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Chairman: Mr. Roberto URDANETA ARBELÁEZ (Colombia).

Complaint by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding aggression against China by the United States of America (*continued*)¹

[Item 70]*

Complaint by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the violation of Chinese air space by the air force of the United States of America and the machine-gunning and bombing of Chinese territory by that air force, and against the bombardment and illegal inspection of a merchant ship of the People's Republic of China by a military vessel of the United States

[Item 75]*

1. The CHAIRMAN said that the First Committee still had before it items 70, 71² and 75 of the agenda.

2. He suggested that items 70 and 75 might be considered jointly.

It was so decided.

3. The CHAIRMAN declared the debate on the two items open.

4. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America) recalled that on 27 November 1950 (407th meeting) Mr. Foster Dulles had said that it might be concluded from Mr. Vyshinsky's accusations that the USSR was trying to destroy the long history of friendly relations between China and the United States and to bring the Chinese people to hate and if necessary, to fight the

¹ Consideration of that item began at the 405th meeting of the First Committee on 24 November 1950 and continued at the 406th meeting on 24 November and the 407th meeting on 27 November.

* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

² Item 71 of the General Assembly agenda: "The question of Formosa".

United States. The present attitude of the Chinese communists confirmed the validity of those conclusions.

5. The USSR delegation (407th meeting) had brought the following five main charges against the United States:

(a) Invasion of Taiwan (Formosa) by United States armed forces;

(b) Blockade of the shores of the island of Taiwan;

(c) Economic aggression in Taiwan;

(d) Intervention in the internal affairs of China;

(e) Systematic violation by the United States air force of the air space in China in the vicinity of the Korean-Manchurian border.

6. In regard to the accusation that United States armed forces had invaded Taiwan (Formosa), President Truman had stated on 27 June 1950 that the attack upon Korea had made it plain beyond all doubt that the occupation of Taiwan by communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to the United States forces performing their lawful functions in that area. Accordingly, the President of the United States had ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa, and had also called upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The order issued on 29 July 1950 by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief in the Far East fully confirmed the fact that the United States had no aggressive designs—political, military or otherwise on Formosa.

7. On 5 August 1950 General MacArthur had sent to Formosa a survey group of thirty-seven officers and men, who had remained on the island until 26 August. Another survey group of fifteen officers had remained

on Formosa from 26 August to 23 October. There were at present on Formosa forty-four persons belonging to the military establishment of the United States, nineteen of whom were officers attached to the diplomatic mission accredited to the Government of China. There were also one warrant officer and twenty-four enlisted men.

8. In carrying out his mission to maintain the *status quo* with respect to Formosa, General MacArthur had directed that units of the United States air force should make occasional training flights over the island. Such training flights were normally carried out by groups of four jet aeroplanes, on an average six times a month. To accomplish the refuelling of those aircraft when they were forced to land, and to support the transport aircraft landing in connexion with the United States Legation, the United States maintained on Formosa five officers and seventeen airmen, all of whom were included in the forty-four United States military personnel referred to earlier. The air squadrons making training flights were not based on Formosa and were not engaged in joint manoeuvres with the Chinese Nationalist Armed Forces.

9. The purpose of the naval action undertaken by the United States in relation to Formosa was to prevent the spreading of the Korean conflict in the Far East.

10. The USSR delegation also claimed that the United States was blockading the island of Formosa. That allegation was absolutely untrue. The essential elements of a blockade, as defined by international law, were absent, since commercial shipping could enter and leave the ports of Formosa freely and conditions of maritime traffic had not changed since 27 June 1950.

11. The third main charge was alleged economic aggression. The accusation, which had first appeared in the newspaper *Jen Min Jih Pao* (People's Daily) of Peking on 7 August 1950, had been reprinted in *Pravda* on 17 August 1950 and had then been brought to the First Committee by Mr. Vyshinsky (407th meeting).

12. The first allegation referred to an agreement for the exploitation of the natural resources of Formosa, which was supposed to have been concluded by representatives of United States monopolies with the Kuomintang in February 1948. In that connexion, it should be remembered that the only agreement between the United States and the Republic of China in 1948 was that of 3 July concerning economic aid. It had been registered with the United Nations and was similar to other economic aid agreements concluded with many States Members of the United Nations. That agreement did not give the United States Government or its citizens any exclusive privilege or concession to exploit the natural resources of Formosa or of China.

13. It had also been alleged that an American company, the Reynolds Metal Company, had invested \$35 million dollars in Formosa in February 1948 for the manufacture of aluminium and had acquired a monopoly for aluminium production on the island. The truth was very different. The Reynolds Metal Company had absolutely no money invested in aluminium plants in Formosa. In 1948, that company, in the course of discussions with the Chinese Government, had indicated that it was willing to invest 500,000 dollars if the Chinese

Government could obtain a loan from the Export-Import Bank and could assure itself a sufficient supply of bauxite. Since neither of those conditions had been met, the American company's offer had not been taken up.

14. It had also been alleged that United States industrialists controlled more than 60 per cent of all the sugar factories on Formosa. Almost all of those refineries were owned by the Taiwan Sugar Company, a subsidiary of the National Resources Commission, which was a Chinese Government institution. The United States had not invested anything in the Taiwan Sugar Company and had no control over it.

15. The USSR delegation had also asserted that the National Development Association, which was supposedly controlled by the United States, had monopolized all fertilizer facilities on the island. The fertilizer plants in Formosa were in fact also controlled by the National Resources Commission of the Chinese Government. It was true that an American company, J. G. White, had made a technical survey of the plants, but only with a view to giving advice on modernization.

16. With regard to electric power facilities, Mr. Vyshinsky had claimed that the majority of those facilities were controlled by United States monopolies, particularly the Westinghouse Electric Company. The facts were as follows: before the war, some bonds of the Japanese-Taiwan Electric Power Company had been sold in the United States, but the United States did not own or control any of the electric power facilities on Formosa. Between November 1948 and February 1949, the Westinghouse Electric Company had made a technical survey of reconstruction requirements of the island's power industry and had subsequently granted a credit of 2 million dollars to enable the Taiwan Electric Company to purchase the necessary equipment. That loan had been repaid.

17. The representative of the Soviet Union had also falsely claimed that United States monopolies controlled the camphor, paper and salt industries on Formosa. Mr. Vyshinsky had even alleged that a considerable part of the land had been used to produce sugar and camphor, to the detriment of the rice production and other crops. In fact, however, rice production had risen from 1.2 million to 1.5 million tons, while sugar production had fallen from 1 million to 400,000 tons since Formosa had been liberated from Japanese rule.

18. All the USSR accusations regarding so-called economic aggression by the United States in Taiwan were therefore groundless.

19. The representative of the Soviet Union had contended, moreover, that the United States had committed aggression or, rather, intervention in the internal affairs of China, because it had continued to recognize the Nationalist Government of China.

20. It was obvious that when a country was torn by civil strife, the problem of recognition became one of great difficulty for other States. It was nevertheless grotesque to assert that the exercise by a State of its sovereign right to recognize or not to recognize a particular régime in China constituted intervention in the internal affairs of that country amounting to an act of aggression. The United States did not impugn the mo-

tives of those States which had recognized the People's Republic of China. If the United States itself had not done so, however, it was for reasons which seemed to it to be honourable and in the best interests of the people of China.

21. It might be pointed out that the government which the United States continued to recognize had signed agreements with the USSR in 1945 granting the latter realization of its historical ambitions in relation to Port Arthur, Dairen and Manchuria. In return, the USSR had promised, under the terms of its Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with China, to give China its moral support and material and military assistance. That Treaty, which was to have remained in force for a period of thirty years, had been dishonoured by the USSR after it had served its purpose of obtaining for the Soviet Union a dominant position in Manchuria.

22. The final charge levelled by the USSR against the United States was related to the alleged systematic violations by the United States air force of the air space in China in the vicinity of the Korean-Manchurian border. On 14 November 1950, Mr. Malik had filed document S/1902 specifying eighty-three violations of Manchurian air space. Of those alleged violations, sixty-one concerned reconnaissance flights. With respect to the remaining flights in which it was alleged that bombs had been dropped, it was interesting to note that the points at which the bombs were said to have fallen were all at Yalu River crossings. That had been ascertained from the chart prepared on the basis of the USSR allegations and sent on 28 November 1950 by the United States delegation to the other delegations. Assuming that the allegations had been founded on fact, the chart proved that the United States air force had bombed the Yalu River bridges across which Chinese communist troops were entering Korea to attack the United Nations forces in that country. The chart further showed that the United States air force had not engaged in attacks on Manchurian territory.

23. The United States representative on the Security Council had previously acknowledged that United States aircraft had, on two occasions, dropped bombs on Manchurian territory by error.³ He had immediately proposed that a neutral commission, consisting of representatives of India and of Sweden, should be sent to the area to investigate the facts and assess the damage.⁴ That proposal had been rejected as a result of a veto by the Soviet Union.⁵ It was difficult to see how, in the circumstances, Mr. Vyshinsky had been able to state on 27 November (407th meeting) that he was prepared to prove his charges.

24. The United States delegation was more than willing to have the charges levelled against the Government of the United States by the USSR delegation put to the judgment of the Members of the United Nations. The United States delegation felt that, since the charges were baseless, the First Committee would dismiss them promptly and decisively.

25. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) recalled that the question of aggression by

the United States against China had been set forth in detail before the First Committee on 27 November 1950 (407th meeting) by Mr. Vyshinsky, who had cited many irrefutable facts.

26. Under United States pressure, consideration of that question had been interrupted for more than two months. Meanwhile, the United States delegation had succeeded in having the General Assembly adopt a resolution charging the Government of the People's Republic of China with an act of aggression (A/1770). The United States delegation had, in so doing, clearly proved that it was in fact opposed to a peaceful settlement of the Korean question and of Far Eastern problems. The purpose of the United States in submitting that proposal had been to conceal its aggression against China.

27. Mr. Vyshinsky had shown (407th meeting) that the United States policy of force against China was a violation of the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter.

28. The aggressive nature of United States action against China could be seen first, in the invasion of Taiwan (Formosa) by United States armed forces, although that island was an inalienable part of Chinese national territory; secondly, in the naval blockade of Taiwan, the purpose of which was to prevent the naval forces of the lawful Government of China from occupying that part of Chinese territory; and thirdly, in the armed intervention of ruling circles of the United States in the domestic affairs of China, which was also a violation of Chinese national sovereignty.

29. Mr. Dulles and Mr. Austin had tried to give the impression that relations between China and the United States of America had always been friendly. On 27 November 1950 (407th meeting), Mr. Dulles had said that the United States had always respected the territorial integrity of China and had tried to raise the standard of living of the Chinese people. The United States representative had intentionally credited the leaders of his country with the friendly feelings which the American people had for the Chinese people. That deliberate mis-statement was intended to hide the real nature of the policy adopted by the leaders of the United States towards the Chinese people.

30. Mr. Dulles had cited the "open door" policy in support of his statements. That had been an unhappy example since everyone knew that the sole aim of that policy, which had been proclaimed by the United States Department of State in 1899, had been to ensure that the Chinese market was controlled by American monopolies under cover of combating the division of China into different spheres of influence—British, Japanese, Russian, German and French. Since then, United States policy in China had invariably been to encourage American banking and industrial monopolies to the detriment of other foreign companies. That had been the case when, on 2 October 1909, China and a group of American capitalists signed an agreement for the construction of a railway in Manchuria.

31. The Nine-Power Treaty signed in Washington in 1922, had also been directed against British and Japanese imperialism in China, and to ensure United States domination there by means of the equality of

³ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year*, No. 35.

⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 39, document S/1752.

⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 43.

rights proclaimed in the Treaty. It was true that it contained some grandiloquent words on Chinese sovereignty, but it contained no guarantees. On the contrary, it had reduced the size of the Chinese armed forces, which constituted the only safeguard of the political independence and territorial integrity of China. The Treaty, which could in some respects be compared with the Treaty of Versailles, had strengthened the conspiracy between the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan, aimed at depriving China of its independence and wealth. Mr. Stalin had rightly stated in 1925 that the Washington agreement would not last long because of the conflicting interests of the conspirators, on the one hand, and because of the opposition of the Chinese people, on the other.

32. Mr. Dulles had also referred to the fact that the United States Government had foregone the damages which the Government of China had committed itself to pay because of the Boxer Rebellion. That, too, had been an unfortunate example to cite, because the Boxer Rebellion had been one of the first manifestations of the will of the Chinese to free themselves, while the suppression of that rebellion by leading capitalist circles had meant complete control of Chinese financial resources by foreign Powers.

33. The Protocol of Peking which had followed the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion, had clearly violated Chinese sovereignty by granting extraterritorial rights to imperialistic Powers, by allowing them to maintain garrisons in certain localities and by obliging China to pay heavy indemnities. The Protocol had remained in force until 1927, by which time two-thirds of the indemnities had been paid by the Chinese Government. It was not until 1943 that the United States Government had decided to forego the balance of the indemnities due it, whereas the Government of the USSR had renounced the indemnities due it twenty years earlier, by an agreement of 31 May 1924, which placed the Soviet Union and China on a basis of absolute equality.

34. In an effort to prove the friendliness of the United States Government towards the Chinese people, Mr. Dulles had also referred to the Stimson doctrine, consisting in refusal to recognize the results of Japanese aggression against China. He had said that the United States had recognized neither Manchukuo nor the Chinese puppet Government of Wang Ching-wei in 1942. He had forgotten to mention, however, that from 1937 to 1941 the United States had encouraged the aggressive policy of Japan towards China. Thus in 1937 China had protested against the embargo imposed by the United States on arms for China, since such an embargo had constituted indirect aid to an aggressor State. Furthermore, between 1937 and 1940, the United States had exported to Japan machines and aircraft which had been used against China. If, in those circumstances, Mr. Dulles could speak of a United States policy of friendship towards China, it might be asked what would have constituted a hostile policy. In short, the history of relations between the United States and China in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was one of efforts made by the United States to ensure to its monopolies the exploitation of the entire Chinese market.

35. In the Security Council, Mr. Austin had also tried to give proof of his country's alleged friendship for China.⁶ He had stated that since 1844 an aim of United States policy had been to maintain the territorial and administrative unity of China by supporting the Chinese Government against the imperialistic pressures of Japan and Russia. He had alluded, in particular, to the Treaty of Wanghia of 1844, but had omitted to mention that it had been signed by the United States Ambassador in China while two United States warships were anchored in the port of Macao. The Treaty had been preceded by a letter from the President of the United States warning the Emperor of China that the United States Government would not maintain friendly relations with China if trade relations with the United States were not placed on the same footing as those with other foreign States. Furthermore, the Treaty of 1844 had granted to the United States extraterritorial rights incompatible with Chinese sovereignty. Lastly, that Treaty had been signed two years after one which had been imposed upon China by the United Kingdom under pressure of its armed forces. Those four factors illustrated the circumstances in which the Treaty had been imposed on China in 1844 by monopolies of the United States in their struggle against competitors. It had certainly not been inspired by friendship for the Chinese people, as Mr. Austin asserted.

36. Mr. Dulles and Mr. Austin had claimed that the aim of the "open door" policy was to defend Chinese sovereignty against Russian imperialism in Manchuria. It was true that tsarist imperialism had differed but little from American imperialism in regard to China. It was also true that all the imperialist Powers of that time had been at loggerheads with one another, after having agreed to partition the world into spheres of influence. From 1844 onwards, all the agreements concluded between the United States and China showed that the American monopolies wished to rid themselves of their foreign competitors and secure for themselves domination over Asia and China.

37. The representative of the USSR then quoted extracts from the work of the British economist, Hobson, *Imperialism*, which had appeared in London in 1902, to the effect that the financial and industrial magnates of the United States, obliged to seek outlets for their products, had as a matter of course turned towards China, the Pacific Ocean and South America.

38. Mr. Dulles and Mr. Austin has also claimed that the United States had endeavoured to raise the standard of living in China and had aided the Chinese Government in its cultural and humanitarian policy. Mr. Austin had cited in particular the work of American missions in China. In that connexion, the aforesaid economist Hobson had stressed the real nature of those religious missions, used by the imperialist Powers for the same purpose as their soldiers, to loot the territory of colonial peoples.

39. The agreement signed in 1905 by Mr. Katsura, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Taft, the United States Secretary of War, was also characteristic of United States policy toward China. Under that agreement, Japan had been granted the right, in case of need, to resort to armed force to prevent Korea

⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 68 (526th meeting).

rom concluding agreements with foreign Powers without the consent of Japan. In that connexion, Mr. Taft had stated that Japan's main purpose was to promote education in that backward area. The Tanaka memorandum of 1927, the first stage in Japan's conquest of China, had been a direct result of the 1905 agreement between the United States and Japan. Those facts gave the lie to the hypocritical statements of United States representatives regarding the alleged friendship of the United States for China. United States policy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had, in fact, been designed to ensure the domination of China by United States monopolies, with the support of reactionary Chinese elements.

40. Mr. Austin had said that the United States had adhered to the Stimson doctrine of non-recognition of Manchukuo because it had been opposed to Japanese aggression against China. He had omitted to say that, if the United States had opposed that aggression, that had been because it had feared Japanese competition in China. In that connexion, Mr. Austin had not mentioned the letter of Mr. Stimson, the former United States Secretary of State, published in the *New York Times* in 1940. That letter pointed out that the United States had, for three years, been sending considerable quantities of ore, scrap-iron, steel and petrol to Japan, which had used them in its aggression against China.

41. The United States representative, during the present meeting, had distorted the facts when he had insinuated that the USSR wanted to appropriate all the economic resources of Manchuria. In fact, the Agreement of 14 February 1950, by which the USSR had transferred to the People's Republic of China all its rights in respect of the joint administration of the Far-Eastern Railway, the military and naval installations at Port Arthur and Dalny (Dairen) temporarily under USSR control, and all Japanese assets in Manchuria, was decisive proof that such allegations were completely groundless.

42. In those circumstances, it should be noted that the sole purpose of the attempts made by the United States and the slanders of the Kuomintang was to attack the USSR and injure the harmonious relations

established with the Government and people of China. He wondered whether the United States representative could find a case in the history of his country's international relations similar to that just cited, namely, a transfer without compensation of goods and property under United States control for the benefit of the State in whose territory such assets were situated.

43. The present-day policy of the United States in regard to China was characterized by the seizure of Taiwan (Formosa), the violation of Chinese air space over the Manchurian frontier and the bombing of Chinese territory. Facts such as these, more than any words, revealed the falseness of the statements made by Mr. Dulles and Mr. Austin concerning the alleged friendship of the United States for China.

44. The First Committee could not ignore the aggressive policy of the United States toward China, the more so as the United States draft resolution adopted by the General Assembly (A/1770) contained a condemnation of China, with the object of disguising United States aggression against Korea and against China itself. The United Nations could not tolerate a military occupation by the United States, a Member of the United Nations, of part of the territory of China, another Member of the Organization. The USSR delegation urged that the General Assembly should take a decision requesting the Security Council to take the necessary steps to secure the immediate cessation of United States aggression against China. That was the purpose of the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/637), submitted on 27 November 1950.

45. Mr. KATZ-SUCHY (Poland) said that he wished to speak at the next meeting.

46. Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), recalling the Chairman's ruling that items 70 and 75 of the agenda would be discussed together, pointed out that the statement he had just made related only to item 70, entitled "Complaint by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding aggression against China by the United States of America" and that he intended to speak later on item 75 of the agenda.

The meeting rose at 5.10 p.m.