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Chairman: Mr. Roberto URDANETA ARBELÁEZ (Colombia)

### Intervention of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China in Korea (*continued*)

[Item 76]\*

#### GENERAL DISCUSSION (*continued*)

*At the invitation of the Chairman, the representative of the Republic of Korea took his seat at the Committee table.*

1. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he was astonished at the great audacity of certain representatives who went so far in distorting incontrovertible facts as to represent the hostilities in Korea as a struggle between the armed forces of the People's Republic of China and United Nations forces which were championing the right of a small country to independence and defending the principles of the United Nations. Nevertheless, that was the way in which the sponsors of the draft resolution (A/C.1/638), in particular, had endeavoured to present the case. They had claimed that the armed forces of the United Nations had entered Korea for the purpose of repelling an attack by the North Koreans directed against a government established by virtue of a United Nations decision. To that version of the so-called North Korean aggression, a new fabrication was now being added, that of an attack by Chinese communist armies upon the United Nations.

2. Assertions now being made by the representatives of the United States of America and the United Kingdom had already been refuted in the First Committee as well as in the General Assembly. In particular, the resolution of the Anglo-American bloc (A/1435), which was offered in justification of the intervention of American troops in Korea, was completely contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations; that had been demonstrated with reference to the relevant texts, and the United States and United Kingdom rep-

resentatives had never been able to refute the accusations levelled against their governments.

3. In point of fact, it was at the instigation of General MacArthur and the Government of the United States of America that the puppet Government of South Korea had launched its aggression. Moreover, one could hardly speak of championing the right of a small country to its independence, when the so-called United Nations Commission itself, despite its desire to clear the name of Mr. Syngman Rhee, had been unable to conceal the reactionary character of his régime, which had been able to remain in office only owing to the support of the American armed forces controlling the country. Illegality, terrorism and violence of the fascist variety—such was the record of a régime which had endeavoured to stifle the aspirations of the Korean people. Finally, since the Commission itself had admitted that there had been a hundred thousand arrests within a period of one year, and that Korean patriots had been tortured for availing themselves of their constitutional right to criticize the government, it was ridiculous to represent the aid given to that régime as a defence of democratic freedoms.

4. As a matter of fact, the National Assembly of South Korea had itself recognized that it was Syngman Rhee who was responsible for the loss of human life and for the devastation of the country. On 3 November, after the Government which had been driven out of Seoul had returned thither, that Assembly, by a vote of 100 to 21, with 2 abstentions, had opposed the appointment of the Minister of National Education to the post of Prime Minister. That was not all; the indignation of the South Koreans had manifested itself by the rise of a powerful partisan movement, many members of which had been tortured in the presence of and with the aid of the American authorities for having opposed the sinister plans of Syngman Rhee and his efforts to unify Korea by force.

5. Now that certain documents, such as a letter dated 30 September 1949, to Mr. Robert T. Oliver had fallen

\* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

into the hands of the North Korean troops, it had been revealed that the South Koreans' systematic preparations for aggression had received military support from the United States. Nevertheless, when various letters of that type, one of them written on the eve of the outbreak of hostilities, had been read to the First Committee (348th meeting) the members of the United States delegation had taken refuge in complete silence.

6. Since, however, an attempt was once again being made to misrepresent events, it was important to recall five essential facts. (1) On 19 June 1950, Mr. John Foster Dulles, addressing the Assembly of South Korea, had given his approval to the plan of attack against North Korea and had promised the moral and material assistance of his country. (2) On 20 June 1950, five days before the attack upon North Korea, Mr. Dulles had written to Syngman Rhee that his country was called upon to play a major part in the forthcoming events. (3) The former South Korean Minister of the Interior had referred to a statement made by General Roberts in January 1950, to the effect that an excuse must be found for the campaign against North Korea, which had already been decided upon and would be launched shortly. (4) In January 1950, Mr. Sebald, an adviser to General MacArthur, had said that when the campaign opened, South Korea would have the aid of the United States Marines and of air forces based in Japan. (5) In the secret archives of the Government of Syngman Rhee which had been seized by the North Koreans, there had been a map on which the plan of attack and the disposition of the different armies were shown.

7. Although Mr. Attlee had declared that the troops at present in Korea were Americans rather than British troops, Messrs. Austin and Younger had, however, continued to speak of United States troops as United Nations forces and to say that those troops had been repelling aggression. In reality, an act of aggression committed in violation of the requirements of the Charter had been supported and assisted, under the flag of the United Nations. It was hypocrisy, therefore, to speak of relieving the sufferings of Koreans, when those who had organized the attack had shattered and devastated the country with American air bombings.

8. The sponsors of the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/638) and their spokesman, Mr. Austin, had spoken of alleged communist armies which were preventing the United Nations forces from re-establishing the national sovereignty of the Korean people. That sudden and passionate zeal for the idea of sovereignty could be only surprising, coming as it did from a delegation which, in the past, had had only sarcastic comments to make on the idea of national sovereignty; moreover, the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and their friends had spoken as if the Chinese were at the frontier of the United States, instead of American troops having advanced toward the Chinese frontier. Long before the outbreak of hostilities, American bombs supplied to the clique of Chiang Kai-shek had helped to massacre Chinese citizens; now American planes were bombing Manchuria. On the last point, there was, it was true, some uncertainty within the United States delegation. Despite Mr. Austin's denials, Mr. Dulles had been forced to admit on 27 November (407th meeting), that Manchuria had indeed

been bombed; and he had attempted to justify the bombing raids (the sites of which he himself had pointed out on a map) by the ridiculous excuse that they were reconnaissance operations against the Yalu bridges.

9. In the circumstances, how could one be surprised that the Chinese people had reacted to events such as the arrival of the United States Seventh Fleet off Taiwan (Formosa), the blockade of that island, and its occupation with a view to preparing for an attack on the mainland? When the American forces, after having crossed the 38th parallel, had continued to advance northward in large numbers, the Chinese people, alarmed in the face of the dangerous situation created by the American intervention, had given vent to its indignation.

10. One had spoken of respecting the Charter, but Mr. Vyshinsky did not believe it possible to associate such respect with the threats addressed to the Chinese people, whom the representative of the United Kingdom (410th meeting) had warned of ominous consequences if they did not follow the advice given. In actual fact, those who so loudly proclaimed themselves defenders of the Charter had flagrantly violated it over and over again.

11. The aggressive policy of the ruling circles of the United States towards China and the northerly advance of armed forces which had threatened China's vital centres explained the sudden rising up of the Chinese people to defend the frontiers of their fatherland. Without doubt it would be stated, in accordance with the American point of view expressed in August 1950 in General MacArthur's famous message, that the whole Pacific area and the chain of islands extending from the Aleutians to the Mariannas represented the United States' first line of defence, and that that nation had the right to defend such illusory frontiers, although China must on no account combat a threat against its real frontiers. But a long history compounded of bitter experience had taught China to take measures of legitimate defence.

12. If, therefore, the United States of America itself would agree to examine the facts objectively, it would see things in their true perspective and appreciate the true reason for the considerable number of Chinese volunteers and the importance of their operations. There was no occasion for surprise that volunteers should be organized, equipped and trained for modern war. Volunteers had the same arms as the armies whose ranks they came to swell; far from necessarily constituting undisciplined hordes, they were naturally organized in units under a commander-in-chief. That was how the Poles of General Dombrowski had fought at Paris beside the Communards, how Lafayette and Kosciuszko had sided with the Americans in their war for independence, and how the American Abraham Lincoln Brigade had fought for the Spanish Republic. That analogy had admittedly been disputed by several speakers, including the representative of Cuba, who had asserted (411th meeting), without producing a shred of evidence, that the present case differed from those which Mr. Vyshinsky had cited inasmuch as it involved a large-scale invasion of the territory of another country on the orders of a foreign government. Just as base-

less as that strange assertion was the charge of imperialism—the eternal refrain of the slanderers of the Soviet Union, who had been exposed a hundred times.

13. The sponsors of the draft resolution (A/C.1/638) were resorting to slander of the People's Republic of China and were asserting that action of such scope implied a nation-wide effort, because they underestimated the strength of a people which in twenty years had rid itself of war-lords, monopolies and American colonists. According to the terms of the Treaty concluded in 1950 between the USSR and the People's Republic of China, the defeat of the Kuomintang and the advent of the People's Government had completely changed the previous state of affairs; the new government, which had the support of the whole of China, had proved itself capable of defending the political independence and territorial integrity of China and the dignity of its people. A failure to understand the events which had followed the overrunning of Korea by United States interventionists was due to misunderstanding of that fundamental reversal of the situation in the Far East.

14. The United States general staff, moreover, had modestly given only a few figures on alleged Chinese units cited in the so-called United Nations Commission's cablegram (A/C.1/639), which Mr. Austin wished to introduce as new factual data; since that enumeration had no foundation in fact, it would have been a very simple matter for Mr. Austin to multiply the figures. It was also a strange coincidence that the Commission should have corroborated the assertions of the American bloc by the entirely gratuitous statement that the prisoners taken had not been volunteers. All too obviously, the cablegram had been sent to meet a specific need. Besides, no self-respecting witness would, moreover, contradict himself, as did document A/C.1/639, which mentioned 231,000 men in paragraph (3) and 400,000 men in paragraph (4) of the same document. Even the *New York Herald Tribune* had been obliged to admit that no reliance could be placed on figures issued by General MacArthur's staff whose information was inaccurate.

15. The absurdity of the figures given in the cablegram of 7 December (A/C.1/639) had been revealed in General MacArthur's Press conference of 2 December, at which he had asserted that the Americans had captured only 300 Chinese out of a total of 145,000 prisoners. The truth was that the facts given by representatives of the Anglo-American bloc were intended solely to save face for General MacArthur.

16. Moreover, in replying to the arguments drawn by the delegation of the USSR from The Hague Conventions of 1907 on the laws of war, the representatives of the United States of America and the United Kingdom had preferred to remain silent and use the good offices of Peru (410th meeting) Cuba (411th meeting), and Uruguay (410th meeting) rather than to state clearly whether or not they regarded themselves as bound by those Conventions. The Cuban delegation which had demonstrated marked zeal in acquitting itself of its task, had charged the representative of the USSR with having misquoted article 6 of Convention V. But it was very precisely stated in the authentic Russian text of 1908 that the responsibility of a neutral Power

was not engaged by the fact of persons crossing the frontier "separately" to offer their services to one of the belligerents. The representative of Cuba, who had based his statement on the French text, had maintained that it was necessary to read "singly" (*isolément*) for "separately" (*séparément*). The representative of the USSR maintained that "singly" was incorrect. Be that as it may, the delegation would not accept an accusation of bad faith.

17. The representative of Cuba had attempted to bring off another trick by citing the jurist Oppenheim on the English Act of 1819 dealing with the United Kingdom Government's attitude in the event of neutrality. In such an event, however, what prohibited British subjects from taking part in military operations was not international law but a specific provision of the Act of 1819. Besides, that provision had not prevented Englishmen from going to the aid of the Queen of Spain in 1835. Similarly, the fact that The Hague Conventions of 1907 had been in force for some considerable time, had not prevented the United Kingdom, in 1940, from going to the aid of Finland. And Mr. Belaúnde, the representative of Peru (410th meeting), had certainly been led astray by his own eloquence to treat as some prehistoric monster those 1907 Conventions, which had allegedly been replaced by the Charter. Yet the preamble to the Charter referred to "respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law". While some treaties might no doubt have become obsolete, The Hague Conventions of 1907 contained vital provisions binding on all civilized States. It was difficult to see what would release those States from their obligation to respect treaties.

18. Paragraph 5 of Article 2 admittedly stated that "all Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes"; but the following words, "in accordance with the present Charter", ruled out any possibility of applying that text to the present case, since a group of Member States had claimed that they alone represented the United Nations and had disregarded and violated the Charter on one occasion after another.

19. It should not be forgotten, indeed, that the dates of 25 June, 27 June and 27 July,<sup>1</sup> each represented a violation of the Charter, specifically because a hearing had been refused to North Korea and because the provisions of Article 33 had been disregarded. Moreover, those who were now hypocritically invoking the Charter had lost all right to do so by violating it themselves in adopting the resolution entitled "Peace through deeds" (A/1531), which had deprived the Security Council of its primary function of maintaining peace and security. The rule of unanimity had admittedly been allowed to stand and might still be used if necessary. On the other hand, the resolution on united action for peace (A/1481, resolution A) had undermined the foundations of the United Nations.

20. As a result of those violations of the Charter, it was entirely natural that the aggression against North Korea at present enjoyed the armed support of divisions of, or, to be more accurate, the symbolic assist-

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year*, Nos. 15, 16 and 18.

ance of a number of countries which were politically or economically dependent on the United States of America. No one who had committed such illegal acts was entitled to press others to respect alleged United Nations decisions; the Security Council could not take valid decisions unless its legitimate members were present; but the absence of the People's Republic of China made the Council's actions essentially null and void. Mr. Younger could hardly call upon the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China to respect the Charter of an organization to which it had been refused admission. Moreover, paragraph 5 of Article 2 referred only to respect for decisions taken "in accordance with the present Charter". Respect for the Charter did not imply that any country was bound by illegal decisions, which the Soviet Union had not recognized in the past, did not now and would never recognize, despite threats which could intimidate only the weak.

21. One would not have forgotten that, at the Security Council meeting of 27 June,<sup>2</sup> Mr. Austin had read out President Truman's statement ordering aid to Mr. Syngman Rhee, and that immediately thereafter the Council had adopted its resolution. It had thus deprived the United Nations of its international character and had made it the instrument of the United States foreign policy of force. An attempt had admittedly been made to create a diversion and, in the absence of sound arguments against the legality of aid to Korea by Chinese volunteers, slanderous charges of imperialism had been levelled against the USSR. But the Chinese people knew from experience American imperialism, before which General Rómulo (409th meeting) who to all intents and purposes was a general in the service of the United States, had humbly bent the knee. General Rómulo had, however, alluded to the fact that the United States itself had also succumbed in the past to some of the temptations of imperialism. That was a polite way of expressing what the British economist Hobson had expressed more harshly in his book *Imperialism*, published in 1902. That bourgeois writer of moderate tendencies had foreseen that the big American industrialists and financiers would not be satisfied with Cuba, the Philippines and Hawaii but would turn their eyes towards China, the Pacific and South America. Recognizing the political influence wielded by industrial and financial magnates, Mr. Hobson pointed out that wars constituted a source of vast profits for bankers, and for armaments manufacturers and merchants. General Rómulo should not therefore deny that the Americans had annexed the Philippines and Hawaii to obtain their coffee and sugar, nor forget that, although the United States had given the Philippines their independence, it had obtained military bases in exchange.

22. As regards the benefits brought by American imperialism to the Philippines, a certain Bell report,<sup>2</sup> drawn up after the somewhat unusual procedure of an inquiry conducted by a foreign State in an independent country, noted that many economists and manufacturers did not believe that the country's economy would

improve and feared the collapse of their currency. Moreover, the administration included too many incompetent and corrupt persons, and the rulers disregarded the deterioration in the lot of the small wage-earner. Assuredly, however, the Philippine people were capable of finding within themselves the means necessary to extricate themselves from an apparently hopeless situation.

23. The six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/638) therefore merely served to camouflage the true reasons for the disastrous war imposed on the people of Korea by means of empty phrases and high-sounding references to the Charter, to the struggle against aggression and the maintenance of peace. The delegation of the USSR would therefore vote against that draft resolution; and in order to make an effective contribution to the strengthening of peace, and to end the infamous intervention of the United States of America and of certain other countries which were taking advantage of the United Nations, the USSR submitted a draft resolution couched in the following terms (A/C.1/640):

*"The General Assembly,*

*"Calling attention to the grave threat to the peace and security of the peoples represented by the continued intervention in Korea of the armed forces of the United States of America and of the armed forces of the other States taking part in that intervention,*

*"Seeking a peaceful settlement of the Korean question and the operation of peace and security in the Far East,*

*"Recommends*

*"1. That all foreign troops be withdrawn immediately from Korea;*

*"2. That the decision on the Korean question be entrusted to the Korean people themselves."*

24. Mr. LIMB (Republic of Korea) declared that by reason of the tragic situation in Korea the lies that had been uttered must be refuted and the truth made quite plain. The opposition to the reunification of Korea had come from the USSR, although it had signed the Potsdam Declaration providing for the establishment of a united and independent Korea. The USSR was the Power that had refused to permit general elections to be held in North as well as South Korea. In that way, the USSR had succeeded in establishing and maintaining in North Korea a puppet régime and had called that régime a government elected by the people, although the elections in North Korea had been carried out under police pressure and United Nations observers had not been able to see that they were properly conducted.

25. The USSR had also, by contesting the legality of the Government of the Republic of Korea and by recognizing the authorities of North Korea, confused international public opinion and had enabled concealment of the responsibility for the attack launched on 25 June by the troops of North Korea against the Republic of Korea. Communist propaganda had alleged that the struggle taking place in Korea was a civil war. That lie had been recently disproved by the capture, by the troops of the Republic of Korea and the United Nations forces, of enormous quantities of arms which had been made in the USSR.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 16.

<sup>3</sup> See *Report to the President of the United States, by the Economic Survey Mission to the Philippines*, Washington, D. C., October 9, 1950.

26. More recently, it had been stated that the intervening Chinese troops were composed solely of volunteers. The United Nations had pretended to ignore that lie in order to enable the Chinese communists to withdraw their troops and consequently to avoid an extension of the conflict. Moreover, the free peoples of the world had given the Peking authorities assurances with respect to the territorial integrity of China. All those efforts at appeasement, however, seemed to have been in vain; their immediate result had been not only loss of time but increased confusion, to the disadvantage of the United Nations forces. Many United Nations soldiers had no understanding of what principle their struggles and sacrifices were intended to uphold.

27. The Korean conflict was not a limited war; on the contrary, the United Nations were confronted by an aggressor set on a policy of extermination. Clearly, therefore, a policy of appeasement would not promote peace and would be an ironic mockery of the great sacrifices endured by the Korean people and the United Nations forces to defend the principles of the Charter. Obviously peace negotiations could succeed only if carried out in a spirit of mutual good faith and good will; to accept the communist demands would be tantamount to repudiating the action that the United Nations had already undertaken.

28. The aim of the Republic of Korea was to live in peace as a free and democratic member of the peaceful community of nations. It had engaged in the struggle only in order to maintain intact that freedom of peace-loving peoples. In that struggle, the population and towns of Korea had been the chief victims. Fortunately, the people of Korea had received with great satisfaction the support of the rest of the free world and was benefiting from an unprecedented international solidarity that had become manifest during the war.

29. Obviously, the only answer to aggression was force and the will to fight. Under the present circumstances, therefore, the watchword should be resolute defence and hope.

30. The United Nations had already condemned the aggression committed by the North Koreans against the Republic of Korea. Now the Chinese Communists had committed a similar act of aggression. It was impossible to appease the Peking authorities; if their aggression diminished in Korea it would be immediately transferred elsewhere.

31. None should forget that the aggression committed by Japan against Manchuria, and later by Hitler and Mussolini against various democratic States, had led to the outbreak of the Second World War, which could have been avoided if the principles of collective security had been defended in time.

32. The free nations of the world had rejoiced on 25 June 1950 when the principle of collective security had been invoked and immediately applied to the defence of a single State. The action of the United Nations forces in Korea had been magnificent. They had already succeeded in restoring peace and security over almost all the territory when hundreds of thousands of Chinese soldiers had poured into Korea under the crude pretext of freeing the Korean people from the domination of the United States of America. The free world

had not been deceived; it had been well aware that the new aggression was a product of the USSR in origin, direction and execution.

33. Now that the Republic of Korea was once again in grave danger, it again appealed to the Members of the United Nations to adopt a policy of resistance to aggression, in order to prevent further aggression in other parts of the world.

34. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) pointed out that the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/638) referred, appropriately, to the resolution adopted on 25 June 1950<sup>4</sup> by the Security Council, which had found, by the unanimous vote of the members voting, that a breach of the peace had been committed by the forces of North Korea.

35. Despite the statements of the representatives of the Soviet group, the evidence remained crystal-clear. It consisted of a collection of facts that were precise and consistent with one another.

36. Those facts included, first, the finding of the United Nations Commission on Korea (A/1350, paragraphs 13 to 18) that the invasion of the territory of the Republic of Korea was an unprovoked act of aggression committed in execution of a carefully prepared plan.

37. Secondly, as the Yugoslav representative had pointed out in the Security Council, the behaviour of the two opposing parties must be taken into account.<sup>5</sup> While the Government of the Republic of Korea had appealed to the United Nations at the outbreak of hostilities and had accepted in principle the cease-fire order of the Security Council, the Government of North Korea had simply declared that the Security Council's order was illegal. The Government of the USSR and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China had maligned that order in their Press and ignored it officially for two months, all the while chanting the praises of the army of North Korea for its victories.

38. At the present time, it was unquestionable that large armed forces of the Government of Peking were fighting in Korea. It was alleged that those forces were composed of volunteers, although a cablegram (A/C.1/639) from the United Nations Commission, which had carried out an investigation on the spot, categorically contradicted that statement. But even if it were true, the absurd idea that acts of aggression could be committed only by armies of conscripts and never by regular armies of volunteers was manifestly untenable.

39. In the face of those clear facts, the fantastic ideas of the representatives of the Soviet group were ridiculous. It could not be seriously maintained that Korea was the theatre of a civil war, that the United States was the aggressor, and that the fifty-three Members of the United Nations who had responded to the Security Council's appeal<sup>6</sup> were the accomplices of the United States. Sooner or later, however, the facts would take their revenge on the myths. That had been the experience of all aggressors who had attempted to

<sup>4</sup> See *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year, No. 15.*

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 72, 530th meeting.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, No. 16.

mislead public opinion by charging their victims with their own misdeeds.

40. It was particularly important to unmask the new techniques of domination and conquest to which the aggressors were now resorting. Countries which could not be completely dominated by military occupation were divided, and the occupied part had imposed upon it a totalitarian régime which tried to undermine the independent part of the country, resorting to armed aggression if subversive measures proved insufficient. The aggression was then designated as civil war, and any assistance lent by the United Nations to the victim was called aggression. Finally, if the true aggressor had to bring his strategic reserves into the fight, he disguised them as volunteers.

42. The delegation of Belgium would vote for the such techniques. The potential forces at the disposal of the free nations were greatly superior to the forces at the disposal of those who aimed at domination. It was essential, therefore, that the free nations should be neither weak nor foolhardy but should act together to take appropriate measures to preserve freedom and peace from a danger which was more than merely transitory.

42. The delegation from Belgium would vote for the six-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/638), which defined the position of the United Nations in firm and moderate terms, and clearly showed that the action taken by the Peking authorities was unjustified; it set forth the fundamental conditions for a settlement of the Korean problem in accordance with the Charter, and insisted that no action should be taken which might lead to the spread of the conflict to other areas.

43. Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru) observed that it was easy to claim that the Security Council's resolutions on Korea were illegal and that any action taken by the United Nations as a result of those resolutions was null and void. In that way, it was not difficult to claim that the United Nations was the aggressor. Clearly, however, such an argument amounted to a complete denial of the true function of the United Nations.

44. What was more important, Mr. Vyshinsky had not refuted the arguments advanced against the validity

of the neutrality provisions of The Hague Conventions of 1907. As usual, he had dealt ironically with certain minor points and left the basic argument untouched. The concept of neutrality as laid down in The Hague Conventions of 1907 was no longer applicable to the present epoch because, since the adoption of the United Nations Charter in 1945, all wars had become illegal.

45. It was true that the provisions of The Hague Conventions or of any other international treaty might be applied, when the occasion required it, on condition that they did not conflict with the provisions of the Charter. However, by virtue of Article 103 of the Charter, it was established that, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of Members of the United Nations under the Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the Charter would prevail.

46. It should also be noted that the Chinese forces intervening in Korea could not be compared to those volunteers, the heroic patriots who, in times past, had participated in the liberation of a large number of countries. The present groups of so-called volunteers were, in fact, elements which had been recruited, organized and equipped for a war of subversion designed to spread eventually throughout the entire world. The United Nations could not accept the thesis that the intervention of those so-called volunteers was legal, since the Charter did not allow aggression, neither open nor camouflaged. Moreover, the numbers, organization and equipment of those volunteers proved that they actually were a real army.

47. Faced with the will to power of the USSR, the free world was demonstrating increasing vigilance and opposing the will for war by a desire for peace that it would defend by arms. The Soviet Union might have a temporary military superiority, but the Western democracies were prepared to organize to defend themselves against the Soviet desire for hegemony. Fortunately, there was still hope for the leaders of the USSR were unquestionably intelligent and knew that they did not need war to survive. The delegation of Peru therefore appealed to their common sense and reason, for the maintenance of peace.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.