

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT**

PRIVATE  
ENDC/PV.41  
24 May 1962  
ENGLISH

---

**FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FORTY-FIRST MEETING**

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 24 May 1962, at 10.0 a.m.

**Chairman:**

**Mr. PADILLA NERVO**

**(Mexico)**

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELLO-FRANCO

Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS

Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO

Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON

U Tin MAUNG

U Ayo LWIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. J.E.G. HARDY

Mr. J.F.M. BELL

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. E. PEPICH

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. M. HAMID

Mr. A. MANDEFRO

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. C.K. GAIROLA

Mr. G.D. COMMAR

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. A. CAGIATI  
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI  
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO  
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG  
Miss E. AGUIRRE  
Mr. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. A.A. ATTA  
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI  
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. M. BIEN  
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU  
Mr. M. MALITZA  
Mr. C. SANDRU  
Mr. E. GLASER

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN  
Mr. G.A. WESTRING  
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN  
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. I.G. USACHEV  
Mr. V.N. ZHEREBTSOV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN  
Mr. A. EL ERIAN  
Mr. M.S. AHMED  
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

United Kingdom:

Sir Michael WRIGHT  
Mr. J.S.H. SHATTOCK  
Mr. J.H. LAMBERT  
Lord NORWICH

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN  
Mr. C.C. STELLE  
Mr. V. BAKER  
Mr. S.H. McINTYRE

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): I declare open the forty-first meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): On Monday the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin, set forth the conception of his delegation with regard to the measures of disarmament involving stage II (ENDC/PV.40). I consider that the proceedings of our Committee have thus advanced a step forward on the way we have to cover with steadfast determination. Today the Romanian delegation wishes to express some views in connexion with problems regarding stage II of the process of general and complete disarmament.

In our view the criterion for judging the proposals concerning stage II included in the two drafts we have before us is, as was the case with stage I, the extent to which the fulfilment of the respective plan ensures the liberation of mankind from the danger of a nuclear war and of wars in general. As concerns stage I there can be no doubt that the provisions of the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/2) correspond to this necessity better than those involved in the United States plan (ENDC/30 and Corr.1). This plan envisages that in a period of fifteen months from the time the treaty comes into force all nuclear weapon vehicles as well as military bases on foreign territories are to be destroyed, which in fact would put an end to the danger of a surprise attack, of a nuclear war. On the contrary, if we were to implement the proposal of the United States, the end of stage I would be come only after thirty-six months. I should like to remind Mr. Dean, who likes folk songs, of an English one, with a slightly modified text: "It's too long a way to Tipperary". On the other hand, even after thirty-six months, 70 per cent of the nuclear weapon vehicles and the military bases on foreign territories would be maintained, as would be the danger of a nuclear war.

What must we ask of a treaty on general and complete disarmament with regard to stage II? Taking into account that this is the second of three stages, we naturally must expect that what is essential in the entire process of disarmament will have been carried out at the end of stage II, and this essential is undoubtedly the complete and final elimination of the danger of a nuclear war.

Keeping this in mind, we note that, according to the Soviet draft, three years after the treaty on general and complete disarmament came into force a nuclear war would be inconceivable. Nuclear weapon vehicles and military bases on foreign territories would have been liquidated in stage I, while nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction would have been eliminated in stage II.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

What does the United States plan envisage in this connexion ? After three years we would find ourselves only at the end of stage I of the United States plan. At that time conventional armaments would have been reduced by 30 per cent, the means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets would subsist in a proportion of 7 per cent, while military bases on foreign territories would continue to exist. In such circumstances, three years after the United States plan had come into force the world would find itself, in fact, in a situation similar to the one in which it finds itself today, when both parties possess huge stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, the production of new and even more murderous weapons continues, and the danger of a nuclear war, of a surprise attack, being unleashed subsists. And, under the United States plan, after six years -- when, according to the Soviet draft, two years would already have elapsed since the achievement of disarmament -- the danger of a nuclear war would not only be maintained but, as demonstrated, would increase even more.

Here is another aspect. The United States outline treaty gives rise to serious doubts concerning the time when stage II starts and comes to an end. The provisions of the United States plan concerning the transition from stage I to stage II are of such a nature as to give rise to doubts concerning the actual possibility of passing from stage I to stage II. Therefore there is a question mark against stage II itself, since it is not clear either when this stage ends. It is agreed by us all that, once started, the process of general and complete disarmament must continue without interruption. This idea is most clearly expressed, also, in the "Statement on Disarmament" adopted by the Conference of the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth on 17 March 1961, which says: "Once started, the process of disarmament should be continued without interruption until it is completed".

However, as is clear from a first reading of the United States outline treaty, the United States Government reserves the right for that Government to state unilaterally that in its view the provisions concerning stage I have not been fulfilled by one or other party, thereby provoking the interruption of the disarmament process. This right refers not only to the fulfilment of concrete measures of disarmament such as the reduction of effectives of armed forces, the destruction of certain weapons or means of their production, but also to measures which are not susceptible of a precise, quantitative, numerical determination, such

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

as the working out of studies on numerous problems of which I want to mention only one, namely the establishment, in the light of studies, of the feasibility of final reduction and elimination of weapons of mass destruction.

Furthermore it seems that, although the United States document speaks only about transition, in fact the United States Government has a real stage of transition in mind. Thus, during a television broadcast at the end of April, Mr. Foster, a member of the United States delegation and the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, declared:

"And, of course, this is not a nine-year plan. We have set three years at the first stage. There is a transitional stage during which one appraises whether the appropriate amount of progress has been made on which you can go to the next stage. Another stage of three years, another transition. A last stage which may be -- I don't know; we are not wise enough to appraise how long that will be." (Press release No. 3983, United States Mission to the United Nations, April 1962, p.14).

I must confess that in connexion with this assertion I have certain misgivings, and I would therefore be grateful to the representative of the United States if he could give us some clarification either in this or in another meeting about the following questions.

According to chapter I, section H, "Transition", paragraph 4 (ENDC/30, p.27), after three years and three months procedures are to be started with the Security Council as to real or alleged infringements of the conditions concerning stage I in the United States document. How long, then, does the United States delegation think the transition period from stage I to stage II would be ?

Secondly, during the period of transition from one stage to another, according to the conception of the United States delegation are any disarmament measures to be taken, or does disarmament stop as soon as one stage has come to an end ? Does it stagnate during the period of transition from one stage to another, starting to work only after the period of transition has come to an end ?

The Soviet draft treaty establishes precise obligations as to the destruction of existing stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction and the banning of their production in any form. According to article 21, which defines the content of stage II, States assume the obligation to carry out the complete elimination of

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Article 22 specifies the concrete obligations concerning the elimination of nuclear weapons; while article 23 provides for the elimination of chemical, biological and radiological weapons. The elimination of all weapons of mass destruction should be completed during stage II; that is, only three years after the treaty on general and complete disarmament comes into force.

The document submitted by the United States delegation on 18 April offers an entirely different picture. In chapter I, section C, paragraph 6, it is stated that:

"The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine remaining unresolved questions relating to the means of accomplishing in stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles. In the light of this examination, the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements concerning nuclear weapons stockpiles." (ENDC/30, p.10)

Similar provisions are included in chapter I, section A, paragraph 4 of the United States proposals concerning chemical and biological weapons (ibid., p.7).

It is true that the United States document contains certain provisions on the reduction of weapons of mass destruction during stage II, and their elimination during stage III. We note, however, that these provisions are dependent on the results of the studies which are to be carried out during stage I; I refer to chapter II, section A, paragraph 5, concerning chemical and biological weapons. (ibid., p.22) and chapter II, section C, paragraph 1, concerning nuclear weapons (ibid., pp. 23 and 24).

It results that the United States proposals do not provide for concrete obligations as to weapons of mass destruction, but speak only of the perspective of studies during stage I and, depending on these studies, of the conclusion of special arrangements as to these weapons.

The question we put to the United States delegation is this. Why does the United States draft not provide for concrete, precise and unconditional obligations as to the elimination of weapons of mass destruction -- obligations to be included in the treaty on general and complete disarmament? Why does the United States document establish a nebulous juridical regime for the weapons of mass destruction? Is there any serious reason which, according to the United States Government, should impose this technique? This question arises all the more since it is the very existence of weapons of mass destruction which has determined the necessity and urgency of carrying out general and complete disarmament.



(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

If we are together here in this hall it is not so much because of the existence of tanks, guns, planes and other so-called conventional or classical weapons as the existence, power of destruction and ever-increasing number of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons represent a qualitatively new threat for mankind, the threat of entire peoples and countries being destroyed in case of an armed conflict.

Under these circumstances, we cannot help being surprised — and we submit that this is a fact that sets one thinking — that a plan on the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament entirely omits concrete obligations concerning the most important weapons. This means that, instead of a treaty on disarmament which would contain strict obligations as to the most destructive weapons, we are given only what the Romans used to call a "pactum de contrahendo", namely, an agreement to conclude a treaty. It is, however, difficult to believe that States will agree to undertake disarmament measures in the field of conventional armaments as long as there is no concrete obligation with regard to the elimination of nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons. General and complete disarmament necessarily calls for the establishment of only one juridical regime, put in a concrete form by only one treaty on disarmament, which would leave no room for doubt as to the concrete measures referring to the elimination of the totality of armaments at the disposal of States.

If we are gathered here in this Committee, it is because it has been considered that its very framework ensures the best conditions for presenting and discussing the positions of the different parties in all problems of disarmament and for finding the most acceptable solutions and working out the international instrument necessary for the implementation of such measures as might be agreed upon. If this is the case, then we wonder why, under the system proposed by the United States Government, the taking of decisions concerning nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is postponed until after the conclusion and coming into force of the treaty on general and complete disarmament: "Hic Rhodus, hic salta". It is here that we discuss the problems of disarmament; it is here that we work out the treaty on general and complete disarmament; and it is this very treaty that must provide for concrete obligations regarding the elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

The idea which may be drawn from the United States proposal in this connexion is that they want us to conclude not one treaty on general and complete disarmament, as is natural -- and, what is more, as we all agreed to conclude -- but two treaties: the first to be concluded in this Conference and the second, to be concluded during the first stage, if and in so far as an agreement is reached in the light of studies which are to be undertaken with regard to the reduction and elimination of weapons of mass destruction.

These are the reasons why the Romanian delegation requests the United States delegation to give up the proposed formula and, in the interest of achieving real disarmament, to admit that the obligation of States as to the elimination of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons should be unequivocally and unconditionally included in the very treaty on general and complete disarmament which is being worked out in this Conference.

If I have insisted today on the differences between the two drafts, I have done so being fully aware of the necessity of clarifying existing divergences, so that they may be eliminated. There are undoubtedly also certain similarities: for instance, the proposal regarding the effectives of armed forces, which according to the Soviet draft should at the end of stage II be one million, both for the Soviet Union and for the United States, and according to the United States draft should be 1,050,000. On this problem there is, of course, almost total agreement, and there should be no difficulty in laying this down in a written document.

The Romanian delegation is fully convinced of the necessity to make repeated efforts with a view to achieving an agreement on the contents of stage II of the process of general and complete disarmament. If it is a question of choice between the Soviet and the United States proposals concerning stage II, we are for the Soviet proposals, since they settle -- and within a short period of time -- our main task: that of totally eliminating once and for all the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear, chemical and bacteriological war from the life of the peoples; and, in fact, eliminating the danger of war in general.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): Before embarking on my speech on peace-keeping machinery I would like -- taking a leaf out of Mr. Zorin's book -- to tell the representative of Romania that he did not quote the next line of the song, "It's a long, long way to Tipperary". That line is: "But we'll be right there."

(Mr. Dean, United States)

On 21 May, at our fortieth plenary meeting, I set forth for the consideration of the Conference the basic philosophy underlying the importance which the United States attaches to effective arrangements for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the maintenance of peace. In so doing, I emphasized the inter-relationship between the development of effective peace-keeping arrangements and the implementation of measures for general and complete disarmament. This relationship, I pointed out, has a basis not only in logic but also in the efforts of our predecessors, whose objectives in seeking measures of disarmament in a peaceful world corresponded broadly to our own. This relationship has been affirmed most recently in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5).

Today I want to explain each of the specific proposals contained in the United States outline which are directed towards the problem of the peaceful settlement of disputes and which pertain to stage I (section H, pp. 17, 18). In subsequent statements in connexion with stages II and III, I expect to deal with the related questions of a United Nations peace force and a United Nations peace observation corps.

The first proposal in our outline treaty, section H, is entitled "Obligations concerning threat or use of force". Permit me to read out the language under this heading:

"The Parties to the Treaty would undertake obligations to refrain, in their international relations, from the threat or use of force of any type -- including nuclear, conventional, chemical or biological means of warfare -- contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter." (ENDC/30, p.17).

We believe that States must abide by their fundamental obligations to refrain from the threat or use of force contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, if we are going to proceed successfully down the uncharted road to general and complete disarmament. Our proposal, which I have just read, can only result, we submit, in a strengthening of the fundamental undertakings contained in the United Nations Charter. We think it is particularly important that all States should reaffirm these undertakings in connexion with the treaty providing for general and complete disarmament. Now when general and complete disarmament goes into effect, as we all hope it will, we are not sure -- and I doubt if anyone at this table, or anywhere else, could be sure -- that stability will necessarily increase through the process of disarmament. In fact there are

(Mr. Dean, United States)

people who believe -- and they seem to adduce good reasons for their opinion -- that stability will decrease. Despite our best efforts to create and support an international disarmament organization to verify disarmament obligations, our system may not work perfectly in all respects. Naturally we hope that it will, but occasionally a State may suspect that another State, perhaps a traditional rival, is not fulfilling its obligations. Distrust and disputes may develop. Consequently temptations may arise to end the disarmament process and to use such national forces as remain to gain national ends.

In addition, as all of us in this room are fully aware, great changes are taking place in the world. In the last several years many new countries have been welcomed into the family of nations, and this is good. Economic and political changes of vast proportions have occurred. So this is a dynamic, and not a static, international environment in which we live. In short, we cannot predict what unforeseen tensions and frictions may arise in the coming years. Therefore we must take steps to ensure, in this evolving context, that countries abide by their solemn obligations not to utilize force or the threat of force in their international relations, contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, if the goal of general and complete disarmament for which all of us are striving is to be reached.

I should like to call attention to one other point concerning this proposal. It specifically refers to "nuclear, conventional, chemical or biological means of warfare" as being included in the obligation. Thus we have focused on the particular requirement that nuclear force, as well as other types, be subject to the general prohibitions contained in the Charter of the United Nations.

The next paragraph of section H -- paragraph 2 -- of our outline treaty is entitled "Rules of international conduct". I will read out sub-paragraphs a and b of this paragraph:

"a. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a study by a subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organization of the codification and progressive development of rules of international conduct related to disarmament.

"b. The Parties to the Treaty would refrain from indirect aggression and subversion. The subsidiary body provided for in sub-paragraph a would also study methods of assuring States against indirect aggression or subversion." (ENDC/30, p.17)

(Mr. Dean, United States)

The United States believes, as I have already stated, that we must at least anticipate the possibility of some radical changes in the sphere of international relations as States move along the unprecedented road towards general and complete disarmament. There will undoubtedly be special political problems created by these far-reaching disarmament measures. An example of the type of problem we have in mind, a problem which already exists, is that of indirect aggression and subversion. Sub-paragraph b of our proposal on rules of international conduct states that parties to the disarmament treaty would refrain from indirect aggression and subversion. I should now like to explain why we think it is most important that States accept this obligation and actually abide by it, and how this action is directly related to disarmament.

I am sure that no one here is naive enough to believe that, just because armies and armaments have been eliminated, all forms of external interference directed against the sovereignty and independence of one State by another will cease. It is true that the means of mass destruction and devastating wars will be eliminated by general and complete disarmament. However, one State can still send into the territory of another subversive agents, persons who can instigate strikes, terrorists who can use home-made bombs, persons who can agitate groups of people into angry mobs, or who can advocate work stoppages or otherwise interfere in the domestic life of the other country. If States engage in such practices during the process of disarmament, there is considerable doubt that we can succeed in reaching the goal for which we are all striving, that is, general and complete disarmament. I will go even further: if States indulge in such practices after general and complete disarmament is reached, it is entirely possible that the condition of general and complete disarmament will not endure, that the scope and frequency of such violence as I have described will increase and that the United Nations force, despite our very best planning, will be unable to cope with the situation.

I do not mean to paint a picture of unlikely events just for the sake of indulging in drama. I believe it is incumbent upon us, as responsible representatives of governments, to recognize these possibilities, and I believe that it is also incumbent upon us to foresee these possibilities and to take the most effective steps that we can devise to prevent them from becoming realities.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Many members here may be familiar with the Hall of Archives in Washington. In front of that Hall there is a brooding figure, and below that brooding figure, carved on the stone, are the words: "What is past is prologue." An American family from the Middle West on a tourist trip to Washington stopped a taxi-cab driver and said to him: "What do those words mean?" He said: "Well, I don't rightly know, but it sounds to me like Washington gobbledegook for 'You ain't seen nuthin' yet'."

Some may say: "These generalities are all very well, but is it meaningful to require States to refrain from indirect aggression and subversion? Can these terms indeed be satisfactorily defined? Can these obligations be enforced?" These are naturally difficult questions. It is possible that some people may wish to try to formulate general definitions of these terms. It is also possible that some may wish to specify particular rules, which we have referred to as rules of international conduct and which will cover particular aspects of what everybody thinks of as indirect aggression or subversion. The difficulty of the task, combined with its absolute urgency, requires that a study be made of these problems. That is why we have suggested that a subsidiary body of the international disarmament organization study "methods of assuring States against indirect aggression or subversion".

In connexion with the entire subject of rules of international conduct, I might point out that the Soviet delegation apparently shares our view that rules or norms of international conduct should be considered and elaborated in connexion with disarmament. As a result of a Soviet proposal, as members know, we have been considering at rather great length -- and I hope with a real degree of progress -- a declaration against war propaganda. This declaration certainly involves rules of international conduct. Therefore, the precedent which our Soviet colleagues have introduced here in seeking to formulate rules of international conduct seems to us to be an exact precedent in support of our proposal.

I turn next to paragraph 3 of section H of the United States outline. It is entitled "Peaceful settlement of disputes". I will read out the three subparagraphs of this proposal:

"a. The Parties to the Treaty would utilize all appropriate processes for the peaceful settlement of all disputes which might arise between them and any other State, whether or not a Party to the Treaty, including

(Mr. Dean, United States)

negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, submission to the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations or other peaceful means of their choice.

"b. The Parties to the Treaty would agree that disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty which were not settled by negotiation or by the international disarmament organization would be subject to referral by any party to the dispute to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties concerned agreed on another mode of settlement.

"c. The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a study under the General Assembly of the United Nations of measures which should be undertaken to make existing arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, whether legal or political in nature, more effective; and to institute new procedures and arrangements where needed." (ENDC/30, pp. 17 - 18).

It is hard to see how anyone can really object to the first sub-paragraph of our proposal on the peaceful settlement of disputes. Naturally I am not attempting to say that our wording represents the most perfect formulation possible, but it is the concept here that must first be considered. We propose that the parties to the treaty utilize all appropriate processes for the peaceful settlement of all disputes, and then we go on to list some of the traditional methods of settling disputes. We also mention submission of disputes to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations. Our proposal, we believe, reflects the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 33 of the United Nations Charter. In order to refresh members' recollection I will read that provision:

"The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Now I would like to say a few words about our proposal that the parties to the treaty agree that a party to an unresolved dispute under the treaty may refer that dispute to the International Court of Justice. The representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin, had some words to say about this proposal which, upon study, I find a little difficult to understand. On 25 April at the twenty-seventh plenary meeting of this Committee the Soviet representative said that this proposal went:

"beyond the scope of the United Nations Charter." (ENDC/PV.27, p.34)

If we turn to the United Nations Charter, we find that Article 92 establishes the International Court of Justice. The Statute of that Court is annexed to the United Nations Charter. Article 36 of the Statute of the Court provides that the jurisdiction of the Court comprises, among other things, "all matters specially provided for ... in treaties and conventions in force." Having this basic provision -- Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court -- in mind, a great many multilateral treaties have been drawn up which contain clauses providing for the compulsory reference of unresolved disputes to the International Court. The Soviet Union itself is a party to a number of these treaties. Let me mention just a few of them: the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency; the Constitution of the World Health Organization; the Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and the Constitution of the International Labour Organization. Both the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as many other countries represented here, are parties to these treaties. It is therefore a little hard for me to see why the Soviet Union should feel that this proposal of the United States is an improper one, that is to say, is in some way "beyond the scope of the United Nations Charter".

However, we would not ask other countries to accept our proposal concerning the International Court of Justice simply because there are precedents in other treaties. In our view, this proposal has great intrinsic merit; it stands on its own two feet. As I have described earlier in my statement, we cannot realistically expect that disputes between States will vanish merely because we have begun the programme of general and complete disarmament. In fact, once we begin the unprecedented journey on which we are about to embark towards general and complete disarmament, some of our disputes may assume new and indeed different proportions. I am referring, of course, to disputes which may arise regarding the many and complex provisions of the general and complete disarmament treaty itself. Certain



(Mr. Dean, United States)

disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the treaty on general and complete disarmament may involve sensitive issues for the parties. For, after all, the disarmament process affects the national security of all the participating States. If disputes do arise, we should not leave the possibility open that they may linger on, aggravating tensions and threatening the entire success of the disarmament process, solely because one or other of the parties is obdurate in its refusal to permit the dispute to be resolved on any terms except those advanced by itself.

Naturally we appreciate that many differences concerning interpretation and application of the treaty would be solved as a result of the goodwill and intelligence of the parties in negotiations, and indeed by means short of reference to the International Court of Justice. But we do not think it wise to proceed upon the assumption that all disputes will be so resolved. Therefore, it seems to us a matter of prudence to include a provision whereby a continuing, disrupting and possibly threatening dispute can be sent, at the request of one of the parties, to the International Court of Justice, so that its opinion can establish the facts and the law of the dispute in question. I think that, on the basis of its record, that we can have confidence in the International Court of Justice. I think its past work justifies our respect. Its judges are eminent jurists, men of unquestioned juridical ability; a number of them come from countries represented at this Conference, including the Soviet Union -- and the current President of the Court, as is well known, is a citizen of Poland. The Court should be able, we believe, to render invaluable service in the event of unresolved disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the disarmament treaty.

The last sub-paragraph of our proposal on the peaceful settlement of disputes states that: "The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support a study under the General Assembly of the United Nations of measures which should be undertaken to make existing arrangements for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, whether legal or political in nature, more effective; and to institute new procedures and arrangements where needed." (ENDC/30, p.18).

Some members who read this proposal may be tempted to say: "Are you merely proposing another study? Have we not had enough studies?". Members may exclaim, as in the Book of Ecclesiastes, that "of making many books there is no end, and much study is a weariness of the flesh". In reviewing procedures and agreements which

(Mr. Dean, United States)

exist for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, we find that there is no dearth of available machinery. For instance, at the present time there are in force some 300 treaties for the peaceful settlement of disputes through investigation, conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement, or through a combination of these methods. There are, as I have already indicated, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 establishing the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Although I am not prepared to comment on the arrangements which countries represented at this Conference may have with various other countries, let me illustrate the extent of the existing possibilities by mentioning a few of the treaty arrangements of the United States.

The United States considers as continuing in force bilateral treaties of arbitration which it has with some twenty-nine other countries. The United States also considers as remaining in force some forty-eight bilateral treaties providing for conciliation. In addition, there exists a great many precedents and procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes under traditional international law.

In view of the great variety and number of procedures which have been developed, and in view of the great mass of precedents under these procedures, particularly those developed in the present century, the United States believes that all countries would benefit if the parties to the disarmament treaty were to agree to support a study of these procedures under the General Assembly of the United Nations. Such a study, as we envisage it, would explore the various advantages and disadvantages of the existing procedures. It would then consider the means by which these procedures could be made more effective, as well as determine if new procedures and arrangements were needed. Such a study would have the additional advantage that States participating in or supporting it would perforce become better informed about the potentialities of the great variety of procedures already available for settling disputes and, as a result, these procedures might come to be drawn upon with greater frequency. In other words, we believe that the type of study we have proposed would contribute substantially to the realization of the proposal contained in sub-paragraph a of paragraph 3 concerning peaceful settlement of disputes; that is, the proposal that parties to the treaty utilize all appropriate processes for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

I would not like to leave the impression that the United States believes that peace, stability and international justice can be achieved solely by the establishment or improvement of legal machinery. What will be required is that the governments and peoples of States not only manifest their determination to settle their differences by peaceful means, but also carry out this determination in practice.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

We come next to the last specific proposal which I wish to talk about today. This is paragraph 4, entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security". I will first read this proposal:

"The Parties to the Treaty would agree to support measures strengthening the structure, authority, and operation of the United Nations so as to improve its capability to maintain international peace and security." (ENDC/30, p.18)

Within the framework of the United Nations Charter we have already developed a wide variety of instruments for pacific settlement. We have used the techniques of debate, negotiation and conciliation in the General Assembly and the Security Council. We have used mediators and conciliators. We have used commissions for observation and fact-finding. Perhaps most important, we have witnessed the growing role of the United Nations Secretary-General, primarily formulated by the late, distinguished Dag Hammarskjold and continued by his distinguished successor, U Thant of Burma, in facilitating negotiations between Members and establishing United Nations "presences" in areas of potential conflict.

When general and complete disarmament is achieved -- as I am sure it will be -- we shall have to make further progress in strengthening the United Nations as an institution for settling disputes. It might be possible to improve in a number of ways the machinery we already have. For instance, we might consider ways of developing more efficient General Assembly procedures, of facilitating access of United Nations Members to mediators and conciliators, and of strengthening the independence and authority of the international civil service.

While a number of us may differ about the precise means which should be employed for strengthening the United Nations in pacific settlement, I think we can all agree on the objective. After all, every State has a direct interest, related to its own security, in enabling the United Nations to fulfil the crucial responsibilities it will have in the disarmed and peaceful world we are seeking.

I would now like to reply very briefly to some of the remarks which our colleague from the Soviet Union made on Monday last (ENDC/PV.40) concerning my first statement on the subject of maintaining peace and improving the machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes. His remarks concerning our proposal for a United Nations peace force will, I believe, be more fully answered when I address myself, as I plan to do in a later statement, to the details of our proposals concerning a United Nations peace force. However, with respect to my general statement, the Soviet representative said:

(Mr. Dean, United States)

"At the same time the United States tell us that disarmament cannot begin unless these political controversies are settled by the definite procedures it advocates. We thus get a vicious circle and can do nothing otherwise. We consider that this approach is wrong". (ENDC/PV.40, p.20)

I submit, with great deference, that the summary of our position which the Soviet representative gave distorts that position. We have tried to point out the close relationship between disarmament and maintenance of the peace and peaceful settlement of disputes because we think that in fact such a close relationship does exist. I have tried to demonstrate this relationship in my statement. I further believe that this relationship will continue to exist without regard to what we may say or do here. We in the United States desire to achieve general and complete disarmament at as early a date as is possible. In our study of how we may succeed in this endeavour, we have reached the conclusion that an accompanying effort must be made leading to very substantial improvements in the field of the maintenance of peace and the peaceful settlement of disputes. We think this is only realism. We do not mean, I assure the Committee, to set up artificial obstacles. On the contrary, perceiving the real obstacles to general and complete disarmament which may exist, we wish to face them squarely, to plan for them and to do our utmost to conquer them. In our view, this is the only realistic approach for those who, like my Government and, I am sure, the Government of every delegation in this room, approach disarmament as a very serious matter.

The Soviet representative suggests that the United States will insist on "the definite procedures it" -- that is, the United States - "advocates". This, I again submit with great deference, is not a correct statement of our position. I assure members, as they know already, that it is not the United States alone which will determine the procedures for maintaining the peace and improving the means for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Many, many countries must participate in formulating agreement on these measures. Even if we wanted to -- and we do not -- we could not maintain the peace all by ourselves, without the co-operation of others. As we have indicated time and again, our proposals are suggestions and we will welcome other suggestions. We invite everyone here to explore with us what should be agreed upon to strengthen procedures for maintaining the peace and settling disputes, so that we may stand a better chance of achieving our great goal of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

What we are proposing is to think through our problems and to make sure that we can carry out general and complete disarmament.

Mr. HAJEK (Czechoslovakia): My delegation, as long ago as on 16 May, referred to the fact that we have reached a point in our discussion when hardly anything new in substance can be said on the first stage of general and complete disarmament (ENDC/PV.38). It seems to me that the discussion which we have heard since then has fully confirmed this view. This seems also to be the opinion of a number of our colleagues, such as the representative of the United Arab Republic, who stated at our fortieth meeting on 21 May:

"Each party has reviewed at length the strategic lay-out of its defences, its armament and disarmament theories. We have been given a full picture of where both East and West apparently stand on disarmament, control and other problems." (ENDC/PV.40, p.13)

In fact, what else can we say at this juncture which would constitute substantial progress for our work on the first stage of the disarmament treaty? With all the respect which we have for our colleagues who have so far spoken on the first stage, I must say this: On the one hand, some delegations have in their interventions insisted on technical details and aspects which we will need, and will be able, to take up only in the next stage of our work, after having completed the first reading of the whole complex of questions concerning general and complete disarmament and after having solved the basic problems.

On the other hand, because nothing of substance can be said which immediately concerns stage I, some of our colleagues have brought up some problems of importance, the contents of which are not limited to the first stage of general and complete disarmament. This we noticed in particular in the intervention of the representative of the United States on 21 May and in his statement this morning on questions of the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace -- questions which in nature and logic are certainly not exclusively linked with the first stage and cannot be usefully discussed in connexion with the first stage alone. On the contrary, these questions may effectively be considered only after the first reading of substantial features of all three stages has been completed.

Anyway, this has already been pointed out here by the representative of India, Mr. Lall, who said at our meeting on 21 May:

"It might be possible ... to discuss the international disarmament organization at the end of our first-round discussion of the substantive disarmament measures in the three stages." (ENDC/PV.40, p.41)

(Mr. Hajek, Czechoslovakia)

It seems to me that this applies also to the general questions concerning the relationship between disarmament and control, as well as to the suggestions on a possible shifting of individual measures from one stage to another that have been made by some speakers in the recent discussions.

The Czechoslovak delegation therefore appreciated the exposition made by Mr. Zorin on 21 May, introducing the second stage of the draft on general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union, which brought our Committee to the discussion of the basic features of this second stage of general and complete disarmament. My delegation would like to follow this path. And, as was the case with our intervention of 4 May in respect to the first stage (ENDC/PV.31), I should like to deal with one specific aspect of the disarmament measures proposed for the second stage, namely, how they contribute to the safeguarding of security and peace in the world.

There is little doubt that this security and peace is threatened mainly by the danger of a nuclear war. Of course, this morning Mr. Dean, the representative of the United States, alleged that there was a danger in actions which he described generally as indirect aggression and subversion. However, from the practical examples he gave it seems that what he is concerned about are strikes or actions resulting from national liberation movements against colonialism -- that is, manifestations of the will of oppressed people, the responsibility for which I think must lie in the misrule of the governing classes and governing circles rather than in manoeuvres of another country. Certainly, viewed historically, the greater threat to the security of the people and to the peace of the world has come from those who have intervened against these manifestations of peoples trying to fulfil their justified aspirations; the greater danger has come from those who, interpreting these manifestations in the same way as the United States representative seems to interpret them, have used such manifestations as a pretext for intervening. I do not think we need go very far to find examples of how peace may be endangered in this way. In the opinion of my delegation, to send the Marine Corps to the borders of Laos at a time when the people's forces are making headway is certainly not action which would contribute to the strengthening of security and peace.

My delegation is also of the opinion that the dangers resulting in such cases would be easily dispelled if all governments abided consistently by the United Nations Charter and if they gave up the dangerous and sterile habit of all reactionaries in history, namely, of interpreting the manifestations of the

(Mr. Hajek, Czechoslovakia)

justified aspirations of peoples as manoeuvres of some other States and branding them as indirect aggression. However, the emphasis which the United States delegation seems to place on this alleged danger of indirect aggression perhaps explains, at least partly, why the United States plan is in no haste to eliminate the only real threat to security, that is, the possibility to start and wage nuclear war.

But the Soviet draft treaty hits the point in this connexion not only in the first stage, where the possibility of launching a nuclear attack would, in substance, be eliminated, but also in the second stage, where the logic and firm internal coherence of the Soviet draft treaty is manifested in the fact that nuclear weapons, immobilized in the first stage, would in the second stage be completely eliminated, their production prohibited, and their stockpiles destroyed; fissionable materials would be used exclusively for peaceful purposes through a special fund belonging to the respective State. The Soviet draft thus practically envisages that two and a half years after the start of the process of general and complete disarmament the danger of a nuclear war would be eliminated once and for all, with all the consequences ensuing therefrom for mankind.

How does this compare with the United States outline? That outline does not give security to the nations and to humanity. It does not deliver them from the danger of a nuclear war even by the end of stage II -- that is, using the figures in the United States plan, even after six years have elapsed. This plan does not envisage complete elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles even in stage II. At the beginning of stage III, in fact, States would be in possession of 35 per cent of the original level of delivery vehicles. It is hardly necessary to underline that, in a stage of affairs in which the number of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles is in the thousands, the remaining 35 per cent represents a considerable capacity for launching a nuclear attack with the use of huge megaton destructive power.

Even less satisfying are the proposals in the United States plan for stage II in respect of nuclear weapons themselves. They would not be completely destroyed, as is called for in the Soviet draft. Their stockpiles would only be reduced and the degree of reduction is not even specified in the United States plan -- while production of them would go on because it is explicitly stated in the United States plan in section C, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph d, that:

(Mr. Hajek, Czechoslovakia)

"Production or refabrication of nuclear weapons from any remaining fissionable materials would be subject to agreed limitations."

(ENDC/30, p.24)

This means that production, although limited in some way, would go on. There is, on the one hand, an unspecified reduction of the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and, on the other hand, their continued production, limited though it may be. The United States outline treaty therefore not only would not provide for a reduction of the danger of a nuclear war but would most probably even increase it, since the production, and most likely also the development, of more modern and more destructive types of nuclear weapons would continue. I know there is in the United States plan mention also of development, but we must take into consideration that if we continued production it would be very difficult to eliminate the development and tendency to perfect what would be produced.

The United States representative himself said at our meeting on 4 May that:

"... nuclear weapons are in fact the crucial index of destructive military capability, and as long as these weapons remain the threat of this destructive capability remains." (ENDC/PV.31, p.17)

As may be seen, the United States plan tries to keep this very threat alive throughout stage II of general and complete disarmament.

The Soviet proposal that in the course of the second stage the production of nuclear weapons should be stopped and prohibited, and that all stocks of nuclear and other weapons capable of mass destruction should be completely eliminated, is linked with far-reaching, widely expanded, effective and realistic control measures. I think these control measures are a precise example of the basic position of the Soviet delegation and the delegations of other socialist States, namely, that effective control, which should exclude any other purpose is possible only with radical and far-reaching disarmament measures, because, as may be seen from the Soviet draft treaty, the organs of the international disarmament organization would control on the spot the destruction of all stocks of nuclear weapons, the liquidation or conversion to peaceful purposes of all plants, facilities and laboratories engaged in the production of fissionable materials, and nuclear weapons or their parts. The whole process of the production of fissionable materials for peaceful purposes would also be inspected on the spot. But such full and perfect inspection and control are possible only if we destroy all possibilities of misusing nuclear power for purposes of war.



(Mr. Hajek, Czechoslovakia)

The advantages of the Soviet plan for the complete elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction within the process of one stage are evident here again. Such a consistent approach makes it possible to introduce full and maximum effective control which could not be misused for intelligence purposes. This would naturally also contribute to the promotion of confidence among States and the safeguarding of their security.

As concerns the United States plan, what has been said in the discussion on the provisions of stage I applies here as well. The maximum of control which it demands also for stage II, providing for a further partial reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and a negligible reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons, might be used by a potential aggressor for the preparation for a nuclear attack. In some of our previous interventions we quoted the opinion of so distinguished an authority of the Western world as Mr. Kissinger concerning the dangerous possibilities which such inadequate control would give to a potential aggressor.

This danger remains even if so-called zonal inspection is put into effect. Under the terms of the United States plan, nuclear weapons and the means for their delivery would exist as late as the beginning of stage III, while control and inspection would be extended over ever-larger regions in the territories of the respective countries monitoring the exact dislocation of the most important means for the defence of the country. This would be done prior to their elimination within the framework of disarmament.

Thus the United States plan provides for the very opposite of what should be achieved. It would result in no relaxation but, on the contrary, in the growth of mistrust among nations; and, in view of the existing danger of a nuclear war, in a threat to their security.

The Czechoslovak delegation is gratified to state that the measures envisaged for the second stage of general and complete disarmament in the Soviet draft are well balanced and thus fully in keeping with point 5 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5).

The United States proposal treats these questions in a quite different manner. In addition to what I have already said, the United States proposal does not envisage, even in stage II, the complete liquidation of all military bases on foreign territory, and provides for the dismantling of those which will be "agreed upon", as is said in the United States plan. With the continued existence of

(Mr. Hajek, Czechoslovakia)

nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, this would provide the NATO countries with significant military advantages; and this, of course, is contrary to point 5 of the Joint Statement.

What are the conclusions of our comparison of the provisions contained in the Soviet draft treaty and the United States outline for the second stage from the point of view of maintaining and strengthening the security and peace of the world ?

The Soviet draft on the second stage is built on a solid basis represented by the provisions proposed for the first stage. The measures to be undertaken in the second stage are logically derived from the former. Their implementation would mean that by the end of the second stage, that is, after two and a half years of the disarmament process, at a time when according to the United States plan only the first stage would have been completed, the possibility of waging a nuclear war would be excluded. In addition to that, in view of the reduction of armed forces, by the Soviet Union and the United States, to one million men in the second stage, the possibility of conducting a war with conventional weapons would, to a considerable extent, also be eliminated.

The United States proposal for the second stage, on the other hand, has no solid starting basis in the provisions of the first stage, since this is only a conglomerate of various partial measures, mostly of a control nature, which, by that very nature, would only increase mistrust and endanger the security of the world, instead of strengthening it. As far as the second stage in the United States plan is concerned, the proposals are of such a character that even after the lapse of six years the risk of a nuclear war would not be eliminated. This risk would still be there, with all its negative consequences on confidence in the relations among States and on their security.

The only point where the United States plan is more or less identical with the level envisaged in the Soviet draft is in the field of conventional armed forces. Of course, we must consider that the timing of this reduction is quite different in the Soviet and United States plans and, in view of the serious shortcomings in the field of nuclear weapons and their nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, and in view of the planned continued existence of military bases on foreign territory, this formal reduction cannot satisfy the requirements of security. The authors of the United States plan have attempted in vain to make up for inadequacies in principle by recommending some subsidiary measures, as they did in the case of the first stage.

(Mr. Hajek, Czechoslovakia)

As we have demonstrated, a comparison of measures proposed for the second stage in the two proposals before us speaks once more in favour of the draft of the Soviet Union, since this is a more realistic and well-balanced plan, the implementation of which would, by as early as the end of the second stage, deliver mankind from the threat of a nuclear war, reduce the possibility of a conflict even with the use of conventional arms, and thus best ensure the security of the world and all the nations at large.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): The delegations of the socialist countries have already begun to give their views on the second stage of the Soviet plan and we have followed their statements with interest. But, like several delegations here, I had reserved the right to make a few additional comments regarding the first stage of disarmament, and I should like to assure the representative of Czechoslovakia that these are not comments on points of detail.

If I speak again on the subject of the first stage it is because I consider this first stage to be the most critical one. The first stage of disarmament must be carried out in a world in which the political situation is still difficult, whereas the subsequent stages may be facilitated by the development of mutual confidence and by the relaxation of tension which will follow the implementation of the first disarmament measures.

It seems to me that the Soviet proposals for the first stage do not take sufficient account of these realities, that is to say, of the lack of understanding which unfortunately still exists between us. That is why I think it would be difficult to eliminate in a very short period of time and at the outset all the armaments which at present constitute the most effective means of defence for both sides, namely nuclear weapon vehicles. It is the present world situation itself which makes advisable and suggests the adoption of a more gradual disarmament system. While it has always been thought that complete disarmament must be carried out in several stages, the idea has been that the various disarmament measures should be distributed gradually and harmoniously in these stages, not that the most important measures should be concentrated in a single stage, the first.

I would point out in passing that the Soviet plan of 19 September 1959 (A/4219) did not provide for the elimination of bases and nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage, but in later stages. It was not until June 1960 that the Soviet Government placed these measures in the first stage. In order to achieve general

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

and complete disarmament, we are in favour of a gradual and over-all reduction of armaments so as to set in motion the disarmament machinery in a progressive and balanced manner, thus reducing the danger little by little and creating an atmosphere of increasing relaxation of tension following the first positive results. Of course, this gradual reduction, which under the United States plan would be 30 per cent in the first stage, must apply to all armaments, including nuclear weapon vehicles and bases. I think that, on our part, this point has already been clearly explained. The armaments of bases must also be gradually reduced. These bases will become less and less dangerous to either side and, by common agreement, will be eliminated altogether at a certain point in the disarmament process.

Thus the gradual reduction of armaments and armed forces over the different stages will meet the fundamental requirement of maintaining the balance of forces during the disarmament process. Obviously this balance will be established in each stage and each year at a lower and less dangerous level. But we are convinced that the maintenance of this balance is indispensable, so as not to jeopardize mutual security. I also think that perhaps insufficient thought has been given to the technical difficulty of eliminating all nuclear weapon vehicles within a year or eighteen months. This operation covers missiles of all calibres, almost all aircraft, ships and submarines and heavy artillery, not to mention launching sites and special trains capable of transporting missiles.

This is obviously a vast operation. It will, moreover, have to be carried out under strict control which cannot be organized overnight. Hence this immense operation of controlled destruction will inevitably require a fairly long time. If we put these measures into a single stage - the first - we shall be faced with the physical impossibility of implementing the provisions of the treaty within the agreed time-limits that have been laid down. That would be a very serious matter. The result would be to make it impossible to implement the treaty punctually, even if there were the best goodwill on both sides, and that would have the gravest consequences.

As I have already said, these operations should be properly controlled. I hope that the delegations of the socialist countries will not hold it against me if I stress the question of control. To judge by their most recent statements, they seem to think that for us control is crucial and disarmament of secondary important. That is not so. We are interested in control because we are ready to advance along the path of disarmament in so far as disarmament is accompanied by control.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

In this connexion, I would remind you of what the representative of the United Arab Republic said at the fortieth plenary meeting:

"In our modest opinion, control and verification should be considered the safety-valves of the disarmament machinery. On their adequacy, effectiveness and strictness depend the amount of confidence generated and the final success of the operation." (ENDC/PV.40, p.18)

Solving the problem of control, in our opinion, would mean solving at the same time the disarmament problem. We know that this binomial, disarmament-control, comprises risks. We have already said that we are ready to accept them. But the problem must be carefully studied with full awareness of these risks, which should not exceed reasonable limits.

I dealt specifically with control over the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles at the meeting on 14 May (ENDC/PV.36), when I asked the Soviet delegation some questions, to which no reply has yet been given. However, the statements of the Soviet delegation have now made it fairly clear to us what that delegation understands by 100 per cent control over the elimination of vehicles. It seems to me - and I hope I am wrong - that the Soviet Government is not prepared to allow complete and effective freedom of inspection over the whole of its territory where nuclear weapon vehicles are concerned, that is to say, to permit the application of article 38 of its treaty in the first stage, restricted, of course, to the specific sector of vehicles. All the Soviet Government seems willing to do is to concentrate the vehicles reported to the international disarmament organization at certain points in its territory and to invite international inspectors to confirm the destruction of these devices. However, in our opinion, this is not complete control over a sector, that is to say, the control which should logically correspond to complete disarmament in that sector. Much more would be required for 100 per cent control. There would have to be - solely for the control of vehicles of course - complete freedom of inspection of the same kind as that provided for in article 38 of the draft Soviet treaty for complete disarmament.

Furthermore, since I have still received no reply, I raise once again the question of control of the remaining armed forces. Logically, these forces - whether they number 1.7 million or 2.1 million - should, according to the Soviet view point, which we share, be subject, in principle, to partial control, because complete disarmament will not yet have been achieved. But these forces are at present equipped with nuclear weapon vehicles, namely, nuclear artillery and small

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

missiles. How will we guarantee that, after the conclusion of the agreement on the elimination of all vehicles, the authorized armed forces will not retain at least a part of this artillery and these small-calibre missiles? Under the Soviet plan, will these forces be subject to international verification for this purpose?

There is another point to which I want to draw attention. It is not quite clear to us from our study of the Soviet plan how the retained forces will be armed. The references to this question are rather vague, for it is merely stated that the armaments of these forces will be proportionate to their size. But what is to be the ratio between the size of the forces and the size of the armaments? I think this is a very complex problem. Remember, too, that the Soviet draft makes no provision for the cessation of production of nuclear bombs and of nuclear tests in the first stage. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the retained forces, while keeping relatively light artillery, from being equipped with miniature nuclear bombs as a result of further tests and new production. On the contrary, if the reduction of armaments, including vehicles, is gradual, we know how the retained forces will be armed. We know that they will have 30 per cent less in the first stage, 30 per cent less in the second stage and so on. These measures will be accompanied by a control which, under the United States plan, seems to be based on the formula: disarmament proportionate to control.

That is precisely the principle underlying the system of control by zones. The acceptance, through control by zones, of this formula of disarmament proportionate to control - which the Soviet delegation has always advocated as fundamental in order to avoid an excessive control regarded as espionage - is now depicted by the Soviet delegation as deriving from the fact that the Western countries have recognized the physical impossibility of carrying out complete control. The Soviet delegation even seems to hold the view that complete control is impossible, even for a limited sector, during disarmament and considers it feasible only at the end of the disarmament process when, perhaps, it would be less necessary.

The Soviet delegation would also like to apply this impossibility to control by zones as proposed by the United States. We cannot share that opinion. In Italy, for instance, a few years ago, we made an experiment with aerial photographs of our territory which yielded remarkable results. The smallest details came out clearly and sharply. Some of these photographs taken at different altitudes by the Italian Air Force, have been left by my delegation with the Secretariat of the Conference and are available to any delegation which may wish to examine them.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

According to our technical data, a B.47 ordinary reconnaissance aeroplane flying at an altitude of 10,000 metres, can, with the co-operation of the countries concerned, take photographs which would be extremely useful for control purposes over an area of 38.4 million square km in a period of 48 hours. It seems to me therefore that for zonal inspection purposes aerial inspection could play a very important part, naturally under the authority of the international disarmament organization, with the co-operation of the countries concerned and, of course, within the strict limits of the zones to be inspected.

In any case, the possibility or impossibility of control is a technical problem. I personally do not think that it would be a waste of time to study it thoroughly with the assistance of a technical committee. There is a proposal by the Brazilian representative on this subject which I gladly support and which we should all support if we have no ulterior motives.

I turn now to another matter which has attracted the attention of the Conference during the last few days, -- the transition from one stage of disarmament to the next. It is understood that the transition from one stage to the next must be conditional on the determination that all the measures laid down for the preceding stage have been carried out conscientiously and completely. The Soviet delegation, however, seems to assert that the arrangements for transition provided for in the United States plan reveal the intention never to pass on to the second stage at all. In this connexion, reference has been made to the problem of the veto, both in the Security Council and the control organization.

Permit me to say that I am not an enthusiastic advocate of the right of veto. It led to such unfortunate experiences in the functioning of the Security Council that the United Nations had to seek new methods of overcoming the difficulties resulting from it by appealing democratically to the General Assembly. However, so long as the Charter includes the right of veto, the disarmament process cannot escape the veto. Failure by one of the parties to comply conscientiously with the disarmament treaty would obviously constitute a threat to peace. This would fall, in one way or another, within the competence of the Security Council and would consequently become subject to the veto.

I personally should like the disarmament organization to enjoy wider powers than those provided, particularly, in the Soviet plan. According to this plan, the disarmament organization would simply take note of facts and would have no

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

further powers. I believe, however, that it should exercise active functions of persuasion and encouragement in following closely the whole disarmament process, and should be empowered, inter alia, to make recommendations.

One of the parties may fail to carry out certain disarmament measures through mere negligence and without any ill will. In such a case it would be a serious mistake to suspend the application of the treaty or to refer the matter to the Security Council, when a recommendation by the disarmament organization to the State concerned might suffice to rectify the situation.

I even think -- and here I am indirectly approaching the idea put forward by the Indian representative -- that the Eighteen-Nation Committee might, in some way, constitute the embryo of the disarmament organization. Having thoroughly studied the disarmament questions, this Committee, if converted into a permanent body, might do very useful work in expediting and supervising disarmament. This is not a proposal, but an idea which I pass on to the Conference.

I should like now to turn very briefly to that part of our work relating to the building of a new world which must accompany the elimination of armaments. These are two operations which must proceed hand in hand. As one goes forward so must the other also, for they are two pillars of the same building. As armaments are eliminated, law must take the place of force.

We have heard interesting statements by Mr. Dean on this last point at the last meeting and today. The United States representative outlined the basic features of the legal organization of the future world. Of course, they call for further and more detailed study, despite the important contribution already made by the United States delegation. At all events, however, the idea of sanctions is implicit in that of the law -- I refer to Mr. de Mello Franco, who is an eminent lawyer, on this point. Without sanctions, the word "law" is meaningless.

Sanctions cannot be applied in respect of violations of the law of nations unless there is an international police force. The establishment of a United Nations international police force is thus directly bound up with our work on disarmament. We envisage a strengthening of the United Nations, whose Charter did not foresee a completely disarmed world. This is a new fact that we must take into consideration. The United Nations therefore must have at its disposal adequate international forces to protect all countries, large and small, against any aggression. These forces cannot



(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

be merged or combined with those which each State will be authorized to retain for the maintenance of public order within its own territory. These international forces must remain separate from other forces and be kept constantly at the disposal of the United Nations. If we were merely to organize forces which might be made available to the United Nations in the event of danger and which would otherwise normally remain at the disposal of each State, such forces would not only be insufficiently effective, but they would give rise to dangerous situations.

In this connexion, I should like to consider the consequences of implementing the Soviet proposals. I shall first take the hypothesis that the internal police force authorized for each State would be strictly proportional to the requirements of internal order. In this case, if the United Nations were to request the services of part of that force at any time, the State making the transfer would no longer have adequate forces to safeguard public order within the country. The police forces remaining at the disposal of that State would be inadequate.

The second hypothesis is that, in the anticipation of the need to make part of their national police forces available to the United Nations at some time, States would safeguard themselves by demanding larger national police forces than are strictly necessary for the maintenance of internal public order. In that case, a State which, in view of the size of its territory or population, was authorized to retain fairly large police forces, would have a considerable military advantage over other States and could undertake aggression against a smaller country.

Those are the difficulties which would confront us if we were to merge the internal police forces with the international police forces, as the Soviet draft treaty seems to wish to do.

What should be the scope and size of the international forces according to our way of thinking? It is still too early to decide this. But it is obvious that, in view of the great area of the world and the tasks which those forces would have to undertake, they should be large enough to enforce respect for the law upon all, at any time and in any place. They should be capable of taking effective preventive and enforcement action in every case, because that is the only way in which the smaller countries, which will be deprived of their armed forces and their military alliances, will be able to feel reassured.

I apologize for this long statement, but I thought it necessary before the discussion of the first stage is concluded, to give the Italian delegation's views

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

on certain problems on which it had not yet spoken. I hope that this will not delay the work of the Conference and that the obscurities to which I have drawn attention will be clarified by the delegations which have submitted the two draft treaties on general and complete disarmament.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Before going into the details of the statement which the Soviet delegation has deemed it necessary to make today, I wish to make two brief comments in connexion with the statement just made by the representative of Italy.

First, what the representative of Italy has said about his understanding of the Soviet Union's position in regard to 100 per cent verification of weapons to be destroyed, does not in fact correspond to the position of the Soviet Union. The assumption of the representative of Italy that the Soviet Union will not provide an opportunity to carry out full control over the type of armaments to be destroyed 100 per cent does not accord with the truth. We are prepared to provide an opportunity to carry out full verification of the 100 per cent destruction of such armaments, that is, of the armaments which are to be destroyed at a given stage.

How this can be carried out in practice is a question that obviously requires clarification and a concrete study of the methods of verification. But in principle, we are in favour of it. Therefore, the suppositions and doubts expressed by the representative of Italy on this score are unfounded. It seems to me that if one read carefully our statements on this subject, it would be impossible to draw such a conclusion as that which the representative of Italy arrived at.

My second comment concerns the verification of what remains. In this connexion, I should like to draw attention to one argument put forward by the representative of Italy when he gave as an example the photographing of the territory of Italy or part of it by a B-47 aeroplane. He put forward this example, if I understood him correctly, as proving that there are no particular difficulties in verifying the remaining armaments if one uses all means of verification, in particular, aerial photography. But I must say that the example given by the representative of Italy merely shows that with aerial photography it is indeed possible to obtain an idea about suitable targets for bombing. That is true. It is also possible to pinpoint all the main objectives situated in the territory of any country. But it would be impossible to verify by means of aerial photography the contents of warehouses. I think the representative of Italy will agree with that.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Therefore, when he put forward the example of aerial photography as proving that control over the remaining armaments is not very complicated, he was certainly wrong. By means of photography one can gain an idea about targets for future bombings. But we do not want to give such an opportunity to anyone who would like to check up on a country. We do not want this, because it does not create favourable conditions for disarmament but, on the contrary, it creates a danger of sudden attack. Therefore, we consider this method of verification altogether unacceptable.

Those are the two comments I wanted to make in connexion with what the representative of Italy has said today. As for his remarks on the question of armed forces and questions relating to the strengthening of peace, I reserve my comments until we consider the matter in earnest, which will probably be at the end of our analysis of the stages of disarmament. However, I can say straight away that when the representative of Italy stated that law must take the place of force, his subsequent analysis showed that he understands law itself as an international force, an armed force. But how law can take the place of force and then put forward force itself as, strictly speaking, the basis of law is something I do not quite understand. However, I do not want to go into the details of this question now. We shall come back to it when we analyse certain general questions relating to all stages of disarmament.

I should now like to deal with the questions which have already been under consideration by the Conference in connexion with the second stage of disarmament. At the fortieth plenary meeting on 21 May, the Soviet delegation explained the proposals for the second stage contained in the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted by the Soviet Government. The nature and course of the debate showed very clearly how right the Soviet delegation had been in doing so. I have in mind, above all, the statements made by Mr. Hassan, the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Barrington, the representative of Burma, and Mr. Lall, the representative of India.

We intend to deal later on with the specific questions which they raised in their statements. However, I must point out straight away the main idea expressed by the representatives of those countries. This idea, so it seems to us, is that in order to find ways and means to reach agreement we must also, in addition to the discussion on the first stage, review proposals for the second and third stages. This will not only give us a very clear picture of our positions, but enable us to ascertain possible bases for bringing them closer together.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Even the statements of the United States representative, Mr. Dean, and the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, despite their intention, provide additional arguments in favour of immediate consideration of the second and third stages of disarmament. In endeavouring to justify the general philosophy of the United States which makes disarmament conditional on so-called measures for the maintenance of peace and the settlement of disputes between States, Mr. Dean reminded us of a series of international conferences which have considered the problem of disarmament in the past. Having in mind the experience of the League of Nations, Mr. Dean stressed that the main theme of negotiations in that organization was "arbitration, security and disarmament". The result of these negotiations is well known. In Mr. Dean's formulation, disarmament is in third place; indeed, it found itself in the background, because it was pushed back by talks about security and arbitration, and was then buried.

Mr. Dean warned us that we would commit a serious mistake if we ignored the experience of the past. But, Mr. Dean, we certainly do not wish to ignore the experience of the past, and that is why we are against making disarmament conditional on all sorts of collateral measures, including those you have listed. We do not want endless delays in our negotiations and therefore we propose to consider as quickly as possible the main subject of the proposals that have been submitted, namely disarmament measures at all stages, and thus find ways and means to reach agreement.

Although the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, did not refer to the experience of the past, there was a whiff of the League of Nations in his statement. The main idea put forward in his statement was a proposal to undertake technical studies of the verification arrangements which, as he said, "would have to accompany the specific disarmament proposals made in the two plans that are before the Committee". (ENDC/PV.40 p.38) Mr. Burns said that he did not want "a study of verification problems in the abstract". (*ibid.*) But, Mr. Burns, it is precisely a study in the abstract, a study divorced from life, that you are proposing. There is no need for us to busy ourselves with a technical analysis of the control and verification proposals contained in the two disarmament plans, upon neither of which has agreement yet been reached. Comments concerning plans which have not yet been accepted and which would be the result of carrying out Mr. Burn's proposal would not be of the slightest assistance in our work and would not help us to bring our positions closer together.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

One cannot but agree with the comments of the representatives of Burma and India who reached the conclusion that the main disagreement at present is not on the question of control and certainly not on its details, but on the actual substance and contents of the disarmament stages. It is on reaching agreement on these questions that we ought to concentrate all our efforts.

At the thirty-ninth plenary meeting on 18 May, we dwelt in detail on what we regard as the main task of the second stage of disarmament. The greatest threat to the peoples of the world today is the threat of a nuclear war, and it is our duty to remove that threat. We recall that in one of his statements the representative of India, Mr. Lall, said that the Soviet Union's proposal for the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons in the first stage had its attraction. The same thought was repeated by the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Hassan, in his statement. Of course it is not difficult to understand why this proposal has its attraction. It is in keeping with the interests of the peoples of the world because it makes it possible to neutralize nuclear weapons within a very short time and thereby eliminate in a practical way the possibility of a nuclear war breaking out. In our proposals for the second stage which, as it were, develop the logic of the first stage measures, we provide for the prohibition and complete elimination of the nuclear weapons themselves.

The representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Hassan, speaking of atomic weapons, emphasized that one is led "to think of the necessity for their elimination" (ibid., p.16). In this connexion he referred to the United States proposal for the establishment of a committee of scientific experts to study the question of control over the reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons. We note the right idea which Mr. Hassan expressed in his statement and which we fully share, when he said that "... once that treaty is signed and ratified, there should be no room for hinging its implementation on any other conditions." (ibid.)

We can say that it is precisely on this cardinal provision that the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament has been built up. Our proposals concerning the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the second stage of disarmament are laid down in the form of strict obligations which are binding upon States. We not only define measures for the physical destruction of nuclear weapons and the discontinuance of their production, we not only lay down as a mandatory condition the implementation of each of these measures under the supervision

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

and control of the international disarmament organization, but we protect States against the possibility of nuclear weapons being re-established. Article 22, paragraph 3, of our draft treaty reads:

"Each State party to the Treaty shall, in accordance with its constitutional procedure, enact legislation on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and on amenability under the criminal law for any attempts at their re-establishment by individuals or organizations."

(ENDC/2, p.15)

If we now look at the United States proposal from this point of view -- from the point of view of trustworthiness of obligations -- we must, unfortunately, come to the conclusion that they in no way guarantee the elimination of the threat which is inherent in nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. When discussing the first stage of disarmament Mr. Dean assured us that the United States endeavours to achieve disarmament in all fields and even provides for a far greater measure of disarmament in the nuclear field in the first stage than the Soviet Union. However, I am bound to say that a study of the United States proposals for the second stage leads us to a very gloomy conclusion.

Let us consider the United States proposals. At the same time I shall compare them with the Soviet proposals, so that the Committee members may have a clear idea of the difference between the two plans.

The Soviet Union, as I have already pointed out, proposes the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, buttressed by the cessation of their production, under international control of course, and the enactment by States of laws imposing severe penalties on whosoever should attempt to re-establish nuclear weapons. What do we find in the United States plan in regard to all these questions?

Firstly, the second stage of the United States document provides merely for a reduction of nuclear weapons -- not their complete elimination which would free the world forever of the threat of a nuclear war, but merely a reduction. In studying the formulations of the United States proposals one cannot help asking the question: what reduction of nuclear weapons does the United States have in mind? On this score the representatives of the United States, from whom we have so often heard statements about the detailed nature of their proposals, display an amazing shyness. All we find in the United States document is a reference to the fact that the reduction of nuclear weapons will be carried out on the basis of an agreed percentage reduction;

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

this was mentioned today by the representative of Czechoslovakia. In practice, this may hold out hopes of a very small if not completely insignificant reduction.

It should be added that even this reduction is most problematic because it is accompanied by reservations to the effect that it will be undertaken in the light of a study by technical experts of the question of control over reductions. We understand the doubts of Mr. Hassan, the representative of the United Arab Republic, who was anxious to find out from the United States delegation what the precise aims of a study of this nature were. One thing is certain: when there is unwillingness really to eliminate nuclear weapons, a technical study may serve as a convenient screen to cover up this unwillingness.

I said "unwillingness". I may add that I am moved not by mistrust, to which the representative of Burma, Mr. Barrington, referred in his statement at the fortieth plenary meeting on 21 May, but by the idea which one cannot help gathering from the United States document. Let us turn to sub-paragraph 1.d. of section C of stage II of the United States plan. There we find it stated in black and white:

"Production or refabrication of nuclear weapons from any remaining fissionable materials ..." (ENDC/30, p.24)

This was also mentioned today by the representatives of Romania and Czechoslovakia.

Whereas the Soviet proposal provides for the complete cessation of production of nuclear weapons under international control, the United States document goes in an altogether different direction. It provides, in stage II, for the retention of production and even the possibility of refabricating nuclear weapons, although in limited quantities. One may well ask how it is possible for such provisions to be compatible with a plan of really general and complete disarmament or with a genuine desire to put an end to nuclear weapons.

Another remarkable fact stands out quite clearly. When the United States representative explained the United States proposals for stage I of disarmament, he displayed particular interest in the idea that States should submit information concerning nuclear weapon delivery vehicles -- in the first place, powerful rockets -- and other categories of armaments. He argued that this was necessary, extremely necessary, in order to ensure effective control. But oddly enough, when we go into the United States proposals for stage II of disarmament, we see an altogether different situation.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Let us look at sub-paragraph I.a. of section C of stage II of the United States plan. It states:

"The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration stating the amounts, types, and nature of utilization of all their fissionable materials." (ibid., p.23)

I draw the attention of the members of the Committee to the fact that the United States is not speaking here about the submission of information concerning existing nuclear weapons, the amounts, categories and types of nuclear weapons, but only concerning fissionable materials. The difference here is, of course, substantial.

In proposing the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, in the second stage, the Soviet Union provides that States, before proceeding to implement this measure, should submit the necessary information about their existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons. But the United States, as we see, speaks only of information about fissionable materials.

However, when exactly does the United States envisage the submission of information about nuclear weapons? From paragraph 2 of section C of stage II of the United States plan, it follows that this information would be submitted only during the last six months of stage II. The United States wants to obtain information about rockets even before disarmament starts, whereas it intends to submit information about nuclear weapons after the completion of a whole stage of disarmament.

The whole scheme of the reduction of nuclear weapons under the United States plan is essentially contradictory. How can one really speak of any agreed percentage reduction when the submission of information about nuclear weapons is deferred to the end, to the time when the reduction is to be completed?

But that is not the main point. The main point is that the second stage in the United States plan does not at all ensure the elimination of nuclear weapons and does not put an end to the threat of a nuclear war.

Side by side with the elimination of nuclear weapons, the Soviet draft treaty, as we have already explained in our previous statement, ensures the destruction of chemical, biological, and other types of weapons of mass destruction. With regard to these types of weapons also, the United States document strikes one by its lack of precision and vagueness. As in the case of nuclear weapons, the very possibility of implementing measures in the field of chemical and bacteriological weapons, is hedged, in the United States document, with the now familiar reservations "in the light of" an examination of this question by technical experts.



(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

What, then, can we expect in regard to the elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons under the United States plan? Let us read section A, paragraph 5.a., sub-paragraph (2) of the United States plan ("Additional Measures"). It states:

"The reduction, by agreed categories, of stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction to levels fifty per cent below those existing at the beginning of Stage II." (ibid., p.22)

For the sake of clarity, we wish to recall that under the United States plan measures in regard to chemical and biological weapons begin in stage II. Therefore, the phrase "those existing at the beginning of Stage II", means the amounts of these types of weapons, which States now have or will have at their disposal at the beginning of stage II. What conclusions can be drawn from this paragraph? That not all types of chemical and biological weapons but only a certain part of them will be reduced, and then only by 50 per cent.

Let us now compare this United States proposal with the Soviet proposal for the complete destruction of all stockpiles and all types of chemical, biological, and other weapons of mass destruction. We ask whether the United States proposal does away with the possibility of chemical and other types of weapons of mass destruction being used in stages II and III. There can be only one answer: No, it does not.

In his statement at the meeting on 21 May, the United Arab Republic representative, Mr. Hassan, dealt in detail with the question of power balance and the need to observe this balance during the disarmament process. He asked in particular:

"... what measures can be thought of, what new ideas can be adduced by the Soviet Union to satisfy the West's fears of the Warsaw Pact's emerging superiority in the conventional means of warfare?" (ENDC/PV.40, p.13)

It seems to me that the United Arab Republic representative himself answered this question to some extent. A little later he referred to statements by Western representatives that the West now relies more on its atomic deterrent than on its conventional forces. These statements show how far-fetched is talk about the superior strength of the Soviet Union and its allies in conventional armaments. If this talk is at all necessary for any purpose, it is to justify a further increase in nuclear armaments.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Let us suppose, however, that the fears of the Western Powers are well-founded. What safeguards are proposed by the Soviet Union to ensure the equal position of the two sides in the disarmament process? When considering the first stage of disarmament, we drew the attention of the members of the Committee to the fact that, simultaneously with the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and foreign military bases in alien territories, we provide for a drastic reduction of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States to 1,700,000 men, that is to that level which the Western Powers at one time regarded as ensuring balance during the disarmament process. The representative of the United Arab Republic said one was puzzled to note that:

"it is the other side which is actually suggesting the reduction to the lower force level previously suggested by the United States." (ibid., p.15)

Indeed, we are proposing a lower level, and we are also puzzled by the fact that the United States, which expresses fears regarding the size of Soviet armed forces, does not agree with our proposal which is precisely intended to dispel these fears.

In the second stage we propose to go even further along the path of reducing force levels by bringing the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States down to the level of 1,000,000 men. In our opinion, this ensures that the equal position of States is maintained also in the second stage of disarmament. On the other hand, we do not find in the United States document that the equal position of States is maintained from the point of view of ensuring their security either in the first or in the second stage of disarmament.

It was, of course, no coincidence that the representative of the United Arab Republic dealt with the question of the elimination of foreign military bases in alien territories in that part of his statement, where he spoke about the equal position of States. The simultaneous elimination of foreign military bases in alien territories and of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles is an indispensable condition for the maintenance of the equal position of the sides. We have already explained why this is so and we shall not repeat what we have said. We need only point out the fact that, as is evident from the statements made by the representative of the United Arab Republic and a number of other representatives, the necessity of the speediest elimination of foreign military bases in alien territories is meeting with general understanding.

The disturbance of the equal position of States in the first stage of the United States disarmament plan becomes even more striking when we study the United States proposal for the second stage of disarmament. The vagueness, which characterizes

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

the United States proposal regarding nuclear weapons, is repeated in regard to the reduction of foreign military bases, provided for in stage II of the United States plan. In the first place, the United States avoids altogether any reference to foreign military bases in alien territories and obscures the issue with a phrase about military bases in general. In section D, paragraph 1, of this document, the United States speaks of the reduction of "agreed" military bases. In conditions where foreign and national military bases are lumped together, this can mean that the measures will affect only national, or almost only national military bases. There is such a possibility, and it would be unforgivable to ignore it.

We could not but draw attention also to the fact that the United States, which is so touchy about control, when it comes to nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, is content with extremely vague formulations in regard to control over the reduction of military bases. Section D, paragraph 2 b, has only a modest reference to "the annex on verification". This point, in my opinion, is very noteworthy.

The representative of Burma, Mr. Barrington, whose statement was imbued with a desire to find ways of overcoming differences, made the following remark:

"It would be my delegation's hope that between them these stages could contain all the major elements of disarmament such as the elimination of all nuclear weapons and their carriers, reduction of armed forces and armaments and liquidation of all potentially offensive military bases, and that stage III would be devoted mainly to providing for the smooth transition of States to a disarmed world." (ENDC/PV.40, p.35)

We agree with the idea expressed in this remark by Mr. Barrington.

It is clear from the explanations, which the Soviet delegation has given on the first and second stages of disarmament, that they contain these major elements of disarmament, including the elimination of all nuclear weapons and their carriers, the substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments and the elimination of foreign military bases. These two stages lead to the final measures, the aim of which is to cleanse the world of any remaining armaments. Our proposals have been drafted in such a way as to ensure the smooth transition from stage I to stage II and from stage II to stage III, or, to use Mr. Barrington's words, "to a disarmed world".

Much attention has been devoted in the Committee to the fact that the United States proposal contains built-in conditions, which not only do not ensure a smooth transition from stage I to stage II and from stage II to stage III, but even render

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

doubtful the possibility of any transition. The misgivings expressed in this connexion during the discussion of stage I become more serious when we study the United States proposal for the transition from stage II to stage III. The old conditions are supplemented by new ones, which make transition even more complicated. Thus, stage II, section 6, paragraph 2, sub-paragraphs a. and b. in the United States document, lay down the requirement that States should adopt so-called "rules of international conduct" and agree to arrangements necessary to assure States against "indirect aggression and subversion" (ENDC/PV: p.27). Mr. Dean spoke about this today.

What is intended here is to afford States having the right of veto the opportunity of putting forward as a justification for not wishing to pass on to the third stage the assertion that certain conditions connected with measures of disarmament itself or control have not been fulfilled or that there is no agreement regarding "rules of international conduct" and assurances against "indirect aggression and subversion". There is no need to mention that there are profound differences of interpretation regarding "rules of international conduct". The representative of Ethiopia, in particular, spoke about this very convincingly when we discussed the draft preamble. Everyone interprets these rules in his own way. Thus, the United States, for example, considers it normal to impose all kinds of restrictions on international trade, and it not only does so itself but compels its allies to do likewise. It also interprets "indirect aggression and subversion" in its own way. I shall not go further into this matter.

In conclusion, the Soviet delegation deems it necessary to dwell on the question of control. In the statements made by Mr. Barrington, the representative of Burma, and Mr. Hassan, the representative of the United Arab Republic, they pointed out the close internal relationship between disarmament and control. There is indeed a relationship between them and, as is evident from our explanations in regard to stages I and II of disarmament, we start out from the principle that each disarmament step must be accompanied by corresponding control.

In our opinion, the representative of India, Mr. Lall, put forward some very sensible considerations on the question of control. He pointed out that fears regarding the possibility of weapons being concealed were unfounded if one considered the question in the context of the increased coverage of inspection. That is precisely how we visualise control. In this connexion, we do not quite understand Mr. Lall's remark that in the disarmament proposals under consideration

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

the proposal for increasing the coverage has not been explained sufficiently. We do not assume any responsibility for the United States proposal. However, our concept of control, as laid down in the Soviet draft treaty, is based precisely on the idea of increasing control. In this connexion, the Soviet Government memorandum submitted in the Committee at the same time as the draft treaty states:

"The draft Treaty prepared by the Soviet Government provides for the extension of international control -- stage by stage -- to those elements of the military machinery of States which are subject to elimination at the corresponding stages of disarmament. In the first stage it will be the means of delivering nuclear weapons to their targets, foreign military bases and foreign troops in alien territories, because it will be these components of the military machinery of States that are to be subject to elimination during the first stage. In the second stage it will be the nuclear weapons themselves, and other types of weapons of mass destruction. In the third stage it will be central and local military institutions, military training establishments, etc.

"As regards armed forces and conventional armaments the draft Treaty takes account of the fact that during the first and second stages they will be merely reduced, while their complete elimination is slated for the third stage. That is why control in the first two stages is proposed over the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, and not over those forces and armaments that will be retained by States. In the third stage armed forces and armaments are to be completely eliminated, and therefore control over the implementation of this measure will assume a comprehensive nature." (ENDC/3, p.9)

It is abundantly clear from this quotation from our memorandum that the Soviet Union provides for continuing inspection and increased coverage, which is just what Mr. Lall spoke about. This shows once again how unfounded are the assertions of the Western representatives about the possibility of armaments being concealed or manufactured clandestinely.

I have one more brief remark. Mr. Hassan, the United Arab Republic representative, speaking about the desirability of making efforts to resolve differences, in particular concerning the elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, pointed out that past projects of the sides provided for the gradual abolition of these means of delivery. I have to make the following correction: the Soviet Union

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

has not put forward such a proposal. As for the United States proposals, which, incidentally, the United States representative mentioned at one of our meetings, their real meaning was not the gradual elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons but the establishment of control over them.

We have no other possibility of removing the danger of a nuclear war than by eliminating nuclear weapons or their means of delivery. There is no other choice. Since it is already recognized by everyone that it is much easier to implement measures in regard to the means of delivery than in regard to the nuclear weapons themselves, the realistic and practical way to eliminate the threat of a nuclear war is to destroy at the very beginning of disarmament all the means of delivering nuclear weapons. If we add to this the destruction of the nuclear weapons themselves in stage II of disarmament, as proposed in the Soviet draft treaty, the threat of a nuclear war will be completely and finally eliminated. That will solve the most vital problem confronting the world at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): I wish to announce that tomorrow, Friday 25 May at 10 a.m., there will be a meeting of the Committee of the Whole. We hope it will be a short one. The two co-Chairmen will submit a draft declaration against war propaganda, together with some joint suggestions with regard to the various items to be discussed next in the Committee of the Whole. This short meeting of the Committee of the Whole will be followed immediately by the forty-second meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its forty-first plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva under the chairmanship of Mr. Padilla Nervo, representative of Mexico.

"The representatives of Romania, the United States, Czechoslovakia, Italy and the Soviet Union made statements.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 25 May 1962, after the meeting of the Committee of the Whole."

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.