

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FORTIETH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 21 May 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. CAVALLETTI

(Italy)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELLO-FRANCO
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE
Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U Tin MAUNG
U Aye LWIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. J.F.M. BELL
Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK
Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. E. PEPICH
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. P. SAHLOU
Mr. M. HAMID
Mr. A. MANDEFRO

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. G.D. COMMAR
Mr. M.B. NAIR

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:
Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAGIATI
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI

Mexico:
Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE

Nigeria:
Mr. A.A. ATTA
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:
Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. M. BIEN
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania:
Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. M. MALITZA
Mr. C. SANDRU
Mr. E. GLASER

Sweden:
Mr. R. EDBERG
Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. G.A. WESTRING
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. I.G. USACHEV
Mr. B.P. KRASULIN

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. A. EL-ERIAN
Mr. M.S. AHMED
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

United Kingdom:

Mr. J. B. GODBER
Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. J.S.H. SHATTOCK
Mr. B.T. PRICE

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. V. BAKER
Mr. S.H. McINTYRE

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): I declare open the fortieth meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): Today I want to talk about that portion of the United States outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world that is directed towards the problem of the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace (ENDC/30 and Corr.1, Section H, pp.17-18). There is a great deal to be said about these matters, and today I shall confine my remarks to setting forth the general philosophy that underlies the position of my government. In subsequent statements I will discuss the specific proposals we have made concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes and the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force and a United Nations Peace Observation corps. In the course of these discussions I will explain the pertinent provisions in the United States treaty outline and answer the specific questions on these provisions raised by my Soviet colleague in our twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh plenary meetings.

As my colleagues in this Conference are well aware, the United States attaches great importance to the progressive development and strengthening of arrangements to keep the peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, parallel with the progress we hope to see achieved in general and complete disarmament. This, of course, is not a new concept. The relationship between disarmament and pacific settlement of disputes may be traced back to the year 1899. In initiating the first important conference on disarmament, which has since been generally known as the Hague Peace Conference of 1899, the Government of Russia proposed not only that the Conference find means for limiting the increase of armaments but also that the Conference

"prepare the way for a discussion of the questions relating to the possibility of preventing armed conflicts by the pacific means at the disposal of international diplomacy."

The 1899 Hague Peace Conference, as well as the 1907 Peace Conference which grew out of it, produced some fifteen important conventions, including the two famous Conventions for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, which continue in force to the present day. According to the records of my government, a substantial number of countries represented at this conference table are parties to one or both of these Conventions: Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Mexico, Poland, Romania, Sweden, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

These two landmark conventions concerning the pacific settlement of disputes, which, as I have pointed out, had their origins in the first important disarmament conference, laid down procedures for good offices, mediation, conciliation and arbitration. The Permanent Court of Arbitration, which was established by these Conventions and which is still in existence, has decided some twenty cases, many of them of signal importance for the development of international law.

In the period after the First World War, an intimate relationship continued to be maintained between disarmament and the peaceful settlement of disputes. In fact, a theme of disarmament negotiations in the 1920s was "arbitration, security, disarmament." Bold efforts to improve the peace-keeping procedures of the League of Nations Covenant were embodied in the well-known Geneva Protocol of 1934, which contained express, reciprocal links with entry into force of disarmament measures. Throughout the latter part of the 1920s a Committee on Arbitration and Security, which was a sub-committee of the Disarmament Preparatory Commission, made studies of important problems connected with keeping the peace and, in addition, produced drafts of some ten treaties concerning the subjects of arbitration, conciliation, non-aggression and mutual assistance. The General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1928, which is still in force today for a number of States, was a combination of several of these draft treaties. The General Act provided detailed procedures for conciliation and for subsequent submission to arbitration or to the Permanent Court of International Justice if the parties were unable to settle their disputes through conciliation.

In the early part of the 1930s a number of other treaties seeking to improve the means for keeping the peace were drafted in connexion with preparations for the Disarmament Conference of 1932-1933. For instance, one of these treaties was the Convention of 1931 to improve the means for preventing war. It was designed to strengthen the procedures by which the League of Nations could prevent hostilities from breaking out or could secure the cessation of hostilities if fighting had already begun. Then, in the latter part of the 1930s, as we all know too well, progress in these fields was unfortunately interrupted by the serious events which led to the Second World War.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

The recognition that the attainment of complete disarmament is impossible without effective measures to keep the peace received renewed emphasis when world leaders turned their attention to the building of a durable peace at the end of the Second World War. The Charter of the United Nations laid out a comprehensive set of arrangements for the pacific settlement of disputes and collective security, as a result of which it was hoped that the use of armed forces for the enforcement of national interests might be avoided. The preamble to the Charter specifies quite significantly that one of the ends of the United Nations is "to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest ...". This and other provisions of the Charter embody the general understanding that only through the acceptance of agreed norms of international behaviour and agreed procedures for the settlement of disputes, together with the achievement of an effective system of collective security, can a peaceful world be secured.

The Charter, of course, does not overlook the fact that the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments form an integral part of the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security. This is quite clear from the language of Article 11 of the Charter.

I have given this brief resume of the early relationship between disarmament and pacific settlement of disputes because it shows that the importance which the United States attaches to this relationship is by no means unprecedented. Indeed, it has its roots in modern history. The great statesmen who laboured so valiantly in the cause of peace in the first part of this century clearly recognized that the problems of war, armaments, disarmament, international security, and the peaceful settlement of disputes, are all inseparably intertwined.

Indeed, we would be making a serious mistake if in our discussions here we ignored the experience of the past -- if we ignored the great deal of thought given to the question and the efforts made by our predecessors -- and talked about disarmament in isolation from the other measures which nations must take to make disarmament possible. We must take into account the fact that, even though disarmed, mankind, would still not be perfect, so that disputes would inevitably arise; consequently implementation of a programme of disarmament which failed to provide adequate means for the settlement of disputes would create a vacuum in which the seeds of war and rearmament might be sown. In short, we must provide an adequate alternative to force of arms as a means of settling disputes.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

The Western nations sought to recognize this inexorable connexion between disarmament and pacific settlement of disputes when they put forward their proposal for disarmament in the Ten Nation Committee in these very conference halls on 5 March 1960. That programme contained some recognition of the need to do something to fill the vacuum which would exist in a genuinely disarmed world. The five Western nations suggested then that joint studies be undertaken immediately on the "means of preventing aggression and preserving world peace and security...", and that the phasing of the reduction of armed forces and armaments be accompanied by the "build-up of international law enforcement capability to preserve world peace". (TNCD/3) Similar references were made to peacekeeping in the United States plan presented to the Ten Nation Committee on disarmament on 27 June 1960. The introduction to that plan pointed out that general and complete disarmament in a secure, free and peaceful world requires "inter alia "the establishment of effective means for enforcement of international agreements and for the maintenance of peace" (TNCD/7).

The very thorough consideration given the problems of disarmament by the United States during the spring and summer of last year strengthened our conviction that disarmament alone is not enough to fulfil what my Soviet Union colleague has referred to as "mankind's age-old dream of ensuring perpetual and inviolable peace on earth" (ENDC/2). We in the United States have described this dream as the goal of a "a free, secure and peaceful world of independent states adhering to common standards of justice and international conduct and abjecting the use of force to the rule of law, a world where adjustment to change takes place in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter; and a world where there shall be a permanent state of general and complete disarmament under effective international control" (ENDC/6).

The United States believes that its programme for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, presented by President Kennedy to the sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly on 25 September 1961 (ibid.), establishes a firm and integral relationship between disarmament and measures to settle disputes and keep the peace. Furthermore, it believes that the establishment of this relationship represents a significant contribution toward the formulation of a realistic programme leading to the achievement of man's search for genuine peace.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

In presenting this comprehensive programme to the General Assembly, President Kennedy said:

"To destroy arms, however, is not enough. We must create even as we destroy -- creating world-wide law and law enforcement as we outlaw world-wide war and weapons". (A/PV.1013).

He went on to point out that:

"... peace is not solely a matter of military or technical problems -- it is primarily a problem of politics and people. And unless man can match his strides in weapons and technology with equal strides in social and political development, our great strength, like that of the dinosaur, will become incapable of proper control -- and like the dinosaur, will vanish from the earth." (ibid.)

If we achieve our goal of general and complete disarmament we will rid ourselves of great national armies and the threat they have posed to the peace. But other forms of power will remain and that power will be centred mainly in the hands of those States which were formerly great military Powers. Obviously the economic strength of different nations, despite our efforts to improve the material well-being of peoples everywhere will remain for some time unequal. We will still be faced with conflicting ideologies and with political struggles, and social systems will be subject to disruptive pressures from within and from without. Nations, however much we try to develop a co-operative atmosphere, will remain competitive, and we cannot reasonably expect that all statesmen and all politicians will conduct their international relations unfailingly with wisdom and generosity. For disarmament alone will not change human nature, will not eliminate from the human race the qualities of greed and ambition, and of false pride and the love of power. Disarmament alone will not usher in Utopia, but if the inevitable competitions and conflicts among men could be waged in peace we would have a far safer earth.

The Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations recognized that international peace-keeping is the handmaiden of disarmament. There we have affirmed in the fourth paragraph of the preamble:

"...that to facilitate the attainment of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world it is important that all States abide by existing international agreements, refrain from any actions which might aggravate international tensions, and that they seek settlement of all disputes by peaceful means, ...". (ENDC/5, p. 1)

(Mr. Dean, United States)

In that important document, which forms the very basis of our negotiations in this Conference, we have set forth what we all believe to be the goal of our negotiations. I say "we all believe" since that statement was unanimously endorsed by the General Assembly.

Let me repeat the language we used to describe that goal -- it is in paragraph 1 of the Joint Statement -- since it makes clear the inter-relationship between disarmament and peace-keeping:

"The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreement on a programme which will ensure that (a) disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and (b) such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter." (ibid.)

Explicitly stated in paragraph 7 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations is the undertaking that:

"Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means". (ibid. p. 3)

It is clear, I believe, beyond a shadow of a doubt that in endorsing that Joint Statement we were endorsing this important inter-relationship between disarmament and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

To summarize the general philosophy which underlies the United States position on the problem of peace-keeping: we believe we must be realistic in our vision of the world disarmed. Unfortunately we do not see the world as a Utopian one without disagreement and discord. Our vision is of a world without war, but if this vision is to be realized we must have an alternative realistic system for coping with such differences and disputes as will inevitably arise.

I believe it is useful to reflect candidly on this vital matter. Nearly all the nations of the world now maintain armed forces to protect their territorial integrity. Many have political differences with one or more neighbours or with other nations of the world. In this situation, how many nations are there which would be prepared to destroy all their armaments while their differences with other nations remained unresolved and no completely reliable alternative means was available to ensure their self-defence?

(Mr. Dean, United States)

So, general and complete disarmament on the one hand and improved peace-keeping machinery on the other are but two sides of the same coin. We cannot have one without the other. Either we develop effective institutions for settling international differences and keeping the peace, or we in effect abandon our hopes for general and complete disarmament. On the other hand, if we build our capacity to keep the peace as we dismantle the vast apparatus of war we can have a world without war, a world in which the energies of man can be wholly devoted to the improvement of his material, cultural and spiritual well-being. In addition, I am convinced that an improvement in measures for pacific settlement of disputes will contribute appreciably towards bringing about a climate of international confidence within which disarmament may more readily proceed. In a sense, then, reliable means for settling disputes peacefully play a role in confidence-building not dissimilar to that played by measures of verification.

I believe that the proposals for peace-keeping which the United States has advanced will help us to build our capacity to keep the peace and thus to realize our objective of a truly free and peaceful world. They are in keeping with the monumental effort we are making here, an effort unprecedented in the history of man. For what we are trying to accomplish here is the difficult task of giving practical effect to the vision already contained in the Charter of the United Nations and further affirmed in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations.

More specifically, the proposals we have designed to help us to reach our ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world constitute a comprehensive, broad and integrated plan. They cover basic rules of international behaviour among States. In addition, there is provision for the study, and later the adoption, of additional rules of international conduct which will help States to adjust their differences in a dynamic and changing international society. Then we have included proposals for the study and development of procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes. As to disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the disarmament treaty itself, ultimate resolution of unresolved disputes would be by the International Court of Justice. In the field of keeping the peace, the parties would agree to support measures for strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations. The parties to the disarmament treaty would also agree to support the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force and a United Nations Peace Observation Corps.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

I have saved one particular point for the closing portion of my remarks. It is a point to which we attach great importance. The Government of the United States visualizes that during and after the attainment of general and complete disarmament there will be many changes. Our proposals for strengthening arrangements for keeping the peace and for peaceful settlement of disputes are designed in order to facilitate the process of change, which we believe is both inevitable and desirable. Our proposals are not designed to freeze every country's position with respect to every other country just where it is at present. Ancient injustices must still be removed and if there are any, border disputes must still be settled. When the armies of countries have been eliminated, we hope -- and we will strive to make this hope a reality -- that there will exist effective and mutually agreed means for the peaceful adjustment of the differences among nations whereby the just and right demands of one country against another cannot be always frustrated on one side or another by a refusal to budge. To achieve these aims we must consider concrete measures. I invite all the representatives at this Conference to join with the United States in exploring the measures proposed in the United States plan.

In subsequent statements I shall continue to discuss the specific disarmament measures we have suggested for stage I, and I shall also consider in greater detail our specific proposals concerning maintenance of the peace and peaceful settlement of disputes.

Mr. HASSAN (United Arab Republic): The Committee may have noticed that I intervene the least in the disarmament discussions. This is not due, of course, to any indifferent attitude on my part, but due rather to the complexity of the subject, as well as to our desire to listen to all the arguments.

For almost a month our work has been mainly concentrated on discussing the first stage in the two draft treaties before us (ENDC/2, ENDC/30 and Corr.1). We have heard many speakers explain their provisions, make a comparison between them and draw our attention to certain characteristics or supposed drawbacks in one or the other draft.

While reviewing this first stage we came across many important problems, such as the question of the theory of strategy behind the Warsaw and NATO alliances and their bearing on the two drafts, the question of military balance, the scope and phasing problems, control and zonal inspection, the time-table of disarmament, confidence, foreign bases and the like.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

As we followed the discussions very closely, we came to realize that many points were still new to us. My delegation was not always in a position to formulate a definite opinion on some vital problems. I may cite, for example, the question of whether either of the two drafts -- as has been suggested by some -- aims at perpetuating one side's superiority or interests at the other's expense. It was also difficult for us to decide whether any party was practising what in the past has sometimes been called "the gamesmanship of disarmament", or whether the two drafts were reconcilable and in what respects. These, as well as many other questions, have come to our mind; and it is our intention today to share our thinking, or rather our thinking aloud and self-questioning, with the Committee. Usually this process helps to crystallize one's thoughts.

At least some ideas have emerged from last month's and especially last week's discussions with more clarity and precision. Each party has reviewed at length the strategic lay-out of its defences, its armament and disarmament theories. We have been given a full picture of where both East and West apparently stand on disarmament, control and other problems. Each party has accused the other party's plan of aiming at upsetting the actual military power balance between them.

One is tempted to ask oneself some questions on this subject of balance of power. Supposing that the West's concern in principle over verification of the destruction of all the means of delivery and reduction of armies in the first stage were satisfied, what measures can be thought of, what new ideas can be adduced by the Soviet Union to satisfy the West's fears of the Warsaw Pact's emerging superiority in the conventional means of warfare?

It has been suggested that disarmament measures will be equally applied to both parties; but what about the time and space factors -- all too well known -- of military strategy? Could not the forces of the Warsaw Pact countries be deployed in such a manner as to minimize those differences of time and space?

Again, in the same order of questioning on power balance, one is tempted to ask oneself a question relative to the United States plan calling for the destruction of 30 per cent of the means of delivery in stage I. Because of the possible numerical differences in each side's inventory of delivery vehicles, might not the resulting 70 per cent ratio aggravate the imbalance by accentuating the differences near the more dangerous minimum safety line or the famous "second-strike capability"?

(Mr. Hassen, United Arab Republic)

When we think of these advanced Western foreign bases, another question comes to our mind. In order to satisfy Western requirements for extra time and for making up for the differences in space, while at the same time relieving the pressure of these bases on the Warsaw Pact countries, might not one of the many schemes for partial disengagement from points of friction, suggested by both East and West at different intervals, or a variant thereof, be devised to suit the legitimate requirements of both parties? Could not a partial disengagement or thinning out of Western foreign bases in stages, beginning by 30 per cent coupled by a similar gesture of equal value and meaning from the other side, satisfy those elements of security?

While my delegation wishes to put on record its opposition to the theory of maintenance of bases on foreign territory, and while we would like to see all foreign bases liquidated as soon as possible, yet some provision has to be made for this purpose in our search for a treaty on general and complete disarmament. We believe that this provision must make room for the important principle that each liquidation -- which we advocate wholeheartedly -- should be done in a manner acceptable to all parties and commensurate with their security.

We must confess that the total elimination of all nuclear weapons in stage I has its attraction and merits. But since we are newcomers to this field our minds are still fresh and therefore perhaps retain some of the history of disarmament negotiations. We are, therefore, familiar with past projects which did not provide for total destruction of all means of delivery from stage I. Instead, those projects had envisaged their gradual abolition. Along the same line, past disarmament programmes had envisaged the liquidation of foreign bases in two stages; and indeed one particular programme even suggested that their liquidation should begin in stage II.

When a newcomer like my delegation comes across these facts, rather than being totally discouraged by those shifts in the position of both parties we draw hope from them, because if it was possible for the same party to hold different opinions at different times, this may be indicative of possibilities of yet newer adjustments.

In this regard we would also want to ask one further question: If the proposal for the destruction of all means of delivery in stage I were to be accepted, would this not leave all foreign bases without nuclear delivery weapons, and, therefore, would not those bases represent less of a threat than they now do?

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

Also, along the same line of argument on past shifts of positions, there is the fact that in 1957 the United States was willing to cut down its forces to 1.7 million rather than 2.1 million. As a matter of fact, it has been suggested by Western speakers that the West now relies more on its atomic deterrent than on its conventional forces and that it is the other side which has a superiority of conventional armaments. Yet one is puzzled to note that it is the other side which is actually suggesting the reduction to the lower force level previously suggested by the United States.

Mr. Godber, the Minister of State of the United Kingdom, speaking on 2 May (ENDC/PV.29, p.9), suggested however that there was only a minor difference between those two levels and that he was hopeful the difference was negotiable. This is our hope, too.

Again we ask ourselves what was the idea of the United States proposal for reduction of means of delivery by a specific 30 per cent. Since previous United States projects did not specify the reduction percentage, and if there is a validity in the argument that it is possible that a reduction of these vehicles by a percentage might aggravate or accentuate the imbalance at the minimum safety line, what other solution can be thought of?

If the West's requirements for inspection of the retained weapon vehicles or those vehicles "hidden under the jacket" are not satisfied, where does this leave us? Has any thought been given to the reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles by an agreed figure, beginning in the first year of the first stage by destruction of a certain number agreed by both sides, under controls which in this instance will meet Soviet specification, and proceeding with the elimination of over-increasing numbers each year? Might not we start this process for some time as a confidence-building measure?

One other question crosses one's mind. The United States treaty outline proposes the ending of the production of fissionable materials in stage I. On 24 April Mr. Dean, the representative of the United States, suggested that this measure would necessarily entail the establishment of a full measure of control (ENDC/PV.26, p.6). How does the United States define this full measure of control? For upon this definition depends to a great extent our ability to reconcile what looks like 100 per cent control over the above-mentioned measure with the 10 per cent control proportionate with the 10 per cent elimination of weapons in the first year of stage I.

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

While we are on atomic weapons, perhaps our co-Chairmen could tell us how their plans for disarmament envisage the application of control over their proposal of the non-transfer of atomic weapons to non-nuclear Powers, and over the non-dissemination of the information relative to their manufacture among non-nuclear States. What sort of verification is needed for compliance with the non-transfer-of-information clause, and with the non-acceptance by non-nuclear Powers of atomic weapons on their territories?

Speaking of atomic weapons leads one to think of the necessity for their elimination. The United States plan provides for the establishment of a committee of scientific experts in stage I to study the reduction and the elimination of stockpiles of nuclear weapons. We would appreciate more information as to the exact nature and purpose of the studies and as to the nature of the obligations, if any, of the States towards this committee and towards abiding by its recommendations.

The Soviet Union, which before 1961 advocated the initiation of such studies, on 24 April came out against the inclusion in the treaty of such a provision (ENDC/PV.26, pp. 23-24). Mr. Zorin, the representative of the Soviet Union, later explained that he does not exclude the possibility of such studies, but that his country is against making the transition from stage to stage conditional on the results of those studies.

My delegation ventures to recommend that such studies, if agreed by both Parties, should begin right away so that the results could be assessed well before the signature and ratification of the treaty on disarmament. But once that treaty is signed and ratified there should be no room for hinging its implementation on any other conditions.

United States projects in the past were content to leave to the international disarmament organization the decision as to the satisfactory execution of the measures embodied in one stage, and as to the readiness of the machinery of the next stage to go into operation. If the Soviet Union draft has left this decision to the international disarmament organization and has provided in its project for decisions within the international disarmament organization council to be taken by a two-thirds majority -- making it possible for the Soviet Union, as Mr. Dean said, to block passage of any decision by its one-third of the votes plus one vote or one abstention by a neutral State -- would not the very same position work in favour of the United States as well? Or, if there is no

(Mr. P'assan, United Arab Republic)

difference in actual practice or in substance between the two projects, as the United States delegation has contended, could not this similarity lead to the acceptance of a joint formula?

We should like to clarify one more point. The United States plan provides for the reduction of weapons by types within categories. One of these categories includes armed combat aircraft having an empty weight of 40,000 kilogrammes or greater, as well as missiles having a range of 5,000 kilogrammes or greater, submarine-launched missiles, and so on. Would it be possible for a State under the United States plan to elect to reduce its production of those aeroplanes more rapidly than required by the treaty and be entitled to retain existing missiles and submarine-launched missiles, and even go on producing certain amounts of these missiles within stage I? If so, would not the resulting weapons inventory be somewhat different from the initial declaration made public at the beginning of the process? And would this difference be made known to or receive the prior approval of the other party or the international disarmament organization? And would not some of these shifts result in altering the balance existing at the time of the initial declaration?

Again, speaking of suspicion and confidence, Mr. Zorin told us he doubted very much whether a great Power could destroy 1,000 missiles or tanks under IDO inspection and proceed stealthily to the production of 1,000 new ones. He suggested that some minimum amount of confidence should exist and stated that the Soviet Union was not asking for any controls over retained armaments in the United States. For our part, we welcome this show of confidence and wish that everybody had as much confidence in everyone else. Yet if both great Powers were to content themselves with asking for verification and control only on eliminated armaments -- let us say, delivery vehicles in stage I --, such verification would not need to be established in large areas of the world where nuclear weapon vehicles did not exist.

Even if the great Powers, by a magnanimous show of confidence and good will, were not concerned over this problem, might not some States show concern over the following illustrative eventuality: might not a great Power have a secret cache of missiles and atom bombs in those parts of the world where there was no control which it might use, or threaten to use, after the whole world had disarmed, and so upset the world balance? Need I repeat that many States in the non-aligned world do not want to see that balance upset? How, then, can we solve this problem?

(Mr. Hassan, United Arab Republic)

Surely the prospect of hundreds and thousands of inspectors roaming around in search of a secret cache of delivery vehicles or atom bombs in all corners of the universe staggers the imagination. But in the absence of confidence-building collateral measures, such as the cessation of nuclear tests, measures to reduce the risk of surprise attack, and so forth, what alternative is left? Could we not give more thought to other techniques of disarmament and inspection as has been originally suggested and already discussed by Soviet and United States scientists? Should we not also, at the same time, give more attention to the establishment of confidence and the lessening of tensions?

In our modest opinion, control and verification should be considered the safety valves of the disarmament machinery. On their adequacy, effectiveness and strictness depend the amount of confidence generated and the final success of the operation.

Before concluding, I wish to deal very briefly with the question of outer space. As has been recalled by Mr. Lall, a joint resolution relating to the peaceful uses of outer space was sponsored by Burma, India and the United Arab Republic in the General Assembly in 1958 (A/C.1/L.224). We hope that outer space will be spared the evils of the arms race and that the United Nations Charter will be expanded to cover that very vital territory of human endeavour. The sooner this is done, the better in order to avoid the intricacies which will inevitably result from any further delay. We note with gratification that both the Soviet and the United States draft treaties contain many similar provisions in stage I relating to possible measures for the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and for peaceful co-operation in outer space.

Our questions may be found to be very frank, and sometimes very elementary. For this reason I would be grateful to representatives if they would excuse us for any lack of understanding, as we are not fully acquainted with the subject. Despite such drawbacks, I hope the sincerity of our motives is appreciated since our sole object is to seek the truth in the light of which we could help to contribute towards finding an appropriate answer to such a delicate and difficult problem.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

Before I proceed to place before you the views with which the Soviet delegation feels it must now deal, I want to make two brief comments on the statements we have just heard.

My first comment concerns certain views and the approach indicated in the United States representative's statement. As I understand it, the United States was explaining its general approach to the measures for strengthening arrangements for keeping the peace set out in section H of the United States plan dealing with stage I of disarmament.

As you know, we have already dealt with this general United States approach to these questions in our general assessment of the outline of basic provisions of a treaty which was submitted by the United States on 18 April (ENDC/PV.26, p.19), and we then drew attention to some of the doubts raised in our minds by our study of this general approach. We pointed out at the time that the United States, when dealing with the United Nations armed forces for keeping the peace, provision for which is made in paragraph 5 of section H (Measures to strengthen arrangements for keeping the peace), speaks in sub-paragraph 5.b. of -

"Examination of the feasibility of concluding promptly the agreements envisaged in Article 43 of the United Nations Charter" (ENDC/30, p.18); and in sub-paragraph 5.c. of the -

"Conclusion of an agreement for the establishment of a United Nations Peace Force, including definitions of its purpose, mission, composition and strength, disposition, command and control, training logistical support....." (ibid.)

In other words, in order to fulfil the requirements of Article 43 of the United Nations Charter the United States proposed merely a study of the feasibility of concluding an agreement promptly; but for the actual conclusion of the agreement it already gave practical instructions under which the agreement would include the exact components of the States' undertakings under Article 43 of the United Nations Charter.

We pointed out at the time that we thought that approach was wrong. It proposed that, whereas States' undertakings under the Charter should be further studied, an agreement should be concluded immediately about matters not subject to undertakings; in other words, it proposed to by-pass the Charter. Perhaps

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representatives will remember that we have already drawn attention to this fact. We said the same thing about some of the principles for the settlement of disputes, for instance arbitration, compulsory referral of all disputes to the International Court, and so on and so forth. We spoke of our serious doubts on these matters; and I do not think those doubts have been set at rest by the explanation which the United States representative, gave today. He was presenting, he said, the United States' general philosophy in the matter.

Briefly put, this philosophy is that, strictly speaking, actual disarmament must depend on the measures for strengthening peace and all the various procedures accompanying the disarmament process. We could not contest that these procedures must accompany the disarmament process; but that the disarmament process should depend directly upon them seems to us quite wrong. If we accept this point of view, then the entire process of disarmament in general will depend on the settlement of international political controversies. This completes a vicious circle, for those controversies are closely linked to the tension which expresses itself precisely in the immense arms race. To remove the tension we must not only stop the arms race but also start substantial disarmament. At the same time the United States tells us, that disarmament cannot begin unless these political controversies are settled by the definite procedures it advocates. We thus get a vicious circle and can do nothing.

We consider that this approach is wrong. We must resolutely start disarmament; this is a very important problem and, I would say, our main problem at the present stage; and we must simultaneously settle international controversies and improve peaceful procedures for their settlement. That is our position.

This position, as you can see, differs from the position from which the United States starts and which it has expounded to us today. I am making this comment only to remind you of the approach we suggested at the beginning of our discussion after we had received the full text of the Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted by the United States on 18 April.

It is, however, our opinion that these questions, the peaceful settlement of disputes and international armed forces, can be usefully discussed later on, when we examine the substance of the disarmament programme itself from beginning to end. We consider that to divert attention now to their detailed

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study is inexpedient and will not help us to solve the disarmament problem itself. It would be more profitable and expedient to examine the entire disarmament programme as a whole.

That is what we are doing now: we have practically finished debate on first reading of the basic disarmament measures proposed for stage I and we can therefore pass by a natural and easy transition to discussion of matters relating to stage II. We shall, of course, come back to the present matters. For one thing, we shall have a debate on the establishment of an international disarmament organization; and secondly we shall return to this question when we examine the specific articles and provisions relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes and the establishment of international armed forces.

That is what we conceive as the most practical way of settling the order of work on our main objective -- the drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. That is one of the comments I wished to make.

My second comment relates to the views expressed today by the representative of the United Arab Republic, which are of extreme interest to us. He expressed many views on specific problems which we have already examined but which have not been made entirely clear to him and, as he said, could be solved in various ways. We do not rule out those various solutions, and we consider that during the next stage of our negotiations we shall have really to get down to the choice of solutions for specific problems of the disarmament plan. We shall therefore study with keen interest and attention all the views the representative of the United Arab Republic has advanced; and we suppose that when our co-Chairmen come to examine specific drafts of a treaty -- that is, the first stage of the Soviet Union treaty and the outline of basic provisions submitted by the United States -- they will have also to consider the ideas voiced today by the representative of the United Arab Republic, and those of other States which have already given, or will by then have given, their views.

It therefore seems to me that at the present stage of our work we should fix our attention on the main, or decisive, questions on which depends the settlement of the programme of general and complete disarmament and of the entire treaty -- the settlement without which there can be no treaty. We must discuss and study carefully the basic disarmament measures in the first, second and third stages. After that we can think over all that this has entailed, and make a careful study of all the opinions and the alternative solutions for controversial

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problems, and then come back to a more detailed consideration of each of these stages for a more final decision.

Those are the views which I felt I had to express to you before I passed to the views which the Soviet delegation feels it must place before you now.

The Committee has devoted much time to discussion of stage I of general and complete disarmament. At a number of meetings we have studied exhaustively the articles in the Soviet draft treaty relating to this stage, and the corresponding sections of the United States plan. Unfortunately, an explanation of the provisions contained in these two documents and our exchange of views have made clear the existence of substantial conflicts between the position of the two sides. These disagreements, it now appears, do not concern any secondary matters but attest an actual difference of approach towards solution of the main problems of stage I of disarmament.

The Soviet Union, as the mandatory terms of its draft treaty show, stands for genuine disarmament under international control under equal conditions for all States. The Soviet proposals solve in stage I the most acute problem of our time: immediate elimination of the threat of nuclear war through the complete elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons and the simultaneous dismantling of military bases in foreign territories.

The United States proposal for percentage reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles does not neutralize nuclear weapons but on the contrary increases the danger of their use, since its associated control conditions would lead to disclosure of the defence system of peaceful nations.

When there are disagreements in principle, there seems hardly any sense in starting to discuss details. Indeed, to do so would not help to remove the main differences but would in fact do the opposite: it would merely complicate and confuse the issues. We believe, therefore, that we should pass on to discuss the articles and provisions governing stage II of disarmament. A consistent study of these stages would give us a complete picture of our situation, and help us in no small degree to map out ways and means of overcoming the differences which have arisen in our approaches to the disarmament programme.

The Soviet delegation deems it expedient to proceed to an explanation of the articles of the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament which constitute stage II of disarmament. In conformity with the practice of

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business-like debate, to which the Soviet delegation has invariably adhered, we will at the same time comment on the corresponding parts of the United States document.

Article 21 of our draft treaty, which so to speak opens stage II, defines its incidents. When we discussed stage I of disarmament we had an earlier opportunity to point to the importance of having introductory articles for every stage, indicating its general content and the principal lines on which States should act. I will therefore not repeat myself.

What tasks do we think should be included in the second stage of general and complete disarmament? The treaty drafted by the Soviet Government assumes that at this stage the parties undertake to liquidate nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and further reduce their armed forces, their conventional armaments and the production of these, and their military budgets. The prohibition and elimination of weapons of mass destruction are the central measures of stage II.

Thus stage II is in a way a logical continuation of stage I a perfectly proper way of ensuring the necessary sequence and continuity in the disarmament process, the main idea behind the agreed principles of disarmament. The elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles in stage I, by neutralizing and paralyzing them, prepares the ground for their elimination in stage II. Whereas, through the measures proposed in the Soviet draft treaty, the threat of attack by one State on another with nuclear bombs and warheads is practically eliminated in stage I, as a result of the implementation of the measures provided for stage II the danger of a nuclear conflict will disappear completely and for ever.

If we now turn to the United States document, we cannot help noticing that it does not outline the tasks for stage II any more definitely than for stage I. The introduction to this stage gives no clear picture of what the States should do; there is just one general sentence about further reduction. Unfortunately our earlier discussion suggests that this vagueness and uncertainty in the United States proposal is no minor fault, nor due to any negligence of its draftsmen, but reflects their general policy of preferring diffuse general provisions to definite disarmament obligations.

The Soviet draft prescribes in chapter V the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons as the main duty in stage II, and lays down a well-thought-out procedure for its fulfilment. (ENDC/2, p.14)

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Before I explain this chapter and the obligations of States under it, I should like to bring up a matter that has been raised more than once in the Eighteen-Nation Committee by the United States representative, Mr. Dean, and again at our meeting on 4 May (ENDC/PV.31, p.18): that is, the United States proposal to set up a committee of experts on nuclear questions before assuming any obligation to destroy nuclear weapons. At the same time - as has become a habit with the Western representatives - he indulged in guesswork about the Soviet Union position so slanted as to create the impression that the Soviet Union was taking a step backwards. We have already replied to his remarks in our reply to Mr. Lall, the representative of India, and I wish once more to set Mr. Dean's mind at rest: We have not taken a single backward step from our proposal of 23 September 1960 (A/4505). No: we are still going ahead, developing and clarifying the proposals on which our draft treaty is based.

This remark, however, is by the way, and I do not wish to dwell on it. The essential point is why the committee of experts should be needed -- to help to give effect to the treaty, or to set up another obstacle to agreement? Briefly, our approach is this. We do not exclude the possibility that the International Disarmament Organization will have to undertake various studies -- within the scope of the treaty, of course -- in order to specify various methods of implementing agreed provisions. For this the help of experts may prove useful. I emphasize once again the main point, and that is that the studies must be subordinate to the task of helping to give the earliest possible effect to the treaty and the obligations already assumed.

Mr. Dean's remarks make it clear that the United States approach is quite different. It looks as if the establishment of a committee of experts on nuclear problems and the results of its work are put forward by the United States as a condition for its acceptance of an obligation to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons. At our meeting of 4 May Mr. Dean expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would not.-

"insist on our concluding a treaty providing for the unconditional elimination of nuclear weapons before this study has been completed".

(ENDC/PV.31, p. 18)

This remark by Mr. Dean leads to one conclusion only: that the United States will not undertake to eliminate nuclear weapons before the studies by the experts are completed. Our experience of negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear

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tests has shown us pretty convincingly how various "technical" questions can be used to block agreement. Furthermore, later remarks by Mr. Dean about "impracticable" tasks, as he called them, seem to imply that the United States has already decided what the result of the work of the expert committee it proposes shall be, and that it will be negative. If this is so, how much value have the words in the introductory part of the United States document about the complete elimination of nuclear weapons? Perhaps we have misunderstood the United States position; if so, we ask for clarification.

We have always considered, and continue to maintain, that nuclear weapons should be unconditionally prohibited, eradicated from the arsenals of States, and destroyed. We cannot and may not refuse that undertaking, for to do so would be nothing less than a justification of nuclear weapons and nuclear wars. However great the difficulties of eradicating and destroying nuclear weapons, they can be overcome; and a guarantee of this is the wide measure of control which will be established during the implementation of general and complete disarmament, and the harmonious system of measures for the elimination of nuclear weapons put forward in the Soviet draft treaty.

These measures are dealt with in article 22, the first paragraph of which provides that nuclear weapons of all kinds, types and capacities shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. Fissionable materials extracted from the war heads of rockets, bombs, torpedoes and other nuclear armaments is to be converted to peaceful uses. Their mechanical and other components are to be fully destroyed. All stockpiles of nuclear materials intended for the production of nuclear weapons will be processed to render them unfit for direct use for this purpose, and will also be transferred to the fund for peaceful uses. All depots and special storage spaces for nuclear weapons will be demolished.

The second paragraph of this article provides that the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable materials for weapons purposes shall be completely discontinued. There is also a special provision that all plants, workshops, installations and laboratories producing nuclear weapons or their components are to be destroyed or converted to production for peaceful purposes.

While these measures are being executed the States parties to the treaty must, in accordance with their constitutional procedure, enact legislation on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and on amenability under the criminal law for any attempt at its re-establishment by individuals or organizations. This provision is contained in article 22, paragraph 3.

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Before I speak on control over the measures we propose for prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons, I feel I must emphasize that in our draft all measures relating to the elimination of nuclear weapons are set out as paragraphs of one article. This is a logical expression of the interrelation between all measures for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. They constitute an indivisible whole, and any attempt to tear out any particular measure would be quite obviously useless and harmful and would only delay agreement on disarmament.

In this connexion the Soviet delegation cannot help expressing its surprise at the persistence with which the United States and the United Kingdom seek to isolate cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes. It is perfectly clear that cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes immediately introduces the question of control over the atomic industry -- that is to say, over uranium mines, uranium and thorium ore-processing plants, diffusion plants for separating uranium isotopes, chemical plants for processing reactor fuel elements and reactors. Even this very incomplete list shows how comprehensive the control must be. We may add that a secondary result of this control, if not its main one, would be to throw the nuclear weapon industry wide open.

It is quite clear -- and I see no need to point this out to the members of the Committee -- that control of this kind is only possible when nuclear weapons have been completely eliminated, and with them the threat of nuclear war. We have said so clearly and openly on several occasions, and have stated our position. However, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom are still pressing for a separate discussion of cessation of production of fissionable materials for military purposes, and have even proposed to involve the Committee of the Whole in it. What is the idea of all this? Considering the real state of affairs, there is only one possible answer: to slow down any purposeful negotiations.

Now I shall say a few words about the transfer of fissionable materials to peaceful purposes. From what I have told you about the provisions of the Soviet draft treaty, it clearly provides that in stage II not merely some 50 tons but all fissionable material without exception, including that contained in nuclear weapons, will be turned over to peaceful purposes.

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At the last meeting the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom repeatedly asserted that the United States proposals go further in disarmament, and reproached the Soviet Union with not making any provision for the nuclear arm in stage I.

However, while holding forth in this way the Western Powers somehow forgot about the all-important time factor. Actually the United States extends stage I over to a period in which nearly two stages could be completed under the Soviet draft treaty. If we compare nuclear disarmament under the respective proposals of the United States and the USSR with regard to the time factor, the result will be the following:

the Soviet Union proposes simultaneously to discontinue production of fissionable material, and to discontinue and prohibit production;

the United States proposes to discontinue production of fissionable materials only, with neither cessation nor prohibition of the production of nuclear weapons;

the Soviet Union proposes to convert to peaceful uses all fissionable materials, whether newly produced, or in stockpiles, or extracted from the eliminated weapons;

the United States proposes to transfer 50 tons of U-235 to peaceful purposes, and nothing else.

Here you have a simple yet graphic comparison showing who is proposing practical nuclear disarmament and who would like to keep to half-measures and not touch the substance of the problem.

I will now turn to control. The Soviet Union considers it necessary that all practical measures of nuclear disarmament shall be executed under strict international control. Article 22 of our treaty accordingly prescribed the measures of control over the elimination of nuclear weapons to be taken by the international disarmament organization. Its inspectors are to verify the destruction of nuclear weapons and their depots and storage places, the discontinuance of the production of nuclear weapons and the conversion to peaceful uses of the nuclear fuel contained in nuclear ammunition. These inspectors will have the right to inspect all enterprises which extract raw materials for atomic production or which produce or use fissionable materials or atomic energy, on the basis of documents made available to the international disarmament organization by the States parties to the treaty.

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Besides the elimination of nuclear weapons the Soviet Union proposes, as I have already mentioned, to execute measures to eliminate all other types of weapons of mass annihilation. The procedure for the elimination of chemical, biological and radiological weapons is laid down in article 23 of our treaty. This article deals with the elimination from arsenals and the destruction or neutralization of all kinds of chemical, biological and radiological weapons, wherever situated. Simultaneously all instruments and facilities for the combat use of such weapons, and all special devices and facilities for their transportation, storage and conservation are to be destroyed. Article 23 also lays down that in this same stage the production of all kinds of chemical, biological and radiological weapons and of all means for their combat use, transportation and storage shall be completely discontinued. Plants, installations and laboratories engaged in their production will be destroyed or converted to production for peaceful purposes. All measures for the elimination of chemical, biological and radiological weapons, the discontinuance of their production and the elimination of the production basis are to be implemented under the control of inspectors of the international disarmament organization.

The members of the Committee cannot fail to notice that our draft treaty imposes firm and definite obligations on States to eliminate chemical, biological and radiological weapons. We observe that the position of the United States is different. As in the case of nuclear weapons, the United States makes acceptance of obligations to eliminate these types of weapons of mass annihilation conditional upon the study of this question by experts. Here too a loophole is left for delaying or even altogether evading the duty to eliminate completely weapons of mass annihilation.

Strictly adhering to the principle of ensuring the equality of States in the disarmament process, the Soviet Union links the elimination of all types of weapons of mass annihilation in stage II with a further large reduction of the States' armed forces.

This reduction of armed forces, conventional armaments and military expenditures is set out in chapter VI of the Soviet draft treaty. Article 24, dealing with the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, provides that in stage II of disarmament the levels of the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union shall be reduced to one million enlisted men, officers and

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civilian employees. On the levels of the armed forces of other States parties to the treaty, it is intended, as we propose for stage I, to come to provisionally agreement with the States parties to the treaty. We note that the United States proposals for stage II provide for approximately the same level of armed forces for the Soviet Union and for the United States. This, of course, is a favourable sign, and the fact that the United States has put forward a similar figure shows yet again how carefully the Soviet Union has considered all the relevant factors in the preparation of its proposals.

Article 24 of our draft contains a recommendation that the reduction of the armed forces shall be carried out primarily through the demobilization of personnel previously attached to the nuclear or other weapons subject to elimination under articles 22 and 23 of the present treaty, and chiefly by way of the complete disbandment of units and ships' crews, their officers and enlisted men being demobilized. We propose this procedure for the further reduction of armed forces with the definite purpose of making as difficult as possible the re-establishment of the kinds of armed forces most dangerous to peace, in case anyone should ever think of doing so.

By the same procedure as for the reduction of conventional armaments in stage I of disarmament, article 24 provides for the destruction of all conventional armaments, military equipment and munitions released by the disbandment of conventionally-armed units, and for the destruction or conversion to peaceful uses of all their means of transportation and subsidiary equipment. Living quarters and subsidiary premises released by the disbandment of units, and all their drill grounds, proving grounds and firing ranges, will be transferred to the civilian authorities. All these measures would be implemented under the control of the international disarmament organization, whose inspectors would inspect the demobilization of personnel at places where troops are disbanded, the destruction of released conventional armaments, and the transfer to the civilian authorities of premises, grounds and military equipment for peaceful uses.

Article 25 of our draft regulates the further reduction of conventional armaments production, by the same procedure as for the first stage of disarmament. The production of conventional armaments and munitions is to be reduced proportionately to the reduction of the armed forces. This reduction would be made, as before, primarily through the elimination of enterprises engaged exclusively in the production of such armaments and munitions: they would be dismantled, their specialized machine tools and other equipment destroyed, and their premises and

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In stage II of general and complete disarmament there would be a further reduction of military expenditures proportionate to the destruction of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons and the discontinuance of their production, and also to the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments and of their production. This comes under article 26 of our draft treaty.

I should like to point out to the members of the Committee that our draft provides for the allotment of agreed funds released by disarmament to assist underdeveloped countries.

All the disarmament measures prescribed for stage II, including the further reduction of military expenditures, would be carried out under the control of inspectors of the international disarmament organization.

To strengthen further the capacity of the United Nations to ensure international peace and security, it is proposed that the States parties to the treaty shall continue to implement the measures regarding the placing of armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council for use under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter. This is dealt with in article 27.

Time-limits for measures of stage II, and the transition from stage II to stage III, come under articles 28 and 29 in chapter VIII of our draft. Like the duration of stage I, the duration of stage II of disarmament in our draft treaty is 15 months. The last three months of this period are allotted to a review of the results of the implementation of stage II. The procedure of transition from stage II to stage III, and the content of the measures preceding the beginning of stage III, are similar to those prescribed for the transition from stage I to stage II: that is, they are resolved by the control council of the international disarmament organization, and no party has a veto.

Those are the basic provisions of the Soviet draft treaty for the second stage of disarmament. The Soviet delegation, respecting the canons of businesslike discussion, is willing to give any further explanation.

The CHAIRMAN (ITALY) (translation from French): The next speaker on my list is the representative of Burma; but the representative of the United Kingdom has asked to speak on a point of order, and I think the representative of Burma is prepared to wait a few minutes. I therefore call on the representative of the United Kingdom.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I shall not delay our colleague from Burma for more than two moments, but I do think it right to say one word immediately following the remarks of our Soviet colleague.

We have, of course, listened with interest to what Mr. Zorin said this morning, but it must be noted he has embarked on stage II of his draft treaty. Of course he is fully entitled so to do. But it does make it a little difficult for us, since we were not aware that he was proposing so to do at this stage. Last week, it is true, he gave indications that he would like to at an early stage, but I had hoped there would be discussions on this matter between the co-Chairmen so that we could all move forward together.

The purpose of my intervention, however, is not to criticize our Soviet colleague, but to make it clear that the fact that he has chosen to move forward to stage II will in no way invalidate the remarks of others who may still wish to comment on stage I. There are others, including myself, who may well want to make further comments on stage I, and I want to make sure we are not to be prohibited, because of the fact that one representative has gone to stage II, from continuing discussion of stage I, if that is desirable or necessary.

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): I had intended to speak myself this morning, as representative of Italy, on questions relating to stage I; but I shall refrain from doing so because I see that there is a long list of delegations that wish to speak on the same subject. Consequently, I too, as representative of Italy, wish to reserve my right to revert to questions relating to stage I.

Mr. BARRINGTON (Burma): The delegation of Burma has followed with the closest attention the debates of our Committee on the subject of general and complete disarmament. As the two sides have presented their proposals and their explanations of them, we have become more and more concerned. Why should this be so? Because it is becoming clearer and clearer to us that, while each side needs and sincerely does want general and complete disarmament for itself, it does not believe that the other side wants it; and that while this state of mind lasts there can be no prospect of our breaking out of the impasse in which we all now find ourselves.

(Mr. Barrington, Burma)

Let me amplify this a little. In his brilliant speech last Friday (ENDC/PV.39), our Brazilian colleague brought into sharp focus the heart of the matter. This is the hypothetical problem of hidden weapons. The United States and its allies hold that the proposals on control contained in the Soviet Union draft treaty do not afford adequate guarantees that no weapons will be hidden during the process of disarmament. This would, they claim, place them at the mercy of the Soviet Union if, on the completion of the disarmament process, they found that the Soviet Union had in fact not destroyed all those weapons which it was supposed to destroy under the agreement. In other words, the Western Powers have no faith in the intentions and motives of the Soviet Union.

For their part, the Soviet Union and its allies claim that this is a needless fear. They say that it is unthinkable that great nations which are actually engaged in the process of destroying powerful armaments in large quantities are going simultaneously to cheat with a view to gaining an unfair advantage. Therefore, they add, the concern of the Western Powers over the alleged possibility of hidden weapons stems not from any real such possibility, but out of a desire to send agents into the territory of the Soviet Union and its allies to seek military information which could assist them in planning a surprise attack at an opportune moment. In other words, the Soviet Union and its allies have no faith in the intentions and motives of the Western allies. This was stated eloquently and unequivocally by Foreign Minister Gromyko at the very beginning of our Conference when he said:

"Our country does not intend to take anyone at his word ... Nor do we expect others to take us at our word." (ENDC/PV.2, p.11)

It is not very often that Western representatives find themselves in agreement with statements made by Mr. Gromyko. The fact that this particular statement has met with the approval of the Western Powers, and that there is hardly a meeting at which it is not quoted or referred to, even after ten weeks of negotiations here, points to the intractable nature of the problem which we face. Put bluntly, it is that neither side really believes that the other wishes to disarm generally and completely. Each thinks that the other is not above using the process of general and complete disarmament to steal a march over it. It is often referred to as lack of confidence. To my delegation it seems that it is even worse than that: it is out-and-out mistrust.

(Mr. Barrington, Burma)

It would be tempting and easy for those in a position like our own to throw up their hands and say that there is no prospect of success for our efforts as long as this state of mind lasts, and that all we can do is to sit and wait until favourable developments in other international areas come to our rescue. Of course, such favourable developments could be of immense help to us, but that possibility would not absolve us of the responsibility we owe to distraught humanity to try to find, within the strict compass of disarmament, a way out of our present impasse. How can this be done? Obviously, it can be done only by somehow removing the mutual mistrust which serves to widen the differences already existing between the two sets of proposals which have been laid before our Committee. How can we begin to remove this mistrust? There may be several ways but, as my delegation sees it, one way would be for each side to convince the other that it really means business when it speaks about general and complete disarmament.

A study of the Soviet Union proposals will show that the proposed concrete measures of disarmament are broken up into three stages, no two of which are identical. However, the control measures proposed for all of the three stages are broadly the same. Similarly, in the United States proposal the proposed concrete measures of disarmament are also broken up into three stages, no two of which are identical. Here again the control measures proposed for all of the three stages are broadly the same. Therefore, in respect of each proposal the variable factors are the stages, while the constants are the control measures. Both sides have explained to us at length their reasons for their adoption of their various stages, and we have of course taken due note of them. But, in addition to these reasons, it is evident that their proposals on staging have been powerfully influenced by the nature of their proposed control measures. This is only natural, since the link between disarmament and control is unbreakable. The consequence is that the deadlock which has been reached with regard to the control measures has tended to freeze all the three stages in each of the draft proposals. If we could somehow break this deadlock with regard to control, might it not un-freeze the stages and thereby make possible some movement in the direction of progress?

What I have in mind specifically is the employment of both the Soviet Union and the United States forms of control with regard to a treaty on general and complete disarmament. I would be less than frank if I failed to mention at this

(Mr. Barrington, Burma)

stage that this idea originated with our colleague from Nigeria, and that what I am trying to do is to develop it. In his thoughtful statement of 4 May, Mr. Atta said:

"We are told that inspection should relate only to the arms being destroyed or on the production line. If we destroy a very small percentage of arms, say, 5 per cent each year, I am prepared to accept the argument that there will be no point in verifying what remains. As soon as we begin to destroy a significant percentage, however, what remains becomes very important. In my opinion, a 30 to 40 per cent cut is such a significant figure. Whether or not we should agree to non-inspection of the remaining arms until we reach a significant cut is a matter to be discussed." (ENDC/PV.31, p.9)

Reference to this has been made by several speakers, among them Sir Michael Wright, of the United Kingdom who, speaking on 8 May, said:

"The question of evil intentions 'under the jacket' arises, of course, also in the context of the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles. Indeed, as the representative of Nigeria pointed out in his intervention at our thirty-first meeting, as soon as we begin to destroy a significant percentage of weapons what remains becomes very important. In fact, the higher the percentage destroyed, the more important the remainders become, until at the point of 100 per cent elimination the possession of even a few weapons 'under the jacket' could give a decisive advantage to the country retaining them." (ENDC/PV.33, p.29)

Then Mr. Godber, speaking on 18 May, expressed much the same idea when he said:

"If only 30 per cent of delivery vehicles were eliminated in the stage I, of course a 5 per cent variation such as I have referred to would not be nearly so serious in regard to the actual destruction of nuclear delivery vehicles. If in fact somebody had hidden away 5 per cent, then it would mean that they would have 75 per cent left rather than 70 per cent, and there would still be a reasonable degree of balance between the two sides. If one wants to go to 100 per cent, then this becomes highly critical." (ENDC/PV.39, p.46.)

(Mr. Barrington, Burma)

Finally, Mr. Dean, speaking on 11 May, expressed the same idea when he said: "If we have a cut-back of 30 per cent we know that the risk from clandestinely retained stockpiles is not as great as it will be later, because 70 per cent of Western strength will remain."

(ENDC/PV.35, p.15)

In fairness to all these three gentlemen -- Sir Michael Wright, Mr. Godber and Mr. Dean -- I wish to say that none of them was in fact advocating that there should be no verification of remaining armaments even in the early stages of disarmament. But they were making the point that there was not anything like as much need for such verification in the earlier stages as during the later stages. What I would like them to consider is whether, given all the circumstances, they need to insist on receiving assurances, during the early stages and before a significant cut has been attained, with regard to remaining armaments. Might not a little "give" here result in a little "take" elsewhere?

Having given careful thought to this question, my delegation wonders whether the United States and its allies might be able to say to the Soviet Union and its allies, "All right, we will accept your control measures for stage I", and that the Soviet Union and its allies might then be able to say to the United States and its allies, "Since you have been able to accept our control measures for stage I, we will accept your control measures for stage II." Of course, stages I and II referred to here would not correspond either to the Soviet Union stages I and II or to the United States stages I and II. It would be my delegation's hope that between them these stages could contain all the major elements of disarmament such as the elimination of all nuclear weapons and their carriers, reduction of armed forces and armaments and liquidation of all potentially offensive military bases, and that stage III would be devoted mainly to providing for the smooth transition of States to a disarmed world. It would be highly presumptuous of us to try to suggest exactly how the elements of complete and general disarmament should be divided or split up between the three stages, or what the timing should be. These are matters which would need to be worked out in detail.

This is not a proposal; it is not even a suggestion; it is little more than a thought. We commend it to our United States colleagues because we feel that their acceptance of the Soviet Union form of control during stage I would

(Mr. Barrington, Burma)

prove that the United States and its allies meant business with regard to general and complete disarmament. It may involve some risks, but general and complete disarmament cannot be attained without taking some risks. We would also ask the Soviet Union to consider seriously whether it could not accept a form of verification which would give the United States a reasonable assurance during stage II that agreed levels of remaining armaments were not being exceeded. If, on the attainment of general and complete disarmament, at a time when all States have lost their offensive power, it is necessary to give the international disarmament organization the broad powers envisaged in article 38 of the Soviet Union draft to ensure against the re-establishment of armed forces and armaments, then is it not reasonable for States to wish to assure themselves through some reasonable means and through the same international disarmament organization that States which still possess the means to launch an offensive do completely rid themselves of such capability? Here again there may be some risk, but again we would say that general and complete disarmament cannot be achieved without taking risks.

Finally, to both the Soviet Union and the United States we would recall the eloquent appeal made in this chamber last Friday by our Brazilian colleague, who asked them to consider themselves as partners in a war against war.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): This morning we have heard statements by the representatives of the United Arab Republic and Burma which were directed in the main to a review of the differences that have become apparent in the approaches of the Soviet Union draft treaty, on the one hand, and the United States basic outline of measures of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, on the other. In these statements suggestions were made which might commend themselves to the delegations of those two great countries in the search for a means of agreement and a way out of the differences which at present seem to stand in the path of progress in our work.

Today the Canadian delegation wishes to comment on some suggestions which were made last week. A number of specific suggestions were raised by several representatives which we think could be usefully considered by the Committee in making some progress, at any rate, towards agreement on how general and complete disarmament is to be achieved.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The first of these suggestions related to outer space. I think that the Committee's discussion of this question last week was very useful in clarifying the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union. It showed, I believe, that there is a very real measure of similarity between the measures in both disarmament plans with respect to the action which should be taken in this field.

Commenting on these measures, the representative of India, speaking on 15 May (ENDC/PV.37), made what we regard as a very useful suggestion. As I understood Mr. Lall, he proposed that the co-Chairmen should undertake the drawing up of a joint draft article or articles on the measures concerning outer space which could eventually be embodied in the overall agreement covering the first stage measures. The Canadian delegation wishes to support this suggestion. Members of the Committee will recall that the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada proposed on 27 March that the Committee of the Whole undertake the drafting of a declaration concerning the reservation of outer space for peaceful purposes, which would prohibit the launching of mass destruction weapons into orbit and would provide for advance notification of the launchings of space vehicles and missiles (ENDC/PV.10, p.25). The Canadian delegation still considers that the Conference could make a significant contribution to reducing tensions by agreeing without delay to a declaration of this type in the Committee of the Whole, since this would provide the world with immediate assurance that the nuclear arms race would not be extended into outer space. But at the same time we recognize that the full range of disarmament measures relating to outer space must be embodied in the treaty on general and complete disarmament which we hope to produce. Now that the relevant positions of the United States and Soviet Union plans have been considered in plenary meetings, it would seem appropriate for the co-Chairmen to proceed to the drafting of an agreed section of our treaty on this subject.

I was happy to note that at our thirty-ninth meeting the representative of the Soviet Union said, at the end of his statement, that he considered it advisable that the Committee should instruct the co-Chairmen to try, in the light of the exchange of views which have taken place in the Committee, to bring the positions of both the United States and the Soviet Union closer on matters covered by the first stage of disarmament. Mr. Zorin said on this subject:

"The Soviet delegation is prepared to enter into such negotiations with the United States delegation." (ENDC/PV.39, p.38)

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

The Canadian delegation believes that the question of outer space, while not belonging to the most important group of questions which have to be resolved, is one which the co-Chairmen could and should negotiate upon and on which, as Mr. Lall has proposed, they could and should work out joint language now for the relevant articles.

The second matter on which I should like to comment is the very valuable and interesting suggestion made by the representative of Brazil last Friday. He suggested that it would be appropriate to establish, under the auspices of the Conference, a competent technical body to study control problems and to formulate suggestions thereon. (ENDC/PV.39, p.20) As Mr. Godber pointed out, the establishment of an expert group of this type would not in any way divert the Conference from its central task. On the contrary, technical studies of the sort which I believe Mr. de Mello-Franco was suggesting would provide the Conference with a clear picture of the precise nature of the verification arrangements which would have to accompany the specific disarmament proposals made in the two plans that are before the Committee. In other words, the Committee would be working not on control or verification in the abstract but on verification applied to specific measures which are included in both the Soviet and United States outline treaties but which are not comparable and in relation to which the possibilities of control are of vital importance.

In the view of the Canadian delegation, it would be very useful if a technical group of this sort were established now. As I said, it should undertake not a study of verification problems in the abstract but an examination of specific inspection arrangements which would be necessary in order to verify the disarmament measures proposed in the outline treaties which have been submitted for the consideration of this Conference. In particular, and to begin with, they should study the means of verification of measures for the elimination of nuclear weapons vehicles. I note that the representative of the United Arab Republic made a similar suggestion today regarding the value of studying this question of the elimination of nuclear weapons. I should therefore like to urge that this very useful suggestion made by the representative of Brazil should be considered favourably by the Conference.

My third and final point relates to the problem of the elimination of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. In his opening statement, at the fourth meeting of the Conference (ENDC/PV.4, p.15), the Secretary of

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

State for External Affairs of Canada emphasized our great concern that early action should be taken to deal with the elimination of this means of warfare, which arouses general repugnance and fear throughout the world. Mr. Green drew attention to the fact that this was a subject which should be examined intensively as soon as possible and that, on the basis of the proposals which both sides had advanced with respect to this subject, there was no reason to delay concrete action in working out the difficult technical questions which the abolition of chemical and bacteriological weapons involves.

I am sure all representatives here are aware of the particularly complicated problems which disarmament in the chemical and bacteriological field raises. It is generally accepted that it is very easy to adapt the production of chemical or bacteriological substances having legitimate peaceful applications to the production of similar materials which could be used for the destruction of life on a very wide scale. The production facilities used for one purpose can with great ease be converted to other purposes. Thus the cessation of production, the elimination of the weapons themselves, and the verification of these measures raise very serious difficulties whose solution requires detailed technical examination.

In my opinion, the suggestion which has been made by the representative of Brazil could be adopted also in relation to the establishment of a technical group for studying the problems of disarmament related to chemical and bacteriological weapons. The Canadian delegation welcomed the assurance we received at our thirty-seventh meeting from the United States representative with respect to the United States position on chemical and bacteriological weapons. In the course of his comments on the twelfth question posed by the representative of Sweden, Mr. Stelle said:

"In an effort to advance our work still more rapidly, we declare our readiness to participate in an expert study group even prior to stage I. We are, in fact, prepared to begin at any time in order to determine whether measures sufficiently effective and workable can be devised in time to be implemented in stage I." (ENDC/PV.37, p.13)

It appears very important to my delegation that no opportunity should be lost to explore the feasibility of including in the first stage of the disarmament process measures to reduce the threat posed by these generally abhorred weapons of mass destruction. I would therefore urge most strongly that this Committee agree to establish now, in whatever form seems appropriate, a qualified expert group to examine the possibilities of early concrete action in this area.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

This morning we heard from the Soviet representative some remarks which repeated the previously stated position of the Soviet Union -- namely, that it feels that the establishment of groups for specialized studies, such as those I have mentioned, might delay the Conference in its main task, that what must be done is to take certain political decisions without paying too much attention to the technical considerations upon which those decisions must, in part, be based. I do not know whether it is fair to say that this means we must decide to do something before we know how it is to be done, or indeed whether it is practicable to do it at all. However, as the Canadian delegation sees it, the practical approach to many of these problems would require that we should know exactly, or as nearly exactly as possible, how we were going to carry out any decisions which are made. There are many measures proposed which would be ideally useful, but the question we have to pay regard to here is whether the measures proposed are feasible, and how they can be carried out in the light of the considerations which have been brought forward here by many representatives, including several who have spoken this morning.

In closing, I would say that the Canadian delegation hopes that after discussion in this Committee of the three matters which I have raised this morning it will be possible for us to take steps on the lines I have suggested.

Mr. LALL (India): I would say first that I generally support the remarks made by the United Kingdom representative, particularly in expressing again the hope that the co-Chairmen will be able to arrive at agreed arrangements regarding the rate of progress in our Committee in the internal transition here from stage I to stage II of the disarmament plans. Of course, representatives are entitled to speak on whatever matter they wish, but for those of us who are trying to form an idea of the comparative positions, and how those positions can be made to dovetail, it would obviously be better if we could proceed simultaneously with both the draft projects before us rather than to find that one had been fully considered in the Committee while the other was still in stage I consideration.

The representative of the United States said today, I believe, that he was going to make a series of statements which would continue to deal with stage I. Without in any way trying to make suggestions to the co-Chairmen, I hope that they will be able to resolve this matter so as to bring us back to parallel and simultaneous consideration of both plans. I might say that informally one has

(Mr. Lall, India)

heard the view that perhaps there are certain elements in both plans which, although relevant to all three stages, could perhaps be all discussed together at the end of our discussion on substantive disarmament measures. It might be possible, as a compromise, to discuss the international disarmament organization at the end of our first-round discussion of the substantive disarmament measures in the three stages. I mention that merely in order to suggest that there are ways out of the present lack of balance in considering the two plans.

I want today to draw attention to certain aspects of the debate on Friday as indicating that, as we are proceeding with our consideration of stage I, important facets of what I might call the truth about disarmament are coming to light, and they are coming to light, significantly, from all sides of our Committee. I draw attention to some of these aspects of the debate because I think they may help to show something that we are very concerned to indicate in our delegation, namely, that even basic thinking regarding general and complete disarmament and the treaty which we are hoping to formulate is not as far apart on the two sides as often appears from their statements.

I would first refer to the following statement made by the representative of Bulgaria:

"It has, indeed, been stated several times that control and verification can not be considered to provide a 100 per cent guarantee, and that disarmament obviously entails certain responsibilities and uncertainties which States are willing to accept". (ENDC/PV.39, p.6)

In that statement Mr. Tarabanov was, I think, indicating his general agreement with that approach to the issue and he was pointing out that it was an approach which had been widely stated.

In Mr. de Mello-Franco's very interesting and thoughtful statement, which has been mentioned by many speakers, I want to refer only to the following very brief remark -- and I am referring to this remark in the light of my own thesis, and not, of course, with the intention of excluding from our consideration anything else that he said:

"...therefore ..., it is absolutely essential and urgent to negotiate with patience, even with obstinacy, in order to find an acceptable solution to the problem of control". (ibid., p.19)

(Mr. Lall, India)

This is a statement with which we very much agree as indicating one of the truths about the process of negotiation and the elaboration of a treaty on disarmament.

Now I come to the statement of the Deputy Foreign Minister of Poland. I should like to quote what I think is a most important paragraph in his statement:

"There is yet another element: the well-understood interests of each party. For what is prompting us to draw up a treaty on general and complete disarmament is, precisely, the fact that we are aware of the instability of the present balance and of the dangers that follow from it. It is, precisely, the well-understood interest of every State and every people that execution of the general disarmament programme will serve their interest in securing for ever that state of peace and security brought about by general disarmament, which will be the best guarantee of the genuineness of the treaty."

(ibid., p. 23.)

I will stop there, although the next paragraph bears on the same thought. I myself believe that this is a very important consideration, namely, that we are dealing with general and complete disarmament in our own interests. Let us not get away from that: it is in the interests of each State represented around this table and of the other States of the world that there should be general and complete disarmament. It is true that general and complete disarmament would promote the general good, but let us not forget that it does promote the good of each country engaged in this operation, and that this in itself is an important safeguard which will emerge from a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Now I turn to Mr. Zorin's statement on the same day. He said:

"The Soviet Union desires and I think that it is also the desire of the other members of the Committee, to achieve agreement and to eliminate differences. However, in order to enable us to find ways and means to eliminate differences, we must be clear in our own minds as to what the substance of these differences is and which of the differences are the most important." (ibid., p. 26)

(Mr. Lall, India)

That, I submit, again includes an important truism in the field of disarmament.

I would like to quote another small passage from Mr. Zorin's statement:

"An international treaty implies the laying down of specific and clearly-defined obligations both in respect of the scope of the measures and in respect of the time-limits for their implementation."

(ibid., p.35)

I suggest that we would all very fully agree with that.

Although there are many other passages which one could quote from the statements I have referred to, I would like now to go on to Mr. Godber's statement. He said:

"... and it is only when one State proposes in the first stage measures which seem to call for a very great degree of verification that one has to probe far more deeply into the feasibility of the verification measures that are intended to accompany that particular measure of disarmament. In that sense, the country which proposes the fullest measure of disarmament in stage I -- or indeed in other stages -- has the responsibility of proposing clearly adequate verification measures to accompany its own particular disarmament proposals." (ibid., p.42)

I think we would all agree that that also sets out a truth which we must bear in mind in formulating the disarmament plan.

Finally, I would like to turn to Mr. Dean's statement at that meeting in which, in the course of a brief intervention, he said something which was eloquent and important. He said:

"I might just say in passing that when the representative of Brazil referred to the greatest war of all, that is, the war against all war, it seemed to me this was the same thought that President Kennedy had when he said, in presenting the United States plan on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world to the General Assembly of the United Nations last autumn, that it was our intention to challenge the Soviet Union not to an arms race but to a peace race, and to advance together step by step and stage by stage until general and complete disarmament had been achieved." (ibid., p. 50)

(Mr. Lall, India)

I am sure we would all agree that the world should turn now from an armaments race to a peace race.

I have gone through this exercise -- I hope not pointlessly -- because I think it is very important that we should continually bear in mind that the views expressed from all sides of this table really are leading us to the same sort of consideration, and that there is truth in all these statements. We must continually bear in mind that no side, no group of countries, has a monopoly of the correct views regarding disarmament. In my view we have not come, as the representative of Burma said he thought we had, to an impasse but to a situation where we must consider a certain basic matter rather carefully -- and this applies to stage I, stage II or stage III of the disarmament plan: how are we going to consider these disarmament plans?

At the end of our debates last week, the socialist countries suggested that we ought to fix the contents of stage I; that we should certainly fix the main objectives of stage I, and that then we should examine what control measures should be attached to those disarmament measures. On the other hand, other speakers thought that that would not be the best way of proceeding, and on 16 May Mr. Burns said very clearly:

"The Canadian delegation must therefore disagree with the representative of the Soviet Union when he says that we must first agree on what goes into the plan and then, afterwards, think about control."

(ENDC/PV.38, p.18)

So we have two views which are opposed to each other, and we must think of a way of getting round this situation.

Fortunately views have again been expressed which show a way round. I think it was Mr. Godber who said on 18 May (ENDC/PV.39) that he agreed that we would have to study the disarmament measures proposed even before we started applying our minds to the details of what controls would be applicable. I would suggest that one important consideration which we should bear in mind, in deciding this question of whether we should discuss first the control measures or the disarmament measures, is that we have all admitted around this table -- and I am sure we will recall, in this connexion, the statements of the representatives of Sweden, the United States and the Soviet Union -- that there is some risk inherent in a disarmament programme in any case. In other words, when we speak about effective control -- and we will continue to speak about effective control, because we do want the most effective practicable control --

(Mr. Lall, India)

we do not necessarily mean that we must always have a 100 per cent elimination of risks which will accompany a disarmament plan.

If it is so that there must be an element of risk, then surely we must not, any of us, fall into the error, when we are criticizing a particular disarmament measure, of saying that we cannot consider this measure for such-and-such a stage of the plan because it involves a certain element of risk. If we take this view there will be a disparity between one statement to which we have already subscribed -- namely, that there is bound to be some element of risk -- and the position which we take up regarding a particular measure proposed for disarmament -- namely, that it contains an element of risk and we cannot, therefore, consider it.

So I would suggest that an item proposed as a disarmament measure in a particular stage should not necessarily be dismissed simply because it involves a certain element of risk. I say this without departing from what Mr. Godber said, with which I entirely agree, that the greater the measure of disarmament proposed, the fuller must be the verification -- the more fully must we be assured that the risk involved is being eliminated as far as is practicable. I suggest this thought because, as we come to the end of the first round of our consideration of stage I disarmament measures and embark upon consideration of stage II measures, this matter will recur; and I think that when the co-Chairmen come to think of finding common ground between the two plans -- and it so happens that the two plans are those of the countries of the two co-Chairmen -- they must, I feel, bear in mind that an element of risk has to be admitted by us, and has been admitted by us, as an unavoidable accompaniment of the disarmament plan which we shall finally accept.

I should like to comment at this stage on two matters which have come up before but which, I think, illustrate this question. One is the proposal made by the United States for transitional measures, namely, that the Security Council should be involved in the process. Why? I presume, so as to eliminate completely the risk which is inherent in disarmament: to eliminate it completely in the sense that there should be no progress from one stage to another until there has been a 100 per cent completion of the preceding stage or stages. We in our delegation agree, of course, that there should be 100 per cent completion of a stage before we proceed to implement the following stage in the disarmament plan. That will be common ground for all of us in this Conference, I have no doubt.

(Mr. Lall, India)

But I would like to have it written into the record that I have made a suggestion, which I will not repeat today but which I hope both co-Chairmen will consider, namely, that there are ways of dealing with the transitional stage without involving the Security Council and the large element of unanimity which the Charter of the United Nations prescribes for decisions of substance in the Security Council.

I would hope that the suggestion I made, which, as we all know, directly involves, the two co-Chairmen, will be a suggestion which they will take carefully into account. I feel it is realistic that when we proceed from one stage to another the two main protagonists should be fully assured that the progress which has been made in the preceding stages will permit of progress to the next stage; but in our delegation we do believe that it is not desirable, and not at all necessary, that any other, wider, form of unanimity should be essential at that point; and that, provided the two co-Chairmen can make an agreed recommendation, the control council should take a vote on the question as to whether we should proceed to the subsequent stage in our disarmament programme. That is one point which I wanted to mention, and to my mind it bears on this question of the risks inherent in disarmament.

The second point which I should like to mention relates to controls. I should like to make this comment in two parts. First, I would like to refresh our minds as to the contents of stages I to III of the two disarmament plans. The contents differ. In stage I the Soviet Union proposes something and the United States, by and large, proposes something else. Although, of course, there is a certain amount of common ground, the contents taken by and large do differ. Similarly, the contents of stages II and III in the two plans differ. Now when we come to controls I find that the kinds of controls proposed in the two plans are much more similar than are the disarmament contents of the two plans. For example, both plans say that there should be complete control over the destruction of weapons and the reduction of forces, and so on, which are undertaken in a particular stage. On this both plans are completely agreed: there is to be full control over all destruction and reduction, and so forth, of armaments and armed forces.

It is only when we come to the problem of retained arms that the United States plan proposes a certain measure of assurance, whereas, it is said, the Soviet plan does not provide even some measure of assurance against divergence from the agreed treaty. The United States in that connexion proposes its zonal plan of inspection.

(Mr. Lall, India)

More or less as a parenthesis, I should like to say that in one statement which I made in this Committee I suggested that there might be other ways of increasing the coverage of inspection in a country as the plan progresses. I still think that that is so. I still think it is essential that as the plan progresses there should be some progressive increase of the coverage of inspection in each country. I think that as we reach 100 per cent of the disarmament process the coverage of inspection should also be 100 per cent, and, incidentally, I believe that at that point there is again common ground between the Soviet Union and the United States. How this increase of coverage should take place is a matter which we will not go into at this stage. I should like merely to say that there is the zonal plan and there is another suggestion, which I made at an earlier date and which, if necessary, we will elaborate when we come to more detailed consideration of this matter.

I want to make a second point about this increased coverage in the countries which will be parties to a disarmament treaty. I am now going to refer to something rather tentatively, because it does not seem to me to have been brought out sufficiently, even by the two proposers of disarmament plans, and I am not sure what the intention of the plans is. However, as Mr. Zorin spoke today this point occurred to me with increased emphasis. When he was talking about article 22 of the Soviet draft treaty, he said that all plants, installations and laboratories specially designed for the production of nuclear weapons or their components should be eliminated or converted to production for peaceful purposes. We went on to say that all such plants, and so on, that are partially engaged in the production of such weapons should be destroyed or converted to production for peaceful purposes; these measures for the discontinuance of the production of nuclear weapons, and so on, should be implemented under the control of inspectors of the international disarmament organization. He told us that the international disarmament organization would have the right to inspect all enterprises which extract raw materials for atomic production or which produce or use fissionable materials or atomic energy.

If this inspection is to be effective -- and I have no doubt that that is the intention of the Soviet Union -- I take it that at least the right to inspect will be a continuing factor; that is to say, that from time to time inspectors will be able to assure themselves that enterprises which are extracting raw materials for atomic production are doing so for peaceful purposes. I take it

(Mr. Lall, India)

also that the inspection of factories which are converted to peaceful purposes will be such that the inspectors will have the right to assure themselves from time to time that those factories are being utilized only for peaceful purposes. If this is so, it would seem to me that there is an element in this plan which institutes a considerable degree of continuing inspection on the territory of the Soviet Union, and in fact on the territory of each country which becomes a party to the disarmament plan.

I suggest that this sort of continuing inspection, or the right to continuing inspection, which seems to me to be implicit in certain aspects of the Soviet plan and which, I take it, is implicit also in certain aspects of the United States plan -- though I have not actually checked this point -- will in fact make it rather difficult for countries to involve themselves lightly in clandestine activities of manufacture or in retaining arms, even arms which are not directly the subject of inspection by this process of continuing inspection, because there will be continuing activities of the international disarmament organization in all territories.

In short, it seems to me that there are already aspects of control in the two plans which do something more than just deal with the destruction under control of armaments or the reduction under control of force levels. If this is so, I would suggest that the whole problem of retained weapons is not quite in the context in which we have been debating it; it is not quite in the context of a total lack of control in the countries concerned. Therefore it would seem to me that there is room for compromise here.

One very interesting suggestion was made today by the representative of Burma which arose out of an earlier suggestion from the representative of Nigeria: namely, that perhaps the question of retained arms should attract direct controls only when the percentage of disarmament has already become significant. That, I believe, was in essence the suggestion -- or, as he described it, the thought -- of the representative of Burma, I think that that is a thought well worth pursuing, and I would suggest that it be pursued in the context of the fact that there will already be elements of continuing control in each country which is a party to the disarmament treaty which we do not seem to have considered sufficiently so far in dealing with this whole question of controls.

(Mr. Lall, India)

I make those remarks to indicate that the problem is edging towards a solution rather than getting farther away from a solution, and I hope that that is indeed the case. Before I close may I say how grateful we in my delegation are both to the representative of the United Arab Republic and to the representative of Burma for their most thought-provoking statements today. I should like to say that the leading questions which the representative of the United Arab Republic asked were the best kind of leading questions, because they were implicitly laden with fruitful suggestions, which we hope the two co-Chairmen, in particular, will consider very carefully.

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): There is still one speaker on the list: the representative of Romania. As it is 1 p.m. I should like to ask him whether he still wishes to make his statement today.

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): I should like to speak before we close our meeting. We have heard six speakers this morning, and, as the seventh, I shall be very brief.

I have listened with due attention to the statements made today by the representatives of the United States, the United Arab Republic, the Soviet Union, Burma, Canada and India. Despite the problems raised in each of these statements, the Romanian delegation notes a fact of positive significance, namely that today our Conference has entered into a discussion of stage II of the process of general and complete disarmament. The representative of the Soviet Union made clear the views of the Soviet delegation with regard to this stage, and his statement will help the work of the Conference.

With regard to the remarks made in this respect by the representatives of the United Kingdom and Italy, the Romanian delegation cannot see any inconvenience in our entering into the examination of stage II. On the contrary, this entails a clear advantage to the progress of our proceedings, as numerous problems concerning stage I have proved to be closely related to the measures provided for in the plans for stage II which need clarification. Nobody, of course,

(Mr. Macovescu, Romania)

wants to limit the right of other delegations to continue to present their views of stage I. But time will not wait and it is for us, living in the era of rockets and sputniks, to keep pace with it.

I shall postpone my principal remarks till the next meeting of the Conference.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its fortieth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Cavalletti, the representative of Italy.

"The representatives of the United States, the United Arab Republic, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Burma, Canada, India and Romania made statements.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 23 May 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.