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Chairman: Mr. Roberto URDANETA ARBELÁEZ (Colombia).

Intervention of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Korea (*continued*)

[Item 76]*

REPLY DATED 17 JANUARY 1951 FROM THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (A/C.1/653) (*continued*)

At the invitation of the Chairman, the representative of the Republic of Korea took his seat at the Committee table.

1. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America) observed that the members of the Committee now had had three days in which to study the reply of the Peking régime to the statement of principles on a cease-fire in Korea (A/C.1/645), for which fifty members had voted (425th meeting). Many members had already declared the reply to be unacceptable.

2. The urgency of the situation compelled the United Nations to act without further delay. Recalling that his government already had stated its view (426th meeting) on what action should be taken, Mr. Austin introduced and read a draft resolution (A/C.1/654) outlining that action. The draft resolution noted the fact of Chinese communist aggression in Korea, announced the determination of the United Nations to meet that aggression, and determined the procedure for deciding further steps to meet that aggression.

3. The General Assembly had the responsibility for recommending collective measures since the representative of the USSR had vetoed the attempt made in the Security Council to restore international peace and security.

4. Mr. Austin added that, while the United Nations remained devoted to the principle that its objective in Korea should be attained by peaceful means if possible, the United States Government believed that the time to draw the line was now. By standing

together on Korea, the Members would support the Charter and preserve the principles of collective security. Collective judgment and collective action offered the best hope of opposing aggression.

5. Mr. CHAUVET (Haiti) thought that the world had retrogressed. The spirit of appeasement now seemed to prevail. Strict adherence to right and duty no longer seemed to be an international virtue. He wished to draw from that fact the conclusions which, considering recent events, would permit Member States to prepare for the future.

6. In June 1950, fifty-three nations had endorsed the Security Council resolution¹ condemning the aggression which had been committed in Korea. Since then, communist China had committed an aggression which was worse than the one which they had condemned. Mr. Chauvet did not believe that any one of those fifty-three nations could disavow and act in contravention of the decision which it had taken in June. The Government of Haiti would respect its given word and the position which it had voluntarily adopted.

7. The events which had taken place since the First World War, which he recalled, had shown what a boomerang appeasement had been; its consequences were clear. Because of the spirit of appeasement, the United Nations had recently received in its midst the representative of a country, communist China, which had been fighting against the United Nations. The Organization had dealt with so-called volunteers according to the rules of war, although those volunteers were guerrillas. Members had heard about truces, cease-fires and armistices; yet, even those who vehemently opposed aggression had stated that the Committee should move slowly. Mr. Chauvet asked if the United Nations had not displayed appeasement in its fullest measure? If the gentlemen behind the so-called iron curtain had decided to launch a world conflict, would appeasement by the United Nations stop them?

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year, No. 15.*

8. Appeasement would deal a death blow to the United Nations. Each Member State must consider events objectively in order to remain worthy of the requirements of the Charter, to act in conformity with its moral obligations and to respond to the necessities and dictates of history.

9. The delegation of Haiti would vote in favour of any draft resolution condemning the aggression of communist China. Mr. Chauvet expressed the hope that none of the fifty-three nations which had publicly declared their solidarity in condemning North Korean aggression would now eschew that condemnation and refuse to condemn the Chinese communist aggression.

10. Mr. HENRIQUEZ UREÑA (Dominican Republic) stated that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, in its reply, had actually rejected the United Nations peace offer. The Central People's Government had proposed that there should be a withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea before hostilities ceased; that foreign troops should be withdrawn from Formosa (Taiwan); and that the Central People's Government should be admitted to the United Nations.

11. Pointing out that a proposal for admission would require a two-thirds majority vote in the General Assembly, Mr. Henriquez Ureña stated that the Government of the Dominican Republic could not vote in favour of such a proposal whatever might be agreed upon by the other members of the Committee. The Dominican Republic, throughout its history, had always recognized the *de jure*, not the *de facto* government, and had never recognized a revolutionary government as long as the legitimate government had continued in existence, even if only in a remote corner of its territory. It could be maintained that Formosa was not Chinese territory but the communists themselves claimed that it was.

12. In the reply of the Central People's Government, it was stated that the proposal to attain a cease-fire first had been designed merely to give the United States a breathing-space that would enable it to continue its aggression, and could never lead to genuine peace: that statement was arbitrary and erroneous. The United States forces fighting in Korea represented the United Nations, just as did the forces sent by other Member States. The statement of principles (A/C.1/645) which had been approved by the First Committee (425th meeting) provided for adequate safeguards for ensuring that the cease-fire would not be used as a screen to mount a new offensive.

13. Recalling that the Central People's Government had proposed adding India, Egypt and France to the membership of the negotiating body to be convened at the cessation of hostilities, Mr. Henriquez Ureña stated that his delegation could agree to increasing the membership of that body. However, it was surprising that the Central People's Government should have ignored the existence of the Latin-American Republics, which constituted one-third of the membership of the General Assembly.

14. In summation, the representative of the Dominican Republic stated that the reply was equivalent to a categorical rejection of the Committee's peace over-

tures. The Central People's Government had requested that, before negotiations were commenced, it be granted the objectives of such negotiations. What then would be the purpose of such negotiations?

15. After reading Article 14 of the Charter, Mr. Henriquez Ureña observed that the provisions of that Article had been fulfilled. The Committee had exhausted all possible means of ensuring peace. The next step to be taken was to declare the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China guilty of an act of aggression not only against Korea but against the United Nations forces. The Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea had been declared an aggressor; now the members of the Committee must decide whether or not to declare the Central People's Government an aggressor.

16. Mr. Henriquez Ureña then discussed the definition of an aggressor which appeared in the Convention on the Definition of the Aggressor, signed in London in 1933 by Afghanistan, Estonia, Iran, Finland, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Turkey and the Soviet Union, and also the draft declaration which had been submitted by Mr. Maxim Litvinov at the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments.² That definition applied also to a State which failed to take the necessary steps in its own territory to prevent assistance to armed invading bands originating in its territory.

17. He also drew attention to an opinion given in the *Revue de Droit International* to the effect that in any case of aggression there were two fundamental elements: the spiritual, which was the lack of desire to achieve a peaceful settlement, or its rejection; and the material, which was the resort to the use of force. Members of the Committee could judge for themselves whether the Central People's Government had or had not endeavoured to achieve pacific settlement of the dispute, and whether it had not in the past and did not continue to employ force.

18. The invasion of South Korea by North Korean forces represented a typical case of invasion as defined by Mr. Litvinov, by renowned jurists and by the Geneva texts. The invasion of Korea by the Central People's Government, in the opinion of Mr. Henriquez Ureña, was a similar case of aggression. He thought that only fear, fear of an international nature, could prevent the members of the Committee from declaring the Central People's Government an aggressor. What was involved was not physical fear, but fear for the responsibilities and consequences involved. Fear of assuming responsibilities was leading to an ostrich policy, the policy which had resulted in the demise of the League of Nations and the capitulation at Munich.

19. The Committee had to condemn the Central People's Government as an aggressor. If it was decided to take other measures, such as sanctions, they could be taken at a later stage. It would be pointless to declare sanctions if, for geographic or other reasons, they would prove ineffective. In condemning an aggressor, however, the door must not be closed to future

² See League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Report of the Committee on Security Questions, Conf. D/C.G.108, published in *Conference Documents*, Vol. II, p. 679 (Series League of Nations 1935.IX.4).

negotiations to restore peace on an honourable basis. That point was covered in the United States draft resolution (A/C.1/654), which the delegation of the Dominican Republic supported.

20. In conclusion, Mr. Henriquez Ureña stated that the United Nations could not survive if it were to abandon the principles on which the Organization had been established.

21. Mr. ARMAND UGON (Uruguay) observed that paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Charter provided that the United Nations should "take effective collective measures . . . for the suppression of acts of aggression . . .". To accomplish that objective, the United Nations required the assistance of all Member States, which was provided for in paragraph 4 of Article 2.

22. He recalled that the fifth session of the General Assembly had opened after aggression had been launched against the Republic of Korea and after action to repel that aggression had been undertaken, in accordance with decisions of the Security Council. That first action undertaken by the United Nations to repel aggression had been a praiseworthy one. A new aggressor, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, had been fighting for more than two months. The United Nations forces in Korea had already declared communist China to be an aggressor. It was now proper for the United Nations, through the General Assembly, to give legality to that declaration, which was the purpose of the United States draft resolution. It was an honour for his delegation to support the terms of that draft resolution and to endorse it.

23. No reason could be adduced to justify the aggression by communist China, which should be condemned. Every guarantee had been given to the communist régime in China. Peaceful overtures had been made by the Committee and by the General Assembly; those overtures had been deliberately rejected. Events bore witness to the deliberate continuation of acts of aggression. The rejection of the efforts of the United Nations had to be borne in mind. The primary purpose of the Organization was to maintain international security, the foundation of international peace. That duty had been written into the Charter, and all of the nations which had subscribed to it had undertaken to support those principles by all moral and material means. That had always been the position of the Government of Uruguay, a position which had been stated unequivocally at San Francisco.³

24. The Charter did not provide for the possibility of neutrality or abstention; the latter was regarded as tacit conspiracy in action against the principle of security. If the Charter rejected neutrality, international reality, at that moment of history, demonstrated that any Members supporting neutrality were actually adopting the decadent attitude of appeasement.

25. Mr. Armand Ugon concluded that, between the principles of the Charter and aggression, there was no choice. One was either for the Charter or against the Charter. To be for the Charter was to be against

aggression. A position of neutrality would undermine the principle of collective security; and any country taking such a stand might, if attacked, be in the position of having to ask for that which it had itself refused to grant.

26. Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia) recalled that the Committee, on 13 January 1951 (425th meeting), had approved the statement of principles submitted by the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea (A/C.1/645). Those principles were to have served as a basis for the discussion of a peaceful settlement of the Korean question and other Far Eastern problems. At that time, the Committee had adopted a resolution (A/C.1/651) transmitting those principles to the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and stating that the Committee would consider that government's reply when it was received.

27. Principle 1 set forth a demand for an immediate cease-fire, which would have provided relief for the United States forces in Korea. It was no secret that the United States forces had been constantly retreating under the heavy pressure of the Korean people's army and the Chinese volunteers, and needed time to regroup and to obtain reinforcements with which to launch a new offensive. That demand for a cease-fire was no more than a manoeuvre.

28. Although the statement of principles included the declaration that the arrangements for the cease-fire "should contain adequate safeguards", the Czechoslovak delegation was only too well aware of the fact that the ruling circles of the United States had repeatedly violated the principles of the Charter and the international obligations undertaken at Moscow, Cairo, Yalta and Potsdam.

29. If the proposal of the Central People's Government for the withdrawal of all armed forces were accepted, the Committee would be complying with the demand for a cease-fire. The delegation of Czechoslovakia was convinced that that proposal would lead the way to a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

30. Mr. Nosek also supported the proposal of the Central People's Government for a conference of seven Powers at which, he noted with satisfaction, that government would be represented as a lawful and equal Member of the United Nations. The discussions in the Committee had been carried on without the participation of a legal representative of the People's Republic of China and of the people of Korea, and the principles had been formulated to comply with the aims of the ruling circles of the United States.

31. The representative of Czechoslovakia stated, in conclusion, that the People's Republic of China, in its sincere desire for a peaceful settlement, had submitted concrete and constructive proposals which his delegation fully supported. His delegation reserved the right to speak later on the United States draft resolution.

32. Mr. KYROU (Greece) remarked that the circumstances which the Committee faced were too grave to permit it to play into the hands of the speakers of the Soviet bloc by long skirmishes. Moreover, what the representatives of Czechoslovakia and Poland (427th meeting) had stated could only confirm what most

³ See *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, 1945*, Volume I, document No. 24.

representatives had already perceived, which was that the Chinese People's Republic's answer to the latest United Nations appeal had not been drafted in Peking but somewhere else.

33. The representative of Greece believed that, in attacking the United Nations troops in Korea on 25 November 1950, communist China had already branded itself as an aggressor. Nevertheless, the United Nations had, for a period of two months, avoided calling things by their right names. It had taken such an attitude in order to permit a peaceful solution of the Korean question. Now that all appeals had failed, the only course that remained open for the Organization was to adhere to the principles and purposes of the Charter, as they had been set forth in the United States draft resolution (A/C.1/654).

34. Mr. KYROU felt that, because Greek volunteers at that very moment were making the supreme sacrifice to uphold the principles of the Charter on the Korean battle-field, the delegation of Greece was entitled to the honour of co-sponsoring that draft resolution.

35. Mr. URRUTIA (Colombia) said that the United Nations Charter provided for two complementary procedures for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. The first was that of conciliation and investigation, to be carried out by either the Security Council or the General Assembly. The second contemplated various measures to be agreed upon in the event that the initial gestures failed.

36. The representative of Colombia recalled that, in the course of drafting both the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of the United Nations, particular importance had been given to the conclusions which would be reached by the Council or the Assembly in investigating the causes of international disputes. While the Anglo-Saxon countries at Versailles had considered that it would be impossible, once the responsibility of an aggressor had been recognized, that all the other countries would not automatically and of their own volition come to the assistance of a country attacked, the nations of Latin America had insisted upon the need of granting to the international Organization the powers necessary to impose its will in the event that the moral sanctions suggested by the Anglo-Saxon countries proved to be inadequate. The procedure adopted for the League of Nations nevertheless had been defective and, although that procedure had been corrected at San Francisco when greater powers had been given to the Security Council to impose, if necessary, the will of the United Nations by force, the paralysis of the Council had compelled the General Assembly, at its present session, through its resolution (377 (V)) on uniting for peace, to empower the General Assembly to consider measures when the Security Council found it impossible to take action.

37. The fact that the United Nations had assumed the functions confirmed by that resolution did not relieve the Committee of the primary obligation to express in precise terms its conclusions concerning the existence or non-existence of aggression. Once the Committee had reached its conclusions, the Council or the General Assembly might, at a later date, study the measures likely to restore peace and security in the area.

38. In that connexion, reference had been made to the definition of the aggressor submitted in 1933 by the USSR, in the League of Nations, to the definition of the aggressor which had been incorporated into the Pact of Bogotá and to the obligations of American States when faced with an act of aggression. As regards assistance to armed bands of volunteers, the American States were bound by a positive obligation under the Havana Treaty of 1928 on the duties and rights of States in the event of civil strife, by the terms of which they undertook to prevent volunteers from crossing their boundaries for the purpose of taking part in civil strife in other countries.

39. It had been contended that the People's Republic of China could not prevent individuals from helping their North Korean neighbours, and that the neutrality provisions in the Conventions of The Hague did not prohibit the enlisting of thousands of Chinese in the ranks of the North Korean army. Even if one would agree to that unwarranted contention, the People's Government of China would, nevertheless, still remain under the obligation to prevent so-called volunteers from obtaining arms from its territory.

40. The delegation of Colombia had supported the efforts of the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea because, under the Charter, all Member States were obligated to exhaust every possible means of conciliation. But in no case could conversations progress under the conditions outlined in the reply of Mr. Chou En-lai to the latest United Nations appeal. The very text of that cablegram gave fresh proof that the Government of the People's Republic of China did not intend to alter its position, which had been considered unacceptable by the United Nations. In the circumstances, the Colombian delegation could not see how troops could be withdrawn before there had been a cessation of hostilities, and could not agree to negotiations being conducted while war was still being waged against the forces of the United Nations. Any such agreement would be tantamount not only to the unconditional surrender of the United Nations but also to a breach of elementary moral principles. The Organization could not put a premium on aggression by admitting the People's Republic of China to the United Nations at the very outset of the proposed conference. Nor could the United Nations in advance give satisfaction to the Central People's Government on all those matters which should constitute the very objectives of negotiations.

41. The Colombian delegation had given close consideration to the various statements of those who had recommended that the United Nations proceed with caution and avoid any precipitate steps which might impose upon the Organization obligations which it could not discharge. Nevertheless, there could be no delay in specifying and defining what had taken place in Korea, because a failure to qualify aggression in Asia would sooner or later have repercussions in other areas of the world.

42. The delegation of Colombia, therefore, was prepared to support and to associate itself with the United States of America in the sponsorship of the draft resolution (A/C.1/654) which the latter had submitted to the Committee. In the draft resolution, it was noted

that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China had refused to agree to the proposals made to it—proposals which had been based on the principle that cessation of hostilities should precede the opening of negotiations—and had committed an act of aggression by giving assistance to those who had been recognized as aggressors. It was difficult to understand how those States which had already declared the North Koreans to be aggressors could now be reluctant to qualify the intervention of the People's Republic of China in the same way. Moreover, in the hope that the Central People's Government of China might change its attitude, the draft resolution proposed that the General Assembly should not immediately determine what collective measures should be taken to assure putting its decision into effect but, rather, that such measures should be studied by the Collective Measures Committee with sufficient time at its disposal to reflect upon the advisability of the Organization taking any further action. The door to future possible agreement and understanding with the People's Republic of China would not be closed.

43. Mr. BLANCO (Cuba) felt that the United States draft resolution set forth the fundamental principles on which future United Nations action should be based in view of the failure of attempts that had been made to obtain a cease-fire in Korea. The Peking Government had not shown the slightest desire to co-operate with the United Nations. On the contrary, what was being asked was the capitulation of the United Nations to the conditions set forth by that government.

44. When his delegation had voted in favour of the supplementary report (A/C.1/645) of the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea, it had done so on the understanding that the transmittal to the Peking Government of the proposals embodied therein would constitute the last effort to be made to reach an understanding with that régime. That did not mean, however, that the United Nations should not at any time be prepared to agree to any suggestions which might lead to a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem; the delegation of Cuba therefore considered it appropriate that the United States draft resolution took that aspect of the question into consideration. However, because the Peking Government had given direct assistance to the North Korean aggressors, it had actually committed an act of aggression, and appropriate machinery should be established for the consideration of the necessary collective measures.

45. The Cuban delegation believed that the United States draft resolution responded to the desire for justice which had been manifested by the great majority of the countries of the world. The delegation therefore wished to associate itself with the principles embodied in that draft, which it would support unreservedly.

46. Mr. HOLGUIN DE LAVALLE (Peru) stated that the delegation of Peru would support the United States draft resolution because it embodied the only decision which the United Nations could take in the present circumstances in order to carry out its responsibilities under the Charter and to safeguard the authority which had been vested in the Organization by Member States. At the same time, the United States draft resolution left the door open to a pacific settlement of the question.

47. Mr. PALAR (Indonesia) recalled that the United Nations Organization had succeeded in bringing about peace between the Netherlands and Indonesia and had persuaded both parties to start negotiations, despite the fact that no cease-fire had officially existed. Although the present situation in Korea was not similar to that which had then prevailed in Indonesia, the purpose of the United Nations in both cases was identical; it was the preservation of peace.

48. The delegation of Indonesia could not conceal its disappointment over the fact that the reply of the People's Republic of China did not immediately lead to the objectives for which the United Nations was striving. Nevertheless, Mr. Palar believed that the spirit of the reply of Mr. Chou En-lai reflected an attitude somewhat different from that which had previously been manifested by the People's Republic of China. One could not help but notice a striking difference in tone when one compared the statements⁴ made at Lake Success by the representative of that Republic and Mr. Chou En-lai's first cablegram to the President of the General Assembly (A/C.1/643) with the counter-proposals made by the Foreign Minister of China in the reply under consideration. It was encouraging to note that the demands which, according to the People's Republic of China, would have to be met before a settlement of the Korean question could be considered, had now become the subject of negotiations, as could be ascertained from the counter-proposals of Mr. Chou En-lai.

49. Those counter-proposals merited the closest attention. They should be carefully studied with a view to determining which points would contribute to the maintenance of peace, so that they might be linked to the proposals which the First Committee regarded as essential for peace. Furthermore, the Committee should try to determine which points in the counter-proposals would hinder it in its efforts to preserve peace. Subsequently, the Committee should make an effort to convince the People's Republic of China that it must abandon those points.

50. Any move to condemn the People's Republic of China in the present delicate position would only add to the difficulties confronting the Committee in its labourious efforts to maintain peace, and might even jeopardize those efforts altogether. The delegation of Indonesia would give its support and co-sponsorship to every endeavour to continue to achieve a settlement with the People's Republic of China on the basis of the accepted principles of the Committee, taking into account the counter-proposals of the People's Republic of China. To that end, the Indonesian delegation was continuing its efforts for world peace as a member of the group of delegations from twelve Asian and Arab nations.

51. Mr. DUNCAN (Panama) stated that, when his delegation had voted for the last cease-fire proposal (425th meeting), it had been somewhat pessimistic about the outcome of such a gesture. Moreover, it had seemed to his delegation that the very nature of the concessions which had been made and the fact that

⁴ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year*, No. 69 (527th meeting) and the statement subsequently issued as A/C.1/661.

those concessions had implied a withdrawal on the part of the United Nations might well prevent the attainment of the objectives which had been sought. Nevertheless, his delegation had wanted to give proof of its co-operation with those who had still harboured hope regarding the true attitude of the Chinese communist Government. The reply of the Peking régime could not have been more categorically negative, and its conditions were the same as those which the United Nations had faced previously. Those conditions were the evacuation of Korea, the handing over of Formosa and representation in the United Nations. Another condition had been added; it was that the proposed conference should be held in China.

52. The United Nations had declared the North Koreans to be aggressors when they had crossed the 38th parallel. Therefore, communist China was also an aggressor because of its invasion of Korea. Though the United Nations had acted with leniency towards the Peking régime, its patience and tolerance had nevertheless been misunderstood and misinterpreted. At the present juncture, any further delay in declaring communist China guilty of aggression was impossible. Moreover, although the Committee had been advised to look well before leaping, the Panamanian delegation felt that the question was not one of leaping, but rather of adopting, without further vacillation, a decision which would support the moral authority of the United Nations.

53. Many of the disappointments which the Committee had experienced in its attempts to negotiate with the Chinese régime in Peking had stemmed from the latter's war-like psychology, in view of which it was evident that no proposal for peaceful negotiations could be successful. In that connexion, the representative of Panama referred to the final paragraph of Mr. Chou En-lai's reply (A/C.1/653, paragraph 4); that paragraph was tantamount to an ultimatum.

54. In view of those facts, the United Nations had no other course open to it than that of condemning communist China as an aggressor. Such a course was imperative if the Organization did not wish to see its prestige completely shattered and its moral authority annihilated. His delegation would therefore vote in favour of the United States draft resolution.

55. Mr. SARDER (Turkey) remarked that the United States draft resolution reflected the attitude which the United Nations should adopt in the present crisis. Moreover, it was in harmony with the line of action which the delegation of Turkey had always favoured and had on numerous instances advocated in the General Assembly. Since his delegation was in agreement with the main ideas and provisions of the United States draft resolution, it would vote for that draft in its entirety.

56. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) stated that his delegation viewed with deep regret and disappointment the fact that the People's Republic of China had not responded favourably to the efforts made, in the first place by the group of thirteen Asian and Arab States in their appeal and, in the second place, by both the General Assembly and the First Committee in their attempts to arrange a cease-fire to be followed by negotiations to settle outstanding Far Eastern questions.

57. Mr. Al-Jamali observed that there was not the slightest doubt that Chinese communist troops had been fighting on Korean soil against United Nations troops and had thereby violated Article 2, paragraph 5 of the Charter. The most generous explanation of the intentions of the Chinese communists would be that they had come to aid their North Korean neighbours, who had been branded as aggressors by the United Nations. Therefore, the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China was helping an aggressor.

58. Moreover, the Committee had been told that the Security Council's decision to take action in Korea and the successive General Assembly resolutions regarding Korea were neither valid nor legal because they had been adopted in the absence of a representative of the People's Republic of China. To that contention, one could only answer that the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations could not be cited as a reason for invalidating the decisions of the United Nations until the issue had been thoroughly considered and decided upon by the General Assembly. Even assuming, however, that the People's Republic of China might have a legitimate claim to representation in the United Nations, that did not in any way justify its support of aggression and its fight against United Nations troops.

59. Allowance should be made to the fact that the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China was apprehensive and suspicious as regards its territory. The history of relations between East and West had led Orientals to view with suspicion and misgivings anything that came from the West. Even the fact that fifteen non-Western nations had taken part in the appeal and the proposals for a cease-fire did not seem to have allayed the suspicions of the People's Republic of China.

60. In accordance with the old-time diplomatic procedure of bargaining, one might assume that, after all, the People's Republic of China might be willing, at heart, to reach a peaceful settlement of all issues, but that a good deal of negotiating would be required before the desired settlement could be reached. Although the Iraqi delegation did not enthusiastically share that view, it wished to assume that the door was not entirely closed to further attempts at a peaceful settlement, and the delegation agreed with the representative of Egypt (427th meeting) that the People's Republic of China should not be branded as an aggressor until all hopes for conciliation had been abandoned. However, his delegation had not the slightest doubt that aggression had been committed, and should the United Nations fail in all its attempts, no one could question the decision of the Committee as regards China's aggression.

61. The delegation of Iraq, along with other Asian and Arab delegations, hoped to revise the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/642) of 12 December 1950 with a view to bringing it up to date. The new attempt would by no means represent any surrender, appeasement or compromise of principle. On the contrary, the object would be to do the utmost in fulfilling the aims and methods of conciliation and pacific settlement. The delegation of Iraq sincerely hope that, through that

attempt, the truly peace-loving spirit of the Chinese people would prevail and that no resort to the branding of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China as an aggressor would be necessary. The Iraqi delegation also hoped that the United Nations would demonstrate the highest degree of self-restraint and unity.

62. The representative of Iraq expressed full understanding and appreciation of the viewpoint of the United States delegation, but hoped that it would be possible for the United States to support still another attempt at a peaceful settlement before calling for the adoption of its own draft resolution.

63. Sir Benegal RAU (India) stated that his government viewed the latest Chinese reply, not as an outright rejection of the principles approved by the Committee, but as partly acceptance, partly non-acceptance, partly a request for elucidation and partly a set of counter-proposals. The best way of appraising the reply would be to examine the four counter-proposals (A/C.1/653, paragraph 3).

64. Counter-proposal (a) was to the effect that negotiations should be held among the countries concerned on the basis of agreement to the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and the settlement of Korean domestic affairs by the Korean people themselves. That was, in fact, a part of principle 3 of the statement of principles in the supplementary report of the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea (A/C.1/645) which the Committee had approved (425th meeting). The only difference was that principle 3 referred to withdrawal by appropriate stages whereas the counter-proposal was silent on that particular point. However, there was no necessary contradiction between the two proposals. Indeed, they might amount to the same thing, for when the Committee spoke of appropriate stages in principle 3, the intention was presumably that the appropriate stages were to be determined by the conference contemplated under the Committee's principle 5. Similarly, when the Chinese reply spoke of withdrawal without speaking of either the manner or the stages of that withdrawal, the intention was presumably that those were matters which might be decided by the seven-Power conference contemplated in counter-proposal (c). Thus, the two proposals might amount to much the same thing in their actual implementation.

65. Counter-proposal (b) was to the effect that the subject-matter of the negotiations should include the withdrawal of United States armed forces from Taiwan (Formosa) and Taiwan Straits, and related Far Eastern problems. Here again there was no necessary contradiction between that counter-proposal and the proposal embodied in the Committee's principle 5, under which all Far Eastern problems were to be the subject-matter of the proposed conference. No problem was excluded, and indeed the problem of Taiwan was specifically included without any qualifications. Once more, therefore, there was room for adjustment.

66. Counter-proposal (c) consisted of two parts. The first merely named the countries that were to participate in the conference. France, Egypt and India were specifically included, in addition to the four States mentioned in principle 5. In that connexion, the Committee

would recall that the enumeration in principle 5 had not been intended to be exhaustive; therefore, the inclusion of those other three countries was merely an amplification of principle 5. In fact, the seven countries mentioned in the Chinese reply were the very same countries that he, Sir Benegal, had mentioned in his statement introducing the twelve-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/642) on 12 December last (415th meeting). The second part of counter-proposal (c) dealt with the problem of Chinese representation. Though that counter-proposal was not as clear as it should be, it should be recalled that the delegation of India, ever since January 1950, had consistently advocated granting the representative of the Central People's Government its seat in the United Nations. The delegation of India was well aware that there were many Member States which could not agree with India then and which might find it even harder to agree with India at the present time. After all, however, the Committee must remember that those were merely counter-proposals, still open to discussion.

67. Finally, counter-proposal (d) stated that the proposed seven-nation conference should be held in China. The venue of the conference was clearly a detail for discussion. There were obvious advantages in holding a conference whose main concern was with Far Eastern problems at some place in or near the Far East. Since the principles approved by the Committee were silent on that point, such a proposal was still open to discussion.

68. It should be clear from the above that the counter-proposals of Mr. Chou En-lai did afford room for further discussions and negotiations. However, many representatives apparently felt that a further attempt at negotiations would be damaging to the prestige and authority of the United Nations. They feared that, to continue to negotiate with a government which, in their view, was directly or indirectly defying the United Nations in the field, would amount to appeasement.

69. But in that connexion one had to ask the reason for Chinese intervention in Korea. Though no one could tell for certain what that reason was, one possibility was that the intervention was not the result of a desire for expansion of Chinese territory or influence, but of a fear for China's own territorial integrity. Reasons of history, a generation of continual war of one kind or another, and the isolation resulting from non-representation in the United Nations and other causes had tended to create various fears and suspicions in the Chinese mind. The United Nations knew that those fears and suspicions were without justification; but it was not enough for the United Nations to know that fact. The Organization must do all it could to remove all groundless fears from the minds of others as well. To remove misunderstandings or misfounded suspicions which were likely to lead to war was not an unworthy task, and negotiations to that end could not possibly be described as appeasement.

70. It might be contended that the Central People's Government was in fact a rebel against the United Nations, whatever its motives, and to negotiate with a rebel was inconsistent with the prestige of the Organization. It would be useful, however, to recall that

five or six years ago there had been an organization in India which had rebelled against British authority. Nevertheless, British statesmen had negotiated with the leaders of that organization, amidst prophecies of disaster to all concerned. Those so-called rebels were now world figures, and India of its own free will remained within the Commonwealth.

71. To brand the Central People's Government of China as an aggressor might serve no useful purpose. If such a step were to be taken, it would hardly increase the prestige of the United Nations unless it was intended to be followed by other steps. Since the feasi-

bility of those further steps had not yet been examined, the only result of such a resolution would be not only to leave all Far Eastern problems unsolved, but also to make them insoluble since, once such a resolution had been adopted, negotiation, even for the purpose of removing misunderstandings, would have to be abandoned. Moreover, the atmosphere for successful negotiation would disappear and the present tension in the Far East would be perpetuated and would continue unabated. For the present, the Government of India was opposed to so disastrous a course.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.