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Chairman: Mr. Roberto URDANETA ARBELÁEZ (Colombia).

Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece (*concluded*)

[Item 22]*

CONSIDERATION OF THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE REPATRIATION OF GREEK CHILDREN (item 22 (b)) (*concluded*)

1. Mr. ESQUIVEL DE LA GUARDIA (Costa Rica) stated that the item before the Committee was unique in its nature and did not concern any political involvement. His delegation had received appeals from women in Costa Rica as well as from Greek mothers asking that it adopt the point of view of the civilized world, of justice and of decency. Costa Rica favoured the four-Power draft resolution whole-heartedly, intended to vote for it and urged all representatives to approve that draft resolution unanimously.

2. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that some speeches had shown that the consideration of the present item involved political motives designed to stigmatize the countries of the people's democracies which had lovingly sheltered and tended the Greek children in their territories. Although much had been said about humaneness, in reality, deplorable prospects awaited those children after their repatriation to Greece. The best that awaited them was children's homes, but in many cases children's jails and camps awaited them. In reality, therefore, the issue was not humaneness, but a mockery of humanity in general, and the Greek children in particular.

3. The General Assembly resolutions of 1948 and 1949 (193 C (III) and 288 B (IV)) had stipulated that the Greek children should be restored to their parents, to their families. However, the Greek Government and the Greek Red Cross were preparing for the reception of children whose parents, branded as political enemies, were in jails and concentration camps. In fact, the head

of the Greek Red Cross had made a statement¹ to the effect that Greek social welfare institutions were prepared to resettle the repatriated children; that there were thirty-three children's homes which accommodated about 13,000 children; and that he would assure that no discriminatory measures would be taken against the children because of their creed or ideology or that of their parents.

4. It had also been stated that numerous homes had been established in Greece for the children of "rebel parents".² One of those homes, on the island of Leros, accommodated about 2,000 children. In spite of the assurances given by the head of the Greek Red Cross that there would be no discrimination, the conditions in such homes showed the real situation, as described by the representatives of Czechoslovakia (396th meeting) and Poland (394th and 395th meetings), and by others.

5. Mr. Tsarapkin then quoted an item published in the Athens Press about conditions prevailing in a home for children in Athens. He stated that even the mayor of Piraeus had conceded that thirty-seven of sixty-nine children in a children's home in Piraeus had already died. The conditions in regard to food, health and sanitation were indeed grievous but he would not quote any more examples since that would take too long.

6. There could be no question of repatriating children whose parents were in jails or concentration camps. The General Assembly resolutions had stipulated that children should be restored if they so desired or if their parents submitted requests. Obviously, a request from parents in jails could not be regarded as *bona fide*, since such request would be imposed by prison wardens or guards.

7. Moreover, it was necessary to point out that the lists of children to be repatriated submitted by the Greek Red Cross contained the names of 2,000 indi-

¹ See document A/C.16/SR.179/annex A.

² See document A/AC.16/SR.179/annex A/Add.2.

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

viduals whose ages ranged from twenty to twenty-four years.

8. Mr. Tsarapkin charged that the lists were full of inaccuracies and even falsifications. Citing several examples, he stated that in many cases it had been found that a child did not recognize the name of the persons who had claimed it through the Greek authorities. It happened that, in those cases, the real parents of the children claimed were also living in the people's democracies. There were numerous such cases which showed the "authenticity" of those lists. The lists, as shown, were compiled with utter lack of good faith, at best without any verification. There was no doubt that, in the face of such a dubious approach to the question by Greek authorities, the whole repatriation problem required careful study before it would be possible to proceed with the repatriation of any individual child.

9. While some representatives had called for humaneness, the fact was that the parents of the children to be returned to Greece languished in jails and in concentration camps. The real reason why these children had been evacuated from Greece was that their parents had fought in the democratic army or had sympathized with that army. Thus, in reality, the question was not one of humaneness but of cold calculation on the part of certain parties in order to stigmatize the countries of the people's democracies.

10. Those countries, having accorded to the children excellent conditions, actually deserved the gratitude of the United Nations, rather than the reproaches or insults which had been flung at them, particularly by the representative of Belgium (396th meeting). It should be pointed out that up to 70 per cent of the children which those countries had sheltered had been afflicted with various types of diseases. The care extended to those children had either completely eliminated those diseases or had reduced their incidence to from 1 to 5 per cent. The children were well cared for in excellent locales, in well-equipped hospitals and clinics, by a large number of nurses and the personnel of health centres. Their feeding was so arranged that they got meals five times a day, representing a total intake of 3,500 calories. Moreover, Greek-language schools had been organized for them and they were being taught complete courses including secondary, professional and craft training; whereas an overwhelming majority had been illiterate on their arrival from Greece, all of them were now learning to read, write and count.

11. Those were the conditions in which the children were being tended in the people's democracies, as compared with the conditions into which the children would be plunged as a result of the proposals of those who demanded the indiscriminate repatriation of the children.

12. Mr. Tsarapkin, comparing the resolution presently proposed with the previous resolutions, recalled that the resolutions of 1948 and 1949 (193 C (III) and 288 B (IV)) spoke about the return of the Greek children to their homes in cases where the parents or the children so requested. That was the basis from which the whole procedure flowed, since the resolutions had implicit in them the procedure for repatriation. They also stipulated what bodies were supposed to deal with the question. On the other hand, the first paragraph of the preamble to the present four-Power draft resolution

condemned those countries which had extended shelter and care to those children. The Soviet Union considered that preamble an undesirable and unworthy insult to the people's democracies. These countries were to be condemned for supposedly not having taken definite action to comply with the previous resolutions of the General Assembly, which had been adopted unanimously. If the process of repatriation had not developed rapidly, that was due to the fact that the lists of children had not been compiled in good faith, thus making their verification difficult, or even impossible.

13. Moreover, paragraph 2 of the operative part of the draft resolution laid down new conditions and set forth new demands, which were unnecessary, since the procedure for repatriation and for consultation with various bodies such as the Red Cross had been set forth in the previous resolutions. The representatives of the Red Cross had accomplished their duty and there was no need to adopt a proposal which would compel the States concerned to receive representatives on their territories. It would be sufficient to refer, in the operative part, to the past resolutions in this respect.

14. Furthermore, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the present draft (A/C.1/627) were unacceptable to the delegation of the USSR, since the organs envisaged therein which were to deal with repatriation and its procedure were contained in the previous resolutions. Quoting the third paragraph of resolution 193 C (III), Mr. Tsarapkin contended that there was no need to erect a new superstructure of organs and committees, since they would not help to achieve the ostensible goal. Since the creation of such bodies did not constitute the substance of the question, his delegation considered the new proposal to be superfluous and took exception to paragraphs 3 and 4 of the four-Power draft resolution. The representative of the USSR would therefore submit some amendments to the four-Power draft resolution subsequently.

15. The basic facts were as follows: the resolutions of 1948 and 1949 had been adopted unanimously. The difficulties that had arisen with regard to repatriation were not the fault of the people's democracies, but of those who had compiled the inaccurate lists. It was necessary to restore the children in suitable conditions. He would remind the Committee that the representative of Australia had previously pointed out the necessity of taking into account the objections raised by Greece's northern neighbours, and also had considered it appropriate to return the children first to another neutral country before final repatriation to Greece. However, the Australian representative had now abandoned that logical stand. Mr. Tsarapkin asked the reason for that reversal of opinion. Obviously, the Australian representative himself was not quite free of suspicions and alarms which the repatriation to Greece might cause.

16. None of the countries of the people's democracies sheltering Greek children had any intention of hampering the implementation of the previously adopted resolutions, but it was essential that the obstacles which had been erected in the path of their implementation be removed. One major obstacle was the internal situation in Greece at present, and the method and spirit in which the lists had been compiled. Verification of those lists was a lengthy and complicated process.

17. Although all the speakers had stated that they regarded the question as purely humanitarian, they had actually attached an exclusively political character to it.

18. The unanimous adoption of the four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/627) was necessary. To achieve it, the delegation of the USSR was circulating three amendments (A/C.1/628). It was prepared to accept the draft resolution if so amended.

19. Sir Keith OFFICER (Australia) proposed that the representatives of Peru, the Philippines and Sweden constitute the standing committee provided for in paragraph 3 of the four-Power draft resolution.

20. In view of certain questions raised by the representative of Syria (397th meeting), he would assure delegations that the proposed Committee did not entail any cost, since the intention was that it would meet in New York when the Secretary-General desired to consult it. The Rapporteur's report would clarify that point.

21. The representative of Syria had also suggested that the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans might perform this work. It was, however, particularly desirable that the committee should be composed of representatives of States disinterested in political aspects of the matter and interested only in the humanitarian aspects. The three countries which he suggested were very appropriate and had agreed to serve.

22. In answering the two points raised by the representative of the USSR, Sir Keith stressed first that paragraph 2 of the draft resolution aimed at urging countries, not commanding them, to allow Red Cross representatives to enter the countries concerned in order to discuss lists and to clear up difficulties. The Red Cross had encountered certain difficulties and had not been accorded sufficient co-operation up to date.

23. Secondly, operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution, which would create the standing committee, was intended to meet the request for assistance addressed by the Red Cross to the United Nations. Unless such assistance were given, the Red Cross might have to be relieved of its mandate, accorded under previous resolutions. Moreover, the standing committee would be in a position to discuss questions, such as that raised by the representative of the USSR regarding the future of these children.

24. Sir Keith, in conclusion, urged the acceptance of the draft resolution by an overwhelming vote as it stood.

25. Mr. VAN GLABBEKE (Belgium), expressing a desire to answer some points raised by the representative of the USSR, stated that he considered it deplorable for a representative of a great country such as the USSR to present a set of arguments in support of the views of those who, in his opinion, remained kidnappers, since they refused to repatriate about 28,000 Greek children. The Soviet Union had voted in favour of repatriation both in 1948 and 1949. In view of the recent statements by the representative of the USSR, however, it was no longer possible to expect a unanimous vote. In fact, even though the Soviet Union had favoured repatriation, for two years it had not done anything to facilitate the work of repatriation. On the

contrary, the work of the International Red Cross had been hampered and obstructed by those countries which the radio and Press called "satellites", over whom the Soviet Union could indisputably exercise considerable influence.

26. If there had been any countries which had sought to introduce purely political considerations, it had been the Soviet Union and those countries described as "satellites". The same methods had been used again today. Errors in lists which covered about 28,000 children had been cited and, on the basis of a few errors, the lists had been declared utterly vitiated and valueless. He would reply to the Soviet Union representative that he repudiated such a method of work. It was impossible to avoid inaccuracies in lists involving so many thousands of children, and it was possible for the National and International Red Cross societies—organizations worthy of confidence—to correct those errors.

27. Moreover, the representative of the USSR had once again embarked on the argument that the conditions for repatriation in Greece were bad. However, that did not mean that there were no places where conditions were good. Anyway, such reasons could not justify a refusal to repatriate and return children to their parents and to the legal authorities in Greece.

28. On the other hand, the arguments that the present status of the children was favourable did not refer to the issue and the crux of the matter but represented efforts to divert attention from the real significance of those problems. As regards the education afforded those children, he hoped that they had not been taught the kind of manners of which the First Committee had had a sample when the Queen of Greece had been attacked by certain representatives.

29. Regarding the argument that the age of some of the children was about nineteen or twenty years, the representative of Belgium remarked that, if no repatriation were to take place for ten to twenty years, there would be no Greek children left in the countries concerned since they would all become of age. Obviously, that seemed to be the intention of those countries. They had been approached by the International Red Cross following the unanimously adopted General Assembly resolutions (193 C (III) and 288 B (IV)), but to no avail. Since they could not procrastinate any longer, they had changed their tactics. There might be practical difficulties in some cases, such as those referred to by the representative of Yugoslavia (397th meeting) in good faith and loyalty; nevertheless, there were thousands of cases which presented no difficulties whatsoever. Why was it not possible to begin by settling the easy cases? On that point, the countries concerned had been conveniently silent.

30. In conclusion, Mr. van Glabbeke referred to the statements of the representatives of Denmark (397th meeting) and the Dominican Republic (396th meeting) of which he approved whole-heartedly. He urged the Committee to wind up the question, to approve the draft resolution submitted by the four Powers, and to rely for its application upon the experience and common sense of persons who had shown their good faith.

31. Mr. POLITIS (Greece) remarked that it was curious that the representative of the USSR should

make charges of exploiting the problem of the children for political purposes when it was the representative of Czechoslovakia who had indicated that his government subordinated the question of returning the children to the question of the establishment in Greece of a régime of which it could approve. As to the alleged inaccuracies, Mr. Politis requested co-operation in order to clear them up.

32. In any event, the Czechoslovak Government had admitted to the Red Cross that it had in its charge 138 children who satisfied the terms for repatriation. Investigations had been made in Greece by Red Cross representatives who had gone out into the villages and verified the desires of the parents. The Government of Greece did not wish children to be separated from their parents, but restored to them. To that end, it asked for co-operation and good faith. The Greek Government did not plan to lodge the children in camps but to send them to their parents. Mr. Politis cited the case of a child who had succeeded in returning to Greece by his own efforts and was now living with his family.

33. That co-operation was possible was clear from the action of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Government had made conditions, some of which seemed excessive, but they had been accepted by Greece. There could be no objections to co-operation except a desire to obstruct. If the government concerned chose not to trust Greece, the Red Cross or the United Nations could manage the matter. The Greek Government was prepared to discuss conditions; all that was needed was a little good will.

34. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said that the problem of repatriation should be considered with care and as far as possible without political rancour. It would be criminal to allow the fate of the children to be used to further political aims or for propaganda purposes. In previous years, the discussions had been conducted in a business-like manner and the concern of all delegations over those unfortunate victims of the war had led to the unanimous adoption of resolutions on the subject. At the General Assembly in Paris, a large drafting committee had worked out the terms of a non-political resolution. The First Committee should try again to proceed so as to reach a solution that would be acceptable to all. It was to be regretted that some delegations, particularly the representative of Belgium (396th meeting), had indulged in recriminations and insults. The use of such words as "kidnappers" was absolutely out of order in the Committee. The representative of Belgium had deliberately repeated the word "satellite". Such practices were not designed to help the Committee.

35. The problem of the Greek children was dealt with in chapter IV, part II of the report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (A/1307), and in the special report of the Secretary-General (A/1480). The UNSCOB report referred to the General Assembly's resolutions of 1948 and 1949 and then set out to prove that the States harbouring children had not complied with those resolutions. The two reports were contradictory, because it was clear from the Secretary-General's report that there had been discussions between the International Red Cross and the national Red Cross societies of the States concerned but that conditions had not been created to enable the resolu-

tions to be implemented. It was clear from those resolutions that the General Assembly had taken great care to ensure that children would only be returned at their own request or at the request of their parents or other close relatives, and that both the requests and the return should be made voluntarily. Those terms had to be met if repatriation was to take place.

36. The delegation of Poland recognized the humanitarian aspects of the problem and agreed that children should join their families. At the same time, it recognized that reasons had existed for the evacuation of the children. In early 1948, when the guerrilla areas had been under bombardment, many parents had decided to remove their children to places where they would be safe from the dangers of bombardment and starvation. That a very real danger existed had been confirmed by the correspondents of British and the United States newspapers. Evacuation had only been carried out at the request of the parents, and it was propaganda to allege that they had been abducted. The true facts could be gathered from the children's own letters, from the evidence of neutral visitors and journalists, and from the parents themselves. The report of UNSCOB had failed to mention those various factors. The States harbouring the children should not be condemned but should, instead, be commended for doing their humanitarian duty.

37. All those States were prepared to conform to the General Assembly's resolution, but they had accepted responsibility for the children and therefore had to ensure that the terms of those resolutions were carried out. The Greek Red Cross had claimed that, up to May 1950, it had compiled a list of 9,514 requests (A/1307, paragraph 194). The lists had not been checked by UNSCOB. Mr. Katz-Suchy wished to draw attention to the way in which some of those requests had been secured. When the Greek Government had not been able to get statements from the parents who were in prison or had left the country, it carried out raids on villages and forced parents or other relatives to sign. Mr. Katz-Suchy proceeded to give details of specific cases of intimidation in the area of Kastoria. It was clear that the so-called requests should be verified.

38. Particular care should be taken to ensure that the children were not victimized or persecuted for political reasons. It should be recalled that the harbouring States had never been requested to draw up lists. A suggestion to that effect had been made by the representative of Greece in Paris, but all delegations had rejected the idea because they knew that such a course would lead to the terrorization of their parents and relatives in Greece.

39. A check on many requests showed that they had been made by distant relatives, although the parents were still living abroad, often with the children. The parents of 1,800 of the 2,534 children in Bulgaria were refugees. Of the remainder, the fathers of 400 had been killed in action, and 242 other parents were in concentration camps or prisons. Nevertheless, the return of those children had been requested. The lists were full of falsifications also, as had been admitted both by the Secretary-General and by the International Red Cross. Mr. Katz-Suchy proceeded to give examples of

requests allegedly made by parents who were known to be either dead or living abroad, some of the latter having even been living with the children requested.

40. Neither UNSCOB nor the International Red Cross had claimed that any genuine voluntary request had been rejected. Their reports were drawn in general terms and it was therefore improper for any resolution to make any accusations. The first paragraph of the preamble to the four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/627) had not been designed to bring about a solution of the problem but represented an attempt to introduce a political element. In fact, the harbouring States had done their duty in protecting children, as many other States had done in similar circumstances in both world wars.

41. At the present time, the children in exile were being brought up in ideal conditions. They were being educated in a spirit of patriotism to admire the great traditions of Greece. Their happy situation had been confirmed by the reports of various visitors, journalists and representatives of humanitarian organizations. Those points were being brought out, not because of any thought that it would be better to retain the children in those satisfactory conditions than to repatriate them, but only to contradict the propaganda about camps where children were being indoctrinated with hatred for their country.

42. It would be possible also to describe the conditions awaiting the children in Greece, where they would receive no food or clothing or medical attention; even the newspapers of Athens stated that conditions were frightful. The contrast in conditions was not an argument, however, and the problem should be solved on a realistic basis and not for political reasons. UNSCOB (A/1307, paragraph 198) had cited the Government of Greece to the effect that there would be no discrimination against the children on political, religious or other grounds. It was very difficult to accept such assurances in the face of the evidence at hand. The Greek Government had sent thousands of women and children to concentration camps, and made a practice of court-martialing and executing students. There was even a children's section in Makronisos.

43. It was clear from the Secretary-General's report³ that the Greek Government intended to put some of the children in camps on their return. Despite the fact that they could not be sent to their families, the requests for their repatriation had been made, and it had been confirmed by correspondents that camps were being prepared. *The Times* of London had confirmed the fact that one camp already accommodated 1,200 children and expected to have 4,000 when children arrived from the Grammos area, and even more when the evacuees returned. The General Assembly should take note of those facts, since it would be responsible for the fate of children who would be repatriated under the terms of its resolution. The Assembly should ensure that the children were not victimized because of their stay abroad or because of their parents' views. Any resolution should avoid giving the impression that it was a political weapon.

44. The UNSCOB report of 8 September 1950 (A/1423) contained charges against Poland which had been repeated in the First Committee. Those charges had already been dealt with, and it would be beneath the dignity of the Committee to consider them again. It was surprising, however, that UNSCOB and the Secretary-General would accept the evidence of a confessed murderer despite the discussions between the Polish Red Cross and the International Red Cross.

45. The joint draft resolution (A/C.1/627) proposed the establishment of a standing committee, but it was by no means clear what its role should be. Evidently it was to function in New York but it was difficult to see how. Surely it would be better to secure a resolution the authority of which would be strengthened by its unanimous acceptance. The Polish delegation, which would support every endeavour to draw up such a text, had therefore urged the Committee to refrain from any decision which would force the repatriation of the children or circumvent the previously adopted resolutions. Those had not called for repatriation in wholesale lots but in accordance with terms which still ought to be met. Any repatriation must be voluntary and must take the children to their families, not into camps. Any effort directed towards such genuine repatriation would be supported by the delegation of Poland.

46. Mr. PLAISANT (France), intervening on a point of order, observed that some delegations had been distressed by the use of the word "satellite". Mr. Plaisant urged that the term should not be considered derogatory. By definition, a satellite was a star circling about another star in a galaxy, and although often it seemed to reflect light, it had a glow of its own. Use of the astronomical metaphor should not cause anyone to take umbrage.

47. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) expressed appreciation of the explanation. He hoped that the representative of France would bear it in mind when references were made to the presence of foreign generals and other officials in France.

48. Mr. POLITIS (Greece), referring to the statement of the representative of Poland that there were children in Makronisos, stated that there was not a single minor in that camp. With regard to the age of the children who had been requested, the Red Cross had been furnished, in accordance with its request, with lists of minors. Perhaps some of them had now come of age. There was also the point that the Czechoslovak Government had admitted that there were 138 children who fulfilled the requirements for repatriation and who had been investigated by the International Red Cross. Any insinuation that the representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross had lied was inadmissible.

49. The CHAIRMAN proposed the closure of the debate.

The Chairman's proposal was adopted by 48 votes to none, with 7 abstentions.

50. Mr. PISEK (Czechoslovakia), pointing out that his name had been entered on the list of speakers, requested an opportunity to speak.

³ See A/1480, annex, part one, section on Greece.

51. The CHAIRMAN replied that there had been other names on the list as well, but that the Committee had taken a decision.

52. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) suggested that, in view of the lateness of the hour, the voting on the joint draft resolution might be postponed until the afternoon meeting. That might enable the sponsors of the joint draft to accept the amendments submitted by the USSR.

53. Sir Keith OFFICER (Australia) and Mr. LUNS (Netherlands) stated that they could not accept the amendments.

54. The CHAIRMAN requested that the Committee proceed to vote on the draft resolution jointly proposed by Australia, Denmark, France and the Netherlands (A/C.1/627) and on the three amendments (A/C.1/628) to that draft which had been submitted by the USSR. He put to the vote the first USSR amendment calling for the deletion of the first paragraph of the preamble.

The first USSR amendment was rejected by 43 votes to 5, with 5 abstentions.

55. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the preamble of the four-Power draft resolution.

The preamble was approved by 52 votes to none, with 5 abstentions.

56. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said that he had not understood the method of voting intended. His delegation was opposed to the first paragraph of the preamble but could accept the second and third paragraphs.

57. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) stated that he had expected the preamble to be voted on paragraph by paragraph, since the USSR amendment to it had affected only the first paragraph, the only one in the preamble to which his delegation had objected. It had no objection to the second and third paragraphs.

58. Proceeding to the operative part of the four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/627), the CHAIRMAN put to the vote paragraph 1.

Paragraph 1 was approved unanimously.

59. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the second of the USSR amendments (A/C.1/628), which concerned paragraph 2 of the joint draft resolution. The amendment called for replacing the final passage "and, whenever necessary, to allow the international Red Cross organizations free access to their territories for this purpose" by the words "in conformity with the resolutions referred to above".

The second USSR amendment was rejected by 46 votes to 5, with 7 abstentions.

60. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote paragraph 2 of the four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/627).

Paragraph 2 was approved by 53 votes to 5, with no abstentions.

61. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the third of the three USSR amendments (A/C.1/628) which called for the deletion of paragraphs 3 and 4 of the four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/627).

The third USSR amendment was rejected by 44 votes to 5, with 8 abstentions.

62. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote paragraphs 3 and 4 of the four-Power draft resolution, with the insertion of "Peru, the Philippines and Sweden" as members of the standing committee which would be established by the terms of paragraph 3.

Paragraphs 3 and 4 were approved by 53 votes to 5, with no abstentions.

63. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote paragraph 5 of the four-Power draft resolution.

Paragraph 5 was approved unanimously.

64. The CHAIRMAN put to the vote the four-Power draft resolution as a whole.

The draft resolution as a whole was approved by 53 votes to none, with 5 abstentions.

65. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) explained that, although the delegation of Poland had been in favour of several parts of the four-Power draft resolution, it had abstained in the vote on the draft in its entirety because it did not consider that the resolution would be a step forward in the solution of the problem of the Greek children who were presently harboured in other countries. His delegation had attempted to bring about a compromise which would have enabled the Committee to have achieved a unanimous vote on the proposal. The intransigence of several delegations had, however, made that impossible.

66. Mr. PISEK (Czechoslovakia) stated that his delegation had also sought to make possible the unanimous approval of the draft resolution. He expressed regret that he had not been permitted to address the Committee because he had wished to submit some suggestions. The delegation of Czechoslovakia had been forced to abstain from voting on the draft resolution as a whole because it could not accept certain parts of the proposal in its present form.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.