

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/PV.152
16 August 1963
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SECOND MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday 16 August 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Sir Paul MASON

(United Kingdom)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. LUKANOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. D. TEHOV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

Mr. James BARRINGTON

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. S.F. RAE

Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. L. SIMOVIC

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. Z. SEINER

Mr. F. DOBIAS

Ethiopia:

Lij MIKAEL IMRU

India:

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. R. KRZYZANOWSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. O. NEDA

Mr. S. SERBANESCU

Sweden:

Baron C.H. Von PLATEN

Mr. S. LOFGREN

Mr. G. ZETTERQVIST

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN

Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV

Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. AHMED OSMAN

Mr. M.S. AHMED

Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

Mr. ABDEL SALAM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN

Mr. D.N. BRINSON

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE

Mr. A.L. RICHARDS

Mr. L.D. WEILER

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I declare open the one hundred and fifty-second plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): Today we resume our discussion of collateral measures for the first time since the signing of a most important collateral measure, the limited test ban treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1). The signing of that treaty, in turn, followed the agreement here in Geneva between the Soviet Union and the United States on a direct communications link (ENDC/97).

We have, therefore, made the initial breakthroughs in this particular area of disarmament negotiations. The breakthroughs have been on limited but nevertheless important steps. In the case of the test ban treaty, the breakthrough has been on a measure that had become a symbol of man's hopes to make a beginning in disarmament.

While we must not expect the next steps to come easily, surely we have a right to expect that areas of agreement will be easier to develop now than was the case prior to those initial breakthroughs. In the search for next steps to improve the international climate, this Eighteen-Nation Committee will have an important role. Not all proposals towards that end will, of course, be appropriate for consideration here, but we shall have plenty of work to do.

During our past discussions of collateral measures, the United States delegation has advanced various proposals. They included a cut-off of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons -- a matter with which I dealt at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.151, pp. 9 et seq.) in the context of general and complete disarmament -- measures to ensure that outer space will be used for peaceful purposes only, and measures to reduce the possibility of war by surprise attack, miscalculation or failure of communications.

As the representatives here are aware, the United States delegation has tended to concentrate its discussion on those measures which it believed were more likely to produce early agreement -- namely, measures to reduce the risk of unintentional war. Thus, in addition to the submission of a working paper on this subject, document ENDC/70 dated 12 December 1962, my delegation elaborated in this Committee the United States views on its proposals on advance notification of major military movements, on exchange of military missions, in the first instance between the United States and the Soviet Union, and on a direct communications link, also in the

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first instance between the United States and the Soviet Union. The successful conclusion of the agreement on the direct communications link would seem to indicate that that emphasis was indeed useful.

We would hope that further consideration of such measures to reduce the risk of war as the exchange of military missions between the United States and the Soviet Union might lead to further agreements in this area. We have elaborated at some length our views on this proposal of ours, but we remain prepared to answer additional questions that might assist in the further consideration of this measure as one that could be taken prior to stage I of a general disarmament programme.

The United States working paper (ENDC/70) contained what we believe to be some interesting considerations concerning the related topic of reducing the danger of surprise attack. As the Soviet Government has recently indicated, renewed interest in the possibility of the establishment of observation posts in certain locations as a means of reducing the danger of surprise attack, we believe we might well explore the possibilities of agreement on that measure.

The members of the Committee will recall that the United States delegation has suggested that the observation posts

"could receive such information relative to military activities in their vicinity as the host State might wish to provide and could, under agreed arrangements, observe the flow of military traffic and the general level of military activity on a local basis ..." (ENDC/70, p.6)

We have suggested also that

"It would be sufficient to place posts at such locations as certain principal ports, major railroad stations, intersections of key highways, and possibly at certain significant airfields." (ibid., p.7)

Those, of course, are matters which need to be discussed in greater detail and, we would emphasize, always with a view to providing increased confidence and reassurance to all parties concerned.

It would seem to us, however, that the most useful contribution to further exploration of this topic at this time would be elaboration by the Soviet delegation of its views on the manner of operation of such a system.

In this connexion it will be recalled also that the United States suggested in its working paper that the usefulness of any system of ground observation posts would be increased if it were undertaken together with a system of advance

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notification of major military movements, and if the ground observation posts were combined with additional observation techniques such as aerial observation, mobile ground observation teams, and overlapping radars. (ibid., p.8)

My delegation wishes to emphasize, however, Mr. Chairman, that the United States does not insist that these additional desirable measures must be included with any system of observation posts. For our part we are prepared to accept an arrangement limited solely to a system of ground observation posts.

I mention this because it would be helpful to our further efforts to reach agreement on this matter if we had a clearer idea of the present views of the Soviet Union concerning the relationship of a system of observation posts to other measures which the Soviet Union, for its part, has in the past suggested should be undertaken. It will be recalled that in the past the Soviet Union has tied the establishment of a system of observation posts to troop reductions in certain areas and also to a specific denuclearized zone. At an appropriate time it would be helpful if the Soviet delegation could clarify the present position of its Government on this point.

We have only a very limited period of time for discussion of collateral measures before we recess in preparation for the General Assembly. We believe we should use this short period to prepare the way for fruitful governmental consideration of those matters during the forthcoming recess in order that, in our resumed sessions, we shall be able to move more quickly to further agreements.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The vast majority of political and social leaders throughout the world have welcomed with profound satisfaction the signing in Moscow of the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water. (ENDC/100/Rev.1) They all recognize without reserve that the conclusion of that treaty has brought about a definite improvement in the international situation and has shown convincingly that it is really possible to solve international problems in the spirit of the principles of peaceful coexistence.

In its recent statement the Soviet Government pointed out that:

"The treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests is of fundamental importance from the point of view of the further search for ways towards solving the controversial problems dividing the world".

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In this respect we must not waste time; we must strike the iron while it is hot. Today, the Soviet delegation would like to state a few considerations in regard to a number of measures the agreement and implementation of which would ensure further progress in the improvement of the international situation and in achieving agreement on general and complete disarmament.

In order to consolidate and further develop the success achieved in the Moscow negotiations, we should first of all conclude a non-aggression pact between the NATO States and the States parties to the Warsaw Pact. True, a non-aggression pact is not a controversial problem; however, its conclusion would undoubtedly create favourable conditions for the settlement of controversial problems. This step would have tremendous significance, a truly historic significance. As the Head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Khrushchev, said:

"The conclusion of such a pact would show all the peoples that the militarily most powerful States and, in the first place, the nuclear Powers, have reached agreement among themselves in order to avoid a thermonuclear war."

No one can deny the fact that a non-aggression pact is valuable precisely when there is need for it, that is, when there is a threat of aggression or when the conditions for the emergence of such a threat are in existence.

Sad as it may be, the facts as we know them confirm that the world today is precisely in such a situation. Since there are in the world acute unsettled problems which could be used for unleashing armed conflicts; since the opposing military groupings of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty States possessing immense nuclear missile armaments are a characteristic feature of the world today, for all the more reason the conclusion of a non-aggression pact is a vital necessity and is a problem which should be solved without delay.

No one can doubt that all the peoples would welcome with enthusiasm the conclusion of such an agreement. A non-aggression pact between the NATO States and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty cannot be regarded as an ordinary measure of a regional nature. Since it would affect States belonging to two different social systems, situated in Europe, North America, and Asia, a non-aggression pact would have world-wide significance. The very participation in this pact of the United States of America and the Soviet Union would unquestionably give it a universal character. Its conclusion would bring about a definite improvement in the international situation and help to establish confidence in the mutual relations between States.

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The Soviet Union considers that in the present state of international affairs it is necessary to take speedy, effective and, if possible, simple measures with which a start could be made and which would have a favourable influence upon the further development of mutual relations between the States belonging to the two opposing military groupings. The whole world has expressed its deep satisfaction at one such measure -- the conclusion of a treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests. We must now go a step further and conclude a non-aggression pact. The implementation of this measure would not involve any difficulty; it would in no way infringe upon anyone's interests; it would greatly reduce the threat of a nuclear missile war and would thus ensure equal security for all.

The draft non-aggression pact (ENDC/77) between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty submitted by the Soviet Union contains provisions which cause no prejudice to either side and which, we are profoundly convinced, are acceptable to all States.

The draft non-aggression treaty submitted by the Soviet Union contains two obligations: first, to refrain from attack, the threat or use of force, and to resolve all disputes by peaceful means only, through negotiations between the parties concerned. Secondly, it provides that:

"Should situations affecting the interests of both sides arise which are likely to endanger the maintenance of peace and security, the States parties to this Pact shall consult together, with a view to taking and implementing such joint measures as may, in conformity with the United Nations Charter, be considered appropriate for the peaceful settlement of such situations". (ibid., p.2)

These two obligations are equal for both sides; they cause no prejudice to anyone, nor do they give any special advantages to anyone. The non-aggression pact proposed by the Soviet Union in no way affects the balance of forces now existing in the world. This pact will merely be a consolidation of the solemn obligation of States not to attack each other.

The non-aggression pact proposed by the Soviet Union, while confirming one of the main provisions of the United Nations Charter, will be a further development of the peaceful principles of the United Nations Charter and will be a concrete example of the implementation of those principles in practice, regulating the relations between the two most powerful groupings of States and ensuring peace and security for the peoples throughout the world.

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We have repeatedly heard statements to the effect that the NATO military bloc was created only for defensive purposes and that it has no intention of attacking anyone. If this is so, then the best confirmation of all such statements would be the signing by the NATO countries of a non-aggression pact with the countries of the Warsaw Treaty.

It is well known that during the Moscow negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests between the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom an exchange of views took place on the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. It was agreed that the governments would inform their respective allies concerning these talks and would consult with them about continuing discussions on this question with the purpose of achieving agreement satisfactory to all participants. We hope that those consultations will not be too long drawn out and that they will lead to the speedy conclusion of a non-aggression pact.

We note with satisfaction that many members of our Committee have already spoken in favour of a non-aggression pact. In this regard we recall the positive statement made by the United Kingdom Government. We should also like to note with satisfaction the fact that several members of the Committee from the non-aligned countries have spoken in favour of concluding a non-aggression pact. The representative of Nigeria, Mr. Obi, speaking of the most important measures aimed at the lessening of international tension, said at our meeting on 1 August:

"My delegation has long since declared itself in favour ... of a mutually negotiated non-aggression pact between the two giant military groupings of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty ..." (ENDC/PV.149, p.9)

At the same meeting, as we all know, the representative of Ethiopia, Mr. Imru, also spoke in favour of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact and called this proposal a realistic measure. The representative of Mexico, Mr. Padilla Nervo (ENDC/PV.148, p.29) the representative of India, Mr. Mehta, (idem, pp.26, 27) and several others spoke in support of a non-aggression pact at our meeting on 30 July.

It seems to be obvious that there are no weighty grounds or serious reasons for protracting or postponing the solution of this important question which has long been ripe for solution. Before the Moscow negotiations the representatives of the Western Powers took a clearly evasive attitude towards a pact. They pointed out that if such a pact were signed, difficulties might arise among the members of NATO,

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obviously referring to the attitude taken by the present Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in regard to the German Democratic Republic. It seems to us that this question should not now embarrass our Western partners to any extent, since the Soviet Government has recently stated that this problem could be settled to the mutual satisfaction of both sides. In his replies to questions put to him by the correspondents of Pravda and Izvestia on 27 July, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, said:

"As regards the question of how the non-aggression pact should be formulated, we are certain that on this score there will be no difficulty in reaching agreement; there are no insuperable obstacles, nor can there be any." (ENDC/103, p.3)

One can be quite sure that if the Western Powers display as much good will on the question of concluding a non-aggression pact as was displayed by both sides during the recent Moscow negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, it would soon be possible to gladden the world with further important good news, namely, the achievement of agreement in regard to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. The implementation of this measure would open up further broad prospects in the struggle to prevent a world war.

I now turn to another measure put forward by the Soviet side, the aim of which is to lessen international tension. We have said that at the present time it would be most useful and appropriate to settle the question of freezing, or still better, reducing the military budgets of States. Although this partial measure would not in itself remove the threat of war, it would nevertheless be a definite forward step towards strengthening confidence between countries and slowing down the armaments race.

Moved by the desire to give a definite start to the process of disarmament, the Soviet Government has in the past repeatedly put forward proposals for the reduction of military budgets and has taken unilateral measures to reduce the Soviet armed forces and armaments and has reduced accordingly the budgetary items of military expenditures. In 1957 the Soviet Government made specific proposals to the Governments of the Western Powers for the reduction of the military budgets of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France by 15 per cent. In 1958 the Soviet side submitted at the thirteenth session of the General

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Assembly the question of reducing the military budgets (A/3925) of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France by 10-15 per cent and of allocating a certain portion of the resources thus saved to assistance to under-developed countries. At the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Soviet Government put forward the proposal (A/4892) that without waiting for the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament the military budgets of States should be frozen, by setting for them a maximum limit not exceeding the military appropriations as of 1 January 1961.

This consistent and resolute campaign of the Soviet Government in favour of the reduction of military expenditures by States, and in the first place by the great Powers, is convincing evidence that the Soviet Union attaches great importance to this question as one of the practical means to slow down the armaments race and to lighten the heavy burden which this race imposes upon the peoples.

We can only regret that in the past the Western Powers should have shown so little interest in this and failed to support the Soviet proposals in this regard. As is well known, they continued to intensify their military preparations and, as a result, the speed of the armaments race has increased still further and military expenditures have reached proportions unprecedented in peacetime.

With these immense resources expended for military purposes, it would be possible to raise substantially the standard of living of the population, increase old-age pensions, grant scholarships to students and build new houses, schools, plants, hospitals and so on. There is no need to prove that all these military preparations cannot ensure national security, including that of the United States and other States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, and that they are most dangerous for the cause of peace.

The continuing growth of military expenditures is merely increasing the tension in the world, is creating an explosive atmosphere of mistrust between States and is piling up more and more obstacles in the way to the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. The disproportionate military expenditures connected with the armaments race impede the normal development of the economies of States, particularly of those which do not possess great economic resources; those expenditures lead to increased budget deficits and to a growth in state loans, and are a heavy burden on the shoulders of the peoples.

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It may be said that not only the Western Powers but the Soviet Union and its allies as well are arming and are appropriating very considerable sums from their state budgets in order to strengthen their security. That is indeed so. The Soviet Union and the other members of the Warsaw Treaty alliance are compelled to take the necessary measures for the defence of their countries.

However, the Soviet Government is ready at any moment to reach agreement on the cessation of the armaments race and on the reduction of that part of State budgets which is connected with the maintenance of armed forces and with the production of the means of warfare. The Soviet Government considers that in the present situation the achievement of agreement on the reduction of military budgets or, at least to begin with, the freezing of them, is quite possible and should give rise to no great difficulties. It is a question of a partial measure, the implementation of which will cause no prejudice to the security of States, will not give a military advantage to anyone and will not alter the general balance of forces in the world. The implementation of this measure will be to the advantage of all the peoples of the world.

The budgets of States reflect in great detail the efforts made by the respective Governments both for peaceful and military purposes. The acceleration of the armaments race is inevitably linked with an increase in military expenditures; therefore the reduction of budgetary appropriations for military purposes or, to begin with, at least the freezing of them at a certain level, would make it possible to slow down or even to halt the armaments race. That is why the Soviet Government proposes as a first step towards stopping the armaments race and creating an atmosphere of confidence between States that agreement should be reached to freeze, or still better, to reduce by a certain proportion budgetary expenditures for military requirements. While emphasizing that we consider this measure only as a first step towards a further curtailment of military production and towards disarmament, we would point out to the delegations that the achievement of agreement on the basis proposed by the Soviet Union is greatly facilitated by the fact that in this case no question of the categories and types of armaments subject to reduction arises, and that States remain free to choose those which they consider necessary for themselves at the present stage in order to ensure their security. At the same

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time an agreed implementation of this measure could become an important stimulus to make further progress in consolidating peace and to carry on successfully the negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

The problem of preventing surprise attack, which has long been on the agenda of international life, is also of great importance in these days. We would recall that as far back as November 1958 the Soviet Union proposed the adoption of a number of concrete measures designed to prevent surprise attack (GEN/SA/7/Rev.1 and GEN/SA/8/Rev.1). In those Soviet proposals control measures were combined with certain partial disarmament measures which could be carried out with some amendments in conformity with present-day conditions. It is quite obvious that the danger of surprise attack can be finally eliminated only in conditions of general and complete disarmament when the military machines of all States have been abolished. However, even before general and complete disarmament has been carried out -- which is the object of our main efforts -- it is possible and even necessary to adopt certain measures which would reduce the threat of surprise attack, would eliminate to a considerable extent the suspicions of States in regard to one another, and would thereby contribute towards the achievement of agreement on general and complete disarmament.

What does this require first of all? As the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, said in his speech of 19 July:

"... we consider it appropriate to establish in certain areas of the Soviet Union and of other countries, ground control posts at airports, railway junctions, main roads and in major ports. Of course, all this must be done on a reciprocal basis". (ENDC/113, p.2)

In our opinion, the establishment of such control posts might be one of the most important means of reducing the danger of surprise attack. It can hardly be denied that even with the existence of nuclear missile weapons, preparations for a modern large-scale war are inevitably linked with the need to concentrate large detachments of troops and a large quantity of armaments and military equipment in certain areas. In the event of war, only the irruption of substantial land forces can ensure control of the enemy's territory. That is why we propose the establishment of ground control posts to keep watch on the lines of the movement of

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troops, so that there should be no dangerous concentration of the large masses of troops without which surprise attack is impossible. Everyone understands that, in order to carry out a military invasion, it is necessary to assemble armed forces with effectives, armaments, military equipment and material and technical means and to group them appropriately along the lines of attack. It is obvious that such preparations, which require large scale movements of troops and military equipment by railway, road and air and through large ports, practically do not lend themselves to concealment, and the establishment of control posts at these points would make it possible to detect any such preparations in good time.

Of course, the establishment of control posts cannot in itself guarantee the maintenance of peace; it would nevertheless be a definite measure aimed at preventing surprise attack, provided, of course, that it was combined with certain partial disarmament measures.

As I have just pointed out, that is precisely the way in which the question is stated in the Soviet proposals of 28 November 1958 for the prevention of surprise attack. Such a combination of measures is certainly necessary if we wish ground control posts to play the part of an effective measure for reducing the danger of surprise attack and relaxing tension. What would be the use of control posts if they were not combined with the implementation of other measures aimed at reducing the danger of the concentration of troops and armaments confronting one another? That would simply be control without disarmament, but such an approach to the solution of the problems before us would yield no positive results; it has been entirely discredited, and I do not think that anyone will insist on it today.

We must combine such a measure as the establishment of control posts with certain partial disarmament measures. Specific considerations in this regard are contained in the Soviet proposals of 28 November 1958. Life, however, does not stand still and we are prepared to introduce the appropriate changes required by life itself into the series of measures listed in the aforesaid Soviet proposals. In particular, we agree to the establishment of control posts also at airfields, a measure to which the Soviet Union previously objected. On the other hand, the question of aerial photography, which was included in the Soviet proposals of 1958, no longer arises today. Certain other reasonable modifications could also be made in these proposals. But there are some measures which have not lost their urgency.

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The question of ensuring the security of the peoples of Europe, and, consequently, universal peace, is particularly acute at the present time. The proposal of the Soviet Union for the reduction of foreign troops located both on the territory of the German Democratic Republic and on the territory of Western Germany (ENDC/113) is aimed at creating conditions that would facilitate the achievement of this aim. It is well known that the Soviet Government is in favour of carrying out this measure as a first step towards the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Europe and considers that, at the present time, in view of the definite improvement in the international situation, favourable conditions have been created for reaching specific agreement on this question.

We are convinced -- we think that everyone who is anxious for the relaxation of international tension will agree with us -- that the reduction of the number of foreign troops on German territory would be of great significance for ensuring peace. As is well known, more inflammable material for war has been accumulated in Central Europe than in any other part of the world; it is there that the armed forces of the two principal military alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, are facing each other. It is essential to make a start to relax the tension which exists in this powder keg of Europe. The reduction and gradual withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory of Germany and other European States would help to normalize conditions in the European continent and, consequently, throughout the world.

Alongside these measures there is much to be said for the proposal (ENDC/113, p.3) to send representatives of the Soviet Union to the troops of the Western Powers in Western Germany, in exchange for the sending of their representatives to the Soviet troops stationed in the German Democratic Republic. This measure seems to us to be all the more expedient because it would be carried out in that part of Europe where the troops of the two groupings of States -- NATO, on the one hand, and the Warsaw Treaty, on the other -- are facing each other. It is not necessary to be a highly qualified military specialist to understand that it is in that area that any preparations for a surprise attack would be particularly noticeable. Furthermore, any movement of troops and military equipment in that area, even if it is not connected with preparations for an attack, might naturally give rise to suspicion and, consequently, to counter-measures by the armed forces on the other side of the line of demarcation between the two military groupings. Thus, the sending of Soviet

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representatives to the military forces of the Western Powers in Western Germany, in exchange for the sending of representatives of the Western Powers to the Soviet troops stationed in the German Democratic Republic, might to some extent contribute towards the easing of the situation in that part of Europe.

Among measures aimed at the lessening of international tension and facilitating general and complete disarmament, an important place is occupied by the proposals for the creation of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world. In the situation where nuclear weapons threaten to spread to other countries and continents, the question of denuclearized zones becomes particularly significant and urgent. The adoption and implementation of measures for the creation of such zones in various parts of the globe, especially in areas where there is a threat of military conflict, would help to reduce the danger of a thermonuclear war, would create definite barriers to the spreading of nuclear weapons and would facilitate the establishment of an atmosphere of confidence in the relations between States.

We see how the idea of creating denuclearized zones is now spreading irresistibly with ever increasing force throughout the world, is gaining the support of more and more States and governments and is taking hold on the minds and the hearts of all the peoples of the world. Convincing evidence of this is provided by the proposals for the creation of denuclearized zones in Central Europe, (ENDC/C.1/1) in the Mediterranean basin, (ENDC/91) in Scandinavia (A/C.1/L 297, Add.1,2) in the Balkans, in Africa (A/Res/1652 (XVI)) in Latin America (ENDC/87) and in other parts of the world. The idea of atom-free zones found practical expression in the 1959 Convention on the Antarctic and in the well-known resolution of the sixteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on the declaration of the African continent as a denuclearized zone, a decision which was reaffirmed at the Conference of the Heads of Independent African States at Addis Ababa in May. (ENDC/93/Rev.1) In our Committee also, the overwhelming majority, including representatives of the non-aligned States, namely, the representatives of Ethiopia, Nigeria, India, Mexico and Brazil, have on several occasions spoken in favour of the establishment of zones free from nuclear weapons and missiles. Information has already been published to the effect that it is proposed to include in the agenda of the forthcoming eighteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations the question of creating denuclearized zones in Latin America, in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean area.

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Such a vast movement in the world for the establishment of atom-free zones clearly shows that this idea is based on realistic factors of modern international life and is in keeping with the fundamental interests of all the peoples who are demanding the immediate adoption of measures to avert the danger of a thermonuclear war.

The Soviet Union, consistently pursuing the policy of peaceful co-existence, has always actively supported and is supporting the creation of zones free from nuclear weapons and missiles, being of the opinion that the implementation of such a measure would be a valuable contribution towards the strengthening of peace and the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Government has frequently declared its willingness to help bring about the creation of such zones, and has stressed that the Soviet Union is prepared to give the necessary guarantees for the maintenance of the status of any given atom-free zone, provided, of course, that similar guarantees are also given by the Western nuclear Powers.

We consider that in the present circumstances the adoption and implementation of the Soviet Government's proposal to declare the area of the Mediterranean Sea a denuclearized zone would be of great significance for strengthening peace and reducing the threat of a thermonuclear war. The implementation of that proposal, as has already been shown repeatedly by the Soviet side, would be fully in keeping with the security needs of the countries in that area, as well as the interests of strengthening world peace.

The realism and usefulness of the Soviet Union's proposal for the creation of a denuclearized zone in the area of the Mediterranean Sea is confirmed by the fact that this Soviet initiative has received wide support both among the peoples of Mediterranean countries and among those living outside that area. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, has spoken in favour of acceptance of the Soviet proposal. The President of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Nasser, speaking of the Soviet Government's proposal, said:

"... We unreservedly support this project in accordance with our policy of peace. We intend to support any international agreement aimed at the elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, and not only in the Mediterranean area..."

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The ever-wider support of the Soviet proposal and its timeliness give us ground for hope that, given good will, it will be possible to make progress in creating an atom-free zone in the Mediterranean and to overcome the obstacles standing in the way of this proposal.

The Soviet delegation further considers that the time has come for us to reach agreement on the creation of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe, as the Government of the People's Republic of Poland has proposed. The implementation of such a measure would help to improve the situation in Europe, to lessen the likelihood of a dangerous conflict between the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty and to improve the whole international atmosphere. The creation of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe would also avert the threat of the use of nuclear weapons by forces hostile to peace and would lay a foundation for good neighbourly co-operation in the relations between European countries belonging to different social systems.

Now, since the signing of the test ban treaty, when the first sprouts of international co-operation have appeared, and when we hear the Western Powers state that they are ready to contribute towards the strengthening of peace, we must redouble our efforts and reach agreement on the creation of zones free from nuclear weapons.

To the same group of questions belongs also the Soviet proposal for a declaration on the renunciation by States of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons. (ENDC/75)

All these questions are, in substance, not so very complicated. Everyone understands perfectly well that, given the necessary good will, agreement could soon be reached on the creation of denuclearized zones. The peoples of the world are entitled to expect that their vital interests will be taken into account, that their demands will be heard and that all these denuclearized zones will be created in the immediate future.

The improvement in the international climate which has resulted from the agreement reached in Moscow on the cessation of nuclear tests gladdens the hearts of all sincere friends of peace and gives us fresh hope for the fruitfulness of efforts to ease the international situation. The signing of the Treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests has laid a good foundation, but we must not forget that this is but the first step and that a long and difficult road lies ahead.

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Concentrated efforts are necessary to ensure that no one will succeed in blocking the path laid by the agreement between the nuclear Powers in Moscow. In our negotiations here in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, we must maintain and develop further the spirit of negotiation which was created in Moscow and which has yielded the first tangible results.

I should like to conclude my statement with the words of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, who, on the occasion of the signing of the Test Ban Treaty in Moscow on 5 August, said:

"We consider that the most important thing now is not to rest content with what has been achieved, not to halt the struggle against the threat of a new war, for the relaxation of international tension and for lasting peace throughout the world." (ENDC/PV.150, p.9)

We hope that the proposals we have explained today which are aimed at easing international tension will be studied carefully by all the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. In this connexion, we should like to make a special appeal to the representatives of the non-aligned States in the Committee, who have always shown unremitting interest in the implementation of measures aimed at improving the international situation and facilitating the success of the negotiations for general and complete disarmament. We trust that they and all the other members of the Committee will study these Soviet proposals carefully, and support them, thus contributing to the strengthening of world peace and the security of the peoples of all countries and all continents.

Mr. SIMOVIC (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): In accordance with the procedure of work of the Committee submitted by the Co-Chairmen and adopted at our meeting on 12 August (ENDC/PV.150, pp.11, 12) today we start once again to discuss so-called collateral measures. On behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation, I should also like to express -- for the time being only in a general way -- our views concerning certain collateral measures. First of all, concerning those, which have already been mentioned at our meetings by some delegations in connexion with the evaluation of the treaty recently signed in Moscow, and which, after serious study and discussion by the Committee, could be agreed upon and adopted in the shortest possible time. The atmosphere of mutual understanding accompanying the successful

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completion of the Moscow negotiations between the three nuclear Powers has been unanimously highly appreciated also in our Committee in the statements of all the delegations. This atmosphere creates favourable conditions for a businesslike and successful discussion of the collateral measures under consideration.

But I should like from the outset of my statement to emphasize that our main task, on the accomplishment of which all our efforts should be concentrated also when discussing collateral measures, should be to achieve agreement on general and complete disarmament. That, incidentally, has been stressed in the preamble to the treaty itself, (ENDC/100/Rev.1) as well as in statements made by many statesmen who put forward proposals for various partial measures, on which it might be possible and useful to reach agreement. The resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, indeed, put an obligation upon us to do so. The peoples of the whole world expect with every right and hope that we will carry out this task in a very short time.

The implementation of an agreement on general and complete disarmament would finally eliminate the threat of a nuclear war; it would help to bring about the liquidation of the means for starting and carrying out acts of aggression; it would release immense material resources which could be used to effect a substantial rise in the standard of living of the peoples; it would create an entirely new international atmosphere and help towards the final triumph of the principles of peaceful co-existence.

It is no secret — and each of us here has mentioned it on many occasions — that so far the results of the Committee's work in the field of general and complete disarmament, as well as in regard to collateral measures, have not been satisfactory or encouraging. The negotiations which have gone on for many months, even though they have helped to clarify the respective positions on the questions and proposals under discussion, have in fact failed to achieve any tangible results. However, even if we do come to this conclusion, we have no intention of belittling the importance of the part played by the Eighteen-Nation Committee in the preparation and success of the Moscow negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests or in the achievement of agreement on the establishment of a direct communications link between Moscow and Washington. (ENDC/97) The hopes for further and more substantial progress towards general and complete disarmament which, as a result of the first successes achieved during the negotiations in Moscow, have again

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grown strong and taken hold on the hearts and minds of the peoples of the world, compel us to consider seriously how we should act in future and upon what questions we should focus our attention and efforts in order to reach, by the most practicable way, our main goal of general and complete disarmament.

We realize that the achievement of agreement on general and complete disarmament is an extremely complicated problem, the solution of which will require considerable efforts as well as time, of course. At the same time, however, the urgency of this question demands that agreement should be reached in the shortest possible time. Therefore, the governments of all countries -- and not only the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee -- should use all available opportunities, occasions and means to settle the question of disarmament once and for all.

It can be noted with satisfaction that in the world there are now beginning to prevail trends towards the reasonable settlement of controversial questions by means of negotiation as well as towards the final solution of the disarmament question. We realize, of course, that not all responsible statesmen in the West have yet renounced their old way of thinking and that on some of them, as Lord Home has said, "the nuclear bomb has imposed the discipline which self-discipline should have imposed."

But we are realistic people and know that after long years of the cold war it is impossible to break the ice along the whole front all at once. Only recently the leaders of certain countries were trying to pursue the policy of "brinkmanship" and were even advocating the expediency of the concept of a preventive nuclear war. I hope that these vestiges of the most acute period of the cold war will definitely become a thing of the irrevocable past. Our task now is to develop all the new healthy growths which are appearing in international life, however weak or imperfect they may be, and to develop them so that their positive influence will eventually prevail in the world. One of these extremely important manifestations of the ensuing improvement in the international atmosphere is, in our view, the signing in Moscow of the nuclear test ban treaty. (ENDC/100/Rev.1) The Czechoslovak delegation is of the opinion that we here, in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, should now direct all our efforts towards maintaining the atmosphere of the Moscow negotiations and continue to resolve other problems as well in the same spirit.

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We think that at the present time the most convenient way for effective and constructive work by our Committee would be to discuss and implement certain collateral measures, which by themselves would contribute to the improvement of the international atmosphere, the lessening of international tension; the consolidation of confidence among States, and which would, at the same time, create favourable conditions for the settlement of other problems, first among which is the problem of general and complete disarmament.

As is well known, the governments of various States and certain delegations in the Committee have submitted a number of proposals concerning such measures. Not all of them, of course, are of equal importance, not all of them are equally practicable and not all of them correspond to the definition of collateral measures given in ENDC/1/Add.1, where it is stressed that such measures should be aimed at the lessening of international tension, the consolidation of confidence among States and facilitating general and complete disarmament. But a number of the ideas and proposals put forward are of a positive nature and correspond to these criteria. The Committee ought, therefore, to deal with them in a definite order of priorities.

In our opinion, it would be appropriate to focus our negotiations -- for the time being in the form of a general debate -- on those measures in regard to which, at least in some of their particulars, there is a closeness or similarity of views and which give promise of a possibility of agreement. In so doing, it would be appropriate and practical to concentrate our attention first of all on those measures which can be implemented without any particular difficulties of a military or technical nature while yielding relatively maximum results.

On the other hand, we do not think that it would be appropriate to discuss those proposals which by their nature might arouse mistrust between the sides and would thus make it all the more difficult to achieve progress in the negotiations.

The Czechoslovak delegation listened with great interest to the proposals put forward at recent meetings by the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States and other countries in regard to the discussion of the problems of so-called collateral measures. We noted with satisfaction that many of the ideas contained in the statements made by the Soviet and United States delegations were analagous, which is an encouraging portent for future negotiations.

We consider that, taking due account of all the aforementioned criteria, we should first of all discuss a pact of non-aggression between the NATO countries and

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the Warsaw Treaty States. This is undoubtedly one of the most important collateral measures which has many advantages when compared with many other projects. In particular:

- it does not involve any difficulties of a military, technical or other nature or as regards control;
- it calls for no concessions on either side and it in no way affects the so-called balance of forces, about which our Western colleagues talk so frequently;
- it could be implemented without any delay;
- it would be of very great import for easing tension and increasing confidence in the relations between States;
- it would create a favourable background for the solution of other problems, in particular for the achievement of progress in the field of general and complete disarmament;
- the parties to the pact would be the countries of the most powerful military groupings and would include all the nuclear Powers.

This pact was aptly described by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, when he called it "a peace pact between the nuclear Powers" (ENDC/103, p.2). I think one can say without exaggeration that in the whole gamut of collateral measures the question of a pact is becoming a problem of key importance.

We all know that up to now this question has also occupied an important place in the negotiations of our Committee. It is a fact that during the whole of our discussions no substantive objections have been or could be put forward against this proposal. Only a few arguments on procedural matters have been advanced, but even those have been convincingly rejected by a number of the delegations present here.

The Czechoslovak delegation welcomed with satisfaction the fact that considerable attention was devoted to the question of a pact in Moscow also and that the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom fully concurred in the view that "agreement satisfactory to all participants" (ENDC/101, p.2) should be achieved on this question.

The interests of peace and security require that the pact should be concluded as soon as possible. Besides others, the representative of Ethiopia, Lij Imru, spoke convincingly about this need at our meeting of 1 August, when he stated:

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"Agreement on certain collateral measures, a realistic non-aggression pact between the two nuclear Power blocs, settlements in sensitive areas of possible conflict and businesslike negotiations on the next steps to be undertaken in the pursuit of general and complete disarmament will have a decisive influence on those who still consider that their security depends upon continuing along the road of nuclear armament." (ENDC/PV.149, p.6)

There can now be no grounds for delaying or dragging out the negotiations or even for speaking against the pact. At the present time it is urgently necessary to speed up consultations within the framework of the two groupings and to set about the specific formulation of a draft without delay.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic declares once again that it is prepared to become a party to the pact and to assume all the obligations contained therein. Allow me in this connexion to quote the words of the Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Vaclav David, who on 8 August 1963 in Moscow, on the occasion of the signing of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, in answer to a question put to him by a correspondent of Izvestia, said:

"Among further urgent measures, for the implementation of which the treaty which has just been signed creates favourable conditions, in the first place is the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the member States of NATO and the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty. Undoubtedly the conclusion of such a pact would have a positive influence on the international situation and would contribute to ensuring peace and security in Europe and throughout the world."

A number of representatives of other countries also spoke in a similar vein on the same occasion; ever-wider circles of public opinion in all countries of the world are expressing their support for the speediest possible conclusion of a non-aggression pact.

Taking into account the appropriateness, the maximum effectiveness and, moreover, the comparatively easy achievement of such a decision, the Czechoslovak delegation considers that the Committee should with redoubled vigour continue negotiations on such important questions as the proposals for the creation of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world, particularly in the so-called

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sensitive areas such as Central Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean. The idea of creating such zones is meeting with ever-wider support in the world, and in a number of areas concrete practical steps have already been taken to carry out the idea. I am referring, in particular, to the initiative of the Presidents of five Latin American countries (ENDC/87) and the resolution of the Heads of Governments of the independent African States adopted at the conference in Addis Ababa (ENDC/93/Rev.1). I have already had the opportunity of speaking on the gist of the question of the creation of denuclearized zones in my earlier statements, in particular at the meetings of 31 May and 7 June (ENDC/PV.139, p.25 et seq., ENDC/PV.141, p.7 et seq.) of the Committee, and therefore I shall not deal with it in greater detail now. In this connexion, I should only like to stress that the main prerequisite for the effectiveness of a proposal to create denuclearized zones is the condition that the nuclear Powers should guarantee the status of these zones. This requirement becomes even more imperative now that a treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests has been concluded and already signed by dozens of States and because practical steps have been taken to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. Only a commitment by the States already possessing nuclear weapons not to use these weapons against countries in denuclearized zones and to fully respect the denuclearized status of these zones can lead to the result that no situation will come about in which there would be potentially unequal relationships between the countries concerned. We noted with satisfaction that this requirement was particularly stressed in connexion with the Moscow negotiations by the United Nations Secretary-General, U Thant.

The next measure which could be implemented without any great delay and which would be of particular importance in restricting armaments is, in our view, the proposal to freeze the military budgets of States or, better still, to reduce them. It is well known that the process of the systematic increase of military budgets clearly reflects the trend towards further accelerating the armaments race. The implementation of the aforesaid measure, however, would help to slow down this process and might even facilitate a direct limitation of armaments.

Czechoslovakia, as a country situated in the immediate neighbourhood of the two German States, attaches particular importance to the Soviet Union's proposal concerning the reduction of the number of foreign troops on the territory of the two

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German States and concerning a reciprocal exchange of representatives of the Soviet Union and the Western Powers to be assigned to the Soviet troops stationed in the German Democratic Republic and to the troops of the Western Powers in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Another serious proposal to which the Committee should give due attention is the question of the prevention of surprise attack. The Soviet Union's proposals contain a number of provisions which are close to the positions hitherto adopted by the Western Powers. As is well known, both sides propose on a reciprocal basis to set up in certain regions ground control posts, which would be located at airports, railway junctions, motor roads and in big ports. The implementation of these measures would unquestionably be of great importance for strengthening confidence between States, since it would render impossible clandestine concentrations of large military forces and armaments for carrying out a surprise attack.

In conclusion, I should like to assure the Committee that the Czechoslovak delegation is also prepared to discuss carefully and in a constructive spirit the other proposals which have already been or will be submitted to the Committee, if their content is in keeping with the principles laid down in the procedure of work of the Committee adopted on 23 March 1962. (ENDC/12)

Mr. BURNS (Canada): The Canadian delegation has always attached considerable importance to the work of this Committee on what are called collateral measures, and of course is happy that we have decided to devote half of our meetings during the present round of discussions to that subject. Since the Conference began in March of last year it has become generally recognized that in order to improve the prospects for agreement on general and complete disarmament we must first take steps to ease international tensions and create confidence. All, or almost all, of the countries of the world have hailed the Moscow test ban agreement as a milestone on the road to improved relations between States. The Canadian delegation believes that in the few weeks which remain before the eighteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly begins our Committee could perform useful work by exploring, in the same constructive atmosphere which prevailed at the Moscow talks, the possibilities for further agreement on collateral measures; and we have heard the representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia state that they are of the same opinion.

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We have just heard from the representative of Czechoslovakia his views of the subjects which could most usefully be discussed and the order in which they should be taken, and we have a somewhat different opinion about that order.

We have listened with careful attention to the very important statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union, which contains so much matter that it will require further study. We note the various measures which, in the opinion of the Soviet delegation, should be discussed among the collateral measures with which we are to deal in this Committee. Some of them, it is well known to both sides, will require discussions with allies, and so far as the NATO alliance is concerned I think it is known that such discussions have been initiated. They will, however, take some time before it will be possible for the representatives of the NATO countries in this Committee to be able to take firm stands in relation to some of the points discussed. However, it seems to us that there is at least one collateral measure to whose discussion in this Committee there is no obstacle.

In his statement of 19 July (ENDC/113) the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, as we have been told again here by Mr. Tsarapkin, (supra, p.14) spoke of the importance of making it impossible for an aggressor to be able to carry out a sudden attack. He suggested that, subject to reciprocity, control posts might be established in certain regions of the Soviet Union and other countries, and at various locations, including aerodromes, highways and ports. We have heard that repeated again by Mr. Tsarapkin today; and we have heard from him a repetition of the proposal to station representatives of Soviet forces with Western forces stationed in West Germany, while the Western Powers would have their representatives stationed with non-German forces located in East Germany. Then there were other proposals such as that for cutting down non-German troops in the Federal Republic of Germany, and in East Germany as well. (supra, p.16)

We have received an indication from Mr. Tsarapkin today, at least as I understood, that the three measures of which I have spoken are in some degree linked together, although he did say, I believe, that the proposals -- which are similar to those (GEN/SA/7/Rev.1 and GEN/SA/8/Rev.1) advanced by the Soviet Union in November 1958 at the Geneva Conference on measures to prevent surprise attack -- were subject to modification owing to changed conditions in the world today. The Canadian delegation, of course, is very encouraged to learn that the Soviet Union recognizes

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the importance of reaching early agreement on measures to prevent surprise attack and accidental war. The kind of measures which we have in mind, and which were mentioned today by the delegation of the Soviet Union, could provide reassurance that neither side intended to launch a large-scale attack with conventional forces. We heard what Mr. Tsarapkin had to say about that, and we are in agreement with the views on that point. We are in agreement that such a measure, if it could be put into effect, would help to reduce tension in a critical area of East-West confrontation, as he said. We know and we are happy that the United States and the Soviet Union, after discussion in this Committee, have taken a first step towards the reduction of the risks of accidental war by agreeing on a direct communications link, and we hope that it will be possible to agree on more far-reaching measures which could help to prevent dangerous misunderstandings on both sides.

While we emphasize the opportunity for agreement on the matter of control posts, the Canadian delegation certainly does not overlook the possibility of progress on other collateral measures such as those which have been mentioned by both the representative of the Soviet Union and the representative of the United States. But it appears to us appropriate that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should, in the short period left to it before it breaks up for the General Assembly, concentrate on measures to reduce the risk of war, since both the Soviet Union and the United States have recently been showing a particular interest in that subject. We understand that they share the view that certain measures in that sphere which are included in their total programmes for disarmament could be included as partial or initial steps to be implemented as soon as possible and before agreement on general and complete disarmament. We feel that both the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the rest certainly of the European countries represented here, have an interest in reducing the fear that war could break out through accident or mutual misunderstanding of actions or intentions.

Our delegation has always emphasized that this Committee should focus its efforts on those areas in which there is a certain degree of common approach, and we are encouraged by the fact that the proposals of the United States and the Soviet Union on the substance of the surprise attack problem now appear to be closer together than they have been at any time in the past. Since the failure of the Conference on measures to prevent surprise attack held here in 1958 there has been little progress in this sphere, both because the areas of agreement were few and because the

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proposals of each side contained a number of measures which were unacceptable to the other side. But analysis of the present position of each side now shows that recently the gap between the positions has narrowed.

Members of the Conference will recall that in the United States disarmament plan (ENDC/30) of 18 April 1962 a number of proposals were made for measures in stage I to reduce the risk of war. They were proposals for advance notification of military movements; observation posts, as discussed today, to report on concentrations and movements of military forces; exchange of military missions between States or groups of States in order to improve communications and understandings between them; and the establishment of rapid and reliable communications among heads of governments. On the last point, of course, agreement has been reached. The United States plan also makes additional proposals which I do not intend to discuss here. All those proposals have been explained and elaborated in document ENDC/70, which was submitted by the United States delegation on 12 December last.

The Soviet Union has put forward proposals on this subject -- at the 1958 Conference and by Foreign Minister Gromyko at the General Assembly in September 1961, but not in its general disarmament plan (ENDC/2) tabled in March last year -- and it has recently in the past year, added new articles to its plan covering some of these measures concerning advance notification of large-scale military movements and other points. I have already mentioned the recent statement by Chairman Khrushchev concerning observers, reduction of forces, and so on.

If we examine the present position certain facts stand out. Since July of last year both the United States and the Soviet Union have submitted provisions on advance notification of military movements, and both sides have also tabled provisions on exchange of military missions. The Soviet Union has just submitted additional proposals (supra, pp.16-17) on the latter subject, and now both sides have also advanced proposals for the establishment of observation posts at the main points at which transportation can best be observed.

The Canadian delegation is fully aware, of course, that there are important proposals of the United States which have no Soviet counterparts and that the Soviet Union has made certain proposals which, although they may appear to be similar, differ significantly from the United States suggestions. I certainly do not wish to minimize the importance of the proposals which have been submitted by both sides in

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emphasizing our view that we should concentrate on this one particular measure. Nevertheless, I repeat, it seems to us appropriate that the Conference should concentrate its efforts on the area where there is a close similarity of approach and where the prospects of early agreement are therefore greater. That is what happened in connexion with the direct communications link. After a period of intensive discussions here the details of that proposal, which had appeared in both the disarmament plans submitted by the Soviet Union and the United States, were worked out and an agreement was adopted.

As we understand it, there are still differences between what is proposed by the Soviet Union and what is proposed by the United States concerning observation posts. What should be the first steps towards bringing these proposals closer together or clarifying them? We think that although we have had useful information on this proposal from the Soviet delegation today there are still matters on which further information and exploration would be required before it would be possible to get to the final negotiations in this matter. We hope that the representative of the Soviet Union will soon provide us with details of, perhaps, the number of observation posts which the Soviet Union thinks should be established and the general geographical area to be covered. We note that he says (supra, p.15) the proposals which were put forward in 1958 are subject to modification in view of the changed conditions since they were originally suggested. There is also the rather important question of whether the posts proposed would be purely stationary or would have a certain radius of action within which they could move, and so on. We gathered from what was said today that the proposals for observation posts were to some extent linked to the proposals for the reduction of non-German forces in the two Germanies. We think that the working out of an agreement on that point is obviously going to require very considerable technical preparation, and we realize that the Soviet delegation may not be in a position just at present to provide us with further detailed information, but it is obvious that clarifications of the kind I have suggested need to be given in order that there may be effective negotiations.

We should like again to draw attention to the fact that in the Eighteen-Nation Committee, with its institution of co-chairmanship, there is a possibility, while we are sitting, of continuing contact and exploration between the most important nations -- the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries and those of the NATO countries. This offers a unique means -- and if use is made of it an extremely valuable one -- of exchanging the detailed information which will be necessary. We understand that

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consultation with allies on these important matters will be required, and that their agreement will have to be obtained before any final arrangements can be made in these -- to the mind of the Canadian delegation at least -- desirable developments.

On going through the various proposals and plans which have been submitted from 1958 until now the Canadian delegation has found it useful to prepare a comparative study of the proposals of the two sides, and it occurred to us that it might be of some assistance to the members of the Committee in their examination of the subject. Accordingly we request that this document, which we shall submit, should be accepted as a conference document^{1/}.

In a month's time the General Assembly will begin its eighteenth session and the Committee must once again submit a report on the progress of its work. In our opinion -- and as others here have said before us -- we must try to take advantage of the improved international atmosphere. The Canadian delegation appreciates the comments made by the co-Chairmen at our meeting on 12 August (ENDC/PV.150, p.11) to the effect that our work during the present session must be of a general and an exploratory character. While we fully understand that we will not have sufficient time during the remainder of this session to get very far in the elaboration of specific agreements we nevertheless hope that during the remaining weeks we will be able to explore the possibilities of measures to reduce the risk of war, and that in that field we will be able to report some progress to the General Assembly.

In closing I would say again that it seems to the Canadian delegation that our best opportunity lies in exploring the proposals for observation posts and certain related measures.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) (translation from French): In taking the floor in the debate on so-called collateral measures, I should like once again to stress the political importance of the Treaty signed in Moscow on 5 August. (ENDC/100/Rev.1) Its practical effects are already making themselves felt. Not only have we succeeded in putting an end to the pollution of the atmosphere, outer space and the seas by radioactive fall-out, but a new climate has been created in international relations, a climate which should have a favourable influence on our negotiations.

^{1/} Circulated as document ENDC/110.

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We share the view of our two co-Chairmen and of all the delegations present here that a first step has been taken towards our final goal, which is general and complete disarmament. This first step should mark the beginning of a series of agreements which will show that the course we have taken is the right one and will eliminate the points of friction still causing international tension.

The history of the negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear tests is most instructive. It shows that, in order to reach final agreement, not only patience and goodwill, but also flexibility and mutual understanding, were required. Thus, the Moscow Treaty not only indicates a will to achieve the cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, but also affords proof of an understanding of all the political implications of this instrument in the world of today.

I think it might be useful to add that we should not content ourselves with this first step. The world is still far from a stable peace. There are still numerous problems which call for urgent solution. Of course, most of them do not fall within our Committee's competence; if I nevertheless mention them it is because I believe that we should be constantly aware of the relationship between the tasks entrusted to us and the struggle for peaceful co-existence and for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. It is in that perspective that we should consider the expediency of the so-called collateral measures. We should examine them primarily from the point of view of their value as an instrument which can contribute to decreasing the danger of another war and to facilitating the search for means of solving international disputes in a manner acceptable to all concerned.

I think we may say that, with regard to the choice of appropriate criteria for estimating the usefulness of the different collateral measures, there has been a serious rapprochement between the positions of the two sides in our Committee. It is true that we do not attach the same importance to the same measures, but the fact remains that we have the same preoccupations and are seeking solutions for the same problems. We are all agreed in recognizing that the object in view is to set in motion a series of political and military measures calculated to strengthen confidence between the two main military groups which confront each other in the world today, and to prevent a dispute between them from degenerating into a military conflict.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

The Polish delegation, for its part, believes that the principal emphasis should be placed on political measures. These are especially important in the context of the present international situation, and also have the advantage that they can be solved without great difficulty. I should like to add at once, however, that in our opinion these measures should be reinforced by military acts giving practical expression to the peaceful intentions of the parties.

I think we can speak of a serious rapprochement between the positions of the United States and of the Soviet Union with regard to the desirability of political measures. This rapprochement found expression in the joint communiqué issued in Moscow on 25 July 1963 by the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union on the conclusion of the negotiations for a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. The communiqué states that:

"The heads of the three delegations discussed the Soviet proposal relating to a pact of non-aggression between* the participants in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the participants in the Warsaw Treaty. The three governments have agreed fully to inform their respective allies in the two organizations concerning these talks and to consult with them about continuing discussions on this question with the purpose of achieving agreement satisfactory to all participants."

(ENDC/101, p.2)

There are several reasons for the insistence with which the socialist countries are pressing for the conclusion of such an agreement. In the first place, a non-aggression pact would strengthen mutual confidence between the States members of the Atlantic Alliance and the countries signatories of the Warsaw Treaty. Secondly, it would be an expression of the willingness of both sides to solve by peaceful means any disputes which might arise between them. Thirdly, it would create formal procedures for mutual consultation between the countries concerned in the event of a situation which might endanger peace. Fourthly, by laying down a firm obligation to solve all international disputes by peaceful means and by eliminating resort to force from the relations between the countries members of the Atlantic Alliance and of the Warsaw Treaty, such a non-aggression pact would raise a barrier against the militaristic and revanchist trends which unfortunately still prevail in certain circles.

* Document ENDC/77.

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We stress the need to conclude a non-aggression pact as soon as possible because we are convinced that it can become, together with such other international instruments as the United Nations Charter, the basis of the stable and peaceful development of international relations among States with different political and social systems. Such a pact would therefore be a kind of consecration of the principle of peaceful co-existence on which the international policy of the socialist countries continues to be based.

The second problem we shall have to solve is that of devising a series of methods for preventing preparations for a surprise attack. This is particularly important in areas where the two military groups, namely the countries of the Atlantic Alliance and the countries parties to the Warsaw Treaty, confront each other directly. There can be no doubt that it is along the line of contact between these two groups that we find the most sensitive areas from the point of view of the maintenance of world peace. A concentration of armed forces and armaments in these areas not only facilitates preparations for a surprise attack, but also involves the risk of an armed conflict breaking out by accident or premeditated provocation.

We believe that, in order to prevent surprise attacks, not only should conditions be created to allow of the accurate appraisal of the military intentions of the other party, but measures should also be taken to achieve a substantial reduction of the military potential concentrated in specific areas.

That is the background against which we should see the new Soviet proposals on the establishment of control posts at airfields, at railway and road junctions and at main ports, with a view to reducing the strength of foreign troops stationed in the territories of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, and on an exchange of missions between the Soviet troops stationed in the territories of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, and on an exchange of missions between the Soviet troops stationed in the German Democratic Republic and the troops of the Western Powers in the territory of Western Germany. (supra, p.16)

The establishment of denuclearized zones and reduced armament zones in various parts of the world is also among the problems which require rapid solution. The Polish delegation noted with satisfaction the statement made at our Committee's meeting of 12 August by Mr. Stelle, the United States representative, in which he recognized

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

the usefulness of a detailed study of the problem of denuclearized zones. (ENDC/PV.150, p.6). That was a further proof of the rapprochement which has taken place between the views of the sides in our Committee. There can be no doubt, as was stressed in the statement made recently by Mr. Adam Rapacki, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, commenting on the consequences of the Moscow Treaty that:

"In the new circumstances, the Polish plan for the creation of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe once more becomes timely."

Since 1957, when Poland submitted the plan for the denuclearization of Central Europe, (A/PV.697) the idea of creating zones free from nuclear weapons has gained supporters in all parts of the world. Many countries have spoken in favour of denuclearizing certain areas and continents. Denuclearization is being more and more widely regarded as an important means of reducing international tension and establishing peace on stable foundations. Poland welcomes the efforts made by these countries and wholeheartedly supports their proposals.

Meanwhile, however, we regard the creation of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe as particularly important and urgent. From the political point of view, this measure could be a prime factor in strengthening confidence and good faith in the relations between the countries of the Atlantic bloc and the signatories of the Warsaw Treaty. Moreover, the implementation of the Rapacki plan would also be vitally important from the point of view of preventing surprise attacks in this part of the world.

The establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe would meet the need to prevent preparations for a surprise attack, because it would combine political expressions of peaceful intentions with material elements consisting in the elimination of nuclear weapons and the controlled reduction of conventional armaments in the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, that is to say, in a region where the armed forces of the two most powerful military groups in the world confront one another.

The socialist countries propose the adoption of a series of measures which could effectively prevent surprise attacks; these measures would be supplemented by a political superstructure reflecting the political intentions of the two sides, in the form of a non-aggression pact signed by the countries belonging to the Atlantic Alliance and to the Warsaw Treaty.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

As I have just said, we see a certain rapprochement between the positions of the sides concerning the nature of the measures which remain to be taken. What we have to do now is to determine the extent of those measures. There can be no doubt that, in the final analysis, their efficacy will depend on their scope. If we succeed in reaching agreement on really concrete measures, it will become all the easier for us to put into effect proposals concerning the reduction of military budgets and to take an important step towards slowing down the armaments race.

The agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests recently concluded in Moscow, the rapprochement of the positions of the two sides on so-called collateral measures, the increasing support for the creation of denuclearized zones which has become apparent throughout the world, the unanimous support of world public opinion for all measures likely to reduce international tension, -- all these are factors which lead us to believe that the efforts made in our Committee can result in the conclusion of new agreements which would bring us nearer to our final goal, that of the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I call upon the representative of the United States, who has asked to be allowed briefly to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. STELLE (United States): I believe my delegation must comment briefly on one, but only one, of the subjects mentioned by the representatives of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland, namely, that of a non-aggression pact between parties to NATO and the parties to the Warsaw Treaty. My delegation reiterated the United States position concerning discussion of this matter in this Committee most recently at our meeting on 31 May. If I may be permitted to quote myself, I said at that time:

"... a host of political problems are crying out for solution; but if we were to attempt to discuss all of them we should turn this Conference into a general political conference and abandon our responsibilities as a disarmament conference.

"This means that one of our real responsibilities is to attempt to make the best judgement we can about what measures we can most usefully discuss here in this Disarmament Conference. It is the judgement of the

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

Government of the United States, in exercise of that responsibility, that the question of a NATO-Warsaw Treaty non-aggression pact is not an appropriate one for discussion in this Conference, and that we can spend our time much more usefully in discussing a variety of other questions." (ENEC/PV.139, p.16)

That continues to be the judgement of my Government.

Moreover, I should like to cite the reference to the question of a non-aggression pact contained in the Moscow communiqué which was issued by the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom on 25 July 1963 at the conclusion of negotiations for a partial test ban treaty. The relevant section of the communiqué, which has already been quoted by our Polish colleague, reads as follows:

"The heads of the three delegations discussed the Soviet proposal relating to a pact of non-aggression between the participants in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the participants in the Warsaw Treaty. The three Governments have agreed fully to inform their respective allies in the two organizations concerning these talks and to consult with them about continuing discussions on this question with the purpose of achieving agreement satisfactory to all participants." (ENEC/101, p.2)

The United States, together with the United Kingdom, has informed its allies concerning the Moscow talks, but the consultations with our allies are just beginning. My delegation submits, therefore, that this is neither the forum nor the time for discussion of a non-aggression arrangement between the NATO and Warsaw alliances.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and fifty-second plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations Geneva, under the chairmanship of Sir Paul Mason, representative of the United Kingdom.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Canada and Poland.

"The Canadian delegation tabled a working paper entitled 'A comparison of some significant developments in USA and USSR proposals concerning the reduction of the risk of war through accident, miscalculation, failure of communications or surprise attack (1958-63)'.^{1/}

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 20 August 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

^{1/} Circulated as document ENDC/110.