CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.83
26 November 1962
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE EIGHTY-THIRD MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 26 November 1962, at 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:	Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO
	Mr. FRANK da COSTA
	Mr. J. LENGYEL
Bulgaria:	Mr. M. TARABANOV
	Mr. G. GUELEV
	Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
	Mr. ISMIRAIEV
Burma:	U TUN SHEIN
	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
Canada:	Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
	Mr. J.E.G. HARDY
	Mr. J.P.M. BELL
	Mr. R.M. TAIT
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. K. KURKA
	Mr. M. ZEMLA
	Mr. M. KLUSAK
	Mr. V. VAJNAR
Ethiopia:	ATO HADDIS ALAMAYEHU
India:	Mr. A.S. LALL
	Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Italy:	Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
	Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI
	Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI
	Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Mexico:	Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
	Mr. D. GONZALES GOMEZ
	Mr. A. de ICAZA
Nigeria:	Mr. L.C.N. OBI
Poland:	Mr. M. LACES
	Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
	Mr. W. WIECZOREK
	Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI
Romania:	Mr. G. MACOVESCU
	Mr. H. FLORESCU
	Mr. E. GLASER
	Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Sweden:	Mr. R. EDBERG
	Baron C.H. von PLATTEN
	Mr. P. KELLIN
	Mr. B. FRIEDMAN
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
	Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN
	Mr. I.G. USACHEV
	Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV
United Arab Republic:	Mr. A.F. HASSAN
	Mr. M.H. El-ZAYYAT
	Mr. S. AHMED

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

nited Kingdom:	Mr. J.B. GODBER
	Sir Michael WRIGHT
	Mr. J.K. WRIGHT
	Mr. J.M. EDES
nited States of America:	Mr. A.H. DEAN
	Mr. C.C. STELLE
	Mr. D.E. MARX
	Mr. V. BAKER
eputy Special Representative of the Acting Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN
eputy Director European Office of the United Nations:	Mr. G. PALTHEY

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I declare open the eighty-third meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I call on the Deputy Special Representative of the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Mr. EPSTEIN (Deputy Special Representative of the Acting Secretary-General): On behalf of the Acting Secretary-General, U Thant, it is once again our privilege to welcome the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to the European Headquarters of the United Nations.

The Conference resumes its deliberations after a recess during which detailed and constructive discussions on disarmament and on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests have taken place in the General Assembly. The Assembly debates enabled all the Members of the world Organization to make important contributions to the solution of these problems.

The recent grave events have provided additional proof of the dangers inherent in the armaments race, which gives no lasting assurance of security but results in acute political disputes and situations which may endanger the peace of the entire world.

We know from past experience and current differences that the road to disarmament is formidable and arduous. The Eighteen-Nation Committee, which has been rightly praised by the Assembly, is pursuing its goal with perseverance and zeal. In particular, it made a noteworthy contribution in narrowing the gap between the opposing positions on the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. The gap appears to have been further narrowed by the current session of the General Assembly, which not only condemned all nuclear tests and requested their cessation by 1 January 1963, but also pointed the way to compromise solutions which could lead to agreement by the nuclear Powers.

There are before you resolutions 1762 A and B (XVII) adopted by the General Assembly on the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. These resolutions reflect the ardent desire of the overwhelming majority of the nations of the world that such tests, and their menace to health and security, be ended for ever. Members of the General Assembly, and in particular the non-aligned countries, have emphasized that a nuclear test ban is the indispensable first step to general and complete disarmament. The present moment seems especially propitious for agreement between the nuclear Powers, perhaps more propitious than ever before

(Mr. Epstein)

in view of the recent exchanges between the heads of government and the almost simultaneous announcements concerning the conclusion of extensive series of tests by both sides. It is our fervent hope that when the Conference reports to the General Assembly by 10 December next, it will be able to record substantial progress in the negotiations.

You also have before you resolution 1767 (XVII) of the General Assembly, which calls for agreement on general and complete disarmament at the earliest possible date. It also recommends that urgent attention be given to collateral measures of disarmament. Various measures, besides the cessation of nuclear tests, have been urged during the Assembly, such as the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons, the reduction of the risk of war by accident or miscalculation, the establishment of nuclear-free zones in certain geographical regions, the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only, and other such measures which would decrease tension and facilitate general and complete disarmament. Agreement on such measures would greatly improve the international climate and help to solve the fundamental issues which are at the core of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Let me express the hope of the Acting Secretary-General that the Committee will achieve results in all the tasks entrusted to it by the General Assembly - a nuclear test ban, collateral measures of disarmament and general and complete disarmament. Let me also express his conviction that the non-aligned members of this Committee will continue their active and positive role in helping to reach agreement. I extend to you the earnest good wishes of the Acting Secretary-General for success in your work.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): In my capacity as Chairman of the present meeting, I should now like to address a few words of welcome to the members of our Committee.

After a recess of two and a half months the Eighteen-Nation Committee is resuming its work. There is no need to speak of the importance of the tasks facing the Committee. A large part, if not the majority, of international crises in recent years have been the direct result of the arms race, which is the nutrient medium of the cold war.

(The Chairman, USSR)

In order to prevent the further extension and intensification of this grim phenomenon of present-day international life, the cold war, it is necessary first and foremost to halt the arms race and to solve the problem of disarmament. Recent events in the Caribbean area have confirmed in the most obvious manner the urgent need to solve the problem of disarmament and to eliminate the danger of a nuclear missile war.

During the period that has elapsed the seventeenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations has considered the disarmament question and the question of the suspension of nuclear weapon tests. This has a direct bearing on the work of our Committee. In that important international forum the hopes and demands of the peoples of all countries in regard to these most important present-day problems were expressed and formulated and resolutions were adopted calling for new constructive efforts to achieve their speediest possible solution. In resuming its work, the Eighteen-Nation Committee must take into account the demands of the peoples expressed at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly and the recommendations adopted by the Assembly on the questions of disarmament and the cessation of nuclear weapon tests and, without diverting its attention to secondary questions, it must strive to achieve the speediest possible solution of these important problems.

I now call on the representative of the United States, as co-Chairman of our Conference, so that he may express some words of welcome.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I should like to express my pleasure at being back in Geneva to begin this resumed session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. I note with great satisfaction that many old friends and colleagues from our former sessions are here again to represent their governments. I shall look forward to establishing the same good relations with the members of delegations who are here for the first time. We anticipate working with them all at the resumed session in the quiet and effective fashion that has become the standard of this Conference. The time is right for us to reach our first agreements, and my delegation will seek every possible opportunity to bring them about. The spirit in which my delegation is returning to this Conference has been eloquently set forth in the statement of President Kennedy, issued today, concerning the opening of this resumed session, which I should now like to read:

(Mr. Dean, United States)

"The Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference resumes its deliberations in Geneva today. This is as it should be. The crucial developments within recent weeks have served to confirm both the need and the urgency of the task before it. It is clear that a renewed and immediate effort must be made to halt the constantly increasing tempo of the arms race if there is to be assurance of a lessening of the danger of war. It is therefore my continued hope that serious negotiations will proceed at once on those initial measures of disarmament which could, if put into effect without delay, materially improve international security and enhance the prospects for further disarmament progress.

Among these measures we believe high priority should be given to the conclusion of an effective agreement which would end once and for all tests of nuclear weapons. The United States has completed its recent series of atmospheric tests. There is hope that the Soviet Union evidently will soon conclude its series of atmospheric tests. This suggests that the moment may be at hand to initiate the beginning of the end of the upward spiral of weapons competition. If so, the opportunity must not be lost. It is important that these negotiations now move forward, and that concrete progress be achieved. To this end I pledge anew my personal and continuing interest in the work of the Conference."

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from ussian): The public part of our meeting is concluded. There will be a five-inute break so that the hall may be cleared of those who are not taking part in he Conference.

The meeting was suspended at 3.25 p.m. and resumed at 3.30 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from ussian): We shall now go on with our meeting. Allow me to say a few words in my apacity as Chairman of the meeting. Today the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Dis-rmament is resuming its work after a recess of more than two and a half months. ome new faces have appeared amongst us and I believe that I express the mind of all the elegations in the Committee in welcoming our new colleagues, the representative of urma, Ambassador U Tun Shein and the representative of Czechoslovakia, the Deputy oreign Minister, Karel Kurka. They will be working with us on the solution of the nportant tasks facing the Committee. I should like also to welcome the

(The Chairman, USSR)

representative of the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, the interpreters and other staff who help us in our day-to-day work.

I avail myself of this opportunity to inform the representatives on the Committee that the co-Chairmen held a meeting on 25 November. During this meeting the co-Chairmen agreed that the work of the Committee should continue according to the procedure already approved by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on 24 July 1962 (ENDC/1/Add.3). The co-Chairmen also agreed to retain the timetable adopted earlier for the meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, namely, that the Committee should meet three times a week on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays. The co-Chairmen propose that the meetings should begin punctually at 10.30 a.m. The co-Chairmen also deemed it appropriate that today's meeting, as well as the next meeting of the Committee on Wednesday, 28 November, should be devoted to a general debate in the light of the resolutions (1762 A and B (XVII) and 1767 (XVII)) of the seventeenth session of the General Assembly on the problem of general and complete disarmament and the suspension of nuclear weapon tests.

Today there are four speakers on the Chairman's list: the representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and Italy. I call on the representative of the United States.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): Today we resume the meetings of our Conference after a recess of two and a half months. During the recess the General Assembly of the United Nations has had an opportunity to review and to discuss the various aspects of our work, and the members of this Conference now have the benefit of the views expressed during the General Assembly discussions. Much has happened since we last met in this Council Chamber, and it is appropriate to ask: Where do we stand? I believe it is fair to say that at the present moment there is cause for concern and also cause for encouragement as we resume here.

Let us be realistic with each other. Let us not veil the causes of concern that do exist. We are all familiar with recent events that brought civilization so close to the abyss of nuclear war, a war which many have talked about but which must be viewed even more soberly and responsibly as a result of recent events. We are also familiar with the recent events in India: those have left sombre lessons for our work here. That clandestine efforts to gain military advantage may be attempted by some is now clear for all to see. That efforts at falsification of facts may be made at very high levels of government is also clear for all to see. The fact has been clearly underscored that the world cannot rest agreements involving national

(Mr. Dean, United States)

security on good faith alone. We all now know that agreements, if they are to bring an increased sense of security and not insecurity and suspicion, must include adequate means for giving reassurance to all parties that treaty obligations are in truth and in fact being met.

The meetings of the test ban Sub-Committee, which were continued here in Geneva during the recess at the suggestion of my Government in the hope that an agreement might be concluded by the end of this year, have unfortunately made no progress. The representative of the Soviet Union continued to reject the very minimum amount of international arrangements for the detection, identification, location and inspection of seismic tests that would give reasonable and adequate assurance of compliance with a comprehensive nuclear test ban agreement.

The Soviet delegation also refused, in effect, to consider a partial ban in those environments which do not require international verification, while negotiations went forward on a comprehensive test ban treaty to ban tests in all environments.

I wish to discuss this question further in a moment, but I do want to say at this point that we must devote ourselves with a renewed sense of urgency and purpose to this unfinished business, as President Kennedy has said in his statement which I read earlier today. We just cannot ignore the causes of concern that have arisen during the recess. Our tasks here are far too serious for us to allow our discussions to become a game of empty charades played in an ivory tower. At the same time, however, we must not despair. Nor, indeed, have we any reason to despair of the prospects for a better and more secure world as the result of our efforts in this Conference.

What are the elements in the present state of affairs that lend encouragement to a more hopeful view? Of course, in terms of national self interest, the strong incentive to halt the arms race remains. The competition in arms has not diminished in its threat to the security of nations; it continues as a drain upon resources that could be better used for the more productive objectives of human society. Surely those facts will spur us on to achieve early progress in our negotiations.

Another hopeful element is the firm establishment of this Conference as a continuing negotiating body. It may have escaped general notice, but it is worth noting, I believe, that, with the exception of negotiations concerning nuclear testing, for the first time in five years disarmament negotiations are being resumed after the General Assembly's consideration of the subject in the same forum in which

(Mr. Dean, United States)

they were taking place before the Assembly met. Indeed, probably for the first time since the end of the Second World War, we are able to resume work on disarmament in a continuing body, with agreed procedures and an agreed plan of work.

That this forum continues to exist in the midst of the swirling international currents of our troubled world is, I believe, in large measure a recognition that nations must seek a better order of things. The existence of our continuing Conference, today again in full session, reflects the belief, now more commonly shared, that it is through our labours here that we can forge the key that will unlock the gates to a better world.

A further cause for hope is that, in the curious way history sometimes unfolds its pages, our vision may be clearer as the result of the sobering events we have recently experienced.

Further, whatever may have induced Chairman Khrushchev to initiate the events of recent weeks, thereafter wise statesmanship has been displayed on both sides in subsequent efforts to resolve the crisis; and the world has been given dramatic demonstration that the earth's two greatest military Powers can reach agreement based on reason when a sufficient incentive to reach agreement exists on both sides. It is for us here to demonstrate that the will to resolve differences can forge agreements even in the absence of the catalyst of acute crisis.

There have perhaps been few watersheds in human history so clearly discernible at the time as the one at which we now find ourselves. Thus the question which all of us in our hearts ask is: What path for humanity? It is a sobering thought that the answer may well be written, at least in the first instance, by the results of the work of this very body.

The spirit of the answer of my Government was contained in a passage of President Kennedy's message of 28 October 1962 to Chairman Khrushchev. The President said:

> 'Mr. Chairman, both of our countries have great unfinished tasks and I know that your people as well as those of the United States can ask for nothing better than to pursue them free from the fear of war. Modern science and technology have given us the possibility of making labour fruitful beyond anything that could have been dreamed of a few decades ago.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

I agree with you that we must devote urgent attention to the problem of disarmament, as it relates to the whole world and also to critical areas. Perhaps now, as we step back from danger, we can together make real progress in this vital field."

The obligations which rest on governments for creative initiative and demonstrations of a will to reach agreement are particularly pressing at this moment in history: for though the limitations of the spoken and written word make it difficult to state it clearly, we all sense, I believe, that there is something different about the world of 26 November 1962 as compared with the world of 7 September 1962, when our Conference recessed.

Further, we all sense, I believe, that what is hopeful about that difference may be fleeting in nature if nations fail at this moment in history to capture and utilize it. This consideration is important for the present session of our Conference.

What then should be our tasks in the coming weeks? As I have noted, we are fortunate in that we have an agreed plan of work, with an agreed schedule of meetings, set forth in documents ENDC/1/Add.2 and ENDC/1/Add.3, which you, Mr. Chairman, have already mentioned. As a useful aid to the progress of work we have the institution of the co-chairmen, of which even greater use should be made during this session. Within this organizational framework we can proceed with our tasks, not in a manner of routine activity but rather with that sense of urgency and of history-making which is obligatory for nations and their representatives who know that they stand at a watershed of history.

Our goal is the elaboration and execution of a programme of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world. Prior to the recess we had, under our agreed plan of work, almost completed the initial consideration of the topics falling under sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 5 of document ENDC/1/Add.3. We were just about to begin consideration of sub-paragraph (d), Measures in the field of nuclear disarmament together with appropriate measures of control. We should, during this session of the Conference, press forward with our consideration of paragraph 5. At the same time, of course, and in keeping with paragraph 4 of that document, any delegation remains free to discuss in our plenary meetings any topic relating to our work, whether or not that topic may have been considered previously.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

We cannot, of course, expect to reach full agreement on a general programme of disarmament, even for the first stage, in the weeks that remain before the end of the year. This fact, however, does not diminish the very real importance of the contributions we can make to our task in this area.

During the recess governments have had an opportunity to review the earlier work of the Conference relating to general and complete disarmament. It is true, of course, that there were other events that preoccupied the minds of national leaders during the recess. Nevertheless, we have all had some opportunity to take stock of the state of the work of our Conference. Also, during the United Nations General Assembly discussions various interesting comments were made which should be the subject of further elaboration.

In this connexion we have, of course, not been unmindful of the brief remarks of Mr. Gromyko, Foreign Secretary of the Government of the Soviet Union, on 21 September in the United Nations General Assembly (A/PV.1127), on behalf of the Soviet Union, about the possibility of a change in his Government's attitude to the arrangements for disposing of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, as well as the amendments (ENDC/48) submitted by the Soviet Union to its treaty proposal (ENDC/2*). Since this problem has been among the most acute of all those confronting our negotiations, any new approach deserves careful explanation, clarification and exploration in depth. We expect to participate actively in this aspect of our work, both in plenary meetings and in discussion with our Soviet co-Chairman.

In general, it is my Government's intention to seek, in every reasonable way, to overcome the admittedly serious differences that do exist with respect to all of the issues that go into the subject of general and complete disarmament. We hope that others will recognize the spirit with which we approach this, our more basic task; for it is one of flexibility based on a desire for mutual understanding of the concerns of each party. Let us, then, in the weeks ahead talk with, and not to, or at, each other.

While we seek that broader accommodation that is required for agreement on general disarmament, we must not lose sight of the significance of the moment of history in which our Conference resumes its work. To capture and utilize that which is hopeful about the difference in world affairs resulting from recent events we must urgently seek agreements in those areas that are ripe for early agreement. Not only would such achievements be beneficial in themselves; not only would they

(Mr. Dean, United States)

facilitate, in ways we may not ourselves comprehend, the reaching of agreements on general disarmament; but they would give to events that favourable momentum which history now offers.

Foremost among subjects ripe for agreement is the question of an effective ban on nuclear testing. Let me briefly review, without rancour and as objectively as I can, the situation in that area as it now exists.

Our meetings are resuming with the debates in New York on the vital issue of a nuclear test ban still ringing in our ears. In addition, we have the texts of two resolutions on this subject to provide us with the views of a large number of members of the General Assembly. Those of us who attended the meetings of the First Committee understand thoroughly the sense of urgency which pervades the attitudes of all governments on this question.

The attention given to a nuclear test ban treaty has helped significantly to make clear to all of us what are the crucial points which separate East and West from an agreement. All representatives, especially in this forum, have had many months to devote to the general problem, and there is now no need to review the many arguments on subsidiary matters or to enter into historical debates.

The United States and the United Kingdom have tabled here for consideration a draft comprehensive test ban treaty which is before the Conference as document ENDC/58. It is based on a careful study of all relevant data, including the helpful suggestions put forward by the eight nations on 16 April last as we read and understand their memorandum (ENDC/28). The United States and the United Kingdom, as suggested by the eight nations, also submitted a partial test ban treaty (ENDC/59) as a possible second-best agreement if the Soviet Union will not accept the necessary controls for the cessation of underground tests.

The United States and the United Kingdom delegations feel confident that the two draft treaties which they have tabled to stop all nuclear tests either on a comprehensive basis or a partial basis while negotiations continue, offer a fair and adequate framework for discussion and agreement. We have always said that those documents were put forward as a basis for constructive negotiation, and we still think now that any reasonable political and scientific modifications, which do not deviate from sound and effective disarmament or verification and inspection principles, can be suitably comprehended in our texts.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

Our immediate duty, therefore, is to face up to the fundamental items which have emerged as the principal obstacle to an accord.

The most basic of these items, of course, concerns the decision that must be taken in regard to the cessation of underground tests. Will this environment be included in the initial overall agreement, or will it not? If it is to be included from the outset, as we all think is the preferable approach, then, we submit, the terms we have outlined in our draft comprehensive treaty are fair and reasonable.

As far as the United States and the United Kingdom are concerned, they remain convinced that some measure of effective and adequate international control is still essential in this area. We are equally certain that this measure of control need not be large or burdensome on any party. We believe that the terms for it can be worked out in such a way as to safeguard the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union, as we have conscientiously tried to provide in our draft treaty (ENDC/58). Although this must, in our view, involve the use of the on-site inspection technique by the international commission in appropriate cases, we see no objective reason why mutually acceptable arrangements in regard to this inspection cannot be concluded with the Soviet Union.

The exchanges which have taken place both at the General Assembly and in the test ban Sub-Committee in Geneva over the past two months have confirmed our impression of last summer that, if the control and inspection issue is once settled, it should not prove too difficult to devise solutions of remaining questions. We do not foresee prolonged debates over the creation and function of the international commission and its staff. We also have grounds for hoping that the modalities for establishing a co-ordinated worldwide data recording and collection system, under the general overall supervision of the commission, will not be beyond our capacity to handle.

We look forward with keen anticipation to the efforts of all delegations in the next few weeks in the hope of rapid progress on a test ban.

I should now like to turn to another issue which is also ripe for early agreement, namely, measures to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation or failure of communications. I intend in future meetings to discuss in more detail United States views on various aspects of this question. I wish to say at this time, however, that my Government attaches considerable importance to the effort which we should make in the coming weeks to make progress in this field.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

At the present time there appears to be a substantial area of accord, in principle, between the positions of the Soviet Union and the United States on certain aspects of this matter. Specifically, these areas of general agreement relate to (1) advance notification of military movements, (2) exchange of military missions, and (3) improved communications between governments.

Proposals on these three measures were set forth in section F, Reduction of the Risk of War, of the United States; Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World (ENDC/30). Specifically, they are included in paragraphs 1, 4, and 5 of section F on pages 11 and 12 of that document.

Similarly, proposals on the same measures are contained in the additions and modifications to its position submitted by the Soviet Union in document ENDC/2/Add.1 of 16 July 1962. Specifically, these proposals are included in paragraph 3, sub-paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 on the first and second pages of that document.

I would hope that agreement can soon be reached on an even broader range of measures in this field, but for the moment we should concentrate on the measures of current common accord.

My Government believes that action is needed to reduce the risk of accidental war and that at this time measures to this end can be rapidly agreed upon. Such measures could result in a useful and indeed significant advance in the capability of States to provide mutual reassurance.

In view of the degree to which both sides appear to have similar proposals, extensive debate in general terms regarding their desirability would appear unnecessary. Rather should we focus attention as soon as possible on a discussion of the means and the manner of implementing these measures. Let us, therefore, move forward rapidly in this field with the knowledge that significant agreements are within our reach.

At the last meeting of our Conference before the recess I spoke of our awesome responsibility to safeguard the future of civilization and to ensure that the precious gift of life will be passed on to our children and to our children's children. That remains our task. We can perhaps see even more clearly than before that it is not mere rhetoric to say these things.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

We are also aware that we have a moment in history favourable to a real beginning in the fulfilment of our responsibility. Let not our children look back at us and our Governments and say "They failed their moment." Let them rather be able to say: "They chose greatness rather than narrow prejudice and suspicion, and unlocked the gates to the future which we now face without fear."

The CHAIRMAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I am now going to make a statement in my capacity as representative of the Soviet Union.

Two and a half months have elapsed since the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament went into recess. During this period a dangerous international crisis occurred, which threatened to plunge the world into the abyss of thermonuclear war. These extremely dangerous events of recent times compel us to draw certain conclusions with a view to strengthening the cause of peace. First of all it is essential to speed up the reaching of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. If we fail to achieve a solution of the disarmament problem in the very near future, we shall have no guarantee that a dangerous international crisis may not arise once again. Whereas this time, thanks to the efforts of the Soviet Government, it was possible to halt the dangerous development of events, there is no guarantee that on another occasion the course of events will not plunge the world into the abyss of nuclear war. This imposes on all the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee a direct obligation to redouble their efforts and to direct their energies towards eliminating the differences that hinder the reaching of agreement. The participants in the negotiations must show a deep understanding of the interests of peace and of all mankind and must make their contribution towards the accomplishment of an historic task, namely, general and complete disarmament.

The second conclusion to be reached by anyone making an objective assessment of the present international situation and of the lessons of the recent international crisis is that disarmament should begin with the elimination of the danger of nuclear war. It is, of course, no mere chance that this conclusion was heard in literally every statement made during the discussion of the problem of general and complete disarmament at the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

(The Chairman, USSR)

What path has to be taken in order to eliminate the danger of nuclear war at the very beginning of disarmament measures? The answer to this question is provided by the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control (ENDC/2*) submitted by the Soviet Government. This draft is the result of work over a long period, a thorough analysis of the international situation and due consideration of the development of present-day military techniques and is, finally, the result of a deep and all-round study of the proposals submitted during the negotiations on disarmament. In this draft, the Soviet Government provides the most realistic and practical solution of the problem of ridding mankind of the threat of nuclear war. This solution consists mainly and foremost in eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles at the very beginning of disarmament measures. The correctness of this approach to the solution of the disarmament problem has been fully confirmed in the recent debate on this question at the General Assembly. It is now recognized by all, or nearly all, that the threat of nuclear war can be precluded either by eliminating the nuclear weapons themselves or by neutralizing them. In this regard the Soviet Union has a flexible attitude. We have already shown this flexibility during the previous stage of the work of our Committee.

In striving to eliminate the threat of nuclear war from the life of human society as rapidly and reliably as possible, the Soviet Government has expressed its readiness, if the Western Powers agree, to transfer all measures for the elimination of nuclear weapons, including the destruction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the cessation of their production, from the second stage of its draft treaty on general and complete disarmament to the first stage.

Our readiness to begin disarmament with the elimination of nuclear weapons has been confirmed at the current session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The destruction of nuclear weapons is the shortest way towards speeding up the solution of the problem. It guarantees the final elimination of the possibility of a thermonuclear war breaking out. However, the negative position of the Western Powers makes it impossible to begin disarmament with the elimination of nuclear weapons. In these circumstances, the Soviet Union, being anxious to find ways and means of facilitating the reaching of agreement on disarmament, has proposed dividing the measures for the elimination of the threat of nuclear war into two stages, namely, to eliminate delivery vehicles in the first stage and then, in the

(The Chairman, USSR)

second stage, to destroy and prohibit the nuclear weapons themselves. This is the approach that has been embodied in the draft treaty of the Soviet Government now under consideration by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

In submitting the proposal that disarmament should begin with the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, we realize what we are giving up. The Soviet Government, as is well known, has built its defence on the means of delivering nuclear weapons, the nucleus of which now consists of powerful rockets: global, inter-continental and of other ranges. It is generally recognized that disarmament must be carried out in conditions of equality, that is that neither side should acquire a military advantage in any stage of disarmament. This requires that, simultaneously with the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, military bases on foreign territories should be liquidated and foreign troops withdrawn therefrom.

Recent events have confirmed with all the more force the urgent need to do away with foreign military bases as rapidly as possible. After all, even the installation of a small number of launching pads in Cuba for the purpose of defending the country against foreign invasion was used by the United States Government as a pretext for putting the world literally on the brink of a nuclear missile war. How can the Soviet Union agree to the elimination of its most powerful means of defence - global and inter-continental rockets - or, in general, to any radical disarmament measures in a situation where the United States of America would maintain intact on foreign territories its bases directed against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries?

In his message to President Kennedy of the United States on 27 October of this year, the Head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Khrushchev, wrote: "You wish to ensure the security of your country, and this is understandable. But this is what Cuba also wishes to do; all countries wish to ensure their security. But how are we, the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government to evaluate your actions which are expressed in the fact that you have encircled the Soviet Union with military bases, you have encircled our allies with military bases, you have placed military bases literally around our country and located your rocket armaments in them? This is no secret. Responsible American personalities have stated this ostentatiously. Your rockets are located in the United Kingdom and in Italy and are aimed against us. Your rockets are located in Turkey".

(The Chairman, USSR)

The Soviet Government considers that in the question of the elimination of foreign military bases, the United States and the other Western Powers should take into account the security interests of other States. It is significant that in the course of the debate in the General Assembly the danger to peace which is constituted by military bases on foreign territories was recognized even in statements by the representatives of States against which the bases of the United States and NATO are not directly aimed.

The representative of Nigeria, a State which takes part in the work of our Committee, spoke of this and stressed his conviction that, and I quote, "... the existence of foreign military bases has aggravated international tension and led to the intensification of the armaments race. Foreign bases do embitter the relations between neighbours. We should therefore like to see them done away with in toto and as quickly as possible" (A/C.1/PV.1271, p. 6).

The representative of another State, a new member of the United Nations, Tanganyika, pointed out that "to sustain confidence and trust in the contesting Powers, foreign bases and nuclear delivery vehicles must disappear, wherever they are, at a very early stage" (A/C.1/PV.1279, p.78). I could quote other statements by representatives of the non-aligned States at the current session of the General Assembly pointing out the danger of maintaining military bases on foreign territories and the need to eliminate them simultaneously with the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

Unfortunately, owing to the position adopted by the United States and other Western Powers, members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, it was impossible in the course of the previous work of the Committee to reach agreement on the earliest possible destruction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. As you will remember, the main and basic objection to the Soviet draft advanced by the Western Powers in the course of the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee in the summer of this year was the argument that the destruction, in the first stage, of all carriers of atomic and hydrogen weapons together with the elimination of military bases on foreign territories and the withdrawal of foreign troops therefrom would upset the strategic balance in the world to the advantage of the Soviet Union and would allegedly put the European States members of NATO in a disadvantageous position and would deprive the United States of the possibility of ensuring their speedy defence. The representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and other Western

(The Chairman, USSR)

Powers also stated that the elimination of delivery vehicles would not lead to elimination of the threat of nuclear war, since the civil aircraft, ships and other transport facilities remaining at the disposal of States after the elimination of these means could be used for delivering atomic and hydrogen bombs to their targets.

The artificial nature of these arguments is obvious. On more than one occasion in the past the Soviet delegation has had to refer to this aspect of the matter. Such arguments cannot serve as a convincing reason for the refusal of the Western Powers to agree to the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage. It is also obvious that no advantage would or could be gained by the Soviet Union and its allies as a result of the implementation of this measure; no one would lose as a result of its implementation, and the whole of mankind would gain.

However, having met with the opposition of the Western Powers and being anxious to find a way to agreement, the Soviet Government submitted an amendment (ENDC/2/Rev.1) to Article 5 of its draft treaty, the gist of which was that the United States and the Soviet Union would retain an agreed and strictly limited number of inter-continental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the "ground-to-air" category exclusively on their own territories until the end of the second stage. Consequently, for a certain period of time the Soviet Union and the United States would retain nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. This clearly goes towards meeting the point of view of the Western Powers in regard to what is called a nuclear "protective umbrella". It goes without saying that after measures for the destruction of all stockpiles and the prohibition of nuclear weapons have been implemented in the course of the second stage, there will be no point in keeping even this agreed quantity of rockets at the disposal of the Soviet Union and the United States.

We note with satisfaction that the efforts of the Soviet Union to eliminate the differences, which in the first stage of the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee prevented the achievement of agreement on the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear warheads and the elimination of foreign military bases on alien territory, have met with understanding and high appreciation on the part of many Member States of the United Nations. We also note that these proposals of ours have aroused a certain interest on the part of the Western Powers as well. We are profoundly convinced that the achievement of agreement on the basis of this Soviet proposal would open up favourable prospects for the work of the Eighteen-

(The Chairman, USSR)

Nation Committee. At the same time, certain tendencies which have been displayed by the Western Powers at the current session of the United Nations General Assembly cannot fail to cause us misgivings. Instead of agreeing on the principles of an agreement between us, they try to start a discussion on details of various kinds, including what should be the characteristics of the remaining missiles and at what specific points they should be located. However, everyone, including even those who are trying to divert the work of the Committee into a morass of fruitless discussions on details, should understand that before we can talk about specific questions and details in connexion with the new Soviet proposal it is essential that the Western Powers should agree with the fundamental principle that disarmament should begin with the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and the elimination of foreign military bases on alien territories. Why argue about details and go over maps looking for points where missiles should be placed and argue about what type of missile they should be, if we stand on different positions in this matter?

We want our negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee to be really business-like, and it is therefore most desirable that the Western Powers should state, in a constructive way, their views in regard to our proposal, and show goodwill and a desire to reach agreement.

We deem it necessary to stress that the Soviet proposal is in no case a departure from the Soviet Union's fundamental approach to the question of the sequence and order in which measures for general and complete disarmament should be implemented, that is to say, we maintain the position that nuclear weapon delivery vehicles should be eliminated in the first stage of disarmament. To depart from this approach would be tantamount to agreeing consciously to preserve the possibility of unleashing a nuclear-missile war while a formal agreement on general and complete disarmament was in existence.

Some temporary delay in eliminating an agreed number of missiles would be merely an exception to the general rule and it should relate only to a strictly limited - I emphasize a strictly limited - number of missiles, so as to preclude the possibility of using such missiles for unleashing a world-wide nuclear missile war.

(The Chairman, USSR)

We agree that a strictly limited number of missiles should be retained, because if many missiles are retained, we shall then have a situation which virtually will be no different from the present situation. It would still be possible for a State to carry on a nuclear war with all its devastating, catastrophic consequences for mankind.

At the previous stage of our negotiations we were unable to reach agreement on the reduction of armed forces in stage 1. Moreover, the Western Powers link the solution of this question with the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. In order to clear the ground for agreement on this matter, the Soviet Union made a move to meet the Western Powers in this case as well. Whereas originally the Soviet draft treaty provided for the reduction of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States to a level of 1.7 million in stage 1, while the United States named the figure of 2.1 million, at the present time the Soviet Union proposes a compromise solution of this question, namely, to reduce the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States in stage 1 to a level of 1.9 million for each side. We are prepared to accept this, although we consider that a more substantial reduction would meet to a greater extent the interests of the earliest possible implementation of disarmament.

Other moves on our part have been aimed at removing existing differences in regard to the first stage of disarmament.

The Soviet Union made a move to meet the United States and accepted its proposal regarding the order in which conventional armaments should be reduced. As a result of this there is now agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union that in the first stage of general and complete disarmament there should be a 30 per cent elimination of tanks, armed vehicles, armed transport, non-nuclear artillery systems and other types of conventional armaments. Obviously, it must be borne in mind that in an era of nuclear-missile means of waging war, conventional armaments no longer play the part which they played in the past. Nevertheless, agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States regarding the proportion in which conventional armaments should be reduced has a certain positive significance and should make it easier to come to an understanding.

In the past the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom objected to the period proposed by us for the implementation of general and

(The Chairman, USSR)

complete disarmament. They asserted that it was impracticable and that we were proposing to cram too much disarmament into too short a space of time.

These delegations failed, in our opinion, to put forward any convincing argument to show why general and complete disarmament should not be implemented within the short periods of time proposed by us. On the contrary, one can rather say the opposite. A number of delegations, including those of the non-aligned States, have stressed the necessity and even the desirability of the speediest possible implementation of general and complete disarmament, since this would make it easier to solve such questions as the maintenance of equal conditions of security for States and many other questions, including those connected with control.

Despite the fact that the Soviet Government is an advocate of the speediest possible implementation of general and complete disarmament, it has agreed to increase the period for the implementation of disarmament measures from four to five years and, accordingly, to extend the duration of the first stage to two years.

Earlier we heard the Western Powers assert that they could not accept the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament because it did not provide adequate measures to reduce the danger of outbreak of war. On these questions, too, the Soviet Union has displayed flexibility and an understanding of the position of the Western Powers.

The Soviet Government deemed it possible to accept some of the United States' proposals for reducing the danger of outbreak of war. The Soviet Union agreed, in particular, with such measures proposed by the United States for the first stage of disarmament as the exchange of military missions between States for the purpose of improving relations and mutual understanding, and the establishment of swift and reliable communication between Heads of Governments and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

As regards the United States proposal for advance notification of substantial military movements or manoeuvres within the national territories of States, the Soviet Union not only accepted that proposal but also deemed it necessary to go further in that respect by putting forward a proposal for the prohibition, in stage 1, of substantial joint military movements and manoeuvres with the participation of the armed forces of two or more States.

The Soviet Union is in favour of strict international control over the implementation of disarmament measures. We are at least no less interested than the

(The Chairman, USSR)

Western Powers in the establishment of such control. But the Soviet Union is categorically opposed to turning control into an end in itself and to using it for the collection of intelligence data on the territory of peace-loving States. It is precisely for this reason that the scope of control measures should correspond to the scope of disarmament measures. This principle is consistently embodied in our draft treaty on general and complete disarmament.

We are aware that there are still differences of opinion on the question of control over disarmament. We realize that these questions must be solved.

If we consider these questions in their natural logical connexion and sequence, we see that it is impossible to set about working out the details of control unless we have first reached agreement as to what the disarmament measures are to consist in, whose implementation it is proposed to control.

To set about working out control questions without having before us agreed disarmament measures would mean drawing up abstract plans divorced from life and totally unconnected with the way in which the disarmament process will be carried out. If we were to take that path, we should certainly be obliged to discard these abstract plans and spend time once again on working out a system of control realistically tied in with concrete disarmament measures. Nevertheless, the Western Powers still continue to draw up various control plans divorced from life and, in doing so, they base themselves, not on the interests of reaching an agreement, but on the plans of their general staffs. No matter how much the plans may differ in form, their essence is the same, namely, to establish the widest control in carrying out insignificant measures for the restriction of armaments, that is, calling a spade a spade, to legalize espionage.

Nothing is changed in this respect by the so-called selective zonal inspection scheme contained in the United States plan (ENDC/30). The authors of that plan demand that, in the first stage of disarmament, thirty per cent of the territory of a State should be thrown open for all-round control over the remaining armaments. Applied to the Soviet Union this means that territory of the Soviet Union equal in area to the whole territory of the United States would be placed under control at the very beginning of the disarmament process.

The Soviet Union has reviewed or included anew in its draft treaty a whole series of articles on important questions of general and complete disarmament (ENDC/2 and Add.1 and 2). Today the Soviet draft treaty reflects more fully

(The Chairman, USSR)

than any other document the programme of action which States would have to carry out in order to achieve general and complete disarmament.

I shall summarize the additions and amendments which have recently been introduced into this draft treaty by the Soviet Government.

First, the Soviet Government has announced that it agrees that, when nuclear weapon delivery vehicles are destroyed in stage 1, an exception should be made for an agreed and a strictly limited number of inter-continental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the ground-to-air category which only the Soviet Union and the United States have at their disposal.

Secondly, the Soviet Union has agreed to a compromise in settling the question of the level of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States in stage 1.

Thirdly, the Soviet Union has accepted the United States proposal on the order in which conventional armaments should be reduced.

Fourthly, we have agreed to lengthen the period for the implementation of general and complete disarmament, this being a matter in which the Western Powers are so much interested.

Fifthly, the Soviet Union has accepted a number of measures put forward by the United States for reducing the danger of outbreak of war.

In addition, the Soviet Union has agreed to transfer measures for the elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons from stage 2 to stage 1, if this is acceptable to the other side.

The amendments and additions which the Soviet Government has recently introduced into its draft treaty have brought about favourable conditions for making progress in agreeing a treaty on general and complete disarmament, and have opened up prospects of overcoming the differences in the positions of the two sides which have become apparent in the course of the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

Up to now the Western side, although it has dealt with the aforementioned proposals in a general way, has not stated clearly and definitely its attitude towards them. On a number of questions the position of the Western Powers is completely unknown to us.

The Western Powers have agreed to a certain change in their position. Unfortunately, this change does not represent any serious improvement in their position. Meanwhile, the United States position, as expressed in the document

(The Chairman, USSR)

(ENDC/30) which it submitted, fails to solve the basic problem of our times: it does not lead to elimination of the danger of nuclear war. It is well known that the United States approach is that, in the first stage of disarmament, the reduction of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles should be limited to only 30 per cent.

It is impossible not to see that the United States proposals in fact not only do not eliminate but do not even reduce the threat of nuclear war, since a devastating strike with the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons could be carried out with the remaining 70 per cent of missiles, bombers and other means of delivery retained by States. Apart from that, the United States proposal to reduce the means of delivery of nuclear weapons by only 30 per cent in the first stage is aimed at securing for the United States a military advantage to the detriment of the security interests of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, which is contrary to the Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5).

What makes this evident? It is evident by the fact that in proposing to reduce by approximately one-third every type of nuclear weapon delivery vehicle, that is to destroy, in particular, a third of the Soviet Union's inter-continental missiles, which are the basis of the Soviet Union's defence, no provision whatsoever is made in the United States plan for any measure, in the first stage, to eliminate its military bases on foreign territories where United States nuclear strike forces - medium-range and operational-tactical missiles, as well as bombers and fighter-bombers, carriers of operational-tactical nuclear weapons - are located. Under the United States proposals the elimination of military bases on foreign territories is postponed to the very end of the disarmament programme, namely, to the final third stage. If the United States plan were to be followed, the turn for the elimination of these bases might never be reached at all, since the duration of the third stage is not defined by the United States.

It should be added that in the United States plan there is no clear and specific obligation regarding the prohibition of nuclear weapons and the elimination of stockpiles thereof. The United States proposals preserve the material physical possibility of unleashing a nuclear war both throughout the disarmament process and after its completion.

Without the complete and unconditional prohibition of nuclear weapons and the destruction of all stockpiles of such weapons, general and complete disarmament is simple unthinkable, because the elimination of atomic and hydrogen weapons constitutes the very essence, pivot and core of disarmament.

(The Chairman, USSR)

It was no mere chance that the demand for the prohibition of nuclear weapons was the recurring theme of the statements of the majority of representatives at the session of the General Assembly, who spoke with great concern about the grave consequences for all mankind, to which the use of these most terrible weapons could lead.

The General Assembly, in its resolution (1767 (XVII)) adopted at the seventeenth session, called on the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee to resume negotiations "in a spirit of constructive compromise". It is impossible to expect success in the negotiations at the expense of the efforts of one side alone. In that case there would be no compromise. The Western Powers, who, presumably, must also be interested in averting a thermonuclear catastrophe, are under obligation, in their turn, to show readiness to seek ways of settling controversial issues and achieving a solution to the problem of disarmament on a mutually acceptable basis.

In the course of an exchange of messages with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. McMillan, expressed their readiness to resume disarmament negotiations with renewed determination and vigour. We should like to hope that these words of the leaders of the United States and the United Kingdom will be translated into concrete deeds and that the Western Powers will show a desire to seek for mutual understanding in order to work out an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

Besides working out a treaty on general and complete disarmament, it would be of definite importance to carry out separate measures intended to decrease international tension and to create favourable conditions for the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament.

The Soviet Union considers that the implementation of such measures would have a certain positive significance. In our opinion, such measures could be the implementation of the proposal of the People's Republic of Poland (ENDC/C.1/1) for the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, as well as plans for the creation of nuclear-free zones in other regions of the world, an agreement of States to renounce the use of nuclear weapons, the conclusion of a non-agression pact between the NATO countries and the countries of the Warsaw Pact, and so on. The implementation of such measures would remove many an obstacle in the path of general and complete disarmament.

In the course of its work, the Eighteen-Nation Committee should give due attention to the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. There is no need to speak about the great positive significance from many points of view, which the achievement of an agreement to cease nuclear weapon tests would have.

(The Chairman, USSR)

One thing should be stressed: the prohibition of all tests would be a sort of prologue to a more decisive step - the elimination of the nuclear weapons themselves and their prohibition.

Half-measures in the question of the cessation of tests, that is, such measures as would preserve the possibility of carrying out further nuclear weapon tests in any one environment, would provide no solution to the problem. All nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, under water, underground or in outer space should be put an end to once and for all. Furthermore, this problem must be solved now, immediately. Such is the will of the peoples of all countries throughout the world. Such is the will of the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations, which was expressed in the debate at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly and in the resolution adopted at that session.

We note with satisfaction that the debate in the General Assembly on the suspension of nuclear weapon tests was conducted on a constructive level. The overwhelming majority of States insistently expressed themselves in favour of the immediate cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. But what cannot fail to arouse our anxiety and concern is the fact that, in the meetings of the Sub-Committee in Geneva, the representatives of the Western Powers have gone on reiterating their old position and have followed the same line which they maintained before the question of the cessation of tests was debated at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly. As a result of this position of the Western Powers we have, to our great regret, been unable to make any headway in solving the problem of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, and the negotiations on this question continue in fact to be in a deadlock.

The nineteen meetings of the Sub-Committee on the discontinuance of tests which have been held since the recess of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament have brought nothing new. The main reason for the lack of progress in the negotiations on the discontinuance of tests is still the unwillingness of the Western Powers to accept the compromise proposal of the non-aligned countries. This proposal is based on the principle that national means of detection are adequate for the practical purposes of control over compliance with an agreement to cease all nuclear weapon tests. The Western Powers stubbornly continue to put forward their demand for the establishment of an international control system and compulsory inspection, knowing beforehand that it is impossible to reach agreement on such a basis.

(The Chairman, USSR)

All this shows that although the Western Powers declare their desire to have all nuclear weapon tests prohibited, they do not want this in fact. In reality they propose that an agreement should be limited to ceasing tests only in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and they insist on retaining their freedom of action in regard to continuing nuclear tests underground.

The Soviet Union, being anxious that the cessation of nuclear weapon tests should be real and not illusory, cannot leave the question of underground tests open. It could not agree to conclude an agreement which would allow of the possibility of continuing nuclear tests in any environment whatsoever. Such an agreement would result in continuing and extending the nuclear arms race and in involving other States in it.

In order to prevent such a dangerous development of events, it is necessary that an agreement on the cessation of tests of all types of nuclear weapons should become a reality. It must be recognized that the positions of the two sides have come considerably closer together and an effort must be made to overcome the last obstacle by agreeing, on a mutually acceptable basis, to the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests as well. The Soviet delegation expresses the hope that the Western Powers will show good will, farsightedness and statesmanship and will meet the wishes of all the other countries of the world, which are demanding the cessation for all time of all nuclear weapon tests without any exception or exemption.

In that case we should be able to implement the resolution of the General Assembly (1762 A (XVII)) which asks that no nuclear weapon tests should be carried out anywhere or by anyone after 1 January 1963.

In conclusion, I should like to say a few words regarding the organization of the future work of our Committee. The Soviet delegation considers that we should retain the previously agreed procedure for considering in the Committee the first stage of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. However, taking into account the fact that in the course of the work of the seventeenth session of the General Assembly the Soviet Union introduced into its draft treaty amendments (ENDC/2/Rev.1) regarding the retention by the Soviet Union and the United States of a strictly limited number of missiles, we shall obviously have to revert to consideration of item 5 (b) (ENDC/1/Add.3) regarding disarmament measures in respect of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and try, as provided for in our agreed procedure of work (ibid.) to overcome the obstacles and differences of view among the delegations on this question and, as we hope, to reach agreement quickly.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I do not wish to take up too much of the time of the Conference but I should like to make a few preliminary comments on the occasion of our reconvening here.

I should like to say how glad I am to find myself back here working on this most important task, to which we are all devoted, and how good it is to see so many of my former colleagues. I should like also to welcome one or two new colleagues who have come to join us in our efforts. I hope that their added wisdom will compensate for what is lacking in the rest of us and will thus stimulate us to greater efforts.

I listened carefully to what our Soviet colleague said, in his capacity as Chairman, at the opening of our discussions, and to what the representative of the United States had to say to us in regard to our procedures. I understand it has been agreed that we should continue with three meetings a week in the same form as previously, but I note that it is intended that those future meetings should start at 10.30 a.m. instead of at the previous nominal 10 a.m. I hope very much that, having fixed this new time, we will all really endeavour to start punctually on each occasion. The Chairman emphasized the word "punctually"; and I think that those of us who attended the seventeenth session of the United Nations General Assembly will realize the advantage of the insistance of the President on the punctuality of our attendance at meetings there. If we can start punctually, without necessarily waiting for every representative to be present in his seat, it might facilitate our work in that sense. I say this as one who has sinned in the past and who is thus most fitted to make this comment.

In coming back to this Conference, and having the pleasure of sitting under the chairmanship of the representative of the Soviet Union, I did think very hard of what I could say of a complimentary nature in relation to his own main contribution here this afternoon. I think that perhaps the safest thing for me to say is that I do congratulate Mr. Tsarapkin on the courteous way in which he castigated the Western Powers. I shall not take it further than that at this moment but I shall wish to return in the course of my remarks to one or two points which he made.

Those of us who were present at the debates in the United Nations General Assembly will need no reminding of the urgency and importance which all the delegations there attach to our efforts here at this Conference; and I hope that we have all returned with a feeling of determination to try to find some means of making effective progress.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

As we reconvene it is perhaps appropriate to consider just for a moment, in relation to our procedures, whether there is any way of a procedural nature whereby we can facilitate, and add to the success of, our labours. I noted that the representative of the United States referred to the co-chairmanship, which I think he said should be made use of even more in the future than in the past. It is right that he, as one of the co-Chairmen, should say that; and, as the first representative who is not one of the co-Chairmen to speak after him, I should like to say that I endorse that statement, and that the more, and the harder, the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union work together, when the rest of us are not working, the more pleased I shall be. Seriously however, I do think that the more informal contacts that can take place between the co-Chairmen the better it will be for our deliberations. We think that the system of co-chairmanship is a good one: and we only urge our two co-Chairmen on to greater efforts in this sphere. I think, so far as the rest of us are concerned, that the more informal contacts and discussions we can have outside this Council Chamber the better. The more we can discuss in this way, possibly the better it is for us to understand one another's points of view. When one has to speak formally here it is not as easy to explore one another's minds as it is when we meet informally. I welcome an increase of these informal contacts in every way possible, both between the co-Chairmen and between others.

As I say, those of us who have been at the United Nations General Assembly do realize, perhaps more keenly than ever, the importance of making progress; and of course this has been accentuated by the events which have troubled all our minds in the last two months, notably the problem of Cuba. I do not wish to go into that history now. It is well known to all of us. I was a little surprised when our Chairman - speaking in his capacity as the representative of the Soviet Union - said that, thanks to the efforts of the Soviet Union, this situation had been overcome. That seems to me rather like the efforts of the small boy who sets a house on fire and then calls the fire brigade to help put it out. I really do not see how the representative of the Soviet Union can seriously seek credit in relation to this matter. I only mention it in that sense and I certainly do not wish to labour the point. I would not have mentioned it but for what he said.

However, the problem of Cuba brought us face to face with the dangers that do exist; and I think that we must all realize the added incentive there is for us to succeed in our labours and in our major efforts in relation to general and complete

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

disarmament. But, perhaps more than anything else, the impression I had in New York was of the urgency in the minds of most representatives that we should complete our deliberations in the field of nuclear tests. I think that those of us who are concerned in the work of the nuclear Sub-Committee have obviously to exert every effort we can to find a basis for agreement. I think that the position of the Western Powers is well and clearly known: it was expanded by both the representative of the United States and myself prior to the recess when we tabled the two draft treaties which stand in our joint name (ENDC/58 and ENDC/59) and which do spell out what we believe is possible in the way of concluding an immediate and comprehensive treaty: or, if the representative of the Soviet Union finds difficulty in that, we offer the partial treaty (ENDC/59) as a step on the road towards the comprehensive treaty, but not as an alternative. I shall be sorry if the representative of the Soviet Union says that he is unable to accept the partial treaty because I think it could have been concluded immediately. However, if that is said, it makes it more than ever incumbent upon the Soviet Union to help us to find a way to resolve the problem in relation to underground tests. In that context it is well known that the United Kingdom delegation is ready and anxious to consider any facts or any scientific information that the delegation of the Soviet Union cares to lay before us in regard to the latest information it has concerning the means not only of detecting but of identifying all nuclear tests. If the Soviet delegation can help us forward in our own work in this sense then it could help us, perhaps, towards a treaty. But until we can have this clear information, until we can be certain in our own minds that we are able not only to detect but to identify all these events, then it is necessary for us to adhere to our clear position that we must have some means of obligatory on-site inspection in regard to at least a percentage of those remaining tests. This is a clear position and I very much hope that the Soviet delegation will help us to come to an agreement bearing this fact in mind.

A few moments ago, Mr. Chairman, you said that the positions of the two sides had come together a great deal - those were the words you used as I understood the interpretation. It is true that they have come together a great deal, but that is because the West has moved towards the position of the Soviet Union. I do beg and appeal to you, Sir, to make a complementary move towards the Western position and thus enable us to overcome the last remaining hurdle that stands in our way. Indeed, it is not very much to ask, because I do not need to remind you that it was just a

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

year ago -- but for two days -- namely on 28 November of last year, that you gave up your previous undertaking that the Soviet Union would be willing to accept obligatory on-site inspection. So, in this past twelve months, while the Soviet Union has moved away from us we have moved towards the Soviet Union.

I am not seeking to make a big debating point out of this. I am merely reminding you, Sir, of it because of the need, as I see it, for you to revert to that position and to help us, and through helping us to help this Conference and the world as a whole, to breathe a sigh of relief that we have bridged this gap and are finally in a position to negotiate a lasting treaty. I do not think this is too much to ask of the Soviet delegation.

If I may turn from nuclear tests to the wider field of general and complete disarmament, it is obvious that we have to redouble our efforts in this regard for the same reasons that I gave a few moments ago. I believe that what we have to do is to concentrate all our efforts particularly on resolving the differences between the two sides on the question of what should go into the first stage of a disarmament treaty. And I think the statements by Chairman Khrushchev, by President Kennedy and by our own Prime Minister really have given a fresh impetus to this, and people do look to us to overcome those difficulties.

You have reminded us, Mr. Chairman, of the proposal put forward by Mr. Gromyko in the plenary debate in the General Assembly (A/PV.1127) in relation to nuclear delivery vehicles. You pointed out that this was a new move on the part of the Soviet Union, a move in which the West has shown interest and one about which we have said that we would like to know a great deal more. At the end of your speech, Sir, you announced that you would wish to revert to item 5(b) of our agenda, presumably to discuss this particular item. Speaking for my own delegation, I would have no objection whatever to such a course. I would only hope that, for tidiness of debate, we may know in advance on which day we are going to discuss these matters. I understand that Wednesday's debate will be on general issues, as was the debate today, but that presumably thereafter we can have days set aside, if necessary, for discussion of item 5(b) before we continue with the agenda. That is to say, normally we should try to keep to our agenda, and if we want days for particular subjects, such as a discussion on item 5(b) or a discussion in plenary

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

of nuclear tests, then that should be specified in advance to enable us to have clear-cut debates on those issues. Otherwise, we shall welcome a discussion of the proposal put forward by Mr. Gromyko because we wish to clarify a number of points.

In this connexion, Mr. Chairman, you referred to the desire of the West to have details. Indeed, we must have a more detailed exposition than we have had thus far if we are to evaluate this proposal properly. You told us that it was fruitless to have a detailed discussion, but I should make it clear to you that we must have considerably more knowledge of this proposal if we are to give it the consideration which it deserves. We shall want to know the number that you have in mind: we shall want to know the type of missiles you have in mind: we shall want to know how you propose to overcome the acute problem of verification in regard to this particular matter. Because, obviously, if specified limited numbers are to be left in the hands of the two major Powers -- and I say nothing about the fact that my own country has not been included in this -- then obviously that does cause a verificati problem in regard to the verification of remainders, because they will be remainders in an acute way and we shall want to know a good deal more about them.

With regard to verification over the whole field of tests, I listened most carefully to what you had to say, Mr. Chairman, in relation to this particular matter. I must admit -- and I hope you will not think me ungracious -- that I was disappointed that you reverted to the old claim that what the West is interested in is legalized espionage. Surely we have had that out sufficiently in the past. Surely we do not need to go through all that again. The West is not interested in legalized espionage. The West is interested in knowing that undertakings given have been properly carried out, and we feel that this has become even more necessary in the light of recent events than ever before. We must have these effective measures if we are to have the necessary confidence that any disarmament measures -- and particularly this proposal -- are to be carried out. Please, therefore, do not let us have these polemical statements about legalized espionage. Let us get down to the basic facts of how we can verify measures of this sort so that we may know whether it is feasible and possible to do so and whether we shall be able to have confidence in these measures being carried out.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

This, of course, applies to many other issues in relation to verification generally. I noticed, Sir, that you referred again to the zonal inspection proposal which has been put forward by the United States, and you referred to it in critical terms. But I must remind you, Sir, that I myself on a number of previous occasions have said to you that if you do not like this proposal then you should tell us how you propose to overcome these difficulties. This is not, I believe, an unreasonable attitude to adopt. We are not wedded to this particular proposal. What we want is some proposal which would bridge the difference between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers on how effective verification can be carried out. This proposal, as I understand it, was put forward originally mainly to overcome the fears of the Soviet Union on this matter. If it does not overcome those fears then it is really up to the Soviet Union to let us have its views on how these matters should be dealt with. I do beg our Soviet colleague to deal with this in the days and weeks ahead.

In our discussions in the General Assembly on this matter I was struck by the number of people who referred to the problem of verification and to the need for overcoming the differences between the two sides to which I have referred. I believe the Indian representative made one or two references to this in the debate in the First Committee. Speaking on 7 November he said that he hoped that when the Geneva negotiations resumed it would be possible again to examine what could be done to ensure that there would be no clandestine activities operating against the agreed disarmament plan. I agree with him. I think it is very important that we should go into this matter.

I noticed also other comments. The representative of Brazil on 8 November repeated the former proposals of his delegation for the establishment of a group of specialists to study technical problems of control, without interfering in the political negotiations at the Conference (A/C.1/PV.1269, pp.48-50). That is something in which I would show sympathetic interest. If it were possible to get agreement here, I think it would be valuable, because we really have to try to get to grips with this and to understand one another, to find a means of bridging the gap between us. I would support any proposal of that sort. I noticed also that the representative of Sweden on 9 November suggested that the Conference tackle

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

control as a matter of urgent priority. He said:

> "It might well be that the most promising avenue would be to select for closer study such disarmament measures for which the accompanying control arrangements are at one and the same time technically feasible and politically acceptable." (A/C.1/PV.1270, p.17-20)

If we can find such measures as come within that desirable description, then let us do so by all means, and this might help us to get going on definite agreement on certain aspects of the disarmament programme where perhaps the question of control measures might not be so difficult to overcome. This is the sort of way in which I have said on previous occasions we ought to seek the places where we can get the greatest agreement.

I rather like the phrase used by our United States colleague when he said: "Let us ... talk with, and not to, or at, each other." (supra, p. 13) I think that is exactly what we should be doing. We should be seeking to find areas where agreement exists rather than repeating our disagreements, which, after some months of discussion here, are quite well known to most of us around this table. If we could find these areas of agreement, that could be a positive advantage. Possibly some of the collateral measures mentioned by both the preceding speakers today might fit well into this context. I will not specify them today. The ones we have had in mind are well known to all of us. If we can find some basis on which we can make progress on some of these collateral measures, that again must help us.

I should have thought that our target was first and foremost to solve the test ban problem; secondly, perhaps, to deal with some of these measures to which the Swedish representative referred, where we might find some areas of agreement; and, thirdly, to deal with the collateral measures. All these seem to be ways in which we can move forward. We might possibly consider again, where appropriate, the setting up of groups of specialists for any particular purposes. I have always had the feeling that this could help us forward with our work. I have instanced the Brazilian proposal, and there have been others in the past. I have always been puzzled at the fact that our Soviet colleagues have not been happy about the setting up of such groups. I believe that these could further our work, and that really is the criterion of whether or not we should set them up. If we think they can help our work forward, then of course this must be right to do.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

There are various ways in which we can facilitate our discussions together. As I have said, I do not propose on this occasion to go into detail on any of these matters. All I really want to do today is to restate the urgency, as I see it, and the need to make progress and to find ways in which we can more easily discuss these matters together, to try to rid ourselves of polemical statements and the reiteration of fixed positions and to seek genuinely and seriously to reach agreement, even if only on limited issues. That seems to me to be what the General Assembly wanted us to do, and I think we should bear in mind its wishes in this regard and do all we can to reach agreement. In that context I would say that the contributions of the eight non-aligned countries represented here have been of major importance in the past. I noticed that they were of very real value in New York and I certainly shall welcome their continued advice to us on all matters connected with our work in the days that lie ahead.

I will conclude by merely repeating my appeal that we should seek deliberately to find the best means of conducting our discussions, that we should really seek to find areas in which we can agree and that we should have the maximum amount of unofficial consultation at all levels, with a real effort to get away from propaganda and get down to the work that really matters.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): The Italian delegation has listened with the greatest interest to the previous speakers and has followed with the closest attention the statements made by the two co-Chairmen, Mr. Dean and yourself, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Dean's words afford fresh proof, in my opinion, of the sincerity, good will and constructive and positive spirit with which the United States delegation is participating in our work and of its determination to bring it to a satisfactory conclusion.

My delegation fully shares the United States delegation's hopes that some important first agreements at least will be swiftly concluded. I am sure that all delegations anxious for the speedy progress of our negotiations will welcome the definite programme of work Mr. Dean has outlined today.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Mr. Tsarapkin's speech, though it reiterated the familiar contentions and arguments to which we have already repeatedly replied in the past, contained some statements which deserve careful consideration. I am particularly happy to note the renewed assurance that the Soviet delegation's attitude is not a rigid one. I also sincerely appreciate the tone of his speech which augurs well for a relaxed and friendly atmosphere during our session.

To Mr. Godber I should like merely to say that a speech like his represents a valuable contribution to our work owing to its clarity, realism and open and constructive spirit. The Italian delegation appreciates it at its true value.

The resumption of the Conference on Disarmament is accompanied, I think, by a revival of hope and by a general mood of intense expectation. I hope that this will not be disappointed. One positive fact already emerges; namely, that the Committee has been able to maintain the agreement reached in principle last September that the Geneva meetings should be resumed immediately after the conclusion of the disarmament debate in the United Nations General Assembly. That is proof that we all rate our task far above any other need, and once again confirms our unanimous determination, in accord with the United Nations General Assembly, to pursue our negotiations unremittingly until the agreements we are seeking have become a reality.

During the recess the peoples have again, through their best qualified representatives at the United Nations, shown their apprehensions with regard to the present situation in which peace is maintained by an unstable balance of forces, and in which enormous economic and scientific resources are absorbed by the armaments race when they might be used to further the well-being of mankind.

Like all the other delegations I suppose, the Italian delegation has followed most attentively the debate on disarmament in the United Nations. It is reassuring to note that there was a full and thorough discussion which led to the adoption of important resolutions approved by a large majority. Almost all the members of the United Nations contributed ideas and encouragement. The countries which hold large stocks of armaments have solemnly reaffirmed their determination to dispose of them as soon as we at Geneva have been able to devise valid means of implementation which really correspond to the requirements of peace and security.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Furthermore, the countries which have no armaments of their own were not content with a recital of their anxieties and grievances. They tried to offer their help in facilitating the conclusion of agreements. That is a valuable contribution of which we should avail ourselves. All that is very useful and gratifying. However, whilst our Conference has been in recess, other things have been happening outside the United Nations. Events of quite a different nature have taken place, and although they were fraught with grave dangers, they can still teach us valuable lessons.

We cannot ignore the crisis in the Caribbean, not of course because we want to prolong the argument but in order to ensure that the lesson to be drawn from it should not be forgotten and should help us to find the right road. As the Italian Prime Minister, Mr. Fanfani, said in his speech on 23 October:

"Whilst we are waiting for reasonable and fair agreements to be concluded, an unstable world peace still depends on the maintenance, and the balance, of armaments."

We saw at the time of the Cuban crisis how risky it is to try to upset this balance. We have had a warning not to modify relations of force by inadequate agreements whilst the disarmament process is going on, for there again the creation of disequilibrium might provoke dangers and crises and drive us to the brink of catastrophe.

Moreover, recent happenings have confirmed that there can be no confidence without verification - objective verification safeguarded against any possibility of espionage but for all that sure and effective.

The Italian delegation is glad to note that the Soviet Union, which had conceded in theory that disarmament should be subject to verification, has accepted this requirement in a practical manner and has agreed to measures of control in a particular case. That is why we may hope today that there will be less difficulty in reaching agreement on a general system of inspection acceptable even to the Soviet Union. It should not in future be impossible to reconcile the essential need for safeguards on disarmament with the elimination of any possibility of espionage.

Recent events have shown that even in the most delicate situations there is always an alternative to nuclear war. An agreement can be reached on a basis of dignity, honour and security, if only there be goodwill on both sides.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

The Italian Foreign Minister said on 30 October in the Italian Parliament: "It is possible that the present crisis will provide a fresh impetus to the disarmament negotiations and we earnestly hope that that will prove to be the case."

I trust that this expectation will be justified by events. Now that the crisis is past, the peoples of the world are looking with renewed hope to our negotiations. It is our bounden duty here at Geneva to fulfil their expectations and to devise undertakings that are realistic and attended by adequate safeguards, formulating in practical legal terms the universal desire for peace in security, the desire to exclude atomic war as a means of settling disputes.

It is the more necessary and urgent for us to act since whilst disarmament was being discussed in the United Nations a great peace-loving people which advocates non-violence has been the victim of a sanguinary aggression. Italy expresses its deep and sincere sympathy to the heroic people of India, who are suffering and struggling to defend one of a nation's most hallowed rights, the inviolability of its frontiers and its territory. Italy hopes that a solution based on the principles of justice and fully in harmony with the law of nations will soon be found for this dispute.

Mr. Chairman, as we resume our negotiations today, we have an advantage over previous sessions in having our path clearly mapped out before us. We all, I believe are aware that in our earlier labours we have cleared a most difficult piece of ground. We have made progress towards a better knowledge of our problems and towards an understanding of our respective standpoints, but we have also succeeded to a quite significant extent in bringing them closer together on certain issues. The recess has given us leisure for reflection, and we can therefore venture to hope, as we resume our work today with a new determination and an added enthusiasm, that we shall reach the goal we are seeking.

The Italian delegation has already stated during the United Nations debate that Mr. Gromyko's proposal, which was mentioned again by Mr. Tsarapkin today, for the partial maintenance of the atomic deterrent during the initial stages of disarmament is an interesting one and worthy of careful study. I suppose it will be spelled out and explained in greater detail by the Soviet delegation in the course of our future work, and we shall thus be able to appreciate its real value.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

I can assure Mr. Tsarapkin that my delegation has no desire to delay negotiation under the pretext of asking for useless details. It only wants such explanations and particulars as are necessary to assess the true scope and significance of the Soviet proposal.

By dint of careful studies and the honest comparison of proposals and counter-proposals, with the participation of all the delegations, we shall, I am sure, be able to find formulae of agreement which will meet everybody's requirements.

As you know, none of the plans for disarmament submitted here is absolutely rigid. On both sides, and particularly on the Western side, it has always been stressed that any constructive and realistic proposal would be examined carefully and in a spirit of goodwill.

Now that we are resuming our work, let us not forget that the formulae we are seeking must necessarily be based on technical data which cannot be ignored or underestimated, otherwise the agreement would be fallacious and defective. I do not wish to minimize the importance of a meeting of political viewpoints from which agreement can result. Such a meeting is essential but cannot be entered upon blindfold. It can lead to results only if the technical data on which it is based have been adequately analyzed beforehand. That is obvious enough. I think that at the present stage of our work even the Soviet delegation and the other socialist delegations must be convinced of the need for setting up within the framework of the Conference the technical working party for lack of which we have until now been unable to make any progress.

Apart from a treaty on general and complete disarmament we have also, as you know, to decide on so-called collateral disarmament measures. That description does not make them any less important. The Italian delegation feels that work on certain collateral measures should be intensified, for not only would agreements in this field be easier to attain, but they would open the way to a swift restoration of confidence and would facilitate general and complete disarmament. Some of them, such as the measures to prevent war by accident, have already been considered at previous plenary meetings of the Committee, but only in a very preliminary way.

The Italian delegation would like to see a wholehearted and energetic resumption of work on this subject, with more time and attention given to it than previously.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Amongst the urgent problems, the most vital one undoubtedly is that of a nuclear test ban. It owes its pride of place not only to the seriousness of the problem in view of its immediate and acknowledged bearing on the physical health of mankind, but also to the fact that the present moment seems to be particularly suitable for an agreement. People are asking whether new technical devices might not now facilitate agreement on the inspection of underground tests. The Italian delegation has always been in favour of exploring every avenue and studying every possibility, particularly those made available to us by up-to-date technology. But now, as before, it should be clear that any method contemplated must offer reliable safeguards for the discontinuance of clandestine tests.

Moreover, if, as seems likely, these studies prove long and difficult, why not impose an immediate ban on tests for which no verification is required? We should still prefer the speedy signature of an agreement banning all tests, but if such an agreement is not possible in the immediate future, why, and I might add by what right, do some delegations seek to deprive the peoples of the world of the benefit of a relief which is already possible today? These delegations are incurring a frightful responsibility for all those human beings who may be born sickly or deformed. But if they could at this very session, and before Christmas, sign the first nuclear agreement, what an encouragement that would be for our subsequent work and what a favourable augury for prospects of peace in the New Year!

The United Nations has asked the Committee to report by 10 December. We have not much time to spare; and must therefore set to work with all speed for we cannot disappoint the hopes and expectations that have been placed in us.

This is not the moment to refer to the various other collateral measures which will have to be studied in detail during this session, but I should like to make a general observation in this connexion to the Committee. It seems to me that certain collateral disarmament agreements should, if intended for swift implementation, include certain executive measures of application or control which could scarcely be dispensed with. Such a task cannot be entrusted to the interim disarmament organization since it does not yet exist, though its creation is envisaged within the framework of the treaty on general and complete disarmament and will accompany its entry into force.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Any collateral measures on which agreement might be reached before the conclusion of the general treaty would therefore find themselves in the air as far as their execution was concerned.

The absence of a suitable organ would inevitably cause practical difficulties of implementation. Similar difficulties arose in connexion with the Cuban crisis when no suitable international organ could be found to which the control of the evacuation of certain weapons could be entrusted. The appeal to the International Red Cross did not provide a solution, and this gives some idea of the uncertainties which arise when no suitable executive organ has been provided for in advance.

I feel that if this Committee's aim is to promote by every possible means the rapid achievement of disarmament, we should deal with this problem also and there seems to me no reason why our Committee or some similar body should not consider the performance of certain executive or supervisory functions until the interim disarmament organization has been set up and can start work. I do not think that that would be incompatible with the terms of reference we have received, if such an enlargement of our functions promoted the rapid implementation of disarmament measures.

Moreover, our Committee's composition as determined by the United Nations offers every guarantee of objectivity and impartiality. This then is an idea I should like to put before the Committee; it can, of course, be developed and elaborated later if other delegations agree that it can be useful for our purpose. In any event it meets a need which will, I am sure, be generally recognized. The Italian delegation is particularly sensitive on this point, for it hopes there will be no delay in bringing the first collateral disarmament measures into force. These must in its view be fully effective from the start.

Such briefly are the points which I wished to put before the Committee today, but I should not like to conclude this first statement without formally putting on record once again the Italian Government's determination to do everything in its power to promote as quickly as possible both initial disarmament agreements and general and complete disarmament, so as to restore the confidence of peoples in the fate of mankind. These are the directives which the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Italy again impressed on the Italian delegation when I was leaving for Geneva, and which my delegation will do its best to obey with full confidence and sincere faith in the aim we are pursuing.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its eighty-third plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Tsarapkin, representative of the Soviet Union.

"Statements welcoming the delegations to the resumed session of the Conference were made by Mr. Epstein, Deputy Special Representative to the Conference, on behalf of the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, by Mr. Tsarapkin as Chairman of the day and co-Chairman, and by Mr. Dean, co-Chairman of the Conference.

"After the conclusion of the open part of the meeting, statements were made by the representatives of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and Italy.

"Letters from the Acting Secretary-General to the co-Chairmen, transmitting resolutions 1762 (XVII) and 1767 (XVII) of the General Assembly, were tabled as documents ENDC/63 and ENDC/64.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 28 November 1962, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m.