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Chairman: Mr. Roberto URDANETA ARBELÁEZ (Colombia).

Declaration on the removal of the threat of a new war and the strengthening of peace and security among the nations (*continued*)

[Item 69]*

GENERAL DISCUSSION (*continued*)

1. Mr. SIROKY (Czechoslovakia) said that the gravity of the problem raised in the USSR proposal (A/C.1/595) could not be questioned, in spite of the efforts made by certain delegations which, like the United States, had tried to disguise their negative attitude to peace by distorting the foreign policy of the USSR. Mr. Austin (377th meeting) had deduced from the speech made by Generalissimo Stalin on 9 February 1946 that the USSR considered the economic system of the West, and not fascism, as a potential cause of war and also that the USSR had abandoned the policy of co-operation. In fact, however, although Generalissimo Stalin had recalled that two great economic crises had given rise to two world wars, he had also stressed that, in contrast to the destruction of bourgeois democratic freedoms by fascism and its aspirations to universal hegemony, the Second World War had displayed an anti-fascist and liberating feature which had naturally been accentuated by the intervention of the USSR. Mr. Austin had thus attempted to exonerate United States ruling circles from the terrible responsibility which they had assumed in substituting the slogans of conquered fascism for a policy of international co-operation.

2. Many texts could be quoted. In April 1950, an American periodical, *U. S. News & World Report* had openly admitted that the aim of American policy was not to reach agreement with the Kremlin, but to establish the kind of force which would constrain the USSR to submit to the views of the Western world. That policy had been outlined by Mr. Winston Churchill at Fulton, Missouri, in the United States, in March 1946, restated in the Truman Doctrine, and expressed on

3 January 1947; according to that policy, the American people was capable of determining the history of the world and General Eisenhower had stated that his country could rule the world. That was the origin of the existing tension.

3. In contrast to the American notion of universal hegemony, the foreign policy of the USSR assumed that international co-operation was not impossible even if the parties did not have the same economic system, provided that they both respected the formula which had won the approval of the people of each country.

4. In submitting its draft resolution (A/C.1/595), the USSR had in mind the peoples of the whole world, and not only of the inhabitants of Eastern and Central Europe and of its own country. Peace was indivisible and the USSR had constantly fought for that peace since the day when, immediately after the October Revolution, it had relinquished the conquests of the czars. That was the only possible policy for a régime which refused to recognize the exploitation of man by man and proclaimed the right of peoples to self-determination and to an independent national existence.

5. Mr. Younger (376th meeting) had disregarded historical truth when he spoke of USSR intervention and of the usurpation of authority by the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia. It should be remembered that, after the bitter fighting of the liberation, USSR troops had evacuated Czechoslovakia, where a government had been set up by eight parties on equal terms. When the 1946 elections took place, at a time when there was no longer any question of Soviet troops, the Communist Party had received the largest number of votes. Nevertheless, reactionary elements had attempted a putsch to exclude the Communist Party from the government. The people had, in those circumstances, risen as one man and had ensured the constitutional and parliamentary triumph of a policy which was in conformity with new developments, since it comprised adherence to the principles of international peace and security, socialist reconstruction and the economic development of the country.

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

6. Those were the facts which the United Kingdom representative had tried to distort by speaking of USSR troop concentrations on the Czechoslovak frontier in an attempt to dissimulate the refusal of the imperialist Powers to co-operate, and that at a time when, ironically enough, the Egyptian representative was justifiably requesting the long-delayed withdrawal of British troops. The cynicism of those who were carrying on subversive activities against the Czechoslovak Republic was boundless.

7. Fortunately, attempts to mislead the Czechoslovak people were vain, for it had learned the lesson of Munich. In his book *War or Peace* (page 142) Mr. Dulles recalled the Franco-British pressure exerted on Benes, who had given in against his better judgment. That particular form of aggression had consisted in sacrificing the bourgeois Czechoslovak Republic, in order to involve Hitler in the East. That had been a short-sighted policy, which had brought retribution upon the Western Powers themselves.

8. Times had changed. Territorial disputes, irredentism and revisionism, fomented by imperialist intrigues and intended to arouse popular hatred against the USSR, had been superseded in that part of Europe by a new atmosphere in international relations, owing to the substitution of people's democracies for bourgeois representative régimes, reaction and fascism. The principle of the freedom and independence of all nations united in their struggle against the forces of war and for the establishment of socialism under the ægis of the USSR constituted such a new element in Central and Eastern Europe that a spirit of mutual aid and friendship had put an end to the "hereditary" quarrels which had been rife, for instance, between the Czechoslovaks, on the one hand, and the Poles and Hungarians, on the other hand. Thanks to the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, a region which had hitherto been economically under-developed had become an important factor in industrial production and had exceeded its pre-war agricultural production level, while devoting itself to the task of reconstruction.

9. The Democratic German Republic had, meanwhile, abandoned its spirit of conquest and was also establishing political, economic and cultural relations with the people's democracies, abundantly demonstrating the fact that denazification, demilitarization and democratization constituted the only solution of the German problem in the interests of peace and of the Germans themselves. Thus, even the countries which had suffered most from nazi aggression and occupation could co-operate with Germany in a spirit of respect for their mutual interests.

10. In those circumstances, there was no gainsaying the peaceful nature of States which had not only put an end to interminable quarrels in their mutual relations, but had established friendly relations with the Democratic German Republic. Mr. Acheson had spoken (279th plenary meeting) of a shroud of secrecy enveloping the history of Central and Eastern Europe; but that shroud was as transparent as the motives of those who interpreted as internal "aggression" the new political and social forms of popular sovereignty or any movement of liberation against colonialist hegemony. That approach was incompatible with the United Nations Charter, which was based on the peaceful co-operation

of different economic systems. Countries such as Czechoslovakia and the USSR, which were pioneering in socialism, were true to the principle of international co-operation, subject to mutual respect for equality of rights. That was indeed a reservation which could not be admitted by the great American monopolies.

11. The policy of the new warmongers, who wished to terrorize the world by the threat of the atomic weapon, was characterized by open interference in the domestic affairs of other countries for the sake of acquiring strategic positions for expansionist and bellicose purposes. The rearmament of the signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty, and of Germany, served as a proof of the aggressive nature of that alliance. Similarly, the purpose of the Marshall Plan was to subject the economy of Western nations to the expansionist wishes of the great American monopolies.

12. The aggressive spirit of the Western governments was most openly expressed in the case of the rearmament of Western Germany, and Czechoslovakia wished to state its determined objection to any recrudescence of the old imperialistic German militarism and to any re-establishment of German military might to serve the purposes of Western policy. It had been with some anxiety, therefore, that Czechoslovakia had followed the proceedings of the recent conference at New York, during which the governments parties to the North Atlantic Treaty had decided, in closed session, to re-enforce their occupation troops in Germany, to amalgamate their armed forces and to allow Germany to participate in the establishment of those unified forces. Certain differences of opinion had, of course, arisen since the governments of France and other States had to take public opinion in their own countries into account. It was well known that Western Europe was much less concerned with its "defence" than was the United States.

13. United States Senator Tom Connally had stated that the time had come to tighten the screws on Western Europe and to force it to provide larger resources for what was called "common defence". The United States had insisted that expenditure on armaments for Western Europe should be doubled, at the taxpayers' expense, and would amount to 12,000 million dollars. In so far as Germany's contribution was concerned, a recent memorandum by nazi generals had stipulated certain conditions, namely, the granting of rights and responsibilities to Germans, so that they should not be used merely as cannon fodder, the establishment of a line of defence on the Elbe instead of the Rhine, the rehabilitation of German military honour and the liberation of all German prisoners of war who were still in France or Belgium.

14. The North Atlantic Treaty could hardly be described as a defensive measure when United States Senator Styles Bridges had admitted that military assistance to Western Europe and to the other signatories was an aggressive measure. A conference to counter that policy was being held at Prague; it was attended by representatives of the USSR, the European people's democracies and the Democratic German Republic, and had found a democratic solution of the German question: the USSR, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France should take measures, on

the basis of a joint declaration, for the establishment of a democratic and peaceful Germany and for the conclusion of a treaty of peace, involving the withdrawal of occupation forces within one year. That was the only way in which the requirements of European security and the interests of the German people could be served. The importance of the Prague proposal was amply proved by the threat to peace inherent in the dismemberment of Germany and the inclusion of the western part of the country in an aggressive military bloc.

15. The Czechoslovak delegation was vitally interested in a solution of the problem of the Democratic German Republic. The delegation was convinced that the activities of the occupying Powers in Western Germany constituted a link of decisive importance in the chain of aggressive military plans which had led to the existing international tension.

16. In those circumstances, the only hope for peace lay in the USSR proposal. In contravention of Articles 11, 26 and 47 of the Charter, which laid down that disarmament was an obligation of the Members of the United Nations, the United States had placed its economy on a war footing and had been followed in that course by the other signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty. The inevitable result had followed swiftly: the giddy rise of prices had led to a drop in civilian consumption and in the standard of living; the economic consequences of that intensive rearmament in themselves endangered the world, by ruining the peacetime economy solely for the benefit of the capitalist monopolies. The periodical *U. S. News & World Report* had written that the end of hostilities in Korea would not affect American prosperity, since armaments had the greatest influence on the economic cycle, and there was no question of slowing down their production.

17. The chairman of the United States Munitions Board, Mr. Hubert E. Howard, had recently estimated that, in the event of full mobilization, contracts to the value of 41,000 million dollars would, in the first half year, be placed with American industries. Those figures revealed the speciousness of the American argument that the present disproportion of forces ruled out disarmament.

18. The efforts of the USSR in disarmament could be traced back to the first session of the General Assembly in 1946, a year after the end of the war, when the USSR delegation had submitted a proposal for the regulation and reduction of armaments.¹ Despite the unanimous adoption of that resolution (41 (I)), those very States which had just stressed the need to re-establish the balance of forces had failed to adopt a constructive attitude, which would have rendered it possible to embark upon a race for peace and not for military equality, the determining factor in international policy.

19. It was surprising to hear the United States—the advocate of *diktat* and the use of force—speak of military weakness, while the USSR, whose military strength was alleged to stand in the way of agreement, was always manifesting its sincere desire for co-operation. That paradoxical situation was revealed in two significant facts. The Federal budget of the United States for 1950-51 allotted 50,000 million dollars for

armaments, a sum 400 per cent greater than that which had appeared in the 1949-50 budget. The USSR, by contrast, was proposing to reduce its armaments and armed forces by one-third in 1951. The truth was that the heart of the matter was not the question of armed forces, but the peaceful or war-like intentions of the various Powers.

20. The first result of the USSR proposal, which called for, as a first step, the reduction of the military forces of the great Powers, would be a relaxation of the international tension. Then, as a result, the prestige of the United Nations would be greatly enhanced in the eyes of millions of human beings now crushed under the burden of war preparations.

21. Mr. Dulles had deplored the fact that the fear of war was turning men's minds away from constructive tasks and arousing evil instincts. In his book *War or Peace* (page 239) Mr. Dulles admitted that the United States wanted to have as many atomic and hydrogen bombs, jet-propelled aircraft and air bases as possible. Whatever the moral and political motives for the present trend in American policy, the important point was whether the policy described by Mr. Dulles was likely to create an atmosphere of peace. The best way to allay fear was to ban war propaganda and the use of atomic weapons as a means of mass destruction of human beings. Hundreds of millions of people of all countries were demanding the prohibition of atomic weapons and were condemning in advance as war criminals whatever government was the first to use them.

22. The fear of determined action on the part of the masses, more and more favourable to the Soviet proposal, had appeared in the statement of the Netherlands representative (375th meeting) who had admitted that the man in the street, hungering for peace, might react favourably towards that initiative. Then Mr. Spender (374th meeting) had come to the assistance of the warmongers, explaining that in a democratic country freedom of speech and of the Press made it possible to say even stupid things. It was not clear if Mr. Spender had meant to refer to certain highly placed civilians and military personages who talked about nothing but hydrogen bombs and were openly advocating war. The only unfortunate thing was that that freedom operated in certain countries only in one direction; in Australia, for example, peace propaganda led to all kinds of persecution, while the advocates of a new war were allowed complete freedom.

23. In the First Committee itself, an effort was being made to twist the USSR proposal, which was in itself quite clear, by putting forward tortuous arguments to legalize the use of that weapon of mass destruction, the atomic bomb. If one had to die, it was argued, a gun could kill as well as the atomic bomb. The point was that that state of mind was endangering the lives of millions of people. It was preposterous to talk of allowing the use against aggressors of a weapon which was by no means defensive, but primarily aggressive. To suggest the use of the atomic bomb was to appear clearly as an aggressor, and to incur the stigma of war criminal in the eyes of peace-loving people.

24. As for the fact that most of the present proposals of the USSR had been considered at previous sessions,

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, Part II, Plenary Meetings, 42nd meeting.*

that only proved how tenacious was the peace policy of the USSR, and also that there was a tendency in the United Nations quite simply to shelve peace proposals.

25. It was fitting to recall that, on 14 December 1946 and on 3 November 1947, the General Assembly had adopted resolutions 41 (I) and 110 (II), referring to the regulation and reduction of armaments, and to war propaganda. It could hardly be contended that some flaw in the structure of the Organization or the veto had made it impossible to give effect to those resolutions. Yet they had been adopted unanimously by the General Assembly, and the procedure for giving effect to them was set forth in the Charter and the rules of procedure of United Nations organs. The truth was that circles hostile to peace had so guided the work of United Nations organs that those resolutions had remained inoperative, and that, on the contrary, measures harmful to the cause of peace had been taken. That was all the more regrettable since the implementation of the resolutions of the USSR would have created a very different atmosphere from that prevailing at the session, and would thus have strengthened the prestige of the United Nations.

26. The delegation of Czechoslovakia therefore supported the USSR proposal which expressed the Czechoslovak people's desire for peace; the putting into effect of that proposal would make it possible to avoid war.

27. Mr. SCHAULSOHN (Chile) pointed out that the USSR proposal (A/C.1/595) did not differ in content from other similar proposals previously submitted by the USSR delegation.

28. It was clear that war propaganda should be eliminated, as the General Assembly had already recognized, at its second and fourth sessions, in resolutions 110 (II) and 290 (IV). In that respect, however, the USSR proposal was incomplete: it was not enough merely to prevent active propaganda in favour of war; it was also necessary to prohibit propaganda by omission which consisted in isolating peoples from contact with the outside world and especially with United Nations action for peace. It was with that in mind that the delegation of Chile was submitting an amendment calling for the insertion, between the penultimate and final paragraphs of the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/597) of the following text (A/C.1/601):

"Reaffirms its resolutions 110 (II) and 290 (IV), paragraph 8, which condemn all propaganda against peace and recommend the free exchange of information and ideas as one of the foundations of good neighbourly relations between the peoples;

"Declares that such propaganda likewise includes:

"(1) Incitement to conflicts or acts of aggression;

"(2) Measures tending to isolate the peoples from any contact with the outside world, such as preventing the press, radio and other media of communication from reporting international events, and thus hindering mutual comprehension and understanding between peoples; and

"(3) Measures tending to silence or distort the activities of the United Nations in favour of peace or

preventing their people from knowing the views of other States Members."

29. It was impossible to claim that different political and economic systems could exist peacefully side by side if, at the same time, peoples were prevented from understanding and collaborating with each other. No one system could claim to have the monopoly of truth, and hence there had to be a ban on all measures likely to isolate the peoples, in order to make it possible for different systems to exist peacefully together and to prevent war propaganda.

30. The USSR draft resolution provided for the conclusion by the five great Powers of a pact for the strengthening of peace. It was wrong to adopt a pact outside the framework of the Charter, since either the pact would be useless, inasmuch as the Charter was a self-sufficient instrument of peace, or its conclusion would be equivalent to a recognition that the provisions of the Charter were inadequate to maintain peace. Moreover, the Committee had recently approved, by a unanimous vote, a resolution (A/C.1/585/Rev.2) which recommended the permanent members of the Security Council to meet and discuss with a view to their resolving difficulties and reaching agreement in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Charter. Since it was not the small States which placed obstacles in the way of attaining peace, surely the great Powers should not act outside the framework of the United Nations, as the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/595) seemed to propose. Certain of the great Powers moreover were not in agreement with the proposal, so that it would have no practical application even if by some miracle it were approved.

31. The United Nations had gained in prestige by the action it had taken against aggression in Korea. That prestige had been increased by the adoption of the resolution on united action for peace (A/C.1/592). It should not now be compromised by the conclusion of a pact outside the Charter, which would reduce the possibilities of action by the United Nations.

32. The USSR draft resolution also spoke of the prohibition of atomic weapons, the control of atomic energy and the reduction of armaments. Those questions had been the subject of long study, but no agreement had been reached concerning the nature of practical control measures. It was certain that no basis for agreement could be found in the verbal promises of those who isolated their people and surrounded themselves with secrecy.

33. The six-Power draft resolution would, if it were amended as his delegation proposed, make it possible to create the necessary conditions for international peace. It supplied what was missing from the USSR draft resolution by stating that aggression was the essential crime to be met with action.

34. The delegation of Chile would vote for the six-Power draft resolution and hoped that the Chilean amendment (A/C.1/601) would be accepted. The delegation also hoped that the six-Power draft would be fused with the Bolivian draft resolution (A/C.1/596). Lastly, his delegation approved of the objectives of the Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/598), which were simi-

lar to those contained in section E of the resolution concerning united action for peace to which Chile had given particular support.

35. Sir Mohammed ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) said that the most passionate desire of all the members of the Committee was to see peace assured and strengthened. There was, however, a great divergence between what was sought and the reality itself. Perhaps the word *peace* did not have the same meaning for all, and the objective of peace could perhaps be interpreted in different ways.

36. Pakistan, having won its independence after centuries of political subordination, realized that the chief value of independence was the hope and opportunities it offered of being able to build a society in which spiritual, moral and material progress would be possible. At the moment, however, the world was divided into rival camps, each arming at ever-increasing speed for a conflict which to many appeared almost inevitable. At a time like that, mankind must not imitate the actions of a mystic who, a few centuries ago had gone back to sleep after a brief period of wakefulness so as to escape from a world in conflict.

37. Another course of action was possible. There was no doubt that so long as society continued to be dynamic, there would be differences of opinions, methods and ideologies. Civilization would not eliminate those differences but, having recognized their existence, must make provision for their peaceful settlement. The United Nations Charter proclaimed various ideals and objectives in its preamble; the Charter also provided methods for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. By their deeds and conduct, the Members of the United Nations must put the Charter into effect and so bring it to life.

38. No exception could be taken to the sentiments which had been expressed in favour of peace; but the

mere expression of those sentiments was not sufficient to strengthen peace. On the contrary, it had to be recognized that peace was becoming more and more precarious. It was high time, therefore, that a common tongue was used so that words should not only say what they meant but should also mean the same thing to everyone. Tolerance and understanding must be shown to those who cherished different faiths and aspirations unless and until it was demonstrated beyond a doubt that those aspirations were contrary to peace, in which case the most resolute resistance must be shown.

39. All that meant learning to live as good neighbours. To achieve that goal, the first essential was clearly to allow freedom of information and to promote international contacts. Until better international understanding had been achieved, no resolution adopted in favour of peace would serve any purpose. The delegation of Pakistan was, of course, at all times prepared to reaffirm its faith in the objectives of the Charter and in the methods of peaceful settlement and to support resolutions which reflected those principles. There was no doubt that there had to be control of atomic energy and reduction of armaments. The machinery set up for that purpose had functioned up to a point and had then come to a standstill. The work of the Commissions concerned must clearly be continued, and aggression in whatever form or from whatever source must be resisted. To the extent to which the purposes and objectives of the Charter were reflected in the different draft resolutions submitted, the delegation of Pakistan would support them.

40. Pakistan also had its own disputes with other Members of the United Nations but was determined to solve them by the peaceful methods indicated in the Charter, unless it was finally proved that those methods were manifestly impracticable.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.