

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-THIRD MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 12 June 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. ARTHUR S. LALL

(India)

cdc.63-877

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO

Mr. E. ROSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CERISTOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. V. ISHIRLIEV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS

Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. L. SIMOVIC

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. Z. SEINER

Mr. F. DOBIAS

Ethiopia:

Ato M. CHEBEYELU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. S.B. DESAI

Italy:

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI

Mr. P. TOZZOLI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. S. SERBANESCU
Mr. S. CELAC

Sweden:

Baron C.E. von PLATEN
Mr. G. ZETTERQVIST

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. O.A. GRINEVSKY
Mr. I.M. PALENYKH

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. M.S. AHMED
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN
Mr. J.M. EDES

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. A.L. RICHARDS
Mr. D.E. MARK
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (India): I declare open the one hundred and forty-third plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

As I happen to be in the chair at this meeting, which is the first that has been held since a certain important statement was made, I feel the Conference would wish me to refer to that statement before calling on the first speaker for today.

I have in mind the most important and encouraging announcement which was made by the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, in a speech which he delivered at the American University on 10 June. I should like to read into the record a relevant part of that announcement. It is as follows:

"... Chairman Khrushchev, Prime Minister Macmillan and I have agreed that high-level discussions will shortly begin in Moscow looking towards early agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty. Our hopes must be tempered with the caution of history -- but with our hopes go the hopes of all mankind." (ENDC/95,p.6)

I would suggest that this agreement between the President of the United States, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom shows their joint determination and will to reach agreement on the test ban issue -- an agreement which has been under consideration for five years at Geneva and which, I am sure, we would agree the peoples of the world consider now to be overdue. I am sure that we all should welcome this expression of determination, faith and will to reach agreement, and I presume that in due course our co-Chairmen will give us a little more information officially about this development.

Mr. SIMOVIC (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): An objective analysis of the proposals, arguments and results of the discussion of paragraphs 5(b) and 5(c) of the agreed programme of work (ENDC/1/Add.3), namely, the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and the reduction of conventional armaments, is bound to raise the question why no result has been achieved so far in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament. It appears that the socialist countries and the States members of NATO approach the main tasks of our Committee in altogether different ways.

We deeply regret that, despite all the efforts exerted and all the arguments put forward during the past months of our negotiations by the delegations of the socialist countries, we have still not succeeded in convincing our partners representing the NATO countries that the threat of a nuclear war which is hanging so directly over mankind, as well as the specific characteristics of nuclear missile weapons, require the adoption of drastic, effective, and immediate disarmament measures. As the Czechoslovak delegation

(Mr. Simovic Czechoslovakia)

and the delegations of the other socialist countries have convincingly shown, the Soviet Union's proposals open up a sure way to the achievement of this aim (ENDC/2/Rev.1).

On the other hand, the way recommended to us by the delegations of the NATO countries for the achievement of this aim is protracted, ineffective and--considering the nature of nuclear missile weapons--dangerous, and for this reason unacceptable. This applies to the questions we have discussed so far, and also to item 5(d), which is now under consideration.

The Czechoslovak delegation listened with great interest to the repeated explanations offered on 15 May (ENDC/PV.132, pp.32 et seq.) and on 5 June (ENDC/PV.140) by the United States representative on the so-called "philosophy" of the United States approach to the solution of the problem of disarmament. Basically, Mr. Stelle summed up this so-called philosophy of the United States approach in the following words:

"... the United States has reached the conclusion that the most feasible, equitable and politically sound method of reaching our common objective is through a gradual and progressive reduction of the military capability of States in the areas of existing armaments, that is, more or less across the board, with such progressive reduction extending over the whole process of disarmament." (ENDC/PV.140, p. 13)

Let us see how this principle of the United States approach to the question of disarmament fits the solution of the problem we are dealing with, namely, nuclear disarmament in stage 1 of general and complete disarmament.

As we well know, our task is to discuss and recommend effective measures which would lead in the very first stage of disarmament to the elimination of the threat of a nuclear conflict. To achieve this aim, the United States and its allies propose in the first place to halt the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, in particular uranium 235 and plutonium, as well as to transfer about 50 tons of uranium 235 from military to peaceful production in the United States and the Soviet Union.

When speaking about the Western proposals on 5 June, Mr. Stelle did not hesitate to assert that they would be a practical measure to put an end to the armaments race. As regards the transfer of fissionable materials, he said:

"... such transfer would reduce the capability of the respective States of producing nuclear weapons and thus would be a real measure of disarmament."
(ENDC/PV.140, p. 17)

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

With the best will in the world, it is difficult to bring this assertion of the United States representative into line with reality. The cessation of the production of fissionable materials by itself can in no way halt the armaments race. There would be nothing to prevent the development of new types of nuclear weapons and their production by drawing on the existing stocks of these materials. We find it difficult to understand what led the United States delegation to such a categorical and unfounded assertion.

As regards the proposed transfer of 50 tons of fissionable materials to peaceful purposes, this would likewise have no practical significance from the standpoint of reducing the danger of a nuclear conflict, as has already been pointed out by the delegations of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

The representatives of the countries members of NATO know very well, for example, that the quantities of fissionable materials already produced in the United States are so great that further production is unnecessary and meaningless even from the military standpoint, and that in a certain sense there has even been an "overproduction".

In the past we ourselves have already pointed out the existence of huge stockpiles of fissionable materials which have been accumulated in the United States. Permit me to quote again the words of the United States author, Mr. R.E. Lapp, who states on page 43 of his book Kill and Overkill, in referring to stockpiles of fissionable materials:

(continued in English)

"By 1967, at the present rate, the fissionable stockpile will reach some 1,000 tons--equal to 200,000 Hiroshima bombs! Bear in mind that this material may be used as a trigger for H-bombs, which multiply the explosive power many times ..."

(continued in Russian)

We have already had the opportunity--as the delegations of the other socialist countries have also had--to point out in this connexion that the stockpiles of nuclear weapons existing in the world are so great that there is hardly any need from the military standpoint to increase them still further. Instead of giving lengthy explanations, I should like to quote the words of another United States writer, Mr. A.T. Hadley, who as far back as 1961 stated with regard to the stockpiles of nuclear weapons existing in the United States that:

(continued in English)

"... the weapons in the United States stockpile have an explosive power roughly equivalent to 35 kilomegatons (35 billion tons of TNT)...

... In the form of TNT this much explosive power would fill a string of freight cars

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

stretching from the earth to the moon and back 15 times ..." (The Nations' Safety and Arms Control, page 3)

(continued in Russian):

It is therefore obvious that the transfer of 50 or even more tons of uranium 235 to peaceful uses would not really solve anything, not to mention the one-sidedness of this proposal, since it would not apply to the United Kingdom and France.

Thus a sober evaluation of the actual situation does not support the assertions of the United States representative in regard to the significance of the measures he has proposed in the field of fissionable materials. These measures would not slow down the armaments race; they are not decisive as regards the further production of nuclear weapons, and therefore, they are anything but an "effective disarmament measure", (ENDC/PV.140, p.17) to use the words of Mr. Stelle.

Let us now take a look at the other aspects of the proposals of the Western Powers in regard to the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes. The United States draft treaty states the following:

"The Parties to the Treaty would submit to the International Disarmament Organization a declaration listing by name, location and production capacity every facility under their jurisdiction capable of producing and processing fissionable materials at the agreed date." (ENDC/30, p.8)

It further states:

"... the International Disarmament Organization would verify the foregoing measures at declared facilities". (ibid.)

Consequently, without any real disarmament measures in the field of nuclear weapons, there would be international control over facilities producing and processing fissionable materials. In practice this would mean that the foreign inspectors would obtain the most precise data regarding the overall production capacity of the State concerned, not only with regard to the quantity of these weapons but also with regard to their quality, their various possible uses, explosive power, specific characteristics and so on. That this would indeed be the situation is evident in a wider context from the arguments contained in the document submitted last year by the United Kingdom delegation on control of fissile material production (ENDC/60).

The proposals of the Western Powers are not in keeping with the principle that the scope and nature of the control measures should be determined by the scope and nature of the disarmament measures. They would mean control without disarmament with all the dangerous consequences which would ensue for the security of States.

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

The implementation of the United States proposals would not lead to reducing the nuclear threat; on the contrary, the proposed control would make it possible--given the retention or, rather, a slight reduction of the existing stockpiles of fissionable materials-- to obtain information which could then be used for improving one's own nuclear weapons. This would lead to a further increase of tension, increased mistrust and a further accumulation of nuclear armaments.

I leave aside the fact that such control without disarmament would also lead to extensive industrial espionage, since the nuclear industry directly reflects the results of the all-round technological progress of a country and the level of development of its key branches of industry.

For this reason it is difficult to avoid the impression that with their proposals in the field of fissionable materials, the Western Powers are trying in another way to achieve in many respects what they were unable to achieve with the notorious Baruch Plan.

In studying the views of the Western Powers with regard to item 5(d) of the agenda, our delegation also noted the amazing efforts made on 29 May by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, to prove that it is impossible to carry out 100 per cent control over past production of fissionable materials for military purposes. He concluded that:

"We may, therefore, be unlikely to be able to achieve complete, total nuclear disarmament until we can establish peace-keeping machinery..." (ENDC/PV.138,p.41)

Perhaps I am again running the risk of being accused by the United Kingdom representative of distorting the meaning of his statement. That is why I have quoted, as I did on 7 June (ENDC/PV.141) the words of the verbatim record, Mr. Godber's own words.

This assertion of the United Kingdom representative leads us to two conclusions:

First, if the situation is really as Mr. Godber says it is, if there is a possibility of concealing up to 20 per cent of the fissionable materials produced in the past with a view to using them for the production of nuclear weapons, then would it not be right to solve the problem of the elimination of nuclear weapons in a drastic and qualitative manner, in the sense of the proposals of the Soviet Union? Only the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in the first or second stages of disarmament (the choice here lies, as we know, with the Western Powers) under strict international control or the neutralization of nuclear weapons through the destruction of their means of delivery, could definitely eliminate the threat of a nuclear war.

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

If Mr. Godber's efforts were really aimed at achieving progress in the question of disarmament and if he were consistent in his reasoning, then he would have to agree to 100 per cent destruction of the means of delivery, in accordance with the Soviet Union's proposal, which lays down a realistic way out of the situation in question.

But no such consistency can be found in Mr. Godber's reasoning. Therefore we are bound to draw the other conclusion, namely, that the United Kingdom delegation wishes to use the impossibility of having 100 per cent control of past production of fissionable materials for military purposes as a new, additional argument in support of the alleged impossibility of carrying out a programme of nuclear disarmament and, consequently, general and complete disarmament altogether.

It is clear that this so-called "philosophy" of the United States' fundamental approach to disarmament in the case of item 5(d) does not lead us to our objective, not to mention the fact that the authors of the United States Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament (ENDC/30) apparently felt that the much-vaunted method of across-the-board percentage reduction in the field of nuclear disarmament was too radical and for this reason they coyly refrain from mentioning it.

But facts are inescapable, and the facts show convincingly that it is not the United States draft treaty but the Soviet draft treaty which lays down a reliable way also in the field of nuclear disarmament. The Western Powers are faced with a choice: either to neutralize nuclear weapons by eliminating their means of delivery or to destroy the weapons themselves in the first or second stage. No third course will lead to our objective.

The Soviet representative, Mr. Tsarapkin, has already dealt very thoroughly with the provisions of article 22 of the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2/Rev.1) on 5 June (ENDC/PV.140,p.27), and therefore I do not consider it necessary to repeat what he said.

I should like to emphasize, however, that the strict international control envisaged in the Soviet draft treaty provides reliable guarantees that the danger of a nuclear war would really be eliminated. Simultaneously with the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons there would no longer be any grounds for the fears of the Western Powers about what would happen if a State were to conceal a certain number of nuclear weapons.

I began my statement today with a polemic against the "philosophy" of the United States' fundamental approach to the disarmament problem and I intend to conclude in a like manner. How can one escape the conviction that this so-called "philosophy"

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

expounded by the United States and its NATO allies in this forum and in all other places where disarmament is being discussed is merely a screen to hide the real philosophy of the military and strategic plans and way of thinking, which dominates in the West? It is a screen to hide the policy of accelerating the nuclear armaments race, the policy based on nuclear weapons, which, according to the Secretary of Defence of the United States, Mr. McNamara, are intended to be "an effective instrument of national policy" of the United States.

But the delegations of the Socialist countries have already repeatedly spoken here about this.

The policy based on nuclear weapons, of which, you, the Western representatives, are making a veritable fetish, is the real reason why you do not wish to go with the socialist and non-aligned countries along the path of drastic measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. Your Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament provides no satisfactory and convincing guarantees that you will ever agree to give up nuclear weapons.

It is appropriate, of course, to note that you have never given a satisfactory reply to the question whether the armed forces which would remain at the disposal of the Security Council after the implementation of disarmament would have nuclear weapons in their equipment.

Instead of effective disarmament measures in the field of nuclear weapons as proposed by the socialist countries, all you wish to do in stage I is to entrust a group of experts with the "examination" of this problem, and in stage II, that is, under the United States plan, after the lapse of six years, there would be only a certain "reduction" of the number of nuclear weapons.

The so-called partial reduction of the number of nuclear weapons under the Western Powers' plan, in view of the immense quantity of existing stockpiles of these weapons, is of no practical significance. This has been unequivocally confirmed by the well-known British writer, Hedley Bull, in his book The Control of the Arms Race. I quote his words from page 102:

(continued in English)

"Such a reduction of stockpiles may not be of military significance: the American stockpile of nuclear weapons, for example, is said to be greatly in excess of American military requirements for purposes of war and deterrence; to constitute, in the ugly jargon of the day, an "overkill capacity". Reduction of this stockpile may be taken a considerable distance, without affecting the capacity of the United States to threaten other Powers ..."

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

(continued in Russian)

The nuclear danger threatening the world calls for a more realistic approach to the problem of nuclear weapons, for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the armaments of armies, for the total destruction of all stockpiles and the cessation of their production. The clinging to these weapons and the feverish nuclear armaments race are too precarious a basis and too dangerous a path both for peace throughout the world and for ensuring the national security of individual countries.

The proposals of the socialist countries for the elimination of the threat of a nuclear danger do not at all mean that "because you cannot do everything you should do nothing", as the United States representative tried to assert on 5 June (ENDC/PV.140,p.17). They spring from a realistic awareness of the danger threatening mankind and from a sincere desire to put an end to it as quickly as possible. For this reason, the Soviet proposals of the socialist countries and not the proposals of the West represent the most reliable, practicable and quickest way to the fulfilment of our main task, in which the whole of mankind is vitally interested, namely, the elimination of the threat and possibility of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict. This is the philosophy of our approach to the disarmament problem.

Mr. STELLE (United States): Mr. Chairman, in your opening remarks you were good enough to refer to the address delivered this Monday, 10 June, by the President of the United States. Since the greatest part of that address was devoted to matters directly related to the objective pursued by our Committee, we are requesting the Secretariat to circulate a major portion of it as a Conference document. What the President had to say can serve as an inspiration to us in our arduous but lofty pursuit. All of us have on occasion experienced moments of discouragement, as the objective we have been trying to reach has appeared to be so remote. We all know that our ultimate goal will require a great deal of patience and serious effort, persistence and perseverance. We know also that attention to the more immediate problems where agreements could be achieved promptly, and where appropriate measures could be implemented with relative ease, would assist us in our longer range efforts. For we could not only find satisfaction by seeing early tangible results of our work, but also help to lay the foundation for our ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

The President suggested that we focus on a practical, attainable peace, based, as he said,

"not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions -- on a series of concrete actions and effective agreements which are in the interests of all concerned." (ENDC/95,p.2)

Such concrete actions and effective agreements can range from the most modest to the most far-reaching, and the United States here has proposed various measures in each of those categories. These measures have been designed to break the vicious and dangerous circle in which we now find ourselves, a vicious circle -- to use the President's words:

"with suspicion on one side breeding suspicion on the other, and new weapons begetting counter-weapons." (Ibid., p.4)

For example, the United States has proposed initial measures in a number of fields. They include steps for reducing the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication, and we here are gratified that on at least one such step the United States and the Soviet Union appear to be approaching agreement.

Other United States proposals provide for concrete steps in general and complete disarmament. Among them are our first stage proposals (ENDC/30,pp.8 et seq.) in one important area of disarmament currently under discussion in our Committee, that of nuclear disarmament. A cut-off of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and transfer by the United States and the Soviet Union of significant quantities of such materials to non-weapons uses would, in our view, represent a really significant start on the road of nuclear disarmament, for it would assist us in breaking the spiral of the nuclear arms race and curtailing the nuclear capabilities of States. Those measures, and the arrangements also proposed by the United States to prevent the spread of independent nuclear capabilities to individual nations not now having such a capability, would, we believe, undoubtedly lay the groundwork for further, more far-reaching steps in this field during the subsequent stages of the disarmament process.

Another measure in the nuclear field, and a measure where the United States believes, and where I think we all believe, concrete action can be taken very promptly, is, of course, the nuclear test ban treaty in which we have been working for almost five years. It is an area in which, as the President said, "... a fresh start is badly needed ..." (ENDC/95,p.6). Not only would this first step measure mark a turning point in the upward spiral of the arms race, but it would also be a measure to begin to meet head-on the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In addition, an effective nuclear test ban would also end whatever harmful effects there may be from the radioactive fall-out resulting from nuclear testing.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

In his address the President announced two specific actions in the effort of the United States to achieve promptly a nuclear test ban treaty. First, in order to ensure that continuing negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty should proceed in a renewed atmosphere of hope, and at the same time to ensure that all possible steps are taken to avoid further introduction of radioactivity in the atmosphere of the earth, the President announced that the United States had undertaken a declaration of self-restraint with respect to atmospheric testing. Specifically, the President said:

"I now declare that the United States does not propose to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere so long as other States do not do so. We will not be the first to resume." (ibid.)

The President pointed out that this declaration of self-restraint would make clear the good faith and solemn convictions of the United States with regard to a nuclear test ban treaty. He pointed out, however, that his declaration was no substitute for a formal, binding treaty, just as a test ban itself would be no substitute for disarmament. But the President indicated that the hope of the United States was that the declaration would be a stepping-stone to a test ban treaty, as we hope a test ban treaty will be a stepping-stone to disarmament.

Secondly, the President made the announcement, which our Chairman has already read into the record of our Conference, in which he said:

"Chairman Khrushchev, Prime Minister Macmillan and I have agreed that high-level discussions will shortly begin in Moscow looking towards early agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty. Our hopes must be tempered with the caution of history -- but with our hopes go the hopes of all mankind." (ibid.)

This last announcement of the President does much to make our work here even more significant, for clearly major assistance to our efforts here could flow from those meetings which will take place in Moscow. Success in this field will do much, we all know, to promote progress in disarmament.

However, while working on those more immediate problems we should never lose sight of our ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, and we should continue to exert our best efforts towards achieving it. The President reaffirmed this when he said:

"Our primary long-range interest in Geneva, however, is general and complete disarmament -- designed to take place by stages permitting parallel

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

political developments to build the new institutions of peace which would take the place of arms. The pursuit of disarmament has been an effort of this Government since the 1920's. It has been urgently sought by the past three Administrations. And, however dim the prospects are today, we intend to continue this effort -- to continue it in order that all countries, including our own, can better grasp what the problems and the possibilities of disarmament are." (ibid.)

This is indeed the task which has been assigned to this Committee. It is, we all know, a grave responsibility, but not an impossible one, because, as the President said:

"Our problems are man-made. Therefore, they can be solved by man. And man can be as big as he wants. No problem of human destiny is beyond human beings. Man's reason and spirit have often solved the seemingly unsolvable -- and we believe they can do it again." (ibid.p.2)

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): The meeting of our Committee is devoted today, as was the meeting of Wednesday last, 5 June (ENDC/PV.140), to the consideration of point 5(d) of the co-Chairmen's recommendations for working procedures relating to the first stage of the treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/1/Add.3) as adopted by our Committee.

My statement today will be confined to the analysis of the relevant paragraphs of chapters C and G (stage I) of the Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a peaceful world (ENDC/30) submitted by the United States Government. Before proceeding to that analysis I should like, however, to make certain points in order precisely to facilitate the understanding of the following considerations with regard to the proposals put forth by the United States delegation in the above-mentioned document.

The Romanian delegation holds the opinion that any measure submitted to this Committee ought to contribute to general and complete disarmament, to the speedy removal of the danger of nuclear war -- that it ought to be efficient and feasible. The value of any proposal can be measured only in relation to the fulfilment of those criteria which stem from the primary task of this Committee: the drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament which should save mankind from war in general and from a nuclear war in particular. In the light of those criteria, the delegation of the Romanian People's Republic wishes to give its opinion regarding the proposals which are before us.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

The United States outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament proposes four measures in the field of nuclear disarmament in stage I. Two of them, namely the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests and the undertaking of obligations with regard to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, represent separate, independent points on this Committee's agenda. Consequently they have been and are still to be discussed. For that reason the Romanian delegation does not propose to refer to them today. We have done so in the past and we shall be doing so in the future, at the appropriate time. We shall dwell, however, on the other two measures: the halting of the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons and the transfer of certain quantities of fissionable materials for peaceful purposes.

As a result of a careful examination, the Romanian delegation, like the other socialist delegations, has reached the conclusion that the proposal on the cessation of the production of fissionable materials does not answer the afore-mentioned criteria; that is, it does not in fact contribute to general and complete disarmament, does not remove the danger of nuclear war, and is not efficient. If we consider the real situation, in its complexity and with all its implications, we cannot fail to arrive at the conclusion that the proposal of the United States Government has grave shortcomings which condemn it from the start.

First of all, the measure, if carried into effect, would not in the least affect the massive stockpiles of nuclear weapons now in existence. No single nuclear warhead would be eliminated from those stockpiles. Such a measure could be of significance only within the context of the destruction of the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and of the transfer of all stocks of fissionable materials to be used exclusively for peaceful ends. Consequently, one cannot describe it as a measure apt to remove or even to reduce the danger of nuclear war.

Secondly, we note that, in their general outlook, the United States and the other Western Powers do not rely on the idea of discontinuing the manufacturing of new nuclear weapons, but precisely the reverse. In accordance with this conception, the process of manufacturing new and more nuclear weapons would go on. Thus, there will be a continuation of the acquisition of idle stockpiles of nuclear weapons, which -- in the recent words of President Kennedy -- "can only destroy and can never create".

(ENDC/95,p.1) Consequently, that is not a measure apt to be conducive to general and complete disarmament, nor is it likely to bring about the reduction of the nuclear war danger.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

Thirdly, the proposal of the United States Government tends to establish control over the whole nuclear industry of States. And such control is to be carried out under circumstances when, according to the United States outline, no genuine measure in the field of nuclear disarmament would be implemented. Basically, this is nothing else but control prior to disarmament, control without disarmament.

I am convinced that nobody in this hall and beyond its walls can earnestly believe that a State might ever agree to submit its entire nuclear industry to control, while the stockpiles of nuclear weapons remained untouched. No State can possibly accept such an encroachment upon the interests of its national security and upon the security of other States. Consequently, one cannot call it a feasible measure.

Why, then, are such proposals submitted to us -- proposals which neither lead to general and complete disarmament nor contribute to the removal of the nuclear war danger, and which are not feasible? Are such proposals consonant with our task of drafting the treaty on general and complete disarmament?

I shall pass now to the proposal made by the United States Government that a quantity of 50 tons of uranium-235 be transferred to peaceful purposes both by the United States and by the Soviet Union. Let us examine it closely and let us go into its essence and its implications.

At our meeting of 15 May the representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle, described the United States proposal as: "an important measure of nuclear disarmament". Mr. Stelle stated that in the following context:

"Let there be no mistake about the effect of a transfer of a significant quantity of uranium-235 of weapons-grade quality to non-weapons uses. Coupled with the cut-off of production of such material, any transfer of such material, regardless of whether the material came from weapons themselves or from the pipeline, would affect directly the size of nuclear stockpiles and consequently represent an important measure of nuclear disarmament." (ENDC/PV.132, p.34)

Mr. Stelle then went on to re-state what he termed the belief of the United States delegation that:

"... significant transfer of nuclear material, in connexion with a cut-off of production, would be the best means of getting the large nuclear stockpiles now in the hands of certain States reduced at the earliest possible time. My delegation also believes that States should have discretion concerning whether the materials to be transferred would come from weapons already produced or from material stockpiled for eventual production of weapons." (ibid, p.35)

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

Mr. Stelle described this as being "a flexible arrangement". (ibid.)

Let us try to decode the contents of these laudative appraisals. An objective scrutiny of the proposals made by the United States Government leads to the conclusion that their implementation would not be of any real significance so far as nuclear disarmament is concerned. In common with the halting of the production of fissionable materials for use in nuclear weapons, the transfer of a quantity of such materials to peaceful purposes does not affect the stockpiles of atomic and hydrogen bombs. As a result of such a measure not even a single bomb would disappear from the arsenals of States.

The transfer of a quantity of fissionable materials to peaceful purposes does not exclude, but rather implies, the continuation of the manufacture of new nuclear weapons. One might say that that is a gratuitous statement, or we might even be accused of appealing to "popular emotions". We beg to assure the representatives of the Western Powers, who sometimes charge us with this, that today we appeal to reason, to calculations and to figures, and that we are going to do some plain arithmetic.

On 29 May the leader of the United Kingdom delegation, Mr. Godber, was good enough to provide us with some data which are of a nature to substantiate the conclusion I have cited. Minister of State Godber told us on that occasion (ENDC/PV.138,p.43) that, according to unofficial assessments, the United States stockpile of highly enriched uranium-235 was some 300 to 350 metric tons a year or two ago. By the way, he failed to mention the stockpiles of plutonium-239 of the United States, which, according to the estimates of certain American scientists, amounted by the beginning of 1960 to some 40 to 50 tons. According to Mr. Godber, 15 metric tons of highly enriched uranium-235 would probably be about enough to make 1,000 atomic bombs of the type dropped on Hiroshima.

Proceeding from those data, let us see what practical significance the transfer to peaceful purposes of a quantity of 50 tons of uranium-235 would offer. It would mean that after such a transfer the United States, even on the assumption that the production of fissionable materials for military purposes were halted, would have enough fissionable materials to produce 16,000 to 20,000 more atomic bombs of the type dropped on Hiroshima. In other words, this would mean that the United States would have the capacity to produce, after the transfer was carried out, enough atomic bombs to destroy 16,000 to 20,000 towns of the size of Hiroshima. If we consider that in the meantime those stockpiles have been even further increased, and if we consider also the stockpiles of plutonium-239, the picture grows even more complete.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

Consequently, if we were to implement the measures advocated in the United States proposal, by the end of stage I of the process of general and complete disarmament the United States stockpiles of nuclear weapons would be increased by at least 50 per cent. In short, by the end of stage I the United States would have at its disposal not the 40,000 nuclear warheads which it is believed to possess now but at least 60,000. Adding to this the fact that, according to the United States proposals, after stage I the United States would still possess 70 per cent of its nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, we realize that an utterly paradoxical situation would be thus reached: by the end of stage I the military potential of the United States not only would fail to be diminished but would be considerably increased.

Let us proceed with our analysis of the proposals made by the United States Government. Even if we were to overlook -- and could we possibly overlook? -- the afore-mentioned shortcomings, the United States proposal would still not be acceptable. It refers only to the Soviet Union and the United States, while omitting the United Kingdom and France, which are nuclear Powers, member countries of NATO and allies of the United States. That omission is not lacking in significance, and we feel that it is not accidental either.

Let us take the example of the United Kingdom. In order to refresh the memory of my colleagues, I should like to recall that on 7 September 1962 Sir Michael Wright stated in this Committee:

"... the United Kingdom will soon be perhaps the largest producer of plutonium in the world and certainly the largest civil producer."

(ENDC/PV.82, p.37)

Now, that is an element which cannot be dismissed as a "negligible quantity". On the other hand, one knows that the United States does import plutonium from the United Kingdom. Here may I be allowed to give a brief quotation from the work The Spread of Nuclear Weapons by Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, published in England in 1962 under the sponsorship of the Institute for Strategic Studies. Here is what we read on page 5:

"It is significant that the United States has apparently been acquiring Plutonium from the United Kingdom even though the amounts of fissile Uranium available in North America are far greater than can be needed for the purely military programme".

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

Those two elements, which I do not propose to analyse in depth today, testify that military advantages would be created for the Western Powers.

Now I should like to speak briefly about the assurance given by Mr. Stelle that the materials to be transferred

"would come from weapons already produced or from material stockpiled

for eventual production of weapons." (ENDC/PV.132, p. 35)

That is an aspect which can on no account alter the fundamentals of the issue. The invariable feature here is that the production of nuclear weapons out of the quantities of fissionable materials retained goes on unhampered. What would be taken out of the nuclear warheads could be quite easily replaced. We feel bound to state that we believe that this is no disarmament measure but rather a military necessity which military men call "refreshing the ammunition".

Thus we come to the statement made by Mr. Stelle regarding a flexible arrangement. In connexion with that statement I would only say that any time we deal with proposals which have nothing in common with genuine disarmament measures we really find a great flexibility on the part of the United States delegation. In our view, flexibility, elasticity, the negotiating spirit, should materialize in the field of effective disarmament measures. It is in that field that we should like to find the flexibility of the United States delegation, and not in connexion with a problem antipodal to disarmament.

We have presented to this Committee some arguments which lead objectively to the conclusion that the United States proposals in the field of nuclear disarmament in the first stage do not answer the major challenge of our era -- the elimination of nuclear danger. But does this challenge find a solution in the measures proposed by the United States for stages II and III of the process of general and complete disarmament? The answer to this question is of a nature to round up the significance of the United States proposals for stage I. From this point of view I can only express my agreement with the words uttered by the United Kingdom representative on 29 May when he said that:

"Stage I measures cannot always be considered in complete isolation from stage II and stage III measures." (ENDC/PV.138, p. 39)

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

It is true that the United States document contains certain proposals relating to the reduction of nuclear weapons in stage II and their eventual elimination in stage III. But, on examining those provisions we find that they are conditional upon the results of certain studies that would have to be carried out in the first stage. Therefore, it results that the United States proposals do not provide for firm and concrete obligations with respect to nuclear armaments since they are limited to the mere outline of prospects for studies during stage I and, depending on those studies, the conclusion of special arrangements for those weapons.

That being so, it can only surprise us and set us thinking that from a plan related to the drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament we find missing precisely the specific obligations with regard to the most destructive of weapons. As I already had the opportunity of stating on 22 May 1962, this means that instead of a disarmament treaty containing explicit obligations with regard to nuclear weapons, we will get what the Romans used to call a pactum de contrahendo, that is, a pact containing only the obligation to conclude another pact. Therefore, the essential deficiency of the Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament submitted by the United States (ENDC/30) consists precisely in that it gives no glimpse of a prospect for the nuclear danger to be eliminated either in stage I or stage II, or even in stage III.

On the other hand, the United States outline, as well as the interventions made in this Committee by the representatives of the Western Powers, do not give a clear answer to the question concerning the armaments to be at the disposal of the international forces. What is essential in this respect is that the United States and the other Western Powers do not exclude the possibility of equipping such forces with nuclear weapons.

Finally, I should like to recall the opposition of the Western Powers to the proposal to ban the use of nuclear weapons. The Committee will remember the refusal of the representatives of the Western Powers to accept the proposal made by the Soviet Union aiming at the "prohibition of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction". The double parentheses containing this proviso of point 2(b) of the working draft of Part I of the Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament of 31 May 1962 (ENDC/40/Rev.1) are a standing proof of that position.

In that connexion it is relevant to recall that the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Canada -- all the Western members of our Committee -- voted

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

against the declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 24 November 1961. Moreover, the United States delegation on that occasion even voted against the paragraph in the preamble of that declaration which reads as follows:

"Believing that the use of weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, is a direct negation of the high ideals and objectives which the United Nations has been established to achieve ...".

(A/RES/1653(XVI), p.2)

All this shows that the stand taken by the United States and its allies on the problem of nuclear disarmament is in flagrant contradiction with the aspirations of the peoples, who demand to see the danger of nuclear war banished once and for all.

By their words the leaders of the Western Powers also admit the necessity of eliminating this danger. Speaking before the United Nations General Assembly on 25 September 1961, President Kennedy said:

"Today, every inhabitant of this planet must contemplate the day when this planet may no longer be habitable. Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or by madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us." (A/PV.1013, para. 50)

But in its deeds the United States does not supply a remedy and does not provide for effective measures to ban and abolish the most destructive of the tools of war -- the nuclear weapon. Were we to follow the path indicated by the United States, and were its proposal implemented, at the end of what it would call general and complete disarmament mankind would find itself confronted with the following situation. All types of weapons, with the exception of the nuclear weapon, would have disappeared from the arsenals of States: the peoples would be freed from all other threats but would continue to live "under a nuclear sword of Damocles". That is the paradox into which we would be led by implementing the United States proposals.

I leave it to the United States delegation to choose between the iron sword of Damocles of the fourth century before our era and the nuclear sword of Damocles of the twentieth century. I want to assure the United States delegation that we do not choose: we struggle in order to smash up the two of them.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

If we are all decided to find a solution to the fundamental issue of present times -- the elimination of the nuclear menace -- then we must follow another path, the path of radical disarmament measures from the very first stage. That path is shown in the Soviet draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under strict international control (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Corr.1). The elimination of all nuclear weapon vehicles, with the exception implied by the well-known Gromyko proposal (A/PV.1127 provisional, p.38-40), is of a nature to cope adequately with the nuclear danger.

The Soviet Union is prepared to go still further. It is known that the Soviet delegation declared its readiness to transfer the nuclear disarmament measures from stage II to stage I. At our meeting on 5 June, the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Tsarapkin re-confirmed this by stating:

"We now confirm once again the Soviet Union's readiness, if the Western Powers agree, to transfer the whole of the measures for the elimination of nuclear weapons, including the destruction of stockpiles and the cessation of production, from stage II to stage I..." (ENDC/PV.140, p.27)

But, unfortunately, confronted with such concrete and efficient measures, the United States delegation puts up proposals devoid of substance, of efficacy, which are far wide of our main target: general and complete disarmament and the removal of the danger of nuclear war.

The Romanian delegation still expresses its hope that, taking into account the reasons adduced here within the framework of our negotiations, taking into account the rapid evolution of the international situation and taking into account the will for peace which is ever more powerfully expressed by all the peoples of the world, the Western delegations and the United States delegation in particular will analyse the proposals made by the Soviet Union and, if they deem it necessary, will submit additional thoughts and improvements which, however, should lead us towards one goal alone: the conclusion of the Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament.

In his speech delivered on Monday at the American University in Washington -- a speech which must be studied with all due attention -- President Kennedy said inter alia:

"... that is the most important topic on earth: peace.

"Peace need not be impracticable and war need not be inevitable.

"In short, both the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its allies, have a mutually deep interest in a just and genuine peace and in halting the arms race.

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

"Our primary long-range interest in Geneva, however, is general and complete disarmament..."

"But I also believe that we must re-examine our own attitudes -- as individuals and as a nation -- for our attitude is as essential as theirs". (ENDC/95)

We hope that these thoughts of President Kennedy will make themselves felt immediately in the attitude of the United States delegation. We are expecting this change of stand and we state that we are prepared to examine, in a negotiating spirit, every constructive proposal.

Until then, however, it is necessary to go on and to discuss point 5(e) of document ENDC/1/Add.3). That does not mean that we could not come back to point 5(d), especially if the two co-Chairmen were to submit to us a jointly drafted text listing the conclusions they had arrived at.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): The Canadian delegation would like to associate itself with your remarks, Mr. Chairman, concerning the very important speech made by President Kennedy on 10 June. We are happy that the parts of that speech which relate to disarmament are to be made a document of this Conference.* The Canadian delegation feels that, besides the good news of the undertaking of discussions in Moscow, which it is hoped will help to free us from the impasse on the cessation of nuclear tests, the confirmation which the President's address afforded of the goal of disarmament and the determination to reach that goal is emphasis on the need for tolerance and understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union and their allies on both sides, to which the representative of Romania has just alluded. All of these points should impress us here and should be taken into account in our future negotiations. We feel that this speech of President Kennedy's will become a historic text in the lengthening literature of disarmament.

Today I should like to make a few remarks on paragraph 5(d) of document ENDC/1/Add.3 which we have under consideration. I have been carefully studying the statement which was made by the representative of the Soviet Union at our meeting on 5 June (ENDC/PV.140, pp. 13 et seq.). In that statement he gave his views on the provisions for the reduction and eventual elimination of the nuclear weapon which are contained in the United States draft treaty (ENDC/30), and he contrasted them with the corresponding provisions in the Soviet Union draft treaty (ENDC/2/Rev.1). No one was surprised when Mr. Tsarapkin

* Circulated as document ENDC/95.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

found the Soviet Union proposals considerably superior to those of the United States, and we have heard the same conclusions reached this morning by the representatives of Czechoslovakia and Romania. I do not think that the Committee will be surprised that the Canadian delegation does not agree with Mr. Tsarapkin's arguments and conclusions, or at least not all of them, and I shall try to explain why.

The first remark of Mr. Tsarapkin with which I must take issue was when he said that the Western representative appeared to cherish the concept that peace is being preserved with the help of an atomic bomb. (ENDC/PV.140, p.24). He implied that we think that this state of affairs should go on for ever. It is rather tiresome to have to keep on rebutting the imputations of the Soviet delegation that the West is not sincere in its commitment to the agreed principles of general and complete disarmament (ENDC/5). Paragraph 3(b) of that document, the agreed principles, calls for the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear chemical and bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction, and cessation of their production. Paragraph 3(c) stipulates the elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction. I say that we must protest against this notion which the representative of the Soviet Union has attributed to Western representatives, that is that peace is preserved by the atomic bomb. But nevertheless there is a concept which we can agree to and which it appears the Soviet Union agrees to, and that is that for the present, and necessarily for some time into the future, the use of nuclear weapons in war is inhibited by the fact that both sides possess those weapons and the means of delivering them, and the relation of the quantities possessed by one side and the other is such as to constitute a deterrent to unleashing nuclear war. The quantities are not necessarily equal, nor are the method by which they are carried, their size, explosive power, and so forth, necessarily similar; but each side has enough weapons and the means of delivering them to deter.

Mr. Tsarapkin referred to the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles or, rather, their reduction to a low level in balance, and pointed out the relationship of that operation to the reduction and elimination of the nuclear weapon (ENDC/PV.140 p.25). We recall that the Soviet Union has modified its original position that it would be possible to eliminate the danger of nuclear war by a sort of totalitarian or catastrophic measure of destroying all nuclear weapon vehicles in one stage. It has modified that original position by introducing what we refer to as the Gromyko proposal (A/PV.1127 provisional p. 38 - 40), which suggests that for the first two stages of disarmament the two sides should maintain a minimal agreed number of intercontinental ballistic missiles which would constitute a deterrent to either side or to any other nation initiating nuclear war.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

There is another phrase that I note in Mr. Tsarapkin's remarks, where he referred to our "purpose of eliminating or at least reducing the threat of a thermonuclear war..." (ENDC/PV.140 p. 19). We agree that that is our purpose. We would put it a little more precisely as the reduction of the threat of nuclear war as quickly as it can be effected, having regard to all the agreed principles for negotiating general and complete disarmament, and eventually the elimination of the threat of nuclear war altogether.

So now we have a conclusion that what inhibits nuclear warfare at present, and must inhibit it for at least the first two stages of disarmament and possibly into the third stage, is a balanced deterrent. The Canadian delegation thinks it follows that a balance should be maintained also in nuclear weapons and that the reduction of those weapons should be by stages and steps until mutual trust is established, when they can all be eliminated. Perhaps this elimination could be done quite early in the process of disarmament if — and I repeat "if" -- anyone could demonstrate some completely satisfactory means of verifying that all nuclear weapons had been destroyed.

The delegation of the United Kingdom has informed us that there are great technical difficulties in the way of verifying the elimination of all nuclear weapons and fissile material for their manufacture (ENDC/60). It is very hard, however an international disarmament organization might try, to be certain that no weapons-grade fissile material has been produced and clandestinely concealed. Hence, it is best to have a disarmament programme which will proceed by agreed stages and steps through reduction to elimination of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon vehicles.

In that connexion we must recognize that proposals for the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons must be shown to be technically sound. Of all the measures which must be included in a programme of general and complete disarmament the elimination of nuclear weapons presents the greatest difficulty from the standpoint of assuring effective verification and compliance with the undertakings which States assume. The analysis of this problem which the United Kingdom has given to the Conference brings out the difficulties very clearly. (ibid.)

To date the representative of the Soviet Union and the representatives of the other socialist States have not seen fit to explain how the Soviet Union proposes to overcome those difficulties in implementing the provisions of its draft treaty. Until that has been done adequately and fully we in the West will remain convinced that a gradual stage by stage approach to nuclear disarmament is the only feasible and practicable one.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

It seems to me that the first step which we in this Committee must take is to recognize the magnitude of the problem which we must solve. We believe that the Soviet Union itself recognizes the difficulties which are involved. On 29 May the representative of the United Kingdom quoted (ENDC/PV.138, p. 45) from the Soviet memorandum of 10 May 1955 (DC/71 Annex 15), which illustrates very well that it is not the West alone which appreciates the problems which will have to be faced. It was not the obstinate Western delegations which made the Soviet Union change its position in 1955, but the obstinate facts of the case. It is for that reason that we continue to hope that the Soviet Union will agree to participate in the technical study of these problems; and in this connexion it is encouraging to recall that in the Soviet draft disarmament treaty (A/4505) which was presented to the United Nations General Assembly in 1960, there were provisions for joint studies of measures relating to the discontinuance of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and to the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons. We hope that the representative of the Soviet Union will confirm that his Government continues to believe in the necessity for early study by experts of how these measures are to be accomplished in a safeguarded fashion.

A good deal of what the Soviet representative had to say on 5 June (ENDC/PV.140 p.20)) referred to the proposal in the United States draft treaty for the cut-off of production of fissile material of weapons grade (ENDC/30 pp. 8, 23). I think no-one will disagree with the view that it would be stupid to start destroying fabricated atomic bombs or thermonuclear weapons while continuing to produce the fissile material for other such weapons. Therefore, we have to correlate provisions for the stopping of the production of these weapons and the fissile material for them with provisions for the actual destruction of mechanical components of the existing weapons and conversion of the fissile material they contain to peaceful uses.

We see that, in view of the relationship between the means of delivery and the nuclear weapon itself, their production must be controlled and reduced and eventually stopped in related measure. Also, the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons should be stopped as soon as possible. The question before us is: are the United States proposals the most suitable to achieve those objectives or are the Soviet Union proposals the most suitable? Should it be done in one stage or step, or should it be done in several stages and steps? If by several stages, how should operations be spread through the three stages of disarmament?

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The representative of the Soviet Union objected (ENDC/PV.140) to the United States proposal for the cut-off of the production of fissile material -- I am repeating in general terms what he said -- because it would imply control or supervision over the nuclear production of other States by the United Kingdom and by the United States, (ENDC/PV.140 p.23) and that objection has been repeated today in the statements of the representatives of Czechoslovakia (supra, pp.7 et seq) and of Romania (supra, p.16). But that is not what those provisions imply precisely. Certainly, there must be control and supervision over nuclear production, because that is also provided for in the Soviet Union plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons in stage II; but the control -- and both sides agree upon this -- is to be exercised by the international disarmament organization. That is not like control being exercised by one or two States out of all those who must participate in the eventual disarmament agreement. But the main objection of the representative of the Soviet Union is that that control will be taking place when, as he says, no actual measures of disarmament are in being. We would contest that statement because, according to the United States plan, that control and cessation of production of nuclear material for weapons would take place when a 30 per cent reduction of all armaments was being effected and when production of all armaments would have ceased, except for small replacements.

However, at this point Mr. Tsarapkin brings in the Soviet Union obsession that the Western proposals are designed to obtain, through the operations of the international disarmament organization, military information which would be used by the West in carrying out a surprise strike in a preventive war against the Soviet Union. We and other Western delegations have argued many times against this obsessive idea, which seems to block so many of our efforts to devise disarmament measures with proper verification. In this case we wonder even whether the Soviet Union's concern is really justified. We recognize that in some contexts the apprehensions of the Soviet Union authorities must be taken into account. But I really wonder if the locations in the Soviet Union of the immense plants required for producing weapons grade material are such a closely-guarded military secret after all these years of operation? I understand that diffusion plants tend to be measured in kilometres rather than in metres.

There is another point which Mr. Tsarapkin makes. But before I go on to that, I should like to refer to the argument which was advanced by the representative of Czechoslovakia today, who said that if the operations of these nuclear material production plants were opened up to the inspectors of the international organization information

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

would be obtained which would amount of industrial espionage -- that it would be used to increase the powers of production of other States. How that would be possible when it would be done as a consequence of an agreement to stop production of that material is not very clear to me, but the argument against industrial espionage, it seems to me, is not a good one for us to advance here. What is more important, keeping some possible industrial secrets or carrying out an effective measure of disarmament?

To go on to the other point made by Mr. Tsarapkin, he argues (ENDC/PV.140, pp.20-21) that because a very large quantity of fissile material has been produced by the United States then that country has no need for any more and is, as he says, in a position of saturation. Therefore, he says the proposal to stop production and to transfer 50 metric tons of fissile material from weapons to non-weapons purposes is meaningless as a disarmament measure. There are two ways of looking at that proposition. The first is that the United States, having produced so much of the fissile material, wants to gain an advantage by stopping production by all nations at the present time. The converse of that statement of the case is that the Soviet Union would regard it as a disadvantage unless it can continue production of this material until it, too, is in a position of saturation. Of course, we cannot really believe that that is what Mr. Tsarapkin meant, although it would follow from his line of argument.

I must observe also that spokesmen for the Soviet Union have claimed that they have enough nuclear weapons to destroy the centres of production and population in practically all the United States and on the territory of its Western allies. Therefore, they must at least have enough now of nuclear weapons for a deterrent and have no need to manufacture any more. In view of all those facts, it is a little difficult to understand why it should not be agreed to stop the production of fissile material in stage I.

Another point which was made by the representative of the Soviet Union was that the amount of fissile material to be converted from weapons to non-weapons purposes is insufficient. But the United States delegation, in formulating its proposals, invited the Soviet Union delegation, if it was not satisfied with them, to make counter proposals. Presumably, if the Soviet Union thinks that the conversion of 50 tons to non-weapons purposes is insufficient, it would propose -- in private discussion if it

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

so desired -- how much more fissile material and how many nuclear weapons it thinks should be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses in the first stage. Of course, the principle of the Gromyko proposal would require a certain number of nuclear weapons to be retained at least until the end of the second stage.

There is only one more point that I should like to make, which arises out of the statement made by the representative of Romania (supra, p.20). I understood him to say in connexion with the destruction or elimination of nuclear weapons that at the end of the third stage all weapons would be eliminated from national arsenals except nuclear weapons. He said that that was a bad state of affairs, and I agree that it would be if it were so. But, of course, in the third stage provisions for the elimination of nuclear weapons in the United States outline of basic provisions, paragraph C(1), it is said that :

"In the light of the steps taken in stages I and II to halt the production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons and to reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles, the Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all nuclear weapons remaining at their disposal, would cause to be dismantled or converted to peaceful use all facilities for production of such weapons, and would transfer all materials remaining at their disposal for use in such weapons to purposes other than use in such weapons." (ENDC/30, pp. 29, 30)

That makes it clear, I think, that the United States proposals are for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon materials in national arsenals.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): Before I turn to my main theme perhaps I may just say how much we in the United Kingdom have welcomed the lofty, imaginative and statesmanlike address of President Kennedy before the American University at Washington, and how much we welcome also the proposal that the major portions of that address should be circulated to us as a conference document* so that we may have the opportunity of studying the President's wise words in greater detail and also may have his remarks before us as an inspiration to the work of this Conference. I was very glad to note that our Romanian colleague seemed to approve of this procedure also.

I think it is desirable and even necessary that I should return this morning to the issues raised at our meeting on 29 May (ENDC/PV.138, p. 38 et seq) by the leader of my delegation, Mr. Godber, in discussing point 5 (d) of our agreed agenda, (ENDC/1/Add.3) and to some of the points he made in support of his statement in drawing upon the United Kingdom paper entitled "The technical possibility of international control of fissile material production", which has been before us since August 1962. (ENDC/60).

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

As I say, it is desirable and necessary that I should do so, in view of the response, if it can properly be called a response, which Mr. Godber's statement elicited from the Bulgarian representative on 5 June (ENDC/PV.140, pp.9 et seq.) from the Soviet representative both then and on 10 June (ENDC/PV.142), and from our Czechoslovak and Romanian colleagues today (supra.p.8 & p.15). I think I should mention in passing that I fear I cannot agree with the proposal our Romanian colleague made to us (supra, p. 23) to the effect that the time had now come to move on to point 5(e) of our agreed agenda. In fact, I think I could only explain such a proposal as being based on either the inability or the unwillingness of our Eastern European colleagues to consider the technical problems involved in nuclear disarmament which were the basis of what the leader of my delegation said on 29 May.

On 5 June the Bulgarian representative said:

"Briefly, this is what the United Kingdom representative said in this connexion. First, the Western Powers do not believe that it will be possible to establish effective control on the measures they propose in the field of nuclear disarmament, even if that control were organized in accordance with their demands and within the frame-work of their own draft. Secondly, the Western Powers doubt the efficacy and the real scope of their own measures." (ENDC/PV.140, p. 9)

Mr. Christov went on to say:

"A study of the United Kingdom representative's "very technical" statement on 29 May gives the very clear impression that all his arguments lead to one conclusion,-- I would even say to the single conclusion-- that nuclear disarmament is unrealizable -- that it is a dangerous illusion. The United Kingdom representative has done everything in his power to convince us that the so-called nuclear disarmament measures provided for in the United States draft are ineffective and could in no way lead to the elimination or reduction of the nuclear danger". (ibid., p.11)

In so saying, our Bulgarian colleague suggested in fact that Mr. Godber took the view, firstly, that it was no use trying to achieve nuclear disarmament and, secondly, that incidentally the proposals to that end contained in the United States draft treaty outline (ENDC/30) were of no value. Mr. Christov then suggested that the second of these views was correct but that the first was incorrect, since under the Soviet proposals:

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

"There is no question that...all the questions, including those connected with control and verification, could be settled". (ENDC/PV.140, p.11)

That latter standpoint was of course warmly endorsed by our Soviet colleague both on 5 and 10 June (ibid. p.24; ENDC/PV.142) as it has been again today by our Czechoslovak and Romanian colleagues.

The Committee will probably have realized that those somewhat sweeping assertions by our Eastern European colleagues were arrived at without any serious analysis of the arguments contained either in document ENDC/60 or in Mr. Godber's statement on 29 May (ENDC/PV.138). I do not think I could justifiably admit that they had either disproved or, indeed, tried seriously to question the technical basis underlying both that paper and that statement. Indeed, I think it would be difficult for them to do so, at least without careful study and analysis, for after all this is a field in which we in the United Kingdom have had a considerable degree of technical experience.

Therefore let me put the case again as we see it -- and I shall restate the argument in very simple language. If what our working paper (ENDC/60) says is true, then we cannot account accurately for past production of fissile material. If we cannot account for past production, we cannot account for present stocks. If we cannot account for present stocks, we can never be sure that stocks have not been hidden away either as fissile material or as warheads or components of warheads. If neither side can be sure that the other has no nuclear warheads, then neither side will be prepared completely to disband its nuclear deterrent so long as it is its sole protection against a surprise nuclear attack. Therefore, how can there be total nuclear disarmament until some alternative form of security -- which to our mind can only be effective peace-keeping machinery -- has been devised and proved effective? Nation States might take some risks over some things but they are going to take no risks when it comes to eliminating nuclear weapons.

Our Soviet colleague asserted on 5 June that the nuclear disarmament measures proposed by the Soviet Union

"have as their main aim the elimination of the threat of a nuclear missile war". (ENDC/PV.140, p.28)

That may be their aim. What I want to know is how that aim is in fact going to be achieved under the present provisions of the Soviet draft treaty. No Soviet representative at this Conference has ever told us. Our Soviet colleague did not tell us on 5 June: he merely asserted that real nuclear disarmament could be achieved "if we adopted the provisions contained in the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament" (ibid., p.24). That assertion was made again this morning by our Czechoslovak and Romanian colleagues.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

I think I have to speak on this subject quite bluntly. That claim is and will remain only so many words until it has been proved to this Committee that these Soviet measures, and in particular the verification measures, such as they are, proposed in article 22 of the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/2/Rev. 1, pp. 16, 17) would ensure that after nuclear disarmament was supposed to have taken place no State could possibly hide and retain significant quantities of fissile materials for weapons purposes, whether in the form of warheads or in some other form, either from its current or, far more important, from its past production.

We in the United Kingdom do not believe that any measures will at present be able to provide a 100 percent guarantee against this possibility. That is why Mr. Godber suggested on 29 May (ENDC/PV.138, pp. 44, 45) that if further technical studies, in which we should be glad to participate, show that we are right in our technical appraisal, then certain conclusions will have to be faced realistically by the Committee. Perhaps I may say at this point that I have gathered that our colleague from India has seemed to agree with our technical appraisal because I remember, and the Committee will no doubt recall, that he said on 7 June 1962:

"Such technical advice as I have taken in this matter -- and it is of a high order -- informs me that science at present knows no way of being sure that all nuclear weapons have been detected and destroyed. There is no way at present, -- no way at all. I state this quite bluntly because I think we have to face that fact: that there is no way now in which we can be sure that all these

nuclear weapons will have been located and destroyed". (ENDC/PV.51, pp. 24, 25)

It is true that our Indian colleague subsequently referred to what in his view were certain countervailing factors, and I am sure that we should want to examine those factors at a future meeting. But the point I want to stress now is that our Indian colleague said -- and I repeat the above quotation "I think we have to face that fact: that there is no way now in which we can be sure that all these nuclear weapons will have been located and destroyed".

Perhaps I may remind the Committee again that Mr. Jacob Malik in 1955 agreed with our technical appraisal. As the Committee will recall, among other things Mr. Malik said -- and I am not going to apologize for quoting again from his statement --

"Thus there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading this control and for organizing the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons, even if there is a formal agreement on international control" (DC/71. Annex 15, p. 18)

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

Therefore, I submit that if our Soviet colleague wishes to convince the Committee that the Soviet Union has, as he alleged, "approached this problem with all the necessary seriousness" (ENDC/PV.140, p.28), then he must prove and not merely suggest that Mr. Malik was wrong in 1955, that Mr. Lall was wrong in June 1962 and that we in the United Kingdom are wrong in our document ENDC/60.

This morning I should like to ask our Soviet colleague the following questions which I hope he will be ready to answer in the near future.

The first question is this. Does Mr. Malik's statement in 1955 still represent the considered view of the Soviet Government?

The second question is this. Does the Soviet Government agree with the technical analysis and conclusions of the United Kingdom working paper (ENDC/60)? In other words, does the Soviet Government agree, concerning current production, that such production can only be accounted for to between 1 and 2 per cent for plutonium and to about 1 per cent for uranium-235? Further, does the Soviet Government agree that concerning past production a control organization could not guarantee the accuracy of its accounts to within 10 to 15 per cent in the case of plutonium, and to within 15 to 20 per cent in the case of the production of uranium-235: or, if it could be proved that the records of electricity supply to the gaseous diffusion plants had not been falsified, to within some 5 to 10 per cent.

Does the Soviet Government agree with our conclusions or does it not?

Those are my two basic questions. If the answers to those two basic questions are in the negative, then I ask our Soviet colleague to answer the following questions arising out of them:

First, will he explain to the Committee what has occurred during the eight years since Mr. Malik's statement in 1955 to enable the Soviet Government to change its view?

Second, will he submit to the Committee a detailed technical analysis by the Soviet Government, as authoritative as the United Kingdom working paper (ENDC/60), showing clearly why and in what way the Soviet Government disagrees with the technical analysis and conclusions of the United Kingdom paper?

If on the other hand, the answers to my original two basic questions are in the affirmative, then I should like to ask our Soviet colleague to answer the following further questions.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

First, does the Soviet Government agree that it would be possible for nuclear Powers, after the completion of stage II of the Soviet draft treaty, to retain illegally and clandestinely at least 10 per cent and perhaps 20 per cent of their existing quantities of fissile material for weapons purposes, either in its pristine state or fabricated in nuclear weapons or as weapons components? And would the Soviet Government agree that such a quantity of fissile material is sufficient for a quite considerable nuclear war?

Second, can the Soviet Union propose any convincing alternative to the proposition advanced by Mr. Godber on 29 May (ENDC/PV.138, p.41) that it may well be impossible to achieve complete total nuclear disarmament until we can establish peace-keeping machinery which can be relied on to deal adequately and effectively with the threat to the security of States posed by the possibility of clandestinely retained nuclear warheads and fissile material for weapons purposes?

I have very nearly finished, but I just want to add two quite simple thoughts. The first is this: it is of course perfectly possible for all of us to live in dream worlds of our own, but a dream world in which people believe that nuclear weapons and fissile material cannot be retained illegally and clandestinely is positively dangerous. A world in which this actually occurred when total nuclear disarmament was supposed to have taken place not only would be a hideous nightmare but would be a hideous reality with suspicion, uncertainty and fear mounting on all sides.

Our Soviet colleague himself quoted on 5 June from a speech by Mr. Khrushchev made in July 1962 in which the Soviet leader said:

"The explosive force of only one powerful hydrogen bomb is many times greater than that of all the explosives used in all the wars in history, including the First and Second World Wars." (ENDC/PV.140, p.18)

And our Soviet colleague reminded us that Mr. Khrushchev also said that in a nuclear war

"... it is the civilian population that will be the first victim of the weapons of mass annihilation ... just a few thermonuclear bombs are capable of wiping out not only enormous industrial centres with populations of many millions, but whole countries." (ibid)

Who would disagree with that? But there Mr. Khrushchev points out the fundamental difficulty of the Soviet case. If, as he is obviously right in telling us, these

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

weapons are so deadly, and if a single one of them contains as much explosive power as all the explosives used by both sides in the last war, then the Soviet Government must show us how we can all be certain -- and nothing less than certainty will do where these terrible weapons are concerned -- that neither side will be able to retain any of these weapons or their components, or the capability of making them, during the first weeks of a so-called conventional war. And in order to prove that our Soviet colleague, I submit, must make out a detailed technical case which refutes the United Kingdom working paper (ENDC/60).

My second and last point is this: to point out that there are great difficulties in reaching a desired goal is not, as our Eastern European colleagues seem to think, to dispute the desirability of reaching it. There was one thing which I could accept in what our Czechoslovak colleague said this morning, and it was his remark that "facts are inescapable" (supra, p.9). Indeed they are, and not the least stubborn things are technical facts. But surely these difficulties are not to suggest that a goal should not be reached. These difficulties are a challenge to all of us to pool our efforts and to co-operate in studies of how to minimize the difficulties and thereby to make the goal easier to reach. That is what Mr. Godber asked for on 29 May (ENDC/PV.138, p.48) and that is what I ask for again today.

Mr. de CASTRO (Brazil) (translation from French): I shall be very brief, but I should nevertheless like to crave the attention of members of the Committee for a few minutes in order to read out to them an official communiqué which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of my country published this morning in the light of the very significant events which have lately taken place within the context of the questions we are examining and which give us reason to hope for positive results of our concerted efforts to guarantee a stable peace for the world.

This is the text I should like to read to you:

"The Brazilian Government, which has protested consistently against all nuclear tests, irrespective of the circumstances, welcomes with enthusiasm and hope the idea of an early meeting of representatives of the nuclear Powers with a view to the conclusion of an agreement on the final cessation of such tests.

(Mr. de Castro, Brazil)

"Realizing the difficulties in the way of the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, the Brazilian Government continues to urge, both at Geneva and in New York, the need for an immediate nuclear cease-fire and the adoption of measures designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons through the progressive establishment of denuclearized zones.

"It is against this background that the Brazilian proposal for the condemnation of these tests (General Assembly Resolution 1762 (XVII)), and the Brazilian plan for the denuclearization of Latin America, should be viewed.^{1/}

"The Brazilian Government cannot fail to support wholeheartedly the fresh move by the nuclear Powers, as it supports the recent declaration by thirty African Heads of State concerning the denuclearization of Africa^{2/} and the proposal submitted at Geneva last Monday by the delegations of Ethiopia, Nigeria and the United Arab Republic concerning new bases for negotiation on nuclear tests.^{3/}

"On several occasions the Brazilian Government has expressed the view that the differences of opinion on the cessation of nuclear tests which still divide the two parties are negligible and almost without significance.

"It appeals to the nuclear Powers that they should undertake and conduct their future negotiations bearing in mind the vital interests of mankind and not only the alleged interests of their security. The Brazilian Government is convinced that this notion of security is today indissolubly linked with the idea of peace. It considers that the carrying out of nuclear tests is a flagrant violation of the oft-expressed will of the General Assembly of the United Nations and that it is contrary to the interests of international peace and security."

That is all I had to say.

1/ Circulated as document ENDC/87

2/ Circulated as document ENDC/93/Rev.1

3/ Circulated as document ENDC/94

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

I wish to avail myself of the right to reply to the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns. Today Mr. Burns protested here against, as he put it, our attributing to the Western Powers the notion that peace is preserved by the atomic bomb (supra, p. 24). In confirmation of this he cited certain provisions of the Western draft disarmament treaty (ENDC/30) which allegedly show that the Western Powers are prepared to agree to complete nuclear disarmament. I must say quite definitely that we cannot accept this protest by the Canadian representative, since the facts and the United States Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World give Mr. Burns absolutely no grounds for it and fully confirm what we have said on this score.

Let us look at the facts. First, we should like to draw Mr. Burns' attention to the fact that in the United States outline of basic provisions of a treaty on disarmament there is no concretely formulated provision for the liquidation of all nuclear weapon stockpiles in the form of a distinct obligation. In the preamble to the United States outline only its purpose is proclaimed, but throughout the whole draft treaty, however scrupulously you may study it, nowhere will you find any concrete indications of how this purpose is to be achieved. Furthermore, it follows from the United States outline of a disarmament treaty that the question of the destruction of nuclear weapon stockpiles is not solved in a definite and unconditional way by the treaty itself, and States would not assume under this treaty an unconditional obligation in regard to the prohibition of nuclear weapons and their complete elimination.

I can read to you straight out from the actual text of the United States document what is provided for in the first stage in respect of nuclear disarmament:

"The Parties to the Treaty would agree to examine remaining unresolved questions relating to the means of accomplishing in stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles. In the light of this examination the Parties to the Treaty would agree to arrangements concerning nuclear weapons stockpiles." (ibid, p.10)

I draw your attention to the wording that the question of the destruction of nuclear weapon stockpiles is first to be examined by experts and then a decision on this question would be taken in the light of this examination by experts.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

So, under the United States outline, in the first stage of disarmament this question is to be examined by experts and, in the light of this examination, the parties to the treaty would agree to arrangements concerning nuclear weapon stockpiles. In other words, after the treaty has come into force and the implementation of measures for general and complete disarmament has begun, the experts are to decide whether or not it is possible to destroy nuclear weapon stockpiles, and if it is possible -- to what extent they should be destroyed. That is what the United States Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament actually provides for, Mr. Burns. But what if by the end of the first stage the experts fail to reach a unanimous decision? What will happen then, Mr. Burns? In such a case, of course, under the United States disarmament outline, the problem of the destruction of nuclear weapons will remain unsolved. This is absolutely indisputable and in fact this question will be dropped from the agenda. As far back as a year ago the United States representative, Mr. Dean, frankly said so. I shall quote his words so that you, Mr. Burns, may also keep them in mind:

"Until the nuclear experts devised means for safely controlling the reduction and elimination of nuclear stockpiles no nation would permit the reduction of its own stockpiles to lower levels -- to say nothing of the complete elimination of the nuclear weapons in its stockpiles."

(ENDC/PV.11, pp. 12,13)

Moreover, Mr. Dean emphasised that until the studies of the experts have produced a solution to the problem of devising means by which the elimination of nuclear weapons could in effect be verified, the United States cannot conclude an agreement unconditionally providing for the elimination of nuclear weapons. I have quoted these words from ENDC/PV.11, p.11.

Thus it turns out that under the United States outline not only will there be no prohibition of nuclear weapons but even the elimination of their stockpiles is unlikely ever to take place.

The experience of the negotiations on such a comparatively simple question as that of the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests shows very clearly how the Western Powers use various technical questions and meetings of experts in order to drag out the negotiations endlessly and to prevent the achievement of an agreement.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

An analysis of the statements made by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom on the question of nuclear disarmament at our recent meetings shows not only that they still stand on their old positions, but that they are even more resolutely opposing the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. This was revealed today in a particularly eloquent manner in the whole series of questions which were poured out onto the Conference table, as from a horn of plenty, by Sir Paul Mason (supra, pp.29 et s.). What strikes us first of all is the fact that the Western representatives, without even waiting for the results of the experts' examination mentioned in the United States outline of basic provisions on disarmament, tell us that it is impossible to verify the cessation of the production and the elimination of the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and that, consequently the question of the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons cannot be solved positively. That is what Sir Paul Mason was telling us all the time today.

It is not difficult to see that such a negative approach to verification of the cessation of the production of fissionable materials and the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles was needed by Mr. Godber and Sir Paul Mason merely to justify in some way the Western Powers' rejection of nuclear disarmament altogether. It is nothing more than that. Here is what Mr. Godber said:

"... we are unlikely to be able to achieve total nuclear disarmament until we can establish adequate and effective peace-making machinery."

(ENDC/PV.138, p.41)

This means that, on the one hand, they talk of the impossibility of nuclear disarmament, linking it with the impossibility of verifying stockpiles, and particularly stockpiles of previously produced fissionable materials. On the other hand, in order to leave no loophole, no possibility for agreement on this question, they back up this negative view also from another angle by saying that it will not be possible to achieve nuclear disarmament until adequate and effective forces have been established for maintaining peace, or as Mr. Godber put it, until we can establish "peace-making machinery". Further Mr. Godber said:

"... such machinery would have to be sufficiently effective to deal with, among other things, a situation in which the security of one or more States was threatened by the retention by another State or States

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

of some... weapons-grade fissile material from either their current or, even more serious, from their past production." (ibid, p.47)

What in fact do these statements by the United Kingdom representatives mean? I think that the answer is clear to everyone. First, the Western Powers have already decided beforehand for themselves that nuclear weapons should be kept, as before, in the armaments of States. That is the first conclusion. The second conclusion is that from the hands of the armed forces of individual States or groups of States nuclear weapons will, perhaps, pass into the hands of the so-called international armed forces and, moreover, in such quantities as to enable those international armed forces to use them against the mythical danger of nuclear weapons secretly retained by a State or several States. Here is the third conclusion: the Western Powers assume that the international armed forces will have the right to use nuclear weapons in their police operations and, consequently, in the plan of the Western Powers, there is no question at all of any real prohibition of nuclear weapons or of their complete destruction and prohibition.

Mr. STEELE (United States of America): The Soviet representative, addressing General Burns, said this morning (supra, p.37) that there was no provision for the elimination of stockpiles of nuclear weapons in the Western plan, and at first he seemed to base that on a provision in the United States plan which calls in stage I for an examination of:

"... unresolved questions relating to the means of accomplishing in Stages II and III the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles." (ENDC/30, p.10, para. C(6))

The Soviet representative claimed that, since that study was called for in stage I, at the time of the treaty nothing would have been undertaken in that study and that, therefore, nothing would have been done along those lines. I should merely like to recall to the Soviet representative a statement which I made as recently as 15 May, when I said:

"We ... believe that the best approach to the problem of the final complete elimination of nuclear weapons should be to attack and resolve jointly the technical issues surrounding the problem of verifying the elimination of those weapons. Such an approach, we believe, need not necessarily await

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

the signature of a treaty. It could begin as soon as delegations felt themselves clearly prepared to undertake the necessary studies."

(ENDC/PV.132, p.37)

In repeating that statement, I would say that it is clear that the offer stands.

Further, in stage III of the United States plan there is a clear provision for the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles. The relevant paragraph reads as follows:

"In light of the steps taken in Stages I and II to halt the production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons and to reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles, the Parties to the Treaty would eliminate all nuclear weapons remaining at their disposal, would cause to be dismantled or converted to peaceful use all facilities for production of such weapons, and would transfer all materials remaining at their disposal for use in such weapons to purposes other than use in such weapons." (ENDC/30, pp.29,30, para. C (1))

I submit that there is a clear provision in the United States outline for the elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles.

The Soviet representative has referred to the extremely important question whether or not -- and, if so, when -- nuclear weapons should be made available to the international peace force. The position of the United States delegation on this question is well known. We do not take a firm position that nuclear weapons should be made available to the international peace force, or a firm position on the time when they should be made available if they are. We do say that a decision on this vital question -- vital and important for reasons adduced so well by the United Kingdom representative today (supra, p.31) -- should be reached only after the most careful study, reflection and negotiation.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

I shall be very brief. What has just been said by the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, fully confirms what I have said. He was unable to refute a single word. He read out a passage from a provision contained in the United States outline for stage III of disarmament, but I draw your attention to the fact that that provision begins with the statement: "In the light of the steps taken in stage I ..."

(ENDC/PV.30, p.29). But what steps are to be taken in stage I? The question of nuclear

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

weapon stockpiles is to be examined, and afterwards the solution of this question would be dealt with in the light of this examination. So you have the complete circle. I should like to draw attention once more to Mr. Stelle's last sentences when he said that on the question of making nuclear weapons available to the international peace force the United States itself had not yet taken a final firm position. This fact by itself shows that the United States outline does not provide for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, their elimination from the arsenals of States and the destruction of their stockpiles.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and forty-third plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Lall, the representative of India.

"Statements were made by the representatives of India, Czechoslovakia, the United States, Romania, Canada, the United Kingdom, Brazil and the Soviet Union.

"The delegation of the United States submitted a document containing excerpts from the address by President Kennedy on peace delivered in Washington on 10 June 1963.*

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Friday, 14 June 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.

* Circulated as document ENDC/95