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Chairman: Mr. MROZIEWICZ (Poland)
later: Mr. ALPMAN (Turkey)
(Vice-Chairman)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

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GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS

The CHAIRMAN: Before calling on the first speaker, I should like at this stage to welcome participants in the United Nations disarmament fellowship programme who are present at today's meeting. I trust that they will benefit from observing the work of the Committee, and I wish them every success in their work.

I now call on the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Yasushi Akashi.

Mr. AKASHI (Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs): First, let me congratulate you most warmly, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of this important Committee.

The First Committee is commencing its work this year in a dramatically altered situation, especially in relation to the bilateral nuclear issues between the United States and the Soviet Union and in the conventional weapons area in the context of East-West negotiations. The conclusion of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in Paris last November, the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in Moscow in July, and the recent announcements by President Bush on 27 September and President Gorbachev on 5 October on major reductions in their nuclear arsenals and changes in their nuclear postures are all remarkable developments opening a brighter vista for a more peaceful future. At long last they are reversing the trend towards the constant increase in nuclear weapons that has been in evidence over the last four decades, since the end of the Second World War. It is earnestly hoped that progress will continue to be made in these and related

(Mr. Akashi)

areas so that the nuclear arms race and the confrontational military situation in Europe will at last become features of the past.

The international community, however, is faced with a new series of conflicts and disputes involving national, ethnic or religious differences between and within some States. Since this Committee last met, the world has again been ravaged by wars. In several areas of the world, boundaries are still ill-defined. Old disputes remain unresolved and some new ones are emerging. Others are awakening from the slumber of history. In this context, the United Nations is called upon to perform numerous new tasks and face mounting challenges. This is certainly a time of enormous opportunity for the global Organization. Arms control and disarmament now constitute essential parts of the complex process of consolidating peace, together with peace-keeping, diplomatic mediation, judicial settlements and other efforts for enhancing international cooperation. What is needed is a sustained, well-coordinated and non-compartmentalized approach to new global issues.

It is generally accepted that in the Middle East, in Central America and in the Korean peninsula, to mention just a few regions, arms control and arms limitation are part and parcel of constructing an enduring edifice of stability, peace and justice. In this connection, the United Nations agencies dealing with development and assistance have come to realize the close interrelationship between their efforts to create a better livelihood for all and the great expenditure involved in maintaining high military establishments and large procurements of weapons. The interrelationship is a complex one, as the protracted debate on disarmament and development has demonstrated, and it has to be linked to new perceptions of broader security.

(Mr. Akashi)

The international community has to espouse a multidimensional approach to peace and security in which the military aspect will not dominate but will be considered in relation to other priorities such as development, welfare, environment and the protection of human rights.

In this age of information, computing and the spread of scientific and technical knowledge, it is urgent and vital to exercise effective control over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, comprising nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as the means of their delivery. At the same time, it is realized that because of the inherently dualistic nature of knowledge itself it is far from simple to channel the dissemination of knowledge into solely peaceful directions.

How can we assure the equitable and peaceful use of the fruits of science and technology without intensifying the danger that the ensnaring attraction of highly dangerous and lethal weapons will eventually engulf all nations? The impact of high technology on research, development and production has often made even the so-called conventional weapons far from conventional.

Vastly improved relations between the major Powers and among the countries of the European region are very welcome but are obviously not enough to assure global peace. Bilateral and regional progress has therefore to be reinforced by multilateral efforts. Disarmament in the fields of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction has to be accompanied by greater constraints on conventional weapons everywhere. From this perspective, it is not without good reason that the General Assembly and the United Nations Disarmament Commission have been placing increasing emphasis on regional disarmament and regional confidence-building measures.

(Mr. Akashi)

In its anticipatory wisdom, the General Assembly has in the last few years established three regional disarmament centres in, respectively, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia and the Pacific. The Department for Disarmament Affairs will continue to make the best use of these centres that resources allow by intensifying dialogue and discussions organized by the centres, which have been deemed valuable by Governments and others. I hope that the General Assembly will be able to review these regional and subregional activities and to strengthen them as appropriate.

Global disarmament has now moved away from the traditional realm of deliberations or negotiations confined largely to the consideration and adoption of resolutions, declarations, conventions or treaties. While these are extremely important endeavours, efforts are now being directed also to enlarging areas of understanding and agreement among Governments on specific issues, such as improved security at lower levels of arms and armed forces, confidence-building measures, transparency of information, data collection, verification and the safe and economical destruction of weapons.

(Mr. Akashi)

Subjects such as the conversion of military industry into civilian industries, the technology of weapons destruction and the development of appropriate means of verifying compliance with agreements reached have in the last few years become focal points of intensive work. Positive results in these practical matters will aid in the acceleration of negotiation and agreement.

The enormous work carried out in Iraq by the Special Commission established by the Security Council in order to implement resolution 687 (1991), Part C, should not be overlooked. Conducted in the context of enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter, the activities of the Special Commission are a unique response to unique circumstances. Even so, they are evidence of a vigorous United Nations in action and they provide a most valuable experience in on-site inspection and destruction of weapons.

(spoke in French)

Our world is unmistakably moving towards greater openness and transparency, providing an excellent opportunity for lowering mutual suspicion and attaining a more accurate perception of each other. Thus, conditions are being created for concrete measures of arms reduction rather than indulging in incantations of pious phrases, as was so often the case in the cold-war period.

The Third Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention, held in Geneva last month, reflected the common interest of the States parties to the Convention to improve confidence-building measures and exchange of relevant information. The agreement reached at the Review Conference was most gratifying, while one regrets that on some other matters consensus eluded the membership.

(Mr. Akashi)

Having consulted a number of Member States and members of the Conference on Disarmament, the Department for Disarmament Affairs is now proceeding to respond to an ever-increasing need to modernize its disarmament database, with the help of the Electronic Services Division. In January we shall be commencing work to design and install a better and more responsive database, relying at the outset largely on voluntary resources. I am gratified to see widespread interest in this project, which should provide widely accessible, up-to-date information on disarmament matters, not just to Secretariat units, but to all interested Governments, non-governmental and academic institutions and specialists. However, it has to be borne in mind that as the database expands, its resource implications will also increase .

In a related but separate area, the dissemination of accurate and balanced information on disarmament to the public continues to be our concern, and the Department is engaged in a constant effort to improve the quality of such information and the effectiveness of its dissemination and impact.

The World Disarmament Campaign, launched in 1982, provides an excellent means of strengthening our information activities. One special project is the making of a major documentary film on chemical weapons with a view to sensitizing the public to the prospective chemical-weapons convention that is, hopefully, now close to completion. I note with pleasure the support of eight Governments for this project, as well as from Nippon Hoshō Kyōkai (NHK) Creative, which has committed itself to combining its resources with others to produce such a documentary for international use.

We also attach great importance to inculcating in the minds of the younger generation methods of resolving international disputes peacefully, of making better use of United Nations institutions and of better understanding

(Mr. Akashi)

arms control and disarmament. The Department has assembled an able group of educators and administrators from 12 countries to advise it on ways and means of devising instructional methods at college and university levels.

I have spoken in this Committee in the past on the priority I attach to stimulating informal discussions on disarmament and security issues through seminars, symposia and conferences under the Department's auspices, in which participating officials mix with parliamentarians, non-governmental representatives, academics, researchers and others, in their personal capacity, for a frank and free exchange of information and ideas. If topics and speakers are carefully chosen and the discussions are structured in such a way as not to force conclusions but to produce a synthesis of diverse viewpoints, I believe that these meetings can be very useful.

(spoke in English)

The General Assembly has also benefited from a somewhat more formalized format of groups of governmental experts financed from the regular budget. Two of these groups have completed their studies this year. One, under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Maj Britt Theorin of Sweden, has delved into the potential use of resources allocated to military activities for civilian endeavours to protect the environment (A/46/364). The other group, chaired first by Ambassador Eugenio Plaja of Italy and later by Mr. Ian S. McDonald of the United Kingdom, has made useful recommendations on transparency in conventional-arms transfers (A/46/301), a subject of much topical interest and a matter to which the Secretary-General has repeatedly called attention.

Still another expert group, under Ambassador Boris Krasulin of the Soviet Union, is engaged in exploring defensive military concepts and doctrines - a subject on which the Department for Disarmament Affairs also intends to

(Mr. Akashi)

organize an informal seminar in New York next January, in order to hear a broader circle of scholars and specialists. Still another expert group, chaired by Ambassador Roberto Garcia Moritan of Argentina, has been exploring measures of confidence-building in outer space. In addition, under General Assembly resolution 45/56 A, the Department has worked with the Organization of African Unity to obtain an expert view on the modalities and elements for the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Africa.

Stimulating discussions have taken place at regional workshops on disarmament, held in Bandung for Asian and Pacific States and in Mexico City for the Latin American and Caribbean countries, with the full support of the Indonesian and Mexican Governments respectively.

In addition, the Department organized a useful seminar on confidence-building measures in South-East Asia and North-East Asia at its regional centre in Kathmandu. A seminar on a similar subject was successfully held among 10 Central African States in Yaounde, Cameroon. A pertinent communication from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cameroon can be found in document A/46/307.

(Mr. Akashi)

Furthermore, in February the Department organized in Vienna an interregional seminar on confidence- and security-building measures with the unstinting support of the Austrian Government. It was a first attempt at a dialogue between Europeans, who have been working for many years on matters related to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and Africans, Latin Americans and Asians, who are anxious to learn about the Europeans' experience with a view to developing their own confidence-building measures. We also convened a major conference in Kyoto, Japan in May on the subject of "A post-cold war and post-Gulf War international system and challenges to multilateral disarmament". Discussions were conducted on three subjects - namely, "Global security and disarmament in reference to regional approaches", "Proliferation of weapons systems and disarmament issues", and "Problems arising from the implementation of disarmament measures". The meeting brought together scholars, politicians and non-governmental organizations, together with Ambassadors from New York and from the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. I take this opportunity to thank all the Governments concerned for hosting these highly useful meetings and for their generous support.

Resources permitting, we have every intention of deepening these dialogues, thereby widening the circle of discussion and delving into new or under-explored subjects. These events often function as a kind of intellectual trail-blazer, preparing the ground on which a more official consideration can fruitfully take place at a later stage. Questions such as disarmament and development and the implications of science and technology for security are among the subjects which may be looked at with the fresh minds of students representing different disciplines. We have to open ourselves to new issues while at the same time reviewing and revisiting old issues, such as

(Mr. Akashi)

nuclear non-proliferation and restraints on nuclear testing, leading to a comprehensive test ban.

The Department for Disarmament Affairs is well known for its meagre budget and a small but highly motivated staff. It has endeavoured to make up for its limitation of resources by focusing on highest priority areas and appealing for voluntary contributions, as appropriate. We have been rather fortunate in finding the necessary means to undertake urgent activities. I feel particularly gratified to find strong political support from Member Governments in our endeavours.

I regret to state to the Committee, however, that there is a serious constraint on our resources. The Department is able and willing to undertake more tasks, but Member States must understand that there is no capacity for further absorption. New tasks will therefore require additional resources, unless our mandates are revised to reduce the existing workload.

The work of the Department has been expanding rapidly. I see that more meetings can usefully take place on interregional, regional and subregional arrangements concerning confidence-building measures on the basis of the wishes expressed by the States concerned, and provided the necessary resources are identified. I am sure that the First Committee will act in a responsible and prudent manner, as it has in the past, in relation to the agenda items which may impinge on the implementation of tasks by the Secretariat.

In closing, may I express my confidence that this first post-Gulf War session of the First Committee will engage in a thorough assessment of where we stand in arms-limitation and disarmament issues, and produce some concrete and forward-looking decisions and agreements. The Committee's deliberations will be facilitated by the prevailing spirit of cooperation, pragmatism and

(Mr. Akashi)

willingness to expand on the positive steps recently taken on the multilateral, as well as bilateral, scenes. The Department for Disarmament Affairs and its staff stand ready to assist the Committee, as appropriate.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Horacio Arteaga, who, in his capacity as current President of the Conference on Disarmament, will introduce the report of the Conference.

Mr ARTEAGA (Venezuela), President of the Conference on Disarmament (interpretation from Spanish): I should first like to offer you, Sir, my warmest congratulations on your election as Chairman of this Committee, which has the sensitive responsibility of dealing exclusively with disarmament and related international security questions. I am convinced that, thanks to your competence, tact and diplomacy, we shall be able to conclude our work successfully. I also extend my sincerest congratulations to the other officers of the Committee.

I am speaking today in my capacity as President of the Conference on Disarmament in order to present to the General Assembly the report of the Conference on its work in 1991. This presentation, which is made each year, is particularly significant on this occasion because of the decisive turn that has been taken by the negotiations on the complete prohibition of all chemical weapons. This question, which is among those that have the highest priority on the Conference's agenda, is entering its final stage after many years of difficult and sometimes fruitless negotiations.

Much of the report of the Conference, which has been distributed as supplement 27 of the Official Records of the General Assembly under the symbol A/46/27, contains detailed information on the present state of the Geneva negotiations on chemical weapons. I am sure that the presentation of this

(Mr. Arteaga, President,
Conference on Disarmament)

report will be very useful for those Member States that are still not participating in those negotiations.

I should like to stress the latter point since, as may be inferred from what I have just said, the content of the section of the report on chemical weapons is substantially different from the content of previous reports, in that for the first time it submits for consideration by the General Assembly, in appendix I to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee responsible for the negotiations, the full text - and I emphasize the words "the full text" - of the preliminary structure of the multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

As a result of the initiative announced on 13 May last by the President of the United States of America, which was widely welcomed by the members of the Conference, the negotiations on this question were stepped up considerably - indeed, work went on continuously from that time until the 1991 annual session concluded and a decision was taken to continue work on the convention until the beginning of the 1992 session. The Conference has also set itself the goal of reaching a definitive agreement next year.

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Conference on Disarmament)

If the progress achieved in 1991 is taken into account, it will be seen that that goal can be achieved without serious difficulties. Without prejudice to the fuller information that can be given by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, who is also participating in the deliberations of the First Committee, I shall take the liberty of indicating the questions on which substantial progress has been achieved during 1991.

First, there is now a consensus on the scope of prohibition. In accordance with article I, the parties undertake never under any circumstances to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone or to use them. Similarly, agreement has been reached on the destruction of the chemical weapons possessed by the States parties or under their jurisdiction or control. It has further been possible to incorporate in the preliminary structure of the convention texts on assistance and protection against chemical weapons, economic and technological development, and measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions.

Secondly, other provisions which had already been the subject of negotiations but on which agreement was far off have now been agreed or are very close to being agreed. This is the case with the relation to other international agreements, in particular the Geneva Protocol of 1925, on which a provision has been completed; and with relation to the settlement of disputes, in regard to which little remains to be done in order to consolidate a generally acceptable text.

Lastly, progress has also been made on subjects such as amendments to the convention, the organization to be established by the convention, and the

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Conference on Disarmament)

question of jurisdiction and control. The Conference is continuing work on aspects of the verification system which are still outstanding, in particular the monitoring of the civilian chemical industry and challenge inspection.

These observations indicate that almost certainly - and this is indeed our hope - this will be the last time the Conference on Disarmament will submit to the General Assembly a progress report on the prohibition of chemical weapons. I am confident that the next report will contain the complete text of the convention, in order that it may receive the support of our Organization, the most representative organization of the international community. In this respect, I should like to remind members that the need to ensure the universality of the convention is a constant concern in the Geneva negotiations, on the part of both the States members of the Conference and States which are not members but are participating in the work on chemical weapons. In addition to the 39 members, during 1991 the unprecedented number of 37 non-member States joined in our negotiations. The total of 76 countries participating in one capacity or another gives a clear idea of the importance assumed by the universality of the convention. In referring to this aspect, which is closely connected with the success of the convention, I wish to point out that the rules of procedure of the Conference contain specific provisions to facilitate the participation of non-member States in its work. I am convinced that the members of the Conference will receive with pleasure any indication of interest on the part of those States in joining our work on chemical weapons, especially at times such as the present, when we are entering the final stage of the negotiation of the convention.

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Conference on Disarmament)

It is also worth while pointing out on this occasion that on 20 June 1991 the then President of the Conference and the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons sent to all Ministers for Foreign Affairs a joint communication which had been unanimously approved by the Conference. In that communication they expressed the hope that Governments would actively follow the progress of our negotiations with the aim of acceding to the convention without delay once it had been concluded.

The convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons will mean the complete elimination of a whole category of weapons of mass destruction which have caused great losses of human life since they were first used in combat. Notwithstanding the valuable contribution of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 in prohibiting the use of these weapons, it is quite clear that the only solution that will guarantee their eradication is the complete prohibition embodied in the convention being negotiated in Geneva. The importance of this agreement and its contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security require that we should, immediately, unite our efforts to secure the accession of the States Members of our Organization.

For the reasons I have explained, I have considered it appropriate to emphasize in this statement the importance that has been assumed by our negotiations on chemical weapons. I shall now refer to other aspects of the report of the Conference to the General Assembly.

Chapter II of the report of the Conference refers to the organization of its work. The agenda and programme of work for the session were adopted without delay. During the time allotted for organizational decisions, five subsidiary bodies on various items of the agenda were re-established and their

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chairmen designated. Invitations were sent to all non-member States which had expressed interest in participating in the work of the Conference. Chapter II of the report also contains a description of our work on questions relating to the expansion of the membership of the Conference and its improved and effective functioning.

Chapter III deals with the substantive work of the Conference during the 1991 session: in other words, the consideration of the substantive items that make up its agenda. I have already commented on the considerable progress achieved in the field of chemical weapons and the undoubted prospects of success in our negotiations. I shall now move on to the other substantive items which the Conference considered this year. In this respect, it is worth emphasizing that the Conference managed to reach agreement on the procedure for appropriately taking up almost all the items on its agenda and programme of work.

Agenda item 1, entitled "Nuclear-test ban", was considered by an Ad Hoc Committee, which met throughout the session. Although that Committee had begun its work during the latter part of the 1990 session, it was in the course of the current year that it was able to carry out a more detailed substantive analysis of the various aspects of the item. Its work has been extremely useful in developing a number of questions that require further consideration. For this reason, the report contains a recommendation that the Ad Hoc Committee should be re-established at the beginning of the 1992 session.

(Mr. Arteaga, President,
Conference on Disarmament)

Agenda items 2 and 3, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament" and "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters", were considered at a series of informal meetings on the substantive questions arising from both items. The Conference held 15 meetings to consider various aspects of these questions, and was also informed by the heads of delegation of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the bilateral talks on strategic nuclear weapons about relevant developments and the conclusion of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). It is interesting to note on this occasion that several of the measures recently announced by the Presidents of the United States and the Soviet Union concerning nuclear disarmament - measures to which there have been positive reactions within the international community - were mentioned during the informal meetings of the Conference as steps that might contribute significantly to the process of disarmament and international détente.

Item 5, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", was considered by an Ad Hoc Committee, in which it was apparent that work is now being concentrated on various substantive aspects and the deliberations are moving towards a more orderly and systematic dialogue. As a result of the contribution of experts to the work on this item, it was possible to gain a clearer idea of the various points of view. In this case, too, the report contains a recommendation that the Ad Hoc Committee should be re-established at the beginning of next year.

In the case of item 6, relating to "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", as indicated in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, specific difficulties remain, concerning different perceptions of the security

(Mr. Arteaga, President,
Conference on Disarmament)

interests of States. This Committee has nevertheless recommended that the search for means of overcoming these difficulties should be continued and, with that aim in mind, it is recommended that the Committee should be re-established at the beginning of 1992.

The Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, item 7 of our agenda, has also made a recommendation that it should be re-established at the commencement of next year's session. This Committee continued work on the two aspects which it is considering: the prohibition of radiological weapons in the "traditional" sense and issues relevant to the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities. Although the work done was useful, this item clearly requires further efforts if progress is to be made in its consideration.

As to item 8, entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament", it was not possible to agree on a generally acceptable organizational arrangement for its continued consideration. This question will be taken up again at the beginning of 1992.

Lastly, I should like to emphasize the positive atmosphere which surrounded the work of the Conference during 1991, albeit in times of international tension. Now that the ideological confrontations of the so-called cold war have been overcome, and in the light of the arms limitation agreements concluded recently, the Conference has worked hard this year and is able to present a balance sheet for that work which is reflected in the report I am introducing today, in particular as regards chemical weapons. In inviting the members of the First Committee to consider the report, I consider it necessary to emphasize once again that we are close to reaching agreement on those weapons whose significance is by any reckoning obvious. This

(Mr. Arteaga, President,
Conference on Disarmament)

agreement, together with other measures that may arise in the framework of the new international dynamism that is becoming apparent in the field of disarmament, will constitute a valuable contribution by the Conference to the strengthening of international peace and cooperation.

Mr. LEHMAN (United States of America): Allow me to congratulate you, Sir, on your selection to the chairmanship of the First Committee. We know that your task is not an easy one. We have a full agenda before us, but the United States has full confidence that your skill and dedication will lead us through a productive and successful session. I want to assure you that the United States delegation will lend its full support to your endeavours.

This morning Under-Secretary-General Akashi has given us an incisive presentation recording recent historic achievements and also highlighting the challenges and opportunities now before us. In that regard I listened with great interest to the report on the activities of the Conference on Disarmament Ambassador Arteaga has just introduced to the First Committee. I was struck by, and wish strongly to reinforce, his message that the negotiation on the chemical weapons convention has come a long way and that we hope to conclude negotiations in 1992. For this reason I would encourage as many countries as possible to become acquainted with these negotiations and to offer their ideas to the negotiators in Geneva. More importantly, we urge that all nations be prepared to become original parties to the convention when it is opened for signature and ratification. There should be no higher priority than the completion of this convention and its coming into force as soon as possible with the widest possible number of adherents. Only in this way can all of us end the proliferation of chemical weapons throughout the

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

world, eliminate chemical weapons themselves both universally and equally, and rid ourselves once and for all of this horrible weapon.

It is an honour for me once again to address this body and to share with members the views of my Government on the important issues facing this Committee. As the United Nations forum for discussions on issues of international security and arms control, the First Committee is an important component of the global effort to establish lasting peace and stability. We are here to take stock of how well this work is progressing and to see how together we may further advance the frontiers of peace.

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

In this regard, allow me to welcome the newest Members of the United Nations. During these pivotal times, fresh ideas are very important as we chart the future course of arms control and disarmament. On behalf of the United States Government, I offer all new Members a sincere welcome.

Against the backdrop of the radically changing world scene, many have asked if there is a continued role for arms control and disarmament. Indeed, early in August, with the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) signed and relations between the United States and the Soviet Union moving beyond cold-war confrontation, there were predictions that arms control had fulfilled its destiny, and that the arms control process had come to an end. Those predictions could not have been more wrong. The failed coup in Moscow and the resulting dramatic changes in the Soviet Union, the events in Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf War, and the continuing violence in other parts of the world all remind us that arms control must remain a critical component of foreign policy and international security.

Yet, as we scan the arms control landscape, we must recognize that we stand at a crossroad, at a juncture where the old meets the new. Traditional features of the arms control landscape remain; but new elements have been added. Increasingly, our most urgent arms control tasks centre less on the traditional questions of the East-West military balance and more on problems of instability and violence that have little or no ideological character, that erupt in unexpected places and in unanticipated ways, and that threaten the peace and well-being of each and every one of us. These problems are a threat made more severe by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. They are a danger that threatens to shatter the fragile movement around the globe towards democracy and freedom that has been the hallmark of the end of the cold-war era.

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

Standing at this crossroad provides us with a particularly good vantage point to view the arms control landscape. Please allow me to provide a summary assessment of the United States view of where we are and where we must go in arms control in the future.

In scanning the current landscape and in looking across the future horizon, we must appreciate that past choices have determined where we are today, just as our choices at this current juncture will determine our path to the future.

During the tensions of the cold-war era the foundation was laid for the current agenda. During those days of uncertainty, the United States provided protection to its allies and championed the cause of freedom around the world. The United States, with its allies, insisted that the key to global stability rested on maintaining a vigilant defence combined with a willingness to engage potential adversaries in a process, if not of resolving our differences, then of negotiating a stable framework to manage them. Arms control was a critical component of that framework. But the United States also demanded that negotiations be based on sound concepts and principles that would produce meaningful agreements, not rhetorical gestures that did nothing to bolster stability. Those concepts and principles - effective verification, equitable outcomes and strict adherence to treaty provisions - remain critical to the important arms control efforts that lie ahead.

While the days of the cold war era were often dark indeed, they were not without their successes. Before the end of the cold war, the United States became party to more than a dozen major arms control agreements that strengthened both United States and international security.

These developments served as an important contribution to the positive changes we have witnessed in recent years and provided an important foundation

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

for the architecture of the new world order. The United States is proud of its arms control record and believes its efforts were decisive in moving the world back from the possibility of nuclear confrontation and into the present era, where prospects for peace appear so promising.

It is said, however, that the past is mere prologue to the future. Our job is not done, and I would like to consider our current arms control problems and summarize our efforts to address them.

As we look at the traditional features of the arms control landscape, one immediate priority of the United States will be to assure that the stabilizing achievements of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty are not lost. That Treaty is designed to produce substantial stabilizing reductions in the strategic offensive weapons of the United States and the Soviet Union. The Treaty contains equal ceilings, and focuses on constraining the most destabilizing weapons, that is, ballistic missiles. One of its key contributions to stability is its counting rules. These rules involve stricter limits in terms of warheads on ballistic missiles, which are fast-flying and, unlike slower bombers that can be recalled, are well-suited for a disarming first strike. The Treaty also constrains ballistic missiles through numerical limits, especially a 50 per cent reduction in Soviet heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) - the most destabilizing strategic nuclear weapons; a ban on increasing the number of warheads per missile; an aggregate throw-weight ceiling; and a limit on throw-weight increases.

The START Treaty also reflects the revolution that has taken place in recent years regarding verification of arms control agreements. The verification measures of the Treaty, which include extensive exchanges of data, cooperative measures and on-site inspection, including perimeter portal monitoring and intrusive on-site inspection, are important additions to

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

monitoring by national technical means of verification. These measures are now accepted principles of international arms reductions. Under START, they have been expanded. Indeed, START broke new ground even during its negotiation. As an experiment to help design re-entry-vehicle on-site inspection procedures, inspectors from each side were allowed to examine front sections of the re-entry vehicle of the other side's most important intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Treaty provides for a number of such inspections to ensure that deployed missiles are not being equipped with a greater number of warheads than are permitted. Another feature is nuclear risk reduction centre notifications. Under the START Treaty they are expected to increase 20-fold from those required under the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty).

The United States has every intention of ratifying the START Treaty and trusts that the Soviet Union will do the same. We believe it is in the interest of both parties to lock in the major reduction and verification commitments of START. Despite its domestic transition, the Soviet Union has made assurances that it intends to live up to its arms control obligations. Implementation of START will increase the transparency of the military and the military-industrial complex in the Soviet Union and, in addition, complement economic objectives in defence conversion - key goals of Soviet reformers. The START Treaty also provides a solid basis for follow-on efforts.

On 27 September, President Bush announced his dramatic initiative affecting the entire spectrum of United States nuclear weapons. He decided to take this initiative to reduce the size and nature of United States nuclear deployments world-wide, enhance stability, and take advantage of recent major changes in the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

The President's initiative includes the following steps:

Withdrawal and destruction of all nuclear artillery shells and all nuclear warheads for short-range ballistic missiles;

Withdrawal of all tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear cruise missiles from surface ships and attack submarines, as well as those nuclear weapons associated with our land-based naval aircraft. This means the removal of all nuclear cruise missiles from United States ships and submarines, as well as nuclear bombs aboard aircraft carriers;

Removal of all strategic bombers from day-to-day alert status and their weapons placed in storage;

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

The immediate stand-down from alert of all intercontinental ballistic missiles scheduled for deactivation under START and their accelerated elimination once START is ratified;

Termination of the Peacekeeper ICBM Rail Garrison System and the mobile portion of the small ICBM;

Cancellation of the short-range attack missile; and

Creation of a new United States Strategic Command, designed to improve command and control of all United States strategic nuclear forces.

The President urged the Soviet Union to take comparable steps. In addition, he proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union seek early agreements to eliminate all land-based ICBMs with multiple warheads, systems that are clearly the most destabilizing. The President also called on the Soviet Union to join in taking concrete steps to permit the limited deployment of non-nuclear defences to protect against limited ballistic missile strikes, whatever their source.

The United States was gratified by the rapid and positive response to these proposals by the Soviet leadership. While not all of President Gorbachev's decisions and ideas match our own, there is a great deal of common ground as both the United States and the USSR have decided to take steps significantly to reduce further the number and kinds of nuclear weapons in both arsenals. We have already had discussions in Moscow on these decisions and proposals and we are hopeful that the process will continue in an expeditious manner. The outcome of the President's initiatives should be no less dramatic than the changes in the world to which it responds.

The world can now see clearly that the two major nuclear Powers have begun to step down the thermonuclear ladder after some 40 years. This is truly an historic turning-point.

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

The second major feature of the current arms control landscape is the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). The CFE Treaty is a landmark in the history of efforts by the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to build a more secure and stable Europe.

The CFE Treaty establishes a balance of conventional forces in Europe at lower levels and eliminates the capability for surprise attacks or large-scale conventional offensive actions in the European theatre. The Treaty will dramatically reduce the burden of armaments in Europe and thus will help eliminate a major source of instability in Europe. It contains far-reaching verification provisions, institutionalizing transparency and openness. In short, the CFE Treaty will provide a foundation of stability and predictability during a period of uncertainty and transition in Europe and, as a result, will provide a firm basis for future cooperation.

East-West arms control has been an important United States objective because of the need to address the threat that tensions might erupt that could involve nations with nuclear arsenals or conventional forces in Europe. The risk of war in Europe may have been low, but the consequences of war would have been catastrophic. The United States, however, is increasingly concerned about threats, instabilities and dangerous capabilities in other parts of the world where the risk of war is higher and the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is growing. Among these troubled regions are the Middle East, the Korean peninsula and the south Asian subcontinent.

Stabilizing measures resulting from the CFE Treaty and the various confidence- and security-building measures negotiated in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) may not necessarily be transferrable to other regions. They can, however, serve as a source of inspiration and experience

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

for appropriate arrangements beyond Europe. We are redoubling our efforts to encourage the pursuit of such an approach towards relieving regional tensions.

In addition, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery is at the top of the arms control agenda. Recent discoveries by the United Nations teams inspecting Iraq's nuclear, chemical, biological and ballistic missile facilities can leave no one complacent about the challenge posed by the need to stem proliferation of these dangerous and destabilizing weapons.

United States efforts to curb proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have a long history, beginning with the Baruch Plan of 1946. Those efforts include the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), the biological weapons Convention, the establishment of the missile technology control regime and the Australia Group, and the current negotiations in Geneva on a global ban on chemical weapons.

Today the United States is pursuing a multi-tiered non-proliferation strategy: first, strengthening existing non-proliferation regimes by expanding adherence to and membership in multilateral non-proliferation regimes; and, secondly, undertaking new initiatives, such as conventional weapons restraint and information sharing, using appropriate arms control approaches to establish regimes that reduce incentives to acquire weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

The United States has long placed special emphasis on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. We are committed to strengthening implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and gaining its indefinite extension at the 1995 NPT Conference, preparations for which should begin in 1993. We are especially encouraged by the accession to the NPT of four African States this year, namely, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

and Zimbabwe, and the recently announced intention of France and China, both nuclear Powers, to become parties to the Treaty. We are also happy to announce that Lithuania acceded to the NPT on 23 September. We look forward to full participation in the nuclear non-proliferation regime by new parties and to the early adherence of those intending to join. We are also committed to strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency and its vital safeguards system.

Our efforts to prevent the proliferation of destabilizing missiles centre on the missile technology control regime (MTCR). Cooperation among the 17 member States of the MTCR has been instrumental in slowing or derailing a number of missile projects of concern in unstable regions. Key priorities of the MTCR will continue to be those of convincing non-member suppliers to avoid technology exports that undercut the regime's non-proliferation controls, and expanding its membership.

A top priority of United States foreign policy continues to be a global ban on chemical weapons, which I believe is the best way to control such weapons. As a priority matter, the United States urges all nations to join in facilitating expeditiously the completion of negotiations on the global ban on chemical weapons as well as in observing the biological and toxic weapons Convention. However, proliferation of chemical weapons and use of such weapons represent immediate security threats and make more difficult the achievement of a global ban. Therefore, while we continue to make every effort to continue negotiations on a ban, we also continue to pursue unilateral and cooperative action to support these chemical weapons negotiations and to inhibit the proliferation and use of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

Under our enhanced proliferation control initiative, export licences are now required on chemical plants and their designs, equipment related to chemical and biological weapons, and for 50 chemical-weapon precursors. We have also tightened controls and accountability over equipment and technology transfers where an exporter knows or is informed by the United States Government that an export may be destined for use in missile, chemical or biological weapons design, development or production. Moreover, United States law provides for criminal sanctions against United States citizens who knowingly assist foreign chemical or biological weapons or missile programmes.

Multilaterally, the United States participates actively in international efforts to curb chemical weapons proliferation. The United States informally consults with 20 Western nations on ways and means to address the proliferation and use of chemical weapons. This informal group, presided over by Australia, was formed in 1984 in response to the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war. Recently, members of the group agreed to expand their national controls to cover also equipment usable in chemical weapons manufacture.

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

As I mentioned earlier, we remain committed to the early conclusion of a chemical-weapons convention as the best means to address chemical-weapons proliferation. This commitment was reaffirmed by President Bush's announcement in May of this year of further steps to accelerate the Geneva negotiations. In particular, the President announced that the United States would formally forswear the use of chemical weapons for any reason, including retaliation in kind with chemical weapons against any State, effective when the chemical-weapons convention enters into force. Further, the United States committed itself to destroying all its stocks of chemical weapons within 10 years of the convention's entry into force.

In addition, we have made clear our willingness to share technology to bring about the safe destruction of the world's chemical arsenals. Together with several other States, the United States presented in Geneva this summer a practical proposal for challenge inspection, a key element of the chemical-weapons convention verification regime. We are committed to doing everything in our power to complete the convention. We call upon the Conference on Disarmament to complete the chemical-weapons convention by the end of May 1992, and we urge all other States to become original parties.

The Third Review Conference of the biological and toxin weapons Convention was recently completed in Geneva. From my Government's viewpoint the Conference was a success. The package of confidence-building measures adopted by the Review Conference will significantly increase transparency, openness and, hence, confidence in the Convention. We call on all parties to participate in implementation of these confidence-building measures. Among the other significant agreements was that on an enhanced set of procedures for consultation and cooperation designed to discourage violations. In addition,

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

the Conference decided that an ad hoc group of experts should examine the scientific and technical aspects of potential verification measures, among others agreed. Participants also strongly reasserted the importance of compliance with all the Convention's obligations. All these measures reflect the international community's realization that biological weapons are not a theoretical but a very real threat, and the community's commitment to do something about it.

The world community's experience with Iraq over the past year highlights the danger of proliferation and underlines the challenge we all confront in preventing it. Security Council resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) provide the most far-reaching arms-elimination and verification regime ever developed. They stipulate not only an arms embargo on Iraq but also an intensive inspection regime to be carried out by the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the elimination of chemical and biological weapons, certain missiles and Iraq's now-revealed nuclear-weapons programme. In addition, they put in place a long-term monitoring programme to prevent Iraq from rebuilding its conventional weapons.* The world is depending on the demonstrated resolve of the United Nations effectively to prevent a stubborn outlaw regime from threatening others with weapons of mass destruction. We must be clear, however, that what is now occurring in Iraq is the consequence of failed aggression; it is not voluntary arms control.

On the other hand, the arms-control agenda I outlined earlier encompasses challenges and new possibilities in the entire Middle East region. To be

* See A/C.1/46/PV.17, page 41.

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

effective, arms-control agreements will have to address military risks in a war-torn region where even the first small steps will be difficult and complex. An important initial goal will be basic confidence-building measures. Just as such arms-control measures were able to contribute to the easing of East-West tensions, they may offer assistance to the Middle East peace process. Arms control cannot substitute for a full peace process, of course, but it does provide opportunities for dialogue and a step-by-step means of testing intentions. Nations far outside the region also have a useful role to play.

With that in mind, President Bush put forward in May an initiative for arms control in the region. Under the President's initiative, the five States which provide perhaps 85 per cent of the conventional arms that enter the Middle East are seeking to develop guidelines for arms shipment to the area. Ultimately, we envisage a broad regime emphasizing responsibility in transfers and effective export controls. To deal with the nuclear danger in the region, the President has suggested that the States of the Middle East as a first step implement a verifiable ban on the production of weapons-usable enriched uranium or separated plutonium. As part of this process, acquisition of the means to produce weapons-grade materials also would be banned. All nuclear facilities in the area would be placed under the safeguards of the IAEA. Finally, President Bush has proposed a freeze on the procurement, production and testing of surface-to-surface missiles by Middle Eastern States. Ultimately the United States would like to see these missiles and all weapons of mass destruction eliminated from the region entirely.

The United Nations is in an excellent position to assist in realising these goals. Its influence has never been greater, and realization of its promise never more evident.

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

The United Nations can play a vital part in promoting an increasingly dynamic role for arms control in preventing and limiting conflict. Education is a large part of the work before us. With its world-wide membership and renewed vitality, the United Nations is well placed to convince troubled nations of the necessity of preventing weapons imbalances and modulating excesses before they create real instability. Just as the United Nations has virtually rid the world of smallpox, so should it help eliminate the scourge of chemical and biological weapons and the threat of irresponsible arms build-ups.

As my agency, the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, celebrates its thirtieth anniversary, the United States looks back at the role that arms control and disarmament have played in the evolution of United States national-security policy and in our efforts to strengthen international security. For whatever success we have had, however, the credit must be shared with other countries. Like the United States, many of these countries, through governmental leadership and the public debates of their citizens, have made arms control a central feature of national strategy and national goals. Our commitment to the success of these efforts is intimately tied to our belief that democracy, peace and stability go hand in hand.

As we witness the crumbling of old antagonisms between East and West, we see them replaced by hostilities, some new, some deeply rooted, in some regions of the world. At the same time that unprecedented opportunities for building peace in Europe appear on the horizon we see regional and ethnic strife casting its dark shadow.

What is disquieting about this turn of events is that some of the strongest proponents of arms control - so long as it is restricted to the major Powers - are often the most reluctant to engage in meaningful

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

arms-control efforts in their own regions. These champions of the reduction of weapons of others practice a double standard: they consistently fail to see any value in reducing their own weapons.

The arms-control agenda of the future is already being written. It promises to be different from that of the past. It is increasingly clear that those who have been most deeply involved in the arms-control agenda pursued thus far cannot carry the new agenda all alone. As far as the United States is concerned, we shall continue to be involved in the pursuit of arms control. But the responsibility is not entirely ours. The future agenda of arms control will require that States in other areas of the world, especially in areas where turmoil and strife threaten violence and chaos, be engaged, in deeds as well as in words.

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

The international community is beginning to understand that concepts of security, if they are to have real meaning, must be broader than the number of weapons in national arsenals. And they must include economic well-being and the general quality of life, human rights and freedoms.

The train is leaving the station. Its destination is greater freedom, stable democracy, economic prosperity, cooperative security and a just peace. More and more States are climbing aboard for this exhilarating ride that has so captured our imaginations. It is our fervent hope that no one will be left behind. We have made our choice; others must make theirs.

Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Australia): The Australian delegation congratulates you, Sir, on your election as our presiding officer, and assures you of our full cooperation in the discharge of your duties. We are also pleased to see our friend, Under-Secretary-General Akashi, with us again today.

Tremendous changes have taken place in the international environment since the General Assembly last met to consider security, arms control and disarmament issues. Those major developments are, first, the resolution demonstrated by the international community in rejecting and reversing the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, an effort that reached its culmination in the first half of 1991, and, secondly, the revolution inside the Soviet Union which took place after the failed coup attempt in August.

Those two major events will have ongoing consequences which will extend in time well beyond this year and in scope well beyond the areas appropriately considered by the First Committee.

While these consequences are still being worked through - indeed, it may be some years before we are able to appreciate the full historical significance of the events of 1991 - there are nevertheless already some identifiable implications in the areas that concern this Committee. Overall,

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

one lesson of the Gulf war is the inadmissibility of force as a mechanism for the resolution of inter-State disputes, and more particularly the affirmation of legal principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations as the proper basis for States' conduct. One lesson of the revolution in the Soviet Union is that States' authority has to flow from their citizens and that a proper legal framework has to rest on the consent of the governed. Thus the major events of the past year vividly illustrate the role for arms-control and disarmament agreements in regulating the peaceful and legal conduct among States.

These simple but powerful ideas are reshaping the world order that has existed for the previous four decades. In the arms control and disarmament areas some important consequences follow from these new developments. There are certainly opportunities to enhance openness and transparency and to devise arms-control agreements which have practical effect and which additionally function as confidence-building measures. All nations need now to participate in joint efforts to negotiate and to codify in legally binding instruments a set of new security arrangements. Opportunities exist in bilateral, regional and multilateral contexts. Some are already in the process of development; others await decisions by national Governments. I will touch on some of these of particular concern to Australia later in this statement.

Another consequence is an increased appreciation that the processes of arms control and disarmament are fully legitimate and necessary elements for defining and enhancing security. With the revolution in political choices and the reversal of armed aggression it is increasingly obvious that there is no longer the need, or indeed a basis, for characterizing the security environment of the international system in the same way and with the same

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

precautions as were necessary in years past. We applaud the recognition of this in the statement by President Bush on 27 September and the response by President Gorbachev on 5 October.

Nevertheless, there remains considerable scope for reducing further the force levels that were necessary to meet the challenges of those earlier times. Our task here in the First Committee must be to take advantage of the new environment to advance further our multilateral efforts in the area of control and disarmament. The announcements by the United States and Soviet Presidents affirm the utility of creative approaches in breaking log jams and give direction, impetus and leadership to the disarmament process.

In moving out of the ideological and intellectual categories of the cold war, we see that arms-control and disarmament agreements have an important part to play. In this new environment not only are there new and welcome ideas, such as restraints on conventional-arms transfers and the proposal to have a register of such arms flows to help facilitate the goal of avoiding destabilizing and excessive conventional-arms build-ups, but old ideas, such as sharp reductions in nuclear weapons, are now seen in a new light. This gives hope for substantial progress on further reductions in the numbers of nuclear warheads and other aspects of disarmament which offer greater stability at lower levels of weapons. The notable achievements of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) are welcome in themselves and as signposts towards a more stable and less threatening world.

In order to take advantage of these new opportunities the agenda for multilateral negotiations needs to be refurbished and the priority of elements on that agenda reconsidered. We should take opportunities as they arise to

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

solve arms-control challenges on their own terms and eschew artificial linkages that threaten immobility and risk lost opportunities. For example, we should take heart from the successful conclusion last month of the biological weapons Convention Review Conference. We should now use the opportunity of this General Assembly session to embody in a resolution acceptable to all the various aspects of that Convention which the Review Conference identified that could and should be strengthened.

We need to make a more determined and committed effort in the chemical-weapons negotiations. We need to capitalize quickly on the valuable progress that has been made in finalizing what is essentially an almost complete treaty text. I would like to take the occasion of a statement in the First Committee, where all Member States are represented, to urge all non-members of the Conference on Disarmament to take an active role in the Conference's Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. This year 37 States availed themselves of this opportunity, and we hope that more States will do so in 1992 as we conclude the Convention.

I would also like to underline again how critical it is to conclude the Treaty in the period immediately ahead. It is worth recalling in this connection that it is in the third world that chemical weapons have been used on each occasion after the initial use in the First World War, and it is in situations of regional tension in the third world where the temptation to use chemical weapons is the greatest. It follows that the enhancement of security by the removal of such a threat will be greatest in the third world, although, of course, the consequences of any chemical-weapons use would have security implications for all States. That is why Australia is working for a multilateral treaty as the effective long-term solution to the problems of chemical weapons.

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

Australia has some practical proposals to make about how the chemical-weapons Convention can be concluded next year.

First, a greater involvement by capital-based officials in the negotiations might help inject a firmer concentration on the security benefits that this treaty will provide.

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

Second, another improvement would be to have a less formalistic structure in the negotiations. In part, this has to do with the drain on resources that multiple working groups demand, especially for small delegations; in part, it has to do with a sense that real negotiating is awaiting the involvement of more senior officials than those participating in the working groups. In turn this sense produces an atmosphere of game playing rather than carefully weighed and nuanced negotiation. More generally, it could be argued that the current group structures are not flexible enough to reflect new realities and that these structures are in fact impeding progress in the negotiations.

Third, in particular it may be time, if the negotiations are to be concluded next year, for the Conference to select several key "Friends of the Chair", who should work on the principal remaining matters, such as verification, assistance and universality, and structural questions related to the chemical-weapons Convention organization. It is also the case that more private consultations via a system of "Friends of the Chair" would allow for compromises to emerge without having to be publicly viewed and without negotiators being seen as gaining or losing face.

Fourth, it should be accepted in principle that a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee at the ministerial level could be scheduled for early 1992. This would in itself impart a discipline and sense of urgency to the negotiations either to conclude the negotiations so that the Ministers could ratify the agreement at such a meeting or, if that were not possible, to clearly delineate options on the outstanding issues so that they could consider an overall package that might clinch the deal. The response to the letter on this issue from the Australian Foreign Minister to his colleagues in the Conference on Disarmament and his Asia-Pacific colleagues has been very encouraging.

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

Fifth, it is also time to encourage greater regional efforts to initiate a dialogue on the practical requirements that this Convention will impose. Such a dialogue is continuing in South-East Asia and the South Pacific regions subsequent to an initiative launched by the Australian Prime Minister in 1988, and has also been undertaken in Latin America under United Nations auspices. There are proposals for similar efforts in Africa. Obvious areas where this approach might be taken further are the Middle East, the subcontinent and East Asia. A regional dialogue could help prepare for the Convention and help assuage false fears about the security intentions of key regional States. The efforts of such non-governmental organizations as the Quakers, who have been active in seeking a common ground to conduct such a dialogue in the Middle East, are to be heartily encouraged.

Sixth, and finally, the time will shortly be upon us, if we are to adhere to the schedule outlined in the Committee's mandate, when it becomes important to have a meeting of the prospective or acting heads of national implementation authorities, a group which will have to be established under the chemical-weapons Convention. Such a meeting will play an important role in standardizing implementation requirements so that each State party could be confident that it would not be commercially penalized by the way it interpreted its obligations. It would also have an important function in educating those who had only recently turned their minds to the requirements laid down in the chemical-weapons Convention about how to implement their obligations thereunder. Australia has circulated in the Conference on Disarmament an extensive description of how we have approached the task of implementing the Convention through the operation of a national secretariat for that purpose. We would be happy to share that experience with all interested States.

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

The past year has demonstrated in stark terms the urgent need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the importance of an effective international non-proliferation regime. The nuclear non-proliferation Treaty has a position of irreducible importance for the international community and it is more necessary for global security now than ever before.

It has been a remarkable year for the non-proliferation Treaty. Australia has welcomed the decisions of France, China, South Africa, Zambia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe to accede to the Treaty. We also note with great satisfaction that Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and the Ukraine intend to become parties to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.

The changes in the Soviet Union raise the possibility that a number of new States might possess nuclear weapons. Accordingly, we urge any other States emerging from the Soviet Union to make an early public decision to forswear nuclear weapons and to give practical effect to that commitment by acceding to the non-proliferation Treaty.

We should not be complacent about the Treaty. Its strength comes from the commitment of its parties. For the first time the world has witnessed a State deliberately disregarding its obligations under the Treaty. Iraq has been condemned by the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for doing so. It is regrettable also that many States parties to the Treaty have still not concluded their obligatory safeguards agreements. Failure to conclude such agreements is a breach of the Treaty and affects the security of all. It is therefore not to be dismissed lightly. We are concerned in particular that one such State is operating unsafeguarded facilities and has by its own inaction on a safeguards agreement raised serious doubts about its nuclear intentions. The Democratic People's

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

Republic of Korea has been called on by the Board of Governors of IAEA to sign and bring about the entry into force and full implementation of its safeguards agreement at an early date. We urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to do so without further delay.

We welcome the important decisions taken by Argentina and Brazil to enter into bilateral and international non-proliferation commitments and hope that Israel, Pakistan and India, which operate significant unsafeguarded facilities, will follow their lead.

The Gulf war has also starkly illustrated the need to strengthen the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards as an essential part of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The recent IAEA General Conference has called for early action on this matter.

Australia wants to see early decisions from the IAEA Board of Governors, in particular on the provision of design information on nuclear facilities and the conduct of special inspections. We also support action to tighten nuclear export controls and nuclear supply policies. Australia has long urged the adoption of full-scope IAEA safeguards as the standard for new nuclear supply. We are pleased with the recent announcement by the United Kingdom and France that they have responded to the call by the Fourth Review Conference of the non-proliferation Treaty, on full-scope safeguards, and have adopted such a policy. We urge all remaining supplier countries, particularly the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China, as members of the Security Council, to follow suit.

The dramatically changed international environment resulting from the recent proposals and unilateral decisions by the United States and the Soviet Union are entirely welcomed and strongly supported in Australia. In this new environment we look forward to enhanced security and sharply reduced levels of

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

nuclear weapons. Similarly, we encourage all nuclear-weapon States to seize these new opportunities and drastically cut their nuclear arsenals. We hope the nuclear-weapon States will be prepared to re-examine their pledges with regard to first use of nuclear weapons.*

Stopping nuclear testing is a long-standing Australian disarmament objective. We urge all nuclear-weapon States to reconsider the political costs and technical aspects of their testing programmes. It is difficult to see a rationale for testing if there is no political purpose or military need for a new generation of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the Australian Foreign Minister, Senator Evans, publicly welcomed the announcement by President Gorbachev of a moratorium on Soviet nuclear testing for the next year as a good start, and called upon other nuclear-testing States to do likewise.

We are aware of arguments about how far the debate on structure and scope, verification and compliance can be taken in the Conference on Disarmament's Ad Hoc Committee on a nuclear-test ban under its current mandate. While we are ready to begin negotiations forthwith, we recognize the problems in realizing such an ambition. But we believe that, at least, this session of the General Assembly should be able to express its views on an end to nuclear testing in a single resolution. We are strongly convinced that there could hardly be a more propitious time for such a unified approach.

As I mentioned earlier, another example where this Committee could forge ahead with practical arms-control efforts would be in the area of conventional-arms transfers. We welcome, accordingly, the Secretary-General's

* Mr. Alpman (Turkey), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

study (A/46/301) on ways and means of promoting transparency in international transfers of conventional arms. Australia hopes that we shall agree this year on a resolution establishing a convention-arms-transfer register, whose objective would be to achieve a sufficient degree of transparency in order to assist in addressing the destabilizing effects of arms build-ups both global and regional - the latter most recently exemplified by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

Finally, as I said at the beginning, the dramatic developments of 1991 will have many ongoing effects. I have focused today on those areas of principal concern to the Australian Government - the inadmissibility of force as an instrument of political change and the value of arms control and disarmament agreements in codifying the new arrangements for enhanced security and improved stability. Those changes should be reflected in a more pragmatic approach to the work of the General Assembly with greater expectation that we should be able to reflect the rich texture of the views represented here and embody more fully and adequately our shared desire for a safer, more secure and more peaceful world.

Mr. DONOWAKI (Japan): My delegation wishes to join others in extending to Mr. Mroziewicz its sincere congratulations upon his election to the chairmanship of this important Committee. My delegation is convinced that, under his able guidance and skill, the Committee will be able to fulfil its tasks successfully. My delegation also wishes to congratulate the other members of the Bureau on their appointments.

At this historic time in the wake of the East-West cold war and of the Gulf war, the world is moving from confrontation to cooperation, opening up tremendous possibilities for progress. At the same time, however, it must be recognized that the world is beset by the uncertainty and instability common to any time of transition. It is essential hereafter that we fully understand the characteristic features of this time of transition and respond unerringly. For instance, various epoch-making achievements made in the arms control and disarmament field as a result of the dismantling of the East-West and the United States-Soviet rivalry will have to be made irreversible and pushed forward further. On the other hand, the international community coalesced magnificently around the United Nations in response to the crisis in the

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

Gulf. It is hoped that the United Nations will play a central role in international cooperation for the creation of a new world order.

In order to meet this expectation, the functions of the United Nations will have to be strengthened and it will be essential that the Secretary-General, the Security Council and the General Assembly each function effectively within its realm of responsibility. From this viewpoint, the strengthening of the functions of the First Committee of the General Assembly, which deals mostly with arms control and disarmament issues, will be a matter of particular urgency. For the past several years, efforts have been made, with some measure of success, to merge and reduce the number of resolutions to be adopted in the First Committee, and for the resolutions adopted to be done as much as possible by consensus. Hereafter, we will have to make a much greater effort to take up such agenda items as may meet the needs of the changing world, without being bound by past practices in conducting meaningful and in-depth deliberation of such items and in adopting resolutions that would contribute to fashioning a new world order.

One of the lessons to be learned from the Gulf crisis is that the amassing of massive arsenals by one country through international transfer and proliferation contributes to aggressive behaviour when such actions are tied to that country's political aims. Thus, the most important issue in the wake of the Gulf crisis is that of strengthening efforts in the fields of international transfer of conventional weapons and of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles.

There is an urgent need to establish a United Nations reporting system that would enhance the transparency of such international transfers of conventional weapons. Japan has advocated the establishment of just such a system since March of this year. Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu announced at

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the Kyoto Conference on disarmament issues in May that Japan would be submitting a resolution to this effect to this session of the General Assembly. At present, we are consulting with those interested States, including the European Community member States, in preparing a draft resolution. In doing so, we are making efforts to reflect as much as possible the views expressed in the course of fruitful consultations by those States concerned so that the draft resolution will receive active and overwhelming support from all the Member States. Some basic concepts on which such a draft resolution should be based have become clearer.

First, a universal and non-discriminatory arms transfer register under the auspices of the United Nations should be established as soon as possible, as recommended in the report of the Group of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General in accordance with General Assembly resolution 43/75 I of 1988.

Second, since a United Nations arms transfer register is only meant for greater transparency as a first step in confidence building, due note should be taken of the importance of the exercise of careful restraint in arms transfers, of the efforts to settle underlying political disputes, and of the efforts to promote disarmament in all its aspects.

Third, such a register should not be expected to be a perfect one from the beginning, but should rather be established as early as possible, improved upon by trial and error, and gradually completed as a universal and non-discriminatory system.

Fourth, there is the question of the adequacy of an arms transfer register if indigenous arms production and the transfer of components and related arms technology are not to be included. In particular, those nations that depend on arms imports rather than on indigenous production are afraid

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that the enhanced transparency of arms transfers might endanger their national security. Indeed, transparency with respect to arms production and arms components will also have to be promoted. In this case, however, the volume of information to be reported will increase tremendously. Therefore, a realistic way would be to begin with what is immediately feasible, while at the same time to keep studying the ways to expand the register to cover production and components.

Fifth, there is the question of how to deal with smuggling and other forms of illicit arms transfers, including arms supply to terrorists and subversive forces. As the report of the Group of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General points out, the illicit arms trade is by definition clandestine, so that transparency per se has only an indirect role to play in dealing with this phenomenon. However, the report recommends several concrete steps that can be taken at present by the international community, and the question will have to be dealt with by our taking these recommendations into account.

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

Japan is convinced that the adoption of a resolution to establish a United Nations system of reporting arms transfers that reflects the basic concepts I have just described will serve as an important first step by which the United Nations can contribute to fashioning a new world order. Recognizing that there may be some technical issues involved in ensuring that such a system operates smoothly, Japan is prepared to cooperate with the United Nations by hosting a meeting next year to assist in the elaboration of these issues. Likewise, should the need arise, Japan is prepared to offer appropriate cooperation to enhance the database capabilities of the Department for Disarmament Affairs for the implementation of this system.

Before leaving the subject of international transfers of conventional arms and taking up the question of weapons of mass destruction, I should like to touch upon a view held by some nations that perhaps international transfers of weapons of mass destruction should also be made transparent and be included in the United Nations reporting system. However, as a matter of fact, weapons, of mass destruction, such as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and missiles are already under far-stricter controls by the international community. It should be recognized that the non-proliferation and elimination of those weapons are precisely the issues of today, going beyond the stage of the transparency of their transfers.

Let me take up first the question of nuclear disarmament. Japan highly values the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union as a historic event, and we all hope for its early ratification by both States. However, the more recent announcements made by President Bush that the United States would take unilateral measures to dismantle all land-based tactical nuclear weapons,

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withdraw all sea-based tactical nuclear weapons and dismantle many of them, and would eliminate by agreement with the Soviet Union all intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), among other things, should indeed be acclaimed as a brave decision of unprecedented magnitude. President Gorbachev's positive response to President Bush's initiative, followed by the initiation of talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, serves as a further source of encouragement to the entire international community. Let us hope that these moves signify a genuine beginning of the end of the nuclear age.

We may recall that the wave of upheavals in the Soviet Union caused some concern about its command and control capability over its nuclear weapons, with possible grave consequences to international peace and security. The announcement made by Foreign Minister Pankin of the Soviet Union to the effect that the central government would be in control of all nuclear weapons helped to dispel such a concern, and we welcome this. However, the problem of the control of nuclear weapons, or rather the problem posed by the danger of proliferation within a nuclear-weapon State, has to be taken seriously, and continuous efforts will have to be made in order to exercise stricter controls.

In view of the encouraging developments in the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union in the sphere of nuclear-arms control and disarmament, Japan wishes to call upon the United Kingdom, France and China to tackle the question of nuclear disarmament with more determination and vigour.

As for the question of a nuclear-test ban, Japan highly values the lively discussions conducted under the chairmanship of Ambassador Chadha of India this year in the nuclear-test ban Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

Disarmament. In particular, the deliberation on the question of the verification of a nuclear-test ban proved to be very useful since a genuine dialogue took place on this matter between the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States. It should be recognized that the materials and proposals submitted to the Amendment Conference of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in January this year also served to enrich the deliberation on the question in the Conference on Disarmament. It is Japan's expectation that the substantial work of the Ad Hoc Committee will be continued next year with the re-establishment of the Committee under the same mandate as it had this year.

In connection with the verification of a nuclear-test ban, Japan is also pleased with the successful completion of the second large-scale test (GSETT II) conducted by the Group of Scientific Experts of the Conference on Disarmament. A final report on the test is scheduled to be submitted next spring, and Japan looks forward to this report since the future direction of our efforts might become clearer then. At the same time, the post-GSETT II activities of the Group of Scientific Experts will have to be considered. Also, from this viewpoint, the re-establishment of the nuclear-test ban Ad Hoc Committee next year will be desirable.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons serves as the most important international framework for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Universal adherence to the Treaty is an important goal to be achieved. Therefore, Japan was pleased to see - after last year's accession of Mozambique to the Treaty - Zambia, Tanzania and South Africa acceding to the Treaty. Also, Japan highly values the announcement of willingness to join the Treaty made by France in June and by China in August, at the time of Prime Minister Kaifu's visit to China, and hopes that these two nuclear-weapon States will take prompt action to implement their decisions.

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

On the other hand, compliance with Treaty obligations by the States parties to the Treaty is of vital importance for securing confidence in the Treaty among its States parties. Japan wishes strongly to call upon a country that, while being a party to the Treaty, has not yet concluded a safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to do so without any further delay.

Furthermore, Japan is in favour of a long-term extension of the non-proliferation Treaty after 1995. Of course, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament are important objectives to be pursued in parallel under the Treaty regime. However, Japan does not share the view that there should be a linkage between the extension of the Treaty and a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

Together with the question of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the importance of the non-proliferation of missiles should not be overlooked. Japan calls upon all States to adopt the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines in response to the appeal made by the Tokyo MTCR Conference in March this year.

As for the chemical-weapons Convention negotiations held in Geneva, it now appears that all the remaining major issues requiring solution are laid out on the table. If the negotiations fail to be concluded during 1992, there is a danger that the momentum brought about by the Gulf crisis and boosted by President Bush's statement of 13 May will be lost forever. It may not be an exaggeration to say that the raison d'être of the Conference on Disarmament is at stake in the outcome of the negotiations. The member States of the Conference on Disarmament should make an all-out effort, even during the course of the current session of the First Committee, to accelerate the

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negotiations. Also, Japan strongly hopes that States that are not members of the Conference on Disarmament will take a greater interest in following the negotiations.

With respect to the Third Review Conference of the biological weapons Convention, the agreement reached on convening a meeting of experts on verification and on improving and supplementing confidence-building measures may be regarded as major achievements. Japan wishes to see the confidence-building measures implemented by all the States parties to the Convention and also wishes to appeal to other States not parties to the Convention to accede to it.

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

Before concluding this statement, my delegation wishes to refer to the difficulties with which the nuclear weapons and other inspection teams of the United Nations Special Commission were confronted in Iraq in recent months. The difficulties represented a serious challenge not only to the authority of the United Nations but also to the efforts of the international community centred around it to bring about peace and stability to the Middle East, and to prevent the recurrence of military aggression in the region. We certainly should not be deterred by this experience from the urgent task of making renewed efforts to strengthen the functions of the United Nations. Successful accomplishment of the tasks of the United Nations Special Commission will be vital in order not to create any adverse effects on the IAEA safeguard mechanism and on the verification and inspection mechanism of the ongoing chemical weapons convention negotiations. From this viewpoint, the Government of Japan has volunteered - in addition to the appointment of a Japanese expert as a member of the United Nations Special Commission and the contribution of \$2.5 million to the funding of the Commission - to send two experts as members of the sixth chemical weapons inspection team to Iraq.

We have witnessed over the last 12 months very fast developments in the arms control and disarmament field, and at this time of historic change a new wave of disarmament appears to be gathering momentum. Parallel with the major cuts in the United States-Soviet nuclear arsenals and in the East-West military forces, greater emphasis is being placed on regional and arms transfer-proliferation aspects in dealing with arms control and disarmament problems. Also, we will have to keep in mind that the settlement of regional conflicts requires an overall approach that deals not only with the hardware aspects of arms control and disarmament but also with the software aspects of

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resolving underlying political issues. What we need may be a new way of thinking to cope with the new wave of disarmament. It may well be that the time has come for all nations, developed and developing, arms suppliers and arms recipients, to be called upon to participate in the international efforts to solve the problems of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles and the problems of the transfer of conventional weapons.

Mr. SAETHER (Norway): Allow me to congratulate the representative of Poland on his election as Chairman of the First Committee at the forty-sixth session of the General Assembly. I should also like to extend my congratulations to the other officers of the Committee. I am sure that under your able leadership the Committee can look forward to a successful session.

This General Assembly takes place against the background of unprecedented developments in nuclear-arms control and disarmament. Entirely new avenues have been opened as a result of the far-reaching and enlightened initiatives of Presidents Bush and Gorbachev. Today, there is a real chance of breaking and reversing the relentless spiral of the arms race. We may even be on the brink of a disarmament race.

It may not be possible, as the old saying has it, to put the nuclear genie back in the bottle. But the genie's potential to wreak havoc will be significantly curtailed once the unilateral reductions and associated measures contained in the two initiatives have been implemented. The nuclear threshold will clearly be raised and strategic stability strengthened. The risk of a devastating nuclear first strike has been significantly diminished, and the entire world community and future generations stand to benefit.

(Mr. Saether, Norway)

From a North European perspective, it is particularly gratifying that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed between themselves that in the new Europe of the 1990s, there is no longer any justification either for ground-launched theatre nuclear weapons or for tactical nuclear weapons on surface vessels and submarines. The elimination of these systems will fundamentally enhance security in the north of Europe and elsewhere on the continent. These initiatives have our enthusiastic support.

It is also clear that the sweeping proposals made by the United States and the Soviet Presidents with regard to strategic nuclear arms are of historic significance. They have set the stage for follow-up Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) negotiations in the near future. A window of opportunity has been opened, which must not be closed until sizable reductions beyond those mandated by the START have been achieved. It is vitally important that the parties stand by their shared vision of a safer and more stable world.

To that end, it is essential that the nuclear-arms dialogue continue without excluding any issue, including the question of a total ban on nuclear testing.

Much has also been achieved in the domain of conventional arms control. The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty is a major contribution to the new European security order which is emerging. It should be ratified and implemented as soon as possible. Recent events in the Soviet Union and the achievement of national independence by Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania may have implications for the CFE Treaty. However, this should not be allowed to delay the Treaty's entry into force at the earliest possible date.

(Mr. Saether, Norway)

This would not of course be the end of the road for conventional arms control. We hope that the ongoing negotiations on CFE (IA) and confidence- and security-building measures can be concluded with tangible results before next year's Helsinki follow-up meeting. At the same time, we are looking beyond that to the establishment next year of a new all-European forum for security and conventional arms control.

The new forum will represent a new departure in conventional arms control. In addition to classical arms control, which primarily comprises stabilizing measures, a broad dialogue on security issues and issues related to crisis management and conflict prevention, should be included.

As a result of political developments as well as breakthroughs in arms control, the danger of a major military confrontation in Europe has all but disappeared. Nevertheless, the crisis in Yugoslavia provides a vivid illustration of the fact that the continent will face other risks and potential instability in the years to come. There is an urgent need for cooperative approaches to the kind of conflict epitomized by the tragic events in Yugoslavia. In the new Europe of the 1990s, security can only be a shared and common security.

Norway fully supports the untiring efforts of the European Community and its member States to arrive at a peaceful and negotiated solution to the problems in Yugoslavia. Similarly, we believe the work undertaken within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has been important in creating broad international support for an end to the conflict. Also the action undertaken by the Security Council has been most valuable. The continuing violence is a serious challenge to all these efforts. The use of force to achieve political objectives remains unacceptable. The shooting must stop and peace must be given a real chance.

(Mr. Saether, Norway)

The Yugoslav crisis has demonstrated the importance of thorough preparations on the part of the international community to meet future crises of a similar kind. The European family of nations must accept a special responsibility for keeping its own house in order. To that end, it is essential that the CSCE be made capable of dealing quickly and effectively with emerging conflicts as well as acute crises. In short, the conflict management aspect of the all-European process must be strengthened.

The elaboration of a broad range of CSCE crisis-management procedures and mechanisms must be given priority. Such procedures and mechanisms should include observer and rapporteur missions, good offices and various forms of arbitration and mediation. In cases where hostilities have already erupted, the opportunity of utilizing CSCE peace-keeping forces should be an option, as should monitoring of cease-fires and disengagement of troops. However, there should be no question of deploying CSCE peace-keeping forces unless this is accepted by the parties concerned. By the same token, peace-keeping operations should not be fielded unless a cease-fire is already in existence. Painfully gained experience in connection with United Nations peace-keeping efforts underlines the importance of those two basic principles.

No time should be lost in bringing the negotiations in Geneva on a convention on chemical weapons to a successful conclusion. President Bush's initiative on chemical weapons last spring was a significant effort in that direction. The decision by the United States Government to accept unconditional prohibition of the use of and total destruction of all its chemical weapons within the first 10 years of the coming into force of the convention was a major step forward for the negotiations. With that decision, the target date of 1992 came within reach.

(Mr. Saether, Norway)

However, some obstacles still remain. In particular, the differing views on the verification regime impede progress towards a final negotiating package. As regards the challenge inspection issue, it is important to find a workable compromise between the need of all States parties to be confident that all parties are implementing the convention and their need to protect information considered essential to their own security interests. The time has now come for all delegations taking part in the negotiations to waive some of their ideal demands in order to reach such a compromise. This would make it possible for the convention to be realized next year, as spelt out in the revised mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee. Similarly, the routine inspection system should soon be finalized with the necessary flexibility on the part of all parties.

In the field of chemical weapons, openness and transparency are of fundamental importance. All chemical-weapon States should provide information about the location, composition and size of their stocks, and all countries not in possession of chemical weapons should make declarations to that effect.

For ten years Norway has been conducting a research programme on verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. This research is carried out by experts at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, and annual reports have been presented to the Conference on Disarmament. We are now considering how to extend the scope of this programme to allow scientists and scholars from developing countries to share our expertise in methods of verification of alleged use of chemical weapons.

This Committee should send a clear signal to the Conference on Disarmament that it should exert all possible efforts during the forthcoming months to resolve outstanding issues and to achieve a final agreement by the middle of 1992.

(Mr. Saether, Norway)

The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on biological weapons was concluded in Geneva only a few weeks ago. The Final Declaration by the Conference represents a significant step towards the implementation of the provisions contained in the Convention. The international norm set by this Convention has been clearly reaffirmed. Furthermore, the confidence-building measures adopted in 1987 have been revised and extended, thus increasing the openness and transparency we need in this very important field. Norway hopes that the declarations concerning the confidence-building measures will be more comprehensive and that far more States parties from all regional groups will respond than in the past.

The Conference also agreed to take a step forward in the difficult field of verification of the Convention by establishing an ad hoc group of experts to identify and examine potential verification methods from a scientific and technical standpoint. We look forward to taking part in this work.

There will be relatively modest costs associated with putting into practice the decisions of the Review Conference. We should try to resolve this issue, preferably during the deliberations of this Committee.

The achievement of a total and permanent ban on all nuclear testing remains an important disarmament objective for Norway. A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty is essential in order to halt both the vertical and the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons effectively. The concern that has been expressed about the environmental and health risks associated with nuclear testing is an additional argument for discontinuing such testing.

We greatly appreciate the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban established by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva this year under the able leadership of India. We also attach great importance to the work of the

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Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts and its second major technical experiment (GSETT-2), the results of which will now be analysed and evaluated before the Group's next meeting early next year. A global network for the exchange of seismic data must serve as the most important basis for a future system of verification of a test-ban treaty. We should now give careful thought to the question how the work of the Group and the results of the global experiment could be used as a basis for a treaty-verification system, and how the future work of the Group could be organized to include other means of verification relevant to a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Norway has for many years been co-sponsoring a draft resolution put forward by Australia and New Zealand on the urgent need for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. That draft resolution reflects our basic views on this important issue. We should like to see the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban in 1992 with an appropriate mandate, as spelt out in that draft resolution.

Developments since the last session of the General Assembly have confirmed the need to establish a mechanism for consultation in situations where there appears to be an excessive build-up of arms. As a welcome first step, China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States have initiated a dialogue related to conventional arms transfers, based on the Middle East arms-control initiative launched by President Bush on 29 May. The recent G-7 London summit meeting also addressed that issue.

A common approach to the guidelines applicable to transfers of conventional weapons is highly desirable. In fact, the support of both arms exporters and importers will be essential to the success of efforts to

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restrain transfers of conventional weapons. In this respect, Norway wholeheartedly supports the proposal for a universal register of arms transfers under the auspices of the United Nations. Such a register would promote greater openness in international arms transfers and help to discourage destabilizing sales.

(Mr. Saether, Norway)

The Gulf War and its aftermath have clearly highlighted the threat to international security posed by the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The findings of the United Nations Special Commission in Iraq have given us all cause for deep concern. The time has come for the international community to make every effort to ensure the elimination of chemical and biological weapons and the prevention of nuclear proliferation.

The non-proliferation Treaty remains the cornerstone of the international regime of nuclear non-proliferation. Norway welcomes the recent accession of more States to the Treaty. The announced intended accessions of France and China will further strengthen the universality of the Treaty.

The spread of ballistic missile systems has gained momentum throughout the world. The Missile Technology Control Regime, which is supportive of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, provides a useful means of curbing the spread of missile systems capable of carrying nuclear warheads. It is a positive trend that the number of nations which apply the guidelines for sensitive missile-relevant technology is increasing.

Finally, I should like to emphasize the growing international acceptance of a wider definition of security and stability. Too often these two concepts have been referred to in terms of military factors alone. A common understanding of the interdependence that exists between military, economic and ecological factors is of vital importance. It is our hope that in time to come it will be possible for the world community to make a significant shift in the allocation of resources, away from armaments and over to development and environment in the broad sense. This Committee should take the lead in preparing future guidelines in the field of security and disarmament. Norway is prepared to contribute its share to that endeavour.

(Mr. Saether, Norway)

My country is the endorsed Western candidate for membership of the Conference on Disarmament. Despite serious efforts in Geneva during this year's session, it remained impossible for the Conference to agree to implement the decision to increase the membership of the Conference. We hope that the decision to accept Norway as a member of the Conference will be taken in 1992.

Mr. SARDENBERG (Brazil): The Brazilian delegation congratulates Ambassador Robert Mroziewicz of Poland on his election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. I wish also to express our satisfaction at seeing Ambassador Sedfrey Ordonez, of the Philippines; Mr. Alpman, of Turkey; and Mr. Pablo Sader, of Uruguay, taking part in the Bureau. I am sure that they will steer our work with competence, ensuring that it will be fruitful. The Bureau can count on the full cooperation of the Brazilian delegation to that end. A word of appreciation is also in order for the excellent work done by Ambassador Jai Rana, of Nepal, as Chairman of the First Committee last year.

Despite recent claims to the contrary, it seems quite clear that the flow of history has resumed. In fact, as long as man exists history will always flow. Although it may be difficult to have a clear sense of history when one is living through it, we are always reminded of its pedagogic function - namely, as witness to the past, reference for the present and warning for the future. Today once again we are being taught that peace rests not on the might of arms alone but, more importantly, on the will of peoples.

We have seen in recent times an unprecedented momentum in the search for a reduction in the most destabilizing types of armaments deployed around the globe, in parallel with the affirmation of democratic values throughout the world. The relationship between democracy and disarmament is not fortuitous.

(Mr. Sardenberg, Brazil)

As democratic values gain the upper hand internationally, the perceived need for armaments decreases sharply, and there is a renewed awareness of the disproportion between the quest for the absolute security of States in purely military terms and the economic and social sacrifices imposed on peoples.

This brings about a second important relationship - namely, that between democracy and development. It is nowadays widely recognized that economic progress is the soil in which democracy grows best. Therefore it is imperative that the resources of our interdependent world economy be allocated to urgent priorities of international cooperation for development in order to strengthen democratic processes not only in some but in all regions.

In turn this leads to a third relationship that completes the equation - namely, the relationship between disarmament and development. As disarmament processes gain momentum, more resources should be made available to civilian priorities. This applies both to the reallocation of resources inside a country and to the international flow of goods, financial resources and technology among nations. The peace dividends to be derived from reductions in the major arsenals of the globe should help the many resources-strapped democracies, especially in developing areas. As we turn a new page in history, democracy, development and disarmament should constitute the foundations supporting the new structure of peace.

Decisive progress in the process of universal disarmament should spur the revitalization of domestic and international economic growth. This, in turn, should strengthen democracies the world over, enhancing peace and stability for all. The international advance of democracies should translate into the democratization of international relations, where the peace and the security of nations great and small are safeguarded by right, not by might.

(Mr. Sardenberg, Brazil)

The time may be ripe for a fundamental reversal of the arms race on a global scale. The Government of Brazil welcomes the important initiatives announced by President George Bush on 27 September 1991 and the equally important response of President Mikhail Gorbachev on 5 October 1991. We believe they are steps in the right direction, as they can begin to address the question of the curbing of vertical and geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons - something that has been demanded for a long time.

However, as the remaining nuclear arsenals are still large enough to destroy the world many times over, we urge the leaders of the two major nuclear-weapon States, as well as the other nuclear-weapon States, to advance expeditiously towards the elimination of all nuclear weapons at the earliest possible date. Recent events have demonstrated that nuclear proliferation is a permanent possibility as long as nuclear weapons exist. No State, no matter how security conscious, can be deemed to be free of the risk that its nuclear arsenals might fall into irresponsible or unauthorized hands.

We believe, therefore, that the international community should resolutely move beyond the current concept of non-proliferation. What we ultimately need is a universal and non-discriminatory convention on the prohibition of the use, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and on their destruction. As in the case of other weapons of mass destruction, we know how difficult it is to put the genie back in the bottle once it is out. But it is precisely to prevent the escaping of new genies that we must get rid of those bottles. We must strive for a new consensus on the total elimination of nuclear weapons, on the basis of the strictest verification measures, applied on a universal and non-discriminatory basis and preserving the legitimate, peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

(Mr. Sardenberg, Brazil)

A crucial step towards moving beyond non-proliferation would be the complete banning of nuclear testing. Last year, President Fernando Collor announced before the General Assembly that Brazil renounced its right to conduct any kind of nuclear testing, even for peaceful purposes. My delegation welcomes the unilateral moratorium announced by President Gorbachev and urges other nuclear-weapon States to follow suit, with a view to contributing to the preservation of peace, the well-being of peoples and the environment.

My delegation will also cooperate constructively in the consultations being undertaken by the Chairman of the Amendment Conference of the partial test-ban Treaty, Minister for Foreign Affairs Ali Alatas of Indonesia, in order to achieve progress in concrete areas identified in the discussions, including the question of reconvening the Conference at an appropriate time.

On 18 August 1991, Argentina and Brazil signed in Guadalajara the Agreement on the Uses of Nuclear Energy Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes. The Agreement is of high significance for our two countries and also in itself, since it demonstrates that it is possible to ensure security and development through peaceful nuclear cooperation.

Argentina and Brazil are proceeding with their negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the safeguards agreement stipulated in the Guadalajara Agreement. The document will provide all elements necessary for the verification of our undertakings and will protect the technological advances achieved by our two countries in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The Declaration of Mendoza on Chemical and Biological Weapons, signed by Argentina, Brazil and Chile on 5 September 1991, and now also joined by Uruguay, was another relevant contribution of Latin American countries to the

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objective of an early and total elimination of those categories of weapons of mass destruction. It was a clear demonstration of aversion to the existence of such a cruel and indiscriminate type of arms. It is our expectation that this exemplary act may spur the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament for the conclusion, in 1992, of a universal and non-discriminatory convention for the total elimination of chemical weapons.

My delegation hails with satisfaction the successful conclusion of the Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the biological weapons Convention and sincerely hopes that the decisions adopted will greatly contribute to the strengthening of the regime of that instrument. We pay a special tribute to the Chairman of the Review Conference, Ambassador Roberto García Moritán of Argentina, whose well-known diplomatic skills and untiring dedication were fundamental to the important results achieved.

The driving force of recent transformations in the international structure was man's quest for freedom. There is, in this regard, a widely shared perception that an ideal world order should ensure the free flow of peoples, the free flow of ideas and the free flow of goods. But we note that even in the freest of systems, there is an underlying tension between the uncertainties of boundless freedom and the need for certain restraints by means of control. In varying degrees, it is a fact that, in different countries and situations, the free flow of peoples is subject to immigration controls; the free flow of goods to import controls; and the free flow of ideas to censorship. The fundamental difference between democratic and non-democratic forms of control resides in the degree of accountability, predictability, transparency and agreement among all the interested parties. The question of the international flow of goods, services and know-how

(Mr. Sardenberg, Brazil)

relating sensitive technologies constitutes today a crucial theme on the international agenda.

Owing to the dual nature of many items of high technology, there are justified concerns that they may be used for destabilizing military purposes, for example in the making of weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, they have a vital role to play in accelerating economic modernization, especially in countries where scientific and technological resources are urgently needed. The international community is therefore called upon to find possible consensual formulas, taking into account the security concerns of the supplying countries and the technological needs of the recipient countries, in order to promote an international flow of sensitive technologies with an adequate balance of accessibility and control.

In this respect, we wish to stress our strong interest in the promotion of a constructive follow-up to the deliberations undertaken at the 1991 session of the Disarmament Commission concerning the international transfer of sensitive technologies. We are fully aware of the complexities involved in the discussion of a theme that has strategic, industrial, commercial, intellectual, legal and many other aspects. None the less, it is our hope that an honest effort towards clarifying many of those questions, from the perspective of both the suppliers and the recipients, would be highly beneficial to all parties concerned.

We would hope that the discussions on this theme at this session of the General Assembly, as well as at the forthcoming sessions of the Disarmament Commission, could be instrumental in arriving at a kind of regime that would be effective, non-discriminatory, predictable, transparent, verifiable and universally acceptable. We believe that the consolidation of a market for safe transfers of sensitive technologies for peaceful purposes would respond

(Mr. Sardenberg, Brazil)

to the needs of economic modernization and technological capacitation of developing countries, as well as to the security and commercial interests of the more industrially and technologically advanced countries.

Finally, let me address the question of transparency in international arms transfers. My delegation welcomes the study on ways and means of promoting transparency in the international transfers of conventional arms, prepared by the Group of Governmental Experts (A/46/301).

The Brazilian Government upholds the principle of transparency in disarmament matters, as shown by the initiatives already mentioned in the fields of nuclear cooperation, renunciation of nuclear tests and rejection of chemical and biological weapons. Brazil has also submitted to the United Nations this year its report on military expenditures in standardized form, as contained in the report of the Secretary-General in document A/46/381. Brazil understands that transparency is not an end in itself but a step towards the adoption of effective measures in arms limitation and disarmament. We expect that initiatives to be discussed at the current session on this subject should contribute to that aim.

My delegation is prepared to participate constructively in the discussions on this and all other items on the agenda of the First Committee, with a view to enhancing the role and prestige of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to remind members of the Committee that the list of speakers for the general debate on all disarmament agenda items will be closed today at 6 p.m.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.