



Wednesday, 25 October 1950, at 3 p.m.

Official Records

Lake Success, New York

CONTENTS

Page

Declaration on the removal of the threat of a new war and the strengthening of peace and security among nations (*continued*) 191

Chairman: Mr. Roberto URDANETA ARBELÁEZ (Colombia).

Declaration on the removal of the threat of a new war and the strengthening of peace and security among the nations (*continued*)

[Item 69]*

GENERAL DISCUSSION (*continued*)

1. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) drew the Committee's attention to the exceptional importance of the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union (A/C.1/595). The three points of the declaration contained a plan to ensure solution of the most important problems facing the peoples of the world. It comprised the essential measures on issues on which depended the restoration of the necessary co-operation among the great Powers.

2. Mr. Wierblowski referred to the speech made by the representative of Australia (374th meeting) which had tried to drown the substance of the question presented by the Soviet Union in a morass of slander and demagogic phrases while juggling the words of the Charter. Without having any data about the Soviet Union's military expenditures, Mr. Spender had stated that that budget exceeded that of the United States. However, by comparing the military expenditures with the figure of the national income of the United States, the feverish armaments race in that country could be observed. When hundreds of millions of people expressed their desire for peace, Mr. Spender saw them as puppets and war-mongers. He also described the peoples' desire for freedom as internal aggression. While the Australian representative had spoken in favour of the proposal to create an international commission on disarmament, he was opposed to any disarmament and declared himself to be in favour of an armaments race. Mr. Spender's attitude of non-co-operation with the work of any proposed disarmament commission confirmed the Polish delegation's judgment about the work of the Commission for Conventional Armaments and its achievements.

3. Mr. Spender had spoken of 150 Soviet Union divisions, but he did not mention the military forces of the North Atlantic bloc which were setting up military installations and bases all over the world, including the area around the Soviet Union and the people's democracies. His allegation of the aggressive policies of the Soviet Union was unfounded. The record of the past five years showed that the USSR, both within and outside the United Nations, had been consistently following a policy of peace and co-operation.

4. Mr. Wierblowski then referred to the speech made by the representative of Greece (374th meeting) which had supported Platonic dialectics but had taken exception to Marxian dialectics. The Greek representative had labelled the Stockholm Peace Appeal, which had been signed by millions of people, as mere Cominform propaganda, and had stated that the rifle of a Greek partisan was as dangerous to the world as an atomic bomb. Those nonsensical words were intended to cover up the reactionary and bloodthirsty nature of the Greek régime.

5. Mr. van Langenhove had also spoken (374th meeting) of Soviet Union imperialism, colonialism and fifth column activities. The representative of Belgium had apparently forgotten that such statements lead to crime and fascism, as was proved by the recent killing of the leader of the workers' movement, Mr. Lahaut, in Liège.

6. The issues raised in the Soviet Union's declaration should not be considered as mere propaganda. The substance of the draft resolution was worthy of a more serious discussion.

7. The first point raised by the Soviet Union draft resolution was warmongering and propaganda. To remove the threat of a new war, psychological preparation and appeals for resort to arms as a method of solving problems should be brought to an end. The USSR draft resolution called upon the General Assembly to urge the States to condemn and prevent any propaganda in favour of a new war and to punish those who were responsible for such activities. The General Assembly,

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

in its second session, had unanimously adopted resolution 110 (II) condemning war propaganda. It had also called upon the Member States to take steps to assist propaganda in favour of peace. That General Assembly resolution, however, had not been enforced in certain countries, and, in the United States, particularly, a war propaganda campaign of extraordinary violence was being conducted on unprecedented lines. The statements of representatives of business, the army, the Press and even members of the Government of the United States showed not only that there had been no change in that attitude but that the situation had even deteriorated considerably. Mr. Wierblowski then referred to statements by Secretary of the Navy Matthews as well as to articles in periodicals and newspapers, such as *Newsweek* and *The New York Times* as a few obvious examples of the campaign of war-mongering which was being carried out in the United States.

8. The Soviet Union draft resolution not only condemned militaristic propaganda, but also demanded that such propaganda should be prohibited and that those who were responsible should be punished, as they would be in Poland under the criminal code. To consider propaganda for a new war to be a criminal act was the only way to bring war-mongering activities to an end. The existing international tension brought about by the aggressive policies of the United States required that such a view be taken.

9. The draft resolution further provided for the prohibition of the use of the atomic bomb as a means of mass destruction, which was contrary to international conscience. It declared that the use of atomic weapons should be unconditionally prohibited and that a strict system of international control should be established to ensure unconditional observance of such a prohibition. The draft resolution further stated that the first government to use the atomic weapon against any country would commit a crime against humanity and would be regarded as a war criminal. Despite the decision taken by the General Assembly by its resolution 41 (I) adopted on 14 December 1946 prohibiting the use of atomic energy for warlike purposes, atomic energy had become a potential weapon of mass destruction.

10. The work of the Atomic Energy Commission had been sabotaged by the authors of the so-called Baruch plan. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union had declared its willingness to submit to control and had come forward with concrete proposals for the solution of atomic problems. It had objected, however, to United States plans for the setting up of an international atomic trust which would be controlled by the interests of American capitalists. The Soviet Union draft resolution which called for strict international control of the use of atomic energy for warlike purposes, indicated the Soviet Union's willingness to co-operate in the solution of that problem.

11. The course of events since the General Assembly's decision in 1946 and the whole course of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission proved the United States' unwillingness to co-operate. That country had rejected all the proposals of the USSR and when it had been established that the United States was no longer the sole possessor of atomic energy, it had tried to create a new myth about hydrogen super-bombs. The

intentions of the States of the Anglo-American bloc had been shown by statements made in the United States Congress, the Parliament of the United Kingdom and other political circles of the two countries, in which the use of atomic bombs had been advocated if it were deemed necessary. Mr. Truman himself had declared that he would not hesitate to order the use of the atomic bomb.

12. In view of the horrible sufferings which would be brought upon mankind by the use of atomic weapons, the peoples of the world had to be safeguarded by the condemnation of the government which would first make use of such weapons. Such was the will of the peoples of the world and they had given vent to that will by hundreds of millions of signatures to the Stockholm Peace Appeal. Mr. Wierblowski felt sure that those millions would understand that only those who intended to use atomic weapons would be opposed to the draft resolution of the Soviet Union.

13. It was clear that the fundamental condition for the implementation of the prohibition of atomic weapons and of war propaganda was the restoration of co-operation among the great Powers. Sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 3 of the operative part of the Soviet Union draft resolution referred to such co-operation by calling upon the great Powers to conclude among themselves a pact for the strengthening of peace.

14. With reference to the draft resolution (A/C.1/593) adopted at the 369th meeting of the Committee, Mr. Wierblowski stated that in voting for that resolution the Committee intended that conversations among the great Powers should not be a mere exchange of views but should yield complete and affirmative results. If the Committee unanimously voted in favour of a renewal of conversations, it should, consequently and logically, vote in favour of an appeal to the five permanent members of the Security Council to conclude a binding pact among themselves.

15. The question of the reduction of the armed forces was one of the main tasks of the great Powers and it was an introductory stage towards the abatement and subsequent elimination of international tensions. The Soviet Union draft resolution, unlike the previous resolutions of the Assembly on disarmament, provided for specific ratios in the reduction of armed forces and a time limit for the implementation thereof.

16. The Polish representative pointed out that armament production in the United States was being conducted on a huge scale, and politicians in that country were giving reassurances that the huge military expenditures were designed to ensure peace and to repel potential aggression. In other words, they maintained that in order to achieve full disarmament, it was necessary to arm.

17. The draft resolution of the Soviet Union on the reduction of armaments of the great Powers by one-third was a decisive step toward peace, and without that first step no genuine disarmament and lasting peace could be obtained.

18. In analysing the present international situation, which required the adoption of measures to secure a lasting peace, Mr. Wierblowski drew the Committee's attention to the fact that his country throughout its his-

tory had been repeatedly subject to Germany's expansionist policy. Poland was watching carefully the events which were taking place in Western Germany and was deeply concerned over the violation of the principles set forth in the Yalta and Potsdam agreements on the four-Power accord concerning Germany. The United States, France and the United Kingdom had clearly violated those principles by establishing the so-called West German State. The Western occupying Powers were including systematically the so-called West German State in their military plans, and had transformed it into a spring-board for their aggressive purposes. To that end, and in violation of the basic provisions of the Potsdam agreement, France, the United Kingdom and the United States had proceeded, at first covertly, and subsequently, more and more overtly, to remilitarize West Germany despite the repeated protests of the Polish Government. The remilitarization of Germany had proceeded with the establishment of a regular German army and the development of its industrial war potential.

19. The Western occupying Powers had also been carrying on aggressive military preparations in Western Germany and had transformed that territory into a base for military actions directed against the Soviet Union and the countries of the people's democracies.

20. In creating the West German army, the Western occupying Powers, in particular the United States, had been assisted by the former generals of Hitler who had been playing an ever increasing role in the life of Western Germany. Those officers were to be assigned to command West German forces in implementation of the aggressive plans implicit in the North Atlantic Treaty. The revival of the German war industry and remilitarization of Western Germany, as one of the political military commentators declared, was designed to restore the German-French-Italian-United Kingdom bloc in a form which would correspond to Mr. Churchill's recommendations. That would mean a return to the Munich days of 1938.

21. The plan of the Western occupying Powers for the establishment of a Franco-German iron and coal cartel and the Schuman plan which itself dealt with the assignment of war industries was in violation of the obligations undertaken by the governments of the Western occupying Powers under the quadripartite agreement and those plans had caused anxiety in the neighbouring States of Germany.

22. That policy of the Western Powers had been accompanied by war propaganda which had assumed an aggressive character in West Germany in the form of an ever-growing revisionist policy. The Polish representative indicated that incitement to a new war, increase of armaments and the violation of the principle of the four-Power decisions regarding Germany, were closely linked to the basic problems dealt with in the Soviet Union draft resolution. Mr. Wierblowski believed that the unilateral decisions taken by the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States at their conference held in New York in September last were flagrant violations of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, as well as of the principle of decisions of the Allied Control Council.

23. The eight-Power conference which had recently taken place in Prague called upon the governments of

the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and the United States to issue a declaration to the effect that they would not permit the remilitarization of Germany or the inclusion of Germany in any aggressive plans and that they would enforce the Potsdam agreement by creating conditions which were propitious to the establishment of a united, peace-loving and democratic German State. The Prague conference further stressed the necessity to restore co-operation among the four Powers as an important step towards the solution of international problems.

24. Mr. Wierblowski had discussed the German problem in detail, because, apart from the fact that his country was a neighbour of Germany, Poland was interested in a peaceful development of a democratic Germany and also because Germany was an example of the dangerous results of the aggressive policies of the United States. Any danger of the re-establishment of German militarism in the German Democratic Republic in East Germany had been removed because of the land reform, the nationalization of industry and the liquidation of the militaristic caste.

25. The Polish representative then referred to the aggressive policy of the United States in the Far East and in particular to the United States' attitude towards the question of the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations, the construction of United States military bases all over the Pacific area and the remilitarization of Japan. That policy had created conditions which had made possible the United States aggression in Korea. There was no doubt that the adoption of the principles laid down in the Soviet Union draft resolution would help considerably to abate tension in the Far East.

26. The Polish people were yearning for peace. The foreign policy of Poland had been and continued to be a reflection of her desire for peace and the establishment of co-operation and friendly relations with all her neighbours.

27. The treaties of friendship and mutual assistance and economic agreements concluded between Poland and her neighbours indicated the peace-loving principles to which his country adhered. In establishing normal trade relations, Poland had been confronted with discriminatory policies applied by the United States or by other countries under pressure of the United States. Despite the difficulties that Poland had met, it had consistently followed a policy of peace and co-operation within and without the United Nations. The Polish representative maintained that the Soviet Union draft resolution would provide a just and equitable solution for all vital international questions. It was an instrument for peace which would help the United Nations in the discharge of its principal tasks and would bring peace and security to the peoples of the world.

28. Mr. DIEZ DE MEDINA (Bolivia) stated that his first reaction to the Soviet Union draft resolution was to reject it for reasons which had been gone into by the Australian representative. Such action might, however, merely play into the hands of Soviet Union propagandists. To the millions in Asia and Europe and in the world behind the "iron curtain", the refusal of democratic nations to agree to an apparently pious resolution with a beguiling title could be made to appear as a danger signal.

29. In the opinion of the Bolivian delegation, it might be wise to make use of the good points in the Soviet Union draft resolution. There were three such points: first, a recognition of the fact that the maintenance of peace and security was the principal aim of the United Nations; second, a preoccupation with the destructive power of atomic weapons; and, third, the desire to bring together the great Powers as a means of ensuring peace and putting an end to the armaments race. With those three good points as a basis, a text could be produced which would be quite different from the Soviet Union draft. A draft resolution could be drawn up really concerned with threats to peace and security without pointing accusing fingers or making propaganda. If the Soviet Union delegation was sincere in its search for international peace and security, it would find no difficulty in accepting the draft resolution which the Bolivian delegation would submit.

30. There was a fourth point which the proposed declaration should include in order to be complete. A new threat to international peace had recently arisen which did not fall within the traditional procedures governing relations between States. Yet, it might be the most dangerous and the most likely to start a major war as it had already started a minor one. The experience of the last three years showed that a real threat to the peace existed in the form of the intervention of a State in the internal affairs of another State with a view to overthrowing its government and replacing it with one more friendly to the intervening State. That new threat should not be overlooked and any nation sincerely interested in the maintenance of peace should be prepared to repudiate that type of aggression.

31. Mr. Diéz de Medina then submitted to the Committee a draft resolution (A/C.1/596) which his delegation had prepared taking the four points he had enumerated into consideration.

32. Mr. VAN HEUVEN GOEDHART (Netherlands) recalled that during the discussion on the previous item of the agenda, he had endeavoured to draw the representative's attention to the desire of the peoples of the world for lasting peace and security. If the United Nations failed to bring that peace and security, the common man would lose all interest in the Organization. It was the common man who had built the United Nations and he expected action and not mere words. He wanted to understand why there was no real peace and security and how they could be obtained. Evidently it was with that view in mind that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union had prepared and submitted its draft declaration. The Soviet Union had invented the term "people's democracies" and claimed that the USSR alone was concerned with the welfare of the masses while the old capitalistic States, composed of warmongering profiteers, had no interest in peace and security. Since Marx was always right and he had stated that capitalism and war went hand in hand, it followed that fifty-five out of the sixty members of the United Nations were warmongers and only five were peace-loving States. Accordingly, the Soviet Union found it necessary from time to time to submit peace proposals.

33. The actions of the Soviet Union—the liquidation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, their blessings on the invasion by North Korea, the fomenting of strikes in

other countries, the threats against Yugoslavia, the opposition to the resolution on united action for peace (A/C.1/576/Rev.1), the frequent use of the veto and the frustrating of efforts to bring about control of atomic energy—might all be carried out in a "peace-loving" spirit, but the evidence was not convincing to anybody else and so there was a need for propaganda to suggest to the world that the Soviet Union was seeking peace. The methods were very ingenious and in past years they had submitted a series of peace proposals. Indeed, the elements of the present draft resolution presented nothing new and were no more than 1950 variations on the familiar tune that the Soviet Union was the only true champion of peace.

34. An examination of document A/C.1/595 revealed many fine phrases, such as "the nations' inflexible will to peace" and "a most heinous international crime against humanity" and "contradictory to international conscience and honour", and others, which were quite exciting. There followed two seemingly concrete proposals, one for a pact among the great Powers and the other for the reduction of armed forces which seemed to meet the needs of the times and the desires of the common man. The Netherlands delegation, however, feared that those words were merely the old familiar ones. It was unable to believe in the sincerity of the declaration in view of the discrepancy between the words and the deeds of the Soviet Union.

35. The first paragraph of the preamble of the USSR draft resolution was a reminder that the most important task of the United Nations was to maintain peace and security and promote international co-operation. While that was very commendable, it should be remembered that the Comintern and Cominform had done all in their power to undermine governments and such action could scarcely be considered as contributing to friendly relations. The Marshall Plan had made a great contribution towards solving the problems of many nations, but the Cominform had sought to undermine its operation. The North Atlantic Treaty constituted another effort to solve international problems, but the Soviet Union had endeavoured to cripple it by fomenting strikes and by distorting in its propaganda the defensive nature of the Treaty. The specialized agencies of the United Nations were designed to further international co-operation but the Soviet Union refused to participate in the activities of most of them. If the meaning of the first paragraph of the preamble of the draft resolution was that the Soviet Union now conceded that the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty and the specialized agencies did promote international co-operation and that it would repudiate the Cominform's subversive activities, then the Netherlands delegation would begin to believe in the sincerity of the Soviet Union proposal.

36. In paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the operative part of the USSR draft resolution, the Committee was invited to express its determination to avert the threat of war and to take a stand on the question of atomic energy and on the question of unifying the efforts of the permanent members of the Security Council. The desire for peace throughout the world was strong enough to persuade many non-communists to sign the Stockholm Peace Appeal. However, included among the signatories were thousands of North Koreans who had signed just

a few weeks before their attack on South Korea. The North Koreans did not meet the Soviet Union's firm determination to prevent war. Rather, Marshal Stalin had encouraged them to resist the forces of the United Nations. It would appear that war was all right and that aggression was not a crime so long as an atomic bomb was not used. That, however, was not the concept of the common man to whom the instrument of his death was immaterial. Most members of the United Nations wished to prevent aggression by combining their efforts but the Soviet Union did not accept that principle and had voted against proposals to strengthen the United Nations. Measures which they had opposed included even the proposal for a modest United Nations guard as well as the resolution on the essentials of peace (290 (IV)), and the draft resolution on the united action for peace (A/C.1/576/Rev.1) as well as the plan for international control of atomic energy. The Netherlands delegation did not blame the signatories of the Stockholm Peace Appeal for their action. They were fearful and lacked confidence in the United Nations but they did not realize that its failure was due to the action of the Soviet Union. It seemed reasonable to refute the Soviet Union's claim to a monopoly of the love of peace as long as it denied its co-operation in the taking of measures to preserve that peace. If, however, the Soviet Union had changed its attitude and was prepared to reverse its stand on such measures, the sincerity of paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the USSR draft resolution could be recognized.

37. With regard to paragraph 1 of the operative part, the Netherlands delegation wished to say that its Government also opposed war-mongering and so did the responsible Press in the Netherlands. His country was not prepared, however, to convert the Press and radio into mere tools of the government. The Soviet Union might claim that there were no fascists left within its borders, that it had freedom of the Press and that any newspaper man might write as he wished. That seemed to mean, however, that any non-communist was a fascist and, as only communists would be allowed to write, they could certainly state what they wished. If subservience of that nature was the price of prohibiting war propaganda, the price was too high. Freedom of information did not mean freedom of misinformation or freedom of "Cominformation". If the paragraph meant that the Soviet Union desired a full and free flow of information throughout the world, including the Soviet Union, the Netherlands delegation was prepared to recognize that there had been a change of attitude on the part of that country.

38. With regard to paragraph 2 of the operative part of the draft resolution, Mr. van Heuven Goedhart recalled his previous statement that the Soviet Union's advocacy of the prohibition of atomic weapons only served to mislead the world because of that country's refusal to accept effective control.

39. As far as paragraph 3 of the operative part was concerned, the Netherlands representative submitted that the best of pacts would fall far short of the Charter. As long as the Soviet Union did not pursue a policy of co-operation and friendly relations, no satisfactory results would be obtained from any new pact; as long as the Soviet Union refused to agree to the control and inspection of armed forces, there was no point in calling for a reduction of those forces except for purposes of propaganda. However, the Soviet Union might have changed its mind and might now be ready to conform to the Charter and to accept a system of armaments control. If that were the case, the proposals in paragraph 3 of the operative part of the USSR draft resolution could be considered sincere.

40. The Netherlands delegation would vote against the Soviet Union draft resolution. It wished it had been able to vote in its favour for that would have meant that by its deeds the Soviet Union had made it possible for others to believe in the sincerity of its proposals. Nevertheless, the Netherlands delegation wished to keep the door wide open for the Soviet Union to join the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations in their efforts to strengthen peace and security. The peoples of the world did not have to fear the failure of the United Nations for its efforts would be successful if all nations acted in the spirit of the Charter. To put to the test the will of the Soviet Union to act in that manner, the Netherlands delegation had joined with the delegations of France, Lebanon, Mexico, the United Kingdom and the United States of America in preparing a joint draft resolution (A/C.1/597) which it now submitted to the Committee.

41. That draft resolution endeavoured to meet the aspirations of the common man. It was not a mere recital of good intentions, which was the feature of the Soviet Union declaration, unless the Soviet Union representative had meant in the statement he made when he introduced his draft resolution (372nd meeting) that his government was prepared to move towards an agreement on the control of atomic energy. The Netherlands delegation, however, was not interested in words but in deeds. The joint draft resolution he had just submitted was an invitation to action and its aims were within reach of every Member to accomplish. The attitude of the Soviet Union towards that proposal was awaited with interest as it would show whether the Soviet Union really shared the peoples' will to peace or only wished the world to believe that it did so.

42. The CHAIRMAN requested the delegations to give him early notice of their intention to speak and proposed to close the list of speakers on the following afternoon.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.