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Chairman: Mr. Roberto URDANETA ARBELÁEZ (Colombia).

### Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece (continued)

[Item 22]\*

#### GENERAL DISCUSSION (continued)

1. Mr. POLITIS (Greece) said that he wished to make only a few observations. The representative of Poland (393rd meeting) had taken umbrage at the use of the term "satellite". That was not a new word and, moreover, persons whose practices were insulting should not be so sensitive about normal usage. The representative of Poland had gone beyond the bounds of courtesy in stating that Mr. Politis took his orders from the Embassy of the United States of America. Evidently, the representative of Poland believed that there was no alternative to taking orders either from the Cominform or the United States. Mr. Politis was proud to assert that he was a servant of Greece. He reserved the right to reply to other insults later.

2. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) remarked that the Greek question was now before the General Assembly for the fourth time. The Committee had before it another report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (A/1307) and a couple of draft resolutions (A/C.1/620 and A/C.1/622) based on that report. Clearly, the authors of those draft resolutions had not sought a real solution, for the basic issues had been avoided, and irrelevant matters had been introduced in order to dupe the Committee.

3. The United Nations had first taken up the matter in January 1946, when the delegation of the USSR had brought to the notice of the Security Council the fact that the presence of British troops in Greece constituted a danger to peace and security.<sup>1</sup> A few months later, the Government of the Ukrainian SSR had asked the Security Council to reconsider the situation in the

Balkans since it endangered the maintenance of peace and security.<sup>2</sup>

4. Although at that time there had been guerrilla activity, no charges of external aid had then been levelled against Greece's northern neighbours. Those charges had been worked out later, as an excuse for introducing the Truman Doctrine, which was to lead to the enslavement of Greece and the establishment of military bases there. The reasons were given by Mr. Benjamin Javits in his book *Peace by Investment*. The book stated that the United States had taken over the British commitment in Greece for reasons of military security, in order to dominate the Dardanelles and outflank Turkey and Italy. Mr. Katz-Suchy remarked that the facts and various statements of policy spoke for themselves.

5. After three years of the Truman Doctrine, Greece was completely under United States control. United States officials decided the composition of the Greek Government and Cabinet. Economic and political policies were laid down by United States missions. Military operations were directed by United States staff officers, who had the power to appoint and dismiss Greek Army personnel. By such means, a reactionary government had been kept in power. An article by Mr. Basil Davidson in the journal of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs<sup>3</sup> stated that it was generally agreed that the Greek régime could not survive for twenty-four hours without Western aid, and that it presented a pattern of bribery and corruption.

6. A threat to Greek independence did exist. The Royalist Government had merely carried out American orders, such as the notorious demands made by Mr. Henry Grady, then the United States Ambassador, in his letter of 31 March 1950 regarding the constitution of that Government.<sup>4</sup> The only choice offered had been

\* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.  
<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, First Year, First Series, No. 1*, 6th to 10th meetings and *Ibid.*, Supplement No. 1, annex 3.

<sup>2</sup> See *Ibid.*, First Year, Second Series, Supplement No. 5, annex 8.

<sup>3</sup> See *International Journal*, Summer 1950.

<sup>4</sup> See *Department of State bulletin*, vol. XXII, No. 563.

either to conform or to lose financial assistance. United States intervention had even extended to such details as changes in methods of tax collection, the distribution of subsidies and the like. Mr. Paul Porter had gone so far as to say that the United States would co-operate with any government which would carry out the American aid programme. Even the *New York Herald Tribune*, on 3 April 1950, had considered that interference rather extreme.

7. United States domination of Greece had not brought any alleviation of the economic plight of the people. Although Mr. Grady, the former Ambassador, had stated in his letter of March 1950 that the aim of American aid was to satisfy the needs of the people, their situation seemed to be appalling. Mr. Katz-Suchy presented statistics culled from a variety of journals on increases in the cost of living and in unemployment, on the rise in the retail price index and in taxes, on the fall in *per capita* income and the reduction in the standard of living, all by very considerable figures during recent months. At the same time, scandals involving the highest government officials in corruption and embezzlement had occurred.

8. Mr. Katz-Suchy then proceeded to quote from an article in the *New York Times* of 28 May 1950 concerning the situation of some 4,000 refugees in Salonika. The article painted a picture of stinking, crowded conditions under which disease was rampant and sanitary arrangements unspeakable. In contrast, a story in the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* of 5 February 1950 stated that Athens was a boom town flushed with get-rich-quick prosperity. An article in the *United States News and World Report* of 28 April 1950 asserted that about 1,000 families in Athens controlled about 90 per cent of the country's wealth and lived in idle luxury under the protection of corrupt officials.

9. Recent reports revealed that the opposition of the Greek people to United States intervention was stronger than ever. The results of the March 1950 elections and the constantly recurring strikes pointed to that fact. The Press of the United States, including even the *Chicago Tribune*, had taken note of public protests which had been made spontaneously in the streets, and of demands that the Americans leave the country. The explosive situation which had been created by the unjust distribution of wealth was well understood by the United States advisors. Their fears had been eased, however, by the willingness of the Greek Government to use death sentences, concentration camps and prisons to maintain itself in power.

10. The foregoing picture had been drawn to show the real proportions of the problem and to cast light on the report of UNSCOB (A/1307). That report should be viewed in the context of the role allotted to Greece in the war strategy and monopoly interests of the United States.

11. With regard to the UNSCOB report, any impartial reader would be puzzled about the bases for its conclusions. No facts or proofs were offered but only assertions based on vague rumors. No effort had been made to conceal the fact that the purpose of the report was to justify United States policies, to defend the internal terror, and to keep the Balkans in a state of tension.

12. Chapter III of the report (A/1307) which dealt with external support of the Greek guerrilla movement, was of particular importance because the conclusions and draft resolutions submitted had been based on it. That chapter also gave some indication of the procedure of investigation which had been followed. Paragraph 75 contained certain statements about the 238 witnesses who had been interrogated between 17 September 1949 and 30 June 1950. The representative of Poland had examined the reports of the original testimony given, and had selected about 110 of those reports, each of which could be disputed before the Committee. It was to be noted that, in all cases, the witnesses had been brought before the observers by the Greek authorities, and only after previous interrogation by the Greek police. In some cases, the Greek authorities stated that they had been unable to produce witnesses or that the latter had not been disposed to testify. Furthermore, most of those witnesses had then been in prison, a point on which Mr. Katz-Suchy cited specific documents.

13. It was evident that the Greek authorities had surrendered witnesses to the Committee only if their testimony would be useful to the Athens Government. Of 119 witnesses who were not in prison, UNSCOB had found only three whose testimony was fit to be mentioned in the report. Although most of the witnesses had been Greek Royalist officers, even those three witnesses had not been able to supply proof of any support given by Bulgaria to the guerrillas; none had seen any crossings of the frontier but only footsteps in the snow. That had been the basis for concluding that aid had been given by Bulgaria.

14. UNSCOB had not seen fit to mention violations of the Albanian and Bulgarian frontiers by the Greek Army. During a period of eight months, however, Bulgaria had reported that its frontier had been crossed twenty-six times by Greek soldiers and eight times by aircraft, while Albania's corresponding figures for Greek violations of its frontier had been eighty-two and fifty-seven. One might have supposed that, in an area of such tension, UNSCOB might have found at least one incident or one witness which would have led to some criticism of the Greek Army or officials. It was clear that the Special Committee had known what was required and had made no attempt to keep up appearances.

15. A great effort had been made to prove that there were Greek guerrillas in Albania and Bulgaria. That fact had never been denied. The Albanian and Bulgarian Governments had given orders that the guerrillas who had crossed the frontiers were to be disarmed. The report noted, for example, (A/1307, paragraph 103) that former guerrillas had gone to work as coal miners and in other civilian occupations. It could hardly be considered a crime to give refuge to men fighting for their liberty against a reactionary clique. Many countries had enacted the necessary laws to ensure asylum for political refugees. The conduct of Albania and Bulgaria in granting such asylum might well be contrasted with the action of the British occupation authorities in Germany who were preparing a group of seamen for deportation to Greece, where death and prison awaited them.

16. The bias of UNSCOB showed up more clearly in its limited number of documents concerning interrogations. An Albanian deserter was described as having given "negative" information, that is, evidence which had not conformed to the desires of the Greek Government. On the other hand, an escaped criminal was considered to have given "positive" information since he had supported the charges of the Greek Government. An examination of the criminal's testimony revealed that it had been a tissue of lies for that witness had referred to an organization as then existing in Albania to aid the guerrillas whereas it had functioned only during the war and had collaborated with the Germans and Italians.

17. Other examples of how precise was the evidence of the Special Committee could be found in paragraphs 108 and 113 of the report (A/1307). Those paragraphs dealt with alleged radio stations but gave no facts to support the allegations. The background of the evidence given in paragraph 86 was of some interest. In the UNSCOB document containing the original testimony, it was stated that the witness concerned was simple and uneducated but seemed honest though not too accurate. His evidence was nevertheless included in the report without the reservations made by the observers concerning its inaccuracy. The process of exposing the bias of the report could be continued indefinitely.

18. Mr. Katz-Suchy drew attention to the UNSCOB report of 8 September 1950 (A/1423) which charged that there were Greek guerrillas and children in Poland. The story of the principal witness seemed to be that he had been abducted by guerrillas in 1947 and that, since he had desired to return to Greece, he had escaped to Albania, proceeded by ship to Poland, and thence had made his way back to Greece. Evidently, that was the shortest route. Although that witness was a confessed murderer, his evidence had been accepted without verification. However, his story was inconsistent since it showed him in more than one place at the same time on a number of occasions. He had told a curious tale of having carried "cases containing uniforms and Russian weapons" from Poland to Albania and of having exchanged them there for German and Italian weapons. Another factor in the allegations against Poland was the fact that one of the captured guerrillas had some Polish toothpaste, a Polish razor blade, medicine label and a hand grenade. The allegedly Polish hand grenade included in its markings the letter "Q", which was not to be found in the Polish alphabet.

19. All the evidence put together failed to support the charge that Albania and Bulgaria were interfering in Greek affairs or that their actions constituted a threat to the peace. Even if there had been double or triple the amount of evidence presented, the charges would still be unsubstantiated. UNSCOB's conclusions had been imposed upon it in order to conceal the situation in Greece, to justify intervention by the United States, and to permit action against the northern neighbours of Greece.

20. If a threat to any country's territorial integrity existed, it was directed against Albania and Bulgaria. Greece had territorial claims against Albania and had refused Albanian offers to establish diplomatic relations

and to settle their frontier problems. No smoke-screen laid by the majority could conceal the responsibility of the United States masters of Greece.

21. In the light of the foregoing, the Committee should consider the draft resolutions before it. The five-Power joint proposal (A/C.1/622) sought to continue UNSCOB in being; the whole discussion had been instigated for that purpose. Although the Special Committee had achieved no results in three years, it was proposed to continue with the old methods. If a solution were really desired, the issue should be faced and the facts examined. The USSR proposal (A/C.1/623) took that attitude and sought by conciliatory means to create a situation which would help restore peace and prosperity to Greece. The leader of the Australian delegation, when he was President of the General Assembly, had tried to use conciliatory means and the reasons he gave for his failure were of some interest. The USSR draft resolution advocated a return to conciliatory measures, both internal and external. It would be easy to reject that draft resolution and yield to pressure, but thousands of lives depended upon the decision. The Greek Government was maintained in power only by terrorism, and the amnesty measures called for would be very timely. In that connexion, Mr. Katz-Suchy requested the circulation of a memorandum (A/C.1/626/Add.3) just submitted to the Secretary-General by the Greek-American Committee for the Abolition of Makronisos.

22. The representative of Greece had stated in the General Assembly (280th plenary meeting) that his country had entered a period of peace and reconstruction. Mr. Katz-Suchy wished to contrast that statement with a story in the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, date-lined Athens and dealing with bloodshed, oppression and political chicanery. He drew attention to the fact that, from 18 August to 12 September 1950, forty-nine political prisoners had been condemned to death. At the present time, there were 29,000 political prisoners and internees, of whom 3,000 were marked for execution. A mass trial was being prepared for 100 trade-union leaders.

23. Even General Plastiras had stated that Makronisos was the greatest stigma in history on Greece's name. Nevertheless, it had taken the efforts of a committee of eminent British women to secure the transfer of 600 women from that camp. Many other protests had been made, but the camp continued to exist. Indeed it might be suspected that the irresolute attempts of General Plastiras to introduce leniency measures had contributed to the downfall of his government and the establishment of an ultra-rightist régime.

24. Despite the pleas of the United Nations, the Greek Government continued on its course. The trade-union leaders were about to be court-martialled under Law 509, which provided for the death penalty. The charge against them was fantastic; it was that, while in prison, they had conspired to annex Greek territory to a foreign State.

25. The representative of Poland described in considerable detail the conditions prevailing in the concentration camp on the island of Makronisos. Citing further cases describing the unbearable conditions of

women prisoners on the island of Trikkeri, he recalled appeals made by the "Greek Committee for the abolition of Makronisos and for a general amnesty in Greece" addressed to the United Nations (A/C.1/626/Add.1), to all governments and to international democratic organizations. The concentration camp of Makronisos was as terrible as those of the nazis. Efforts had been made to conceal the horrors of such camps, and also efforts to compel the inmates to speak and act in accordance with the orders of the administration. The prisoners in that camp comprised individuals of different trades, classes in private life, and political beliefs. The Makronisos camp was not for leftists alone but for all opponents of the present Greek régime. Attempts had even been made by the oppressors in the camp to oblige the victims to sign affidavits professing their loyalty to the policies of the Greek Government. But the prisoners who were loyal to the real Greece and Greek people had ignored tortures and refused to sign.

26. Moreover, no one knew what had happened to the trade-union leaders and to thousands of other Greek patriots, against whose death sentences some States had protested. They probably had been subjected to the terrible fate which awaited prisoners in the concentration camps.

27. Only the amnesty requested in the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/623) could end the internal terror in Greece, and ease the existing tension to help restore peace and tranquillity to the Balkans. A government based on free elections and the end of foreign intervention would restore normal relations between Greece and its neighbours.

28. The real threat to the independence of Greece came from the intervention of selfish foreign Powers which perpetuated the power and privileges of the present Greek régime for their own purposes. That threat did not, however, justify the proposal made in the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/622) that the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans be retained for another year.

29. The present Greek Government, which completely depended on United States support, pursued a hostile, provocative policy toward Albania and Bulgaria. It terrorized the people, and thereby created tension and threatened peace in the Balkans. Hence, the proposals advanced in the USSR draft (A/C.1/623) were valid and necessary.

30. The political tension in Greece, however, was only a part of that great tension facing the world today. The choice before the United Nations was whether it should strive for peace and security or whether it should continue actions which would only aid those who ruled in Greece. The General Assembly could, through new and conciliatory measures, resolve the Greek question and bring peace, security, observance of human rights and a free democratic government to the Greek people. The tragedy of Greece had become the tragedy of the United Nations because of previous United Nations action. Instead of acting for peace and security, the United Nations had protected foreign interventionists, terror and persecution.

31. The time for positive action had come, and the proposal of the USSR provided for action which would lessen the general tension, would return the United Nations to the purposes for which it had been created and would bring peace, security and progress in the economic, social and humanitarian fields. Otherwise, the responsibility for the sufferings of the Greek people would rest on each of the Member States. Many States, despite political differences, felt that the part played by the United Nations in Greece had been wrong. The provisions of the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/623) would bring general amnesty and political freedom to Greece, would save thousands of lives and bring new hope to all those who looked to the United Nations for some action on their behalf.

32. Mr. JOOSTE (Union of South Africa) stated that, in so far as Mr. Katz-Suchy's hostile allegations required refutation, he would leave that to the other speakers and confine himself to the merits of the case. Before the Committee, however, he expressed regret that Greece had been subjected to an unbridled attack in the Organization, such as that just made by the representative of Poland.

33. The United Nations had been seized of the present item since 1946. Since then, it had persevered in its efforts to remove the threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece. It had, thus, sought to assist the Greek people to extricate themselves from the suffering and turmoil which they endured since 1940-41.

34. The United Nations deserved credit for the manner in which it had succeeded hitherto, with patience and perseverance, in averting a major conflagration in the Balkans and also in contributing to the general improvement in that area. The Greek people had also been aided in their triumphant emergence from their serious struggle.

35. It was not possible to ignore the assistance afforded to Greece by the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Those who considered that that assistance had cloaked intervention in the internal affairs of Greece could not ignore the fact that it had been rendered in consequence of agreements with the Greek Government; nor could it be doubted that the present government was the only constitutional and freely elected authority in Greece, subservient to no external Power. Allegations to the contrary were merely calculated to justify the improper action of those who sought to impose their way of life on others.

36. Although Anglo-American assistance had been invaluable, it was the Greek people themselves, in the first instance, who were responsible for their success which had attended their heroic struggle. On the other hand, their self-restraint had prevented a major conflict in the Balkans. Greek recovery had been admirable and its completion was hoped for. It was important to note, however, that threats to Greece still persisted, although in a lesser way, and it was necessary not to underestimate those factors in the Balkan situation which still caused concern. As long as the threat of Greece continued to be a menace to peace, it was the duty of the United Nations to continue its efforts to remove that menace.



37. The United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans recommended, in chapter VI of its report (A/1307) that the General Assembly consider the advisability of maintaining an agency on the Balkans, in view of the current international situation and the conditions prevailing along the northern frontiers of Greece. The South African delegation strongly supported that recommendation and appreciated the work of the present Special Committee. Considering the refusal of other States concerned to co-operate, it would be too optimistic to hope that it could achieve a permanent settlement; yet there could be no doubt that the presence of the Special Committee had acted as a powerful deterrent to the violators of Greek territory. Its continued watchfulness could only further peace and the establishment of settled conditions in the Balkans.

38. Moreover, it was a fact that the availability of indisputable evidence of what was taking place in that area had contributed largely to the success of the United Nations in handling the situation. The Special Committee which obtained that evidence, had thorough knowledge and experience in dealing with the problem. Its work had been well performed, in close co-operation with the authorities in Greece and without indulging in matters within that country's domestic jurisdiction. Hence, the South African delegation supported not only the maintenance of a United Nations agency in the Balkans, but also the maintenance of the present Special Committee.

39. For those reasons, the South African delegation intended to vote for the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/622), and noted the advisability of its second operative paragraph. In the meantime, Mr. Jooste suggested that those immediately concerned should consider the possibility of reducing the size of the Committee as and when that proved to be feasible.

40. Regarding the UNSCOB report (A/1307), Mr. Jooste commented on two matters raised therein. The first was the repatriation to Greece of those Greek nationals who desired to return and live in accordance with the law of their land. They included Greek military personnel captured by the Greek guerrillas and removed by them to countries to the north. He agreed with and intended to vote for the draft resolution submitted by Greece (A/C.1/620) which appeared to indicate the way in which that problem could be solved.

41. The second matter raised was the problem of the repatriation of Greek children. His government condemned without reservation the actions of those responsible for that problem. Furthermore, Mr. Jooste supported the views expressed in the communication sent by the acting representative of the United States to the Secretary-General in May 1950 (A/1284). The Government of the Union of South Africa was also ready to support any appropriate measures which might be suggested to end that intolerable situation speedily.

42. Regarding the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/623), Mr. Jooste stated that certain provisions therein rendered it inadmissible. The South African delegation had no objection to sub-paragraph (d) of that draft, but would reject sub-paragraphs (c) and (e). Moreover, his delegation considered that sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) went beyond the competence of the United Nations. Mr. Jooste reminded the Committee that sub-

paragraph (a) was similar to the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/559) which had been rejected at the 393rd meeting on the grounds that it was contrary to Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter. As for sub-paragraph (b), not only did it deal with a matter exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of Greece, but also it cast unfounded doubts on previous elections in Greece, as well as on the constitutionality of the present Government of Greece. The attitude of the delegation of the USSR was merely an attempt to misrepresent American and British assistance to the people of Greece.

43. Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) stated that, for the fourth time, the General Assembly had been compelled by the United States and its followers to scrutinize the item under consideration. This time the illegal United Nations Special Committee had handed up accusations against Albania and Bulgaria which were utterly unfounded, biased, unobjective and misleading. The Special Committee's report accused those two countries of threatening the independence and integrity of Greece, and contained charges that such threats, at the present time, originated principally from Bulgaria.

44. At previous sessions of the General Assembly, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR, together with some other delegations, had exposed the inconsistency and tendentiousness of those accusations against Albania and Bulgaria. It had been shown then that they had been designed to blame Greece's neighbours for the abnormal situation in Greece, which was the result of the reactionary and anti-people's policy of its Government as well as the intervention of the United States. It was clear how justified such assertions had been. Since its foundation, the Special Committee had been biased and hostile to Albania and Bulgaria. Those countries were accused of supporting the guerrillas in Greece. The purpose of the report was to defame Bulgaria and Albania, to arouse suspicion of their foreign policy and thus to breed hostility in the Balkans for the benefit of the United States. The Special Committee had proved itself to be an instrument of United States ruling circles, which attempted to cover up the designs to turn Greece into an American *place d'armes* in the Balkans. The present case confronting the General Assembly was a repetition of the same story.

45. There was indeed a threat against Greece, but it had been bred by the Government of Greece and by the United States, which had intervened in the internal affairs of Greece, thus turning it into an American domain.

46. The notorious Belgrade-Athens Axis also had been imposed by the United States, and threatened the interests of the Greek and Yugoslav peoples. Through United States intervention, Greece in reality had become a colony whose politics, finance and army were controlled by the United States, as had been candidly conceded by Greek statesmen. Referring to the letter addressed by Mr. Grady, then United States Ambassador, to Mr. Venizelos demanding the resignation of the Greek Government, Mr. Baranovsky quoted from a pro-American newspaper, condemning that intervention as being tantamount to a loss of Greece's political and economic independence.

47. The representative of the Ukrainian SSR cited other statements in the Greek Press and by Greek states-

men to that effect and stated that the Americans had not only become the masters of Greece but had displaced its government, reduced the people of Greece to poverty and need, undermined the Greek Army, maintained forces in Greece and thus, in reality, threatened Greek independence and integrity.

48. The present terroristic régime directed against the people was, however, an even greater danger. It had conducted a policy of terror, torture and violence against the democratic elements of the country. Despite the denials of Greek representatives, death sentences had been handed down to thousands of persons for their political and economic views. Patriots condemned to death had to wait for months for a review of their sentences. Such facts proved that the internal policies of the Greek Government, which maintained many concentration camps where scores of thousands were subjected to tortures merely because they disagreed with the policies of the Government, had remained unchanged. Thus, it was the present régime which actually threatened Greece.

49. In order to divert the attention of world opinion, the representatives of Greece had endeavoured to defame the Soviet Union. An example was their reference to the alleged shooting of Polish officers in the Katyn Forest by the Soviet authorities. That and similar allegations had been disproved long ago by various documents and many experts.

50. The present charges against Bulgaria and Albania in the report of the Special Committee were to the effect that Greek partisans sheltered in those two countries had been violating the Greek frontier. However, the Special Committee had not backed up these charges.

51. Stating that the Special Committee had been unobjective in its attitude, Mr. Baranovsky quoted testimony from the report (A/1307). Paragraph 118, for instance, confirmed the fact that Greek troops had violated the Albanian border, as stated in the protest notes addressed by the Government of Albania to the United Nations. Moreover, paragraph 99 contained the testimony of an Albanian Army deserter, which exposed the falsity of the charges against Albania. That witness confirmed the fact that most Greek guerrillas had left Albania. The testimony in paragraph 103, already discussed by the representative of Poland (paragraph 15 above), was also referred to by the representative of the Ukrainian SSR.

52. Consequently, despite the efforts of the Special Committee to pick out proper witnesses, who were in fact forced to testify, the unedifying truth had a way of coming to light. It was obvious that a number of guerrillas had been forced to leave their country in order to escape persecution by the Greek authorities. What Albania and Bulgaria had done was merely to abide by international law, interning the refugees and giving them an opportunity to live and engage in civilian work.

53. Quoting paragraph 83 of the report, Mr. Baranovsky termed that testimony inconsistent too. There was no need to cite other examples of the Special Committee's misinterpretation of facts; it had obviously been designed to shift the blame to Albania and Bulgaria.

54. The present report (A/1307), as had the previous reports, only strengthened the firm conviction that it was the Special Committee which, by its actions and provocative attacks upon Bulgaria and Albania, had kindled enmity between those countries and Greece, and had thus hampered the settlement of the whole question.

55. Finally, the Special Committee had included in its report the question of the repatriation of Greek children. The Soviet Union was prepared to assist in the restoration of those children to their parents. The Government of the Ukrainian SSR, too, had demanded unsuccessfully the return of its children kidnapped by the nazis. However, that demand had not been heeded by the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States, which still kept those children in Western Germany. His government had also favoured the return of Greek children, but protested against the transformation of the matter into a political game carried on for the purpose of providing propaganda hostile to the countries of the people's democracies, which were all willing to solve the question in accordance with resolution 193 C III, adopted by the General Assembly on 27 November 1948.

56. That resolution clearly set forth the conditions under which those children should be returned, and the Greek Government also should adhere to those conditions. Quoting from an article in the *New Statesman and Nation* of 14 January 1950 by Kenneth Spencer, an UNSCOB observer during the period when the children had been evacuated, Mr. Baranovsky stated that the article confirmed the voluntary character of the evacuation on the part of the families of the children involved. The fact was brought out that, despite the pressure exerted by the Government of Greece on the kin of the children, the latter had in most cases refrained from making such requests.

57. That was not surprising, since the evacuated children had been cared for lovingly by many social and governmental organizations. The insistence of the Greek Government that the children be returned was not based on humanitarian motives, but was for purposes of political blackmail. At any rate, the Greek Government was not in a position to offer favourable conditions for those children, as the present status of Greek orphanages proved. Citing and describing various examples of the very bad conditions which prevailed in such institutions in Greece, Mr. Baranovsky asked whether anyone would insist on subjecting Greek children to such "mercies" of the Greek Government.

58. The Ukrainian SSR considered that the Greek children could be returned, provided that their return was desired by the children themselves or their families. It was necessary, however, that such restoration be based on an agreement in each individual case between the Greek Government and the government of the country in which those children were at present situated.

59. On the basis of the foregoing, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR considered that the essential prerequisite for the settlement of relations between Greece and its northern neighbours had to be the cessation of military-political intervention by the United States and

the United Kingdom in the affairs of Greece. Those governments should stop encouraging hostility between Greece and its neighbours, and should put an end to the question of the revision of Greece's northern frontiers. On the other hand, it was necessary that the Greek Government carry out democratic reforms, proclaim a general amnesty, liquidate concentration camps and establish, through parliamentary elections, a representative democratic government capable of saving the country from the grievous situation precipitated by the present anti-people's government.

60. Since the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans had disturbed relations between Greece and its neighbours, and since that Committee posed a constant threat to peace in the Balkans, it had to be disbanded. It was also necessary that the Assembly recommend the establishment of normal diplomatic relations between Greece and Albania, and between Greece and Bulgaria.

61. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR repudiated the joint draft resolution (A/C.1/622) since it was incapable of normalizing the situation between Greece and its neighbours. The delegation would likewise vote against the maintenance of the illegal Special Committee.

62. On the other hand, his delegation supported the USSR draft resolution because it would assist in transforming Greece into a democratic and peace-loving State, and would also avoid the consequences of the present tension between Greece, on the one hand, and Albania and Bulgaria, on the other.

63. Sir Keith OFFICER (Australia), speaking on a point of order, regretted the attacks made by the representative of the Ukrainian SSR upon the members of UNSCOB. He considered it improper to attack members of United Nations commissions, who had been appointed by their governments and who were endeavouring to do their duty.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.