



Friday, 4 December 1953,
at 3 p.m.

New York

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Chairman: Mr. F. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium).

Complaint by the Union of Burma regarding aggression against it by the Government of the Republic of China: report of the Government of the Union of Burma (A/2423, A/2468, A/C.1/L.89, A/C.1/L.90/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.91, A/C.1/L.93) (concluded)

[Item 25]*

1. Mr. Y. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation had already expressed (656th meeting), its complete sympathy with the Burmese people who were victims of aggression by the troops of Chiang Kai-shek, had condemned the assistance provided to the latter by certain countries in the form of weapons and subsidies, and had maintained that, in view of the threat the situation presented to the peace and security of the Far East, General Assembly resolution 707 (VII) of 23 April 1953 should have been applied.

2. The Committee had before it draft resolution A/C.1/L.90/Rev.1. In studying that text it should be remembered that despite the considerable time which had passed only a very small number of people, mainly women and children, had been evacuated; total evacuation at that rate would take seven years. The actual intention was to allow the Chiang Kai-shek bands to remain in Burma by means of a feigned evacuation which would permit a regrouping of forces, and would thereby only increase the threat to the peace. The only conclusion to be drawn from Mr. Lodge's letter (A/C.1/L.89) and the enclosed report was that the Kuomintang and its protectors were snapping their fingers at the General Assembly. Modern weapons had been distributed to a force numbering 12,500 men; the United States could hardly refer to the surrender of five serviceable rifles as an improvement in the situation.

3. The Chiang Kai-shek clique had not merely committed an act of aggression by maintaining its troops in the territory of a sovereign State; it was also, as the Polish representative had pointed out, engaging in attacks on merchant shipping on the high seas. When it was remembered that the United States Navy had occupied Formosa as long ago as 1950, it could only

be concluded that that violation of the freedom of the seas involved the responsibility of a Power which could easily exercise pressure on the puppet Chiang Kai-shek régime.

4. Since the Kuomintang knew only the law of the jungle, as had been pointed out, the United Nations could not close its eyes to the situation. The USSR delegation shared the indignation of the Polish Government and people at such acts of piracy.

5. Accordingly, draft resolution A/C.1/L.90/Rev.1 in no way met the situation. It included a paragraph according to which the General Assembly appreciated the efforts of the United States and Thailand. As several representatives had remarked, there was no reason for satisfaction with an evacuation which covered only 8 per cent of the forces concerned. If a director of an enterprise was responsible for such a failure, it would warrant his dismissal.

6. His delegation would be unable to support the nine-Power draft resolution unless the words of congratulation—calculated to deceive public opinion, aggravate the situation and disguise the fact that certain parties were in reality opposed to any evacuation—were deleted.

7. To try, as the United States and Thailand did in their amendments (A/C.1/L.92), to confer official status on the Joint Military Committee at Bangkok was to make nonsense of the Charter and the General Assembly's rules of procedure. The General Assembly had never established such an organ and knew nothing of its activities; rather than "not pressing" the amendments the United States would do better to withdraw them altogether.

8. Mr. DOMINGUEZ CAMPORA (Uruguay) said that the Committee was confronted with actual aggression, as had been noted in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly. All States, particularly the smaller ones, were vitally interested in the affirmation of the principle of territorial integrity.

9. Unfortunately, although the perpetrator of the crime was known, two factors essential for the imposition of a penalty were missing: a subject of international law who could be charged with the crime, and the possibility of the victim securing reparation.

10. Those juridical considerations apart, the damage being caused was increasing, and the situation might undermine confidence in the United Nations.

11. His delegation would have liked to be able to support a more forceful proposal, but would vote for draft resolution A/C.1/L.90/Rev.1, to enable the United Nations to meet any eventuality.

12. Mr. TORIELLO GARRIDO (Guatemala) wished to place on record the deep anxiety felt by his

* Indicates the item number on the agenda of the General Assembly.

people and Government over the position in which Burma found itself owing to the intervention of foreign troops within its territory. The most painful feature of the situation was that it had lasted for so long and that, despite the fact that it was known to the United Nations, no more energetic and adequate steps had been taken to defend the territorial integrity of a nation which was small in area but made great by its courageous and deserving attitude and, according to the Charter of the United Nations, the sovereign equal of all other States. The case of Burma was an example of what could happen to small countries whose only defence against similar aggression was whatever action the United Nations might take to protect them. However, unless energetic steps were taken and if United Nations action was too little and too late, the small nations would once more see an uncertain future opening before them and the peoples would receive a negative reply to the hopes they had placed in the United Nations, which ought to be implementing the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, which were designed to safeguard all nations, with all the diligence that the case required.

13. Although the draft resolution (A/C.1/L.90/Rev.1) did not entirely satisfy the Guatemalan delegation, because it left the difficulties in which Burma found itself unsolved, he would vote in favour of it on the grounds that it represented an attempt, however feeble, to take appropriate action. Guatemala hoped that if the intervention of which Burma, a country for which his delegation expressed the most lively sympathy, was a victim, was not brought to an end within a reasonable space of time, the United Nations would take immediate action. Failure to take such action would be to tolerate a situation which was a threat to world peace and security, in the face of which the United Nations would have left the legitimate aspirations of the peoples unanswered.

14. Mr. VAVRICKA (Czechoslovakia) observed that resolution 707 (VII) had failed to meet Burma's request that the act of aggression against it should be condemned, although the machinations of the Kuomintang had been perfectly clear. The nine-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.90/Rev.1) similarly contained a particularly unfortunate element: paragraph 3 of the operative part would convey a false impression and allow the Kuomintang to consolidate the position of its forces in Burma.

15. His delegation agreed with the Polish representative (678th meeting) with regard to the responsibility of the United States in the situation illustrated by the recent attack on a Polish vessel. Looting on Burmese territory, opium smuggling, brigandage and piracy: such were the acts of a régime controlled by the United States, whose various criminal activities had of course been even intensified since the conclusion of the Korean armistice. For example, a cargo of Czechoslovak goods aboard the Italian vessel *Marilu* had been seized on 11 August by Kuomintang forces; and the British Press too was constantly reporting acts of piracy against British vessels. Such were the crimes of the Kuomintang, a group hostile to the peaceful co-existence of peoples which, thanks to United States pressure, occupied a seat which legally belonged to the representative of a great peace-loving State. If the United States withdrew its support all those criminal activities would obviously cease.

16. His delegation would vote against paragraph 3 of the operative part of draft resolution A/C.1/L.90/Rev.1.

17. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) said that his delegation had studied all the juridical aspects of the matter when the draft resolution originally submitted by Mexico had been adopted at the 428th plenary meeting. Some results had certainly been achieved, but unfortunately the evacuation had not been as complete as might have been desired.

18. The nine-Power draft resolution confirmed the previous resolution, taking recent developments into account, and his delegation, which had listened with sympathy to the Burmese representative's clear and dispassionate statement (677th meeting), would vote for it and for the amendments (A/C.1/L.92) if they were put to the vote. It was the duty of the United Nations to continue to show active sympathy for a people in grave danger.

19. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said that he realized that the United States representative was confronted with a difficult and thankless task. He was surprised, however, that the latter appeared to have a rather poor opinion of the First Committee's intelligence; though at the beginning of his speech he had actually maintained that his Government had endeavoured only to reduce tension and implement the General Assembly resolution, his subsequent words had entirely refuted that assertion.

20. The United States representative had not, moreover, replied to the charges directed against his country, but had only dealt with the alleged repatriation. The still unconfirmed figure of 1,421 repatriated persons, including 206 women and children, was sufficient evidence of the scope of that operation. Even that number included some sick, aged and wounded, as well as Burmese recently recruited into the Kuomintang bands. As for the weapons surrendered, they amounted to nineteen rifles and one sub-machine gun. The United States representative had in fact only confirmed that the evacuation had been a stratagem for regrouping the Kuomintang forces by ridding them of the sick and unfit and equipping them with modern weapons.

21. Furthermore, the United States representative had made it clear that no total evacuation was envisaged. He had only spoken of an evacuation of 2,000 persons which was merely a face-saving device for the benefit of the Kuomintang and the United States, and did not remove the serious danger to Burmese independence and sovereignty. Whoever understood American policy, which aimed at the use of Burma, Formosa and North Korea as bases for a future attack, realized that after the failure of the Korean venture Burma had assumed increased importance as a base for the attack on the People's Republic of China which the United States had been carefully planning for a number of years.

22. Certain charges had been made concerning attacks on merchant ships. Yet the United States remained silent, or gave evasive replies, though it could hardly imagine that the First Committee had such a short memory that it had forgotten the decision taken by the United States in June 1950 to control Formosa with the Seventh Fleet. Since that time, the Kuomintang had subsisted only thanks to American equipment and subsidies, which enabled it to maintain its reign of terror over Formosa. Documentary evi-

dence was available: under the Mutual Security Act, the Kuomintang had received \$US 350 million, in addition to secret subsidies. That was because, as the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate had stated in chapter 32 of its report of 13 June 1953, Formosa was of considerable strategic importance. That being so, the Kuomintang's acts of piracy and its aggression in Burma were being perpetrated with the connivance, if not the full participation, of American forces. Furthermore, an American aircraft had taken part in the seizure of the Polish vessel *Praca*—a fact which the United States representative had been able neither to deny nor to explain. Indeed, the United States, in its note of 20 October had replied to the Polish note of 12 October by an outright denial, instead of giving a detailed answer to the charges made. That amounted to an admission of complicity with the pirates.

23. The United States, which would be aroused by the appearance in Burma of a single soldier of the Chinese People's Army was assuming the defence of the Kuomintang in order to allow the latter to perpetrate misdeeds on land and sea.

24. As at the previous session, the proposed draft resolution did not meet the needs of the situation; indeed, its adoption would allow the trouble-makers to commit fresh acts of aggression. In particular, the Polish delegation was unable to support any expression of appreciation to those who had never attempted to bring about a real solution of the problem. On the other hand, the Polish delegation would be prepared to support any measures genuinely conducive to the restoration of peace, friendly relations between nations, and the freedom of shipping.

25. Mr. NINCIC (Yugoslavia) said that his delegation would support the nine-Power draft resolution but without any great illusions; for developments in regard to repatriation had only confirmed the fears expressed earlier. The numbers of persons evacuated did not correspond to the promises given, and the number of weapons surrendered was ludicrously small. That did not presage any early implementation of the resolution, nor a change of attitude on the part of Formosa.

26. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.90/Rev.1 reflected a situation which was hardly encouraging. While it did not go so far as some might have desired, however, it did reaffirm legitimate principles. It was the duty of all concerned to see that the new resolution would be more effectively implemented than the preceding one. The Yugoslav delegation, for one, would be satisfied only with total evacuation and the cessation of the aggression committed.

27. Mr. Chih-Mai CHEN (China) said that unfortunately Mr. Tsiang was prevented by illness from taking part in the day's discussions. A number of delegations, it might be noted, had come round to the Chinese point of view that a reopening of the general debate would serve no useful purpose.

28. It was rather surprising that nobody had thought of referring to the body of irregulars on Burmese territory as the Anti-Communist National Salvation Army. The speakers had doubtless thought that by using all sorts of designations in preference to that used by the irregulars themselves they would be proving some point.

29. Furthermore, it was peculiar to speak of aggression, when the originators of the aggression were being evacuated daily from the place where the aggression had allegedly taken place. In actual fact, since the resolution had been adopted, practical steps had been taken to implement it, and substantial progress had been achieved. The Chinese delegation deeply appreciated the efforts of the honest brokers: the United States, Thailand and the Joint Military Committee. In those circumstances it was unfortunate that the co-operation given to the latter body by the Republic of China was not always appreciated; the difficult conditions in which the evacuation was taking place were often overlooked. They included racial complexities, the impossibility of ascertaining precise figures, and diversity of weapons, sometimes purchased on the black market.

30. The First Committee must realize, accordingly, that the situation was changing from hour to hour. For instance, weapons had just been shipped from Monghsat to Tachilek and would soon be surrendered to the Joint Military Committee. Consequently, the expediency of another resolution seemed open to question. China understood the concern of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.90/Rev.1; however, in view of the fluid situation obtaining, it would abstain from the vote.

31. Mr. U MYINT THEIN (Burma) said it was gratifying to see that the members of the Committee showed the greatest understanding of Burma's situation. That unanimity would allow him to make his final speech brief. It was, however, necessary to observe, in reply to the Thailand representative's assertion (678th meeting) that the efforts of the Joint Military Committee at Bangkok had not been fully appreciated, that all the delegations, including the Burmese delegation, was grateful to that Committee for the goodwill which it had displayed. But it had to be remembered that the Joint Military Committee, composed of representatives of four governments, was not an organ of the United Nations. His delegation's objection to the use of the term "Joint Military Committee", in the amendment to the draft resolution, was due merely to its desire to avoid complicating the issue. While it fully appreciated the Committee's efforts, his delegation considered that it was improper for that body to be authorized to send its reports direct to the United Nations.

32. The Joint Military Committee's documents had been transmitted to the United States Government by subordinate military officers, and could be regarded only as documents originating from the American delegation, not as reports addressed to the United Nations.

33. The Burmese delegation was gratified to learn that neither Thailand nor the United States would press their amendments. If they did, it would be compelled to vote against them.

34. As for the situation in Burma, it must be emphasized that the evacuation had been unsatisfactory. While it was true that approximately 1,200 alleged combatants had been evacuated, a good proportion had in fact been invalids and children dressed in uniform. Those were established facts; indeed, photographs had been taken and had been published in the 7 December 1953 issue of *Life*. The photographs showed, for example, a group of men leaving Burmese territory carrying the Chinese Nationalist flag. Another photograph showed a child who looked no more than eight

years old in uniform. Further, there had been a photograph of the arms surrendered by the first batch of evacuees—three knives.

35. Mr. Tsiang had announced that the weapons would be collected at Monghsat, but that had not yet been done and the fact remained that so far the evacuation had been wholly unsatisfactory. The withdrawal of 2,000 persons and the surrender of forty worthless weapons meant little in relation to the forces remaining in Burma.

36. The Chinese Government, which had left the troops in question behind in 1950, refused to give them official orders to withdraw. So long as such an order was not forthcoming from Formosa, the men would think that they were required to remain in the jungle. The only people who could induce the people at Formosa to settle the problem were the people of the United States. Consequently, the problem would remain unsettled until something more than moral pressure was brought to bear on the Formosa authorities.

37. It was gratifying that the President of the United States himself was taking an interest in the matter. Recently the Vice President had been in Burma and had been apprised of the situation. If the people of America from the President down would persuade the authorities at Formosa to see reason, the problem would be solved.

38. The Burmese Government had shown great patience since the adoption of the resolution 707 (VII) of 23 April 1953. When no progress had been made Burma had started military operations, which it had suspended at the request of the United States and Thailand. The time-limit for the cease-fire had been extended twice. If the evacuation became more serious and tangible progress was made, the Burmese Government would continue to co-operate. It hoped that it would not be obliged to change its attitude; but if it were, the United Nations would surely understand that all patience had its limits, and that Burma's patience was all but exhausted.

39. Although the Burmese delegation was not entirely satisfied with the draft resolution, believing that aggression should be treated as such, it would be desirable for the resolution to be adopted unanimously. As it did not wish to do anything that might increase the present international tension, Burma would support the draft resolution, and hoped that the representatives of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian SSR, the Byelorussian SSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia, which had shown sympathy for Burma's cause, would be magnanimous so as to achieve unanimity.

REVISED DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY AUSTRALIA, CANADA, INDIA, INDONESIA, NEW ZEALAND, NORWAY, SWEDEN, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND URUGUAY (A/C.1/L.90/Rev.1) AND THE AMENDMENT THERETO

40. Mr. Y. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) asked that the Committee should vote on the USSR amendment, which had been submitted orally, for the deletion of paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.1/L.90/Rev.1.

41. The CHAIRMAN put the amendment to the vote.

The amendment was rejected by 49 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions.

42. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the draft resolution A/C.1/L.90/Rev.1.

The draft resolution was adopted by 51 votes to none, with 6 abstentions.

43. Mr. HOPPENOT (France) explained that his delegation had supported draft resolution A/C.1/L.90/Rev.1, which expressed in clear and moderate language the view reached by the Committee after weighing the views of the parties concerned. Moreover, the resolution was a logical sequel to that unanimously adopted on 23 April 1953, which was conceived in the same spirit.

44. As the Indian representative had pointed out, Burma could not be placed on the same footing as Nationalist China in the case. While the Formosa Government's special difficulties in asserting its authority over General Li Mi must be recognized, it was to be desired that the Formosa Government should continue its somewhat belated efforts in a more effective manner than in the past.

45. The French delegation appreciated the efforts made by Thailand and the United States in the matter, and was confident that they would persevere in them and obtain more satisfactory results in the future.

46. The French people felt the warmest friendship for the young Burmese State and had followed with admiration its people's efforts to establish and strengthen its independence within a framework of social democracy. The French delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.90/Rev.1 mainly because the Burmese delegation had very wisely supported it.

47. Mr. CAREY (United States of America) said that the fact that the Committee had refused by an overwhelming majority to delete paragraph 3 of the draft resolution was the most telling answer to the Polish representative's gratuitous slander against the United States. The United States Government would continue to do everything in its power to expedite the evacuation of the foreign troops stationed in Burma and the surrender of all weapons.

48. Mr. Y. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) wondered whether the United States representative should not supplement his last statement by naming a time-limit.

49. The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee was now solely concerned with explanations of vote.

50. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) noted that the United States representatives had found nothing more specific to say in answer to the facts and figures cited by the Polish delegation than to call them slander.

The meeting rose at 4.50 p.m.