

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/PV.119
8 April 1963
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND NINETEENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday 8 April 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman

Mr. J. B. GODBER

(United Kingdom)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil: Mr. A. A. de MELO FRANCO
Mr. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria: Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
Mr. V. IZMERLIEV

Burma: Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada: Mr. E. L. M. BURNS
Mr. S. F. RAE
Mr. A. E. GOTTLIEB
Mr. R. M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia: Mr. K. KURKA
Mr. V. PECHOTA
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. A. MLKULIN

Ethiopia: Lij Mikael IMRU
Ato M. HAMID
Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India: Mr. A. S. LALL
Mr. A. S. MEHTA
Mr. S. B. DESHKAR

Italy: Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO

Miss E. AGUIREE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M. T. MBU

Mr. L. C. N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Mr. M. STAHL

Baron C. H. von PLATEN

Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. I. G. USACHEV

Mr. P. F. SHAKOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. F. HASSAN

Mr. M. S. AHMED

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S. E. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Mr. J. B. GODBER
Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J. G. TAHOURDIN
Mr. D. N. BRINSON

United States of America:

Mr. C. C. STELLE
Mr. A. L. RICHARDS
Mr. D. E. MARK
Mr. V. BAKER

Deputy Special Representative of
the Secretary-General:

Mr. M. A. VELLODI

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I declare open the one hundred and nineteenth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): At our meeting on 1 April, the representative of Poland and, particularly, the representative of the Soviet Union brought forward some interesting facts published at the beginning of March 1963 about the discussions in the United States Senate on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests (ENDC/PV.116, pp. 7-8, 19-22). In our opinion, those facts show in an interesting light the position which the delegations of the Western Powers have hitherto taken in our negotiations and they also explain why these negotiations have so far produced no concrete results.

At the same meeting on 1 April the delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States submitted for our consideration a memorandum regarding their position on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests -- I refer to document ENDC/78. We are perfectly justified in noting that that memorandum brought nothing new to our negotiations. It merely repeated the previous position of the Western Powers, the inconsistency of which had already been demonstrated many times before by the delegations of the socialist countries. This has become particularly clear in the light of the new facts which have been cited by the delegations of Poland and the Soviet Union. The memorandum is obviously a continuation of the attempts of the Western delegations to avoid in these negotiations any discussion of the main issue, namely the annual quota of on-site inspections, and to involve the negotiations in a fruitless discussion of the technical details of inspection. But as long as an agreement on the inspection quota has not been reached, such a discussion could only be, I would say, academic and would serve only as an end in itself. It could in no way contribute to achieving genuine progress in our negotiations and, what is more, would create the illusion that serious negotiations were being conducted. That, in our opinion, would mean deceiving world public opinion, which is perturbed by the acceleration of the armaments race and the implementation of plans for spreading nuclear weapons to additional States, particularly to Western Germany.

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

The centre of gravity and the main attention in the work of our Committee at the present stage of the negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests should, in our opinion, be directed towards achieving agreement on a quota of on-site inspections. This is the main element, the solution of which would open the way to the solution of all other outstanding problems. The key to the solution of this basic question is in the hands of the Western Powers.

That is why we believe that the facts referred to in the United States Senate by Senator Humphrey (ENDC/32) and mentioned at our meeting on 1 April by the representatives of the Soviet Union and Poland, cannot be dismissed as lightly as the representative of the United Kingdom, Sir Paul Mason, tried to do. Sir Paul said in this connexion:

"I shall not take up the time of the Conference by going over again the ground covered by our Soviet colleague this morning on the relation of scientific assessment to political decisions. That has been done many times, and if anybody wishes to study the Western views they have been put on record on numerous occasions during the past weeks."

(ENDC/FV.116, p.25)

One can, of course, agree with the representative of the United Kingdom that a great deal has already been said on that question by the delegations of the Western Powers in order to refute the arguments put forward by the delegations of the socialist countries. But that is precisely why the facts brought out by Senator Humphrey in the United States Senate are so interesting -- facts which, I would say, unfortunately, have not been brought out by the United States delegation in our Committee. The point is that Senator Humphrey in his statement refuted or at least showed up in a rather strange light certain main assertions on which the delegations of the Western Powers have hitherto been trying to base their inconsistent position with regard to the use of national means of control over an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear tests, the importance of on-site inspection, an annual inspection quota and a number of other questions. That is why I do not think it will be superfluous to revert once again to certain questions which Senator Humphrey brought up in the United States Senate.

It appears that the position of the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom on the question of the control of underground nuclear tests is far from being so firmly based on scientific data as their representatives are systematically

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trying to make us believe. The delegates of the socialist countries have repeatedly pointed out that the obstacles in regard to reliable control which the Western Powers have been constantly placing in our path are artificially constructed and have no solid foundation.

That is because there exist at the present time reliable means of control which would preclude the possibility of violation by any State of the obligations assumed in a treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests. Nevertheless, the representatives of the Western Powers go on making out that there is a tremendous danger of the treaty being violated. They speak as if possible cheating would be a terrible threat to the security and even the very existence of the Western Powers. That question was considered by Senator Humphrey in his statement in the United States Senate on 7 March 1963. He said, among other things:

"It is argued that if the Soviets cheat on an agreement to stop testing they can force the United States into surrendering completely to the Communists. That is poppycock ... In the first place, it would be difficult for the Russians to conduct even one clandestine test without considerable risk. In the second place, it would be extremely difficult to cheat on a series of tests, which is what any violator would want to do to attempt to gain a military advantage."

(ENDC/82, p.31)

Furthermore, Senator Humphrey also pointed out that even in the event of possible cheating its consequences -- according to the assessment of the United States Department of Defence -- would be far from being such as the representatives of the Western Powers are trying to make us believe. On 21 March in another statement on the same question, Senator Humphrey said:

"But any conceivable advances in weaponry resulting from those tests could not affect significantly the strategic military balance between ourselves and the Soviet Union."

Such, then, is the view of Senator Humphrey on the possible consequences of cheating and violation of a treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests and, in particular, on the possibility of detecting attempts to cheat. Nevertheless, the representatives of the Western Powers in our Committee still persist in their attitude. Under the pretext of an exaggerated danger of cheating and the inadequacy of control, they are in fact blocking a successful conclusion to our negotiations. As I said before, those are tactics which are always used whenever the prospect of a speedy achievement of agreement begins to emerge.

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

On the question of control over underground explosions there have been, in the past as in the present, many disputes. The representatives of the Western Powers stubbornly denied, and continue to deny, the possibility of reliable control with the existing national means of detection. They assert that they have no reliable means of detection and that the methods of such control are unknown to them.

I wish today to make a few remarks and to adduce some facts which will enable us to have a fuller picture of the position taken by the Western Powers on this question, and, of course, of the motives determining that position.

First, the question of the effectiveness and reliability of control through the use of existing national means. It is well known that a few months ago the representatives of the Western Powers attacked the delegations of the socialist countries in connexion with their view that control through the use of existing national means of detection is sufficiently reliable and effective.

On that question also the statement made by Senator Humphrey on 7 March contains a number of interesting facts. The representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, in his statement at the meeting on 1 April, has already quoted (ENDC/PV.116, pp.19-22) the words of Senator Humphrey (ENDC/32, p.20), who said that the United States no longer needed internationally manned stations on Soviet territory since its existing means of detection and identification -- I stress, detection and identification -- made this unnecessary, and he further noted that its capability to detect nuclear explosions was much greater than the American press had led people to believe on the basis of the information it had received from the United States Government.

The importance of national means of detection as a basis for effective control was at last also recognized by Mr. Stelle at our meeting on 22 February (ENDC/PV.101,p.42). Nevertheless, our Western colleagues persist in their attempts to prove that national means of detection alone are insufficient for reliable control. Under that pretext they continue to insist on a large number of on-site inspections. Contrary to the position of the socialist countries, which maintain that the question of the number of inspections is exclusively a political one, the delegations of the Western Powers assert that their demand for an unacceptably large number of inspections is based on certain scientific and technical data. The socialist delegations have already pointed out on numerous occasions that manipulations of so-called scientific data are absolutely unconvincing. Eloquent facts in that regard based on the activities of the United States Congress have been brought forward, particularly by the representative of Romania, Mr. Macoveanu, at our meeting on 6 March (ENDC/PV.105, pp.11-13).

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In trying to bolster the shaky position of the West on that question, the representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle, stated, among other things, at our meeting on 11 March 1963:

"First, the West has published numerous volumes of scientific data and analysis which relate to its position, all freely available to any person of any country who would wish to read them." (ENDC/FV.107, p.5)

However, certain circumstances show that the United States has by no means published all the data it possesses on this question. It appears, as the delegations of the socialist countries have repeatedly pointed out, that the United States publishes only the data and information which serve to support its political position; and, on the other hand, it conceals and does not publish those scientific data which do not serve this purpose. With this approach to the matter, it can hardly claim that its position has a scientific basis.

Very cogent proof that the United States has been acting precisely in this way is, for instance, the statement made by the Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, in the Senate on 11 March, which has already been quoted at our meeting on 1 April by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, (ENDC/FV.116, p.22). The Secretary of State of the United States said, among other things:

"The United States capability to detect violations of a nuclear test ban is better than can be revealed".

In connexion with the question of the publication of scientific information and data available on the possibility of control over the observance of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, I should like to dwell briefly on one particular fact.

All those who have followed the negotiations in our Committee during the past year, as well as the discussions on the cessation of tests at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, know very well that one of the arguments very frequently put forward by the delegations of the Western Powers against the position of the socialist countries in regard to the reliability of national means of control was the demand that the Soviet Union should publish the data it possesses on this question. The fact that the Soviet Union, in view of the present situation, could not satisfy those demands, has since been used by the Western Powers for attacks on the socialist countries. In particular, they accuse the Soviet Union, since it knows of such instruments and methods and does not publish them, of taking upon itself "a terrible responsibility", as was stated, for instance, at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly by the representative of the United Kingdom.

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But as time goes on it becomes all the more evident that the Governments of the Western Powers are not at all so uninformed on this question as their representatives would have us believe. It appears that, just as in a number of other cases, their accusations and attacks on the Soviet Union regarding the publication of the relevant data are only part of a diplomatic game.

This question was also dealt with fairly extensively by Senator Humphrey in his statement in the Senate on 7 March 1963. From his words it appears above all that the United States possesses all the necessary data and information regarding the effectiveness and reliability of a control system using the existing national networks. At the same time it appears that as regards the publication of such information the situation is not at all what Mr. Stelle tried to make us believe at the meeting on 11 March. On the contrary, Senator Humphrey complained quite frankly that in regard to control over the cessation of nuclear tests there was much secret information to which not even the members of the legislative body, the United States Congress, had access.

As to the ability of the United States to detect nuclear tests in the territory of the Soviet Union, Senator Humphrey said, inter alia:

"This question of the identification of underground events has become of such interest to my colleagues and others that I have requested the administration to make available to the public the above-mentioned 5-year study of the detection and identification of underground events in the Soviet Union. This covers the period from 1958 through 1962 and it shows precisely how many events were detected and the ways in which they can be judged to be identified in varying degrees, and the geographical areas in which they occur. This study shows clearly why the number of inspections and the number of detection stations can be reduced without in any way diminishing the effectiveness of verification."

(ENDC/82, p.24)

It is clear that with regard to knowledge and information on the possibilities of control and detection of underground events there are certain reasons which prevent the Governments of some countries from publishing such information. The reasons determining the position of the Soviet Union on this question were mentioned by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin, at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly (A/C.1/PV.1246, p.61).

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But the statements of Senator Humphrey show that the Government of the United States also possesses the relevant scientific knowledge and data which it does not publish. There is, however, a fundamental difference between the position of the Soviet Union and the position of the United States in regard to the way in which the Governments of these two great Powers use the information at their disposal in the negotiations for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. The standpoint of the Soviet Government with regard to an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests and on control over the fulfilment of obligations is fully in keeping with the facts and scientific information at its disposal.

The Government of the United States obviously takes a different position in this matter. The statements of Senator Humphrey show that the Government of the United States has the necessary knowledge and also that the United States control system is much more effective than the Western Press and certain United States official spokesmen assert. Senator Humphrey is clearly sufficiently versed in the whole problem to enable him to make such categorical statements. But the United States and its representatives in our Committee, as well as in other bodies, including the United Nations General Assembly, deny these facts. The information in the possession of the United States is kept secret for a perfectly clear and obvious purpose, namely, to justify the untenable position of the United States on the question of control over the cessation of tests and to prevent the achievement of an agreement on this question, as certain influential circles in the United States obviously desire.

Senator Humphrey threw an interesting light on this fact in his aforementioned statement of 7 March, when he showed that the strict system of secrecy concerning scientific knowledge and data in the field of seismology in the United States "handcuffed" all those who are interested in the question of a test ban.

Another member of the Senate, Senator Clark, showed even more clearly the political basis underlying the United States position when he said at the same session:

"I share the concern of my friend" — that is, Senator Humphrey — "that the industrial-military complex in this country is such an effective agent for promoting expenditures in the defense system, in the interest, really, of keeping the arms race going, that they blanket the press with propaganda that they want to give to the American public, in the interest of why we are for tests. The other position is not given to the American public, and we are led to believe, by columnist

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after columnist, by scientists, even by Senators, that those who seek a test ban treaty seek something that is dangerous to our security ..."

(ENDC/82, p.25)

I believe that these statements by members of the United States Senate, whom, of course, no one can suspect of having any sympathy for the position of the socialist countries on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, show clearly enough who precisely, in the United States, is interested in having our negotiations lead to no result and in creating new obstacles in the way to an agreement, which has been opened up thanks to the flexible attitude of the Soviet Government.

It is clear that the circles referred to by Senators Humphrey and Clark have in their hands not only the press and other means of propaganda in the United States. Their interests are obviously still having an important, if not decisive, influence on the shaping of the United States position in these negotiations. This is clearly confirmed also by the present situation in our Committee.

The response of the United States to the concessions made by the Soviet Union was, in fact, to put forward new demands and to adopt an even more rigid and intransigent position. The representatives of the Western Powers have tried to deny this fact, but responsible persons in the United States admit that this was really so. In this connexion I should like to refer again to Senator Humphrey's statement of 7 March. In arguing against the opponents of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests, who criticize the present position of the United States Government, Senator Humphrey referred to the negotiations with the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kuznetzov, and said:

"When we reminded him (that is, Mr. Kuznetzov) -- because we wanted to retain a negotiating position -- that we wanted to preserve an area of agreement, he reminded us that we were toughening our position and were making it more difficult. He was a good deal more correct than were some of our critics in the United States". (ENDC/82, p.34)

It seems to me that that observation of Senator Humphrey needs no additional comment. It confirms sufficiently the supposition which we have expressed in the Committee, namely, that the main obstacle in our negotiations lies in the lack of interest on the part of the United States in achieving agreement on the prohibition of tests.

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

In conclusion, I should like to note that we fully realize that our statement today has not brought much that is new as regards fundamentals. All the main facts, of which I have spoken today, have been brought out many times by our delegation, as well as by the delegations of the other socialist countries. We only wanted to cite certain circumstances illustrating and confirming the validity and correctness of our position.

We thought it appropriate to revert to those matters even at the risk of drawing from the representatives of the Western Powers the accusation that our statement does not contribute to the achievement of progress in the negotiations or that by constantly repeating our point of view we are depriving the Committee of valuable time which, in their opinion, might be used, for instance, to discuss secondary questions of a technical nature.

But to those who level such accusations against us I should like to say that on this question, that is, the question of what is useful and what is harmful to the achievement of progress in the work of our Committee, our view is somewhat different. We believe that it is useful to elucidate certain basic political facts which show the position taken by the Governments of the various countries with regard to the object of our negotiations, that is, with regard to the achievement of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests. On the other hand, we consider it as a waste of time to discuss technical questions of a secondary nature before we have reached agreement on the fundamental political problems, on the basis of which other technical and organizational questions could also be settled.

It is obvious that the key to agreement, the importance of which there is no need to emphasize, is entirely in the hands of the West. If our negotiations which, thanks to the flexible position of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, have come so close to their goal, become deadlocked again, the responsibility will lie with the Western Powers.

It is desirable that the responsible statesmen of the West should finally take into account the insistent demands of the peoples of the whole world and show readiness to come to an agreement on the basis which would take into consideration the just interests of both sides. Perhaps the statements of Senator Humphrey to which I have referred so frequently in my statement today, may be taken as a sign that in the United States there will come to prevail at last a realistic appraisal of the situation and the views of those who recognize the urgency and importance of achieving an agreement on the cessation

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of nuclear weapon tests and its usefulness not only from the standpoint of the interests of the peoples of the whole world, but also from the standpoint of the United States itself.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): At a number of our past meetings various delegations have reviewed where they think we stand on the question of a nuclear weapon test ban. On Monday last, 1 April, the Soviet representative did so (ENDC/PV.116, pp. 16-23). My delegation would like to do so today.

However, first we should like to reply to a point made on 1 April by both the Polish representative (ibid., pp.7-8) and the Soviet representative (ibid., pp. 19-22), and today by the Czechoslovak representative **in connexion with a nuclear test ban.** **The point concerned a speech** delivered by Senator Hubert Humphrey on the floor of the United States Senate on 7 March of this year. My reply is directed to the remarks of the Polish, the Soviet and the Czechoslovak representatives. They used the old technique of selecting quotations out of context. Particularly in the case of the Soviet representative, the quotations were selected and pieced together in a way designed to try to prove a particular point. However, I submit that that selection of quotations distorted the meaning of Senator Humphrey's statement.

The Soviet representative sought to show from the statement in which Senator Humphrey said that, under certain conditions, there might be only twelve highly suspicious seismic events in the Soviet Union that, consequently, the United States should accept the Soviet offer on on-site inspections. We are, of course, not displeased if this conclusion of the Soviet representative means that he has at long last come around to recognizing that there is a scientific or technical basis on which we can make honest, admittedly political, judgements about the size of the quota and its effectiveness. There are, however, a number of inaccuracies in the Soviet representative's treatment of the quotations from Senator Humphrey, and it is through a clarification of those inaccuracies that I wish to make clear the real meaning of what Senator Humphrey said.

First, let me quote in full that portion of the statement made by Senator Humphrey from which the Soviet representative drew his erroneous conclusions. Senator Humphrey said:

"It is argued that the number of inspections being proposed by the United States is not adequate. The number of inspections is adequate when one compares the number with the total number of events in the Soviet Union that would be

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

highly suspicious. At one time the United States proposed to have 12 to 20 inspections when it thought there might be as many as 70 to 100 unidentified underground events equal to a 19 kiloton explosion." (ENDC/82, p. 32)

I wish to repeat that phrase: "70 to 100 unidentified events equal to a 19 kiloton explosion".

Senator Humphrey continued:

"At the same time we proposed not to inspect for three years any event which was below this size. In other words, for a 3 year period we were willing to forgo inspection altogether for all small underground tests, and we were proposing to inspect roughly 1 out of 5 unidentified events above the equivalent of 19 kilotons.

"Today we are proposing that all unidentified events be subject to inspection — no more moratorium; no threshold — even though we presumably are not worried about small tests any more than we were then. We simply think this provides greater deterrence to a cheater. As to large seismic events, the number of those that are really most suspicious, that is, that give no indication of being an earthquake, number only about a dozen, as compared with the previous estimate of from 70 to 100." (ibid.)

I should like to repeat that sentence:

"As to large seismic events, the number of those that are really most suspicious, that is, that give no indication of being an earthquake, number only about a dozen, as compared with the previous estimate of from 70 to 100".

Senator Humphrey then continued:

"We can easily maintain the same ratio of inspections to number of events and have some inspections left over for the smaller events." (ibid.)

That quotation is taken from the Daily Congressional Record, United States Senate, Eighty-Eighth Congress, First Session, page 3532.

Two main facts are clear from that quotation — two facts which the Soviet representative ignored or sought to slide over.

First, Senator Humphrey, when he mentioned a dozen highly suspicious events, was clearly speaking about large events above the former treaty threshold of 4.75 seismic magnitude, which is roughly equivalent to a nuclear explosion of 19 kilotons yield in volcanic tuff.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

Secondly, Senator Humphrey was discussing a very small number of large events which he called "highly suspicious", or "most suspicious". That means that he was dealing with a group of events which were above 19 kilotons in yield, and about which also there was absolutely no indication that any of them could have been an earthquake. They were events chosen from a much larger group of events above seismic magnitude 4.75 which had been detected, located, and not eliminated as earthquakes on the basis of the seismic data.

On the first point -- that the numbers of events to which Senator Humphrey was referring were all above the threshold of seismic magnitude 4.75 -- all representatives are well aware that we are talking at this point in our discussions about a detection threshold considerably lower than magnitude 4.75. In fact, it is a detection threshold around seismic magnitude 4.0. The 4.75 threshold was equivalent, as I have said, to approximately a 19 kiloton explosion in volcanic tuff, while seismic magnitude 4.0 is equivalent roughly to a range of 2 to 6 kiloton explosion in volcanic tuff. Consequently, we are considering events which in some cases are some ten times smaller.

For example, it is now estimated that there are roughly 900 shallow earthquakes throughout the world above seismic magnitude 4.75. This figure compares roughly with some 4,000 to 5,000 shallow earthquakes above seismic magnitude 4.0 throughout the world. Therefore, Senator Humphrey was speaking of about a dozen highly suspicious events in the Soviet Union above the former treaty threshold, but now we are talking about a treaty with no threshold and a detection system with a capability of turning up events above magnitude 4.0. This system obviously would detect a considerably larger number of events in the Soviet Union, including a large number which would not have been identified as earthquakes.

On the second point, Senator Humphrey spoke of "highly suspicious" events. In the past our position on an inspection quota has been based on a percentage of unidentified seismic events -- that is, events which are not identified according to the treaty criteria. There is, therefore, a vast difference between the number of "highly suspicious" events, to which Senator Humphrey was referring, and unidentified events. In the case of the former, the selection is to a large degree a subjective, unilateral process. In the case of the latter group -- unidentified events -- there are criteria by which some earthquakes can be positively identified. All other events are included in the large group of unidentified events, some of which may be more suspicious than others. Under present proposals for treaty criteria, we believe there may be in an average year as many as 150 seismic events in the Soviet Union above seismic magnitude 4.0 which still remain

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unidentified. Naturally, caution should be exercised in fixing on any single figure because, as in the case of most natural phenomena, the occurrence of earthquakes in various areas of the world may vary considerably from one annual period to the next.

Clearly, the attempt to twist Senator Humphrey's statement in order to try to make the case that he somehow differed from the United States delegation on what constitutes an adequate number of inspections cannot stand close scrutiny on the basis of Senator Humphrey's own words. We hope that in future meetings we shall not be treated to such tactics by the Soviet representative.

Let me turn now to the main points which my delegation wishes to make today. Over the past two months we have had an opportunity to hear expositions of the position of each side. Those positions could in large part be expected to be new because they could take account of various aspects of the change in positions brought about by the correspondence (ENDC/73,74) between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy. However, we have found the position taken by the Soviet delegation most disappointing because it failed to take advantage of the changes and the possibilities for agreement which arose from the exchange of letters.

Instead, since Soviet acceptance, or re-acceptance, of the principle of on-site inspection the Soviet position in all areas has remained rigid and unnegotiable. On the question of how to proceed to the next step in our negotiations the Soviet delegation has remained adamant. It has insisted that there is only one possible way to proceed. The West has been told it must agree to discuss only numbers of on-site inspections, and to do it before all else. There are, in the Soviet view, no other subjects open to discussion with the West. It is clear that the Soviet position as yet allows for no possible compromise solutions to this particular procedural deadlock.

The Soviet position on substance compounds the stalemate on how we should proceed. The Soviet Union says that in reaching an agreement on the number of inspections we must accept the numbers which it has proposed. Here again there is no semblance of a willingness to enter into real negotiations; rather it is a sort of "You give, I take" proposition. It is the kind of negotiation which belies the real meaning of the word. It is a position which is the antithesis of flexibility and willingness to arrive at mutually acceptable positions.

How has the Soviet delegation sought to support that position? The Soviet representative has followed three major lines over the past two months. First, he has

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

sought to defend the procedural stand of his delegation on the basis that the West wished to avoid agreement by engaging the Conference in what he frequently terms as "a morass of technical detail." However, that argument collapsed, we submit, when we made it clear that we agreed that technical detail should be left to the treaty drafters, and that it was our urgent intent to agree on a set of principles governing the conduct of on-site inspections — a set of principles which could, of course, among other important elements, include the number of inspections.

Secondly, the Soviet representative has alleged that the United States and the United Kingdom actually proposed to the Soviet Union the numbers upon which the Soviet Union now insists we must agree if there is to be a nuclear test ban treaty. The Soviet representative has made several statements about proposals purportedly coming from Ambassador Arthur H. Dean, but those allegations have been refuted in the record. The Soviet representative has quoted from a number of statements made by various Western representatives in this Conference and elsewhere to try to justify his case. But those statements themselves merely show that the West was urging publicly, as well as privately, that the Soviet Union return to the principle of obligatory on-site inspection. There was no Western suggestion of numbers now proposed by the Soviet Union and none appears in the verbatim records of any of these meetings. The Soviet Union had a clear idea of the Western position as a result of President Kennedy's letter to Premier Khrushchev of 28 December 1962 (ENDC/74). It is difficult to see how the Soviet Union can continue to ignore clear and forthright statements of our position and attempt to stand on mistaken allegations of what Western representatives are supposed to have said.

Thirdly, and somewhat in contradiction to the charge that the West wished to engage the Conference in "a morass of technical detail", the Soviet representative and his allies have dredged up numerous misrepresentations of previous Western positions on the technical and scientific basis for on-site inspection, to seek to undercut the obvious importance of scientific factors in the question of on-site inspections.

We submit that the Soviet representative has failed in this endeavour on a number of counts. First, he has never shown what he has sought to show, namely, that the Western position has ignored the relevant scientific and technical factors which make it possible to form a realistic judgement about the size of a quota of on-site inspections and about the effectiveness of such a quota.

Second, his extensive quotation from Western scientific sources has given credence to our position that there will be a number of unidentified events which can be identified

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

only by on-site inspection. The Soviet representative has tended to demolish, every time he has quoted from scientific sources, the Soviet argument that national systems, or even an international network of national systems, can detect and identify every seismic event. In this particular question the Soviet delegation cannot have it both ways. Either it should show us clearly its own data to indicate the effectiveness of national seismic stations; or its reliance on our data, even to the point of using it to try to disprove the Western case, must be considered evidence that there will be some unidentified events, and therefore that a number of on-site inspections is actually essential.

That leads me to the third point. Never in all of the almost two months of this session has the Soviet representative produced any new Soviet scientific data to support his case. He has relied entirely on Western sources. Soviet data has just not been produced; yet we are criticized for allegedly withholding important data. It is true that the Soviet representative has quoted from some statements made by Soviet scientists in 1959 at a meeting of Technical Working Group 2, but those statements themselves tend to show that there will be a number of unidentified events which must be inspected in order to be identified.

Let me contrast this summary of the Soviet position with the position which the West has presented over the past two months. On procedure, we have said we are flexible given the fact that we must know what it is we are talking about when we discuss a particular number of on-site inspections. The Western position has not been that we should reach agreement on all of the arrangements for on-site inspections before we can discuss or reach tentative agreement on a quota number. Rather, we have said, "Let us discuss the two questions in parallel"; and that seems to us to be a most reasonable position. We believe that if, in discussing these questions in parallel, we know in general terms what arrangements for the conduct of on-site inspections are possible, it will make it easier for us to reach agreement on the numbers. But in this question, as in others, flexibility cannot be shown just on one side if we are to reach an agreement.

On the question of substance, we have clearly stated a number of the basic principles which we believe should be applied to the conduct of on-site inspections. We have not insisted on discussion of minutiae. We have made our position clear on the broad outline of the issues concerning the conduct of inspections.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

In order that there might be no misunderstanding of our position, the United Kingdom and the United States presented a memorandum setting forth in some detail the outline of their position on on-site inspections. It is before the Conference as document ENDC/78. We have given the Conference our views on how events and epicentres should be designated. We have indicated the criteria which we believe should govern the designation of events. We have stated our position on how events should be selected for inspection. We have given our view on the size of the area which ought to be subject to inspection. We have stated our proposals on the composition of inspection teams, their duties and the procedures to be fulfilled by them.

So far, unfortunately, we have had no Soviet response to those proposals, nor have we been given a cogent reason for the failure of the Soviet Union to respond. We have not asked for an exhaustive response from the Soviet Union, although naturally we should be pleased to have one. We have merely asked for an indication of which proposals it can accept, which it would wish to change and in what general way it would wish to change them.

We earnestly urge the Soviet delegation to review its own position to see if there is not some small particle of flexibility which it can put forward to match the flexibility which we in the West have shown. We ask the Soviet Union to tell us where it stands on the major issues in a test ban treaty. Only in that way can we enter into real negotiations so that a treaty can be promptly agreed.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(translation from Russian):

I should like first of all to say a few words in connexion with the attempt of Mr. Stelle, the representative of the United States, to refute what was said by the Soviet representative at the meeting on 1 April, or, rather, Mr. Stelle's attempts to refute Senator Humphrey. But he did not succeed in doing so.

The representative of the United States referred to Senator Humphrey's statement merely in order to misrepresent the main substance, the main tenor and spirit of all Senator Humphrey's statements in the Senate on 7 March. Moreover, Mr. Stelle directly misrepresented Senator Humphrey's attitude towards the question of the inspection of small nuclear explosions.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

I shall take the liberty of exposing the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, by quoting Senator Humphrey's own words taken from his statements as they appear in the Senate's official publication, the Congressional Record of 7 March, page 3532.

Here is what Senator Humphrey said with regard to inspection in general, that is, what inspection should be applied to. He said that the number of inspections should be determined in relation to the total number of highly suspicious events. Here are his words:

(continued in English)

"The number of inspections is adequate when one compares the number with the total number of events in the Soviet Union that would be highly suspicious." (ENDC/82, p.32)

(continued in Russian)

So, in his statement, Senator Humphrey linked the number of inspections with the number of highly suspicious events. Such events, Senator Humphrey himself stated, were only events of great magnitude.

What is his attitude towards the question of inspection in respect of small explosions? His attitude is this -- I quote again from the Congressional Record. He said:

(continued in English)

"At one time, the United States proposed to have twelve to twenty inspections when it thought that there might be as many as seventy to one hundred unidentified underground events equal to a nineteen kiloton explosion. At the same time, we proposed not to inspect for three years any event which was below this size. In other words, for a three-year period we were willing to forego inspection altogether for all small underground tests." (ibid.)

(continued in Russian)

Further, Senator Humphrey said:

(continued in English)

"We presumably are not worried about small tests any more than we were then, when we were willing to forego inspection altogether for all small underground tests". (ibid.)

(continued in Russian)

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

This is by way of a reply to the representative of the United States. I shall now pass on to my main statement.

At one time many people hoped that it would prove possible to reach agreement quickly and easily on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. It cannot be said that these optimistic suppositions were groundless. The point is that an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests is not in itself a disarmament measure. The implementation of such an agreement will not put a stop to the production of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the nuclear Powers, nor will it lead to the destruction of the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and, of course, it does not mean the prohibition of nuclear weapons. Consequently, an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, as such, is a simple measure, easy to carry out and not requiring the establishment of a complicated system of international control as would have to take place in the case of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. That is why many people expected that an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests could be concluded within two or three weeks. In any case, in 1958 none of those who were anxious for the conclusion of such an agreement could have even surmised that years would go by and that even in April 1963 there would still be no agreement.

The question of the number of inspections is now, as in previous years, the main obstacle in the path to an agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests. We must state most categorically that the Soviet Union now, as before, sees no necessity for on-site inspection. Our agreement to the carrying out of two to three annual inspections on the territory of the Soviet Union was prompted exclusively by the desire to contribute towards removing the remaining differences preventing us from reaching agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests. We agreed to a quota of two-to-three inspections a year as an additional guarantee of compliance with the treaty.

On many occasions in our discussions we have dealt with the causes of the unsatisfactory state of affairs in our negotiations. Referring to facts, to the actions and statements of government leaders and responsible officials in the Administration of the United States, we have shown how the United States is in fact blocking the achievement of agreement on the question of inspection. The position of the United States on this question bears the stamp of concessions to those forces

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within the United States which are altogether opposed to any agreement whatsoever on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. Those forces, not wishing to act openly in a negative sense at the negotiations in Geneva, are trying to achieve their purpose by the tactics of dragging out the negotiations.

This tactical line has already been carried out over a long period of time and in two ways: first, the representatives of the United States at the negotiations in Geneva are piling up more and more obstacles in the path to an agreement and, second, they are persistently trying to lead the negotiations into a morass of endless and sterile controversies on organizational, technical and administrative details connected with on-site inspection. By acting in this way, the United States has succeeded in preventing agreement over a period of almost five years of negotiation on this comparatively simple and straightforward question.

The absence of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests is not, of course, the result of any differences on questions of control. Those measures of control over the fulfilment of an agreement, which have already been proposed here as the basis for an agreement and to which I referred once again at the meeting on 1 April (ENDC/PV.116, pp.16-23), are more than adequate for an agreement. Everyone realizes perfectly well that the negotiations for an agreement have been blocked over a period of many years and are still in a state of deadlock today solely for political reasons. We have also spoken a good deal about those reasons. I am referring to the policy of the Western Powers aimed at continuing the armaments race and intensifying military preparations.

This policy of the Western Powers finds its practical application, firstly, in the refusal of the Western Powers to disarm, their refusal to agree to the implementation of measures that would lead to a diminution or even to the elimination of the threat of a nuclear missile war such as the elimination, in the early stages of disarmament, of nuclear missiles or their means of delivery; secondly, in the refusal of the Western Powers to agree to the implementation of effective measures which would help to reduce international tension and create favourable conditions for the implementation of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. We are referring to the obvious reluctance of the Western Powers to accept the declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75). Similarly, they avoid in every way accepting the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the

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States parties to the Warsaw and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty (ENDC/77); thirdly, this policy of the Western Powers finds expression also in their defiantly disdainful attitude towards the appeal of the General Assembly that all nuclear weapon tests should cease as from 1 January 1963 (A/RES/1762(XVII)- ENDC/63). To this appeal of the General Assembly the United States responded with nuclear explosions in Nevada and since 1 January five further nuclear explosions have been carried out. The NATO ally of the United States, France, has also made its "contribution" to this business and carried out in March a new nuclear explosion in Africa. That explosion called forth a storm of indignation and anger, not only among the peoples of Africa, on whose soil France is carrying out its nuclear explosions, but throughout the world, and it was only among the Western Powers that not a single word was uttered in condemnation of those actions of their ally. Fourthly, this policy finds its practical implementation in the feverish measures of the Western Powers for the further spreading of nuclear weapons and for further increasing the nuclear armaments of the NATO bloc. We are referring to the United Kingdom-United States agreement at Nassau, the recent Franco-West German agreement, the meeting of the NATO Council and the journeyings of Ministers and other emissaries of the United States for the purpose of building up new NATO nuclear forces, and so on.

That is what is really preventing agreement, not only on general and complete disarmament but also on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

In this connexion I must remind you of the negative influence which is being constantly exerted in various ways on our negotiations by those known in the United States as "brass hats", that is, the people from the Pentagon and the Atomic Energy Commission, not to mention such stubborn and determined opponents of an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests as the powerful United States corporations connected with the production of the latest types of armaments and known in the political life of the country as the United States "military-industrial complex". We all know that these opponents of an agreement in the United States are not idle and are actively using all possible means, all their influence, in order to prevent agreement. And here in the Committee, the representatives of the Western Powers are trying to reduce the matter to technical differences regarding the number of inspections, the modalities of inspection and so on. They busy themselves with trying to find all sorts of reservations and pretexts which would enable them to carry on fruitless negotiations and thereby evade an agreement. The statement made today

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by Mr. Stelle confirms this very clearly. I will recall, however, that in October, November and December 1962 the Western representatives were trying to persuade the Soviet Union to accept two to three inspections a year, and that when the Soviet Union accepted this, the representatives of the Western Powers beat a retreat. They even took the risk of disclaiming their own words regarding the number of inspections. They continued to assert that the scientific data available to them required a larger number of inspections than two to three. Mr. Stelle has repeated this today. But it is no longer possible for the United States representatives to refer to science. In insisting on an increased number of inspections, the representatives of the United States are simply trying to satisfy the demands of the United States intelligence services which are very much interested in every additional inspection. Those services are reluctant to let slip the favourable opportunities which would be afforded them in connexion with the carrying out of each individual inspection as such. It is not for nothing, as you may have noticed, that in the United States-United Kingdom memorandum the great importance of measures in respect of on-site inspection is emphasized so categorically (ENDC/78). Each additional inspection on the territory of the Soviet Union affords them additional opportunities for collecting the intelligence data in which they are interested.

Later the representatives of the Western Powers proposed that we should leave aside the solution of the question of the number of inspections and the number of automatic stations and take up the discussion of various organizational, technical and administrative details connected with the preparation of a test ban treaty.

To put it briefly, the representatives of the Western Powers are busily trying to find ways which will take us further afield. They are evading an agreement.

A continuation of this policy is the memorandum, submitted on 1 April by the representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle, on behalf of the United States and the United Kingdom, dealing with the position of these Powers on the question of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests (ibid). It is appropriate to ask what purpose the representatives of the Western Powers were pursuing in submitting that memorandum. In any case, the memorandum is not aimed at opening the way to an agreement.

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The contents of that memorandum show the intention of the United States and the United Kingdom to persist in maintaining their old position in regard to demanding from the Soviet Union an increased number of annual inspections and automatic seismic stations. The United States-United Kingdom memorandum emphasizes very definitely the rigid position taken by the Western Powers on the question of banning tests. They obviously do not want an agreement.

The United States-United Kingdom memorandum also shows that attempts are still being made by the Western delegations to impose a discussion of technical matters on the Committee, so as to avoid taking a decision on the main questions which would open the way to the achievement of an agreement. We can but emphasize once again that a discussion of technical details in the absence of agreement on the main questions could not lead to any positive results and would be a sheer waste of time.

The representative of the United States has on several occasions stated that a quota of two to three inspections a year is unacceptable to the United States. Mr. Stelle has said so again this morning. The statements of the United States representative leave no doubt that it would be quite useless and even senseless to enter into a discussion of details relating to inspection, a discussion which the representatives of the Western Powers so persistently wish to impose on the Committee. We must first reach agreement on the quota of inspections and the number of automatic seismic stations. There is no justification for procrastination in that matter. The Soviet Union has accepted the proposal for two to three inspections a year put forward officially and unofficially by the Western representatives. Not only was that proposal for two to three inspections put forward by the Western side, but it is now fully in accordance with the data of the Western Powers themselves. Now that the United States has been forced to admit that the number of significant seismic events occurring in the territory of the Soviet Union which might not be identified as natural earthquakes is only about a dozen in a whole year, the United States can no longer justify its exaggerated demand in regard to the number of inspections even by reference to the number of seismic events.

We recall that in speaking in the Senate on 7 March Senator Humphrey stated that it had previously been estimated in the United States that from 70 to 100

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significant unidentified seismic events occurred each year in the territory of the Soviet Union (ENDC/82, p.32). On the basis of the ratio of 1:5 of inspections to unidentified events, which was the ratio established by themselves, the Americans insisted on their demand to carry out from 12 to 20 inspections a year on the territory of the Soviet Union. Now that it has been established according to more accurate United States data that the number of significant unidentified seismic events in the Soviet Union is not 70 to 100, but about a dozen in all, that is 6 to 8 or even 10 times less than the number which was used by the Americans to justify the demand for 12 to 20 inspections a year in the Soviet Union, it is obvious that the figure of 12 to 20 inspections should be reduced in accordance with the reduction in the number of events, that by 6 to 8 or even 10 times, and not by one unit as the United States representatives are trying to do by reducing the number of inspections from 8 to 7. This means that the number of inspections for 10 to 12 significant seismic events a year in the Soviet Union should not exceed 1.2 or at most 2.5 inspections a year. This calculation is also in strict accordance with United States data on the number of such events in the Soviet Union and with the ratio of 1:5 of inspections to events as used by the United States.

As regards seismic events of low magnitude — I should like to repeat this for the special benefit of Mr. Stelle — we noted that Senator Humphrey expressed the view that the United States is not worried about these events at the present time any more than it was some time ago when it proposed not to inspect any underground event below 19 kilotons in size, at least for the first three years of the treaty.

The quota of two to three inspections a year proposed by the Soviet Union would be sufficient to serve as a deterrent against any attempt to circumvent an agreement.

As you see, all the conditions for an agreement are present. The only thing lacking is good will on the part of the United States. The point at issue now is whether the United States will succeed in placing the common interests of mankind, which require the cessation of all nuclear tests, above the interests of small groups interested in frustrating an agreement and continuing the nuclear armaments race.

What has been said by Senator Humphrey certainly deserves our closest attention. His approach to the problem, the facts and figures adduced by him, as well as his

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conclusions show that the United States can and should come to an agreement to ban nuclear tests on the basis which has already taken concrete shape in the Committee and which I mentioned at the meeting on 1 April. We do not intend, however, to display too much optimism in connexion with Senator Humphrey's statements. Above all, we note to our regret and surprise that all these admissions and considerations of the Senator have not been reflected in any way in the position of the United States delegation in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. Until today the United States delegation had not uttered a word about these statements of Senator Humphrey, and today it has been compelled to touch upon this matter merely in order to refute Senator Humphrey himself. The delegation of the United States still persists in its demand that the Soviet Union should increase the number of inspections and the number of automatic stations, that is, no visible change has taken place in the position of the United States. Nevertheless, we are inspired with some hope for an eventual agreement by the following thought which Senator Humphrey expressed at the end of his speech in the Senate on the 7 March:

"The arms race, including nuclear testing, is buying the United States less security than we would have with effective arms control and disarmament agreements, one of which would be an effective treaty banning nuclear weapons tests". (ENDC/82, p.36)

That thought of Senator Humphrey, as well as the facts and data that were adduced and the conclusions and inferences that were drawn in his statement and in that of Senator Clark in the Senate on 7 March, may to some extent be regarded as a sign that common sense and political perspicacity are apparently beginning to force their way through and to produce sprouts even in incredibly difficult conditions on the stony ground of the United States Senate. We can only express the hope that now the United States will not make us wait a long time and will make it possible for us to achieve an agreement in the near future.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I should like to speak now as representative of the United Kingdom. I shall be as brief as possible.

Today we are again discussing a nuclear test ban. I have listened with care to the statements we have already heard this morning. At the close of his speech our Czechoslovak colleague, with a modesty which I found altogether charming, said

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that it might be said that his statement contained nothing new. That was a very generous admission from a speaker at this Conference. I feel sure that, with the same candour, he would agree that exactly the same was true of the speech to which we have just listened. Indeed it is difficult for any representative speaking on this subject at the present time to say anything very new as long as we are not able to enter into serious discussion of the problems which still remain outstanding.

The United States and the United Kingdom have tried very hard at this session to engage our Soviet colleague in serious discussion to enable us to eliminate as many as possible of the points of difference still dividing us. Unfortunately our Soviet colleague has refused to agree to that and has sought to concentrate entirely on one particular issue, namely, the number of on-site inspections. Today he has gone over a whole range of arguments, all directed towards that same point and he has charged the West, in the course of his remarks, with all sorts of sins. First he claims that we are not serious in wanting agreement, and then he claims that we are all militaristically inclined and that we are seeking to build up the arms race and not to eliminate it. Yet in the same breath he tells us that of course a test ban treaty would not in itself be a disarmament provision, and that its effects would not be very great. I do not agree with him that its effects would not be very great. I think the psychological effect would be enormous if we could achieve an agreement on a test ban treaty, and I believe that we can and should reach an agreement. I believe that the difference between us now is so small, in spite of what our Soviet colleague has just been saying, that it really is our duty to find some way of eliminating it.

I continue to hope that we can have discussions on the various ancillary matters still outstanding. However, if our Soviet colleague is determined that we must first of all get rid of the basic problem of the difference in numbers, then I suggest it is incumbent on him, and on him alone, to make some move forward to enable us to do so. If he is arguing that it is the vital point that divides us, if he is arguing that the West is showing no flexibility, then let him show some flexibility and let him move towards us. I think that is incumbent on him in the light of all he has said to us.

It is really a mere waste of the Conference's time for him to come forward with statements such as his statement this morning that the Soviet Union had accepted the

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proposal for two to three on-site inspections which he said had been "put forward officially and unofficially by the Western representatives" (Supra, p.26). Really, with the greatest respect to our Soviet colleague, he must know that that statement is a complete distortion of the facts. We have been through this so many times that there is really no point in reiterating statements of that kind. I would ask him to come back to the facts of life and not to live in a dream world of his own. That really is necessary if we are to make progress.

It is perfectly well known what the Western position is, just as it is perfectly well known what the present Soviet position is. The rather pathetic attempt all the time to find some Western personality, some Western newspaper, some Western source which can be quoted back against the official Western position seems to me, again, a waste of this Conference's time. Of course I realize that our Soviet colleagues, living in a community of the type in which they live, perhaps attach exaggerated importance to statements emanating from unofficial sources in other countries — because, of course, if such statements were to appear in their own country it would certainly cause quite a stir. One has to realize there is a difference of background here. But I would encourage our Soviet colleague to stimulate more free expression of opinion in his own country and then we can have the pleasure of quoting back at him some statements of that kind. But they really do not get one anywhere. The official positions of the two sides are known. The position of the West is known to reside firmly on the best scientific assessment we can get. If our Soviet colleague says that that scientific assessment is wrong, then it is up to him to come forward and show us a better one; not by repetition of what somebody somewhere said, but by meeting us here, and by having Soviet scientists meet ours here in order to achieve once more an agreed position. That is the only way to solve a difference of opinion of this kind if he is basing himself on this as the reason why the Soviet Union should not move any further forward.

Our Soviet colleague has told us again this morning the old story about the interest of the intelligence services in the West in stepping up the number of on-site inspections. Really, I thought we had heard the last of that. If the Soviet Union can accept three on-site inspections without risk to its security through intelligence gains on the other side, then I have still to learn why the acceptance of seven would so completely undermine its position. These arguments

are not tenable and I think it is a great pity they are continually put forward, particularly when our Soviet colleague accuses the West of using "tactics of procrastination" (ENDC/PV.119/Provisional, p.46). If I were searching my mind for a description of our Soviet colleague's speech this morning the word "procrastination", which he has so kindly given me, fits it better than anything else I could hope to find. He says the West is piling up new obstacles to agreement. But the West is not: the West is trying to elucidate the points of difference, to show exactly where they exist and to find some means of getting over them. I wish our Soviet colleague would join us in that endeavour. Ever since we re-assembled here in February we have been going over the same ground. I do hope our Soviet colleague can come forward with some fresh proposal either to discuss the modalities with us and reach agreement where possible, or to show us how flexible and how serious and ready for agreement the Soviet Union can be.

The Soviet representative made the charge again that the memorandum (ENDC/78) we produced last week merely showed how the United States and the United Kingdom were adhering stubbornly to their old positions (supra. p. 26). It is rather incredible to me that that sort of charge should be made, because the memorandum was brought forward to show the position we have now reached on the Western side. We thought it would be helpful to the Conference as a whole to have the opportunity of seeing precisely what our position is. It would be very helpful if we could have a similarly clear statement of the Soviet Union position on the various aspects covered in our memorandum.

In the course of his speech this morning our Czechoslovak colleague said that the strict system of secrecy in the field of seismology handcuffs those who seek to achieve a test ban treaty (supra. p. 11). At that stage he had been quoting substantially and I am not quite sure whether those were his own words or a quotation. If it was a quotation, he was showing agreement with those words. I agree very much with him that such a strict system of secrecy is disadvantageous and so I hope very much that, if he does hold that view, he will talk seriously to his Soviet colleague after this meeting and encourage him to try to get rid of this system of secrecy concerning developments in Soviet seismic research, because clearly, if he does hold that view, then he must share my view that it would help if the Soviet Union were to tell us just how far it has progressed and explain to us how it can identify all the unidentifiable

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events which we in the West still hold exist. I shall welcome support on this matter from another adherent, and if he and I together could work on our Soviet colleague we might make some progress and so possibly get a meeting of scientists to discuss these matters. That indeed, would be helpful.

Coming back to the main question of numbers, I was a little puzzled when our Soviet colleague in the course of his speech talked about two to three inspections being an additional guarantee (supra. p.22). He emphasized the word "additional". But additional to what? Additional to what the Soviet Union claims can be done? Not additional to anything that we know. Our position is still quite clear. It is that we do not know how to identify all those events, so that this cannot be an additional guarantee to anybody until we can all be assured on that point. And so one keeps coming back to the same position concerning the difference between our two sides.

I said I would not take too much of the Committee's time, but I did feel it necessary to comment on the last statement to which we have just listened, because if we are going to make progress we must be willing to talk together about the issues that divide us. We in the West have done our best; we have tried in this Committee to bring forward the various issues. We have formally submitted a document to the Conference, and all we get is the sort of reaction which we had this morning. I can only regret that, but I hope we shall have further and more effective discussion which will carry us forward to agreement in due course. In view of the hour, I shall not prolong my remarks.

Mr. LALL (India): I too shall be extremely brief. I intended to be brief in any case, but in view of the lateness of the hour I shall be even briefer.

I should like to begin my remarks, into which I am going to inject a certain amount for the consideration particularly of the delegations of the two co-Chairmen, by drawing attention to parts of two statements which we heard today. I shall take first a few words from the statement of Mr. Kurka, the Czechoslovak representative, as he was the first to speak. We were very glad to hear him say (supra. p.13) that our negotiations are already near to our common goal. He made that remark towards

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the end of his statement, and I would hope that it expresses not only his view but the view of everyone in this room that our negotiations on a test ban are near to our common goal. Remarks are sometimes made round this table which seem to suggest that that is not our common goal, and that we are not near it, but we were very glad to hear Mr. Kurka's remark, with which we are in entire agreement.

Then I come to your statement, Mr. Chairman, in which you said (supra. p.29) that we can and should reach agreement because the difference between us is so small. We were very glad indeed that you voiced that sentiment. Again, we entirely agree with it. May I say that we also agree with the sentiment you voiced that the psychological effect of a test ban would be enormous. We do not take the view that a test ban now would be a small matter, because though it might be intrinsically small its significance to our future work would certainly be very great indeed. Indeed, we feel that even intrinsically it would be an important step forward because tests have been continuing, hundreds of nuclear tests have been made, they are an important aspect of the manifestations of the arms race, and to stop testing would in itself be a most significant step forward.

In that connexion I should like to turn for a moment to the agreement of principle which was reached at the end of our meeting on 5 April, and which is recorded in the statements made then as they appear in the verbatim record (ENDC/PV.118). I should like to draw attention to the statement made by Mr. Tsarapkin in which he said:

"The Soviet Union is ready to agree immediately, without waiting for general and complete disarmament, to the establishment of a direct telephone or teletype communications line between the governments of the Soviet Union and the United States." (ibid., p.52)

Then, Mr. Stelle, speaking for the United States delegation, said:

"the United States welcomes warmly the statement made by the Soviet representative this morning that the Soviet Union is ready to consider favourably the United States proposal for the establishment of a direct communication link between our two Governments. As I listened to what Mr. Tsarapkin said about our proposal it appeared to me that his remarks fitted well with what we had proposed." (ibid., p.55)

(Mr. Lall, India)

We realize that your Government is also involved, Mr. Chairman, but since this particular matter is so framed we should like to suggest to the two Governments chiefly involved that there would be no better use of the agreement to have a direct communications link between the two Governments than if they would use that link immediately to achieve a test ban. We suggest that the agreement in principle reached on 5 April is most opportune because it fits into the immediate requirements of the test ban issue; it fits into the need which has been expressed here, and which has been strongly voiced by all the non-aligned delegations in particular, that there should be no delay in reaching a test ban agreement.

It might take a few days for them to install the direct teletype system which they have agreed in principle to have for dealing with urgent situations, so I would go further and suggest that they should produce for this Conference and for the world -- and much more for the world than for this Conference -- a test ban agreement based on the spirit of that agreement which they have reached regarding direct communications. They know that that is what is needed of them; they know that the world demands it of them; they know that all the non-aligned countries present at this Conference hold that view very strongly. They know our views in detail, and so do you, Mr. Chairman. We hope that you will support this suggestion of ours that, in the spirit of the agreement which they reached on Friday, they should be duty bound to use the new communication system -- and the idea behind it even before they have that system -- to present us with a test ban agreement.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): Having in mind the need to end our meeting in due time, I promise to speak for a maximum of two minutes.

I carefully read the speech made by Senator Humphrey in the United States Senate of 7 March (ENDC/82), and I drew from it conclusions which are in keeping with those arrived at by other socialist delegations and expressed in this Committee. Today I have learned that the representative of the United States is contesting those conclusions. In view of that it seems that not all the delegations present here are in possession of the same text, and I wonder whether the representative of the United States would find it feasible to ask the Secretariat to circulate Senator Humphrey's speech of 7 March as a Conference document. I should be very grateful to the United States representative if he could tell us his views on this suggestion.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I should like to say a few words by way of reply. The first thing I cannot leave unanswered is that part of the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom in which, obviously abusing the right of the representatives here to speak on anything they like, he accused the representative of the Soviet Union of distorting the position of the Western Powers on the question of the number of inspections. But I should like to point out to the representative of the United Kingdom that I was quoting the statements of Mr. Godber, Sir Michael Wright and Mr. Stevenson from the verbatim records. I added nothing of my own; I did not put anything of my own into their mouths. But what I read from the verbatim records shows quite clearly that those gentlemen made an appeal to the Soviet Union to agree to two to three inspections a year. In this connexion I should like to say that if anyone has distorted the position of the Western Powers it is certainly not the person who quoted those statements; it is those who tried to comment on them in a different sense and as an afterthought. I think the matter is clear.

Now, speaking as the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber was puzzled as to why we regard inspection as an additional guarantee and asked "additional to what?" My reply is: an additional guarantee, of course, to national systems, because we consider -- and this now seems to be acknowledged by everyone -- that control over an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests must be based on national systems. Of course, Mr. Godber, I take into account the fact that you were not present at the meeting of 1 April, during which, in the course of my statement, I dealt in considerable detail with the serious changes which have taken place in the national detection system of the United States and to which Senator Humphrey referred in his statement in the Senate on 7 March. For your convenience I can remind you, Mr. Chairman, and not only as Chairman but also as the representative of the United Kingdom, of the following words spoken by Senator Humphrey in the Senate on 7 March:

"... our detection capability" -- he was referring to the United States detection system -- "is much greater than the press has led us to believe on the basis of the information it has received from the U.S. Government". (ENDC/82, p.20)

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

And Senator Humphrey further said:

"... the results in 3 years of research are phenomenal ..."

(ibid., p.24)

I draw your attention to the word "phenomenal".

Finally, it is also known that in a statement made in the United States Senate, the Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, speaking of the United States capability to detect violations of a nuclear test ban, said that this capability is greater than can be disclosed.

These hints, half admissions and direct statements regarding the extraordinary effectiveness of the national detection system of the United States are sufficiently eloquent confirmation of the fact that control on this basis would be effective and that inspection can be regarded merely as an additional guarantee also within the limits which we have indicated and which we have proposed.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I call on the representative of the United States, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): In response to the question put by the representative of Romania, I would say that my delegation would be very happy to make available to the Secretariat the text of Senator Humphrey's speech made on the floor of the Senate on 7 March this year. As is common practice, the Daily Congressional Record containing that speech by Senator Humphrey contains also certain interpolations made by other Senators during Senator Humphrey's statement which I think should be included too to make Senator Humphrey's statement clear. Therefore, we shall make available to the Secretariat the text of Senator Humphrey's statement of 7 March and the interpolations made during the course of that statement.

I referred earlier to a statement by Senator Humphrey appearing on page 3532 of that Daily Congressional Record. Mr. Tsarapkin also referred to that page, and in fact his quotation from Senator Humphrey was precisely the quotation I gave in my statement. We were speaking from the same portion of the same text, and I believe it can be left to representatives to read both statements and to see whether they conclude -- as I confidently believe they will -- that Senator Humphrey's actual statements refuted the misinterpretation of them which I believe was made by the Soviet and other Eastern delegations, or whether, as Mr. Tsarapkin claims, what Senator Humphrey said refuted Senator Humphrey.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I hesitate to take any more of the Committee's time, but I really must say one word as representative of the United Kingdom, following what our Soviet colleague said a few minutes ago. From the interpretation I understood him to say -- although I hope he did not -- that I was abusing my position as Chairman. That would be a very unfortunate thing indeed, and I hope it was not what he said. I understood him to say it in relation to my comments about his earlier speech in which he said that the Soviet Union had accepted proposals of two to three annual inspections put forward both officially and unofficially by the West. I denied that that was so; I deny it again now. In fact, the point has been gone over in this Committee so many times that I really do not think it is necessary to go into it again in detail. My own comments on it, and those of my United States colleague, are on record from previous discussions. They show quite clearly that the charge is incorrect and that, in fact, the statements in question were made in conditions where they were fully qualified by other statements. Again, it is a matter of taking quotations out of the record and not giving them in their true connotation.

I hope that that will suffice for the moment, but if the charge is brought up again I shall then feel bound to weary members of the Committee once more with a full repetition. But I hope that our Soviet colleague will not persist in his claim that I have in any way abused my position as Chairman of this Committee. That is a charge which I do and must reject.

Mr. KURKA (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): I do not intend to delay the Committee with polemics, and therefore I shall limit myself to a few remarks. I am, of course, very glad, Mr. Chairman, that you gave your kind attention to my statement and I am also very glad that you were not in a position today to say anything new, although you may not show the same measure of modesty as I did in my statement.

However, that is not what I wish to speak about. Perhaps, owing to an erroneous interpretation you did not understand that part of my statement where I spoke about being handcuffed in the field of seismology. Of course, that is a reference to Senator Humphrey's statement. You are, perhaps, well acquainted with the text of that statement in which he sincerely complained that a strict system of secrecy concerning scientific data in the field of seismology in the United States handcuffed all those who are interested in that question. I am saying that merely for the purpose of clarification. I do not think I can take a positive attitude towards your wish that I

(Mr. Kurka, Czechoslovakia)

should exert an influence on Mr. Tsarapkin and ask him to supply you with certain scientific data of the Soviet Union. You will remember quite well, Mr. Chairman, that at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly, when you yourself also spoke about the terrible responsibility which the Soviet Union was taking upon itself by withholding publication of certain methods of detection, Mr. Zorin gave you a clear answer when he said that the present relations between States did not allow of information in the field of nuclear weapons being freely exchanged or of supplying one another with information on the system of detection or verification. That is what Mr. Zorin said (A/C.1/PV.1246, p.61). But you, Mr. Chairman, are, of course, well aware that the point is not whether the governments of some particular Powers consider it possible or convenient to publish this or that scientific information. We must base ourselves on a realistic point of view. The point is how they use that scientific information for the purposes of our negotiations; that is the gist of the question: whether they use that information for the purpose of achieving a generally-acceptable agreement or for the purpose of preventing progress in our negotiations by putting forward demands unacceptable to the other side. I drew attention to that part of Senator Humphrey's statement in which he essentially admits that the United States possesses sufficient scientific information to enable the United States, I would say, without difficulty and without prejudicing its security, to give a positive response to the important political concession made by the Soviet Union. It is to that part of Senator Humphrey's statement that I drew particular attention. That is all I wished to say for the purpose of clarification.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

I wish to make the matter clear. In my statement I did not refer to you in your capacity as Chairman of our meeting today. I must say that no criticism applies to you as Chairman of our Conference. You are courteous and considerate enough. But the point is that when you begin to speak as the representative of the United Kingdom, you immediately undergo a transformation. And in this respect I should like to repeat what I said, namely, that you obviously abused the right of the representatives of States here to speak on anything they like, when you accused the Soviet representative of distorting the position of the Western Powers, whereas I quoted word for word your own statement and the statements made by Mr. Stevenson and Sir Michael Wright on the question of inspection. I should like to make this quite clear for the record so that Mr. Godber should not harbour the slightest doubt about my attitude towards him as Chairman of our Conference.

The CHAIRMAN (United Kingdom): I am very grateful for that reassurance, and feel that my Soviet colleague still has confidence in me as Chairman if in no other way.

Does any other representative wish to address the Committee? If not, I might just touch upon one point before proceeding to the communique. On Wednesday we shall of course be returning to the consideration of general and complete disarmament, and there is before the Conference the report which is to be submitted to the United Nations. It would perhaps be appropriate for any discussion of that report to be held at the beginning of business on Wednesday before we turn to other matters.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and nineteenth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Godber, the representative of the United Kingdom.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Czechoslovakia, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, India and Romania.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 10 April 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.