for military purposes.

There is no question that under those conditions all the questions, including those connected with control and verification, could be settled.

The discussion in the Committee on the problems of disarmament has been proceeding for a long time. We have to admit, however sad it may be, that we have not made much progress in our work. No one can claim that we have got nearer to our goal and, what is even less encouraging, I think, is that no one can say how far we still are from our objective.

This is not the time to dwell on the reasons preventing us from going any faster. But I should like to say in two words that, besides the real difficulties inherent in the problem of disarmament, one of the most certain causes of our marking time is no doubt the manifest desire of the Western delegations not to engage in a constructive discussion.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): My delegation would like to associate itself warmly and sincerely with the tribute which the Chairman has paid to His Holiness the late Pope John XXIII. As the leader of world Catholicism he was revered and respected by peoples of all faiths as a man of warm human qualities, of wisdom and compassion. He bequeathed to humanity a new legacy of purpose and of courage. We hope that his deep concern for peace and for international co-operation -- so eloquently expressed in the historic encyclical which he left to us, "Pacem in Terris", and to which the Chairman has referred -- may serve as our inspiration and guide. We hope that here in this Conference we shall respond to the ringing words of the paragraphs of that encyclical which the Chairman has quoted to us.

Now that the Committee has turned its attention to the next item on our agenda (ENDC/1/Add.3) -- stage I measures in the nuclear field -- my delegation believes it useful to set forth some basic factors by which, in its opinion, we should be guided in developing disarmament measures in any field, including the one now under discussion.

As we have stated before, we believe the agreed goal of all members of our Committee, including the United States and the Soviet Union, is the same. All of us have subscribed to the goal of eliminating all national armaments by the end of the disarmament process and of leaving at the disposal of States only such forces as will be required for maintaining internal order and supporting the international peace force. The question is how, at what speed and when, we should arrive at that objective. It is over those questions of modalities that the disagreement between West and East is most apparent.

We in the United States have been guided in our approach to general and complete disarmament and to the way in which we believe it should be carried out by the following basic considerations.

First, we believe we can never afford to forget that, in developing a disarmament programme, we are dealing with most intricate and sensitive mechanisms developed by nations to meet their own national security requirements as they see them. We are dealing with the fundamental machinery for national defence and survival.

Second, it seems clear to us that those mechanisms, while being reduced towards zero -- which is our objective -- must nevertheless retain an interim military capability to enable their effective use, if need be, for the purpose of defence in whatever circumstances might prevail at any given point in time during the disarmament process.

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Third, we all know that the military establishments of individual nations at present form a very complex system which has produced an approximate balance of power in the world. Therefore, their reduction must be effected in a way which at no time would upset that balance by creating military advantages for one State or group of States at the expense of another State or group of States.

Fourth, it is axiomatic that to assure all parties that disarmament is being carried out in good faith, all measures and agreed points in the disarmament treaty must be accompanied by appropriate measures of verification.

Finally, it is imperative that, as national armaments are reduced, we must develop an international machinery to maintain the peace and to protect the security of States in a disarmed world.

We believe that no one can seriously dispute the validity of these considerations. Indeed, they flow inexorably from the joint statement of agreed principles (ENDC/5) worked out by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1961 and endorsed by the General Assembly of the United Nations. However, those elements must be translated into practical plans and then reflected in practical proposals submitted for consideration by our Committee.

We cannot proceed sensibly and realistically without examining the various component parts of these intricate mechanisms of the national military establishments. We must understand their interrelationships, both in the national and international context, in order to see what makes these mechanisms presently viable and effective. Only then can we tackle the problem of the degree to which they can be reduced at any given point in time without rendering the whole remaining mechanism ineffective while it still has a legitimate defensive role to perform before the security of States is safeguarded by an international peace-keeping machinery.

It is only as a result of such an examination that the United States has reached the conclusion that the most feasible, equitable and politically sound method of reaching our common objective is through a gradual and progressive reduction of the military capability of States in all areas of existing armaments, that is, more or less across the board, with such progressive reduction extending over the whole process of disarmament. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, appears to have adopted an approach which provides, at the different stages of the disarmament process, for the destruction in one fell swoop of one or another of the most important pillars supporting

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the national military security structure of States. In stage I, under its proposals, it is nuclear delivery vehicles, however defined, which are to go. In stage II, it is nuclear weapons.

That approach might be appropriate if we were engaged in tearing down an evacuated building, because in such a case knocking out the main supports at its foundation would lead to its prompt collapse. But we are not in the wrecking business. Our purpose is not to deprive nations, in the process of disarmament, of the residual military means necessary to protect them against the possibility of aggression which will still remain during the process. On the contrary, while we seek to implement disarmament measures which will progressively reduce national military capabilities towards zero, we must nevertheless still allow effective safeguards for their security until an adequate international peace-keeping umbrella has been developed to enable States with complete confidence to dispose of their own national military machines.

If we look at the Soviet proposals (ENDC/2/Rev.1 & Corr.1), we see that they provide for almost total elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles in stage I. Nothing would be done with respect to such armaments during stage II except that at the end of that stage the remaining, still unspecified, number of certain types of delivery vehicles would be eliminated.

The United States proposals (ENDC/30 Corr.1, Add.1,2), on the other hand, provide for a 30 per cent reduction of all major armaments, including nuclear delivery vehicles, in stage I, with 50 per cent of the balance to be reduced in stage II and the remaining armaments to be reduced in stage III. The Soviet Union accepts the United States approach of progressive reduction in regard to conventional armaments.

What does this mean in practice? In the field of nuclear delivery vehicles, the Soviet Union's scheme calls for virtually 100 per cent elimination over a twenty-four month period. Since this reduction would presumably be carried out in some orderly fashion over that time span -- although the Soviet delegation has not, in fact, elaborated its ideas on this -- we should assume that a 30 per cent reduction of vehicles would have taken place, under the Soviet proposals, during a period equal to 30 per cent of twenty-four months, or just over seven months.

Thus it appears that, with regard to stage I, we can express the differences between the Soviet and United States plans in this fashion: the United States plan would eliminate 30 per cent of nuclear delivery vehicles in thirty-six months, whereas the Soviet Union would do so in about seven months. At the same time, however, we find that the Soviet Union does not adhere to its seven-months criterion for

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conventional armaments, either under its original proposals or under the United States proposals which it has now professed to adopt. For conventional arms, the Soviet Union holds twenty-four months to be the correct period for a cut-back of 30 per cent.

On the other hand, when it comes to nuclear weapons themselves, nothing is to be done about them at all in the first two years under the preferred Soviet proposals, but they are all to disappear in the twelve or twenty-four months of the Soviet Union's stage II. Here it is the United States plan which would begin to cut into nuclear military stockpiles in a moderate but effective way at the very outset of the disarmament process in stage I.

Frankly, the United States delegation is somewhat at a loss to understand the diverse criteria concerning the time periods of reductions which the Soviet Union has conjured up for its various disarmament measures. What is the magic justification for seven months with regard to 30 per cent of delivery vehicles which is so strong that it excludes, let us say, either two months or thirty-six months? Why is twenty-four months appropriate for a 30 per cent cut in conventional armaments but not for nuclear weapons or delivery vehicles? Why should we be put into a position either where we must abandon nuclear disarmament completely in stage I or where, if we are to deal with it, we must eliminate nuclear weapons entirely in stage I?

As far as we can see, there is no inherent logic in the Soviet Union's approach. It seems to us haphazard, helter-skelter and inconsistent. It takes no account of the problems of developing adequate verification procedures and of relating the breadth and scope of those procedures to the breadth and scope of the disarmament measures to which they are related in the particular stage. It ignores totally the relevance of developing adequate peace-keeping machinery pari passu with the reductions of armaments. There is in the Soviet scheme a total lack of a reasonable approach to the problem of avoiding undue tampering with the mechanisms of national security, with the existing pattern of the military mix of individual States and with the existing military balance among States during the disarmament process.

Turning more specifically to disarmament in the nuclear field, we see, as I have already noted, that the Soviet proposal lumps together all measures in this field in stage II. There is not a single provision affecting the nuclear capability of States in stage I, but there is a requirement that all nuclear weapons be eliminated in a single stroke in stage II. True, the Soviet Union has expressed willingness to move those measures to stage I, but again on the condition that the total elimination

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of nuclear weapons be effected in that stage. Thus the Soviet Union has presented us with two alternatives, neither of which is feasible from the practical standpoint or in consonance with the basic factors we have enumerated earlier today. Furthermore, it appears to us that the Soviet Union's expressed willingness to move the provisions for the elimination of nuclear weapons to stage I cannot really be genuine because, if it were implemented, it would completely undermine whatever validity there may be in the Soviet proposal (A/PV.1127, provisional p.38-40) for the retention of a limited number of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles until the end of stage II. But, again, would it not be more realistic and more consonant with the national security of States to proceed in this field too on the basis of gradual and progressive steps, starting in stage I with measures that are the easiest to implement and then expanding those measures in stages II and III until we have reached our ultimate objective? We all know that the problems involved in an adequately verified reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons are formidable. The complexity and the difficulty of those problems were pointed out by our United Kingdom colleague on 29 May (ENDC/PV.138, pp.35 et seq.), and we hope that in due course we shall be able to exchange further views on them in our Committee.

It is on the basis of all these considerations that the United States has developed and proposed a number of measures (ENDC/30, Corr.1, Add.1,2) in the nuclear field which, in our view, could be implemented with relative ease during stage I while at the same time significantly affecting the nuclear capabilities of the States possessing such capabilities and preventing those States not possessing such capabilities from acquiring them.

Among other things, the United States has proposed that a complete cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons be effected in stage I. We believe that this measure is a logical one for beginning nuclear disarmament, for before reversing the trend we must stop it. The Soviet Union and its allies have on numerous occasions called for stopping the nuclear arms race. Here is a practical measure which could assist us in accomplishing this task.

The cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons would be relatively simple to implement and to verify. It would not raise the problem of verifying past production, the difficulties of which were presented to us by Mr. Godber. (ENDC/PV.138, p.40) Moreover, contrary to assertions we have heard from the Soviet delegation in the past, it would not require the opening to inspection of the entire nuclear weapon industry of a State. We were glad to hear the Bulgarian representative (supra, pp.4 et s.) take notice of that fact this morning. All this measure would require

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from the standpoint of verification would be assurance that fissionable material plants have in fact stopped production, or, if they are continuing to operate for peaceful purposes, that the material thus produced is not diverted to use in weapons. None of these verification requirements is such as would be unduly onerous to a State or would involve disclosure of national security information relating to weapons design at this early stage of disarmament, since no nuclear weapon installations other than those directly related to the cut-off would be involved.

But even if, contrary to our view, the Soviet Union believes that verification of the cut-off does present some problems from the standpoint of its national security, we would be only too glad to sit down and join our efforts in attempting to resolve them and thus make a beginning on bringing the nuclear arms race to a halt.

However, as we have said, our proposals for stage I measures in the nuclear field go further. After the cut-off of production had been implemented the United States and the Soviet Union would, under our proposals, transfer to peaceful uses significant quantities of weapons grade fissionable material. The United States has suggested that 50,000 kgs of such materials be transferred by the United States and the Soviet Union but, as we have stated previously, if the Soviet Union for some reason regards such an arrangement as unsatisfactory we would be prepared to consider appropriate and reasonable adjustments. However, whatever the exact amounts, such transfer would reduce the capability of the respective States of producing nuclear weapons and thus would be a real measure of disarmament. For what we are concerned with in this area is not only weapons already produced but also those that can be produced from the existing stocks of fissionable material.

The representative of Bulgaria today attacked those two proposals for cut-off of production and transfer of fissionable materials to peaceful uses on the familiar grounds that they would not eliminate nuclear weapons 100 per cent. This is the old argument that because you cannot do everything you should do nothing, and it is an argument to which we do not subscribe.

In the course of our further deliberations we must attempt to examine all the facts pertaining to the problems we are trying to resolve and on the basis of such examination we should seek to arrive at agreement as to which specific steps we should adopt. If our differences of opinion are honest -- and we hope they are -- we may be able to find, through patient and persistent efforts on both sides, a common basis for making progress in the vital area of nuclear disarmament.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

The Soviet delegation associates itself with the expressions of deep and sincere condolence upon the death of His Holiness, Pope John XXIII. The late Pope showed a profound understanding of the desire of the peoples for peace; he did not merely contemplate life, but was an active advocate of disarmament and the establishment of peace on earth and thereby won universal sympathy and respect. The fruitful activity of Pope John XXIII on behalf of the consolidation of peace and of peaceful co-operation among the peoples will live in the memory of all men of good will throughout the world.

Today the Soviet delegation intends to speak on item 5 (d) of the agreed agenda, (ENDC/1/Add.3) that is, on the question of measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. This question has been brought to the fore by life itself and calls for an urgent radical solution.

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, speaking on 10 July 1962 before the World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace in Moscow, gave the following definition of the decisive changes in military technique which have radically modified the character of modern war. He said:

"In present conditions, world war must not be measured by old criteria and considered in outworn modes of thought. We have to face up to the fact that the weapons of war have changed radically, and qualitatively, and that their destructive force has increased to unheard-of proportions. What does this imply?

"First, modern weapons cannot in any way be compared to the old. The explosive force of only one powerful hydrogen bomb is many times greater than that of all the explosives used in all the wars in history, including the First and Second World Wars.

"Second, nuclear rocket war completely erases the line between the battlefield and the rear. What is more, it is the civilian population that will be the first victim of the weapons of mass annihilation. In a war of this sort, just a few ~~thermonuclear~~ bombs are capable of wiping out not only enormous industrial centres with populations of many millions, but whole countries.

"... In this age of nuclear weapons, this age of rockets, the danger of a murderous nuclear war cannot be eliminated unless the means of mass annihilation are utterly destroyed and nuclear weapons prohibited. We are in favour of the complete destruction of the material means of warfare." (ENDC/47, pp.6,9)

This is a concise but very apt definition which goes to the very root of the tremendous qualitative changes which have occurred in military technique in the last two decades and which have radically changed the character of modern war, which, if it were to break out, would be a thermonuclear war. The colossal technical revolution which has taken place in military matters has resulted in the creation of such powerful weapons of destruction that their use would inevitably result in the death of

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hundreds of millions of people. The eminent United States scientist and Nobel Prize winner, Linus Pauling, in his book No More War, came to the conclusion that as the result of a nuclear strike 800 million people throughout the world might be killed within a short time. As a result of the pernicious effects of atomic radiation, a nuclear war would cause untold calamities and the loss of millions of human lives also in countries that would not be directly subjected to nuclear bombardment. The extent of the danger threatening mankind as a result of thermonuclear war is really shattering. There is no need to dwell upon this. We all have a good idea of these terrible effects. In short, the main task of all countries and peoples is to prevent a thermonuclear war, not to allow it to break out.

With this task in mind, in discussing point 5 (d) of the agreed agenda on measures in the field of nuclear disarmament the Eighteen-Nations Committee must start from the premise that in our time the elimination of the threat of a thermonuclear war is an imperative necessity. By reason of its urgency this is the number one task. The Committee must exert every effort to reach agreement on such measures as would really be aimed at achieving this purpose. That is why, in considering any proposals submitted, we must ascertain whether or not they answer the purpose of eliminating or at least reducing the threat of a thermonuclear war. This is the criterion by which we must be guided in discussing item 5 (d) of the agreed agenda.

As you see, the designation of this item of the agenda speaks for itself. It needs no interpretation or commentary. Everyone understands that nuclear disarmament in its full sense means the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, that is, their withdrawal from the arsenals of States, the destruction of all stockpiles of such weapons and the cessation of their production. Only nuclear disarmament can eliminate forever the terrible threat of a thermonuclear war hanging over mankind. At present we are discussing measures for the first stage of disarmament. Of course, the greatest blessing for all mankind would be to ensure nuclear disarmament in the first stage. Unfortunately, this has proved impracticable because of the stubborn refusal of the Western Powers to agree to the elimination of nuclear weapons in the first stage of disarmament. They are unable to back up their objections to this disarmament measure with any well-founded arguments. In this situation the minimum that should be ensured in the first stage of disarmament is the adoption of measures which, while not affecting nuclear weapons, could nevertheless eliminate or at least greatly reduce the threat of a thermonuclear war. This purpose is served by the other Soviet proposal for the destruction in the first stage of disarmament of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons

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except for an agreed, strictly limited number of missiles of certain types and categories. (A/PV.1127 provisional 38-40) However, this proposal, which we submitted by way of a step towards meeting the Western Powers, has also been blocked by the Western Powers, who avoid agreement on this question also.

Let us see what the United States and United Kingdom propose to us as nuclear disarmament measures in the first stage. The United States-United Kingdom outline (ENDC/30) envisages as such a measure the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes. They propose that the production of uranium 235 and plutonium for use in nuclear weapons should cease at the beginning of stage I of disarmament. What is the significance of this proposal? First of all, the question arises: what significance would this measure have for the purpose of eliminating or at least reducing the threat of a thermonuclear war? In this connexion it should be borne in mind that at the present time the nuclear Powers have already produced huge quantities of nuclear materials with which it will be possible to continue making nuclear weapons in huge quantities for many years to come.

According to the estimates of scientists and military experts, by the end of last year the United States already possessed about 40,000 nuclear bombs and warheads. According to the unofficial estimates to which the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, referred on 29 May, the United States stockpile of highly enriched uranium had already reached 300-350 metric tons two years ago. Moreover, Mr. Godber emphasized that 5 per cent of this stock of highly enriched uranium would be about enough to make 1,000 atomic bombs of the type dropped on Hiroshima. He remarked:

"Weapons design has, of course, been improved since then and fusion or thermonuclear devices introduced, so that the explosive power per kilogram of fissile material is now much greater than it was twenty years ago."

(ENDC/PV.138, p.43)

In making a general estimate of the existing stockpiles of nuclear materials it should also be borne in mind, as Mr. Godber himself rightly observed, that in making nuclear weapons not only uranium 235 is used but also plutonium, of which the nuclear Powers also have very large stockpiles.

According to estimates quoted by Mr. Godber:

"... 10 per cent of the present stocks of fission and fusion weapons are more than enough to obliterate the major cities of the world ..." (ibid.)

To this should be added also those nuclear materials which are not encased in weapons but are in a so-called free state and with which, if used for the making of atomic bombs, the present stockpiles of such weapons can be increased several times.

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Thus from the data adduced in their statements by the representatives of the Western Powers themselves it is evident that the United States, which has been engaged in the production of various nuclear materials over a period of twenty years, finds itself in a situation where the further production of nuclear weapons and the further accumulation of nuclear materials for these weapons has become pointless, even from the standpoint of its military needs and plans.

With regard to the production of nuclear weapons and the accumulation of nuclear materials for their further production, the United States has been, figuratively speaking, in a state of saturation, that is, in a situation where the further production of nuclear weapons and the accumulation of nuclear materials essentially add nothing to its already overabundant capacities to ensure the material basis for a devastating nuclear missile war and, even from the purely military standpoint, is a senseless waste of colossal resources and materials.

As is well known, this problem has arisen in the United States not today, but much earlier. Several years ago scientists, political leaders, economists and even United States military leaders began to have serious doubts about the appropriateness of the United States continuing the production of nuclear materials. Even then, in the pages of the United States press there appeared reports that the United States did not know where to put the huge, already accumulated, stockpiles of nuclear materials, where to store them and what to do with them. The United States was faced with a new and rather peculiar crisis, namely, the crisis of overproduction of both nuclear bombs and the nuclear materials for their production. But, as you see, this purely domestic problem of the United States came about as a result of an overabundance of nuclear weapons, and what the United States is now proposing is of absolutely no significance either for nuclear disarmament or for eliminating or reducing the threat of a nuclear missile war. And this is actually so. Not a single bomb out of the huge stockpile of nuclear weapons which now exists would be withdrawn or eliminated, although there are tens of thousands of them. Consequently, this United States proposal is obviously fictitious if one has in mind nuclear disarmament or the elimination of the threat of a nuclear missile war or at least its reduction.

As another nuclear disarmament measure for the first stage of general and complete disarmament the United States proposes that the United States and the Soviet Union should transfer 50,000 kg of uranium 235 from military to peaceful purposes. How can we evaluate this United States proposal? In this connexion I shall cite a comparison, which has been mentioned before: the total weight of the TNT equivalent of all

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explosives set off during the entire Second World War was 10 million tons; the TNT equivalent of the total explosive power of the nuclear weapons which had been produced by the middle of 1961 -- that is, two years ago -- was over 250 milliard tons. These data indicate that the explosive power of the nuclear materials which had already been produced two years ago was twenty-five times greater than the total power of all the explosives used during the entire Second World War. In these circumstances judge for yourselves, gentlemen, the significance of the proposal to reduce the United States stockpiles of uranium 235 by fifty tons.

The United States proposal to transfer fifty tons of uranium 235 to peaceful purposes would not reduce the stockpiles of nuclear weapons by a single bomb, nor would it to any extent reduce the threat of a nuclear war. That is the crux of the matter.

It should be noted that in his statement on 15 May Mr. Stelle especially pointed out that fissionable materials would not be extracted from already existing nuclear weapons. (ENDC/FV 132,p.35) It should also be noted that the United States proposal for the transfer of a certain quantity of fissionable materials to peaceful purposes does not at all mean that an obstacle will be placed in the way of creating new nuclear weapons. There will be no obstacle to continuing the production of nuclear weapons under the United States proposals.

The industry producing nuclear weapons will be in full operation for years to come. It will have more than enough raw material for the production of nuclear weapons from the already accumulated stockpiles of nuclear materials. All these facts indicate that such a nuclear disarmament measure as the transfer of fifty tons of uranium 235 to peaceful purposes is of absolutely no significance for the elimination of the threat of a nuclear missile war or even for the reduction of this threat.

Thus, an analysis of the main proposals of the United States regarding nuclear disarmament measures for the first stage of general and complete disarmament shows quite clearly that they do not to any extent lead to real nuclear disarmament. Moreover, it should be noted that in these proposals of the United States one can clearly perceive its desire to secure unilateral advantages for itself and for NATO as a whole. This is particularly obvious in its proposal for the withdrawal of fifty tons of nuclear materials from the sphere of military production of the United States and the Soviet Union.

This proposal, which affects neither the United Kingdom nor France, although they too are engaged in the production of nuclear weapons, reflects even more clearly the desire of the United States to secure unilateral advantages for itself and for its NATO allies. But this is not the only purpose served by these United States proposals.

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Their hidden purpose is also to try to take under control the atomic industry of other States and to ascertain their atomic potential without the implementation of any nuclear disarmament measures.

It requires no great perspicacity to see that the raising of the question of ceasing the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, according to the conception of the United States and the United Kingdom, is a plausible pretext not only to place under their supervision but also to establish real control over the atomic industry of the nuclear and other States.

The United States proposal for the cessation of production of fissionable materials for military purposes is aimed, in particular, at ascertaining the capacity and location of the atomic industry of other States in the very first stage of disarmament. It is precisely for this purpose that the United States proposes that all States parties to the treaty should submit detailed information on the location and production capacity of plants producing and processing fissionable materials as well as on the type and quantity of fissionable materials being produced at each of these plants. The United States and the United Kingdom are trying in this way to establish control over the entire atomic industry of States, over uranium mines, over plants for processing uranium and thorium ore, over diffusion plants for separating uranium isotopes, over chemical plants for processing the fuel elements of reactors and over the reactors themselves. In other words, they are trying to secure the widest possible control, the result of which would be the ascertainment of information on the whole complex of the atomic industry, including information on plants producing nuclear weapons - and all this in the conditions where no real disarmament measures would be carried out.

It is proposed to do all this for the alleged purpose of preventing the possibility of the concealment and use of fissionable materials for military purposes in the future. But actually all this would lead to trying to find out and obtain the information, so necessary to the United States intelligence service and NATO Headquarters, on the state of nuclear production and the amount of nuclear materials stockpiled in other countries and, in the first place, in the Soviet Union. The main objective the Western Powers are striving for is to establish control over the production of fissionable materials, which would in fact amount to establishing control over the entire atomic production of States. This would be carried out, I emphasize once again, in the absence of any effective measures for nuclear disarmament. What such control would lead to, it is not difficult to guess. Such control would be a convenient, legal means of ascertaining the military potential of States; it would be a means of espionage for the benefit of NATO.

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By these proposals the United States is trying to pave the way to the establishment of a widespread network of comprehensive control without disarmament. Control instead of disarmament. That is what the representatives of the Western Powers are driving at.

An analysis of the United States proposals on nuclear disarmament for the first stage has shown that these proposals do not in the least reduce the risks of a nuclear missile war. They do not provide for the destruction of nuclear weapons. Under the United States-United Kingdom disarmament plan, the whole 100% of the immense stockpiles of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would be retained in the first stage. If one takes into account the fact that, under the United States-United Kingdom plan, 70% of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles would be retained to the end of the first stage, it is impossible not to come to the conclusion that the danger of a nuclear war, far from diminishing, would even increase, since the proportion, and to a still greater degree, the significance of nuclear weapons in the armed forces would increase. We must most definitely point out that the Soviet Union cannot agree to such United States-United Kingdom proposals, because they do not lead to the accomplishment of the tasks before the Committee and merely pursue an aim which has nothing to do with the problem of general and complete disarmament, or with nuclear disarmament, or with the question of really eliminating the threat of a nuclear missile war.

We propose a different way, the way of genuine nuclear disarmament which can be carried out if the relevant provisions of the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament are adopted. (ENDC/2/Rev.1). We have constantly stated, and state once again, that the problem of eliminating the threat of a nuclear war can only be solved by the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons together with their elimination from armaments, the destruction of all the stockpiles of such weapons and the cessation of their manufacture. The concept of the representatives of the Western Powers is that peace is maintained by nuclear bombs, but that concept is harmful and exceedingly dangerous. That concept prevents any progress in solving the problems of disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear weapons. That concept, in particular, is a definite obstacle in the way to agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests as well.

Taking as its premise the aim of eliminating the threat of a nuclear war as speedily as possible and for ever, the Soviet Union proposes the way of complete nuclear disarmament, which means the total prohibition of nuclear weapons and their elimination both from the armaments of States and from the armaments of any international contingent of armed forces. The main, most important measures in the field of nuclear

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disarmament have been spelt out in article 22 of the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. Under paragraph 1 of this article it is stated:

"Nuclear weapons of all kinds, types and capacities, shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. Fissionable materials extracted from such weapons, whether directly attached to units or stored in various depots, shall be properly processed to render them unfit for direct reconstitution into weapons and shall form a special stock for peaceful uses, belonging to the State which previously owned the nuclear weapons. Non-nuclear components of such weapons shall be completely destroyed". (ENDC/2/Rev.1, p.16)

Nuclear fuel extracted from rocket warheads, bombs, torpedoes and other nuclear military equipment is to be converted to peaceful uses. All depots and special premises for storing nuclear arms are to be liquidated. In addition to the extraction of nuclear material from the nuclear weapons to be destroyed, the Soviet proposal envisages the removal of any possibilities of creating new weapons out of the existing stocks of nuclear materials. For this purpose, all stocks of fissionable materials intended for use in nuclear weapons are also to be rendered unfit for military purposes through appropriate processing and are to be transferred to the stock for peaceful uses.

Paragraph 2 of article 22 of the Soviet Draft Agreement on General and Complete Disarmament provides for the complete discontinuance of production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. Under the provisions of paragraph 2:

"All plants, installations and laboratories specially designed for the production of nuclear weapons or their components shall be eliminated or converted to production for peaceful purposes. All workshops, installations and laboratories for the production of the components of nuclear weapons at plants that are partially engaged in the production of such weapons shall be destroyed or converted to production for peaceful purposes". (ibid.)

In order to prevent any attempt secretly to manufacture nuclear weapons by any organizations or individuals, article 22 of the Soviet Draft Treaty contains the following provision:

"Each State party to the treaty shall, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, enact legislation completely prohibiting nuclear weapons and making any attempt by individuals or organizations to re-constitute such weapons a criminal offence". (ibid page 17)

All the measures for nuclear disarmament, for the liquidation of nuclear weapons under the Soviet disarmament plan are inter-connected and form a complete whole. These measures are to be carried out in direct relationship with, and mutual dependence on, each other. For this reason they have been drafted in the form of paragraphs of a single article of the treaty on general and complete disarmament.

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A comparison of the proposals of the Soviet Union and the Western Powers clearly shows two different approaches to the existing nuclear threat. One approach leads to the solution of this problem, to the elimination of the threat of a nuclear missile war. The other approach leads to the maintenance of this threat. If, for instance, we consider the transfer of fissionable materials for use in peaceful purposes, there is a difference of principle between the position of the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and that of the Western nuclear Powers, on the other. Whereas the United States proposes that 50 tons of uranium 235 be transferred to peaceful purposes, the Soviet proposals proceed from the premise that all fissionable materials without exception should be transferred to peaceful purposes, including the materials contained in nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union proposes that the nuclear threat be eliminated in the very first stage of disarmament through the abolition of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and all military bases on foreign territories, with the exception of a strictly limited agreed number of missiles to be retained by the United States and the Soviet Union.

The implementation of these measures, as we have already explained a good many times, would in fact make it impossible to unleash and wage a nuclear war.

In stage II of disarmament we propose the elimination of the nuclear weapons themselves. In this connexion it is appropriate to recall that in the United States disarmament plan, or rather the United States disarmament outline, there is no provision for the total destruction of nuclear weapons either in stage I of disarmament, or in stage II, or even after the completion of stage III of disarmament. We have made persistent attempts to obtain from the United States delegation a clarification as to whether it envisaged the total destruction of nuclear weapons, their complete elimination; the United States delegation has always avoided giving a direct answer to this question by taking refuge in the observation that nuclear weapons could be transferred to some international organization so that it could wage a nuclear missile war, if necessary. That is how the United States disarmament outline looks in reality.

Views have been expressed here in the Committee, and the question has been asked whether we could not speed-up the implementation of measures to do away with stockpiles of nuclear weapons and fissionable materials so as to establish, in the very first stage, more reliable guarantees against the outbreak of a nuclear war. We should like to state in this connexion that the Soviet Union advocates the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons together with the elimination in the very first stage of disarmament of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials. In its draft treaty the

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Soviet Union provides for the implementation of this measure in the second stage solely because of the Western Powers' refusal to begin disarmament with the elimination of nuclear weapons simultaneously with the elimination of their means of delivery, as proposed by us.

The Soviet Government has already declared its readiness to transfer the implementation of nuclear disarmament measures from stage II to stage I. We now confirm once again the Soviet Union's readiness, if the Western Powers agree, to transfer the whole of the measures for the elimination of nuclear weapons, including the destruction of stockpiles and the cessation of production, from stage II to stage I, that is, to eliminate all nuclear weapons in the first stage of disarmament simultaneously with the destruction of all means of their delivery. Of course, if agreement were reached on a strictly limited number of missiles to be retained by the Soviet Union and the United States till the end of stage II, obviously a strictly limited agreed number of nuclear warheads for these missiles should be retained.

Now a few words on the question of control. The real disarmament in the nuclear field proposed by the Soviet Union would be carried out under strict international control. Article 22 of our draft treaty defines the measures of control over the elimination of nuclear weapons to be carried out by the international disarmament organization. Inspectors from this organization are to verify the elimination of nuclear weapons from the armed forces and their destruction, as well as the liquidation of depots and premises intended for the storing of nuclear weapons. The inspectors of the international disarmament organization are to exercise control over the implementation of measures for the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable materials for such weapons. The inspectors are to see to it that the nuclear fuel contained in nuclear weapons is transferred to production for peaceful purposes. They are to have the right to inspect plants extracting atomic raw material, producing or utilizing atomic materials or atomic power. Moreover, the States parties to the treaty will furnish the international disarmament organization with documentary information on the extraction of nuclear raw material, its processing and use for military and peaceful purposes. Thus we have considered both the United States and the Soviet proposals in the field of nuclear disarmament in regard to stage I. What conclusions can be drawn as a result of comparing these proposals? The main conclusions are as follows: the aim set by the Soviet Union is the elimination of nuclear weapons, their prohibition and the complete cessation of their production, as well as the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes. The

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United States proposes that we should limit ourselves to such a measure as the cessation of the production of fissionable materials, without stopping, however, the production of the nuclear weapons themselves, without prohibiting their use for military purposes and without eliminating all stockpiles. The Soviet Union proposes that all fissionable materials, whether extracted from nuclear weapons to be destroyed, stockpiled or newly-produced, should be transferred to peaceful purposes. The United States proposes to transfer only an insignificant quantity of uranium 235 to peaceful purposes and to leave intact the fissionable materials contained in nuclear weapons, as well as the immense stockpiles of fissionable materials, so as to continue the nuclear armaments race.

Lastly, the main difference between the proposals of the Soviet Union and the United States for measures in the field of nuclear disarmament is that the Soviet Union's proposals have as their main aim the elimination of the threat of a nuclear missile war. The United States proposals not only do not eliminate such a threat, but to no extent lessen the dangers of such a war. Such are the proposals on the question of nuclear disarmament for stage I of general and complete disarmament which have been submitted to the Committee by the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and by the United States and the United Kingdom, on the other. We appeal to all members of the Committee to give their full attention to the consideration of this most important problem of our times -- the elimination of the threat of a nuclear missile war. The fate of all nations, of the whole of mankind, depends on the solution of this problem. The Soviet Union has approached the drafting of its proposals on this question with all seriousness and with full understanding of the tremendous significance of the problem of eliminating the threat which is hanging over mankind and which is becoming greater each day and year, as the nuclear armaments race expands. The Western Powers, and the United States in the first place, should show the same understanding and the same good will. That is what we are expecting from them.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and fortieth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Burns, the representative of Canada.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Bulgaria, the United States and the Soviet Union.

"The Chairman, on behalf of the Conference, and the other speakers, on behalf of their delegations, paid tribute to the memory of Pope John XXIII and recalled his support for disarmament and peace.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 7 June 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.

