

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/FV.139

31 May 1963

ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-NINTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 31 May 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

(Burma)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. V. ISMIRLIEV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Mr. P.D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. L. SIMOVIC

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. F. DOBIAS

Mr. Z. SEINER

Ethiopia:

Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. S.B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI

Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI

Mr. P. TOZZOLI

Mexico:

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. O. NEDA
Mr. S. SERBANESCU

Sweden:

Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. G. ZETTERQVIST

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. O.A. GRINEVSKY
Mr. V.A. SEMENOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. S. AHMED
Mr. M. KASSEM

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN
Mr. J.M. EDES
Mr. R.C. BEETHAM

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. A.L. RICHARDS
Mr. D.E. MARK
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I declare open the one hundred and thirty-ninth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The main task before the Committee is to prepare a treaty on general and complete disarmament. It is towards this goal that our efforts should be directed, since, in the present situation, general and complete disarmament is the principal means of ensuring a lasting peace. At the same time, the Soviet Government has repeatedly pointed out the need to make efforts to reach agreement on a number of measures likely to lessen international tension and aimed at ensuring the security of States and thereby facilitating the accomplishment of general and complete disarmament.

The developments in the international situation today show very clearly that to these ends effective measures must be taken which would bring about a positive improvement of international conditions in the direction of normalizing the situation in the world. At present, eighteen years after the end of the Second World War, the situation in the world not only has not been normalized but contains all the features of the cold war, which is becoming ever more extensive and vehement from year to year.

We are now witnessing a situation which is altogether unusual in time of peace. Never before in peace-time has an armaments race reached the pitch it has reached today. The number of States comprised in military alliances has never been so great as at the present time. The deployment of armaments and armed forces at military bases located on foreign territories has never been so extensive as it is today. The cold war has assumed such a character and intensity that an outbreak of armed conflict may be expected anywhere and at any moment, a conflict which in this day and age could turn into a universal nuclear missile war within a matter of hours.

In order to improve the state of international affairs, what are needed are speedy, effective and, if possible, simple measures to start with, which would have a positive effect on the development of the mutual relations between States and, in the first place, between the States belonging to the two opposed military groupings. It was precisely for this reason that the Soviet Government submitted to the Committee a number of proposals aimed at improving the international situation.

What is the situation with regard to the consideration of these Soviet proposals by the Committee? In our statement at today's meeting we shall speak about the Soviet Union's proposal (ENDC/77) for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the two

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military groupings. At subsequent meetings we shall state our views on other proposals for collateral measures. We have already pointed out that the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact has met with recognition and approval not only in the socialist and non-aligned countries, but also in public and even government circles of the Western Powers. The views on this subject of President Kennedy and the United Kingdom Prime Minister Macmillan, who have spoken in favour of concluding such a pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries, have been quoted here on numerous occasions.

It is also appropriate to quote the recent statement in this regard made by a prominent NATO leader, the former Secretary-General of that organization and now Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Mr. Spaak. About ten days or perhaps a fortnight ago, in reply to a question put by a correspondent of Izvestia who asked him what his opinion was regarding the Soviet proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries, Mr. Spaak said:

"I should like to stress that I have more than once stated my opinion on this subject, and this opinion is positive. Of course, there are people in the world who think that, since we have the United Nations Charter and other international agreements, that is enough. But to talk like that amounts to giving no reply to a vital question. There is no doubt that the non-aggression pact you mention would play a positive role. I would say without hesitation that the idea of such a pact should be accepted. Its conclusion could become a very positive factor in improving relations between the two worlds."

We must pay tribute to Mr. Spaak, who, in spite of the position adopted here in the Committee by the representatives of other Western Powers, frankly, unequivocally and unreservedly spoke in favour of accepting the Soviet proposal for a non-aggression pact. Mr. Spaak has witnessed the tremendous calamities brought upon the peoples of many countries by two world wars and their consequences. As the former Secretary-General of NATO he had an opportunity to become acquainted with modern means of destruction and to get a clear idea of the catastrophic consequences which a nuclear missile war would have for the peoples of Europe, and particularly for densely-populated Western Europe. He drew the proper conclusion from all this, and did not hesitate to speak of the need to conclude a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries, on the one hand, and the Warsaw Treaty countries, on the other.

Unfortunately, the representatives of the Western Powers in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, who shout from the roof-tops that NATO is a purely defensive

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organization of the Western Powers and has no intention of attacking anyone, in reality prove the exact opposite by refusing to accept the Soviet proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact.

Speaking on 27 February 1963, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, said:

"In order to improve the situation in Europe, what could be more natural than to conclude a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Treaty countries and the countries belonging to NATO? Such a pact would not upset the balance of power and would be an important moral victory for the peoples. But that is something the Western Powers are unwilling to accept."

Despite the fact that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact would have quite obvious and indisputable positive consequences for the consolidation of peace and an improvement in the international situation, no progress has been noted in regard to consideration of this question in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. The representatives of the Western Powers have put forward a number of procedural objections against consideration of this question in the Committee as well as substantive ones against the conclusion of such a pact.

In his statement on 17 May the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Simovic, very precisely summarized and thoroughly analysed the objections of the Western Powers and advanced convincing arguments to refute them (ENDC/PV.133, pp. 7 et seq.). He cited the following main objections of the Western delegations to the non-aggression pact, and brought convincing arguments against them:

1. The proposed pact should be considered in another forum. The Eighteen-Nation Committee does not include a number of NATO and Warsaw Treaty States and is therefore not competent to study this question.
2. This proposal involves political problems the study of which goes beyond this Committee's terms of reference.
3. The proposed pact relates only to a narrow specific regional question which does not come under the category of those broad world problems which the Eighteen-Nation Committee has been called upon to study and resolve.
4. This proposal is a repetition of some of the already-existing obligations of States laid down in the United Nations Charter, and therefore there is no need for States to assume such obligations once again.
5. The proper time for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact has not yet come.

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6. The proposed pact envisages the normalization of the situation in Europe and is linked with the existing boundaries between the European States. The assumption of obligations in these fields is not in keeping with the interests of the Western Powers.

Those are the basic objections put forward by the representatives of the Western countries belonging to NATO against the consideration of the question of a non-aggression pact. All the aforementioned objections of the Western Powers to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact have been very thoroughly analyzed in previous statements by the representatives of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania. We, too, have dealt with these questions in our statements. Therefore today we should like to summarize briefly our arguments and views in regard to the completely unconvincing and wholly unfounded objections of the Western Powers to the consideration of our proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact.

1. The thesis that this Committee does not include a number of NATO and Warsaw Treaty States and is therefore not competent to study a non-aggression pact was put forward by the United States representative, Mr. Foster, on 20 February (ENDC/PV.100, p.50). We have refuted that thesis and shown it to be completely unfounded. If we were to adopt that sort of reasoning, the Eighteen-Nation Committee would not be able at all to consider a single item on its agenda.

The problems of general and complete disarmament concern all peoples and States without exception. The question of the cessation of tests concerns not only the nuclear Powers but, just as in the case of disarmament, absolutely all countries and all peoples. Any collateral measure aimed at lessening international tension and facilitating disarmament also concerns, directly or indirectly, many of the States not represented here. All the one hundred and eleven States Members of the United Nations are deeply interested in the solution of all these problems.

But we are still considering all these problems in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. As we all know, the Committee cannot take a final decision: it merely prepares recommendations. But in taking a decision all the States concerned will participate. When a recommendation has been agreed upon here, any State directly interested in any particular question will have the time and opportunity to express its attitude towards the recommendation agreed upon by the Committee. Only by virtue of such an interpretation of its competence does the Committee, consisting of the representatives of eighteen, actually

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seventeen, States, consider questions and problems directly concerning all the countries of the world. Therefore the objection of the United States to the consideration of the proposed pact in the absence of certain States concerned has no legal value and no political justification.

2. The thesis that the proposed pact is a political question, not envisaging any kind of disarmament and therefore outside the terms of reference of the Committee, was advanced by the United States representatives, Mr. Foster and Mr. Stelle, on 20 February (ibid.) and 3 May (ENDC/PV.127, p.27). At our meeting of 17 May the United States representative said:

"Surely we have enough to occupy our time in the field of disarmament without engaging in long discussions about the merits or lack of merits of general political proposals". (ENDC/PV.133, p.34).

By "general political proposals" the United States representative meant the Soviet proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. Enough has already been said here on the flimsiness of that thesis, and one can only repeat that the problem of disarmament is precisely the most political problem of all by its nature and its consequences. All the other problems studied by the Committee are also political questions, whether proposals relating to collateral or partial measures, which do not envisage direct disarmament measures, or the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

The Western Powers' objections to the Soviet proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact are all the more groundless since this proposal is fully in keeping with the aims which, according to the Committee's decision, collateral measures should serve. According to the Committee's decision, proposals relating to collateral measures are aimed at the lessening of international tension; the consolidation of confidence among States; and facilitating general and complete disarmament (ENDC/1/Add.1). The conclusion of a non-aggression pact would be fully in keeping with these aims. Therefore the thesis put forward by the United States delegation that the Committee is not competent to consider this Soviet proposal is altogether groundless and unjustified.

3. The thesis that the proposed pact relates only to regional European problems and therefore does not come within the category of questions considered by the Committee was put forward by the Canadian representative, Mr. Burns, on 3 May (ENDC/PV.127, p.18). We should like to point out the complete lack of foundation of this argument also for two reasons.

First, the proposed pact is not of a regional character. Even the strictest pedant and dry-as-dust formalist could not describe a non-aggression pact between the NATO

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countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries as a limited regional agreement. In the first place, it must be pointed out that this pact would directly affect States in Europe, North America and Asia Minor. The political significance and the beneficial effects of such a pact would undoubtedly extend far beyond the geographical boundaries of the States it covers.

It should be easy for everyone to understand that a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries would bind the United States and its NATO allies, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Treaty allies, on the other, with an obligation not to attack one another. No one will deny that the Soviet Union and the United States, which represent the basic, main power respectively of each of the two contracting groups, are States whose importance and influence are felt literally throughout the world and are therefore rightly called world Powers. If these two world Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, bind themselves through the aforesaid pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries with an obligation not to attack each other, it is clear to everyone that this obligation would be of a world-wide character; this, in fact, is implied in the actual text of the draft non-aggression pact.

Of course, this obligation would not be assumed in order to tie our hands by this pact, say, in Europe while remaining free to attack each other in other parts of the world. Therefore the Soviet proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact should be considered in a broad political context as it deserves. Consequently a non-aggression pact between the NATO States and the Warsaw Treaty States would in no way be a sort of limited regional agreement. It would have universal significance. As you see, this argument of the Western Powers does not stand up to criticism.

We have already quoted the words of Mr. Spaak, who said that the conclusion of such a pact would help to improve relations between the two worlds. His reference to two worlds clearly shows that the conclusion of a pact would have world-wide significance. This is also evidenced by many other facts, in particular the interest in this question which is being shown literally in every part of the world, including Asia, Africa, Latin America and so on. This can be seen, for example, in the statements of the representatives of Nigeria, Mexico, Brazil and Ethiopia, who have pointed out the great significance of this proposal. Further evidence of this can be seen in the quotations given by the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Simovic (ENDC/PV.133, p.9), from

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statements by leading personalities in Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and even statements made by President Kennedy in November 1961 and in October 1962, which have already been quoted here on numerous occasions by the representatives of various countries.

The question of concluding a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries undoubtedly has world-wide significance, not to mention that, even formally, such a pact would comprise countries situated on three continents. It would in fact contribute to the improvement of relations throughout the world, since it would help to create confidence between the two worlds: the countries belonging to the Western military alliance, and the socialist countries parties to the Warsaw Treaty. This pact is aimed at normalizing the situation in the most important and sensitive area of world politics: the mutual relations of the States which are keeping powerful armed forces facing each other in the centre of Europe.

As the representative of Romania, Mr. Macovescu, has pointed out, the members of these two organizations, NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Alliance, are States which by virtue of their geographical position, size and military potential, and of the fact that they include all the nuclear Powers, and also because of their economic resources and their importance in international relations, have a considerable influence on the international situation throughout the world. Therefore the arguments of Western delegations that the non-aggression pact proposed by the Soviet Union would be of a regional character are without any foundation.

In this connexion we should like to ask them a question. Is the Committee not entitled to consider regional arrangements? In the opinion of the representatives of the Western Powers, is the Committee not entitled to consider such questions as the creation of denuclearized zones in Africa, in Latin America, in Central Europe, in the Mediterranean basin, in the Baltic area or in Northern Europe, which in a formal sense are also of a regional character but are essentially international problems the world-wide significance of which is beyond dispute? If agreement were reached on these questions, it would be a tremendous step towards solving the problems relating to so-called collateral measures. Moreover, it should be noted that the thesis that this Committee is not competent to consider regional questions is in itself an artificial one. There are no provisions or limitations preventing this Committee from considering problems of a regional character.

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Thus the thesis that the regional character of the proposed pact prevents this question from being considered in the Committee is completely unfounded. This thesis is being used by the Western Powers in order to avoid considering this vitally essential and clear proposal, which can easily be implemented.

4. The thesis put forward by the Western Powers that a non-aggression pact would be useless since it would be a repetition of obligations already assumed under the United Nations Charter has already been very thoroughly analyzed in detail and laid bare, in particular by the representative of Romania, Mr. Macovescu, in his statement at our meeting of 29 March. In that statement (ENDC/PV.115, pp. 11-13) he showed the complete invalidity of the aforesaid thesis of the Western Powers. And indeed, how can one object to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact on the ground that it reproduces a most important provision of the United Nations Charter? In international practice there are abundant precedents for the reiteration of generally-recognized principles and obligations. An example of this can be seen in the numerous resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly in which the principles of the United Nations Charter are reaffirmed over and over again and which contain repeated appeals for disarmament and non-aggression.

Whenever we meet with a refusal to reaffirm the most important generally-recognized principles, it is always connected with the counteraction of the forces which are pursuing a policy contrary to these principles. The refusal of the Western Powers to reaffirm the principles laid down in the United Nations Charter only confirms our assessment of the essentially aggressive aims and purposes of the North Atlantic Alliance. In this connexion it is very appropriate to quote again from the aforementioned interview of Mr. Spaak (supra, p. 5), when he stated that to refuse to conclude a non-aggression pact on the ground that the United Nations Charter and other international agreements already existed would amount to giving no reply to a vital question. That is the true situation with regard to the thesis of the Western Powers that it would be useless to reaffirm the generally-recognized provisions of the United Nations Charter.

5. The thesis that the time for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact has not yet come was advanced by the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, and the United Kingdom representative, Sir Paul Mason, at the meetings of 3 and 10 May (ENDC/PV.127, p.18; PV.130, p.16). In defending this thesis the Western representatives stress particularly that certain preliminary measures would have to be carried out before the question of concluding a non-aggression pact could be considered. They do not specify when, in their opinion, the appropriate time for the conclusion of such a pact will come.

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The flimsiness of the thesis that it is premature to consider this question is now obvious. To postpone the conclusion of a non-aggression pact until all controversies between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries have been settled would be tantamount to abandoning all efforts aimed at reducing international tension at the present time. The point is that a non-aggression pact would be valuable precisely at this time, when the situation is fraught with possibilities of armed conflict and there is consequently a real need for such a pact. But when controversial problems have been settled, there will be no need for a non-aggression pact; such a pact will then be no more than a pure formality and not a means for preventing aggression.

Another thesis of Mr. Burns also gives rise to legitimate objection:

"...a non-aggression pact at some point may possibly be appropriate in the context of an East-West understanding on those broader questions". (ENDC/PV.127, p.18)

The representatives of the Western Powers, being unable to deny the positive significance of the proposal for the conclusion of such a pact and, on the other hand, being anxious to prevent the accomplishment of such a measure, are trying to make agreement on this question depend upon agreement on a wider range of questions.

It can easily be seen, however, that the attempt to make the conclusion of a non-aggression pact depend upon the settlement of a wider range of questions amounts in fact to rejecting the pact, because such a condition immediately makes the conclusion of a pact an extremely difficult and complicated problem doomed to endless procrastination. In using such tactics the Western Powers are obviously trying to postpone the conclusion of a non-aggression pact to the Greek Calends -- that is, in fact, to avoid it. By making the conclusion of a non-aggression pact conditional upon a series or package of agreements, the Western Powers are in fact rejecting the proposal for the improvement of the mutual relations between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries, and are acting as opponents of the reduction of international tension.

In this connexion we should like to draw attention to the attempts of the representatives of the Western Powers to make out that the non-aggression pact is a measure that serves only the interests of the socialist countries. Having depicted or, I would say, distorted the matter in that way, the Western Powers could not resist the temptation to make the non-aggression pact a subject of political bargaining. They try to impose on the socialist countries various kinds of conditions and demands in exchange for their agreement to conclude such a pact. Haggling on questions of war and peace, on questions of international security, is a regrettable feature of the policy of the Western Powers, a feature which has been preventing progress in all fields of the Committee's work.

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6. The thesis that the pact envisages the normalization of the situation in Europe and is linked with the existing boundaries and therefore cannot be considered in the Committee was put forward by the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, at our meeting of 3 May (ibid.). If the Western Powers are opposed to the normalization and stabilization of the international situation, especially in those areas of the world which are most important from the standpoint of ensuring peace, one is bound to come to the conclusion that all the efforts of the Committee to work out measures aimed at the lessening of international tension are doomed to failure, as are all attempts to reach agreement on disarmament. If the Western Powers are opposed to ensuring international security in this area on the basis of the existing boundaries, what alternative have they in mind? The alternative can only be what the militarist and revanchist circles of West Germany are insisting on: the building-up of a military striking force for the purpose of bringing about by force a revision of the existing boundaries in Europe.

As recent events have shown, this is precisely what certain circles in the West, and above all in the Federal Republic of Germany, are striving for. It is they who demand a broadening of the armaments race, the equipping of the NATO armed forces with nuclear weapons, and the creation of a multilateral and multinational nuclear force; and it is they who oppose all measures which would lead to the normalization and stabilization of the situation in this most sensitive and important area of international political life. They are obviously not interested in the normalization of relations between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries, and for this reason they oppose in every possible way not only the conclusion of a pact, but even the consideration of the question of concluding a non-aggression pact between the two military groupings.

Mr. Burns asserted that the Federal Republic of Germany has no aggressive designs. He said:

"...I should like also to emphasize that at the London Conference in 1954 the German Government made a declaration by which it undertook never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the Federal Republic of Germany." (ENDC/PV.133, p.18)

In that case why do the Federal Republic of Germany and the other Western Powers, and Mr. Burns himself, object to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact on the ground that it is linked with the question of the existing boundaries in Europe?

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The point is that Mr. Burns, in putting forward the question of boundaries as an obstacle to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, frankly expressed ideas about which the other representatives of the Western Powers prefer to keep silence. The revanchist forces of Western Germany have not renounced their intention to redraw the map of Europe. In his statement of 27 February the Head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Khrushchev said:

"The Government of Western Germany openly declares its disagreement with the existing boundaries. The revanchists are hatching plans to change the existing situation in Europe by force and to destroy the German Democratic Republic. But after all it must be understood that this situation can be changed only by military means. It cannot be seriously believed that the governments of the Socialist countries will be like certain leaders of the West who use their territory and the interests of their peoples as bargaining points".

The refusal to conclude a non-aggression pact and the attempt to justify this attitude by the argument that this question should be linked with the problem of settling the existing boundaries -- all this clearly reflects the striving of the revanchist forces to retain their freedom of action in regard to redrawing the map of Europe, that is, their freedom of action in regard to unleashing a war.

But everyone understands that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact would bind the hands of those forces which are preparing for aggression, for revenge. And it is significant that, apart from Western Germany, only the representatives of the United States and Canada -- that is, the representatives of countries which are thousands of miles away from Europe -- have spoken against a non-aggression pact. But the peoples of Europe wholeheartedly support the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. Significant in this regard is the statement of the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Spaak, who gave it his full support.

We have analysed the main arguments and reasons advanced by the Western representatives against consideration of the Soviet proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries. As a result of this analysis it is impossible not to come to the conclusion that the Western Powers are not interested in an agreement or in the adoption of the measures under consideration by the Committee aimed at the lessening of international tension and facilitating disarmament. Their arguments against consideration of the Soviet proposal for a pact are strikingly unconvincing, baseless and unsound, and, let us be frank, lacking in good will. The fact that the representatives of the United States and Canada, which are thousands of

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miles away from Europe, object to the conclusion of a pact shows that the political leaders of these countries are profoundly indifferent to the interests and aspirations of the peoples of Europe.

The attitude of the representatives of the Western Powers towards the question of a non-aggression pact shows that the Western Powers do not want to be bound by a non-aggression pact. But then everyone can and must with very good reason draw the inevitable conclusion -- and it will, of course, be absolutely right -- that the Western Powers are preparing for attack, for aggression, in order to achieve their political aims. One should not underestimate the extremely negative consequences that would arise as a result of the failure of our negotiations on measures aimed at the lessening of international tension and facilitating disarmament.

We must emphasize that the refusal of the Western representatives to consider the proposal for a pact would have a certain negative effect not only on the work of our Committee but on the development of the international situation as a whole. The attitude of the Western Powers towards this question is bound to give rise to concern and alarm among all those who wish for the implementation of concrete measures aimed at assuring international security.

We appeal to the Western Powers to reconsider their negative attitude towards the question of a non-aggression pact and to take a more constructive attitude in these negotiations. Being a simple question, which does not infringe anyone's interests and does not to any extent upset or affect either the military or the political balance of power existing in the world at the present time, the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact is at the same time the touchstone by which it is easy to test to what extent the Western Powers really desire a relaxation of tension in international relations.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): Our Soviet colleague has given us this morning a lengthy and detailed statement in which he has attempted, with many arguments and counter-arguments, to set forth the position of the West and of the United States delegation on the question of discussing in this Committee a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty States.

His description of the United States position was so complicated that I think it might be best to state again simply what that position is. It is quite simple. No one would deny that measures of disarmament and arms control have an important political

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content. No one would deny that the solution of political problems could have an immediate and strong influence on progress in measures of disarmament and arms control. There is a general distinction, although admittedly it cannot be drawn too finely, between disarmament and arms control measures on the one hand, and political problems on the other hand. Furthermore, a host of political problems are crying out for solution; but if we were to attempt to discuss all of them we should turn this Conference into a general political conference and abandon our responsibilities as a disarmament conference.

This means that one of our real responsibilities is to attempt to make the best judgement we can about what measures we can most usefully discuss here in this Disarmament Conference. It is the judgement of the Government of the United States, in exercise of that responsibility, that the question of a NATO-Warsaw Treaty non-aggression pact is not an appropriate one for discussion in this Conference, and that we can spend our time much more usefully in discussing a variety of other questions. That is the position of the United States; it is a very simple one, and not at all complicated.

As to which other questions we might best discuss, on Friday last (ENDC/PV.136, pp. 12 et seq.) I described to the Committee the general philosophy and attitude with which the United States delegation approaches our discussion of collateral measures, and the nature of the measures which we think would have the greatest chance of becoming the subjects of early agreement. At that same meeting, and at our Monday meeting this week (ENDC/PV.137), we heard statements from the Eastern delegations here regarding a variety of collateral measures sponsored by the Soviet Union. Those statements lead us to recognize again that there exists a major difference between the approaches of the Eastern and the Western delegations to our search for agreement on measures short of general and complete disarmament. Since that difference could block prospects for success, I wish to state once again the views of the United States delegation on this problem. We can only hope that a clearer understanding of what we believe should be our common approach might lead to a more fruitful exchange of views with the Eastern delegations on discovering those measures which seem promising and desirable to both sides.

For over a year now we have all, ostensibly at least, been agreed -- as our Soviet colleague pointed out this morning -- on the purposes which collateral measures should serve: namely the reduction of international tensions, the promotion of confidence among

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States, and the facilitating of agreement on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/1/Add.1). Last Friday my delegation expressed its belief (ENDC/PV.136, p.12) that in order to achieve those purposes, collateral measures should and indeed must be in the mutual interest of both East and West. For our part, we would not expect the Soviet Union to agree to a measure which in its view was unfair or one-sided, not only because we know that would be unrealistic, but primarily because such a measure would not help to reduce international tension or to build confidence. On the contrary, a measure of that kind, we believe, would only tend to aggravate the present situation and increase mutual suspicion. Since, in the present unfortunate international atmosphere of distrust, States will naturally be inclined to be most wary of the possible consequences of any collateral measure, we believe that early steps -- which can be taken before the beginning of the implementation of a disarmament treaty -- will almost inevitably have to be modest. Moreover, their weight will have to fall in an equal and balanced way on both sides, and each side will have to be convinced that such steps will be in its own interest.

There has been much discussion during our recent meetings about the importance for national security of maintaining a balance in disarmament measures; and we seem to be agreed that this principle of balance must be applied to collateral measures as well as to the stages of general and complete disarmament. As we all know only too well, in the world of today each State has to look to its own security interests and the interests of its allies, and it is unlikely to let itself be convinced of the desirability of any measure which it feels might jeopardize that security.

Last week we referred (*ibid.* pp.12 et seq.) to the example of the United States proposals to reduce the risks of war. We believe that Soviet acceptance in principle (ENDC/PV.118, p.52) of our proposal (ENDC/70) for establishing a direct communications link was based on recognition of the potential value of this measure to both sides. At the same time the Soviet delegation has professed to believe that our suggestions, with regard to advance notification of major military movements (*ibid.*, p.4) and exchanges of military missions (*ibid.*, p.8) would somehow threaten the security of the Soviet Union.

As we have said, we believe that this reaction indicates a lack of understanding of the United States proposals, and we still hope that the Soviet Union will give them serious reconsideration in due course. The United States delegation put them forward

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

precisely because we believed, as we still believe, that they represent modest but nevertheless mutually-advantageous measures. However, it is obviously for the Soviet Union in the last instance to decide whether any specific measure advanced by the United States or by any other delegation would, in its view, enhance or jeopardize Soviet national security.

I have felt it necessary to dwell on these questions of mutual interest and of balance in connexion with collateral measures because of some rather extraordinary remarks which we have heard during the last week in this regard. At the meeting last Friday our Czech colleague advanced some arguments in support of the Soviet draft declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for the stationing of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ENDC/75). In attempting to answer Western criticism that the draft declaration would offer unilateral military advantage to the Eastern countries, he first assured us that the implementation of that proposal would require the same commitments from all participants. But he then proceeded to argue that the West opposed the declaration because it would affect the network of NATO bases, which he termed:

"... a result of long-term unilateral measures taken by the United States Government and its allies..." (ENDC/PV.136, p.18)

He concluded that:

"Logic requires that before anything else we get rid of this unilateral, lopsided situation." (ibid)

I ask members of the Committee to think for a second about those statements. They seem to us contradictory. A measure cannot require the same commitments from all the participants and at the same time serve to eliminate an alleged unilateral advantage that one participant has over the other. In the second place, it seems to us illogical to pretend that a measure which is openly directed towards undermining the established military position of one of the two sides in this negotiation can possibly reduce international tensions, build confidence among States, or facilitate further agreements. It is rather difficult to believe that such a measure has been put forward with any seriousness in the hope that the other side could also find it of genuine interest when, by admission of the side which proposes it, the measure would rectify what that side claims to be a "lopsided situation". We submit that such a proposal can only be a demand for unilateral concessions by the West, and this is precisely the case.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

Our colleagues from the Eastern delegations have taken the same attitude in proposing the establishment of a denuclearized zone in the Mediterranean area. The proposal itself, as set forth in the Soviet note (ENDC/91) which the Soviet representative read into the record last Monday (ENDC/PV.137, pp. 9-14), is an attempt to prevent the NATO defensive alliance from taking measures in the nuclear field for the collective security of its members. As we noted at the time, it was presented in the context of an all-out propaganda attack on the discussions in Ottawa regarding the military defences of the NATO alliance. It seems to us that in fact the proposal itself is obviously of minor importance compared to the opportunity which it has created for propaganda and political attacks against NATO.

Speaking on this subject last Monday (ENDC/PV.136, p. 35 et seq), the Bulgarian representative launched a whole series of charges against the Western alliance. Unfortunately, we are becoming hardened to hearing such propaganda speeches in this Committee; but the Bulgarian representative ended on a truly remarkable note when he openly and -- it seemed to us -- proudly announced that the object of the Soviet proposal for a Mediterranean nuclear-free zone was to undermine certain actions undertaken by the United States and its allies in that area.

We are, of course, aware that our Bulgarian colleague and the other Eastern delegations like to claim that the actions which NATO is taking in exercise of collective self-defence pose "a serious threat to world security". But on this point I would simply refer our Bulgarian colleague to the remarks of our colleague from the United Kingdom last Wednesday which put those charges in a more sensible perspective. Mr. Godber said:

"... what in fact the Western Powers have said is that they need their overseas bases in the early stages of disarmament so that they may be better able to defend themselves from any prospect that the Soviet Union might attack them." (ENDC/PV.138, p.37)

He was speaking of general and complete disarmament, but this thought applies equally well to Soviet-sponsored collateral measures which seek in unilateral fashion to harass and obstruct Western defensive moves taken to keep NATO modern and up-to-date in the face of the mammoth Soviet military effort.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

I am not discussing today the substance of those proposals, and in particular the substance of the proposal for a Mediterranean nuclear-free zone. The Soviet Government will in due course receive from the United States Government whatever response is appropriate to its note. I would simply like to point out how struck my delegation was by the blatantly one-sided nature of the proposals with which we have been presented, and especially by the fact that their one-sided effect is their openly-avowed objective. We submit that no pretence is made by the Eastern delegations that these measures could be of mutual military interest or advantage to the two sides.

We believe this is not a propitious way to approach the problems with which we are faced. We can imagine the reaction of the Soviet Union if we, for our part, were to propose, for example and as an entirely hypothetical case, that there be a nuclear-free zone comprising the full territory of all States bordering on the Caspian Sea. Clearly, each side is capable of thinking up unbalanced schemes; but we believe that we in the West are sensible and responsible enough not to burden our Conference and the world at large with such nonsense.

We are attempting here to build confidence among States, to breach a wall of tension and mistrust. It does not seem to us, nor indeed can it seem to any serious negotiator, that the way to achieve this objective and to reach agreement on collateral measures is to choose proposals aimed at undermining defensive measures which the other side has taken to protect its security. Military machines can, of course, and we hope will be dismantled, but the only acceptable way of doing that is by sound and equitable agreements on disarmament.

As I stated last week, it may be possible by means of patient explanation to convince the other side that a certain proposal does not really jeopardize -- and indeed adds to -- its security. However, this cannot possibly be the case with measures which are proposed solely to attempt to cut down the position of the other side. For the sake of progress here, we hope we can get on with discussion of realistic measures that have some chance of general acceptance by the delegations and States directly concerned.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) (translated from French): At meeting of the Committee held on 24 May Sir Paul Mason, the representative of the United Kingdom, did me the honour of commenting (ENDC/PV.136, p. 25-27) on my statement of 17 May last (ENDC/PV.133, pp. 25 et seq.), and I think that I owe it to him to reply.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

First, let me say how glad I am to note that Sir Paul Mason shares the point of view on the role of the Rush-Bagot Treaty, although he criticizes me (ENDC/PV.136, p.27) for having forgotten to learn its lessons. He also asserts that the comparison that I attempted to make between that Treaty and the Soviet draft declaration is inaccurate. I have to note, therefore, that my arguments have not convinced him. Sir Paul Mason still believes that the Soviet draft declaration on the renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75) favours one party only, does not provide for identical obligations for both parties, and calls for performance by the West that is not compensated by any concession by the Soviet Union. Sir Paul Mason concludes that it cannot be claimed that such proposals as these tend to ensure equality of obligation in the qualitative sense.

I should like to go over this argument once more. The United Kingdom representative states that the Soviet draft declaration does not provide for identical obligations; but a simple reading of the text should have convinced him to the contrary. For the draft declaration provides for obligations that are equal for all the signatories. What I endeavoured to point out was that the contributions to be made by the different States for the application of the draft declaration would not be identical; but in our opinion that does not derogate from the principle of equality.

Sir Paul Mason apparently does not agree with me on this point. He refuses to make a comparison between the general contributions of the parties to the creation of the state of affairs contemplated by the draft declaration, and prefers to compare specific contributions in the different fields of armaments. If I understand him aright, he considers that the principle of equality is characterized by respect for quantitative reciprocity: for instance, submarine for submarine, aircraft carrier for aircraft carrier, missile for missile and so on. Surely he must realize that, if his predecessors had wished to apply the same method, the 1817 Treaty between Great Britain and the United States would never have seen the light of day. I hope that he is equally aware of the truth that an attempt to base our disarmament plans on respect for strict equality of quantitative contributions would condemn our efforts in advance to certain failure.

The Soviet draft declaration was not conceived as an abstraction; it corresponds to a series of material conditions which have been accumulating throughout the post-war years. Its object is to remove from international relations the most dangerous

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

elements of friction introduced by the cold war, and it is natural that the party which contributed to bringing this negative situation into being should make the greater efforts and the greater contributions to restore the status quo ante and to normalize the situation. Inasmuch as the United States and its allies are responsible for the tension set up by the existence of bases on foreign territory, it is only right that they should bear the greater onus of the costs of the operation. This would represent a contribution to the cause of collective security and, if I may use a comparison, would be equivalent to a tax on the unjust enrichment arising out of the cold war.

The problem can be looked at from two points of view: either that of the selfish interests of particular countries, or that of the general interests of the whole international community. Our Western colleagues seem to have chosen the first of these. Yet it should be obvious that in giving absolute priority to the selfish interests of particular countries we shall never achieve disarmament. The interest of the international community very frequently demands the renunciation by States of their acquired rights with a view to the replacement of an old and obsolete order which no longer corresponds to present requirements by a new and higher international order.

We have undertaken the laborious task of negotiating a treaty on general and complete disarmament. We wish to agree upon the so-called collateral measures because we recognize the absolute necessity of putting an end to the armaments race and of averting the danger of a nuclear war. We are sitting round this table because we are firmly convinced that we must break away from the existing international order in favour of a higher order which would give States a stronger sense of security. Now, all this implies the adoption of certain value judgments recognized and respected by all. Our Western colleagues take the view that the maintenance of bases on foreign territory and their equipment with strategic nuclear weapons is their natural right. Last year's events showed that they regard themselves as alone possessing that right. Obviously a very convenient point of view: you're never better looked after than when you do it yourself.

I must say, however, that I do not understand how the Western Powers can reconcile this attitude with their declared concern for the principle of equality. For if you admit that the maintenance of foreign bases equipped with strategic nuclear weapons is a natural right, then you must concede the same right equally to all States; or, if you consider that the existence of such bases conflicts with the interests of collective security, then you should demand their immediate liquidation, whatever the conditions of their establishment and whatever contribution the parties will make in order to attain such an objective.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

In my statement today I should like to touch briefly on another subject. At the meeting of the Committee held on 24 May Mr. Stelle, the representative of the United States, protesting against the denunciation by socialist countries of the rearming of Western Germany, accused us of waging a campaign of hatred against the German people (ENDC/PV.136, p. 15). Of course, I do not want to take up too much of the Committee's time in giving our views on the German problem, but I cannot let pass in silence a statement which is a flagrant and intolerable distortion of reality.

First of all, a word on the method used by the United States representative. He wanted to make the Committee believe that our attitude towards the Federal Republic of Germany coincided with our judgment of the German people as a whole. I want to correct this at once. Our criticism is not directed against the German people; it is concerned only with certain political tendencies which are at present emerging in Western Germany and which find expression in the political acts of the Bonn Government.

I can understand that, seen from Washington, the German problem does not look the same as when seen from Warsaw, Moscow or Prague. The Federal Republic is an ally of the United States, and the desire to defend an ally is understandable. All the same, such a defence should take into account reality and common sense.

We denounce the Western policy towards Germany because it is responsible for the Bonn Government's having been able to rebuild its military potential and convert the Federal Republic into the bastion of Atlantic strategy in Western Europe. We denounce that policy because it marks the return in the Federal Republic of Germany, on the political scene, of forces which in our century have plunged the world into two world wars from whose consequences we have suffered more than any other country.

The process of the remilitarization of Western Germany is today being carried out to the accompaniment of the same slogans as accompanied the expansion of the war machine of Hitlerite Germany. Now, as then, the claim is for equality of armaments. In the inter-war period the pretext for the rearming of Germany was that it acted as the bulwark of Western civilization. Today the formula has been slightly modified, and Germany is referred to only as the vanguard of the Atlantic alliance. A country which has genuinely peaceful intentions does not demand equality in the field of armaments; it does not claim as a right full participation in the armaments race when the whole of mankind is calling for universal disarmament. The experience of history proves conclusively that demands for such equality conceal aggressive intentions.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

I should like to say that my words are in no way inspired by any polemical intent; I merely want to stress the responsibility that we all have in respect of the future development of events. The Western Powers -- and especially the United States -- want to confront us with the fait accompli of a rearméd Germany. But that is not all; they would also like us to recognize this fact without a protest, to forget the lessons of history, and to resign ourselves to the violation of treaties on Germany concluded between the Allies after the last world war.

The fact that the United States seems to have forgotten so quickly the tragic consequences of the growth of German militarism does not mean that we should do likewise.

Despite the enormous losses sustained by the Polish people, Polish policy towards Germany is not -- whatever Mr. Stelle might say to the contrary -- motivated by hatred towards the German people. We are anxious to collaborate peacefully with all the democratic elements in the German nation. We have established and are developing excellent relations of good neighbourliness and close co-operation in the political, economic, social and cultural fields with our friend and ally the German Democratic Republic. We have also often expressed our desire to normalize our relations with the Government of the Federal Republic. That our efforts in that respect have hitherto been fruitless is not our fault, and I am sure that the United States representative knows it perfectly well.

The situation is truly paradoxical. We are accused of waging a campaign of hatred against the German people, whereas the feelings of hostility which persist in Western Germany towards the Polish people and other peoples of Eastern Europe are regarded as a normal phenomenon and an expression of democratic and peaceful sentiments. Our Western colleagues would have us admit, for instance, that the notorious attempts made in the Federal Republic to shift the responsibility for the outbreak of the last world war to the countries which were the victims of Hitlerite aggression are apparently of no significance; that the campaign carried on in Western Germany to the effect that the sufferings of the German people during the war were caused, not by the Hitler Government, but by the States which were the victims of its policy of aggression is unimportant; that the policy of fostering in millions of Germans the illusion that one day they will be able to regain the land taken by force from others in the past is a perfect expression of the desire for peace.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

For our part, we shall not cease to denounce the policy of the militarist and revanchist circles of Western Germany and those who support them. We shall do so in the name of millions of human beings who gave their lives to rid the world of the scourge of Hitlerism and fascism. We want to cling always to the hope that the Western Powers will come to understand that one does not prepare for the peace of tomorrow by rearming the aggressor of yesterday.

Mr. SIMOVIC (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): Before I begin my statement I should like to say a few words in connexion with the statement made by Mr. Stelle.

The United States representative, referring to the statement made by the Czechoslovak delegation last Friday (ENDC/PV.136, pp. 17 et seq.) on the declaration regarding the stationing of strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75), made an attempt to refute our arguments showing the appropriateness of that measure. His arguments regarding the one-sided nature of the declaration were extremely unconvincing. It seems -- and we have already mentioned this many times -- that the basis of the United States' approach to this measure is the desire to retain for the NATO countries, and in the first place for the United States, the possibility of delivering a nuclear blow. I intend, however, to revert to Mr. Stelle's statement at one of our future meetings after I have studied the verbatim record thoroughly.

At the meeting of our Committee held on 27 May, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics submitted (ENDC/PV.137, pp. 9-14) a document containing a proposal to declare the area of the Mediterranean Sea a zone free from nuclear weapons (ENDC/91). He announced the readiness of the Government of the Soviet Union to assume an obligation not to deploy any nuclear weapons or their means of delivery in the waters of that sea provided that similar obligations are assumed by the other Powers to which the appeal has been addressed. Lastly, the Government of the Soviet Union gave its assurance that in the event of this proposal being implemented it would be prepared, together with the governments of the other countries, to give reliable guarantees that the area of the Mediterranean Sea should be considered as being outside the sphere of use of nuclear weapons in the event of any military complications.

The Czechoslovak delegation has already had the opportunity at the aforesaid meeting of the Committee to state briefly its point of view with regard to this initiative of the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.137, p.33). It considers this to be a new and important

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contribution to the cause of peace, which would substantially facilitate the achievement of our main aim, an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

The Czechoslovak delegation is of the opinion that the proposal to declare the area of the Mediterranean Sea a zone free from nuclear and rocket weapons comes within the range of the collateral measures to be discussed by our Committee in accordance with the principles laid down in the work programme adopted on 23 March 1962 (ENDC/1/Add.1) and would lead to the lessening of international tension, the consolidation of confidence among States, and facilitating the solution of the problem of disarmament as a whole. The implementation of the Soviet Union's proposal would prevent nuclear weapons from being stationed in an area of such great geographic and strategic importance. It would help, in the event of military operations, to protect these countries from the danger of a nuclear blow.

The Government of the Soviet Union has made this important proposal at a time when we are witnessing a new impetus in the efforts of the peoples of the world, aimed at the adoption of measures against the spread of nuclear weapons and the threat of a nuclear conflict. We can see quite clearly that the idea of creating denuclearized zones is constantly gaining acceptance throughout the world and penetrating the consciousness of the peoples. I should like to recall the most important of such proposals: the proposal made in 1957 by the Polish People's Republic to create a denuclearized zone in Central Europe (A/PV.697, para. 136); the proposal to create similar zones in the Balkans, in the Near and Middle East, in the Far East and in the Pacific area; the proclamation of the Antarctic as the first denuclearized zone in the world in 1959; the resolution adopted in 1961 at the sixteenth General Assembly of the United Nations declaring Africa a denuclearized zone (A/RES/1652 (XVI)); and lastly the valuable initiative of the Latin-American countries, whose proposal (ENDC/87) was recently submitted to our Committee.

We are now witnessing new steps towards reducing the threat of a thermonuclear war. At the same time as the Government of the Soviet Union submitted a plan for freeing the Mediterranean Sea from nuclear weapons, prominent Scandinavian statesmen -- the President of Finland, Mr. Kekkonen, and the Prime Minister of Sweden, Mr. Erlander -- repeatedly expressed themselves in favour of creating a nuclear-free zone that would include the countries of Northern Europe.

What could be more convincing proof of the vital importance of this idea of creating nuclear-free zones and of the growing awareness of the danger of a nuclear war in the world than the fact that recently even the representatives of certain countries members

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of the aggressive NATO group, such as Denmark and Norway, have deemed it necessary to emphasize that their countries will not participate in the creation of the so-called NATO multilateral nuclear force? These Governments made these important decisions immediately after the end of the NATO Council session in Ottawa, where, as is well known, the United States and certain other countries made so many efforts in regard to increasing nuclear armaments and spreading nuclear weapons to other States.

In the light of these facts, how petty and insignificant are the objections voiced at our meeting of 27 May in the irritated replies of the representatives of certain NATO countries when speaking against the Soviet Union's proposal to turn the Mediterranean Sea into a denuclearized zone: (ENDC/PV.137). Would it not be better if the Western representatives, instead of reacting so hastily and accusing without any reason the Soviet Union and the other socialist States of making propaganda, gave first of all an opportunity to express themselves to the governments and peoples of those countries which this proposal directly concerns, some of which are also members of our Committee?

Let us take a sober look at the actual arguments advanced by the Western representatives against the Soviet proposal at our meeting of 27 May. Just as in the case of other proposals of the socialist countries, the Western Powers in the first place put forward the objection, which has just been repeated today by the United States representative, Mr. Stelle (supra. p. 20), that this is a one-sided measure which would give military advantages to the socialist countries. The United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, tried (ENDC/PV.137, pp.23-24) to create the impression that the Western Powers were compelled to set about making their arrangements, which are dangerous to the cause of peace, because the Soviet Union is threatening with its rockets the security of the countries of this area, and that the sending of nuclear submarines with Polaris missiles on board is a necessary counter-measure for the purpose of maintaining the so-called "balance of forces". The United States representative, Mr. Stelle, also asserted that:

"Such a proposal ... breaches the essential principle of balance carefully enunciated in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles ...". (ibid., p.26)

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

But how can we believe these words of the representative of the United States and the United Kingdom when such an authoritative person as the United States Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Anderson, takes an entirely different view of the introduction of United States nuclear submarines into the Mediterranean Sea? On 4 March 1963, at a meeting of the Armed Forces Sub-Committee of the United States Senate, Admiral Anderson openly stated the following:

(Continued in English)

"...the deployment of these POLARIS to the Mediterranean is of great advantage to us and great disadvantage to the Russians.

"First of all, it extends the submarines into an area where the Russians have no antisubmarine capability at all at the present time..."
(Military Procurement Authorization, Fiscal Year 1964, p.688).

(Continued in Russian)

As you see, the point is not at all, as Mr. Stelle and certain other Western representatives are trying to maintain, that by its proposal the Soviet Union is upsetting some sort of "balance of forces". We are perfectly right when we say that the decision of the United States Government to introduce nuclear submarine into the Mediterranean Sea is a one-sided aggressive measure which aggravates the situation and increases the danger of a nuclear conflict with all the consequences it entails.

But that is only one aspect of the matter. At the same time there is also the very serious fact that by its policy the United States is literally bringing nuclear weapons and the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war to the doorsteps of the peoples of the Mediterranean, and exposing them to all the terrible consequences of a nuclear conflict.

This is an incontrovertible fact. But the leader of the United Kingdom delegation, contrary to all the laws of logic, is not only unwilling to see this fact, but in his statement at our meeting of 27 May he even asserted (ENDC/PV.137, p.25) that the introduction of United States nuclear submarines with Polaris missiles on board into the Mediterranean Sea is for the peoples of that area a miraculous guarantee against the outbreak of a nuclear war. As is well known -- and he confirmed this at the same meeting -- he did not put forward this peculiar argument accidentally. In his view, the feverish arming and the piling up of nuclear weapons are a most effective guarantee against the outbreak of war.

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

Another argument advanced by Mr. Godber (ibid., p.23) was that nuclear-free zones should not be created in areas where the armed forces of the two groups are directly in contact, or where this would affect the defensive measures of States; with regard to Europe, he said that such a measure would not be practicable. This assertion of the United Kingdom representative runs counter to the basic principles of all logic. It is quite obvious that, for the measures of which we are talking to be effective and to lead to positive results, they must be put into effect wherever the appropriate conditions exist and, in the first place, wherever there is or may come into being the focus of a potential clash of the armed forces of the Powers. The point is that, unlike Mr. Godber, we demand that the measures on which we have to reach agreement here should not be purely formal or merely ends in themselves, but that they should actually contribute to the consolidation of peace throughout the world.

At our meeting of 27 May the Western representatives also tried to label the Soviet proposal as propaganda. (ENDC/PV.137, p.22). It has already become a habit of the Western Powers to use this expression whenever the socialist countries mention in their statements the activities of aggressive Western circles, activities which run counter to the aims we are pursuing in this Committee. We believe that world public opinion can itself best decide what is and what is not propaganda. But if you wish at all costs to describe in such words proposals such as the latest proposal of the Soviet Government, then we frankly tell you that we only welcome it if we find similar propaganda in support of peace coming from your side as well.

It appears that what is not to your liking and what you try to minimize in your statements is the fact that this document of the Soviet Government sheds light on the activities in which you are engaged -- as we have already pointed out on many occasions -- outside this council chamber. But we have already had occasion several times to tell you that we will not pass it over in silence when, on the one hand, you assure us here that you are prepared to conduct negotiations on disarmament and to reach an agreement, but in fact you do everything possible to intensify even further the feverish armaments race, to act as the advocates of the West German militarists and revanchists, and to spread nuclear weapons to other States and areas, including the Mediterranean.

In conclusion, I should like to touch briefly on one other important question. In the field of so-called collateral measures, the delegations of the socialist countries in our Committee have already submitted several proposals prompted by a sincere effort to

(Mr. Simovic, Czechoslovakia)

lessen international tension in the world, to reduce the threat of a nuclear war and to create favourable conditions for the achievement of an agreement on disarmament. However, we observe on the part of the Western Powers a tendency not only to avoid a businesslike discussion of these proposals, but also literally an anxiousness to get rid of them without any preliminary serious and businesslike discussion of them. Such an approach cannot lead us to any positive result, and the experience we have had so far shows this quite clearly.

The importance of the document before us and its usefulness for the cause of peace, not only in the area of the Mediterranean Sea, but throughout the world, urgently require that all the delegations, aware of their responsibility in the eyes of the peoples of their own countries and in the eyes of world public opinion, should set about a businesslike and serious discussion of the proposal submitted by the Soviet Government.

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I call on the representative of the Soviet Union, who wishes to exercise his right of reply.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I shall be very brief. The representatives of the Western Powers indicate as a reason for their objection to certain measures proposed by us that they cannot agree to a measure which would be one-sided or would jeopardize the security of one side. That is what the United States representative, Mr. Stelle, said in his statement today (supra, p. 17). That thesis has been purposely devised in order to obstruct real disarmament measures, and we do not agree with it.

However, even if we approach from that angle the assessment of the Soviet proposal (ENDC/77) for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, it is clear to everyone that in its basis this measure is purely bilateral and not one-sided. It binds the two opposing groups with the obligation not to attack each other. No proofs are necessary to confirm that such a measure as the conclusion of a non-aggression pact would not jeopardize anyone's security. On the contrary, a non-aggression pact would tie the hands of those who are hatching aggressive plans. Therefore the conclusion of a pact would only contribute to enhancing security. That is an irrefutable truth requiring no proof.

Today's statement of the United States representative has shown that the United States continues to object to the proposal for a pact. This attitude is all the more regrettable as Mr. Stelle made his statement without having carefully studied the arguments which we have set forth and which show the utter flimsiness of the arguments

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

on which the Western Powers rely in avoiding acceptance of the Soviet proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact.

Many of the statements made here in the Committee have shown the utter flimsiness of the Western Powers' objections to the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. If the purpose of the Western Powers in taking part in the work of the Committee is not in order to impose their will, now that all their arguments against a non-aggression pact have been demolished, they should take this fact into consideration and re-consider their negative attitude towards the Soviet proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. They should adopt a constructive attitude and agree to enter into a non-aggression pact. This will be welcomed with the greatest satisfaction both in our own Committee and throughout the world.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and thirty-ninth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of U Maung Maung Gyi, representative of Burma.

"Statements were made by the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 5 June 1963, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.40 p. m.

REVISIONS

REVISIONS

The following table shows the number of copies of the book published in each year from 1950 to 1960. The total number of copies published during this period is 1,200,000.

Year	Number of Copies
1950	100,000
1951	150,000
1952	200,000
1953	250,000
1954	300,000
1955	350,000
1956	400,000
1957	450,000
1958	500,000
1959	550,000
1960	600,000
Total	1,200,000

The following table shows the number of copies of the book published in each year from 1961 to 1970. The total number of copies published during this period is 1,800,000.

Year	Number of Copies
1961	600,000
1962	700,000
1963	800,000
1964	900,000
1965	1,000,000
1966	1,100,000
1967	1,200,000
1968	1,300,000
1969	1,400,000
1970	1,500,000
Total	1,800,000

1950 1960 1970